Ex Parte Clemons Motion for Order of Consolidation Petition for Writ of Mandamus or Other Writ Brief in Support of Petition

    No Miscellaneous

IN THE

Imtefr CUmtrt of Kppm h
For the Sixth Circuit

Ex Parte J oyce M arie Clem ons , an infant, by Gertrude 
Clem ons, her mother, and next friend D eborah K. 
R ollins, an infant, by N orma R ollins , her mother and 
next friend, M yra D arline  C umberland , an infant, by 
Z ella M ae Cum berland , her mother and next friend, 
E velyn  M arie S teward, V irginia A n n  S teward and 
Carolyn  L ouise S teward, infants, by E lsie S teward, 
their mother and next friend, D orothy M arie Clem ons, 
an infant, by R oxie C lem ons , her mother and next friend, 
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.

MOTION FOR ORDER OF CONSOLIDATION 
PETITION FOR W RIT OF MANDAMUS OR OTHER W RIT 

BR IEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION

R ussell L . Carter,
J am es H. M cG hee ,

949 Knott Bldg.,
Dayton, 2, Ohio.

Constance B aker M otley,
T hurgood M arshall,

107 W. 43rd Street,
New York 36, N. Y.,

Counsel for Petitioners.

S upreme P rinting Co., I nc., 114 W orth Street, N. Y. 13, BEekm an  3 - 2320



IN  TH E

luttefc States Court of K ppm lz
For the Sixth Circuit

------------- --------- o------------------ —

Ex Parte J oyce M arie Clem ons, an infant, by Gertrude 
Clem ons , her mother, and next friend D eborah K. 
R ollins, an infant, by N orma R ollins, her mother and 
next friend, M yra D arline Cumberland , an infant, by 
Z ella M ae Cumberland , her mother and next friend, 
E velyn  M arie S teward, V irginia A n n  S teward and 
Carolyn L ouise S teward, infants, by E lsie S teward, 
their mother and next friend, D orothy M arie Clem ons, 
an infant, by R oxie Clem ons, her mother and next friend, 
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.

•--------------------—o---------------------- -

MOTION FOR ORDER DIRECTING THAT HEARING ON 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND APPEAL 

BE HEARD TOGETHER

To the Honorable Charles C. Simons, Chief Judge 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, and to the Honorable Associate 
Judges of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit:

Petitioners move this Court for an order directing that 
their petition for writ of mandamus filed herewith and 
their appeal in the case of Joyce Marie Clemons, et al. v. 
The Board of Education of Hillsboro, Ohio, et al., No.



2

12,367, presently pending in this Court be argued before 
this Court at the same time.

R ussell L. Carter,
J ames H. M cG hee ,

949 Knott Bldg.,
Dayton, 2, Ohio.

Constance B aker M otley,
T hurgood M arshall,

107 W. 43rd Street,
New York 36, N. Y.,

Counsel for Petitioners.



IN  T H E

Hutteii States (tort nf Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit

------ --------- ------- o----------------------

Ex Parte J oyce M arie Clem ons, an infant, by Gertrude 
Clemons, her mother, and next friend Deborah K. 
R ollins, an infant, by N orma R ollins, her mother and 
next friend, M yra D arline C umberland , an infant, by 
Z ella M ae C umberland , her mother and next friend, 
E velyn  M arie S teward, V irginia A n n  S teward and 
Carolyn  L ouise S teward, infants, by E lsie S teward, 
their mother and next friend, D orothy M arie Clem ons, 
an infant, by R oxie Clem ons, her mother and next friend, 
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.

--------------- ------- o----------------------

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR OTHER 
WRIT TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, WEST­
ERN DIVISION, AND TO THE HONORABLE JOHN 
H. DRUFFEL, JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT

OF OHIO, WESTERN DIVISION

To the Honorable Charles C. Simons, Chief Judge 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, and to the Honorable Associate 
Judges of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit:

Petitioners respectfully show the following:
1. The infant petitioners are Negro children residing 

in the City of Hillsboro, Ohio who are eligible to enroll in 
and attend the elementary schools of that City.



2

2. There are three elementary schools in the City of 
Hillsboro. The names of these schools are Washington, 
Webster and Lincoln.

3. The Lincoln School has long been maintained as an 
elementary school for the exclusive attendance of Negro 
children.

4. For approximately fifteen years prior to September 
7, 1954 no Negro pupil had attended either the Washington 
or Webster Schools.

5. On September 7, 1954 three of the infant petitioners 
were registered in the Webster School and four of the 
infant petitioners were registered in the Washington 
School.

6. The infant petitioners were assigned seats in regu­
lar classrooms on September 8, 1954 and continued in 
attendance at the schools in which they had enrolled until 
September 17, 1954.

7. For several years prior to September 7, 1954, the 
Washington and Webster Schools have been overcrowded. 
In view of this, plans for expanding both of these schools 
were adopted several years ago and are presently being 
executed.

8. The total elementary school enrollment at the open­
ing of school in September 1954 was 899, whereas at the 
opening of school in September 1953 the total elementary 
enrollment was 928.

9. The average number of pupils per room in Wash­
ington School on September 8, 1954 when the four infant 
appellants, and other Negro children similarly situated, 
were enrolled was 35.4.

10. The average number of pupils per room in the 
Webster School on September 8, 1954 when the three infant 
appellants, and other Negro children similarly situated, 
were enrolled was 38.



3

11. On September 8, 1954, 17 Negro children were 
enrolled in the Lincoln School which has a total of four 
classrooms, only two of which are in use as regular class­
rooms.

12. There are two full-time Negro teachers assigned to 
the Lincoln School who teach all six elementary grades in 
the two rooms.

13. In September 1953 there were approximately 70 
Negro students enrolled in these two rooms.

14. There are twelve regular classrooms in Washington 
School and twelve in Webster School. One white teacher 
is assigned to each classroom.

15. In September 1954, in order to relieve the over­
crowding in the Washington and Webster Schools and in 
order to utilize to their capacity the two regular classrooms 
in the Lincoln School, the Board of Education of Hills­
boro, Ohio met on September 13, 1954 and decided to 
remedy this situation by assigning as many Negro children 
to the Lincoln School as necessary.

16. In order to accomplish this result, the Board of 
Education adopted for the first time school zone lines. 
All of the streets on which Negro school children live, 
including those on which the infant petitioners live, regard­
less of the location of such streets within the City, were 
included in the Lincoln School Zone.

17. A total of eleven Negro children living on streets 
immediately adjacent to Washington or Webster Schools, 
and living between white families on these streets were 
included in the Washington and Webster School zones, so 
that there are presently eight Negro children in the Wash­
ington School and three in Webster.

18. As a result of the school zone lines adopted by the 
Board of Education on September 13, 1954 to become effec­



4

tive September 17, 1954, only Negro children have been 
assigned to the Lincoln School.

19. The Lincoln School zone is divided into two parts—■ 
a northeast section which is adjacent to Lincoln and a 
southeast section which is approximately nine blocks south­
east of Lincoln. Three of the infant petitioners live in the 
southeast section. In order to reach the Lincoln School, 
these petitioners must pass by the Washington School.

20. White students living nearer the Lincoln School, 
and in at least one instance right next door to the Lincoln 
School, were not included in the Lincoln School Zone.

21. More than 500 white children are transported daily 
from outside of the City limits for the purpose of attend­
ing elementary and high schools in Hillsboro. None of 
these pupils is assigned to the Lincoln School.

22. None of the Negro children attending elementary 
school in Hillsboro is transported into the City. Although 
the 525 white children transported into the City are in the 
Hillsboro School District, the school zone lines adopted by 
the Board of Education apply only to children living within 
the City limits.

23. On September 21, 1954, petitioners filed a com­
plaint in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio, Western Division. Petitioners first sought 
a temporary restraining order restraining the Board of 
Education of Hillsboro, its members and the Superintend­
ent of Schools from requiring petitioners to withdraw from 
the Webster and Washington Schools. The complaint also 
prayed for a preliminary and permanent injunction, 
restraining the Board of Education of the City of Hills­
boro, Ohio and Marvel K. Wilkin, President, Elmer Hedges, 
Vice President, Wilfred A. Paul, William L. Lukens, and 
John Henry Brown, members of the Board of Education 
of Hillsboro, and Paul L. Upp, Superintendent of Schools,



5

from enforcing a policy of racial segregation in the public 
elementary schools of Hillsboro, Ohio and restraining them 
from requiring infant petitioners to withdraw from the 
Webster and Washington Schools in Hillsboro, solely be­
cause of their race and color, and restraining them from 
requiring infant petitioners to attend Lincoln Elementary 
School or any other school in Hillsboro, attended exclu­
sively by Negro children.

24. The temporary restraining order was denied by 
the Honorable John H. Druffel, Judge of the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Ohio.

25. With their Complaint petitioners filed a motion for 
preliminary injunction. This motion was set down for 
hearing by the Honorable John H. Druffel on September 
29, 1954. Notice of this hearing was duly served on all 
defendants.

26. On September 29, 1954, a hearing was held in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio, Western Division, before the Honorable John H. 
Druffel, Judge of said Court. The testimony of several 
witnesses called by petitioners was taken.

27. The statements set forth above in paragraphs one 
through twenty-two of this petition were testified to by 
these witnesses.

28. Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the Honorable 
John H. Druffel failed and refused to finally determine the 
motion and continued proceedings thereon until two weeks 
after the United States Supreme Court formulates final 
decrees in the School Segregation Cases presently pend­
ing before it.

The District Court entered its order on October 1, 1954 
which reads as follows:

“ This cause came on for hearing on plaintiffs’ 
motion for a preliminary injunction and upon con­



6

sideration thereof, and on consideration of the plead­
ings, testimony and evidence, it is

“ Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed that further 
proceedings on the motion for preliminary injunc­
tion be continued until two weeks after the United 
States Supreme Court decides upon the formulation 
of decrees in the School Segregation Cases, Brown 
et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka, et al., 347 
U. S. 483, presently pending before it.”

29. The Honorable John H. Druffel was of the opinion 
that the petitioners’ suit is premature.

30. The Honorable John H. Druffel was of the opinion 
that the defendants have a right, “ until the Supreme Court 
establishes a formula, to use their best judgment as to how 
it is going to be taken care o f.”

31. Petitioners, believing that this order of the District 
Court denies or refuses a preliminary injunction as prayed, 
appealed to this Court pursuant to the provisions of Title 
28, United States Code, §1292(1). This appeal is pres­
ently pending before this Court and is case No. 12,367.

32. This order of the District Court, entered on the 
1st day of October 1954 either constitutes a refusal to 
grant a preliminary injunction or constitutes a denial of a 
preliminary injunction within the meaning of Title 28, 
United States Code, §1292(1) and appeal to this Court 
is appropriate, or the order of the District Court of Octo­
ber 1, 1954 involves a failure or refusal on the part of that 
court to perform a mandatory judicial act, i.e., a failure 
or refusal to proceed to a final determination of petition­
ers’ motion.

33. If the order of October 1, 1954 be construed as a 
failure or refusal on the part of the District Court to per­
form a mandatory judicial duty, then petitioners are com­
pelled to seek the issuance of a writ of mandamus from 
this Court directing the District Court and the Honorable



7

John H. Druffel to proceed to a final determination of 
petitioners ’ motion for preliminary injunction, or the issu­
ance of any other writ which this Court deems necessary 
or appropriate in aid of its appellate jurisdiction or in the 
exercise of its supervisory powers over the District Court.

W herefore, petitioners pray that in the event that 
petitioners’ appeal in case No. 12,367 is considered im­
proper and is dismissed a rule to show cause issue from 
this Court directed to the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, and to 
the Honorable John H. Druffel, Judge of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western 
Division, to show cause on a day to be fixed by this Court 
why a writ of mandamus should not issue from this Court 
directing the said District Court and the Honorable John 
H. Druffel to vacate and expunge from the record the 
order of October 1, 1954 and directing said Court and 
Judge to proceed with the hearing of petitioners’ motion 
for preliminary injunction and to finally determine said 
motion.

Petitioners pray that this Court grant such other, addi­
tional, alternative or further relief and process as may be 
deemed necessary and appropriate in the premises.

Respectfully submitted,

R ussell L. Carter,
J ames H. M cG hee ,

949 Knott Bldg.,
Dayton, 2, Ohio.

C onstance B aker M otley,
T hurgood M arshall,

107 W. 43rd Street,
New York 36, N. Y.,

Counsel for Petitioners.



I. Whether after notice to defendants and a hearing on 
petitioners’ motion for preliminary injunction, the Honor­
able John H. Druffel, Judge of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, 
failed or refused to perform the mandatory judicial duties 
of his office by failing to proceed to a final determination of 
petitioners’ motion.

The Honorable John H. Druffel, Judge of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio, Western Division, after due notice to the 
defendants in the cause and after a hearing on 
petitioners’ motion for preliminary injunction, 
continued proceedings thereon until two weeks 
after the United States Supreme Court formulates 
final decrees in the School Segregation Cases pres­
ently pending before it, Brown, et al. v. Board of 
Education of Topeka, et al., 347 U. S. 483.

Petitioners contend that the answer to the above 
question should be in the affirmative.

Statement of the Questions Involved



IN  TH E

Httiteft States (Emtrt nf Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit

---------------------- o--------------- --------

Ex Parte J oyce M arie Clem ons, an infant, by G ertrude 
Clem ons, her mother, and next friend D eborah K. 
E ollins, an infant, by N orma R ollins, her mother and 
next friend, M yra D arline C umberland , an infant, by 
Z ella M ae Cumberland , her mother and next friend, 
E velyn  M arie S teward, V iro*in ia  A n n  S teward and 
Carolyn  L ouise S teward, infants, by E lsie S teward, 
their mother and next friend, D orothy M arie Clemons, 
an infant, by R oxie Clem ons, her mother and next friend, 
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.

——  ------- --------o----------------------

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

Statement of the Facts

The facts in this case are set out in full in the petition. 
Petitioners feel it would be repetitious and burdensome 
to the court to repeat those facts at this point.



2

ARGUM ENT

I. Whether after notice to defendants and a hear­
ing on petitioners’ motion for preliminary injunction, 
the Honorable John H. Druffel, Judge of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, 
Western Division, failed and refused to perform the 
mandatory judicial duties of his office by failing to 
proceed to a final determination of petitioners’ motion.

The Honorable John H. Druffel, Judge of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio, Western Division, after due notice to the 
defendants in the cause and after a hearing on 
petitioners’ motion for preliminary injunction, con­
tinued proceeding thereon until two weeks after 
the United States Supreme Court formulates final 
decrees in the School Segregation Case presently 
pending before it, Brown et al. v. Board of Educa­
tion of Topeka, et ah, 347 U. S. 483.

Petitioners contend that the answer to the above 
question should be in the affirmative.

A. The United States District Court for the Southern Dis­
trict of Ohio, Western Division, and the Honorable John 
H. Druffel, Judge of said court, have jurisdiction of 
petitioners’ cause of action. Title 28, United States 
Code, Section 1343(3); Title 42, United States Code, 
Section 1983.

Title 28, United States Code, Section 1343(3) provides 
as follows:

“ The district courts shall have original jurisdic­
tion of any civil action authorized by law to be com­
menced by any person:

* * *



3

(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of 
any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, cus­
tom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity 
secured by the Constitution of the United States or 
by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights 
of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction 
of the United States.”

Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, provides as 
follows:

“ Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State 
or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con­
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress.”

In their complaint petitioners allege that the jurisdic­
tion of the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio, Western Division, was invoked pursuant 
to these provisions of the United States Code.

The right of a District Court of the United States to use 
its equity powers in such cases has been consistently recog­
nized and upheld.

McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 
637;

Hague v. C. I .0., 307 U. S. 496;
Kansas City v. Williams, 205 F. 2d 47 (C. A. 6 

1953) cert. den. 346 U. S. 826;
Westminister School Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F. 2d 

774 (C. A. 9 1947);
Mitchell v. Wright, 154 F. 2d 924 (C. A. 5 1946);



4

Alston v. School Board, 112 F. 2d 992 (C. A. 4 
1940) cert. den. 311 U. S. 693.

The right of a District Court of the United States to 
take jurisdiction in such cases and to use its equity 
powers has not been suspended by any action or directive 
of the United States Supreme Court in the School Segrega­
tion Cases presently pending before it. Brown et al. v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, et al, supra.

B. The effect of the decision of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Divi­
sion and of the Honorable John H. Druffel, Judge of 
said court, is to deny jurisdiction or having taken juris­
diction, to decline to exercise that jurisdiction.

The District Court was of the opinion that petitioners’ 
suit is “ premature” . This is tantamount to a determina­
tion that although the District Court may have jurisdic­
tion in the future, it does not now have jurisdiction or elects 
to decline jurisdiction at this time.

Petitioners contend that the District Court has juris­
diction now to enjoin the Board of Education of Hillsboro, 
Ohio, its members and the Superintendent of Schools of 
Hillsboro from requiring petitioners to withdraw from the 
Washington and Webster Schools solely because of the race 
and color of petitioners pending the final determination of 
petitioners cause of action. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents, supra; Westminister School District v. Mendez, 
supra.

The District Court was of the opinion that the Board 
of Education of Hillsboro has a “ right” , until the Supreme 
Court of the United States establishes a formula, to use 
their best judgment as to how “ it is going to be taken care 
o f ” , apparently “ it”  refers to segregation in the public 
schools of Hillsboro.



5

The District Court would be correct if the petitioners’ 
suit against the Board of Education of Hillsboro were pres­
ently pending before the United States Supreme Court. 
The District Court’s opinion assumes that the Supreme 
Court’s formulation of decrees in the School Segregation 
Cases will determine the decree to be issued in the peti­
tioners case. This would he true if facts in petitioners’ 
case were identical with the facts in any of the cases before 
the United States Supreme Court. In none of the cases 
before the United States Supreme Court is an injunction 
sought enjoining a Board of Education or other school 
authority from requiring Negro children to withdraw from 
a racially integrated or desegregated school solely because 
of their race and color and to attend a racially segregated, 
all-Negro school under the pretext of establishing school 
zone lines and for the purpose of solving temporarily a 
school capacity problem.

The District Court’s opinion is tantamount to a deter­
mination that the right of petitioners not to be discrimi­
nated against by the state solely because of their race and 
color after having been duly admitted to a state school has 
not yet been determined by the United States Supreme 
Court. But petitioners ’ right not to be discriminated 
against by the state after having been duly admitted to a 
state school was clearly established by the United States 
Supreme Court before its decision in the School Segrega­
tion Cases. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra.

The petitioners’ right not to be compelled to attend the 
Lincoln School in the City of Hillsboro, as long as it is a 
racially segregated school, under the pretext of school zone 
lines or pursuant to any other devise adopted by the Board 
of Education of Hillsboro has been clearly established by 
the United States Supreme Court in the Brown case and by 
other federal courts. Westminister School District v. 
Mendez, supra.



6

In the School Segregation Cases before the United 
States Supreme Court formulation of final decrees was 
postponed by the high court in those cases for reasons 
peculiar to the circumstances of those cases which are 
clearly inapplicable to petitioners ’ case. Those reasons are 
the following:

1) Because of the wide applicability of its decision, and 
because of great variety of local conditions, the formula­
tion of decrees in those cases presents problems of con­
siderable complexity.

2) On reargument, the consideration of appropriate 
relief was necessarily subordinate to the primary question—• 
the constitutionality of segregation. In order that the 
court might have the full assistance of the parties in for­
mulating decrees, the cases were restored to the docket, 
and the parties requested to present further argument on 
questions previously submitted to them on the question of 
decrees to be issued in those cases.

In petitioners’ case, a decision by the District Court 
would not be one of wide applicability. It would apply to 
a single school district having three elementary schools 
already voluntarily desegregated. The petitioners’ case 
did not present to the District Court a great variety of 
local conditions to be dealt with and therefore the formu­
lation of a decree by the District Court did not mean that 
it would be confronted with problems of considerable com­
plexity. The District Court had before it counsel for both 
parties in petitioners’ case and there was both time and 
opportunity to get the views of counsel as to the type of 
decree to be issued.

Therefore, the reasons for postponement of decrees in 
the School Segregation Cases before the Supreme Court 
were for reasons inapplicable to the petitioners’ case.

In addition, it is clear that the United States Supreme 
Court’s decree in the School Segregation Cases will be of



7

no assistance to the District Court in petitioners’ case be­
cause the facts in petitioners’ case are not before the 
United States Supreme Court and are fundamentally dif­
ferent from the facts in any of those cases.

Since the District Court clearly has jurisdiction now of 
petitioners’ suit, and since that jurisdiction has not been 
suspended by any action or directive of the United States 
Supreme Court in the School Segregation Cases, and since 
the facts in petitioners’ case are fundamentally different 
from the facts in any of the School Segregation Cases 
before the Supreme Court, as a result of which any decree 
issued by the Supreme Court in those cases or any direc­
tions given by it in remanding those cases to the courts of 
first instance could not determine the type of decree in peti­
tioners’ case, and since the District Court had no adequate 
reason for declining to exercise its equity powers at this 
time, the District Court’s duty was to take jurisdiction of 
petitioners’ case now and proceed to a final determination 
of petitioners’ motion. Therefore a writ of mandamus 
from this court directing the District Court of the United 
States for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, 
and the Honorable John H. Druffel as Judge of said court 
to take jurisdiction of petitioners’ case now or having taken 
jurisdiction proceed to exercise it now appears appropriate 
in the premises. Re Simon, 247 U. S. 231; Re Hohorst, 150 
U. S. 653, 664; Ex parte Parker, 131 U. S. 221, 226; Ex parte 
Parker, 120 U. S. 737, 743; Ex parte Newman, 14 Wall, 152, 
165, 169; In re Howard, 130 F. 2d 534 (C. A. 5 1942); 
United States Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Leaver, Judge, 44 
F. 2d 913, 915 (C. A. 5 1930).

C. Effect of District Court’s order.

The District Court’s order of October 1, 1954 continuing 
proceedings on petitioners’ motion for preliminary injunc­
tion until two weeks after the United States Supreme Court 
formulates decrees in the School Segregation Cases, in



8

effect, postpones the final determination of this motion for 
an indefinite period of time. The Supreme Court may order 
reargument of those cases. Indefinite postponement of 
rights in a case involving irreparable injury is not justi­
fiable here.

The Supreme Court may remand those eases to the 
courts of first instance to formulate decrees, in which case 
the petitioners shall have been denied their personal and 
present right to the equal protection of the laws under a 
mistaken apprehension as to what the United States 
Supreme Court may do in certain other cases.

Therefore mandamus is the appropriate remedy in the 
premises. Re Simon, supra; Re Hohorst, supra; Ex Parte' 
Parker, supra; Ex Parte Newman, supra; in re Howard, 
supra.

Relief

Petitioners pray that this Court issue a rule to show 
cause directed to the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, and to the 
Honorable John H. Druffel, Judge of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western 
Division, to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not 
issue as prayed in petitioners’ petition filed herewith.

Respectfully submitted,
R ussell L. Carter,
J ames H. M cG h ee ,

949 Knott Bldg.,
Dayton, 2, Ohio.

Constance B aker M otley,
T hurgood M arshall,

107 W. 43rd Street,
New York 36, N. Y.,

Counsel for Petitioners