Roadway Express v Monk Brief Amicus Curiae

    1st the

(Enurt o! %  United 0tateB
October T erm, 1979

No. 79-701

R oadway E xpress, I nc.,

v.

Petitioner,

J. D. Monk, et al.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE, 
AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE, OF THE NAACP LEGAL 

DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.

Jack Greenberg 
James M. N abrit, I I I  
N apoleon B. W illiams, Jr.

Suite 2030
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

March 1980



INDEX

Motion for  Leave to F i l e  A B r ie f  Amicus
Curiae ...................................................   v i

Statement o f  In te res t  ....................................  1

Summary o f  Argument ..........................................  3

Argument

I .  SECTION 1927 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO 
THE CONDUCT OF RESPONDENTS’
ATTORNEYS ....................................................  5

I I .  ATTORNEYS'S FEES ARE NOT ALLOWABLE
AS ELEMENTS OF COSTS UNDER § 1927 . . .  20

Conclusion ............................................................  24

Page

x -



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Acevedo v. Immigration and Natura l i ­
zat ion Service, 538 F .2d 918 
(2d Cir .  1976) ............ ............... .............  7, 17

Aetna L i f e  Ins. Co. v.  Haworth, 300
U.S. 227 (1937) ............................ ............ 6

Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975) ............ ................. .. 2

Alyeska P ipe l ine  Serv. v. Wilderness
Society,  421 U.S. 240 (1975) ..............  21

Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) . .  6

Bradley v. School Board of  C ity  of
Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974) . . . . . . .  2

Brotherhood o f  Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen v. Bangor & A.R.R. ,
389 U.S. 327 (1967) .......... ....................  19

Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine
Co., 457 F .2d 1377 (4th Cir.  1972) . .  14

Browning Debenture Holders'  Committee 
v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 
(2d Cir.  1977) .......................... 8, 11,21

Burre l l  v. McCray, 426 U.S. 471
(1976) .................... ......................... ........... 7

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commis­
sion, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) _______ 2,14,15,21

- ii -



Page

1507 Corporation v. Henderson, 447
F. 2d 540 (7th Cir.  1971) ......................  20,21

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) ............  6

Gamble v. Pope & Talbot , In c . ,  307 
F .2d 729 (3rd Cir.  1962), ce r t ,  
denied 371 U.S. 888 (1962) ..................... 12

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971) ..................................................  2

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co v. Wolf Bros.
& Co., 240 U.S. 251 (1916) ..................  19

Hanley v. Condrey, 467 F .2d 697 (2d
Cir. 1972) ................................................ .. 11, 17

Hughes v. Repko, 578 F .2d 483 (3rd
Cir. 1978) ............ ................................... . 23

K ie f e l  v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc . ,  404 
F.2d 1163 (7th Cir.  1968), c e r t . 
denied, 395 U.S. 908 rehearing 
denied, 395 U.S 987 ...................... .. 12,20,21

Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. o f
Phi ladelphia v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp. , 487
F. 2d 161 (3rd Cir.  1973) ...................... 23

Los Angeles County v. Associated 
General Contractors o f
Ca l i fo rn ia ,  438 U.S. 909 (1978) ........  2

Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Steiner,
301 F. 63 (2d Cir.  1912) ...................... 7

Newman v. P igg ie  Park Enterprises, 390
U.S. 400 (1968) ........................................ 23

- iii -



Page

Parham v. Southwestern B e l l  Telephone Co.,
In c . ,  433 F .2d 421 (8th Cir.
1970) .................. ........................................  14

Parker v. Cali fano, 561 F .2d 320 (D.C.
Cir.  1977) ........................ ................ 21

Prandine v. National Tea Co., 585 F .2d
47 (3rd Cir 1978) .......................... .........

Reed v. Ar l ington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d
721 (8th C ir .  1973) .................... ...........  14

Surowitz v. Hi lton Hotels Corp , , 383
U.S. 363 (1966) ____. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

Thompson v. L o u is v i l l e ,  362 U.S 199
(1966) .............................     16,19

Triangle Involvement Council v. R i tch ie ,
402 U.S 497 (1971) ................................  7

United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146
(1961) .......................................................   6

United States v. Ross, 535 F .2d 346
(6th Cir.  1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

Weiss v. United States, 227 F.2d 72 
(2d Cir 1955), c e r t . denied,
359 U.S. 936 (1956), rehearing
denied, 350 U.S. 977 ........................   12

Wheeler v. Anchor Continental,  Inc . ,
20 F.E.P.C. 591 (D.S.C. 1978),
appeal docketed, No. 79-1116
(4th C i r . ,  Feb. 14, 1979) ....................  17

- IV



Page

Statutes

28 U. S.C. § 1920 ................................................  23

T i t l e  V I I  o f  the C i v i l  Rights Act
o f  1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k) ............................................ .. 20,22

C i v i l  Rights A ttorney 's  Fees Award Act
of  1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ....................  20,21

28 U.S.C. § 1927 ............................................  3,4,5,10,
16,18,

20 , 21,22

Rule 23 o f  the Federal Rules of
C i v i l  Procedure ........................................  13,14

Publ ications

Comment, Sanctions Imposed By Courts on 
Attorneys Who Abuse the Judic ia l Process,
44 Chi. L. Rev. 619 (1977) ............................  8

7 Am Jur, 2d, Attorneys at Law,
§§ 12-43, 167-200 ..............................................  8

v -



IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1979 

No. 79-701

ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC.,

P e t i t ion e r ,

v.

J. D. MONK, et a l .

On Writ o f  C e r t io ra r i  to the United 
States Court o f  Appeals for  the 

F i f th  C ircuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS 
CURIAE OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE 

AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.

NAACP Lega l  Defense and Educat iona l  Fund, 

Inc. hereby moves for  leave to f i l e  the attached 

b r i e f  as amicus curiae.

- vi -



The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 

Inc .  i s  a n o n - p r o f i t  c o r p o r a t i o n  in co rp o ra ted  

under the laws o f  the State o f  New York. I t  was 

formed to ass is t  black persons in securing the i r  

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t s ,  and o ther  r i g h t s ,  by 

prosecuting and defending lawsuits. I t s  charter 

declares that i t s  purposes include rendering lega l  

serv ices  gratu itously  to  Negroes su f fer ing  in­

jus t i c e  by reason o f  r a c ia l  discr iminat ion.  For 

many years attorneys for the Legal Defense Fund 

have represented part ies  in l i t i g a t i o n  before this 

Court and other courts as wel l  as f i l e d  b r i e f s  

amicus cur iae . See, e . g . ,  Griggs v. Duke Power 

Co. , 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Los Angeles County v . 

A s s o c i a t e d  General Con t rac to rs  o f  C a l i f o r n i a , 

438 U.S. 909 (1978).

The L e g a l  Defense Fund b e l i e v e s  that  i t s  

experience in l i t i g a t i o n  concerning a ttorney 's  

fees and employment discr imination may be o f  as­

sistance to the Court in the present case. See, 

e . g . ,  Bradley v. School Board o f  City o f  Richmond, 

416 U.S.  696 (1974 ) ;  A lbemarle  Paper Company

- V l l



v . Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975 ) ;  C hr is t ian sbu rg

Garment Co, v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). Ac­

c o r d in g l y ,  i t  r eq u es ts  perm iss ion  to  f i l e  the 

accompanying amicus curiae b r i e f .  Consent to the 

f i l i n g  o f  the b r i e f  has been granted by counsel 

for  respondents but has been refused by counsel 

fo r  p e t i t i o n e r .  The b r i e f  is  submitted in support 

o f  responden ts .  I t  supports  the arguments o f  

respondents and the general analysis o f  the Court 

o f  Appeals  below a lthough the bas is  f o r  i t s  

reasoning is d i f f e r e n t  from that r e l i e d  upon by 

respondents and the Court o f  Appeals. Because o f  

this  d i f fe r ence  and the p o ten t ia l l y  adverse impact 

o f  improper appl icat ion of  28 U.S.C. § 1927, and

re la ted  prov is ions,  upon the enforcement o f  c i v i l  
* /r i g h t s  s t a t u t e s , — the movant submits that the 

b r i e f  should be accepted for  f i l i n g  by the Court.

See, e . g . ,  Wheeler v. Anchor Continental, 
I n c . , 20 FEP Cases 591 (D .S .C .  1978) , appeal
docketed, No. 79-1116 (4th Cir.  , Feb. 14, 1979); 
Plummer v.  Chicago Journeyman Plumbers '  Loca l  
Union No. 130, U.A. , C i v i l  No. 77 C 1726, Nov. 
19, 1979 (N.D. 1 1 1 . ) ;  F lo ra  v. Moore, 22 EPD
% 30,365 (N.D. M iss . ) ,  Dec. 8, 1979.

- viii -



WHEREFORE, the NAACP Lega l  Defense and 

Educational Fund, Inc. r espec t fu l l y  prays that 

th is  motion be granted and that the attached b r i e f  

be f i l e d .

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I  
NAPOLEON B. WILLIAMS, JR. 

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circ le  
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for  Amicus Curiae

- ix -



IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1979 

No. 79-701

ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC.,

P e t i t ion e r ,

v.

J. D. MONK, et a l .

On Writ of  C er t io ra r i  to the United 
States Court o f  Appeals for  the 

F i f th  C ircuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NAACP LEGAL 
DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 

Inc .  i s  a n o n - p r o f i t  c o r p o r a t i o n  in co rpo ra ted  

under the laws o f  the State o f  New York. I t  was



formed to ass is t  black persons in securing the ir  

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t s ,  and o ther  r i g h t s ,  by- 

prosecuting and defending lawsuits. I t s  charter 

declares that i t s  purposes include rendering lega l  

serv ices  gratu itously  to  Negroes su f fe r ing  in­

jus t i c e  by reason o f  r a c ia l  d iscr iminat ion. For 

many years attorneys for the Legal Defense Fund 

have represented part ies  in l i t i g a t i o n  before this 

Court and other courts as we l l  as f i l e d  b r i e f s  

amicus cur iae . See, e . g . ,  Griggs v. Duke Power 

Co• , 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Los Angeles County v .

A s s o c i a t e d  General C on t rac to rs  o f  C a l i f o r n i a , 

438 U.S. 909 (1978).

The L ega l  Defense Fund b e l i e v e s  tha t  i t s  

experience in l i t i g a t i o n  concerning a t torney 's  

fees and employment d iscr iminat ion may be o f  as­

sistance to  the Court in the present case. See, 

e . g . ,  Bradley v. School Board o f  City o f  Richmond, 

416 U.S. 696 (1974 ) ;  A lbemarle  Paper Company 

v . Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975 ) ;  C h r is t iansburg

Garment Co. v, EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).



3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The wr i t  o f  c e r t i o r a r i  should be dismissed as 

im p ro v id en t l y  gran ted .  Although th i s  Court 

granted the wr i t  for  the sole purpose o f  de te r ­

mining the a l l o w a b i l i t y  o f  a t t o r n e y ' s  f e e s  as 

excess costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, i t  is  not 

possible  to decide th is  issue in the present state 

o f  the record since both the Court o f  Appeals and 

the d i s t r i c t  court  be low e r ron eou s ly  assumed 

that § 1927 was applicable to  the facts  presented 

here. The record shows that the acts found by the 

court below to be unreasonable and vexatious were 

acts which were no more than fa i lu re  to prosecute 

respondents'  claims for  r e l i e f .  They were not 

acts which e i ther  m ult ip l ied  the proceedings below 

or caused de fendant to  incur excess co s ts .  

Accordingly § 1927 is  inapplicable .

The w r i t  should a l s o  be d ismissed as im- 

providently  granted because of  the nonfinal nature 

o f  the judgment by the Court of  Appeals remanding 

the a c t i o n  t o  the d i s t r i c t  court  to determine 

what, i f  any, excess costs were caused by respon­



- 4 -

dents'  at torneys '  unreasonable and vexatious acts 

or by any m u l t ip l i ca t ion  o f  the proceedings by 

them. I f  the d i s t r i c t  court, upon remand, con­

cludes that no excess costs and no m ult ip l ica t ion  

o f  proceedings were caused, then the granting o f  

the wr i t  o f  c e r t i o r a r i  to  determine the a l low­

a b i l i t y  o f  a t to rney 's  fees as excess costs under 

§ 1927 w i l l  have been improvident.

I f ,  in the  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  the w r i t  i s  not 

dismissed, then we submit that th is  Court should 

a f f i rm  in part and reverse in part.  Insofar  as 

the judgment remands the case to  the d i s t r i c t  

court  f o r  the purpose o f  d e te rm in ing  whether 

excess  co s ts  were incurred  by p e t i t i o n e r  and 

whether excess cost resulted from respondents'  

at torneys '  vexatious acts or a l leged  m u l t ip l i ca ­

t ion  o f  the proceedings, the judgment, we submit, 

should be aff i rmed. To the extent,  however, that 

the judgment r e s t s  on an assumption, in the 

absence o f  evidence, that respondent McPherson's 

f a i lu re  to  appear at his scheduled deposit ion was 

a m ult ip l i ca t ion  o f  proceedings caused by respon­

dents'  attorneys, the judgment should reversed.



- 5 -

I f  the Court nonetheless decides to reso lve  

the hypothet ica l issue in th is  case o f  whether 

a t t o r n e y ' s  f e es  can be assessed under § 1927, 

then, we submit, the Court should ho ld  that  

a t torney 's  fees are not items o f  costs within the 

meaning o f  § 1927. I f  the Court, however, holds 

that at torney 's  fees are al lowable under § 1927, 

then we urge that i t  should ho ld  fu r th e r  that  

the i r  allowance as part o f  excess costs is d is c re ­

tionary and governed by standards normally app l i ­

cable to an award o f  a t torney 's  fees.

ARGUMENT

I .  SECTION 1927 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE
CONDUCT OF RESPONDENTS' ATTORNEYS

This  Court g ranted  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  w r i t  o f  

c e r t i o r a r i  fo r  the l im ited purpose o f  determining 

whether a t torney 's  fees are al lowable as elements 

o f  excess costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Neces­

s a r i l y ,  the Court assumed that  th i s  issue was 

presented by the record below and that § 1927

was appl icable  to the proceedings below. Because



t h i s  assumption is  not c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  the 

record, the p e t i t i o n  for  wr i t  o f  c e r t i o r a r i  should 

be dismissed as improvidently granted.

I t  is a guiding rule of  th is  Court that i t  

w i l l  neither render advisory opinions on hypothe­

t i c a l  qu es t ions  nor determine c o n t r o v e r s i e s  

which are not s u f f i c i e n t l y  d e f in i t e  and concrete 

to assure an immediate and d e f in i t i v e  determina­

t ion o f  the v a l i d i t y  o f  c o n f l i c t in g  claims pre­

sented by adverse  p a r t i e s . —  ̂ Aetna L i f e  Ins .  

Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-241 (1937 ) ;  

United S ta tes  v.  F ruehau f , 365 U.S. 146, 157

(1961). A lso see, Flast v, Cohen, 392 U.S 83, 

92-101 (1968 ) .  D ism issa l  o f  the w r i t  o f  c e r ­

t i o r a r i  as improvidently granted is proper there­

fore  i f  necessary to e f fec tua te  this po l ic y .  The 

writ  should also be dismissed as improvidently 

granted when "conditions o r i g in a l l y  thought to 

ju s t i f y  granting the writ o f  c e r t i o r a r i  are not

- 6 -

U The source o f  th is  po l icy  is  in A r t i c l e  I I I  
o f  the Constitut ion o f  the United States as we l l  
as in jur isprudent ia l  considerations.  See Barrows 
v. Jackson, 346 U.S 249, 256-257 (1953); Flast v . 
Cohen, supra, 392 U.S at 92-101.



7

in  f a c t  p r e s e n t . " — B u r r e l l  v . McCray, 426 U.S 

471, 473-74 (9 1 76) (Brennan, J . ,  d i s s e n t i n g ) .

Both conditions ex is t  here.

By the e x p l i c i t  terms o f  the statute ,  § 1927 

is applicable  only i f  the offending attorney has, 

in the course o f  l i t i g a t i o n ,  (1 )  mult ip l ied  the 

proceedings, (2 )  increased the costs,  (3 ) engaged 

in unreasonable  and v exa t io u s  ac ts ,  and (4 )  

caused excess costs to have been incurred as a 

consequence o f  the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  o f  the p ro ­

ceed ings  r e s u l t i n g  from the unreasonable  and 
3/

vex a t io u s  a c t s . — See e . g . ,  Mot ion P i c tu r e s

2 /

2/ In Tr iangle  Involvement Council v. R i t c h ie , 
402 U.S. 497, 502 (1971), Justice Harlan stated in 
his concurring opinion that a "changed posture of 
the case" could preclude i t s  adjudication from 
being "a provident expenditure of  the energies of  
the Court."

3/ The necessity  for  showing the existence of  
each o f  the four  requ irements  has not always 
been c l e a r l y  perce ived. See Acevedo v. Immigra­
tion and Natura l izat ion Service" 538 F . 2d 918 (2d 
Cir.  1976) (assessment o f  double costs as excess 
cos ts ) .  A more recent decis ion by the same court 
attempted to formulate standards applicable to 
§ 1927. The court wrote that

[ l ] n  an a c t i o n  not i t s e l f  brought in bad
f a i t h ,  an award o f  a t t o r n e y s '  f e es  should



8

Patents Co. v, S te ine r , 301 F. 63, 64-65 (2d Cir.  

1912). A f inding o f  l i a b i l i t y  under § 1927 can 

therefore  only be predicated upon an antecedent 

f inding that each o f  these c r i t e r i a  is s a t i s f i ed .  

In par t icu la r ,  i t  must be shown that the proceed­

ings have been m ult ip l ied  and that the m u l t ip l i ­

cat ion resulted in excess costs being incurred by 

the oppos ing p a r t y .  A mere showing that  the

attorney acted unreasonably and vexat ious ly  is
/ /

there fore  in s u f f i c i en t  to invoke § 1927.—'

The a l leged  vexatious and unreasonable acts 

committed by r espon den ts '  a t t o rn ey s  were des-

3J  cont 'd

be l im i t e d  t o  those expenses rea sonab ly  
incurred to meet the other par ty 's  ground­
less,  bad fa i th  procedural moves.

Browning  Debenture H o ld e r s '  Committee v .  DASA 
Corp . , 560 F . 2d 1078, 1089 (2d C i r .  1 977).  
Whether even th i s  fo rm u la t ion  is  c om p le te ly  
accurate is perhaps doubtful.

it/ A wide range o f  sanc t ions  are a v a i l a b l e  
a ga ins t  an a t t o r n e y  who ac ts  unreasonably  and 
v e x a t i o u s l y .  See 7 Am Jur, 2d, A t to rn eys  at 
Law, §§ 12-43, 167-200; and Comments, Sanctions 
Imposed By C our ts  On A t to rn eys  Who Abuse the 
J u d i c i a l  P ro cess ,  44 Chi. L. Rev. 619 (1977 ) .



- 9 -

c r ib ed  at l en g th  by the Court o f  A p p e a ls .— 

599 F . 2d at 1380-1381. These acts were termed 

vexatious by that court as we l l  as by the d i s t r i c t  

c ou r t .  L ike  the d i s t r i c t  c ou r t ,  the Court o f  

Appeals regarded these acts as being vexatious 

on ly  i n s o fa r  as they ev idenced  the f a i l u r e  o f  

respondents'  attorneys " t o  d i l i g e n t l y  pursue the 

p l a i n t i f f s '  in t e r e s ts "  and evidenced the cause 

f o r  the " f o r c e d  d i s m is s a l  o f  the p l a i n t i f f ' s

5 /

5J  Respondents '  a t t o r n e y s  were he ld  by the
d i s t r i c t  court  to  have ac ted  unreasonably  and 
v e x a t i o u s l y  b e ca u s e  o f  th e  f o l l o w i n g :  ( 1 )
f a i l u r e  o f  respondent McPherson to  appear for  
tw ice  scheduled d e p o s i t i o n s ;  ( 2 )  f a i l u r e  to 
answer p e t i t i o n e r ' s  in ter roga tor ies  as ordered; 
(3 )  fa i lu r e  of  respondents'  attorneys to f i l e  a 
b r i e f ,  as ordered by the d i s t r i c t  court, within 10 
days o f  A p r i l  7, 1976; ( 4 )  f i l i n g  a b r i e f  on 
June 1, 1976, more than ten days fo l low ing  the 
c o u r t ' s  second order  o f  May 19, 1976 to  f i l e
a b r i e f  within ten days (the b r i e f  was a l leged by 
the d i s t r i c t  judge to  be inadequate  because 
i t  "casually  mention[ed]" a case which the judge 
wanted b r i e f e d  and because i t  "p r esen ted  no 
so l id  factual  basis for  d is t inguishing between 
that case" and the one before  the court. (Ruling 
upon Motion For Rehearing, dated Apr i l  13, 1977); 
and (5 )  fa i lu r e  to advise respondents of  the ir  
denomination as class representat ives and o f  the 
possible  f inanc ia l  consequences o f  the denomina- 
t ion.



10

c la ims."—̂ 599 F.2d at 81. The aff irmance by the 

Court o f  Appeals o f  the d i s t r i c t  court 's  f inding 

and con c lu s ion  that  r espon den ts '  a t t o rn eys  

acted  v e x a t i o u s l y  thus r e f l e c t s  the Court o f  

Appeals ' view, as w e l l  as that of  the d i s t r i c t  

court, that respondents'  attorneys acted v e x a t i ­

ously only insofar as they f a i l e d  to prosecute 

t h e i r  c l i e n t s '  case and caused the c la ims o f  

th e i r  c l i en ts  to be dismissed for  nonprosecution.

Acts const i tu t ing  a f a i lu re  to prosecute are 

not, with respect to  an action dismissed on that 

ground, cognizable under § 1927. Such acts by 

d e f in i t i o n ,  do not resu l t  in a m u l t ip l ica t ion  o f  

proceedings. Perhaps, the requ is i t e  m u l t ip l i ca ­

t ion would have exis ted had the action not been 

aborted by respondents'  at torneys '  conduct. This 

i s sue ,  however ,  need not be dec ided  s ince  the

6/ The opinion of  the Court o f  Appeals makes i t  
e v id en t  that  i t ,  and the d i s t r i c t  c ou r t ,  con­
sidered the fa i lu re  to  f i l e  b r i e f s  as ordered and 
the fa i lu re  to communicate with the named p la in ­
t i f f s  concerning possible  class representation as 
bearing only upon respondents'  attorneys '  f a i lu re  
to prosecute properly the i r  c l i e n t s '  case. 599 
F .2d at 1381.



11

action was in fact dismissed for  nonprosecution. 

P e t i t ion e r  bene f i t ted  from the dismissal rather 

than being harmed by i t  and necessar i ly ,  incurred 

no excess  cos ts  from f a i l u r e  to  p rosecu te  or 

d i s m is s a l .  To reward p e t i t i o n e r  w i th  excess  

costs ( i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  whether a t torney 's  fees are 

included in the award) would not be in conformity 

with the statute but would reward pe t i t i on e r  twice 

over, once by dismissal o f  respondents'  claims and 

once by an award o f  a l leged  excess costs . The 

absurdity o f  such a result  is  e spec ia l l y  egregious 

since ne ither  the d i s t r i c t  court nor the Court of 

Appeals found that respondents or the i r  attorneys 

had vexatiously  commenced the action. Each r es ­

ponsive action taken by p e t i t i on e r  in th is  lawsuit 

was t r igge red  by nonfr ivolous actions taken by

respondents and the i r  attorneys. Consequently, no
7 /m u l t i p l i c a t i o n  o f  p roceed ing  occurred— and no

1J M u lt ip l i ca t ion  o f  proceedings occurs when a 
f r i v o l o u s  a c t i o n  is  commenced or a f r i v o l o u s  
appeal is  brought, See e .g .  Hanley v. Condrey, 
467 F . 2d 697 (2d Cir.  1972); Browning Debenture
Holders'  Committee v. DASA, supra, 560 F .2d at 
1088-1089, or when any f r ivo lous  action is taken 
which requires a response by the opposing party or



12

excess costs were incurred.

In holding that respondents'  attorneys acted 

v e x a t i o u s l y  in not p ro s e c u t in g  the un de r ly in g  

T i t l e  V I I  action,  both lower courts considered the 

f a i l u r e  o f  r espon den ts '  a t t o r n e y s  to f i l e  a 

b r i e f  and the f a i l u r e  t o  adv ise  t h e i r  c l i e n t s  

concerning the s ign i f icance  o f  in s t i tu t in g  the 

act ion as a class action. The fa i lu r e  to f i l e  the 

r eq u i r e d  b r i e f  c l e a r l y  d id  not m u l t ip l y  the 

proceedings or lead to excess costs. In a s im i lar  

s i tuat ion ,  the Third C ircu it  held that the fa i lu re  

to f i l e  a p r e t r i a l  memorandum w i th in  the time 

l im its  did not cause the opposing party to incur 

excess costs .  Gamble v. Pope & Talbot , In c . ,  307 

F.2d 729, 731, n . l  (3rd Cir.  1962) cert  ■ denied, 

371 U.S 888 (1962 ) .  Moreover,  r esponden ts '

attorneys eventual ly  did f i l e  a b r i e f .  See note 

5, supra. In any event, no m u l t ip l ica t ion  of  the 

proceedings resulted from the fa i lu re .

7/ contd.
which puts that party to unnecessary expense. See 
Weiss v.  United S t a t e s , 227 F.2d 72 (2d C i r .  
1955), c e r t . dneied, 359 U.S 936 (1956), rehearing 
denied 350 U.S. 977; K i e f e l  v. Las Vegas Hacienda, 
In c .,  404 F,2d 1163 (7th Cir.  1968), c e r t . denied, 
395 U.S. 908, r eh ea r in g  denied 395 U.S. 987.



13

S im i la r ly ,  no m u l t ip l i ca t ion  o f  the proceed­

ings resulted from the i n i t i a l  e f f o r t  to bring the 

a c t i o n  as a c l a s s  a c t i o n  or from the a l l e g e d  

fa i lu re  to advise the indiv idual  p l a i n t i f f s  in 

d e ta i l  about the s ign i f icance  o f  the c lass act ion. 

No ev idence  has been presen ted  showing that  a 

class action was improper or that respondents'  

attorneys were not i n i t i a l l y  e n t i t l e d  to r e ly  upon 

the ir  c l i e n t s '  assert ion and b e l i e f  that other 

blacks suffered s im i lar  rac ia l  d iscr iminat ion at 

the hands o f  defendant. See excerpts from respon­

d e n ts '  d e p o s i t i o n s  73 F.R.D. at  414-415, n.2.  

Moreover, neither the Court of  Appeals nor the 

d i s t r i c t  court found that the purported e f f o r t  to

bring the act ion as a c lass action was f r ivo lous
8/ . . .  

or v e x a t i o u s . — Apart from the i n i t i a l  d es ­

i g n a t i o n  o f  the law su i t  as a c la s s  a c t i o n ,  no 

attempt was made to  seek a determination, pursuant 

to Rule 23(c ) o f  the Federal Rules o f  C i v i l  Pro-

8/ Even i f  there were a p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  constru­
ing the d i s t r i c t  cour t 's  decis ion as holding that 
respondents'  attorneys acted vexat ious ly  in a t ­
tempting to bring the action as a class action, 
that portion o f  the d i s t r i c t  court 's  decis ion was 
not a f f i rm ed  upon appeal .  See the Court o f  
Appeals'  opinion at 599 F.2d at 1381.



14 -

cedure, that the action could be maintained as a 
9/

c la s s  a c t i o n . — F i n a l l y ,  the f i n d in g  that  r e s ­

pondents' attorneys had not apprised respondents 

that  c o s t s ,  in c lu d in g  a t t o r n e y ' s  f e e s ,  cou ld  

conceivably be assesed against them, see Chris-  

t ian sbu rg  Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Oppor­

tunity  Commission, 434 U.S. 412, 421-422 (1978), 

did not demonstrate that respondents'  attorneys 

had caused a m u l t ip l i ca t ion  o f  the proceedings or 

had caused p e t i t i o n e r  to incur excess costs.

9/ The i n i t i a l  d e s i g n a t i o n  by responden ts '  
attorneys o f  the action as a class action did not 
necessar i ly  determine the permissible scope of 
respondents'  in te r roga to r ie s .  See, e . g . ,  Brown v. 
Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co. , 457 F .2d 1377 
(4th C i r . 1972), where the Fourth Circuit  stated 
that prosecution o f  indiv idual  claims o f  r a c ia l  
discr imination may require examination o f  " s t a t i s ­
t i c s ,  patterns, pract ices  and general p o l i c i e s  
to ascerta in  whether d iscr iminat ion e x i s t s . "  457 
F . 2d at 1382. Accord: Parham v. Southwestern Bell  
Telephone Co. ,  433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir.  1970)'; 
Reed v. Ar l ington Hotel Co., In c . ,  476 F.2d 721, 
723 (8th Cir.  1973).

10/ In Surowitz v. Hil ton Hotels Corp.,383 U.S. 
363 (1966), th is  Court tentat  i v e l y  explored, in 
the context o f  a d e r iva t iv e  suit under then Rule 
23(b),  the extent to which an attorney might be 
required to d isc lose  to the c l i en t  the nature o f  
the lawsuit and the extent to which the c l i e n t ' s



15

Moreover, the Christiansburg rule is applicable

only when the action is f r ivo lous  or brought in

bad fa i th .

Since respondents'  at torneys '  other a l leged
, ,  , . 11/ .unreasonable and vexatious acts—  did not mult i­

ply the proceedings or cause excess costs, § 1927 

i s  in a p p l i c a b l e  to the f a c t s  o f  t h i s  case and 

the w r i t  should be d ismissed  as im prov id en t ly  

granted.

10/ cont'd

ignorance o f  the c ircumstances o f  the lawsu it  
might, i f  e v e r ,  j u s t i f y  a d i sm issa l  o f  the 
c l i e n t ' s  complaint. 383 U.S at 371-374. Apart 
from stat ing  the necessity  for  the attorney and 
the c l i en t  to act in good fa i th ,  th is  Court only 
went so far , in the circumstances o f  that case, as 
to conclude that a p l a i n t i f f  seeking to invoke the 
aid o f  the j u d i c i a l  p rocess  must on ly  "have 
general knowledge of  the acts o f  which she com­
plains and the connection of  the defendants to 
those acts which she a l l e g e s . "  383 U.S at f t .  5.

11/ The f a i l u r e  o f  r e sp on d en t ' s  a t t o rn ey s  to 
appear at a 10:00 a.m. court meeting on Apr i l  21, 
1976, was described in the docket sheet o f  the 
d i s t r i c t  court as due to " inadvertence . "  73 F.R.D. 
at 412 (W.D. La. 1977).

Since no evidence was presented below showing 
that respondents'  attorneys were responsible for 
respondent McPherson 's  nonattendance at h is



16

The reason for  dismissing the wr i t  as impro­

vident ly granted is simply put. The decis ion of 

the Court o f  Appeals, while correct in concluding 

that  a t t o r n e y ' s  fees  are not a l l o w a b le  under 

§ 1927, erred in assuming that § 1927 was app l ic ­

ab le  to responden ts '  conduct as found by the 

d i s t r i c t  court. Dismissal o f  the wr i t  as impro­

vident ly  granted would allow th is  Court to avoid 

compounding the error .

On the other hand, a f a i lu re  to dismiss the 

wr i t  as improvident ly granted that is fol lowed by 

an award o f  a t torney 's  fees to p e t i t i on e r ,  would 

imply that § 1927 is  appl icable  to conduct con­

s is t ing  o f  a fa i lu re  to  prosecute. Moreover, i t  

would r a i s e  s e r ious  qu es t ions  concern ing  the 

scope and the proper appl icat ion o f  § 1927. For 

example, i t  would ra ise  questions concerning what 

type o f  conduct const i tutes  a m ult ip l ica t ion  o f

11/ cont'd

scheduled deposit ions,  his f a i lu re  to appear can­
not be used to show that respondents'  attorneys 
m u l t i p l i e d  the p ro ceed in gs .  See Thompson v. 
L o u is v i l l e ,  362 U.S 199 (1960).



17

proceedings and what type o f  acts create excess 

costs. In addition i t  would in v i te  doubt as to 

whether there was a need to make an ev ident iary  

showing o f  a causal connection between the multi ­

p l i c a t ion  o f  the proceedings and the vexatious and 

unreasonable acts or to make a showing o f  a causal 

connection between these acts and the incurrence 

o f  excess costs.  F in a l l y ,  i t  would ra ise  a basic 

question o f  whether the existence o f  excess costs 

can be i n f e r r e d  s o l e l y  from the occurrence o f  

vexatious acts.

In view o f  the confusion which already ex is ts  

concerning the appl icat ion o f  § 1927, see e . g . ,  

Hanley v. Condrey, 467 F . 2d 697 (2d Cir.  1972); 

(the need for  a hear ing ) ;  Acevedo v. Immigration 

and Natura l izat ion Se rv ice , supra (whether double 

costs can be imposed); Wheeler v. Anchor Continen­

ta l ,  In c . ,  20 F.E.P.C. 591 (D.S.C. 1978), appeal 

docketed, No. 79-1116 (4th Cir.  Feb. 14, 1979) 

(whether excess costs ,  including a ttorney 's  fees,  

can be assessed in the midst o f  t r i a l ,  whether 

ora l  argument s a t i s f i e s  the requirements for  an 

e v i d e n t i a r y  h e a r in g ,  and whether p a r t i c u l a r



18 -

conduct is vexat ious ) ,  adding another l e v e l  o f  

confusion might en t i r e l y  overwhelm the e f f o r t  to 

apply § 1927 in accordance with Congressional 

in t en t .

Besides these reasons, there is  one further 

reason which r eq u i r e s  d is m is s a l  o f  the w r i t .  

There is more than a substantial p o s s ib i l i t y  that 

the d i s t r i c t  court, acting pursuant to the judg­

ment o f  the Court o f  Appeals, w i l l ,  upon remand, 

obviate any necessity  for  deciding the a l lowab i l ­

i t y  o f  a ttorney 's  fees under § 1927. The l i k e l i ­

hood is  great since the record shows neither the 

existence o f  excess costs nor any mult ip l ica t ion  

o f  the p roceed ings .  Given th i s  l i k e l i h o o d ,  

the w r i t  should be dismised as im prov id en t ly  

granted.—

12/ In i t s  remand order, the Court of  Appeals 
below said

§ 1927 provides only for excess costs caused 
by the p l a i n t i f f s '  a t t o r n e y s '  v exa t ious  
behavior and consequent m ult ip l ica t ion  o f  the 
proceedings, and not for  the to ta l  costs o f  
the l i t i g a t i o n .

599 F .2d at 1382.



19

Moreover, the dismissal would be, g iven the nature 

o f  the remand by the Court o f  Appeals, consistent 

with th is  Court 's p o l i c y  o f  not reviewing nonfinal 

appel late  decis ions. See Brotherhood o f  Locomo­

t i v e  F i rem en  & Enginemen v ,  Bangor & A .R .R . , 

389 U.S 327 (1967); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v . 

Wolf Bros. & Co. , 240 U.S 251, 258 (1916).

I f  the Court does not dismiss the w r i t ,  then 

i t  should a f f i r m  the judgment o f  the Court o f  

Appeals remanding the case f o r  an e v i d e n t i a r y  

hearing on the question whether excess costs were 

incurred and whether there was a m u l t ip l ica t ion  o f  

p roceed ings  caused by r espon den ts '  a t t o r n e y s '  

vexatious acts.  To the extent,  however, that the 

judgment o f  the Court o f  Appeals permits  the 

d i s t r i c t  court  to  f in d  tha t  excess cos ts  were 

c rea ted  as a r e s u l t  o f  respondent McPherson 's  

f a i lu re  to attend his noticed deposit ions, the 

judgment should be reversed since no evidence was 

ever o f fe red  showing that any such excess costs , 

or concomitant m ul t ip l i ca t ion  o f  proceedings, were 

caused by acts o f  respondents'  attorneys. See 

Thompson v. L o u is v i l l e ,  supra.



20 -

I I .  ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE NOT ALLOWABLE AS ELEMENTS 
OF COSTS UNDER § 1927

I f  th is  Court decides the issue for  which i t  

granted c e r t i o r a r i ,  then the judgment o f  the Court 

o f  Appeals must, on that issue, be af f i rmed. For 

the reasons indicated by the F i f th  C ircu i t ,  a t t o r -
13/ney 's  fees are not recoverable under § 1927.——' 

As the F i f th  C ircu it  im p l i c i t l y  recognized, the 

scope o f  the meaning o f  the term "cos ts "  appearing 

in § 1927 is  ne ither enlarged nor r es t r i c t ed  by 

the types of  costs allowable under T i t l e  V I I  o f  

the C i v i l  Rights Act o f  1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C 

§ 2000e-5(k) and under the C i v i l  Rights Attorney 's

13/ No one ser ious ly  doubts that, at the time the 
statute was enacted, i t  was not contemplated that 
an award o f  excess costs under i t  would include 
a t torney 's  fees .  C lear ly  the meaning o f  the term 
"cos ts "  was l im ited  to what are commonly re fe rred  
to as taxable costs . 1507 Corporation v, Hender­
son, 447 F. 2d 540, 542 (7th Cir.  1971); United 
States v. Ross, 535 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir.  1976). 
This has been interpreted co r re c t l y  to require 
on ly  in c lu s i o n  o f  items o f  " r e g u l a r  c o s t s "  as 
e lements o f  excess  cos ts  under § 1927. 1507 
Corporation v. Henderson, supra, 447 F,2d at 542. 
Accord: K i e f e l  v. Las Vegas Hacienda, In c . ,  supra, 
404 F .2d at 1166, 1170. Since at torney 's  fees are 
not items o f  regular costs under federa l  costs



21

Fees Award Act o f  1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.—  No

j u s t i f i c a t i o n  e x i s t s  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  that  the 

meaning and a p p l i c a t i o n  of. § 1927 should vary

13/ cont 'd

statutes,  they have been proper ly  excluded from 
c o n s id e r a t i o n  as items o f  c os ts  under § 1927. 
1507 Corporation v. Henderson, supra, 447 F.2d at 
542-43; K i e f e l  v. Las Vegas Hacienda, In c . ,  supra, 
404 F .2d at 1170. ‘

This  conc lu s ion  i s  the on ly  one which i s  
consistent with th is  Court's decisions in Alyeska 
P ipel ine  Serv. v. Wilderness S o c ie t y , 421 U. S 240 
(1975) and Christiansburg Garment Co. v . EEOC, 
supra. To the extent that contrary dec is ionshave  
been reached in o the r  cases ,  they  have been 
reached without analysis o f  the underlying issues. 
See e . g . ,  Browning Debenture Holders'  Committee v . 
DASA Corp. , supra.

\kj The purposes behind the c i v i l  r igh ts  statutes 
and § 1927 are d i f f e r e n t .  The l a t t e r  is a penal 
statue, United States v. Ross, supra, 535 F.2d at 
350, whereas the c i v i l  r ights  statutes are reme­
d ia l .  See Newman v. P igg ie  Park Enterpr ises , 390 
U.S 400, 402 (1968); Prandine v. National Tea Co. , 
585 F .2d 47, 53 (3rd Cir.  1978); Parker v. C a l i -  
fano, 561 F.2d 320, 330-331 (D.C. C i r .  1977). 
Morever, § 1927, unlike the c i v i l  r igh ts  statutes,  
is only concerned with m u l t ip l ica t ion  o f  proceed­
ings. By contrast , the c i v i l  r ights  statute are, 
unlike § 1927, only concerned with compensating 
p reva i l in g  part ies  and with deterr ing  groundless 
actions.



22

according to whether the action is  commenced under 

a c i v i l  r igh ts  statutes or is commenced pursuant 

to another federa l  provis ion.

Moreover, allowance o f  such a variance in the 

meaning o f  the statute would produce an anamoly. 

I t  would mean, for example, that the United States 

would not be a b le ,  in  a T i t l e  V I I  a c t i o n ,  to  

ob ta in  a t t o r n e y ' s  f e e s ,  as part o f  i t s  excess 

c o s ts  under § 1927, a ga ins t  a d e fe n d a n t ' s  a t ­

torney who committed vexatious acts, no matter 

how much those ac ts  may have m u l t i p l i e d  the 

proceedings and caused the United States to incur 

excess  c o s t s .  This r e s u l t  f o l l o w s  from the 

fact  that T i t l e  V I I  does not authorize the United 

States to recover a t torney 's  fees .  See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-5(k).  Yet ,  defendant would be permitted 

to recover,  in the reverse s i tuat ion ,  at torney 's  

fees as excess costs against attorneys for  the 

United S t a t e s .  Th is ,  however ,  would be an 

absurdity that would make a mockery o f  the pur­

poses o f  § 1927. Thus, the term "cos ts " ,  as i t  

appears in § 1927, must be interpreted uniformly 

and made e q u a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e  to  a l l  a c t i o n s .



23

Even i f  t h i s  Court were to  ho ld  that  a t ­

torney 's  fees are recoverable  under § 1927, i t  

would not f o l l o w  there from, that  such f e es  are 

automatically to be awarded everytime excess costs 

are taxed under § 1927. The question o f  whether 

a t torney 's  fees should be imposed in a par t icu lar  

case is  a separate question from whether regular  

items o f  costs,  including excess costs ,  should be 

imposed in the case .  The a l l o w a b i l i t y  o f  a t ­

torney 's  fees is governed by standards that are 

a l together  d i f f e r e n t  from those governing assess­

ment o f  cos ts  under, f o r  example, 28 U.S.C.  

§ 1920. See e . g . ,  Newman v. P igg ie  Park Enter­

p r i s e s , supra; Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3rd 

Cir.  1978); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc, o f  Ph i la ­

d e lph ia  v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary 

Corp. , 487 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir.  1973). Thus, any 

r e v e r s a l  o f  the F i f t h  C i r c u i t ' s  judgment must 

include a remand permitt ing that court an oppor­

t u n i t y  to  fash ion  standards f o r  the award o f  

at torney 's  fees under § 1927 and permitt ing that 

court, as wel l  as the d i s t r i c t  court, to  determine 

whether respondents'  at torneys '  conduct has been,



24 -

in l i g h t  o f  a l l  o f  the circumstances, such as to 

j u s t i f y  the assessment o f  a t torney 's  fees against 

them. Moreover, such a remand may be necessary, 

in any event, to  determine whether the judgment o f  

the F i f th  C ircu it  below const ituted a f inding that 

respondents'  attorneys '  conduct was not so v e x a t i ­

ous and unreasonable  as to r e q u i r e ,  in  t h i s  

instance, an assessment o f  a t torney 's  fees against 

them and in favor of  p e t i t i on e r .

CONCLUSION

For the reasons s ta t e d  above, th i s  Court 

should dismiss the wr it  as improvidently granted, 

o r ,  in  the a l t e r n a t i v e ,  to  e i t h e r  a f f i r m  the 

judgment below or remand the action for  proceed­

ings consistent with pr inc ip les  set forth herein.

R e s p e c t f u l l y  s u b mi t t e d ,

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I  
NAPOLEON B. WILLIAMS, JR. 

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus C irc le  
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for  Amicus Curiae



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