Safeco Insurance Company of America v City of White House Brief for US EPA
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March 1, 1998

74 pages
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Safeco Insurance Company of America v City of White House Brief for US EPA, 1998. a25b6d67-c39a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/e16694e3-048b-4bab-9315-a9450cb3501b/safeco-insurance-company-of-america-v-city-of-white-house-brief-for-us-epa. Accessed May 12, 2025.
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Nos. 97-6094, 97-6105 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA; EATHERLY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Plaintiffs-Appellants v . CITY OF WHITE HOUSE, TENNESSEE, A Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee-Cross Appellant UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Intervenor-Appellee APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY JONATHAN Z. CANNON General Counsel BILL LANN LEE Acting Assistant Attorney General HOWARD F. CORCORAN MARK D. GORDON KENNETH A. REDDEN Attorneys Office of the General Counsel U . S. Environmental Protection Agency Washington, D.C. 20430 MARK L. GROSS LISA WILSON EDWARDS Attorneys Department of Justice P.O. Box 66078 Washington, D.C. 20035-6078 STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT We think that oral argument would be helpful to the Court in resolving the issues raised in this appeal. TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT STATEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION . . . . 1 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES........................................2 STATEMENT OF THE C A S E ..........................................2 A. Procedural History ................................ .2 B. F a c t s ................................................4 C. District Court Decisions .......................... 14 STANDARDS OF REVIEW....................................... 16 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.................................... 16 ARGUMENT: I. THE EPA REGULATION IS AN OUTREACH PROVISION THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT ANY CONTRACTING DECISION BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF RACE, AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY............... 20 A. The EPA Regulation Requires Only Outreach . . . 20 B. Programs That Require Only Outreach Are Not Subject To Strict Scrutiny .................... 21 C. The EPA Did Not Require Eatherly To Award A Subcontract Based On Race, And Therefore The Application Of The Regulation To Eatherly Is Not Subject To Strict Scrutiny ................ 30 II. THE EPA REGULATION SATISFIES STRICT SCRUTINY . . . . 36 A. The EPA Regulation Was Promulgated Pursuant To An Express Delegation By Congress . . . . . . . 36 B. Congress's Ample Findings of Discrimination Against Minority Businesses Establish A Compelling Interest For Mandating Executive Branch Agencies To Promulgate Remedial Measures...................................... 3 8 -i- TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued): PAGE C. Congress Has Authority Under The Constitution To Mandate Remedies That Are National In Scope, And Neither It Nor The Agency Administering A Federal Program Are Required To Make Localized Findings Of Discrimination Prior To Implementing The Remedy...................................... 42 D. The EPA Regulation Satisfies The Requirements Of Narrow Tailoring .......................... 45 CONCLUSION.................................................. 49 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES: Adarand Constructors. Inc, v. £ena, 965 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Colo. 1997) .................................. 42, 44 Adarand Constructors. Inc, v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) passim Anderson v. City of Bessemer City. 470 U.S. 564 (1985) . . . 31 Billish v. City of Chicago. 962 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1992), on reh'g, 989 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.Men banc), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 908 (1993) 30 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown. 441 U.S. 281 (1979) 36 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) passim Coal Resources, Inc, v. Gulf & Western Indus.. Inc., 865 F . 2d 761 (6th Cir. 1989) ........................... 31 Concrete Works Qf-Colo., .Inc.̂ v. city & County of Denver. 36 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994), cert, denied, 514 U.S. 1004 (1995)................................ 24-25 Contractors. Ass1n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993)........................................ 25 Cortez III Service Corp. v. NASA. 950 F. Supp. 357 (D.D.C. 1996) 42 Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60. 917 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1990)...................................... 23 -ii- CASES (continued): PAGE Domar Electric. Inc, v. City of Los Angeles. 885 P. 2d 934 (Cal. 1995).............................. 26 Ensley Branch. NAACP v. Seibels. 31 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1994)...................................... 30 Ex Parte Virginia. 100 U.S. 339 (1880) .................... 44 F. Buddie Contracting Co. v. City of Elyria. 773 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ohio 1991).................... 25 Fullilove V. Klutznick. 448 U.S. 448 (1980)........ 38, 39, 45 Gilday v. Mecosta County. 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997) . . . 16 Katzenbach v. Morgan. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).................. 44 Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth.. 128 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1997) 31 M.C. West. Inc, v. Lewis. 522 F. Supp. 338 (M.D. Term. 1981) 25 Miami Tele-Communications. Inc, v. City of Miami. 743 F. Supp. 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1990).................... 25 Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson. 125 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1997) 26 Oregon v. Mitchell. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).................... 44 Peightal v . Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545 (llth Cir. 1994).................................. 29, 30 Podberesky v. Kirwan. 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992).......... 23 Raso v. Lago. 1998 WL 21849 (1st Cir. Jan 27, 1998) . . . 27, 28 Safeco Ins. Co. v. City of White House. 36 F.3d 540 (6th Cir.), reh'g denied, 42 F.3d 319 (6th Cir. 1994) ................................ 3, 4, 14 S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Fulton County. 696 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Ga. 1987) .................... 25 United States v. Martin. 25 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 1994) . . . . 16 Wheeler v. McKinley Enters.. 937 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1991) . 31 -iii- Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 ...................................................44 Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, Section 205(a), 40 U.S.C. 486(a) 36 Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. 91-609, 84 Stat. 1813, 15 U.S.C. 694(a), (b) .................... 45 Small Business A c t , .................................... passim Section 3, 15 U.S.C. 632 ................................ 7 15 U.S.C. 632(a) 7 15 U.S.C. 632 (a) ( 2 ) ..........................................7 1978 Amendments to the Small Business Act, Pub. L. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1767, Section 211, 15 U.S.C. 637 .......... passim Section 8(a), 15 U.S.C. 637(a) 40 28 U.S.C. 1 2 9 1 ................................................1 28 U.S.C. 1 3 3 1 ................................................1 28 U.S.C. 1332 1 42 U.S.C. 1983 28 REGULATIONS: 13 C.F.R. Pt. 1 2 1 ..............................................7 40 C.F.R. 31.36(e) 7 40 C.F.R. Part 3 3 ..............................................7 40 C.F.R. 33.005 ...................................... 6, 7 40 C.F.R. 33.240 passim 40 C.F.R. 33.240(a) ..................................... 20 40 C.F.R. 33.240 (a) (1) 20 40 C.F.R. 33.240 (a) (2) 20 40 C.F.R. 33.240 (a) (3) 21 40 C.F.R. 33.240(a)(4) 21 40 C.F.R. 33.240 (a) (5) 21 40 C.F.R. 33.240(a)(6) 6 CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES: PAGE -iv- LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: PAGE To Amend the Small Business Act to Extend the Current SBA 8(a) Pilot Program: Hearings on H.R. 5612 Before the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).......................................... 40 Small and Minority Business in the Decade of the 1980's, Pt. 1, House Committee on Small Business, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) ........................................ 40 Small Business and the Federal Procurement System, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on General Oversight, House Committee on Small Business, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) 41 Hearings on Minority Business and its Contributions to the U.S. Economy, Senate Committee on Small Business, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) 40 Hearings on Federal Contracting Opportunities for Minority and Women-owned Businesses: An Examination of the 8(d) Subcontracting Program Before the Senate Committee on Small Business, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) 41 Hearings on Women Entrepreneurs: Their Success and Problems Before the Senate Committee on Small Business, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).......................................... 41 Hearings on the State of Hispanic Small Business in America Before the Subcommittee on SBA and SBIC Authority, Minority Enterprise and General Small Business Problems of the House Committee on Small Business, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) . 41 Hearings on Minority Enterprise and General Small Business Problems Before the Subcommittee on SBA and SBIC Authority, Minority Enterprise and General Small Business Problems of the Committee on Small Business, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) .................................................. 41 Small Business Problems, House Committee on Small Business, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) ............................ 41 Surety Bonds and Minority Contractors, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) . . . 41 Barriers to Full Minority Participation in Federally Funded Highway Construction Projects, House Committee on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) ................ 41 -v- Minority Construction Contracting, House Committee on Small Business, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) .................. 4 1 Small Disadvantaged Business Issues, House Committee on Armed Services, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991).................... 41 Problems Facing Minority and Women-owned Small Businesses in Procuring U.S. Government Contracts, House Committee on Gov't Operations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) .......... 41 Discrimination in Surety Bonding, House Committee on Small Business, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) .................. 41 H.R. Rep. No. 94-468 (1975)................................ 39 124 Cong. Rec. 29,641 (1978) ............................. 39 124 Cong. Rec. 29,644 (1978) ............................. 40 124 Cong. Rec. 34,097 (1978) ............................. 39 124 Cong. Rec. 35,304 (1978) ............................. 39 48 Fed. Reg. 12,922 (Mar. 28, 1983)...................... 5, 36 61 Fed. Reg. 6,066 (Feb. 15, 1996) .......................... 7 Executive Order 11,458 (Mar. 5, 1969) 38 Executive Order 11,625 (Oct. 13, 1971) ' ..................... 38 Executive Order 12,138 (May 18, 1979) 38 Executive Order 12,432 (July 14, 1983) ............ 18, 36, 37 MISCELLANEOUS: EPA Guidance for Utilization of Small, Minority and Women's Business Enterprises in Procurement Under Assistance Agreements (1986).................................... 47, 48 Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Minority Enterprise and Public Policy 53 (1977) .......... 46 Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum to General Counsels. Daily Labor Rept. (BNA) 125 (June 28, 1995).......................................... 29 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (continued): PAGE -vi- IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Nos. 97-6094, 97-6105 SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA; EATHERLY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. CITY OF WHITE HOUSE, TENNESSEE, A Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee-Cross Appellant UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Intervenor-Appellee APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY STATEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 because the case involved the constitutionality of federal regulations promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The district court also had original jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332. Timely notices of appeal from the district court's orders of August 5, 1997 were filed by Safeco Insurance Company of America, Eatherly Construction Company, and City of White House, Tennessee. This Court has jurisdiction of these appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. -2- STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1. Whether an EPA regulation that requires prime contractors to ensure that small, minority-, and women-owned businesses are solicited to compete for subcontracts, but does not require competitive advantages for these firms, is subject to strict scrutiny. 2. Whether the EPA regulation satisfies strict scrutiny. STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Procedural History This case arises from a declaratory judgment action filed in November 1987 by plaintiff Safeco Insurance Company of America (Safeco). Safeco alleged that it was not liable as surety for damages incurred by the City of White House, Tennessee (City), resulting from an alleged breach of a construction contract by Safeco's insured, Eatherly Construction Company (Eatherly). The bid specification required Eatherly's compliance with an EPA regulation, 40 C.F.R. 33.240, that requires prime contractors to make good faith efforts to ensure that small, minority-, and women-owned businesses are solicited as potential sources for supplies, construction and services. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge that while there was a valid contract between the City and Eatherly, there were disputed factual issues as to whether Eatherly had complied with its obligations under the contract. The City later moved for summary judgment on the grounds -3- that: (1) the district court concluded that Eatherly and the City had a contract; (2) there was no factual issue regarding breach because Eatherly withdrew its bid after it had been accepted; and (3) damages could be ascertained by stipulation. On May 14, 1993, the district court granted the motion and entered judgment against Safeco in the amount of $352,847.08 for substitute performance, plus $207,358.03 in prejudgment interest. On October 3, 1994, this Court affirmed the district court's holding that a binding contract existed between the City and Eatherly, but held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Eatherly breached the contract by failing to comply with the EPA regulation, and vacated the grant of summary judgment. Safeco Ins. Co. v. City of White House. 36 F.3d 540 (6th Cir.), reh'g denied, 42 F.3d 319 (6th Cir. 1994). The Court remanded for further proceedings. 36 F.3d at 548. In June 1995, Safeco moved for summary judgment, arguing that the EPA regulation was unenforceable against Eatherly because it did not satisfy strict scrutiny as required by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Adarand Constructors. Inc, v. Pena. 515 U.S. 200 (1995), and was therefore unconstitutional. The EPA intervened as defendant to defend the regulation. EPA and the City also filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On March 20, 1996, the district court granted EPA's motion for partial summary judgment and the City's motion for summary judgment, and held that the EPA regulation was facially constitutional. After trial, the jury returned a verdict that -4- Eatherly did not satisfy the EPA regulation. On August 5, 1997, the district court entered a decision denying Eatherly's complaint for declaratory judgment, and entered judgment in favor of EPA and the City. B. Facts i. The Contract. Nearly eleven years ago the City entered into a contract with Eatherly to expand the City's sanitary sewer system (TR I 18-20).A/ The construction project was partially funded by a grant from the EPA (TR I 11, 22; Exh. 1 at Inf.-4). Eatherly submitted the lowest bid at $2,643,749.10. Safeco, 36 F.3d at 542. Moore Construction Company submitted the second lowest bid at $2,989,029.56 (id. at 543), $345,280.46 higher than Eatherly's bid. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Eatherly furnished the City with a bid bond, and Safeco signed as Eatherly's surety on the bond (TR I 19). As stated in the bid specifications, Eatherly was required to secure EPA approval of the contract prior to the City issuing its notice to proceed (TR I 22; Exh. 2; TR II 11). As a part of that responsibility, Eatherly had to document compliance with the requirements of 40 C.F.R. 33.240 within ten days after the bid opening (Exh. 3). EPA approval was y “R. __" refers to items listed in the district court's docket sheet. “TR I " refers to pages in the trial transcript dated April 15, 1997. “TR II ” refers to pages in the trial transcript dated April 16, 1997. “TR III __" refers to pages in the trial transcript dated April 17, 1997. “Safeco Br. refers to pages in the brief filed by appellant Safeco/Eatherly. “Exh. " refers to the trial exhibits. -5- required prior to the City's issuance of the notice to proceed. The City had 90 days, or until July 15, 1987, to issue the notice, and Eatherly was prohibited from withdrawing its bid during that period (TR I 34-36; City Exh. 2, 74; TR II 21-22; TR III 22) 2. The EPA regulation. EPA regulation 40 C.F.R. 33.240 was promulgated on March 28, 1983, pursuant to a directive from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that established government policy for clarifying and simplifying existing regulations governing procurement under federal assistance programs. 48 Fed. Reg. 12,922-12,923 (March 28, 1983). OMB Circular A-102, entitled “Grants and Cooperative Agreements with State and Local Governments", sets forth federal standards and guidelines for the procurement of supplies, equipment, construction and services for federal assistance programs. The EPA regulation, incorporating language from Attachment 0 of the Circular, states that it is EPA policy to encourage contractors under EPA grants and cooperative agreements to “award a fair share of subagreements to small, minority, and women's businesses” when they award subcontracts. 40 C.F.R. 33.240; see also OMB Circular A-102, Attachment O (attached as Addendum B). The regulation established that as a condition to receipt of federal funds, recipients of grants and cooperative agreements must take “affirmative steps" to assure that “small, minority, and women's businesses are used when possible as sources of supplies, construction and services." Ibid. The -6- regulation describes “affirmative steps" as: (1) Including qualified small, minority and women's businesses on solicitation lists; (2) Assuring that small, minority, and women's businesses are solicited whenever they are potential sources; (3) Dividing total requirements, when economically feasible, into small tasks or quantities to permit maximum participation of small, minority, and women's businesses; (4) Establishing delivery schedules, where the requirements of the work permit, which will encourage participation by small, minority, and women's businesses; (5) Using the services and assistance of the Small Business Administration and the Office of Minority Business Enterprise of the U.S. Department of Commerce, as appropriate. The regulation requires that these affirmative steps be taken by a recipient's prime contractor when awarding subcontracts on EPA- funded projects. 40 C.F.R. 33.240(a)(6). EPA defines a minority business enterprise (MBE) as a business that is “(1) [c]ertified as socially and economically disadvantaged by the Small Business Administration, (2) certified as a minority business enterprise by a State or Federal agency, or (3) an independent business concern which is at least 51 percent owned and controlled by minority group member(s)." 40 C.F.R. 33.005. The regulation describes a minority group member as an individual who is a citizen of the United States and either a Black American, Hispanic American, Native American, or Asian- Pacific American. 40 C.F.R. 33.005. A women's business enterprise (WBE) is a business that is certified as such by a state or federal agency, or an independent business concern at least 51 percent owned by a woman or women who also control and -7- operate it. 40 C.F.R. 33.005. In defining “small business," the regulation adopts the definition provided by Section 3 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632). 40 C.F.R. 33.005. This statutory provision defines a small business as one that “is not dominant in its field of operation." 15 U.S.C. 632(a). The statute also permits the Small Business Administration (SBA) to specify detailed definitions for determining a small business based on, for example, number of employees, dollar volume of business, net worth, and net income. 15 U.S.C. 632(a)(2); see also 13 C.F.R. Pt. 121 (small business size regulations).^ 3. Eatherly1s actions taken to satisfy the EPA regulation. Eatherly Construction Company was managed by its owner, Robert Eatherly (TR III 173). Robert Eatherly started his business in 1952, and has worked on other EPA-funded projects prior to being awarded the City's contract to construct the sanitary sewer system (TR III 6, 50). Mr. Eatherly stated that he has secured MBE participation on some EPA-funded projects (TR III 52). He also stated that he has had EPA-funded contracts where he has had nc MBE participation, and EPA approved the contract (TR III 52-53). Eatherly's estimator, James Stacey, prepared the company's bid for the City's sanitary sewer system project (TR I 72). When Eatherly's bid was accepted, Stacey was * v On February 15, 1996, the EPA issued a final rule deleting the entire Part 33, including 40 C.F.R. 33.240 and 33.005, from its regulations. See 61 Fed. Reg. 6,066 (Feb. 15, 1996). The affirmative steps set forth in 40 C.F.R. 33.240 continue to apply to assistance agreements with states and local governments pursuant to 40 C.F.R. 31.36(e). -8- assigned the responsibility of soliciting small, minority-, and women-owned firms to compete for subcontracts on the project in order to satisfy the EPA requirements (TR I 84). Stacey had never before been involved with soliciting MBE or WBE participation on construction projects (TR II 13-14, 52). Pursuant to the bid specifications, Eatherly was required to satisfy the six steps for soliciting small, minority-, and women- owned businesses to bid on subcontracts (Exh. 2, 3). There was no numerical goal, either in the contract or region-wide, that either the City or Eatherly, as prime contractor, was expected to meet to satisfy EPA requirements (R. 233: Attachment I at 6 (declaration of Nancy Barron)). Stacey met with the City's engineer, Ed Walker, to talk about the items that had to be submitted pursuant to the contract, including documentation of Eatherly's compliance with 40 C.F.R. 33.240 (TR III 68-69). Walker told Stacey that Nancy Barron, who worked at the EPA's Atlanta office, could assist him in locating MBE and WBE subcontractors (TR I 87). Stacey had a list of small, minority-, and women-owned firms compiled by the Tennessee Department of Economic and Community Development (TR I 87; Exh. 5). He told Barron that he was sending bid invitations by certified mail to ten local contractors inviting bids for work on pavement, sidewalk and curb replacement, road boring, and gravity sewer lines (TR I 90; TR II 5-6). Stacey later sent Barron a copy of the invitations for bids, and a list of the ten businesses to which he sent the invitation (TR I 91; Exhs. 6, 7). -9- Barron told Stacey to call her when he got responses to the letters (TR I 89). Stacey did not receive any responses (TR I 95). Three of the letters were returned by the Post Office (TR II 56, 59; Exh. 8), and one letter was sent to a contractor who was dead, and no one was operating the business (TR III 117). Another letter was sent to an electrical firm, although the invitation for bids did not solicit for electrical work (Exh. 5 at 36; Exh. 6 at 3). Despite Barron's request, Stacey did not send her certified receipts from the mailings or return receipt cards showing that the letters were received by the recipients (TR II 107-108). Barron considered Stacey's list of ten firms incomplete because the addresses lacked zip codes, telephone numbers, and there was no indication that Stacey followed through with phone calls to these businesses (TR II 114; TR III 116). Despite the lack of responses, Stacey told Barron that he would be able to comply with the regulation (R. 233: Attachment I at 4 (declaration of Nancy Barron)). Stacey testified that he called one firm on the list, but the owner informed him that he was too busy to perform the work (TR I 97-98). Barron informed Stacey that his submission was inadequate (TR III 115), and advised him to contact Cecil Conley, who worked for the Office of Business Enterprise in the Tennessee Department of Economic and Community Development (TR I 105; TR III 116). Conley specializes in certifying small, minority-, and women-owned firms as “disadvantaged businesses” and works with -10- federal and local government agencies, as well as large construction companies, helping them to identify small, minority-, and women-owned firms for contracting opportunities (TR III 85). Although Stacey testified that he tried unsuccessfully to reach Conley (TR I 105), Conley testified that he did not receive any telephone calls, messages, or letters from Robert Eatherly or James Stacey during the spring of 1987, and never met with either (TR III 87-88). Conley further testified that the secretary's telephone log did not reflect any such calls, and that if there were multiple messages, the secretary would have informed a supervisor (TR III 88-89). Conley stated that had Stacey or Eatherly contacted him, he would have provided the names of numerous minority- and women-owned businesses throughout the State that could perform the work that they wanted to subcontract (TR III 90-93). During the trial, Conley named several potential minority-owned businesses that Stacey could have contacted (TR III 90-93). Conley testified that during his 15 years working with the State and coordinating efforts with EPA, he was not aware of any instance where a contractor failed to secure EPA compliance with the good faith efforts provision of 40 C.F.R. 33.240 (TR III 95; see also TR III 74 (testimony of Ed Walker)). In June 1987, the City's attorney, David Amonette, sent a letter to Robert Eatherly informing him that the City wanted to announce a starting date for constructing the sanitary sewer system, and asked Eatherly to give the EPA compliance matter his -11- “closest attention" (Exh. 27). During a conference call on June 10, Stacey told Barron that he had talked to HMC Contractors, a minority-owned business (TR II 131, 147-148), about the possibility of doing paving work for the sewer system project (TR I 99-100; TR III 123-124) and that it was his intention to use that company (TR III 149). Barron told Stacey that she needed him to confirm that in writing so that she would have proper documentation (TR III 124). David Amonette told Stacey to send the letter to Barron by Federal Express (TR II 27; TR III 125, 147). Barron and Amonette understood Stacey to say that he would do that (TR II 27; TR III 141, 149), and Amonette sent a letter to Stacey confirming their understanding that Stacey would send the letter to Barron (Exh. 11). Barron said during the conference call that she would give approval for the project once she received that information from Stacey (TR III 124). Stacey never sent the letter to Barron (TR III 125). After the June 10 conference call, neither Stacey nor Eatherly made any further efforts to solicit small, minority-, or women-owned firms for subcontracting on the project (TR II 29-30). During this time, Eatherly was informed by his pipe supplier that he could not hold the price of the pipes for Eatherly, and that the price would increase by $26,000 (TR III 26). When Barron then called Stacey about the letter, he told her that he did not send it because he felt that he could not commit to using HMC since he did not have a formal written agreement from that company (TR III 125-126). Barron testified that she -12- understood that there was no formal agreement between Eatherly and HMC (TR III 128), but said that she needed only written confirmation that Stacey intended to subcontract with HMC if the firm was available at the appropriate time (TR III 124, 127). Barron testified that had Eatherly not utilized HMC, it would be required only to inform EPA and try to solicit another firm for the work at a comparable price (TR III 127-130, 136). Charlie Batemen, the secretary/treasurer of HMC, testified that he was already working on many projects, but that when it was time for the paving work to be done he would have considered taking the job depending on his firm's availability (TR I 100; TR II 136, 140) . Barron testified that the regulation required prime contractors only to make a good faith effort to solicit and utilize small, minority-, and women-owned subcontractors (TR II 105-106, 110-111). She said a good faith effort meant contacting these businesses by mail or advertising in newspapers to let them know of subcontracting opportunities, and giving them sufficient time to bid (TR III 112). Barron stated that she never required Eatherly to subcontract with a minority firm on the project (TR III 133). She testified that she would have approved Eatherly's contract had it made a good faith effort to solicit MBEs, even if it had not successfully employed an MBE on a subcontract (TR III 133-135). Barron testified that she asked Stacey to put any intent to use an MBE in writing, because documentation is required for EPA approval and explained that requirement to -13- Stacey (TR III 124-125). When a contractor makes a commitment to use a specific subcontractor but is unable to abide by the commitment because of changed circumstances, the EPA requires the contractor to notify the agency and make a good faith effort to solicit another MBE to compete for the subcontract (TR III 129- 130) . Barron stated that where a prime contractor receives bids from MBEs or WBEs that are not competitive with those submitted by non-minority or non-women-owned firms, there is no expectation that the contractor will utilize the MBE or WBE, and there is no administrative penalty for failing to use those firms (R. 233: Attachment I at 6 (declaration of Nancy Barron)). Barron stated that EPA has approved contractors who in good faith satisfy the affirmative steps, and document their compliance, but who are unable to obtain any MBE or WBE participation on a project (R. 233: Attachment I at 6-7 (declaration of Nancy Barron)). She stated that the failure to subcontract with an MBE or WBE does not result in noncompliance with the EPA regulation (R. 233: Attachment I at 7). The period for Eatherly to satisfy EPA's regulation so that the City could issue its notice to proceed was to expire on July 15, 1987 (TR I 36). On June 17, 1987, Robert Eatherly met with City officials (TR III 153) and announced that he was withdrawing his bid on the sewer system project (TR III 29, 153). He told the City that he had not secured EPA approval (TR III 28) and that the cost of the pipes that he would need to do the work had -14- increased significantly (TR III 28). The City awarded the contract to Moore Construction Company, the second lowest bidder. Safeco, 36 F.3d at 543. Moore obtained EPA approval and completed the construction for its bid of $2,998,029.56, plus $20,000 for the increase in the price of materials between the bid date and the contract date. Ibid. C. District Court Decisions 1. On March 20, 1996, the district court entered an order and opinion holding that the EPA regulation is facially constitutional, and does not trigger strict scrutiny analysis because it “merely seek[s] to ensure that minority firms are fairly notified of and considered for subcontracting opportunities" (R. 2 60 at 6) . The court stated that the regulation does not require prime contractors to subcontract with minority firms, and does not establish set-asides, numerical goals, penalties or financial incentives giving minority firms any competitive advantage (R. 260 at 6). Rather, the regulation requires prime contractors only to make “good faith efforts" to take certain steps to ensure that small, minority-, and women- owned firms are aware of and considered for subcontracting opportunities (R. 260 at 6). The district court found further that the regulation is not unconstitutionally vague, since the steps required of prime contractors are set out in the contract and the “Notice of Bidders” (R. 260 at 6-7). The district court concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the regulation was applied in an unconstitutional manner to Eatherly, -15- and denied summary judgment with respect to that issue (R. 260 at 7) . 2. During April 15-17, 1997, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on whether the EPA regulation was applied to Eatherly in a constitutional manner. A jury was empaneled to determine the factual question whether Eatherly undertook good faith efforts to comply with the regulation. On April 18, 1997, the jury returned a verdict that: (1) Eatherly did not comply with EPA regulations which required it to make good faith efforts to solicit small, minority-, and women-owned business participation, and to document its efforts to do so; and (2) it would not have been futile for Eatherly, acting with reasonable diligence, to obtain EPA approval during the 28-day period following withdrawal of its bid. On August 5, the district court entered an order holding that EPA applied the regulation to Eatherly in a constitutional manner (R. 308, 309). The district court denied Eatherly's complaint for declaratory judgment, and entered judgment in favor of EPA on this issue (R. 308, 309). The district court found that “Eatherly did not document and submit to the approving officials in good faith its efforts to comply with the requirements of 40 C.F.R. 33.240, to solicit and consider minority and women's businesses for subcontracting" (R. 308 at 11). The district court further found that it would not have been futile for Eatherly to try to show that it complied with the -16- regulation (R. 308 at 11). The court held that the regulation did not require Eatherly to subcontract any specific portion of the project to a small, minority-, or woman-owned firm in order for EPA to authorize the contract (R. 308 at 3); nor did the regulation “require or induce Eatherly to award contracts on the basis of race" (R. 308 at 11) . The district court concluded that Eatherly's decision to withdraw its bid “was voluntary and not due to any unlawful acts or omissions on the part of the United States or the EPA” and that EPA acted “in a constitutional and lawful manner with regard to the contract at issue" (R. 308 at 11) . Based on these findings, the district court entered monetary judgment against Safeco, and ordered it to pay the City the principal amount of $352,847.08, plus costs and attorneys' fees (R. 310) . STANDARDS OF REVIEW The district court's grant of a summery judgment motion should be reviewed si£ novo. Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 762 (6th Cir. 1997). The district court's factual findings should be reviewed for clear error, and the court's conclusions of law should be reviewed si£ novo. United States v. Martinf 25 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 1994). SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The EPA regulation does not require race-conscious decision making affecting any individual, and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny. The regulation is merely an outreach provision -17- designed to ensure that a wide variety of firms, including small, minority-, and women-owned firms, are aware of opportunities for subcontracts on EPA-funded projects. As the district court found, the regulation does not establish numerical goals, set-asides, financial incentives, or other competitive advantages to encourage the use of minority-owned firms, and does not create any competitive barriers that make it more difficult for non-minority firms to be awarded subcontracts. The regulation is designed only to enhance equal opportunity, and does not discriminate against any person because of race. Strict scrutiny is not required. Moreover, the record shows that the regulation was not applied to Eatherly in a manner that required the consideration of race in the issuance of any contract or subcontract. The agency never required Eatherly to retain a minority firm in order to secure EPA approval of the construction contract. Nancy Barron, the EPA staff person overseeing the project, asked Eatherly's employee, James Stacey, only to use good faith efforts to inform minority businesses of opportunities to compete for subcontracts and provide documentation of those efforts. Eatherly failed to satisfy that obligation. Stacey's mailing proved ineffective and failed to produce any responses — five of the ten mailings were either returned, sent to a deceased contractor, or directed to a company that did not do the type of work being subcontracted. Stacey failed to follow through on Barron's advice to contact a state official who specializes in -18- identifying small, minority-, and women-owned firms for subcontracting opportunities. Stacey also refused to document any discussions with a potential minority-owned firm which Eatherly indicated it might use to perform the paving work on the project. Eatherly's bid was over $345,000 lower than the second lowest bidder. Prior to any final action taken by EPA, and upon receiving a report that the cost of pipes had increased significantly, Eatherly withdrew its bid. EPA never informed Eatherly that it must contract with a minority firm to satisfy EPA's regulatory requirements. Strict scrutiny is clearly inappropriate. Should this Court nonetheless decide that strict scrutiny applies here, the regulation satisfies that level of review. The regulation is a valid exercise of authority delegated to the Executive Branch by Congress under Section 211 of the 1978 Amendments to the Small Business Act. Section 211 of the Act sets forth Congress's mandate that small businesses, including minority-owned firms, be given the “maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the performance of contracts let by any Federal agency." Pursuant to that mandate, Executive Order 12,432 directs federal agencies to develop ways to encourage greater minority business subcontracting by federal prime contractors, and by recipients of federal grants and cooperative agreements. In response to the Executive Order, EPA promulgated 40 C.F.R. 33.240, which encourages recipients of EPA funds and their prime contractors to solicit minority firms for -19- subcontracts, without requiring that such firms be retained. Under strict scrutiny, the use of racial criteria affecting decision-making must be supported by a compelling governmental interest, and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Because Congress reviewed and considered significant findings that discrimination against minority firms in public and private contracting and in the construction industry has hindered the opportunity of minority firms to secure federal contracts and subcontracts, the government has a compelling interest supporting measures to ensure that minority firms are included in the federal contracting process. Prior to the passage of Section 211 of the Small Business Act in 1978, Congress had observed the continuing problems experienced by minority firms in securing business opportunities. Since passage of Section 211, Congress has engaged in ongoing review of the status of minority business participation in contracting, both in the private and public sectors and in federal procurement and construction. The overwhelming evidence showing the continuing existence of problems faced by minority businesses establishes a compelling interest for remedial measures. Because the EPA regulation is merely an outreach provision, and does not create any barriers to non-minority firms seeking subcontracts, it easily satisfies the narrow tailoring requirements of strict scrutiny. -20- ARGUMENT I THE EPA REGULATION IS AN OUTREACH PROVISION THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT ANY CONTRACTING DECISION BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF RACE, AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY A. The EPA Regulation Requires Only Outreach Safeco argues (Br. 26-27) that the EPA regulation is a “racial preference" and that strict scrutiny must apply in evaluating its constitutionality. But, as the district court properly determined, the regulation is not subject to strict scrutiny because the affirmative steps set forth in 40 C.F.R. 33.240 do not require a contractor to engage in race-conscious decision-making. The regulation requires prime contractors under EPA grants and cooperative agreements, when awarding subcontracts, to “assure that small, minority, and women's businesses are used when possible as sources of supplies, construction and services." 40 C.F.R. 33.240(a). To fulfill that objective, the EPA requires such contractors to “[i]nclud[e] qualified small, minority, and women's businesses on solicitation lists[,] [and] [a]ssur[e] that [these] businesses are solicited whenever they are potential sources." 40 C.F.R. 33.240(a)(1), (2). The regulation also directs such contractors to divide supply, construction and service needs into “small tasks or quantities to permit maximum participation" by these businesses, “[e]stablish delivery schedules" that encourage their participation, and use the “services and assistance of the Small Business Administration and the Office of Minority Business -21- Enterprise of the U.S. Department of Commerce" when seeking potential subcontractors for EPA-funded projects. 40 C.F.R. 33.240(a)(3), (4), (5). None of these provisions grant minority firms competitive advantages, or require prime contractors to hire minority firms as subcontractors. Rather, the EPA regulation seeks only to “ensure that minority firms are fairly notified of and considered for subcontracting opportunities” (R. 260 at 6) , by requiring prime contractors to take certain steps that will enhance the pool from which subcontractors competitively bid for contracting opportunities on EPA-funded projects. The regulation establishes no numerical goals, set-asides, quotas, or financial incentives to encourage the use of minority-owned firms, and therefore does not create any barriers that make it more difficult for non minorities to be awarded a subcontract. The regulation is designed to maximize participation by small, minority-, and women-owned firms in the bidding process, not to give these businesses an advantage over non-minority firms. B. Programs That Require Only Outreach Are Not Subject To Strict Scrutiny Regulatory or statutory provisions that do not utilize race for purposes of decision-making are not subject to strict scrutiny. In Adarand Constructors. Inc. v. Pena. 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny applies to a governmentally imposed racial classification that may deny an individual a benefit or otherwise detrimentally affect an individual based on that individual's race. The racial -22- classification under challenge in Adarand was incorporated into a subcontracting compensation clause included in bidding contracts for federal highway projects. Under the subcontracting compensation clause, prime contractors were compensated for the additional cost associated with awarding subcontracts to small businesses owned and operated by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. Under the program, small businesses owned and operated by minorities were presumed socially and economically disadvantaged. 515 U.S. at 205. The Department of Transportation awarded a prime contract for a highway construction project to Mountain Gravel and Construction Co. When Mountain Gravel solicited bids for subcontractors, Adarand submitted the lowest bid. Ibid. Gonzales Construction Co., a minority-owned business, also submitted a bid. Despite Adarand's low bid, Mountain Gravel awarded the subcontract to Gonzales to take advantage of the bonus authorized by the subcontracting compensation clause. The race of Gonzales' owner thereby was a factor in its receipt of the contract, and the prime contractor's decision not to give it to Adarand. Ibid. While the Supreme Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the racial classification challenged in Adarand, it did find that this kind of race-based decision making, even when congressionally imposed, required analysis under strict scrutiny. The Court stated, “whenever the government treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely -23- within the language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection," idj. at 229-230, and held that strict scrutiny applies to federal racial classifications. Id. at 224, 227. This kind of racial classification presented in Adarand is similar to the state-sponsored program that was subjected to strict scrutiny in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.. 488 U.S. 469, 495-496 (1989). In Croson, the Supreme Court subjected the City of Richmond's Minority Business Utilization Plan to strict scrutiny because it required prime contractors awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of each contract to minority-owned businesses. Id. at 477. Other racial classifications that require decision-making based on race and therefore have been subjected to strict scrutiny include a state university's decision to create a minority-only scholarship program (Podberesky v. Kirwan. 956 F.2d 52, 54-55 (4th Cir. 1992)), and a school board's decision to retain a less-senior black social worker over a white social wotker during a reduction-in-force (Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60. 917 F.2d 431, 437-438 (10th Cir. 1990)). Unlike those cases, the EPA regulation does not require any contractor to give an advantage to minority subcontractors over non-minority subcontractors. While Eatherly was required to carry out the affirmative outreach steps set forth in 40 C.F.R. 33.240, it was not required to award a subcontract to an MBE as a condition of performing the contract. The EPA simply required Eatherly to take steps to ensure that MBEs were aware of and had -24- an opportunity to compete for subcontracts. Moreover, under the regulation, MBEs compete for available subcontracts on the same terms as all other firms. Minority firms are not given any competitive advantage; there is no regulatory requirement that an MBE be awarded a subcontract where that firm is not the lowest bidder (see supra p. 13). Rather, the regulation helps facilitate participation by MBEs by requiring prime contractors to actively solicit and include MBEs in the bidding process, as well as small businesses and WBEs. Under the EPA regulation, prime contractors under EPA grants and cooperative agreements are merely required to include qualified small, minority-, and women- owned businesses when soliciting subcontracting opportunities for EPA-funded projects. A contractor is not required to enlist an MBE or WBE. Safeco argues (Br. 27-28) that, even though the regulation contains no numerical goals, set-asides, quotas or financial incentives for minority firms, the EPA's outreach provision is subject to strict scrutiny. Safeco cites various cases in support of its claim. However, Safeco's reliance on these cases is misplaced. Each of the cases cited by Safeco involves a constitutional challenge to a local ordinance or federal regulation that included specific numerical goals or quotas for hiring minority- or women-owned firms. The courts in those cases determined that since the ordinance or regulation mandated specific numerical hiring goals, they were each subject to heightened scrutiny. See Concrete Works of Colo.. Inc, v. City & -25- Cnnntv of nenver. 36 F.3d 1513, 1516 (10th Cir. 1994) (city ordinance required the establishment of numerical goals on a project-by-project basis for the participation of MBEs and WBEs in city projects), cert, denied, 514 U.S. 1004 (1995); Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia. 6 F.3d 990, 994 (3d Cir. 1993) (city ordinance set goals for participation of disadvantaged businesses in city contracts: 15% for MBEs, 10% for WBEs, and 2% for businesses owned by handicapped persons); Zj. Buddie Contracting Co. v. City of Elyria. 773 F. Supp. 1018, 1023 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (city ordinance set MBE goal at 14% and WBE goal at 3% for construction, repair or maintenance contracts, and an MBE goal of 5% and WBE goal of 3% for supplies, services and professional contracts); Miami Tele-Communications. Inc, v. City of Miami. 743 F. Supp. 1573, 1579 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (city ordinance required cable TV licensees to employ MBEs for 20% of its contracted expenditures); M.C. West. Inc, v. Lewis, 522 F. Supp. 338, 340, 343 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (district court characterized as a “preference" a federal regulation that, as administered, adopted contract goals for highway projects in Tennessee at 2-1/2% for MBEs and 1% for WBEs); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Fulton County. 696 F. Supp. 1480, 1482 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (DOT regulation required the establishment of annual percentage goals for the dollar value of work expected to be awarded to MBEs, and, where appropriate, goals on each specific prime contract). The EPA regulation at issue here, however, does not impose -26- any numerical goals, set-asides, quotas, or financial incentives for contracting with minority firms. There is no requirement that a number or percentage of contracts or subcontracts be awarded to minority firms. The EPA regulation is also fundamentally different from the “good faith efforts" provision ruled unconstitutional in Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 1997). The contracting provision adopted by the State of California required prime contractors to subcontract 15% of the contract to MBEs, 5% to WBEs, and 3% to firms owned by disabled veterans, for a total subcontracting goal of 23%. Ibid. While prime contractors who were minority-, female-, or disabled-veteran-owned could satisfy this percentage goal by retaining a percentage of the work for themselves, contractors not within these protected classes were required to subcontract out 23% of the work on a public contract, or at minimum engage in good faith efforts to achieve this numerical goal. The court held that this dichotomy placed those preferred firms at a competitive advantage by exempting them from subcontracting requirements. Id. at 709. Again, the EPA's regulation does not impose any such requirements, and does not place non-minority- or non-female-owned firms at a competitive disadvantage. See, e.q.. Domar Electric. Inc, v. City Pf LOS Angeles. 885 P.2d 934, 941 (Cal. 1995) (city outreach program that requires prime contractors to document good faith efforts to seek out MBEs and WBEs to compete for subcontracting opportunities “does not compel them to set aside * * * -27 contract[s] [for] MBEs or WBEs" and “provides no incentive to a bidder to use MBEs or WBEs if they are inferior in cost or ability") . Recently, the First Circuit held in Raso v. Lago. __ F.3d 1998 WL 21849 (1st Cir. Jan. 27, 1998), that an affirmative fair marketing plan for a newly constructed, government- subsidized residential complex that was designed to further a federal objective of making housing available to a broad pool of city residents did not trigger strict scrutiny. The fair marketing plan challenged in Base gave a 55% tenancy preference to former residents of the community where the complex was located, and a 45% preference to all other applicants for occupancy in the complex located in the Old West End section of Boston. The former residents, mostly white, were forced to relocate when their homes were taken 30 years ago by eminent domain. State law required that the former residents be given a “preference in the selection of tenants for dwelling units built in the project area." 1998 WL 21849 at *1. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) granted funds for construction and subsidies for low income units in the new complex. Pursuant to HUD policy, and a 1991 consent decree, HUD required that some percentage of units be made openly available to all persons to further HUD's obligations under the consent decree that federally assisted housing located in predominantly white neighborhoods achieve a racial composition that reflects the city as a whole. While minorities made up 41% -28- of Boston's population, only 2% of former West End residents were minorities. 1998 WL 21849 at *2. The former West End residents brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the tenant selection process and the plan. The former residents alleged that the plan was a prohibited racial classification that violated equal protection. The court of appeals held that the plan did not violate equal protection, and indeed was not subject to strict scrutiny, because it did not give a preference to one race over another. The court stated that “the apartments freed from the statutory [residential] preference are made available to all applicants regardless of race." 1998 WL 21849 at *5. The court held that HUD's decision to condition the receipt of federal funds by requiring that “some of the apartments — which otherwise would have almost automatically been occupied by whites — be made available to all applicants on a race-blind basis * * * cannot [be] viewfed] * * * as a 'racial classification' reserving benefits for a favored race." Ibid. Similar to the tenant selection plan upheld in Rasof the EPA regulation does not seek to give a preference to one race over another. Because it seeks only to ensure that a wide variety of firms are sought out and considered for subcontracting opportunities, the regulatory provision, like the fair housing marketing plan in Rasof should not be subject to strict scrutiny. The Justice Department, in its review of the Adarand decision that was disseminated to all federal agencies, concluded -29- that outreach and recruitment aimed at minorities or women of the sort set out in the EPA regulation at issue, generally did not fall within strict scrutiny because race or sex is not a factor in any contracting or hiring decision. See Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum to General Counsels at E—3, Daily Labor Rept. (BNA) No. 125 (June 29, 1995) d33. Courts that have addressed outreach have characterized such practices as race-neutral. In Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545 (11th Cir. 1994), the court of appeals evaluated the constitutionality of an affirmative action plan that sought to redress prior discrimination against minorities and women in a county fire department. Plaintiff, a white male, applied to become a firefighter when the department was hiring pursuant to a program that called for the selection of black, Hispanic, and female applicants in accordance with certain goals. Despite plaintiff's high score on the firefighter examination, black, Hispanic and female applicants were hired over plaintiff in order to satisfy the terms of the affirmative action plan. Id. at 1548-1549. In evaluating the affirmative action plan under the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny, the court of appeals observed that the county had engaged in “race-neutral measures" for remedying the discrimination against women and minorities. The race-neutral measures were: (1) “initiat[ing] high school and college recruiting programs to provide information and to solicit applications from young minorities and women for firefighting -30- positions”; (2) engaging in “outreach programs"; and (3) designating a “recruitment specialist to organize and implement a special recruitment program." Id. at 1557-1558; see also Billish V. City of Chicago. 962 F.2d 1269, 1290 (7th Cir. 1992) (“aggressive recruiting" considered a race-neutral measure), on reh'g, 989 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 908 (1993); Ensley Branch. NAACP v. SeibelS, 31 F.3d 1548, 1571 (11th Cir. 1994) (actively encouraging minorities to apply for positions deemed race-neutral). Because the EPA regulation requires prime contractors under EPA grants and cooperative agreements only to solicit minority businesses to compete for subcontracts, and does not impose any numerical goals, set-asides, quotas, or financial incentives to ensure that these minority firms are awarded subcontracts, the regulation does not require any race-conscious decision-making that would warrant strict scrutiny review. C. The EPA Did Not Require Eatherlv To Award A Subcontract Based On Race. And Therefore The Application Qf The Regulation To Eatherlv Is Not Subject To Strict Scrutiny Safeco argues (Br. 29-30) that Nancy Barron, the EPA staff person assigned to oversee Eatherly's compliance with the agency's regulations, denied approval because Eatherly failed to employ a minority-owned business. This claim conflicts with the facts established at trial and found by the jury. At the outset, EPA never formally or finally denied approval of Eatherly's contract because Eatherly withdrew its bid prior to EPA taking any final action. There was, quite simply, no final action taken -31- by EPA against which the court could apply strict scrutiny. The trial court's factual findings may only be set aside if clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer Cityf 470 U.S. 564, 574-575 (1985); Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth.. 128 F.3d 337, 341* (6th Cir. 1997). A finding is clearly erroneous “when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson. 470 U.S. at 573. “This standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently.” Ibid. Similarly, in reviewing civil jury verdicts to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the judgment, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Coal Resources. Inc, v. Gulf & Western Indus.. Inc.f 865 F.2d 761 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). When presented with conflicting evidence, credibility determinations are properly made by the jury. Wheeler v. McKinley Enters., 937 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1991). In the present case, there is more than sufficient evidence to support the district court's finding, and the jury's verdict, that Eatherly failed to satisfy its obligation adequately to solicit minority businesses, and then withdrew its bid prior to the EPA granting or denying approval of its bid proposal. There is also ample evidence to support the district court's determination that Nancy Barron properly applied the regulation -32- by requiring Eatherly only to make a good faith effort to solicit minority-owned businesses to compete for subcontracts on the City construction project, and that she never preconditioned EPA approval on the award of a contract to a minority business. James Stacey, the estimator for Eatherly, was assigned by owner Robert Eatherly the responsibility of securing EPA approval on the City of White House sewer construction contract (see supra p. 7-8). The only written documentation of Eatherly's efforts to comply with the EPA regulation is a handwritten list of ten minority subcontractors to whom Eatherly allegedly sent invitations to bid (supra p. 8). Stacey sent the list to Barron, who expressed concern that the information was incomplete since some of the contractor listings lacked zip codes, telephone numbers, and there was no indication that Stacey followed through with phone calls to the firms (supra p. 8-9). Indeed, the record shows that three letters were returned by the Post Office, a fourth letter was sent to a contractor who was dead, and a fifth letter was sent to an electrical contractor, even though the invitation for bids did not announce the need for electrical work (supra p. 9). Stacey testified that he received no responses from the mailing. Despite Barron's concerns over the adequacy of Stacey's mailing, Stacey assured her that he would complete the solicitation and documentation requirements (siiEra p. 9) . In an effort to assist Stacey, Barron told him to call Cecil Conley, a state official who specialized in assisting companies in identifying small, minority-, and women-owned firms for -33- subcontracting opportunities (supra p. 9). But Stacey did not follow through on Barron's advice. Conley testified that he did not receive any telephone calls or messages from Stacey or anyone else at Eatherly. Conley testified that had Stacey called him, he would have been able to contact numerous minority-owned firms qualified to bid for the kind of work that Eatherly sought to subcontract out (supra p. 10). Conley testified that during the 15 years that he has worked with EPA, he was not aware of any instance where a contractor failed to secure compliance with the good faith efforts provision set forth in 40 C.F.R. 33.240 (supra p. 10). During a telephone conference call in June 1987, Stacey told Barron that he had talked to HMC, a minority-owned firm, about doing paving work for the sewer system project, and that it was his intent to use that company. Barron told Stacey that he should record his discussions with the minority subcontractor in writing, and send it to her to satisfy EPA requirements that such contacts be in writing (supra p. 11). Stacey never sent the letter to Barron, and after the conference call that day, he did nothing further to solicit small, minority-, or women-owned firms for subcontracting on the project. Around this time, Robert Eatherly was informed by his pipe supplier that the cost of pipes would increase by $26,000 (silfira p. 11) . Barron later called Stacey to find out why he had not sent the letter. He told her that he did not write the letter because he did not have a formal written agreement with HMC (supra p. 11- -34- 12). Barron testified that she understood that there was no formal agreement between Eatherly and HMC, but that Barron asked only for written confirmation from Stacey that his company intended to subcontract with HMC at the appropriate time (supra p. 12). Barron never told Eatherly that it was required to utilize HMC (TR II at 129-130). Barron testified that had Eatherly not utilized HMC, it would have merely been required to inform EPA and then try to use good faith efforts to solicit other small, minority-, or woman-owned firms to compete for the subcontract (supra p. 13). Barron testified that she would have approved Eatherly's contract had it made a good faith effort to solicit small, minority-, or women-owned firms to compete for subcontracting opportunities on the sewer project. She stated that EPA contracts are approved without MBE or WBE participation, where prime contractors show good faith in soliciting participation and document those efforts (supra p. 13). Eatherly has even worked on numerous EPA-funded projects, prior to the City of White House project, some of which have been approved by EPA without any MBE or WBE participation (supra p. 7). Eatherly withdrew its bid on June 17, 1987, one month before the expiration of the 90-day period during which Eatherly was prohibited by contract from withdrawing its bid. These facts, established at trial and found by the jury, demonstrate that the EPA did nothing more than request documentation of Eatherly's efforts to solicit minority-owned businesses, as required by the regulation. Safeco's claim (Br. -35- 29-30) that EPA forced Eatherly to award a subcontract to a minority business is baseless. At the outset, there was no contractual or region-wide numerical goal, quota, set-aside or financial incentive that required MBE or WBE participation. Moreover, neither the EPA regulation nor Ms. Barron required Eatherly to subcontract with any minority business. As required by the regulation, Barron only asked Eatherly effectively to inform MBEs and WBEs of opportunities to compete for subcontracts on the project and provide documentation of those efforts to her. Eatherly was never required to award a contract to an MBE or WBE. This fact is underscored given that in past contracts on EPA- funded projects Eatherly has secured EPA approval without any MBE participation (supra p. 7), so Eatherly had to understand that such participation was not required in the sanitary sewer system contract with the City of White House. In this case, because Eatherly failed to document adequate good faith efforts to make such solicitations, EPA withheld approval until Eatherly complied. Moreover, Eatherly's bid was almost $345,000 lower than the second lowest bidder, and upon being informed that the cost of pipes had increased significantly, Eatherly withdrew its bid prior to any final action taken by EPA. Contrary to Safeco's claims, Eatherly's withdrawal of its bid on the contract could not have been motivated by any disapproval by EPA since the agency had not taken any action on the contract prior to Eatherly's announcement that it would withdraw its bid, and the record quite clearly establishes that EPA did not require race conscious contracting. -36- In sum, neither EPA's regulation, nor its conduct enforcing that regulation, is subject to strict scrutiny. II THE EPA REGULATION SATISFIES STRICT SCRUTINY Even if this Court determines that EPA's regulation or conduct requires race-conscious decision-making and is subject to strict scrutiny, the government's action satisfies that standard of review. A. The EPA Regulation Was Promulgated Pursuant To An Express Delegation Bv Congress EPA regulation 40 C.F.R. 33.240 was implemented pursuant to Executive Order 12,432. Regulations that are promulgated by executive order will have the effect of law where the order is “rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress." Chrysler Corp. v. Brown. 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979). The explanatory text that precedes the regulation (at 48 Fed. Reg. 12922 (March 28, 1983)), states that EPA's authority to promulgate 40 C.F.R. 33.240 is based upon Executive Order 12,432, which outlines the minority business development responsibilities of federal agencies. See Executive Order 12,432 (July 14, 1983) . Executive Order 12,432 states that it is grounded in Congress's express delegation pursuant to Section 211 of the 1978 Amendments to the Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 95-507.11 That 11 The Executive Order also relied on Congress's delegation provided by Section 205(a) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 486(a)), which authorizes federal agencies to promulgate rules for the economical and efficient system of procuring government supplies and services. -37- section directed executive agencies to “develop and implement incentive techniques to encourage greater minority business subcontracting by federal prime contractors," and “encourage recipients of federal grants and cooperative agreements to achieve a reasonable minority business participation in contracts let as a result of its grants and agreements." The 1978 Amendments to the Small Business Act, 92 Stat. 1767 (15 U.S.C. 637), set forth Congress's mandate that small businesses, and small businesses owned and operated by socially and economically disadvantaged persons, be given “the maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the performance of contracts let by any Federal agency." 92 Stat. 1767. The statute defines a “small business concern owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" as a small business that is at least “51 percent owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged persons." 92 Stat. 1767. The statute presumes that such individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, and other minorities or individuals found to be disadvantaged by the SBA. 92 Stat. 1767. In order to satisfy the legislation's objectives, Congress authorized federal agencies to “provide such incentives as * * * appropriate in order to encourage such subcontracting opportunities as may be commensurate with the efficient and economical performance of the contract." 92 Stat. 1768. Other orders preceding Executive Order 12,432 directed federal agencies to undertake efforts to ensure that minority businesses had fair -38- opportunity to compete for federal contracts. See Executive Order 11,458 (March 5, 1969); Executive Order 11,625 (October 13, 1971); Executive Order 12,138 (May 18, 1979) (created a national initiative for promoting women's businesses). B. Congress's Ample Findings Of Discrimination Against Minority Businesses Establish A Compelling Interest For Mandating Executive Branch Agencies To Promulgate Remedial Measures Under strict scrutiny, the use of racial criteria that affects decision-making must be shown to satisfy a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235-237; Crosonf 488 U.S. at 493, 507. In determining whether Congress had a compelling interest in enacting Section 211 of the Small Business Act, and correspondingly whether there is a compelling interest for the EPA regulation promulgated in response to Congress's directive, this Court should consider the wide variety of evidence before and available to Congress, including legislative reports, hearings, and studies regarding nationwide discrimination in contracting in the federal, state, local and private sectors, as well as other congressional measures undertaken to remedy discrimination. As Justice Powell explained in Fullilove v. Klutznick. 448 U.S. 448 (1980): “[w]e are not confined in this case to an examination of the legislative history [of the challenged program] alone[;] [rjather, we properly may examine the total contemporary record of congressional action dealing with the problems of racial discrimination against minority business enterprises." 448 U.S. at 503. -39- When Congress enacted Section 211 of the 1978 Amendments to the Small Business Act, it was well aware of the continuing problem that minority businesses were experiencing in securing business opportunities. A 1975 report of the Subcommittee on SBA Oversight and Minority Enterprise of the House Committee on Small Business concluded that: The effects of past inequities stemming from racial prejudice have not remained in the past. The Congress has recognized the reality that past discriminatory practices have, to some degree, adversely affected our present economic system * * * These statistics [showing that minorities comprise 16% of the U.S. population, but only 3% of U.S. businesses] are not the result of random chance. The presumption must be made that past discriminatory systems have resulted in present economic inequities. In order to right this situation the Congress has formulated certain remedial programs designed to uplift those socially or economically disadvantaged persons to a level where they may effectively participate in the business mainstream of our economy. Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 465-466, citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-468, 1-2 (1975). Representative Addabo, the floor manager of the bill amending the Small Business Act, stated in 1978 that Congress's “findings clearly state that groups such as black Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Native Americans, have been and continue to be discriminated against and that this discrimination has led to the social disadvantage of persons identified by society as members of those groups." 124 Cong. Rec. 34,097 (1978); see also 124 Cong. Rec. 35,304 (remarks of Senator Nunn). Other congressmen supporting the 1978 Amendments to the Small Business Act pointed out that minority businesses were only 4% of the nation's total number of businesses and accounted for less than 1% of total receipts. 124 Cong. Rec. 29,641 (testimony of -40- Senator Glenn); 124 Cong. Rec. 29,644 (statement by Senator Heinz). In 1980, the Senate Select Committee on Small Business held hearings on legislation to amend provisions of the Small Business Act that pertain to the Section 8(a) program.A/ Evidence was presented there regarding the small percentage of construction dollars going to minority-owned firms. Hearings on 8(a) Pilot Program, n. 21, at 16-17. The hearing also described the continuing effects of discrimination faced by minority firms in getting subcontracts, even on Section 8(a) projects. Id. at 19- 23. The House Committee on Small Business held hearings in 1981,5/ where the Committee heard evidence concerning disadvantage experienced by small and minority firms due to difficulties getting bonding for construction projects (Hearing on “Decade of the 80's," at 10), securing adequate financing and credit terms (id. at 33-34, 220), getting prompt payment by prime contractors for work completed (id̂ . at 65), and criticism that federal agencies were not fully promoting the utilization of DBEs by prime contractors (id. at 114, 118, 120, 241), which resulted in preventing minority and small firms from becoming viable, competitive businesses. In addition, the Committee conducted a 4/ To Amend the Small Business Act to Extend the Current SBA 8(a) Pilot Program: Hearings on H.R. 5612 Before the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). 5/ Small and Minority Business in the Decade of the 1980's Pt. 1, House Committee on Small Business, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); see also Hearings on Minority Business and its Contributions to the U.S. Economy, Senate Committee on Small Business, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). -41- hearing on the role of small businesses in federal procurement. The Committee heard evidence from federal procurement workers and small business owners about such matters as agency tactics that unfairly screen small businesses out of consideration for government contracts (Hearing on Federal Procurement System, at 22-23), and limited the use of small businesses on federal subcontracts (id. at 51). Later hearings similarly evidenced the continuing difficulty of establishing small, minority-, and women-owned firms after years of discrimination.-7 £/ Small Business and the Federal Procurement System, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on General Oversight, House Committee on Small Business, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 2/ See, e.a.. Hearings on Federal Contracting Opportunities for Minority and Women-owned Businesses: An Examination of the 8(d) Subcontracting Program Before the Senate Committee on Small Business, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Hearings on Women Entrepreneurs: Their Success and Problems Before the Senate Committee on Small Business, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Hearings on the State of Hispanic Small Business in America Before the Subcommittee on SBA and SBIC Authority, Minority Enterprise and General Small Business Problems of the House Committee on Small Business, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Hearings on Minority Enterprise and General Small Business Problems Before the Subcommittee on SBA and SBIC Authority, Minority Enterprise and General Small Business Problems of the Committee on Small Business, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Small Business Problems, House Committee on Small Business, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Surety Bonds and Minority Contractors, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) ; Barriers to Full Minority Participation in Federally Funded Highway Construction Projects, House Committee on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Minority Construction Contracting, House Committee on Small Business, 101st Cong. 1st Sess (1989); Small Disadvantaged Business Issues, House Committee on Armed Services, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991); Problems Facing Minority and Women-owned Small Businesses in Procuring U.S. Government Contracts, House Committee on Gov't Operations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Discrimination in Surety Bonding, House Committee on Small Business, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). -42- Indeed, Congress had, over a long period of time, carefully scrutinized conditions in public contracting and the construction industry to determine whether continued use of programs for minority and disadvantaged businesses is necessary. In view of the overwhelming evidence of discrimination and problems facing minority- and women-owned businesses in government procurement, and public and private construction contracting, Congress had a more than sufficient factual predicate for directing federal agencies to adopt measures for increasing contracting opportunities for these businesses. Indeed, at least two district courts that have examined the compelling interest for federal affirmative action programs since Adarand was decided by the Supreme Court have held that Congress had a compelling interest supporting those programs. See Adarand Constructors. Inc, v. Penar 965 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Colo. 1997); Cortez III Service Corp. v. NASA. 950 F. Supp. 357 (D.D.C. 1996). C. Congress Has Authority Under The Constitution To Mandate Remedies That Are National In Scope. And Neither It Nor The Agency Administering A Federal Program Are Required To Make Localized Findings Of Discrimination Prior To Implementing The Remedy Safeco claims (Br. 26) that prior to adopting a remedial measure in the Nashville area, EPA was required to establish the existence of past discriminatory practices in the local construction market. This view is contrary to Congress's broad remedial authority. While Adarand made strict scrutiny applicable to racial classifications requiring race-based decision-making promulgated 43- at the federal level, the Court did not question Congress's authority under the Constitution to impose broad measures for remedying discrimination that impacts victims nationwide. 515 U.S.'at 252-253 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (the majority's “silence" in explaining its “departure from the reasoning in past cases * * * cannot erase the difference between Congress' institutional competence and constitutional authority to overcome historic racial subjugation and the States' lesser power to do so"); id. at 268 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J. and Breyer, J.) (“[N]othing in today's opinion implies any view of Congress's S 5 power and the deference due its exercise that differs from the views expressed by the Fullilove plurality") In Croson. supra. where the Court applied strict scrutiny analysis in a constitutional challenge to a minority set-aside program adopted by the City of Richmond, Justice O'Connor recognized the importance of the distinction between Congress's authority to remedy acts of discrimination and that of states and local bodies. In her plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor stated: Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment. The power to 'enforce' may at times also include the power to define situations which Congress determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with those situations. The Civil War Amendments themselves worked a dramatic change in the balance between congressional and state power over matters of race. 488 U.S. at 490 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.) (citations omitted); see also Adarand. 515 U.S. at 252 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by -44- Ginsburg, J.). Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a “positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Crosgn, 488 U.S. at 490, quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan/ 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). “[T]he Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments * * * 'were intended [as] 1imitations of the powers of the States and enlargements of the power of Congress.'" Croson. 488 U.S. at 490, quoting Ex parte Virginiar 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880) (emphasis added). Unlike states or localities, Congress need not make specific findings that each locality that participates in a federally mandated affirmative action program must rely on local findings of discrimination. Once Congress has found a national problem of discrimination, local participation does not require local findings of discrimination. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (Court affirmed the power of Congress to pass a nationwide ban on literacy requirements to vote, without making state-by state findings of discrimination); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Supreme Court held that it was within Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power to prohibit all states from limiting the franchise to English speakers even if the specific state law at issue had not been passed for discriminatory reasons); see also Adarand Constructors. Inc.. 965 F. Supp. at 1572-1573. Thus, neither the Congress, nor the administering agency (here, the EPA), need to find discrimination in the construction industry in the city of Nashville prior to implementing the -45- congressionally authorized remedial measure there. D. The EPA Regulation Satisfies The Requirements Of Narrow Tailoring. The EPA regulation is sufficiently tailored to satisfy strict scrutiny. Factors for determining whether a federal program utilizing racial elements is narrowly tailored include: (1) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (2) the duration of the remedy and whether it is subject to periodic review; (3) program flexibility and the availability of waiver provisions; (4) the manner in which race is used; and (5) the effect of the program on nonbeneficiaries. Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 510-516 (Powell, J., concurring); Croson. 488 U.S. at 507-510. 1. Prior to amending the Small Business Act in 1978, Congress explored race-neutral measures, and was aware of other governmental efforts to increase minority contracting in federal programs. Congress utilized race-neutral measures for at least 25 years prior to the 1978 amendments. When Congress passed the Small Business Act in 1953, it allowed the SBA to enter into contracts with the federal government and subcontract them out to small businesses. In the 15 years that followed, however, minority-owned businesses continued to be disproportionately excluded from government procurement. In 1970, to help small businesses obtain surety bonds, the SBA was authorized by the Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. 91-609, 84 Stat. 1813, codified at 15 U.S.C. 694(a), (b), to establish the Surety Bond Guarantee Program. This program covered surety companies for up to 90% of their losses on bonds. By 1975, however, the General -46- Accounting Office reported that the SBA's “success in helping disadvantaged firms to become self-sufficient and competitive ha[d] been minimal. "fi/ Thus, Congress's 1978 reform of the Small Business Act was based on the ineffectiveness of race-neutral measures in helping minority-owned firms overcome the discriminatory barriers in federal procurement. While the EPA regulation encourages the use of minority- owned businesses, the regulation also encompasses race-neutral provisions since the affirmative steps are not directed only to minority-owned businesses, but also to small and women-owned businesses, regardless of the race of the owners. The regulation defines “women-owned business" as a business that is 51% owned and operated by women, without regard to race (supra p. 6-7). The regulation describes a small business as that defined by the Small Business Act (see supra p. 7). The statutory definition of small business concern is a firm that is “not dominant in its field of operation" (supra p. 7) . That definition also makes no reference to racial criteria in qualifying companies or firms as small businesses. The EPA thus uses race-neutral measures in implementing its outreach program since it encourages recipients of EPA grants and cooperative agreements and their prime contractors to solicit bids from small and women-owned businesses, regardless of the race of the owners, as well as from minority-owned businesses. fl/ Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Minority Enterprise and Public Policy 53 (1977). -47- Further, Congress regularly reviews the state of small, minority-, and women-owned businesses through continued hearings and oversight review of the programs administered by the SBA. See supra p. 38-41. Moreover, the EPA reviews its regulation administering Congress's mandate. In 1986, EPA issued a substantive guidance on issues related to the regulatory program. See EPA Guidance for Utilization of Small, Minority and Women's Business Enterprises in Procurement Under Assistance Agreements (1986) (R. 233 at Attachment 2: 1986 Guidance). This document instructs EPA staff administering the program as to definitions and policy objectives, guidance on evaluating whether a grantee has complied with the affirmative steps, certification of minority-, and women-owned businesses, grantee reporting obligations, bid protests, and program operating responsibilities. A supplemental memorandum to the 1986 guidance was issued a year later, and sets forth various questions and answers concerning the 1986 Guidance. The EPA regulation is also inherently flexible in that it does not require that minority firms be hired. Rather, it merely seeks to ensure that these firms are effectively solicited when contracting or subcontracting opportunities on EPA-funded construction projects become available. Moreover, the EPA regulation does not contain any numerical goals for retaining minority firms, nor does it direct prime contractors under EPA grants and cooperative agreements to award subcontracts to these firms should their bids be higher than that of a non-minority -48- firm. The only requirement of the EPA regulation is that prime contractors engage in efforts to ensure a broad pool of subcontractors from which to choose in awarding subcontracts on EPA-funded projects. Finally, the EPA regulation has virtually no effect on non minorities. It has no direct racial effect on non-minority subcontractors since the regulation is designed to increase the pool of firms competing for subcontracts. Because the regulation does not contain any numerical goals, set-asides, quotas, timetables, or financial incentive, there was no contractual or region-wide goal tied to the contract itself, and the regulation does not give minority firms a preference in the competitive bidding process, non-minority firms are not disadvantaged at all because of their race. This fact is underscored since the regulation permits prime contractors to award subcontracts on a nonracial, competitive basis. 2. Safeco claims (Safeco Br. 32), that the regulation's reference to “fair share" implies a racial quota. However, the EPA's 1986 Guidance, prepared for agency personnel, State and local governments, and businesses interested in participating in EPA financial assistance programs, states that “fair share" does not constitute an absolute goal, but rather, a commitment on the part of the recipient to solicit bids by minority and women's businesses by carrying out the six affirmative steps set out in the regulation (R. 233 at Attachment 2: 1986 Guidance at 3-1). Moreover, the EPA regulation adopted verbatim the language of -49- Attachment O to OMB Circular A-102, and was put into effect by EPA pursuant to the directives of the executive orders that required agencies to undertake measures for encouraging minority business participation, while cautioning agencies against the use of set-asides or quotas. Thus, once the recipient and its prime contractor have complied with these affirmative stpes, including providing the necessary documentation of compliance, they have no further obligation under the regulation. CONCLUSION The district court's orders should be affirmed Respectfully submitted, JONATHAN Z. CANNON General Counsel BILL LANN LEE Acting Assistant Attorney General HOWARD F. CORCORAN MARK D. GORDON KENNETH A. REDDEN Attorneys Office of the General Counsel U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Washington, D.C. 20430 MARK L. GROSS LISA WILSON EDWARDS Attorneys Department of Justice Civil Rights Division P.0. Box 66078 Washington, D.C. 20035-6078 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Nos. 97-6094, 97-6105 SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA; EATHERLY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. CITY OF WHITE HOUSE, TENNESSEE, A Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee-Cross Appellant UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Intervenor-Appellee APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE INTERVENOR-APPELLEE'S DESIGNATION OF APPENDIX CONTENTS The United States Environmental Protection Agency, pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 11(b), hereby designates the following filings in the district court's record as items to be included in the joint appendix. Document Data Entry No. EPA's Memorandum of November 14, 1995 233 Partial Summary Judgment, Attachment I (declaration of Nancy Barron) Testimony of James Stacey: TR I 91, Exh. 6 TR II 56, Exh. 8 April 15, 1997 April 16, 1997 2 Testimony of Nancy Barron TR II 114 TR III 112-119 April 16, 1997 April 17, 1997 TR III 124-126 TR III 133-134 TR III 141 Testimony of Cecil Conley: TR III 87-89 April 17, 1997 Testimony of David Amonette: TR III 149-151 April 17, 1997 Testimony of Robert Eatherly TR III 52-53 Respectfully submitted JONATHAN Z. CANNON General Counsel BILL LANN LEE Acting Assistant Attorney General HOWARD F. CORCORAN MARK D. GORDON KENNETH A. REDDEN Attorneys Office of the General Counsel U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Washington, D.C. 20430 MARK L. GROSS LISA WILSON EDWARDS Attorneys Department of Justice Civil Rights Division P.O. Box 66078 Washington, D.C. 20035-6078 i ATTACHMENT O* Circular No. A-102 PROCUREMENT STANDARDS 1. Applicability a. This Attachment establishes standards and guidelines for the procurement of supplies, equipment, construction and services for Federal assistance programs. These standards are furnished to ensure that such materials and services are obtained efficiently and economically and in compliance with the provisions of applicable Federal law and executive orders. b. No additional procurement requirements or subordinate regulations shall be imposed upon grantees by executive agencies unless specifically required by Federal law or executive orders or authorized by the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy. This prohibition is not applicable to payment conditions issued in accordance with Treasury Circular 1075, individual grantee requirements pursuant to Section 10 of the basic circular or the provisions of this or other OMB circulars. c. Provisions of current subordinate requirments not conforming to this Attachment shall be rescinded by grantor agencies unless approved by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). 2. Grantee/Grantor Responsibility a. These standards do not relieve the grantee of any contractual responsibilities under its contracts. The grantee is responsible, in accordance with good administrative practice and sound business judgment, for the settlement of all contractual and administrative issues arising out of procurements entered in support of a grant. These include but are not limited to source evaluation, protests, disputes, and claims. Executive agencies shall not substitute their judgment for that of the grantee unless the matter is primarily a Federal concern. Violations of law are to be referred to the local, State, or Federal authority having proper jurisdiction. b. Grantees shall use their ownprocurement procedures which reflect applicable State and local laws and regulations, provided that procurements for Federal Assistance Programs (No. A-102) conform to the standards set forth in this Attachment and applicable Federal law. 3. Grantee Procurement Improvement Executive agencies- awarding Federal grants or other assistance which require or allow for procurfement by the recipients are encouraged to assist recipients in improving their procurement capabilities by providng them with technical assistance training, publications, and other aid. 4, Procurement System Reviews a. Executive agencies are encouraged to perform reviews of their grantees’ procurement systems Lf a continuing relationship with the grantee is anticipated or a substantial amount of the Federal assistance is to be used for procurement and review of individual contracts is anticipated. The purpose of the review shall be to determine: (1) whether a grantee's procurement system meets the standards prescribed by this Attachment or other criteria acceptable to the OFPP, such provisions of the Model Procurement Code for State and local government; and (2) whether the grantee’s procurement system should be certified by the reviewing agency. Such a review will also give an agency an opportunity to give, technical assistance to a grantee to remedy its procurement system if it does not fully comply. In addition, such a review may provide a basis for deciding whether the grantee's contracts and related procurement documents should be subject to the grantor's prior approval, as provided by Section b. In conducting procurement system review, grantor agencies will evaluate a grantee's procurement system in terms of whether it complies with the standards prescribed by this Attachment and represents a fair, efficient and effective procurement system. To the maximum extent feasible, reviewers will rely upon State or local evaluations and analyses performed by agencies or organizations independent of the grantee contracting activity. * Federal grantor agency completes a procurement it shall furnish a report to the grantee, with a copy to All agencies should normally rely upon the resultant findings or certification for a period of 24 months before another review is performed. c .review, OFPP. d. (No. A - 102) 3 e. Reviews shall be conducted in accordance with standards and guidelines approved or issued by OFPP. f. The reviews authorized by Section 6 are waived if grantee's procurement aystem is certified. 5. Protest Procedures a. Grantor agencies may develop an administrative procedure to handle complaints or protests regarding grantee contractor selection actions. The procedure shall be limited as follows: a. No protest shall be accepted by the grantor agency until all administrative remedies at the grantee level have been exhausted. b. Review is limited to: • (i) Violations of Federal law or regulations. Violations of State or local law shall be under the jurisdiction of State or local authorities. (ii) Violations of grantee's protest procedures or failure to review a complaint or protest. 6. Grantor Review of Proposed Contracts Federal grantor pre-award review and approval of the grantee's proposed contracts and related procurement documents, such as requests for proposal and invitations for bids. is permitted only under the following circumstances: \ a. The procurement is expected to exceed $ 10.000 and is to be awarded without competition or only one bid or offer is received in response to solicitation. b. The procurement expected to exceed $10,000 specifies a brand name" product; or c. The grantee'8 procurement procedvu^Ps or operation fails to comply vith one or more significant aspects of this Attachment. The grantor agency shall notify the grantee in vi'iting, with a copy of such notification to the OFPP. 7 7. Code o f Conduct (No. A-102) 4 ^*"a^ t e e s * h a l l m a in ta in a • w r i t t e n *«v« c o n d u c t w h ich s h a l l g o v e r n t h e o e ^ L «d * ° r * t a n d * r d 3 o f e m p lo y e e s o r . g e n t , e n g a g e d ” n Si Sllrt IS* °A ! * ? i r o££i'*r*. c o n t r a c t s s u p p o r te d b y F e d e r a l fu n d * •d Join i s t r a t i on o f • g e n t o f t h e g r a n t e e s h a l l p a r t i c l e ! ? ! in if «nP f° y * « * o f f i c e r o r * « r d o r . < t o t n i . t r . t i o n otlccnlr.il " i n th e “ * of int*««t. re.i or .pp«?2£ voul£y fundsSuch a conflict would arise when: PP nz' would b« involved. a. b. c. The employee, officer or agent; Any member of his immediate family; His or her partner; or \i any dof tt.C^ “ S r . i ^ S i l0y*' °f 11 t. employN. selected for award! 1 1 or other interest in thePfira •oliSt gnIrtBrcceptflIrItuiti«°yef!vorr *9ents aha11 neither Va^ue from contractors, potential contrirt anything of monetary subagreements. P ial contractors, or parties to f« n o t ^ a n ^ i o T t h r hcr? the interestintrinsic value. 9 an ^solicited item of nominal such standards*of ellduet^hall^JlJiSI f°Cal la? °r regulati°ns, °C other disciplinary actions for viol*r<°r Penalties, sanctions, the grantee’s offi£e r s elllfvL!olations of such standards by or their agents. ' P y .or agents, or by contractors 8 . Procurement Procedurei provide 9thate*proposid Procure">«nt procedures which sr.ntee offici?l.P ^ . 5 ^ Sh*U bo «vieve5 by duplicative items V P h,se o£ unnecessary or consolidation o r b r e a K i ^ be 9iv6" ro purchase. Where appropriate an an i°btainL * more economical versus purchas.- altlfnative. aid III1??!* U b* made of lease J® d«termine which approach volld be^h approPriat« analysis foster greater economy and efficient b the moot economical. To enter into State and local inr» ^rantees are encouraged to procurement or Use of common goods al^sl^vills1 a<?reements f°* (No. A - 102) s 9. Contracting with Small and Minority Firms, Women* a Business Enterprise and Labor Surplus Area Firms -------- a. It is national policy to award a fair share of contracts to small and minority business firms. Accordingly, affirmative steps must be taken to assure that small and minority businesses are utilized when possible as sources of suppliers, equipment construction and services. Affirmative steps shall include thl following: (1) Including qualified small and minority businesses onsolicitation lists. • « (2) Assuring that small and minority businesses aresolicited whenever they are potential sources. (3) When economically feasible, dividing total requirements into smaller tasks or quantities so as to permit maximum small and minority business participation. (4) Where the requirement permits, establishing deliveryschedules which- will encourage participation by small andminority business. (5) Using the services and assistance of the Small Business Administration, the Office of Minority Business. Enterprise of the the Department of Commerce and the Community ServicesAdministration as required. (6) If any subcontracts are to be let, requiring the prime contractor to take the affirmative steps in 1 through 5 above. b. Grantees shall take similar appropriate affirmative action in support of women's business enterprises. c. Grantees are encouraged to procure goods and services from labor surplus areas. d. Grantor agencies may impose additional regulations and requirements in the foregoing areas only to the extent specifically mandated by statute or presidential direction. 10. Selection Procedures a. All procurement transactions, regardless of whether by sealed bids or by negotiation and without regard to dollar value, shall be conducted in a manner that provides maximum open and (N~ A-102) 6 ^ree competition consistent with this Attachment. Procurement procedures ahall not restrict or eliminate competition of what is considered to be restrictive of competition’ i S ^ S i but are not limited to: (1) placing unreasonable requirements on firms, in order for them to qualify to do business- (?) noncompetitive practices between firms; (3) orcanizit-t«i«i re££iTOe£tsf interest; and (4) ^«cessary experience and bonding • ** .v1?? grantee shall have written selection procedures «^irementJ: P ' “ a following procedure Solicitations of offers, whether by competitive sealed bids or competitive negotiation shall: P sealed - . (a) Incorporate a clear and accurate description of thetechnical requirements for the material, product, or service to be procured. Such description shall not, ik com^tHive procurements, contain features which unduly restrict comSe^itiin The description may include a statement o f ^ q ^ a U t a ^ e n^ure of the material, product or service to be S e c u r e d I n d Z h l l „ 'et £°rth those minimum 'essentia? r1S*JC*- and standards *o which it must conform if it is S?jiS£y lt8 lnt«nded use. Detailed product specification* should be avoided if at all possible. When it is impractical or uneconomical to make a clear and accurate description of thf technical requirements, a "brand name or equal" description mav be used as a means to define the performance or o^er salient requirements of a procurement. The specific features of nd WhiCh must be - * b* °««ror3 shafl be clf.r?y fulfill fidari n * U " “niregents which offerors must proposals*nd 0ther £lctors“ be ■“*«* in evaluating bids or (2) Awards shall be made __ 4 w S e“ ? : ~ r s & p o ' : s ; ^ r o s s f u U y u n d e rConsideration shall be given to -such Procurement. integrity, compliance with public policy record co^tractor performance, and financial and technical resources * PaSt 11. Method Procurement only to responsible contractors (No. A-102) ( 7 Procurement * under grants shall be made by one of the following methods, as described herein: (a) small purchaseprocedures; (b) competitive sealed bids (formal advertising); (c) competitive negotiation; (d) noncompetitive negotiation. a. Small purchase procedures are those relatively simple and informal procurement methods that are sound and appropriate for a procurement of services, supplies or other property, costing • in the aggregate not more than $10,000. Crantees shall comply with State or local small purchase dollat limits under $10,000. If small purchase procedures are used for a procurement under a grant, price or rate quotations shall be obtained from an adequate number of qualified sources. b. In competitive sealed bids (formal advertising), sealed bids are publicly solicited and a firm-fixed-price contract (lump sum or unit price) is awarded to the responsible bidder whose bid, conforming vith all the material terms and conditions of the invitation for bids, is lowest in price. (1) In order -for formal advertising to be feasible, appropriate conditions must be present, including, as a minimum, the following: (a) A complete, adequate and realistic specification or purchase description is available. (b) Two or more responsible suppliers are willing and able to compete effectively for the grantee's business. (c) The procurement lends itself to a firm-fixed-pricecontract, and selection of the successful bidder can appropriately be made principally on the basis of price. (2) If formal advertising is used for a procurement under a grant the following requirements shall apply: (a) A sufficient time prior to the date set for opening of bids, bids shall be solicited from an adequate number of known suppliers. In addition, the invitation shall be publicly advertised. (b) The invitation for bids, including specifications and pertinent attachments, shall clearly define the items or services needed in order for the bidders to properly respond to the invitation. (No. A - 102) e (c) All bids shall be opened publicly at the time and stated in the invitation for bids. *** Place <d) A firm-fix-price contract award shall be made bv notice to that responsible bidder whose bid, conforming to invitation for bids, is lowest. Where specified in the biddf!?* documents factors such as discounts, transportation ^ostj iSd life cycle costs shall be considered in determining which bid ±« lowest. Payment discounts may only be uied to determini l o w b i d when prior experience of the grantee indicates that such discounts are generally taken. v *uch (e) Any or all bids may be rejected when there are sound documented business reasons in the best interest of the program. c * competitive negotiation, proposals are reguested froma number of sources and the Reguest for Proposal is publicized negotiations are normally conducted with more than one of th» .cure., submitting off.rs, and .ith.r a fixI2-p?ie. cost-reimbursable type contract is awarded, as appropriate Competitive negotiation may be used if condition^ are not *PProPriate for the use of formal advertising. If competitive negotiation is used for a procurement undlr a gr^t ^ following requirements shall apply: 9 ‘ XXim «hall be solicited from an adequate number of *ource* to Permit reasonable competition consistent with the nature and requirements of the procurement The for Proposal shall b. publicized and r * » « n S ” r S ^ e s S by p * h*U b* honored to «*. £ximum (2) The Request for Proposal shall identify all sionificant evaluation^* “h*U Pf°Vide mechanisms for technical responsible Sff.rSj w S K ? discussions, and selection for contract award. ttCn °r °ral proposal J ? U dbeaL i ; ^ t0 thc re£P°"sible otferor whose proposal will be most adavantageous to the procuring party price £2«f!vdeprompuy” cor'=ld'r'd ' "»«*c«— ?»l * tt.?o£ r2 L K lS c ( No . A - 102) 9 O for (S) Grantees may utilize competitive negotiation procedures procurement of architectural/engineering professionaltors' Qualifications in __> l wa wij. w»i/tngiaieriag professionalservices, whereby competitors’ qualifications are .evaluated and the most qualified competitors' is selected, sublect to negotiation of fair and reasonable compensation, - d. Noncompetitive negotiation is procurement through solicitation of a proposal from only one source, or after eoliciation of a number of sources, competition is determined inadequate. Noncompetitive .negotiation may be used when the .award of a contract is infeasible under small purchase competitive bidding (formal advertising) or competitivi negotiation procedures. Circumstances under which a contract mav be awarded by noncompetitive negotiation are limited to the following:| (1) The item is available only from a single source; (2) Public exigency or emergency when the urgency for the Solicitation-Wil1 Permit * eUl4y iac*dent to competitive (3) The Federal grantor agency authorises noncompetitive negotiation; or . . After soliciation of a number of sources, competition isdetermined inadequate. e. Additional innovative procurement methods may be used bv grantees with the approval of the grantor agency. A Lpy of such approval shall be sent to the OFPP. ^ n 12.. Contract Pricing p 1* plu* * percentage of cost and percentage ofconstruction cost method of contracting shall not be used Grantees shall perform some form of cost or price analysis in “ “ “ «•» »ith .very p r o c u r e action in=ljdl“ c*n?r,c?Coat* prices based on estimated costs for contracts under grants shall be allowed *oly to the extent that costs incurred or cost estimates included in negotiated prices are consistent with Federal cost principles. negoT::Lar«a Prices 13. Grantee Procurement Records “̂ all m*int*ia records sufficient to detail the significant hiitory of a procurement. These records shall (No. A-102) include, but ere not necessarily limited to information pertinent to the following: rationale for the method of procurement, selection of contract type, contractor selection or rejection,* and the basis for the cost or price. 14. Contract Provision In addition to provisions defining a sound and complete procurement contract, any recipient of Federal grant funds shall include the following contract provisions or conditions in all procurement contracts and subcontracts as required by the provision. Federal law or the grantor agency. a. Contracts other than small purchases shall contain provisions or conditions which will allow for administrative, contractual, or legal remedies in instances where contractors violate or breach contract terms, and provide for such sanctions and penalties as may be appropriate. b. All contracts in excess of 510,000 shall contain suitable provisions for termination by the grantee including the manner by which it will be effected and the basis for settlement. In addition, such contracts shall describe conditions under which the contract may be terminated for default as well as conditions where the contract may be terminated because of circumstances beyond the control of the contractor. c. All contracts awarded in excess of 510,000 by grantees and their contractors or subgrantees shall contain a provision requiring compliance with Executive Order 11246, entitled "Equal Employment Opportunity," as amended by Executive Order 11375, and as supplemented in Department of Labor regulations (41 CFR Part 60) . d. All contracts and subgrants for construction or repair shall include a provision for compliance with the Copeland "Anti- Kickback" Act (18 \JSC 874) as supplemented in Department of Labor regulations (29 CFR, Part 3). This Act provides that each contractor or subgrantee shall be prohibited from inducing, by any means, any person employed in the construction, completion, or repair of public work, to give up any part of the compensation to which he is otherwise entitled. The grantee shall report all suspected or reported violations*to the granlfer agency. e. When required by the Federal grant program legislation, all construction contracts in excess of 52,000 awarded by grantees and subgrantees shall include a provision for compliance 11 with the Davis-Bacon Act (40 USC 276a to a-7) as supplemented by Department of Labor regulations (29 CFR, Part 5). Under this Act contractors shall be required to pay wages to laborers and mechanics at a rate not less than the minimum wages specified in a wage determination made by the Secretary of Labor. In addition, contractors shall be required to pay wages not less often than once a week. The grantee shall place a copy of the current prevailing wage determination issued by the Department of Labor in each solicitation and the award of a contract shall be conditioned upon the acceptance of the wage determination. The grantee shall report all suspected or reported violations to the grantor agency. f. Where applicable, all' contracts awarded by grantees and subgrantees in excess of $2,000 for construction contracts and in excess of $2,500 for other contracts which involve the employment of mechanics or laborers shall include a provision for compliance with Sections 103 and 107 of the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act (40 USC, 327-330) as supplemented by Department of Labor regulations (29 CFR, Part 5). Under Section 103 of the Act, each contractor shall be required to compute the wages of every mechanic and laborer o"n the basis of standard workday of 8 hours and a standard workweek of 40 hours. Work in excess of the standard workday or workweek is permissible provided that ' the worker is compensated at a rate of not less than 1-1/2 times the basic rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 8 hours in any calendar day or 40 hours in the work week. Section 107 of the Act is applicable to construction work and provides that no laborer or mechanic shall be required to work in surroundings or under working conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to his health and safety as determined under construction, safety and health standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. These requirements do not apply to the purchases of supplies or materials or articles ordinarily available on the open market, or contracts for transportation or transmission of intelligence. g. The contract shall include notice of grantor agency requirements and regulations pertaining to reporting and patent rights under any contract involving research, developmental, experimental or demonstration work with<5respect to any discovery or invention which arises or is developed in the course of or under such contract, and of grantor agency requirements and regulations pertaining to copyrights and rights in data. h. All negotiated contracts (except those awarded by small purchase procedures) awarded by grantees shall include a (No. A - 102) 12 provision to the effect that the grantee, the Federal grantor agency, the Comptroller General of the United States/ or any of their duly authorized representatives, shall have access to any books, documents, papers, and records of the contractor which are directly pertinent to that specific contract, for the purpose of making audit, examination, excerpts, and transcriptions. Grantees shall require contractors to maintain all required records for three years after grantees make final payments and all other pending matters are closed. i. Contracts, subcontracts, and subgrants of amounts in excess of $100,000 shall contain a provision which requires compliance with all applicable standards, orders, or requirements issued under Section 306 of the Clean-Air Act (42 USC 1857(h)), Section 508 of the Clean Water Act (33 USC 1368), Executive Order 11738, and Environmental Protection Agency regulations (40 CFR, Part 15), which prohibit the use under non-exempt Federal contracts, grants or loans of facilities included on the EFA List of Violating Facilities. The provision shall require reporting of violations to the grantor agency and to the USEPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement (EN-329). J. Contracts shall recognize mandatory standards and policies relating to energy efficiency which are contained in the State energy conservation plan issued in compliance with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (P.L. 94-163). Grantor agencies are permitted to require changes, remedies, changed conditions, access and record retention and suspension of work clauses approved by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. 15. Contract Administration Grantees shall maintain a contract administration system ensuring that contractors perform in accordance with the terms, conditions, and specifications of their contracts or purchase orders. «* (No. A - 102) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on February 17, 1998, one copy of the Brief For The United States Environmental Protection Agency was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, on the following counsel: Peter Curry Rob S. Harvey Tuke, Yopp & Sweeney Nations Bank Plaza, Suite 1100 414 Union Street Nashville, Tennessee 37219 Alfred H. Knight Alan D. Johnson Willis & Knight 215 Second Avenue, North Nashville, Tennessee 37201 Lisa Wilson Edwards Attorney