NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. v. Harrison Petition for Rehearing
Public Court Documents
September 30, 1960

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. v. Harrison Petition for Rehearing, 1960. 5576513a-bf9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/de84039e-176c-4def-a59e-f98477a19900/naacp-legal-defense-and-educational-fund-inc-v-harrison-petition-for-rehearing. Accessed July 09, 2025.
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IN THE Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia Record No. 5097 N.A.A.C.P. L egal, D e f e n s e a n d E d u c a t io n a l F u n d , Tn c ., Petitioner, v. A . S . H a r r is o n , J r ., A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l of V ir g in ia , et a l ., Respondents. PETITION FOR REHEARING S po t t sw o o d W. R o b in s o n , III, 214 East Clay Street, Room 208, Richmond 19, Virginia. T h u rg o o d M a r s h a l l , 10 Columbus Circle, Suite 1790, New York 19, New York. Counsel for Petitioner. P ress of B yron S . A d a m s . W ashington . D . C. SUBJECT INDEX Page Statement ............................................................................ 1 Argument ............................................................................ 3 I. The Ruling That Chapter 33 Applies To Peti tioner’s Activities Is Not Supported By The Record And Conflicts With The Applicable De cisional L a w ............................................................ 3 II. The Constitutional Validity Of Chapter 33 Was Not An Issue Before The Court On This Appeal 9 Conclusion .......................................................................... 10 Certificate ............................................................................ 11 TABLE OF CITATIONS C ases Ackerman v. State, 124 Tex. Cr. Rep. 125, 61 S.W. 2d 116 (1933) .................................................................... Ariola, In re, 252 App. Div. 61, 297 N. Y. S. 100 (1937) Bayles, Ex parte, 42 Okla. Cr. Rep. 28, 274 P. 485 (1929) Brown, Re, 389 111. 516, 59 N.E. 2d 855 (1945).............. Buder, In re, 358 Mo. 796, 217 S.W. 2d 563 (1949) . . . . Chicago Bar Asso., People ex rel., v. Bamborough, 255 111. 92, 99 N.E. 368 (1912) ....................................... Clark, Re, 161 App. Div. 630, 146 N. Y. S. 1030 (1914) Colorado Bar Asso., People ex rel., v. Betts, 26 Colo. 521, 58 P. 1091 (1899) ............................................... Crafts v. Lizotte, 34 R. I. 543, 84 A. 1081 (1912 ).......... Gillespie v. People, 188 111. 176, 58 N. E. 1007 (1900) .. Gordon v. Coolidge, 10 Fed. Cas. Co. 5,606 (C. C. D. Me.) .............................................................................. Government Employees v. Windsor, 353 U. S. 364 ___ 2, Harris, Re, [1897] 3 Terr. L. R. (Can.) 7 0 .................... Harrison v. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 360 U. S. 1 6 7 ............................. 4 Helfant, Re, 228 App. Div. 479, 240 N. Y. S. 242 (1930) 6 O ) (0 0 5 —' 1 05 CT 5C 5 05 O * <l — 3 GO ii Index Continued Page Huff, In re, 371 111. 98, 20 N.E. 2d 101 (1939 ).............. 6 Kelley v. Boyne, 239 Mich. 204, 214 N. W. 316 (1927).. 8 Klingensmith v. Kepler, 41 Ind. 341 (1872), 50 Ind. 432 (1875) ......................................................................... 6 Laird v. State, 156 Tex. Cr. Rep. 345, 242 S.W. 2d 374 (App. 1951) ................................................................ 8 Lawton v. Steele, 119 N. Y. 226, 23 N. E. 878 (1890) . . . 7 Luce, Re, 83 Cal. 303, 23 P. 350 (1890) ......................... 6 McCaughey, Re, [1883] 3 Ont. Rep. 425 ....................... 6 McCloskey, Ex parte, 82 Tex. Cr. Rep. 531, 199 S. W. 1101 (1918), affirmed McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U. S. 107 (1920) .................................................................. 8 McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U. S. 107 (1920 )..................... Maloney, Re, 35 N. D. 1, 153 N. W. 385 (1915 ).............. 6 Marrell, In re, 1 App. Div. 2d 328, 119 N. Y. S. 2d 772 (1956) .......................................................................... 8 Morris, People ex rel., v. Moutray, 166 111. 630, 47 N. E. 79 (1897) .................................................................... 6 Moses, People ex rel., v. Adams, 172 Misc. 143, 14 N. Y. S. 780 (1939) .................................................... 8 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887) ....................... 7 N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. v. Patty, Civ. No. 2436, reported sub nom National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo ple v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, vacated Harrison v. National Association for the Advancement of Col ored People, 360 U. S. 1 6 7 ....................................... 2 Parkins v. State, 116 Tex. Cr. Rep. 52, 28 S.W. 2d 137 (1930) .......................................................................... 8 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Asso. v. Bamborough, 255 111. 92, 99 N.E. 368 (1912) ....................................... 6 People ex rel. Colorado Bar Asso. v. Betts, 26 Colo. 521, 58 P. 1091 (1899) ............................................... 6 People ex rel. Morris v. Moutrav, 166 111. 630, 47 N. E. 79 (1897) .................................................................... 6 People ex rel. Moses v. Adams, 172 Misc. 143,14 N. Y. S. 2d 780 (1939) .............................................................. 8 People v. Galerson, 276 N. Y. 656, 13 N.E. 2d 47 (1938) 8 People v. Gottleib, 8 Cal. App. 2d 763, 50 P. 2d 509 (1935) 8 People v. Levine,161 i\iisc. 336, 291 N. Y.' S. 1001 (1936) 8 People v. Levy, 8 Cal. App. 2d 763, 50 P. 2d 509 (1935) 8 Page People v. Meola, 193 App. Div. 487, 184 N. Y. S. 353 (1920) .......................................................................... 8 People v. Winter, 288 N. Y. 418, 43 N.E. 2d 470 (1942) 7, 8 Port Huron v. Jenkinson, 77 Mich. 414, 43 N. W. 923 (1889) .......................................................................... 7 Porter v. Vance, 14 Lea. 629 (Tenn. 1885).................... 6 Priddy v. McKenzie, 205 Mo. 181, 103 S. W. 968 (1907) 6 Rockmore, Re, 130 App. Div. 586, 117 N. Y. S. 512 (1909) .......................................................................... 6 Rosenberg, In re, 413 111. 567, 110 N.E. 2d 186 (1953).. 6 Ross, Re, [1897] 16 Ont. Rep. 482 ................................. 6 Speetor Motor Service v. Walsh, 135 Conn. 37, 61 A. 2d 89 (1948) .................................................................... 9 State v. Breslin, 67 Okla. 125, 369 P. 897 (1917 ).......... 6 State v. Schultz, 242 Iowa 1328, 50 N.W. 2d 9 (1951) .. 7 State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 128,110 P. 1027 (1910) .. 7 United States v. Burdett, 9 Pet. 682 U.S. 1835 ............ 7 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277 (1943) . . . 7 Warner v. Griswold, 8 Wend. 665 (N. Y. 1832)............ 6 Worthan v. State, 189 Ala. 395, 66 So. 686 (1914 )___ 8 Yale v. State Bar, 16 Cal. 2d 175, 105 P. 2d 112 (1940) 6 S t a t u t e s Virginia Acts of the General Assembly, Extra Session 1956: Chapter 33 .................................................1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9 Chapter 36 .............................................................. 9 Virginia Code (1950): Sec. 54-74 ................................................................ 1,5 Sec. 54-78 ................................................................ 1 Sec. 54-79 ................................................................ 1 O t h e r A u t h o r it ie s Annotated Cases, 1917B, 16-17....................................... 6 Canfield, Corporate Responsibility for Crime, 14 Col. L. Rev. 469 (1914) ..................................................... 7 Francis, Criminal Responsibility for the Corporation, 18 111. L. Rev. 305 (1924) ......................................... 7 Index Continued iii IV Index Continued Page Gausewitz, Criminal Law—Re Classification of Certain Offenses as Civil Instead of Criminal, 12 Wis. L. Rev. 365 (1937) ........................................................ 7 Hall, Principles of Criminal Law 279-322 (1947 )........ 7 Laylin and Tuttle, Due Process and Punishment, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 614 (1922) ........................................... 7 Perkins, Criminal Law 702-703 (1957) ......................... 7 Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col. L. Rev. 55 (1933) .......................................................................... 7 Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 689 (1930) .................................... 7 IN THE Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia Record No. 5097 N.A.A.C.P. L egal , D e f e n s e a n d E d u c a t io n a l F u n d , I n c ., Petitioner, v. A. S. H a r r is o n , J r ., A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l of V ir g in ia , e t a l ., Respondents. PETITION FOR REHEARING To the Honorable Judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia: Petitioner, N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., appellant in the above-styled case, respectfully represents that it is aggrieved by the opinion and judgment or decree entered by this Court on the 2nd day of Septem ber, 1960, affirming so much of a final order of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond as declared that Chapter 33 of the Acts of the General Assembly, Extra Session 1956, codified as Sections 54-74, 54-78, 54-79 of the Code of Virginia of 1950, as amended, 1958 Replacement Volume, construed in the light of the constitutional contentions 2 theretofore made by petitioner in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Divi sion, in a cause captioned N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Incorporated v. Patty, Civ. No. 2436, and reported sub nom National Association for the Ad vancement of Colored People v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, vacated Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167, one, applies to and prohibits certain of the customary activities of peti tioner and, two, the evidence shows that petitioner, its officers and attorneys employed or retained by it or to whom it may contribute monies or services, are engaged in the improper solicitation of legal business and employ ment in violation of Chapter 33. Upon careful consideration of the opinion and judgment or decree of this Court in the foregoing particulars, peti tioner is of the opinion that this Court’s holding thereon is erroneous and in serious conflict with the decisional law and legal authorities apposite to the criminal and disciplinary liability of petitioner, its officers, attorneys and agent, under Chapter 33 for the conduct and activities shown by the evidence material and relevant to the issue raised thereon in the pleadings, particularly to the issue of fact finally presented. Petitioner also feels obligated, in any event, to bring to the attention of this Court that the judgment or decree entered herein against it is errone ous insofar as it adjudges or decrees that “ Chapter 33, Acts of Assembly, Extra Session, 1956, is a constitutional and valid enactment,” because neither petitioner’s plead ings and prayers in the court below nor assignments of error and conclusions urged in this Court raised this issue: rather, petitioner merely sought a construction of the Act “ in the light of constitutional objections presented in the [Federal] District Court.” cf. Government Employees v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366. These considerations constrain petitioner to present this petition for rehearing and for the vacation or modification of the aforesaid holding and judgment or decree. 3 ARGUMENT I The Ruling Thai Chapter 33 Applies to Petitioner's Activities Is Not Supported by the Record and Conflicts With the Applicable Decisional Law Chapter 33 was elaborately analyzed in the petition for appeal (pp. 26-28, 35-37). That analysis, briefly put, was that petitioner’s conduct could not violate Chapter 33 unless it amounted to an improper solicitation of business for an attorney or for itself; and, unless either petitioner or its regional counsel in Virginia improperly solicited business, Chapter 33 is inapplicable. With this, the Court appears to agree: the provisions of Chapter 33 “ deal with solicita tion of any legal or professional business or employment, either directly or indirectly,” (Opinion, p. 15), and, to the extent that the former law was amended, the Act “ broadens the offense specified which theretofore made it unlawful for any person, corporation, partnership or association to act as a runner or capper for an attorney at law or to solicit any business for him, to make it unlawful for a person, association or corporation to solicit any business for an attorney at law or any other person, corporation or association” (Id., p. 17). The Court, however, considering the evidence material and relevant to issues raised as to Chapter 33 on the plead ings, particularly the final issue of fact presented, con cluded that petitioner’s conduct violated Chapter 33. And, therefore, petitioner submits that the record does not sus tain this conclusion. At the outset, it should be said that any assumption that petitioner supplies services or monies in all Virginia litiga tion in which the N.A.A.C.P. is interested or identified goes beyond the record herein. In those litigations which the record shows that petitioner rendered services or monies, or both, the evidence is as follows: 4 In the Prince Edward County school case, the firm of which the regional counsel was then a member was con tacted directly by the parties who by written authorizations directly employed the firm as counsel (ft. 120; PI. Ex. R-9, p p . 211-215) ;* In the Norfolk school case, three attorneys were directly engaged by the parties with authority to enlist other counsel, pursuant to which the regional counsel was by them associated (R. 114-115; PI. Ex. R-9, p. 219); In the Newport News school case, two attorneys were directly retained by the parties and authorized to associate other counsel, and the Fund’s regional attorney associated with them at their request (R. 107, 137, 139, 141, 144, 148, 151, 152, 156, 162, 164, 209; PI. Ex. R-9, p. 219); In the Arlington school case, the Fund’s regional counsel came into the case on request from counsel directly re tained by the parties pursuant to authority from the clients to associate additional counsel (R. 116-118, 166-167, 173, 176, 179, 185-186; PI. Ex. R-9, p. 220); In the Charlottesville school case, counsel directly en gaged by the parties associated, pursuant to authority so to do, additional counsel of whom the Fund’s regional counsel was one (R. 110, 192, 196, 199, 202, 204, 206; PL Ex. R-9, pp. 216-219); In the Warren County school case, the Fund’s regional counsel, on request of the attorney directly employed by the parties, associated with him (R. 130). The executive secretary of the State Conference testified that he did not refer any of the parties to these cases to * References “ R. .. ” are to the record in this case, and those ‘ ‘ PI. Ex. 9, p. are to the printed record in Harrison v. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 360 U.S. 167, which is Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 9 in the record in this case. All such references are to the page numbers printed in the upper left and right corners of the page rather than to the original page numbers. 5 the Conference’s legal staff but that, rather, the parties directly employed their counsel (R. 62-63). Nor is there evidence to suggest that petitioner brought about the em ployment by the parties of the attorneys they selected. Petitioner submits that the record is devoid of evidence upon which it might be concluded that there was solicitation in any of these cases either by it or by its regional counsel. In each instance the employment of initial counsel was direct, in one such instance its regional counsel was one of those directly employed, and in the others he associated at the request of the parties’ attorneys expressly or im plicitly authorized to request his association (PI. Ex. R-9, pp. 334, 388). This was in line with petitioner’s general policy by which assistance is not afforded unless and until the party or his personally-retained attorney specifically requests it (PI. Ex. R-9, pp. 253, 270-271, 272, 280, 290, 319). Petitioner further submits that the conclusion that it has violated the statute is not supported by the evidence. It is not shown that its regional attorney solicited employ ment in any case, or accepted compensation from anyone except petitioner, or accepted employment from anyone except the parties in consequence either of direct engage ment by them or association at the request of their retained counsel. Nor is it shown that petitioner participated in any way save to afford assistance to the litigation after counsel had been engaged. The record does not establish impropriety on the part of counsel directly engaged insofar as their employment is concerned. Even if there were, there is no evidence indica tive of knowledge thereof by petitioner or its counsel. Such knowledge would be essential to the conclusion that the statute was violated, Sec. 54-74(6), and to any con clusion that its assistance was otherwise improper. Whoever may have violated Chapter 33, assuming pro arguendo that someone is blameworthy, the record surely 6 sustains no conclusion other than that petitioner and its regional attorney in Virginia have not violated it and are blameless. Of course, it has long been true that each member of a law firm, irrespective of whether he participated in or knew of the transaction, is civilly liable to a client for the misconduct of any of the firm’s members within the scope of their authority. See, e.g., Warner v. Griswold, 8 Wend. 665 (N.Y. 1832); Gordon v. Coolidge, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5,606 (C.C.D. Me., per Justice S tory ); Priddy v. McKenzie, 205 Mo. 181, 103 S.W. 968 (1907); Anno: Ann. Cas. 1917B, 16-17. But it is also well settled that one member of a law firm is not subject to disbarment or discipline because of the misconduct of any member without knowledge of, or consent to or participation in, the transaction. Compare Klingensmith v. Kepler, 41 Ind. 341 (1872), 50 Ind. 432 (1875); Porter v. Vance, 14 Lea. 629 (Tenn. 1885); Re Luce, 83 Cal. 303, 23 P. 350 (1890); Re Rockmore, 130 App. Div. 586, 117 N.Y.S. 512 (1909); Re Clark, 161 App. Div. 630, 146 N.Y.S. 1030 (1914); In re Maloney, 35 N.D. 1, 153 N.W. 385 (1915); State v. Rreslin, 67 Okla. 125,169 P. 897 (1917); In re Huff, 371 111. 98, 20 N.E. 2d 101 (1939) and Yale v. State Bar, 16 Cal. 2d 175, 105 P. 2d 112 (1940)1 with People ex rel Colorado Bar Asso. v. Betts, 26 Colo. 521, 58 P. 1091 (1899); People ex rel. Morris v. Moutray, 166 111. 630, 47 N.E. 79 (1897); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Asso. v. Bamborough, 255 111. 92, 99 N.E. 368 (1912); Re Helfant, 228 App. Div. 479, 240 N.Y.S. 242 (1930); Re Brown, 389 111. 516, 59 N.E. 2d 855 (1945); In re Buder, 358 Mo. 796, 217 S.W. 2d 563, 576 (1949); and In re Rosenberg, 413 111. 567, 110 N.E. 2d 186 (1953). Similarly, where attorneys, although not general partners, are associated together, one is not subject to disciplinary sanctions because of an associate’s misconduct unless he has knowledge of or par 1 See also Re MeCaughey [1883] 3 Ont. Rep. 425; Re Ross [1895] 16 Ont. Rep. 482; Re Harris [1897] 3 Terr. L. R. (Can.) 70. 7 ticipates in it. Compare Crafts v. Lizotte, 34 R. I. 543, 84 A. 1081 (1912) with In re Ariola, 252 App. Div. 61, 297 N.Y.S. 100 (1937). Moreover, since in Anglo-American jurisprudence crimi nal liability is essentially personal and individual and is also dependent upon proof of individual causation, the doctrine of liability without fault or “ strict liability” has never been accepted in criminal law except with regard to a limited species of offenses variously classified as public welfare or regulatory or civil offenses. Sayre, Crimi nal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 720 (1930); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col. L. Rev. 55 (1933); Gausewitz, Criminal Law—Re Classifica tion of Certain Offenses as Civil Instead of Criminal, 12 Wis. L. Rev. 365 (1937); Hall, Principles of Criminal Law 279-322 (1947). And even the application of “ strict lia bility” to such offenses is unreasonable, unjust and con stitutionally suspect. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285-286 (1943, dissenting opinion); Ex parte Rales, 42 Okla. Cr. Rep. 28, 274 P. 485, 486 (1929); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 128, 110 P. 1027 (1910); Gillespie v. People, 188 111. 176, 58 N.E. 1007 (1900); Lawton v. Steele, 119 N.Y. 226, 23 N.E. 878 (1890); Port Huron v. Jenkinson, 77 Mich. 414, 43 N.W. 923 (1889). See also State v. Schultz, 242 Iowa 1328, 50 N.W. 2d 9 (1951); Canfield, Corporate Re sponsibility for Crime, 14 Col. L. Rev. 469, 480 (1914); Francis, Criminal Responsibility for the Corporation, 18 III. L. Rev. 305 (1924); Laylin and Tuttle, Due Process and Punishment, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 614 (1922). Cf. United States v. Rurdett, 9 Pet. 682 (U.S. 1835); People v. Winter, 288 N.Y. 418, 43 N.E. 2d 470 (1942). Indeed, in view of these latter considerations, it is not surprising that the direct or indirect solicitation of legal or professional business does not fall within the eight categories of offenses for which criminal sanctions are imposed under the doctrine of strict liability. See Perkins, Criminal Law 702-703 (1957). 8 Nor is it surprising that there are only a handful of prose cutions revealed in the reported decisional law of the thirty-odd states with statutes which make it a criminal offense for attorneys or others, or both, to solicit legal business for an attorney or themselves.2 See Worthan v. State, 189 Ala. 395, 66 So. 686 (1914); People v. Gottleib {People v. Levy) 8 Cal. App. 2d 763, 50 P. 2d 509 (1935); Kelley v. Boyne, 239 Mich. 204, 214 N.W. 316 (1927); People v. Galerson, 276 N.Y. 656, 13 N.E. 2d 47 (1938); People ex rel. Moses v. Adams, 172 Misc. 143, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 780 (1939); People v. Levine, 161 Misc. 336, 291 N.Y.S. 1001 (1936); People v. Meola, 193 App. Div. 487, 184 N.Y.S. 353 (1920); People v. Winter, 288 N.Y. 418, 43 N.E. 2d 470 (1942) ;3 Ex parte McCloskey, 82 Tex. Cr. Rep. 531, 199 S.W. 1101 (1918), affirmed McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107 (1920); Ackerman v. State, 124 Tex. Cr. Rep. 125, 61 S.W. 2d 116 (1933); Laird v. State, 156 Cr. Rep. 345, 242 S.W. 2d 374 (1951); Parkins v. State, 116 Tex. Cr. Rep. 52, 28 S.W. 2d 137 (1930), and none of these cases was sustained on the merits absent a record which clearly established actual knowledge, consent or participation in the solicitation of such business or em ployment. Were this not the case, petitioner, in the light of the authorities cited above, suggests that the consti tutionality of this legislation would not have been upheld in the Galerson, Kelley, Adams and McCloskey cases, supra. Therefore, petitioner submits, the Court’s ruling that Chapter 33 applies to petitioner’s activities is not sup ported by the record herein and conflicts with applicable decisional law and apposite authorities. 2 Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. 3 Cf. In re Marrell, 1 App. Div. 2d 328, 149 N.Y.S. 2d 772 (1956). 9 II The Constitutional Validity of Chapter 33 Was Not An Issue Before the Court on This Appeal In its opinion, the Court concluded that “ chapter 33 is a valid regulation of the practice of law, enacted under the police power of the State, and is not violative of any constitutional restrictions,” and, in its judgment or decree, affirmed the order appealed from “ in so far as it holds that Chapter 33, Acts of Assembly, Extra Session, 1956, is a constitutional and valid enactment.” Petitioner submits that the Court erred in making such determination as to it. The history of this litigation in the Federal District Court, prior to institution of suit in the court below, is set forth in the petition for appeal herein (pp. 2-3). As was then pointed out, the District Court entered judgment retaining jurisdiction as to Chapters 33 and 36 pending interpretation of these laws by the courts of Virginia. For this purpose only, suit was brought in the court below. Conformably to Government Employees v. Windsor, 353 TJ.S. 364, petitioner sought construction of the laws in the light of its constitutional contentions made in the District Court. Neither in its pleadings nor in its prayers did petitioner present the question whether Chapter 33 is constitutionally valid; that issue it left for future decision by the District Court. For this reason, the court below made no ruling or adjudication on this question (R. 31). Nor was the issue raised by the assignment of error or conclusions presented to this Court. (R. 51-54). The function of this Court was therefore limited to interpretation of the laws in question, leaving to the District Court decision on all other issues, Spector Motor Service v. Walsh, 135 Conn. 37, 61 A. 2d 89, 92,105 (1948), and it is therefore submitted that, in any event, the opinion and judgment or decree of this Court should be modified accordingly. 10 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, petitioner prays that this Court will review and rehear this case, and vacate or modify its decision and its judgment or decree herein in the particulars specified in this petition. Respectfully submitted, N.A.A.C.P. L e g a l D e f e n s e an d E d u c a t io n a l F u n d , I n c . By: S po t t sw o o d W. R o b in s o n , III, 214 East Clay Street, Room 208, Richmond 19, Virginia. T h u r g o o d M a r s h a l l , 10 Columbus Circle, Suite 1790, New York 19, New York. Counsel for Petitioner. 11 CERTIFICATE I hereby certify that on the 30th day of September, 1960, three copies of the foregoing petition for rehearing were mailed, with first class postage prepaid, to each of the fol lowing persons at their respective addresses shown: David J. Mays, Esquire, Counsel for Respondents, State-Planters Bank Building, Richmond, Virginia. Henry T. Wickham, Esquire, Counsel for Respondents, State-Planters Bank Building, Richmond, Virginia. Honorable Albertis S. Harrison, Jr., Attorney General of Virginia, Supreme Court Building, Richmond, Virginia. S po tt sw o o d W. R o b in s o n , III, Of Counsel for Petitioner .