Indictment of Yolanda Clark
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1982 - January 1, 1982

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Sheridan v EI duPont de Nemours and Company Amicus Curiae, 1996. 7b36e32f-c49a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/1631524e-9205-4e87-9ea6-0eece5eb8783/sheridan-v-ei-dupont-de-nemours-and-company-amicus-curiae. Accessed August 19, 2025.
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No. 94-7509 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT BARBARA R. SHERIDAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. E.I. duPONT de NEMOURS AND COMPANY, et al., Defendants-Appellees. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. Elaine R. Jones Director-Counsel Theodore M. Shaw Charles Stephen Ralston NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 99 Hudson Street Suite 1600 New York, New York 10013 (212) 219-1900 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. TABLE OF CONTENTS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE .................................. 1 BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.................................................................................. 1 I. IN TR O D U C TIO N .................................................................................................... 1 II. THE SUPREME COURT REJECTED "PRETEXT PLUS" IN H IC K S .......... 3 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... b CERTIFICATE OF S E R V IC E ........................................................................................... 7 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Pages: Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)..........................................................2 Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976)..............................................2 Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978)...................................................... 2 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) .................................................................. 2 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) ................................................2 Sheridan v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 74 F.3d 1439 (3rd Cir. 1996) .................2 St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,___U .S .___ , 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) ............ 2, 1-5 Texas Dept, of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) ............................... 4 United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983) . . . . 2 Other authorities: Pages: Catherine Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the ‘Pretext- Plus' Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (1991) . . . 1 l No. 94-7509 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT BARBARA R. SHERIDAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. E.I. duPONT de NEMOURS AND COMPANY, et a!., Defendants-Appellees. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., by its undersigned counsel, moves for leave to file the attached brief amicus curiae in the above-captioned case, in support of the Plaintiff-Appellant. In support of this motion amicus curiae would show the following. 1. On February 28, 1996, this Court ordered rehearing in banc in this case. On March 21, 1996, this Court entered an order providing that amici curiae could move for leave to file briefs no later than April 30, 1996. This motion is filed pursuant to that order. 2. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., is a non-profit corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York. It was formed to assist African-American citizens to secure their rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States. For many years, Legal Defense Fund attorneys have represented parties in litigation before the Supreme Court of the United States and other federal and state courts in cases involving a variety of discrimination issues, including many cases involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). 3. In particular, the Legal Defense Fund has been counsel in a number of the cases that have established the principles for deciding individual cases of disparate treatment under Title VII, including McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Fumco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); and, most recently, St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,__ U .S .___ , 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). 4. The central issue to be decided by this Court in this case will be the proper interpretation and application of the Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks. The Legal Defense Fund believes that its views, as counsel for the respondent in Hicks, will be of assistance to this Court in deciding this issue. 2 Wherefore it is prayed that the attached brief amicus curiae be permitted to be filed Respectfully submitted, Elaine R. Jones Director-Counsel Theodore M. Shaw Charles Stephen Ralston NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 99 Hudson Street Suite 1600 New York, New York 10013 (212) 219-1900 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 3 No. 94-7509 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT BARBARA R. SHERIDAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. E.I. duPONT de NEMOURS AND COMPANY, et al., Defendants-Appellees. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. I . INTRODUCTION Since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in St Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, ___ U.S. ___, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), most of the Courts of Appeals have interpreted the decision as rejecting the so-called "pretext plus" rule that had been developed by a number of circuits.1 "Pretext plus" holds that the plaintiff in an individual, disparate treatment, discrimination case not only must prove that the reasons advanced by lSee, Catherine Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the ‘Pretext-Plus’ Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (1991). the employer are pretextual, in the sense that they are false, but must introduce additional evidence beyond the prima facie case that the actual reason for the challenged action was intentional discrimination. Put another way, the plaintiff was required to show not only that the reasons were false, but to prove that they were pretexts for discrimination by proof that went beyond simply demonstrating their falsity. Amicus urges that the decisions, including those of this Court, that reject this view are correct and that the decisions that have sought to re-impose "pretext plus" after Hicks2 have misread that decision. This conclusion is compelled by the simple fact that the Court was squarely presented with the issue of whether it should adopt the "pretext plus" rule, and rejected the rule. Indeed, three positions were advanced to the Court in Hicks: First, respondent Hicks, represented by the undersigned counsel, argued that proof that the reasons advanced were pretextual and, therefore, false, compelled a judgement for the plaintiff; Second, it was argued that proof that the reasons were pretextual, that is false, permitted judgement for the plaintiffs; Third, the petitioner, St. Mary’s Honor Center, argued that proof that the reasons advanced were false, standing alone, was insufficient to prove a violation and, therefore, did not permit a judgement for the plaintiff, i.e., it was necessary to prove "pretext plus." 2See the cases cited in the panel decision herein, Sheridan v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., 74 F.3d 1439, 1448 (3rd Cir. 1996). 2 As we will now demonstrate, the Supreme Court expressly rejected positions one and three, that is, the positions advanced by the parties, and adopted the second position, that proof of pretext, together with the already established elements of the prima facie case, permitted the fact-finder to find discrimination and that no other additional evidence was required to support a judgment against the employer. II. THE SUPREME COURT REJECTED "PRETEXT PLUS11 IN HICKS As noted above, in Hicks the employer and its amici argued that it was insufficient, as a matter of law, for a finding of discrimination to rest on a determination that the reasons proffered by the employer (after a prima facie case had been established) were not the true reasons. The Supreme Court squarely rejected this argument: The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection "[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required," . . . . 125 L.Ed.2d at 418-19 (emphasis in the original). The Court also rejected, in the same passage, the argument made by the employee: But the Court of Appeals’ holding that rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff disregards the fundamental principle of Rule 301 that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the "ultimate burden of persuasion." 125 L.Ed.2d at 419 (emphasis in the original). Later on the decision, the Court states that it is not enough just to disbelieve the 3 employer, and that the employee must show "both that the reason was false and thaf discrimination was the real reason." Id. at 422. However, as the Court itself noted (id. at 418-19, n. 4), there is no inconsistency in the Court’s position. Of course, if the only evidence before the fact-finder is that the proffered reason is false, then there is no basis to conclude that there was unlawful discrimination. But there will always be more evidence than that, i.e., the evidence that established the elements of the prima facie case. In other words, just because the bubble created by the Rule 501 presumption through the prima facie case has burst, does not mean that the facts upon which the prima facie case rests have vanished. To the contrary, just as when any bubble bursts, a residue is left, consisting of the evidence that created the presumption. Thus, the Court was consistent in Hicks when it said, on the one hand, that "the factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons ... may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination," and when it said, on the other, that "it is not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer." Once again, the operative phrase is "may . . . suffice," i.e., the jury is permitted to find for the plaintiff.3 Since the evidence establishing the prima facie case plus proof of the falsity of the proffered reason is sufficient to permit the jury to find for the plaintiff, it would be improper to grant either JSee also, Texas Dept, of Community’ Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981): The fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination. In other words, the factfinder may disbelieve that an honest mistake was made and interpret an error by the employer as evidence of discriminatory intent. 4 summary judgment or a judgment n.o.v. for the employer. Thus, the fulfillment of the employer’s burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action dissipates the McDonnell Douglas presumption insofar as a judgment for the employee is mandated. And Hicks holds thai even proof that the employer was untruthful when it advanced the reason does not resurrect the presumption; i.e., a judgment for the employee is not mandated even if the jury believes that a deliberate lie was told. The evidence that gave rise to the presumption remains in the record and is itself not destroyed or dissipated by the employer’s meeting its burden of articulating a reason for the action. A disbelief in the reason together with the evidence introduced to establish the prima facie case is enough to support a judgment in favor of the plaintiff if, in the words of Hicks, "there [is] a finding of discrimination." This is because "rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons is enough at law to sustain a finding of discrimination." 125 L.Ed.2d at 418-19, n. 4 (emphasis in the original). The jury in this case rejected the employer’s proffered reasons, and its decision must be sustained as a matter of law under the holding of St. Mary’s Honor Society v. Hicks. 5 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court entering judgment in favor of duPont and granting duPont’s motion for a new trial should be reversed. Theodore M. Shaw Charles Stephen Ralston NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 99 Hudson Street Suite 1600 New York, New York 10013 (212) 219-1900 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 6 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the undersigned is a member of the bar of this Court and that copies of the foregoing MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., have been served by depositing same in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, on this 29th of April, 1996, addressed to the following: Thomas S. Neuberger, Esq. Suite 702 Ninth Street Plaza 200 W. Ninth Street Wilmington, DE 19801 Raymond M. Ripple, Esq. Legal Department E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co 1007 Market Street Wilmington, DE 19898 CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON