Defendant-Intervenor Wood's Second Supplement to Answers to Interrogatories; Supplement to Motion to Compel Discovery from Plaintiffs

    ATTORNEYS 

A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING 

PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS 

J. EUGENE CLEMENTS, P.C. 

PARTNER 

(713) 226-0606 

PORTER & CLEMENTS 
FIRST REPUBLICBANK CENTER 

700 LOUISIANA, SUITE 3500 

HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002-2730 

  

TELEPHONE (713) 226-0600 

TELECOPIER (713) 228-1331 

TELECOPIER (713) 224-4835 

TELEX 775-348 

July 18, 1989 

Clerk, U.5. District Court 
200 E. Wall st., Suite 316 
Midland, Texas 79702 

Re: 

Dear Sir: 

Enclo 

following: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

Pleas 
provided. 

No. MO88-CA-154; League of United Latin American 
Citizens (LULAC), et al. v. James Mattox, Attorney 
General of Texas, et al.; In the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Texas, Midland-Odessa 
Division 

sed for filing in the above-referenced case are the 

Defendant-Intervenor Harris County District Judge 
Sharolyn Wood's Second Supplement to Her Answers to 
Interrogatories; 

Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood's Supplement 
to Her Motion to Compel Discovery from Plaintiffs; and 

Order (proposed). 

e return a file stamped copy to me in the enveloped 

A copy of this filing is being mailed to all counsel by 
first clas 

JEC/cdf 
enclosures 

s United States mail, postage prepaid. 

Sincerely yours, 

  

. Eugene Clements  



    

PorTER & CLEMENTS 

Clerk, U.S. District Court 
July 18, 1989 
Page -2- 

CC: Mr. William L. Garrett 
Ms. Brenda Hall Thompson 
Garrett, Thompson & Chang 
Attorneys at Law 
8300 Douglas, Suite 800 
Dallas, Texas 75225 

Mr. Rolando L. Rios 
Southwest Voter Registration & 

Education Project 
201 KR. St. Mary's, Suite 521 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Ms. Susan Finkelstein 
Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. 
201 N. Sst. Mary's, Suite 600 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Mr. Julius Levonne Chambers 
Ms. Sherrilyn A. Ifill 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor 
New York, New York 10013 

Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald 
Matthews & Branscomb 

301 Congress Ave., Suite 2050 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas 
Ms. Mary F. Keller, First Assistant Attorney General 
Ms. Renea Hicks, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 
Mr. Javier Guajardo, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 
P. O. Box 12548 
Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Edward B. Cloutman, III 
Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C. 
3301 Elm Street 
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 

Mr. E. Brice Cunningham 
777 So. R.L. Thornton Freeway, Suite 121 
Dallas, Texas 75203 

 



    

PorTER & CLEMENTS 

Clerk, U.8. District Court 
July 18, 1989 
Page -3- 

cC: Mr. Ken Oden 
Travis County Attorney 
P. O. Box 1748 
Austin, Texas 78767 

Mr. David R. Richards 
Special Counsel 
600 W. 7th Street 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Mark H. Dettman 

Attorney at Law 

P. ©: Box 2559 

Midland, Texas 79702 

Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr. 

Hughes & Luce 
2800 Momentum Place 
1717 Main Street 
Dallas, Texas 75201 

 



  

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION 

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN 
CITIZENS (LULAC), et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

JIM MATTOX, Attorney General 

S 
§ 
§ 
S 
S 

Vv. NN NO. MO-88-CA-154 

S 
S 

of the State of Texas, et al., § 

S 
S Defendants. 

DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN 
WOOD'S SECOND SUPPLEMENT TO HER ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES 
  

  

TO: Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record, Rolando 
L. Rios, Southwest Voter Registration & Education Project, 
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 521, San Antonio, Texas 78205; 

Plaintiff-Intervenors Houston Lawyvers' Association, by and 
through their attorneys of record, Julius L. Chambers and 
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
Inc., 99 Budson Street, 16th Floor, New York, New York 

10013; and 

Plaintiff-Intervenors the Legislative Black Caucus, by and 
through their attorney of record, Gabrielle K. McDonald, 
Matthews & Branscomb, 301 Congress Ave., Suite 2050, Austin, 

Texas 78701 

Defendant-Intervenor Harris County District Judge Sharolyn 

Wood ("Wood") supplements her Answers to Plaintiffs' First Set of 

Interrogatories No. 1 and 2, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 26 (4) (e). 

Defendant-Intervenor Wood may call as an involuntary 

resource witness, whose testimony may involve factual matters and 

expert opinions, the following person: 

 



  

1. Hon. Manuel D. Leal 

U.S. Courthouse 

515 Rusk Street 

Houston, Texas 77002 
(713) 221-9780 

Respectfully submitted, 

PORTER & CLEMENTS 

ok A 
es PB 0 Ne 

J. Eugene Clements 
1700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 

_Jucuston, Texas 77002-2730 

(713) 226-0600 

L\ yd Vi a ABST | 
2\ Lr / A 4 Ca > V Lal a <i 1 

\ CA i AL er en a” 7 ltr ~ 

Darrell Smith ./ yy < 
Attorney at Law | pil CR 
10999 Interstate’ Hwy. 10, #905 
San Antonio, Texas 78230 
(512) 641-9944 

  

By: 
  

ATTORNEYS FOR HARRIS COUNTY 

DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD 

OF COUNSEL: 

PORTER & CLEMENTS 

John E. O'Neill 
Evelyn V. Keyes 
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 
Houston, Texas 77002-2730 

(713) 226-0600 

Michael J. Wood 
Attorney at Law 
440 Louisiana, Suite 200 
Houston, Texas 77002 

(713) 228-5105 

 



  

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ol at - 

I hereby certify that on the [§ day of July, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Defendant- 
Intervenor Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood's Second 
Supplement to Her Answers to Interrogatories was served upon 
counsel of record in this case by first class United States mail, 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 

  

Mr. William L. Garrett 
Ms. Brenda Hall Thompson 
Garrett, Thompson & Chang 
Attorneys at Law 

8300 Douglas, Suite 800 
Dallas, Texas 75225 

Mr. Rolando L. Rios 
Southwest Voter Registration & 

Education Project 
201 N, St, Mary's, Suite 521 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Ms. Susan Finkelstein 
Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. 
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 600 

San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Mr. Julius Levonne Chambers 
Ms. Sherrilyn A. Ifill 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street 
16th Floor 
New York, New York 10013 

Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald 

Matthews & Branscomb 

301 Congress Ave., Suite 2050 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas 
Ms. Mary F. Keller, First Assistant Attorney General 
Ms. Renea Hicks, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 
Mr. Javier Guajardo, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 
P. O. Box 12548 
Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Edward B. Cloutman, III 
Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C. 
3301 Elm Street 
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 

 



Mr. E. Brice Cunningham 
777 So. R.L. Thornton Freeway 
Suite 121 
Dallas, Texas 75203 

Mr. Ken Oden 
Travis County Attorney 
P. O. Box. 1748 
Austin, Texas 78767 

Mr. David R. Richards 
Special Counsel 
600 W. 7th Street 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Mark H. Dettmann 

Attorney at Law 

P. OO. Box 2559 
Midland, Texas 79702 

Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr. 

Hughes & Luce 
2800 Momentum Place 

1717 Main Street 

Dallas, Texas 75201 

L — ; 
/ Si < 

Ev&lyn V. Keyes 
  

WO002/46 

 



  

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION 

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN § 

CITIZENS (LULAC), et al., § 

S 
Plaintiffs, § 

S 
N. § NO. MO-88-CA-154 

S 
JIM MATTOX, Attorney General N 
of the State of Texas, et al., § 

S 
Defendants. § 

ORDER 
  

Came on for consideration Defendant Harris County District 

Judge Sharolyn Wood's Motion to Compel Discovery from Plaintiffs 

and her Supplement to that Motion, and the Court, having reviewed 

Defendant Wood's Motion and Supplement and the Response to her 

First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, and 

having considered the arguments of counsel, is of the opinion 

that Defendant Wood's Motions should be GRANTED. It is therefore 

ORDERED that Plaintiffs LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN 

CITIZENS ("LULAC") et. al. reanswer fully each of Defendant 

Wood's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production 

as requested in Defendant Wood's Supplement to her Motion to 

Compel Discovery from Plaintiffs and produce all of the documents 

and things requested therein on or before July 31, 1989. 

SIGNED this day of yr 1989, 
  

  

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION 

LULAC, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

NO. MO-88-CA-154 Vs 

MATTOX, et al., 

WW
 
N
W
 

WD
) 

WD
) 
D
D
N
 W

D 

Defendants. 

HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD'S SUPPLEMENT 
TO HER MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY FROM PLAINTIFFS 
  

Defendant-Intervenor Harris County District Judge 

Sharolyn Wood ("Wood"), having been served with Plaintiffs 

Responses to Interrogatories and Requests for Production and 

having received Plaintiffs' Response to her original Motion to 

Compel, files this Supplement to Her Motion to Compel Discovery 

from Plaintiffs pursuant to F.A.C.P. 33(a), 34(b) and 37(a) and, 

in support thereof, respectfully shows the Court the following: 

1. On July 3, 1989, Defendant Wood served a Motion to 

Compel Discovery on the Original Plaintiffs in this case. A copy 

of that Motion is attached hereto as Exhibit "1." In that Motion 

Defendant Wood requested that the Court direct the Plaintiffs to 

answer her First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Produc- 

tion of Documents and to produce the documents requested therein. 

As Defendant Wood argued in her Motion, those Interrogatories and 

Requests for Production were served on the Plaintiffs on Febru- 

ary 28, 1989, one day after the Court permitted Defendant Wood to  



intervene in this case; but, in the following two and one-half 

months the Plaintiffs refused to respond either to the formal 

discovery request itself or to Defendant Wood's informal 

inquiries about discovery. 

2. In response to Defendant Wood's Motion to Compel, the 

Plaintiffs served on Defendant Wood on July 6, 1989 a document 

entitled "Plaintiff LULAC Statewide Response to Defendant Wood's 

First Set of 1Interrogatories and Request for Production of 

Documents" ("Response"). A copy of that Response is attached 

hereto as Exhibit "2." In connection with that Response, the 

Plaintiffs produced no documents whatsoever; nor did they provide 

any substantive answer to any Interrogatory other than to 

identify for Defendant Wood the same two experts previously 

identified by the Houston Lawyers Association, Plaintiff- 

Intervenors in this case. Indeed, the Plaintiffs absolved most 

Plaintiffs from the responsibility of having to respond to 

discovery requests on the ground that Original Plaintiffs LULAC 

Councils 4434 and 4451, James Fuller and Christina Moreno have 

"no contact in Harris County." Response at 1. This left only 

Plaintiff LULAC Statewide to respond. The Plaintiffs admitted 

that LULAC Statewide has no officers in Harris County and it 

refuses to identify any members in Harris County. Response to 

Interrogatory No. 3. 

3. Defendant Wood has previously argued that an organiza- 

tion claiming voting rights violations cannot refuse to identify 

any individuals who have suffered voting rights deprivations.  



See Defendant Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Woods Motion 

to Dismiss the Legislative Black Caucus. Therefore, she will not 

repeat that argument. However, the result of the Plaintiffs’ 

secrecy is that instead of providing any specific fact informa- 

tion in response to Defendant Wood's discovery requests, the 

Plaintiffs hide behind the shield of their claim to be a state- 

wide organization with a secret membership in order to repeat the 

broad, general charges in their First Amended Complaint. Since 

Defendant Wood's Motion to Compel Discovery Against the 

Plaintiff's -- which has yet to be ruled upon =-- is based 

entirely upon the argument that the Plaintiffs have failed to 

provide her with any information about their claims or with any 

documents, and since the Plaintiffs have, in their tardy 

responses, utterly failed to provide any substantive answers to 

interrogatories, as well as any documents whatsoever, Defendant 

Wood does not withdraw her motion. Instead, she only supplements 

it with the following specific objections to the Plaintiffs’ 

Response while continuing to rely on the arguments and authori- 

ties set forth in her original Motion to Compel Discovery from 

Plaintiffs. 

4. In response to Requests for Production Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 

9s 10,11, 12,13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 .and 21 the 

Plaintiffs repeatedly refer Defendant Wood to the same three sets 

of documents despite the dramatic diversity of the types of 

documentation requested. (Defendant Wood's First Set of Inter- 

rogatories and Requests for Production of Documents ("Request")  



  

is attached to Exhibit "1" as Exhibit "A.") Moreover, those 

documents have not been made available for inspection and copying 

by the Plaintiffs; and, even if they were, they would be totally 

inadequate to respond to any of Defendant Wood's Requests, much 

less virtually all of them. 

5. The first documents mentioned are two tables from the 

1980 Census. As Defendant Wood argued in her Motion to Compel 

Discovery from the Houston Lawyers Association ("Motion to Compel 

Houston Lawyers") still pending before the Court, data from the 

1980 census, even if responsive to a request for production, is 

inadequate to establish any facts relevant to this case since it 

is nine and one-half years out of date. See Motion to Compel 

Houston Lawyers at 15. The same argument applies to the second 

category of documents mentioned by the Plaintiffs: the 1980 

Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract. The thirty 

category, precinct data which the Plaintiffs claim has been 

furnished to Defendant Wood by Sherrilyn Ifill, has never been 

furnished to Defendant Wood by Sherrilyn Ifill (attorney for the 

Houston Lawyers Association), nor by any other Plaintiff or 

counsel for any Plaintiff in this case. Nor, as Defendant Wood 

pointed out in her Motion to Compel Houston Lawyers, has any 

Plaintiff in this case produced any document to her in response 

to any request -- formal or informal -- since she intervened on 

February 27, 1989 and filed her first discovery requests on the 

Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors on February 28, 1989. 

 



  

6. In response to Defendant Wood's Request for Production 

No. 5, the Plaintiffs state that two months before trial they 

have not one document to support their broad general claims that 

the system of electing state district judges in Harris County is 

the result of an intent to discriminate; nor do they give even 

one factual instance of discrimination in response to Defendant 

Wood's corresponding Interrogatory No. if Defendant Wood 

requests that the Court order the Plaintiffs to produce the 

documents that support these claims. 

7. In response to Defendant Wood's Requests for Production 

Nos. 8 and 18, the Plaintiffs claim to have no documents that 

indicate the size of the pool of black and Hispanic lawyers 

eligible to run for election as state district judges in Harris 

County. Yet, as Defendant Wood argued in her Motion to Compel 

Houston Lawyers, proof of the size of the pool of eligible 

candidates for a position is an essential element of a cause of 

action for racial discrimination. See Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. 
  

Atonio, 109"U.S.% 2115 (No. 87-1387, June 5, 1989), a’ copy of 

which is attached to Defendant Wood's Motion to Compel Houston 

Lawyers as Exhibit wy, n.2f Thus the Plaintiffs must possess this 

  

1/ The internal references to Interrogatories in some of 
Defendant Wood's Requests for Production were inadvertently 
misnumbered. Plaintiffs' responses make it clear that they 
correctly understood each request to refer to the 
immediately preceding (rather than following) interrogatory. 

2/ Although Ward's Cove is a Title VII case, the principle is 
  

exactly the same in a Voting Rights Act case. 

 



  

information in order to prove their case; and, possessing it, 

they have an obligation to produce it in response to Defendant 

Wood's discovery requests. Defendant Wood therefore requests 

that the Court order them to produce it. 

8. In response to Interrogatory No. 3, the Plaintiffs 

claim that their Harris County membership is not discoverable. 

This response is evasive and improper where the Plaintiffs’ 

standing to raise a Voting Rights Act claim in Harris County 

depends upon the actual existence of individual members of LULAC 

who have voting rights in Harris County. Defendant Wood has 

previously dealt with the claim that membership lists of 

organizations claiming voting rights violations are not 

discoverable. However, she would add that the Plaintiffs’ 

refusal to name any individual LULAC member who resides in Herris 

County is doubly evasive and inadequate in a Voting Rights Act 

case, since the inquiry required by the United States Supreme 

Court to establish a vote dilution claim is, as the Fifth Circuit 

has pointed out, especially fact-intensive. See Thornburg v. 
  

Ginglez, 478. U.s8. 30, 50-52, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2766-67 (1986); 

Overton v. City of Austin, 871 .r.24 529, 533 (5th Cir. 1989) 
  

(violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act entail a 

"fact-bound, intensely local inquiry"). Therefore Defendant Wood 

requests that the Plaintiffs be compelled to identify actual 

persons in Harris County who can provide factual information 

regarding alleged violations of their voting rights. 

 



9. The Plaintiffs' responses to Interrogatories No. 4, 5 

and 6, requesting specific information regarding discrimination 

against the Plaintiffs in Harris County -- namely that Harris 

County has a history of past discrimination and lingering effects 

of socio-economic stratification and that this discrimination is 

deliberate -- are simply a restatement of their pleadings and are 

therefore nonresponsive. Defendant Wood requests that the Court 

compel the Plaintiffs to describe the local facts upon which they 

base these claims, just as she requests that the Court compel the 

Plaintiffs to identify the individuals who have suffered from 

such alleged discrimination. 

10. In response to Interrogatory No. 7, the Plaintiffs deny 

that they would abolish the system of electing district judges in 

Harris County from county-wide seats to serve specialized 

functions. Yet the destruction of the county-wide election 

system, which the Plaintiffs expressly seek, entails precisely 

such a result. Moreover, the Plaintiffs claim in response to 

Interrogatories No. 7, 8, and 13, that they need not describe how 

they would draw judicial districts to preserve such specializa- 

tion or how they would draw judicial districts in any event, 

since this matter properly belongs to the remedy phase of this 

case. The Plaintiffs' claim is, however, mistaken. As Defendant 

Wood showed at length in her Motion to Compel Houston Lawyers, a 

copy of which was served on the Plaintiffs, under the Thornburg 
  

criteria, a map of proposed election districts is essential to  



prove vote dilution claims since without such a map, Voting Right 

Act Plaintiffs cannot show that they would constitute a majority 

of the voters in any proposed district as Thornburg requires. 
  

Sce 478 U.s. 30, 50-52; 106 8.Ct. 2752, 2765-67; and Defendant 

Wood's Motion to Compel Houston Lawyers at 16. Thus there is 

nothing premature about Defendant Wood's request for a map 

showing where the Plaintiffs would draw each new judicial 

district in Harris County to prevent alleged vote dilution, nor 

is there anything premature about her attempts to discover how 

the Plaintiffs would draw those districts to preserve judicial 

specialization, which they claim would not be abolished, and the 

principle of one-man, one-vote, if, indeed, they would preserve 

that principle. Since the Plaintiffs cannot prove this case 

without the proof that a map of proposed remedial districts 

provides, they must have this information and Defendant Wood is 

entitled to its immediate production so that she can begin to 

3/ 
prepare her defense.— 

  

The Plaintiffs refer cryptically in response to 
Interrogatory No. 8 to maps which are available for 
inspection. If this response refers to 1980 Census Tracts 
maps, the answer is evasive and unresponsive. If it refers 
to any other maps, Plaintiffs should be compelled to reveal 
where these maps are available. No maps responsive to 
Interrogatories No. 7 and 8 and their corresponding requests 
for production have ever been made available to Defendant 
Wood.  



11. The Plaintiffs' response to Defendant Wood's Interroga- 

tories No. 9 and 10 -- seeking to determine why Harris County and 

certain other selected counties were targeted by this suit while 

other counties were not targeted -- is totally non-responsive. 

The Plaintiffs claim that no client asked them to include other 

counties. The request, however, is not directed to counsel for 

the Plaintiffs but to the Plaintiffs themselves, and it clearly 

requires them to state their factual basis for distinguishing 

between the target counties, in which the election system is 

challenged, and the non-target counties, in which the identical 

election system is not challenged. Since the election system in 

both target and non-target counties is the same, the basis for 

the Plaintiffs' attack on that system must be a fact pattern 

which distinguishes the application of the Texas judicial 

election system in Harris County and the other target counties 

from the application of the same system in surrounding counties; 

and Defendant Wood is entitled to know what that selectively 

discriminatory fact pattern is. This request is especially 

important in that, should the Plaintiffs prevail in this suit, 

the State of Texas will be left with a dual judicial election 

system with county-wide election districts in counties and 

sub-districts drawn along racial lines in others. Thus the 

philosophical and factual rationale for the dual system for 

electing state district judges which the Plaintiffs seek to 

impose is of extreme importance in this case; and Defendant Wood 

requests that the Court require the Plaintiffs to reveal it.  



  

12. Defendant Wood does not specifically object to the 

Plaintiffs' responses to Interrogatories No. 11 and 12 except to 

the extent that the Plaintiffs claim that they are unprepared to 

respond to her request whether blacks and Hispanics will combine 

their votes in Harris County. Since proof on this issue is 

essential to the Plaintiffs' case, Defendant Wood requests that 

the Court compel the Plaintiffs to provide her with this informa- 

tion (and the documentation that supports their response) so that 

she can begin to prepare her defense. 

13. Finally, the Plaintiffs claim, in response to Inter- 

rogatory No. 14, that this lawsuit does not address venue. 

Defendant Wood objects that this answer is non-responsive in that 

any new judicial election scheme in which judges are elected from 

districts smaller than a county will necessarily have an impact 

on the present venue scheme, which provides for county-wide 

venue. Any alleged remedial plan that the Plaintiffs could 

propose would either provide for the continuation of county-wide 

venue -- 1in which case judges would have venue over cases 

involving litigants who had no right to vote for or against those 

judges -- or provide for district-wide venue -- in which case 

litigants would have strong incentive to forum-shop. Defendant 

Wood is entitled to know which eventuality the Plaintiffs 

foresee; and she requests that the Court compel the Plaintiffs to 

reveal this information so that she can prepare her defense. 

14. Defendant Wood has previously set forth numerous 

authorities in support of the arguments made in her Motion to 

(= 

 



  

Compel Houston Lawyers and her original Motion to Compel 

Discovery from the Original Plaintiffs -- both of which are still 

pending before the Court. Therefore she will not repeat those 

arguments here but instead hereby incorporates them by reference. 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant Wood respectfully 

requests that the Court order that by July 31, 1989 the Plain- 

tiffs must answer her Interrogatories and produce the documents 

she has requested, as set forth above and in her original Motion 

to Compel Discovery from Plaintiffs, so that she may adequately 

prepare for the trial of this case; and she requests such other 

and further relief, in law and in equity, to which she may show 

herself justly entitled. 

Respectfully submitted, 

PORTER & CLEMENTS 

a <5 <i i ey 

  

J. Eugene Clements 
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 

~~-Houston, Texas 77002-2730 
(713) 226-0600 

{ 

By {\ = crn lls & Pl gallos 
  

Getic Smith ¢ (ry. "er ww. 
Attorney at Law | // 
10999 Interstate Hwy. 10, #905 
San Antonio, Texas 78230 

(512) 641-9944 

ATTORNEYS FOR HARRIS COUNTY 
DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD 

-=11- 

\ 

 



  

OF COUNSEL: 

PORTER & CLEMENTS 

John E. O'Neill 
Evelyn V. Keyes 
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 
Houston, Texas 77002-2730 

(713) 226-0600 

Michael J. Wood 
Attorney at Law 
440 Louisiana, Suite 200 
Houston, Texas 77002 

(713) 228-5105 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  

I hereby certify that on the day of July, 1989, a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing Harris County 
District Judge Sharolyn Wood's Supplement to her Motion to Compel 
Discovery from Plaintiffs was served upon counsel of record in 
this case by first class United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed as follows: 

  

Mr. William L. Garrett 
Ms. Brenda Hall Thompson 
Garrett, Thompson & Chang 
Attorneys at Law 
8300 Douglas, Suite 800 

Dallas, Texas 75225 

Mr. Rolando L. Rios 
Southwest Voter Registration & 

Education Project 
201 KN, St. Mary's, Suite 521 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Ms. Susan Finkelstein 
Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. 
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 600 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Mr. Julius Levonne Chambers 
Ms. Sherrilyn A. Ifill 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street 

16th Floor 

New York, New York 10013 

-12- 

 



  

Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald 

Matthews & Branscomb 

301 Congress Ave., Suite 2050 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas 
Ms. Mary F. Keller, First Assistant Attorney General 
Ms. Renea Hicks, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 

Mr. Javier Guajardo, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 
P. O. Box 12548 
Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Edward B. Cloutman, IIT 

Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C. 
3301 Elm Street 
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 

Mr. E. Brice Cunningham 
777 So. R.L. Thornton Freeway 
Suite 121 
Dallas, Texas 75203 

Mr. Ken Oden 

Travis County Attorney 
P. O. Box 1748 
Austin, Texas 78767 

Mr. David R. Richards 
Special Counsel 
600 W. 7th Street 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Mark H. Dettman 

Attorney at Law 
P. O.. Box i2559 

Midland, Texas 79702 

Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr. 

Hughes & Luce 
2800 Momentum Place 

1717 Main Street 
Dallas, Texas 75201 

     

Evelyn V. Keyes 
\ 

Su 

  

W0002/45/cdf 

-l 3 

 



   



PorTER & CLEMENTS 
FIRST REPUBLICBANK CENTER 

700 LOUISIANA, SUITE 3500 

HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002-2730 

ATTORNEYS 

A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING 

PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS 

  

TELEPHONE (713) 226-0600 

TELECOPIER (713) 228-1331 

TELECOPIER (7131 224-4835 
EVELYN V. KEYES TELEX 775-348 

(713) 226-061 

July 3, 1989 

Clerk, U.S. District Court 
200 E. Wall St., Suite 316 
Midland, Texas 79702 

Re: No. MO0O88-CA-154; League of United Latin American 
Citizens (LULAC), et al. v. James Mattox, Attorney 
General of Texas, et al.; In the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Texas, Midland-Odessa 
Division 

Dear Sir: 

Enclosed for filing in the above-referenced case is Harris 
County District Judge Sharolyn Wood's Motion to Compel Discovery 
From Plaintiffs, along with a proposed Order. 

Please verify filing by placing your stamp in the margin of 
the enclosed extra copy and return same to me in the self- 
addressed stamped envelope provided. 

By copy of this letter, all counsel are being served a copy 
of this filing by first class United States mail, postage 
prepaid. 

Sincerely yours, 

Cody V (ey. 
Evelyn V. Keyes 

EVK/cdf 
enclosures 

cc: Mr. William L. Garrett 
Ms. Brenda Hall Thompson 
Garrett, Thompson & Chang 
Attorneys at Law 
8300 Douglas, Suite 800 
Dallas, Texas 75225  



   PorTER & CLEMENTS 

Clerk, U.S. District Court 
July 3, 1989 
Page -2- 

CC: Mr. Rolando L. Rios 
Southwest Voter Registration & 

Education Project 
201 N, St. Mary's, Suite 521 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Ms. Susan Finkelstein 

Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. 
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 600 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Mr. Julius Levonne Chambers 
Ms. Sherrilyn A. Ifill 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor 
New York, New York 10013 

Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald 
Matthews & Branscomb 

301 Congress Ave., Suite 2050 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas 
Ms. Mary F. Keller, First Assistant Attorney General 
Ms. Renea Hicks, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 
Mr. Javier Guajardo, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 
P. O. Box 12548 
Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Edward B. Cloutman, III 
Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C. 
3301 Elm Street 
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 

Mr. E. Brice Cunningham 
777 So. R.L. Thornton Freeway, Suite 121 
Dallas, Texas 75203 

Mr. Ken Oden 
Travis County Attorney 
P.O. Box 1748 

Austin, Texas 78767 

 



  

PorTER & CLEMENTS 

  

Clerk, U.S. District Court 
July 3, 1989 
Page -3- 

Mr. David R. Richards 
Special Counsel 
600 W. 7th Street 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Mark H. Dettman 

Attorney at Law 

P.O. - Box 2559 

Midland, Texas 79702 

Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr. 

Hughes & Luce 
2800 Momentum Place 

1717 Main Street 

Dallas, Texas 75201 

 



  

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION 

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN 
CITIZENS (LULAC), et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

JIM MATTOX, Attorney General 

§ 

§ 

S 

§ 

S 
V. § NO. MO-88-CA-154 

S 

S 
of the State of Texas, et al., § 

S 

S Defendants. 

HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY FROM PLAINTIFFS 
  

  

Defendant/Intervenor Harris County District Judge Sharolyn 

Wood ("Wood") files this Motion to Compel Discovery from Plain- 

tiffs pursuant to Fed. R, Civ. P. 33(a), 34(b) and 37(a) and, in 

support thereof, respectfully shows the Court the following: 

i, This case was brought by the League of United Latin 

American Citizens ("LULAC") and certain named black and Hispanic 

individuals ("Plaintiffs") claiming that Texas' system for 

electing state district judges from county-wide districts 

discriminates against blacks and Hispanics by diluting their 

votes in certain target counties in violation of section 2 of the 

Voting Rights Act, 42 U.,8.C. § 1973, and the Pourteenth and 

Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 

2. The Court permitted Defendant Wood to intervene in this 

case on February 27, 1989. The same day, the Court permitted 

 



several other parties to intervene as Plaintiffs or Defendants. 

The next day, on February 28, 1989, Defendant Wood served her 

First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 

Documents, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," on 

the following original Plaintiffs: LULAC Councils #4434 and 

#4451, James Fuller, LULAC Statewide, Christina Moreno, and 

Aquilla Watson. The Plaintiffs have never responded to Defendant 

Wood's Interrogatories and Requests for Production. On June 22, 

1989, counsel for Defendant Wood conferred with counsel for 

Plaintiffs by telephone, seeking to discover why the Plaintiffs 

had never responded to her discovery requests. Counsel was 

informed that the Plaintiffs would attempt to discover what had 

happened. Since June 22, counsel for Defendant Wood has heard 

nothing from counsel for the Plaintiffs; nor has any effort been 

made by the Plaintiffs, either before or after that date, to 

respond to any requests for discovery from Defendant Wood. 

3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides that a 

party seeking discovery may apply to the Court for an order 

compelling an answer to an interrogatory upon the refusal to 

answer of the party upon whom the interrogatory has been served. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2). Rule: 37 further provides that, if in 

response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, a 

party fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as 

requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling 

inspection. Id.  



4, Rule 37 was designed to assist parties in Defendant 

Wood's position in obtaining discovery from recalcitrant parties. 

Rule 37 establishes a flexible means by which the Court may 

enforce compliance with discovery procedures through a broad 

choice of remedies and procedures. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co. Vv. 
  

Lyster, 328 F.24 411, 415 (5th: Cir. 1964). The rule is to be 

liberally construed. McCarthy v, Benton, 13 P.R.D. 454, 455 
  

{(D.C.D.C. 1952). Even in civil rights actions, plaintiffs are 

not free to disregard the discovery rules, and any sanction which 

may be imposed for discovery abuse in a non-civil rights case may 

be imposed in a civil rights case. Prince v. Poulos, F.2d 
  

{5th Cir. June 22, 1989) (1989 WL 59164). A copy of Prince 

is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 

5. Compliance with the rules of discovery is particularly 

important, and the issuance of an order to compel discovery is 

particularly appropriate, when, as in the instant case, the 

Plaintiff has placed certain claims in issue and then refuses to 

permit discovery regarding his basis for those claims. The 

Federal Rules of Discovery are designed to enable a defendant to 

elicit the basis for a plaintiff's allegations and to prepare his 

defenses to the charges made; they are not designed to permit a 

plaintiff to make broad-based allegations without any basis for 

belief in those allegations. Equal Employment Opportunity 
  

Commission v. Carter Copywriter, Div. of ACF Indus., Inc., 76 
  

F.R.D. 143, 144 (DC Mo. 1977), mandamus issued 577 F.2d 43, cert. 
   



denied 439 U.S. 1081, 99 S.Ct. B65 (1979). Once the plaintiff 

has placed his claims in issue, he cannot refuse to cooperate 

with the defendant in discovery concerning the crucial questions 

he has raised; and the willful failure to comply with a court 

order compelling discovery can be taken as an admission that the 

plaintiff's claim lacks merit. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. 
  

Litig., 611 F.Supp. 1290, 1294 (D.C.N.J. 1985). The refusal to 

answer legitimate and crucial questions is indefensible and 

properly invokes Rule 37. EEOC v. Carter Carburetor, 76 F.R.D. 
  

at 144. Since the Plaintiffs in this case have totally ignored 

all attempts by Defendant Wood, both formal and informal, to 

obtain discovery regarding the basis for their claims, an order 

compelling discovery and requiring them to answer fully and 

completely every interrogatory posed by Defendant Wood and to 

produce every document requested in Defendant Wood's document 

request is fully indicated. 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant/Intervenor Harris 

County District Judge Sharolyn Wood respectfully requests that 

the Court order the Plaintiffs to answer fully and completely the 

Interrogatories and Requests for Production served upon them by 

Defendant Wood and to produce all of the documents and things 

requested therein at least 45 days prior to trial so that 

Defendant Wood may adequately prepare her defense to the Plain- 

tiffs' claims; and she requests such other and further relief in 

law and in equity to which she may show herself justly entitled.  



  

Respectfully submitted, 

PORTER & CLEMENTS 

  

  

  

Suite 3500 

77002-2730 

  

By: 
  

y = C3 k. A A 2 ff i 2 oy 

Perrarl Smith ~~ 4 

Attorney at Law Li 
10999 Interstate 10, #2905 

San Antonio, Texas hE 

(512) 641-9944 

ATTORNEYS FOR HARRIS COUNTY 
DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD 

OF COUNSEL: 

PORTER & CLEMENTS 

John E. O'Neill 
Evelyn V. Keyes 
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 
Houston, Texas 77002-2730 

(713) 226-0600 

Michael J. Wood 
Attorney at Law 

440 Louisiana, Suite 200 
Houston, Texas 77002 

(713) 228-5105 

 



  

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  

I hereby certify that on the 2 ay Cf July, 1989, a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing Harris County 
District Judge Sharolyn Wood's Motion to Compel Discovery From 
Plaintiffs was served upon counsel of record in this case by 
first class United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as 

follows: 

Mr. William L. Garrett 
Ms. Brenda Hall Thompson 
Garrett, Thompson & Chang 
Attorneys at Law 
8300 Douglas, Suite 800 
Dallas, Texas 75225 

Mr. Rolando L. Rios 
Southwest Voter Registration & 

Education Project 
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 521 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Ms. Susan Finkelstein 

Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. 

201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 600 

San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Mr. Julius Levonne Chambers 
Ms. Sherrilyn A. Ifill 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson Street 
16th Floor 
New York, New York 10013 

Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald 

Matthews & Branscomb 

301 Congress Ave., Suite 2050 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas 
Ms. Mary F. Keller, First Assistant Attorney General 
Ms. Renea Hicks, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 
Mr. Javier Guajardo, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 

P. O. Box 12548 
Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78701 

 



  

Mr. Edward B. Cloutman, III 
Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C. 
3301 Elm Street 
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 

Mr. E. Brice Cunningham 
777 So. R.L. Thornton Freeway 
Suite 121 
Dallas, Texas 75203 

Mr. Ken Oden 

Travis County Attorney 
P, O. Box 1748 

Austin, Texas 78767 

Mr. David R. Richards 
Special Counsel 
600 W. 7th Street 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Mr. Mark H. Dettman 

Attorney at Law 

P. O. Box 2559 

Midland, Texas 79702 

Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr. 

Hughes & Luce 
2800 Momentum Place 

1717 Main Street 
Dallas, Texas 75201 

Et, Y io» 
Evelyn V. Keyes 
  

WO0002/35/cdf 

 



  

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION 

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN § 

CITIZENS (LULAC), et al., § 

§ 

Plaintiffs, § 

S 
Xo. § NO. MO-88-CA-154 

S 
JIM MATTOX, Attorney General § 
of the State of Texas, et al., § 

§ 
Defendants. § 

ORDER 
  

Came on for consideration Defendant Harris County District 

Judge Sharolyn Wood's Motion to Compel Discovery from Plaintiffs, 

and the Court, having reviewed Defendant Wood's Motion and the 

response thereto, if any, and having considered the arguments of 

counsel, is of the opinion that Defendant Wood's Motion should be 

GRANTED. It is therefore 

ORDERED that Plaintiffs' LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN 

CITIZENS ("LULAC"), et. al. answer Defendant Wood's First Set of 

Interrogatories and Requests for Production and produce all of 

the documents and things requested therein on or before July 31, 

1989. 

SIGNED this day of 1989, 
  

  

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

W0002/35/p2 

 



E
X
H
I
B
I
T
 

A 

 
 

 



  

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN 
CITIZENS (LULAC), et al., 

VY. 

JAMES MATTOX, Attorney General 
of the State of Texas, et al., 

TO: 

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION 

Plaintiffs, 

§ 

§ 

§ 

S 
§ : 
§ NO. MO-88-CA-154 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 
Defendants § 

8g 

DEFENDANT WOOD'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
  

Plaintiffs League of United Latin American Citizens 
("LULAC") Councils $4434 and $4451 and each of the 
following: James Fuller, and LULAC Statewide, by and through 
their attorney of record, Rolando Rios, Esgq., Southwest 
Voter Registration & Education Project, 201 N. St. Mary's, 
Suite 221, San Antonio, Texas 78205; 

Christina Moreno, by and through her attorney of record, 
Susan Finkelstein, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 201 N. St. 
Mary's, Suite 600, San Antonio, Texas 78205; and 

Aquilla Watson, by and through her attorney of record, 
William L. Garrett, Esqg., Garrett, Thompson & Chang, 
8300 Douglas, Suite 800, Dallas, Texas 75225; 

In accordance with the provisions of Rules 33 and 34 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Intervenor-Defendant Sharolyn 

 



  

Wood submits these Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 

Documents to League of United Latin American Citizens, Christina 

Moreno, Aquilla Watson, James Fuller, and LULAC Statewide 

("Plaintiffs") in the above captioned cause of action. 

Plaintiffs are to each to answer interrogatories within 15 

days, but may collectively produce all items responsive to these 

requests at the offices of Porter & Clements, 3500 RepublicBank 

Center, 700 Louisiana, Houston, Texas, on or before 10:00 a.m. on 

April ‘3, 1989. 

DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS 
  

DEFINITIONS: 
  

(a) Definition of "request": request shall mean these request’: request 

Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. 
  

{b) Definition of "document": for purposes of this 
  

request, a document shall include any method of reducing and 
  

recording information in written form, whether a memorandum, a 

letter, a note, etc, including without limitation papers, books, 

accounts, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, electronic or 

videotape recordings, computer disks or tapes or other forms of 

computer memory storage, and other data compilations from which 

information can be obtained and translated, if necessary, by you, 

into reasonably usable form. The term document shall also be 
  

understood to include any other tangible thing which constitutes 

or contains matter relevant to the subject matter of this suit. 

 



  

{c) ‘Definition of "identify": for purposes of this   

request, (i) when used with reference to a person or entity, the 

term "identify", shall mean to state the full name of such person   

or entity and his/her/its last known address and telephone 

number; (ii) when used with reference to a document, the term 
  

"identify" shall mean to describe the document, its date of   

  

creation and the name of its author. 

(d) Definition of "or": for purposes of this request, "or" 

shall mean and/or. 

(e) Definition of "targeted counties": for purposes of 
  

this request, the term "targeted counties" shall mean each of 
  

those Texas counties designated by Plaintiffs as the objects of 

this cause of action, including Harris, Dallas, Ector, Mclennan, 

Tarrant, Midland, Travis, Jefferson, Galveston, Bell, Lubbock, 

Fort Bend, Brazos, Brazoria, Taylor, Wichita, Angelina, Gregg, 

Smith, Atascosa, Frio, Karnes, La Salle, Wilson, Aransas, Bee, 

Live Oak, McMullen, San Patricio, Caldwell, Comal, Hays, Calhoun, 

De Witt, Goliad, Jackson, Refugio, Victoria, Castro, Hale, 

Swisher, Culberson, El Paso, and Hudspeth. 

INSTRUCTIONS: 
  

(a) The Interrogatories which follow are to be answered 

separately and fully, in writing and under oath, signed by the 

person making said answers. 

(b) This request applies to all documents and information 
  

within your possession, custody or control. 

 



  

(c) Documents produced in response hereto shall be   

organized and designated to correspond to the categories in this 

request or produced as they are kept in the usual course of 

business. 

(d) A copy of your response to each Request for Production 

should be served on the undersigned attorneys within thirty (30) 

days after service of this request. 

(e) If privilege or work product protection is claimed as a 

ground for withholding production of one or more documents in 
  

whole or in part, the response hereto shall identify the date of 

the document, its author, its subject matter, its length, its   

attachments, if any, its present custodian and all recipients 

thereof, whether indicated on the document or otherwise, and 
  

shall describe the factual basis for the claim of privilege or 

work product protection in sufficient detail to permit the Court 

to adjudicate the validity of the claim of privilege or protec- 

tion. 

(f) In the event that a document called for by this request 
  

has been destroyed, the response hereto shall identify the 

preparer of the document, its addressor (if different), address-   

ee, each recipient thereof, each person to whom distributed or 

shown, date prepared, date transmitted (if different), date 

received, a description of its contents and subject matter, the 

date of its destruction, the manner of its destruction, the name, 

title and address of the person authorizing its destruction, and 

 



  

the reason(s) for its destruction, the name, title and address of 

the person destroying the document and a description of efforts   

to locate the document or recording and copies of it. 

(g) This request shall be deemed to be continuing so as to 

require supplemental response in accordance with Rule 26 (e) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 



INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
  

Interrogatory No. 1: 
  

As to each person you expect to call as an expert witness in 

the trial of this case: 

(a) identify each person; 
  

(b) state the matter(s) on which each person is expected to 

testify; 

(c) state the substance of the facts ang opinions to which 

the person is expected to testify, and summarize the grounds for 

each opinion; and 

(d) identify each person whom you have retained as a   

consulting expert in connection with the instant litigation, to 

the extent such person's opinion will be relied upon, in whole or 

in part, by any person identified in Answer to subpart (a) 

hereof. 

Answer: 

Request for Production No. 1: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying each and every document, 
  

including, without limitation, each and every demographic report 

for study or compilation of demographic data, that has been 

 



submitted to, prepared by, or used by each person you expect to 

call as an expert witness, including his/her associates, with 

regard to the subject matter of this litigation and all documents 
  

furnished to persons identified in Answer to Interrogatory No. 

1(d), above. 

Interrogatory No. 2: 
  

State the qualifications of each expert witness and/or 

consulting expert identified in response to Interrogatory No. 1 
  

to render an opinion with respect to the matters for which you 

have retained his/her services. 

Answer: 

Interrogatory No. 3: 
  

Identify all officers and members of LULAC resident in 
  

Harris County, Texas. 

Answer: 

 



  

Request for Production No. 2: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents that 
  

support or otherwise refer, relate, or pertain to the claim that 

blacks and Hispanics are denied the right to participate equally 

in the judicial electoral process in Harris County. 

Interrogatory No. 4: 
  

Describe all social, economic, and political forces that you 

claim have caused the inability of Hispanics and blacks to elect 

candidates of their choice to the Texas judiciary in Harris 

County under the at large system of judicial election. 

Answer: 

Request for Production No. 3: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents that 
  

evidence any local interaction of economic, social and political 

forces that deprives or has deprived Hispanics and blacks of the 

right to participate equally in the judicial system process in 

Harris County. 

Interrogatory No. 5: 
  

State the factual basis for your claim that you have 

personally been denied the right to elect state district judges 

of your choice. 

Answer: 

 



  

Request for Production No: 4: 
  

Produce for inspection and copy all dbcuments which support 
  

or otherwise relate to your answer to Interrogatory No. 6. 

Interrogatory No. 6: 
  

State whether you are alleging that the system of electing 

state district judges at large in Harris County is the result of 

an intent to discriminate against blacks and/or Hispanics. 

Answer: 

Reguest for Production No. 5: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents that refer, 
  

relate, or pertain to your answer to Interrogatory No. 7. 

Interrogatory No. 7: 
  

(a) State whether or not you are claiming that the system, 

currently in effect in Harris County, Texas, of electing district 

Judges at large to serve specialized functions, such as the 

adjudication of civil disputes or criminal disputes or family law 

matters, should be abolished or otherwise changed; and (b) if 

your answer to part (a) is affirmative, describe in detail how 

you would change said system; and (c) if negative, describe fully 

how each single member judicial district could be drawn to 

preserve judicial specialization. 

Answer: 

 



  

Request for Production No. 6: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents which 
  

refer, relate, or pertain to your answer to Interrogatory No. 8. 

Request for Production No. 7: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents that 
  

indicate the size of the pool of potential black and Hispanic 

attorneys eligible for election as state district judges in 

  

Harris County, including, without limitation, all documents that 

indicate the number of black and Hispanic attorneys in Harris 

County and/or their years in practice. 

Request for Production No. 8: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents that 
  

indicate the percentage of black and Hispanic attorneys among all 

attorneys eligible to run for election as state district judge in 

Harris County. 

Request for Production No. 9: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents that 
  

indicate the number and percentage of registered black, Hispanic, 

and other voters in Harris County. 

Interrogatory No. 8: 
  

Describe the location and population of each and every 

minority-majority judicial election district, whether black, 

Hispanic or combined, that you claim could be drawn in Harris 

County. 

Answer: 

10 

 



Request for Production No. 10: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents that 
  

support or otherwise relate to your answer to Interrogatory 

No. 8. 

Request for Production No. 11: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying each and every document 

that supports or otherwise relates or pertains to the claim in 

913 of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (the "Complaint") that 

Harris County contains a sufficiently compact minority population 

for the drawing of at least one single member judicial district 

in which blacks and Hispanics together would constitute the 

majority of voters. 

Request for Production No. 12: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying each and every document 
  

that supports or otherwise relates or pertains to the claim in 

914 of the Complaint that the counties listed in {13 contains 190 

judicial districts, and a combined minority population of almost 

30%, but that only 5.3% of the judges are minority judges. 

Request for Production No. 13: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying each and every document 

that supports or otherwise relates or pertains your claim in q15 

of the Complaint that Harris County contains sufficient black 

population for the drawing of at least one majority black 

single-member district referenced in that paragraph.  



Request for Production No. 14: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents that 
  

support or otherwise relate or pertain to your claim in 16 of 

the Complaint that the counties listed in 915 contain 164 

judicial districts and have a black population of 16.4% but that 

only 4.3% of the district judges in those counties are black. 

Request for Production No. 15: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents that 
  

support or otherwise relate or pertain to your claim in 917 of 

the Complaint that Harris County has a sufficient Hispanic 

population for the drawing of at least one majority Hispanic 

single member district. 

Request for Production No. 16: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents that 
  

support or otherwise relate to your claim in g18 of the Complaint 

that the counties listed in q17 contain 148 judicial districts 

and a Hispanic population of 15.4% and that only 2.7% of the 148 

district judges are Hispanic. 

Interrogatory No. 9: 
  

State the basis for your omission from this suit of all 

other counties in Texas besides the targeted counties, including, 
  

without limitation, the following counties: Cameron, El Paso, 

Bexar, Hidalgo, Webb, Duval, Kleberg, Willacy, Uvalde, Maverick, 

Zavala, Dimmit, Kinney, Val Verde, Brooks, Jim Hogg, Jim Wells, 

San Patricio, Starr, and Zapata. 

Answer:  



  

interrogatory No. 10: 
  

State whether or not you are claiming that blacks and 

Hispanics are or have been denied the right to participate fully 

in the election of state district judges generally in Texas or 

only in certain counties and explain the reasons for your answer. 

Answer: 

Recuest for Production No, 17: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents that 
  

indicate the number and percentage of black, Hispanic and other 

voters in each of the non-targeted counties in Texas. 

Request for Production No. 18: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents that 
  

indicate the size of the pool of black and Hispanic attorneys 

eligible for election as state district judges in each of the 

non-targeted counties in Texas, including without limitation all 

documents that indicate the number and/or percentage of such   

attorneys in each county and their number of years in practice. 

Interrogatory No. 11: 
  

State the factual basis for your claim in 924 of the 

Complaint that minorities are politically cohesive in Harris 

County. 

Answer: 

13 

 



  

Reguest for Production No. 19: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents that 
  

support or otherwise relate to your answer to Interrogatory 

No. 10. 

Interrogatory No. 12: 
  

(a) State whether you are alleging that black voters and 

Hispanic voters vote for state district judges on the basis of 

race in Harris County and, if so, the reasons therefor; and (Db) 

state whether you are alleging that black voters and Hispanic 

voters will combine their votes in districts where together they 

constitute a majority of the electorate to vote for a minority 

judicial candidate over a white candidate and, if so, the reasons 

therefor. 

Answer: 

Request for Production No. 20: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents that 
  

provide the factual bases for your answer to Interrogatory 

No. 11. 

Request for Production No. 21: 
  

Produce for inspection and copying all documents that refer, 
  

relate, or pertain to your answer to Interrogatory No. 12. 

14 

 



  

Interrogatory No. 13: 
  

State whether you are alleging that the determination of the 

size and location of state judicial election districts is or 

should be made on the basis of population and explain the reasons 

for your answer. 

Answer: 

Interrogatory No. 14: 
  

State whether you are alleging that, and, if so, why, under 

a single-member district system venue should lie in the single- 

member district as opposed to the county. 

   
  

   

  

Answer: 

Respectfully submitted, 

PORTER & CLEMENTS 

SQ Ls Cor 
: Eugene Clements — 

00 Louisiana, Suite 3500 
ouston, Texas 77002-2730 
(713) 226-0600 

ATTORNEYS FOR HARRIS COUNTY 
DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD 

OF COUNSEL: 

PORTER & CLEMENTS 
John E. O'Neill 
Evelyn V. Keyes 
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 
Houston, Texas 77002-2730 

(713) 226-0600 

15 
a 

 



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  

I hereby certify that on this 20 day of February, 1989 a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was 
mailed to counsel of record in this case by first class United 
States mail, postage pre-paid, addressed as follows: 

William L. Garrett, Esq. 
Brenda Hall Thompson, Esq. 
Garrett, Thompson & Chang 
Attorneys at Law 
8300 Douglas, Suite 800 
Dallas, Texas 75225 

Rolando L. Rios, Esq. 
Southwest Voter Registration & 

Education Project 
201 RK. St, Mary's, Suite 221 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Susan Finkelstein, Esq. 
Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. 
201 XN. St. Mary's, Suite 600 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Julius Levonne Chambers, Esq. 
Sherrilyn A, 1%2ill, Esq. 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street 

16th Floor 

New York, New York 10013 

Gabrielle XK. McDonald, Esq. 
Matthews & Branscomb 
301 Congress, Avenue 
Suite 2050 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas 
Mary F. Keller, First Assistant Attorney General 
Renea Hicks, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 
Javier Guajardo, Spec. Assistant Attorney General 
P. O. Box 12548 

Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78701  



Edward B. Cloutman, III, Esq. 
Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C. 
3301 Elm Street 
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 

E. Brice Cunningham, Esq. 
777 So. R.L. Thornton Freeway 
Suite 121 

Dallas, Texas 75203 

Ken Oden, Esq. 
Travis County Attorney 
P. O. Box 1748 
Austin, Texas 78767 

David R. Richards, Esq. 
Special Counsel 
600 WW, Temiftwgar 

Austin, Texas 78701 

Mark H. Dettman 

Attorney at Law 

P. O. Box..2559 

Midland, Texas 79702 

Darrell Smith, Esq. 

Attorney at Law 
10999 Interstate Highway 10, #905 
San Antonio, Texas 78230 

Michael J. Wood, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
440 Louisiana 
Houston, Texas 77002 

Robert H. Mow, Jr. 

Hughes & Luce 
2800 Momentum Place 
1717 Main Street 

Dallas, Texas 75201 

Cowl. HW» 
Evelyn V. (Keyes 
  

WO0001/08  



EXHIBIT 
B 

 
 

 



  

PAGE 1 

Citation Rank(R) Database Mode 
-- F.2d === R1 OF 35 CTAS P 
18989 WL 59164 (5th Cir.(Tex.)) 

Wayman L. PRINCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, 

Vv. 

Michael J. POULOS, et al., Defendant-Appellees. 

No. 88-6118 

Summary Calendar. 

United States Court of Appeals, 

Fifth Circuit. 

June 22, 18989. 
Plaintiff appealed from order of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Texas, Lynn N. Hughes, J., which dismissed complaint for 
discovery abuse. The Court of Appeals, Gee, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) 

dismissal was not an abuse of discretion, and (2) attorney fees were adequately 
supported by documentation. 

Affirmed. 

{13 

170BK712 

FEDERAL COURTS 

K. Briefs in general. 

C.A.5 (Tex.) 1988, 

Overnight courier service is not a public authority and thus not a form of 
“mail” for purposes of appellate rule that briefs shall be deemed filed on the 

day of the mailing if the most expeditious form of delivery by mail, excepting 

special delivery, is utilized. F.R.A.P.Rule 25¢(a), 28 U.S5.C.A. 

Prince v. Poulos 

www fF oo0 ~~-~, 1988 Wl. BBI1E4 (Sih Cir. (Tex. )) 

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 

[2] 

170BK712 

FEDERAL COURTS 

K. Briefs in general. 

C.A.5:{Tex.) 18859. 

Brief mailed by certified registered mail on the date that brief was due was 

timely filed. F.R.A.P.Rule 25(a), 28 U.S5.C.A. 

Prince v. Poulos 

www F.2d --——, 1888 Ui. BBI1G4 (Bth Cir.{(Tex.)) 

{3] 

170AK1278 

FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 

K. Failure to respond. 

C.A.5 (Tex.) 1988, 

It was not an abuse of discretion to dismiss for violation of discovery orders 

where plaintiff had consistently refused to comply with orders or engage in 
piecemeal disclosure designed to impede recovery, court had previously twice 

imposed monitored sanctions for discovery abuses, conduct was prejudicial to 

the defendant's case, and the defendant himself was an attorney who was or 

should have been aware of his discovery obligations. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 

37(b)(2XC), (d), 28 U.S5.C.A. 

COPR. (C) WEST 1985 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 

 



  

--- F.2d -——— PAGE 2 

Prince v. Poulos 

www F.2d —~==, 18989 UL 58184 (5th Cir.(Tax.)) 
[4] 

178AK1278 
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 

K. Failure to respond. 

C.A.5 (Tex.) 1989, 

Even in civil rights actions, plaintiffs are not free to disregard rules of 

discovery and any sanction which may be imposed for discovery abuse in a 
noncivil rights case, including dismissal with prejudice, may be imposed in a 

civil rights case. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 37(d), 28 U.S.C.A. 
Prince v. Poulos 

we F.2d ==-=, 1989 WL 59164 (Sith Cir.{Tex.)) 

[5] 

170AK1278 

FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 

K. Failure to respond. 

C.A.5 (Tex.) 1988, 

Amount awarded as attorney fees as sanction in connection with dismissal for 

discovery violations was supported by the 60 pages of invoices submitted by 

counsel. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 37(b)(2)(C), 28 U.5.C.A. 

Prince v. Poulos 

mw Reel ~>~=_ 10809 | 59184 (Sth Cir.{(Tex.}) 

[6] 

170AK1278 

FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 

K. Failure to respond. 

LC.A.5 (Tex.) 1889. 

Plaintiff's failure to object to award of costs when action was dismissed as 

discovery sanction waived objection that costs were not specifically requested 
during the hearing. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 37(d), S4(d), 28 U.S.C.A. 

Prince v. Poulos 

wee F.20 —===-,-1980 WL 58184 (Bth Cir. .{Tex.)) 

Wayman L. Prince, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant. 

John H. Smither, J. Alfred Southerland, Houston, Tex., for defendants- 
appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

Texas. 

Before GEE, WILLIAMS, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges. 

GEE, Circuit Judge: 

The appellant in this action contends that the district court abused its 

discretion by dismissing his complaint with prejudice as a sanction for 

discovery abuse. The appellant also contends that the district court erred in 

awarding the appellees $8,362.34 in attorney's fees incurred as a result of the 

appellant's failure to comply with discovery and in awarding appellees 

$6,512.30 in costs. We find that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in dismissing the appellant’ 's complaint. We further find that the 

COPR. (C) WEST 1989 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 

 



  

--- F.2d ---- PAGE 3 

amount of attorney's fees awarded to the appellees was reasonable and that 
costs were properly assessed against the appellant. Consequently, we affirm 
the judgment of the district court. 

I. Facts 
In September 1986 the appellant filed a complaint alleging violations of 42 

U.S.C. ss 1981 and 1983, wrongful termination, negligence, fraud and bad 
faith. The complaint consisted of 175 paragraphs and 11 exhibits for a total 
of 181 pages. On October 1, 1986, the appellee moved to strike the complaint 
and filed notice to take the appellant's deposition on October 13, 1986. The 
appellant failed to appear at that deposition. Consequently the appellee moved 
under Rule 37(d) for an order compelling the appellant to appear at his 
deposition and imposing a monetary sanction in the amount of $500. 
On April 9, 1987, the appellee filed a second motion to compel discovery. On 

April 13, 1887, the district court held a court conference and ordered the 
appellant to produce certain documents and answer certified questions no later 
than May 11, 1987. The court held a second court conference on May 6, 1987. 
At this time the court informed the appellant's attorney that her client was 
obligated to make full disclosure of the matters previously discussed and to be 
deposed regarding these matters. The appellant appeared for his deposition as 
scheduled, but failed to provide all of the documents requested and refused to 
answer questions about those documents. On May 21, 1987, the appellees filed a 
motion to dismiss based on the appellant's failure to comply with the court's 
order. The court denied that motion but fined appellant $500 for failure to 
comply with discovery. The court also warned the appellant that “any further 
refusal to answer all questions would result in the dismissal of his suit." 
On April 4, 1988, the appellee moved to compel the appellant to produce 

certain documents for testing. On April 15, 1988, the appellee moved to compel 
a financial audit of the appellant. On May 25, 1988, the court granted both 
motions and ordered the appellant "to turn over all of his financial 
instruments. The order stated that this material was to be produced by June 2, 
1888." On August 15, 1888, the appellee moved under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) to 
dismiss appellant's complaint for failure to produce the information that he 
had been ordered to produce. : 
On October 13, 1988, the district court held a pre-trial conference hearing. 

At this hearing the appellant conceded that he had not yet produced all the 
required documents. The appellant contended that he was “diligently” 
attempting to comply with the request. He admitted, however, that he began to 
do so "approximately a week and a half ago." This conference took place 
eighteen months after the material was originally requested, approximately five 
months after the appellant had been ordered to produce the documents, and four 
months after the date on which production was due. At the hearing on October 
13, 1988, the district court granted the appellee’ s motion to dismiss. On 
October 14, 1988, the court heard evidence regarding the extent to which the 
appellee's attorney's fees were increased by the appellant's failure to comply 
with discovery orders. Following that hearing the court awarded appellees 
$8,362.34 in attorney's fees. Following entry of judgment the appellees filed 
a Bill of Costs in the amount of $6,512.30. Appellant did not file an 
objection to the allowance of the Bill. Consequently, the Clerk taxed costs in 
this amount against the appellant. 

II. Analysis [FNL] 

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--- F.2d ---- PAGE 

A. Dismissal With Prejudice 

(11[2] A district court's decision to dismiss a complaint with prejudice 
as a sanction for violation of a discovery order may be reversed only if it 
amounts to an abuse of discretion. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan 
Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2780-81, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 
1976). 

In determining whether a district court abused its discretion, our precedent 
has addressed a number of considerations. First, dismissal is authorized only 
when the failure to comply with the court's order results from willfulness or 
bad faith, and not from the inability to comply. Next, dismissal is proper 
only in situations where the deterrent value of Rule 37 cannot be substantially 
achieved by the use of less drastic sanctions. Another consideration is 
whether the other party's preparation for trial was substantially prejudiced. 
Finally, dismissal may be inappropriate when neglect is plainly attributable to 
an attorney rather than a blameless client, or when a party's simple negligence 
is grounded in confusion or sincere misunderstanding of the court's orders. 
Bluitt v. Arco Chemical Co., 777 F.2d 188, 190-191 (5th Cir.1985). 
[3] Applying these standards to the facts of this case we have no difficulty 

in concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. First, the 
appellant's failure to comply with a discovery order was not a single isolated 
instance. Rather, the appellant consistently refused to comply with such 
orders or engaged in piece-meal disclosure designed to impede discovery. As 
the district court noted, "At ... best, ... [the appellant has] been 
disingenuous with the Court and ... [his] behavior has ranged downward from 
there." 

Second, prior to dismissing the appellant's complaint the district court twice 
imposed monetary sanctions for discovery abuses and warned the appellant that 
further failure to comply with such orders would result in dismissal of his 
complaint. Despite this fact, the appellant continued to ignore discovery 
orders. It is clear, therefore, that other less drastic sanctions were 

ineffective in curbing the appellant's discovery abuses. 
Third, we find that the appellant's conduct prejudiced the appellees’ case. 

The appellant was seeking damages for lost past and future wages. Without the 
financial information sought by appellees, they would be unable to determine 
the validity of the appellant's claim. Further, the appellees contended that 
the appellant was discharged for meeting with and working for private clients 
on company time. The records sought by the appellee were highly relevant if 
not essential to establishing the validity of the appellees’ contention. The 
appellant 's failure to disclose the information, consisting of massive 
quantities of complex financial documents, until three months prior to trial, 
was clearly prejudicial to the appellee. 

[4] Fourth, this is not a case in which a blameless client was made to suffer 
for his attorney's misdeeds. The appellant himself is an attorney who was, or 
should have been, fully aware of his discovery obligations. In light of these 
facts we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
dismissing the appellant's complaint. [FN21 

B. Attorney's Fees 

[5] "We review the district court's award of ... attorney's fees under 
the abuse of discretion standard. In requesting attorney's fees the appellees’ 
attorneys submitted sixty pages of invoices listing the date on which services 

COPR. (C) WEST 1989 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS  



  

zon Fold ws PAGE 5 

were rendered, the attorney who performed the services, the service performed, 
and the hours expended in performing those services. In some instances the 
number of hours expended had been "lined out” and adjusted hours written in. 
In every single instant in which the number of hours expended had been adjusted 
the new figure was lower than the original figure. Mr. Smither, one of the 
attorneys for the appellees, testified that the hours "lined out" regarded 
matters that were not "attributable to the multiplication of litigation." 
Smither testified that in each instance the billing attorney informed the 
firm's central accounting department of the number of hours to line out. The 
documents submitted also included itemizations of disbursements made on behalf 
of the appellees. 

Despite this detailed itemization of attorney's fees and expenses incurred, 
the appellant maintains that the district court erred in awarding attorney's 
fees because the fees were neither reasonable nor substantiated. Additionally, 
the appellant contends that the award of fees was improper because he had no 
opportunity to cross-examine the attorneys who authorized the line-outs. In 
McFarland v. Gregory, 425 F.2d 443 (5th Cir.1978), we held that it is error for 
the district court to award attorney's fees without giving the opposing party 
the opportunity to cross-examine the person upon whose affidavit the fees are 
based. In McFarland, however, the sole basis for the award of the fees was the 
affidavit. In this case the award was based on the documentation submitted by 
the appellees and the testimony of Mr. Smithers. The appellant had the 
opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Smithers and, in fact, did so. We, therefore, 
find that the appellant was not denied the opportunity for cross-examination 
regarding attorney's fees. We further find that the fees were reasonable and 
substantiated. The award of attorney's fees was, therefore, proper. 

C. Costs 

[BE] The appellant contends that tte appellees should not be awarded costs 
because they did not specifically request them during the hearing. Rule 54(d) 
of the Fed.R.Civ.Proc. states that "... costs shall be allowed as a matter of 
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs. (emphasis 
added). This rule further provides "[oln motion served within five days 
[after costs are taxed], the action of the Clerk may be reviewed by the 
court." Fees were properly awarded under this rule and the appellant failed to 
object to the costs. Consequently, we find that the appellant has waived his 
objection to the Bill of Costs. 

III. Conclusion 
The appellant in this case has consistently demonstrated his complete 

disregard for the rules of discovery and the orders of the court. 
Consequently, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
dismissing the appellant's claim with prejudice. We also find that the 
district court's award of attorney's fees and costs was proper. Consequently, 
the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED. 

FN1. The appellant moved to strike the appellee's brief on the grounds 
that it was not timely filed. Appellees’ brief was due on March 29, 1989. 
Appellees mailed their brief via certified registered mail on that date. 
Rule 25(a) of the Fed.R.App.P. provides that "briefs ... shall be deemed 
filed on the day of mailing if the most expeditious form of delivery by 

COPR. (C) WEST 1889 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 

 



--- F.2d ---- PAGE 6B 

  

mail, excepting special delivery, is utilized." The appellant contends 
that certified mail is not first class. The Post Office disagrees. The 
appellant further contends that Federal Express, not first class, is the 
most expeditious form of mail. Webster's defines mail as "... letters 
conveyed under public authority." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 
(1873). Since Federal Express is not a public authority, they are not a 
form of "mail" and need not be utilized under Rule 25(a). The appellees’ 
brief was timely filed and the appellant's motion to strike is denied. 

FN2. The appellant states correctly that “[iln civil rights actions, 
pleadings are to be liberally construed such that a district court is 
warranted in granting a motion to dismiss only where plaintiff can prove no 
stated facts entitling him to relief." Cubellis v. Costar, 65 F.R.D. 49 
(W.D.Pa.1874). Therefore, appellant contends, his complaint should not 
have been dismissed prior to trial because it was not frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation. Had the district court dismissed this 
complaint for failure to state a claim the appellant's contention might 
have had some merit. Even in Civil Rights actions, however, plaintiffs are 
not free to disregard the rules of discovery. Any sanction which may be 
imposed for discovery abuse in a non-civil rights case, including dismissal 
with prejudice, may also be imposed in a civil rights case. See, e.qg., 
Morton v. Harris, 628 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.1980) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1044, 
101 S.Ct. 1766, 68 L.Ed.2d 243 (1981) in which we affirmed the dismissal of 
a pro se attorney's race discrimination suit for his willful and deliberate 
failure to comply with discovery orders. 

END OF DOCUMENT 

COPR. (C) WEST 1989 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOUT. WORKS 

 



   



  

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
MIDLAND/ODESSA DIVISION 

LULAC COUNCIL #4434, et al., § 
Plaintiffs, § 

§ VS. 
§ Civil Action No. APR 
§ MO 88 CA 154 A vale WILLIAM CLEMENTS, et al., § 

Defendants. § 
- 

SET OF INTERROGATOR Io Aun RANT PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Defendant-intervenor Wood's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents is directed to LULAC Councils 4434 and 4451, James Fuller, LULAC Statewide and Christina Moreno. Since LULAC Councils 4434 and 4451, James Fuller and Christina Moreno have no contact in Harris County (where Wood resides), they make no response to this discovery request, Plaintiff LULAC (statewide) makes the following responses only as to Harris County: 

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1;   

Richard Engstrom 
University of New Orleans 
Political Science Department 
New Orleans, LA 70148 

Testimony concerning minority voting behavior and white voting bloc in Harris and Dallas Counties, 

Robert Brischetto 
Southwest Voter Research Institute 
403 E. Commerce, Suite 260 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Testimony concerning minority voting behavior and white voting bloc in all areas at issue in this case except Harris and Dallas Counties, 

Richard Reyna 
4203 Woodcock 
Suite 103 
San Antonio, Texas 78228 

Testimony concerning socio-economic stratification in all areas at issue in this case. 

If LULAC statewide decides to call other expert witnesses, Defendant intervenor Wood will promptly be notified in accordance with F.R. Civ, P. 26. : ea 

 



RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:   

a) See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. 

b) See 1980 Census Voting .Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M » Phone # (409) 845. 5332, : 
Sey PR al "i J 

c) Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill, 

The resumes of the experts are attached. They state the experts’ qualifications. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3:   

The membership of LULAC Statewide in Harris County is not discoverable - » 357 U.S. 449 (1958). It has no officers in Harris County. 

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 2:   

a) See all local judicial election results from 1980 to present. 

b) See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. 

c) See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rutal Sociology, Texas A & M , Phone # (409) 845- : 5332. 

d) Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill. 

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO, 4; 

from electing candi 
rris County. 

See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. 

See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract: Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M , Phone # (409) 845- 3332. 

Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill,  



RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO 5:   

Members of LULAC statewide who reside in Harris County have been denied the right to elect state district judges of their choice because the history of past discrimination, combined with its lingering present effects of socio-economic stratification, and the existing system of electing district court judges causes the votes of minorities to be submerged in Harris County. 

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:   

a) See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. 
5 

b) See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A&M, Phone # (409) 845- 5332. 

c) Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill. 

The system of electing district court judges in Harris County is a result from an intent to discriminate against Blacks and/or Hispanics. 

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:   

Plaintiffs do not possess such documents. 

(a.) No. 

(c.) This pertains to a matter of remedy, which is not properly at issue at this point in litigation. 

To the extent that this pertains to remedy, this request is premature and LULAC statewide does not respond. To the extent that this pertains to Gingles 1, the documents are as follows: 

a) See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. 

b) See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M » Phone # (409) 845- 3332. i 

Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill.  



RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:   

LULAC statewide does not possess documents that fully respond to this request. All responsive documents, however, are available as follows: 

a) See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. 
a 
PELs SE 

Ye ~ er b) See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M » Phone # (409) 845. 5332, 
wy 

c) Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill. 
d) See information center at State Bar office in Austin, Texas for list of attorneys in Harris County. 

Also, this request deals with the issue of remedy, which is not properly at issue at this point in litigation. 

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:   

LULAC statewide does not possess such documents. 

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 9:   

a) See 1980 Census, PC80 : 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. | 

b) See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M » Phone # (409) 845. 5332. : 

¢) Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill. 

See response to Request for” Production #6. The maps, which are available for inspection, are the best description of locations of potential districts. 

a) See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. : : 

b) See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M » Phone # (409) 845- 5332. 

Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill.  



  

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11   

a) 

b) 

c) 

See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. SN 

See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M , Phone # (409) 84s- 5332. : E ns 
PRLS ETRE 

Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 12: --   

a) 

b) 

c) 

See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. 

See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M » Phone # (409) 845- 5332. 

Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill. 

Also, see list of judges included in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13:   

a) 

b) 

eo) 

See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics ° Tables 175 & 182. 

See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M » Phone # (409) 845- 5332. 

Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill. 

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:   

a) 

b) 

See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. ; 
. 

See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M » Phone # (409) 845. 5332. 

Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill. 

 



  

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15:   

a) See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. 

b) See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M , Phone # (409) 845- 5332. 
nia 
re" Pe 

Nat 

¢) Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill. 

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16: --   

a) See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. 

b) See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M, Phone # (409) 845- 5332. 

c.) Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill. 

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5%   

El Paso County and Bexar County are included in this lawsuit. No client requested that the lawsuit include other counties. 

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10:   

This lawsuit only addresses the rights of minorities in the targeted counties. The reason for this is no client requested that the lawsuit include other counties. 

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17:   

a) See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. 

b) See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M, Phone # (409) 845- 5332. 
| 

c) Dr. ‘Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you: by Sherrilyn Ifill, 

Plaintiffs do not possess such documents. 

 



  

| 
| 

| * 

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11:   

Generally, Black and Hispanic voters vote for Black and Hispanic candidates and polarization prevents these candidates from winning. 

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 19:   

a) See 1980 Census, PC80 - | - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics - Tables 175 & 182. 

b) See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M » Phone # (409) 845. 5332. 

¢) Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill. 

(a) Yes. Election results suggest that minority candidates carry the minority precincts and do not carry the non-minority precincts. (b) Analysis on this issue is not complete. 

  

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20: 

a) See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. 

b) See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M, Phone # (409) 845- 5332. 

¢) Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill. 

a) See 1980 Census, PC80 - 1 - C45: General Social & Economic Characteristics Tables 175 & 182. 

b) See 1980 Census Voting Age Population by Census Tract; Texas State Data Center, Department of Rural Sociology, Texas A & M, Phone # (409) 845- 5332. 

¢) Dr. Richard Murry's precinct data furnished to you by Sherrilyn Ifill. 

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO, 13, 

LULAC statewide does not .answer this interrogatory at this time because it applies to remedy, which is not at issue at this stage of this case. 

 



This lawsuit does not address the issue of venue in Texas district courts. 

Dated: July 6, 1989 Respectfully , submitted, 

7 / Zs is? bi 9 

ROLANDO L. RIOS 
Attorney. for Plaintiffs 
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 521 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 
(512) 222-2102 
State Bar No. 16935900 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this 6th day of July, 1989 a true and correct copy of ove and foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record in this case by first class United States mail, postage pre-paid, addressed as follows: 

WILLIAM L. GARRETT J. EUGENE CLEMENTS BRENDA HULL THOMPSON JOHN E. O'NEILL Garrett, Thompson & Chang EVELYN V. KEYS 8300 Douglas, Suite 800 : PORTER & CLEMENTS Dallas, Texas 75225 700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 
Houston, Texas 77002-2730 JULIUS L. CHAMBERS 

SHERRILYN A. IFILL MICHAEL J, WOOD NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Attorney at Law Fund, Inc. 
440 Louisiana, Suite 200 99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 New York, N.Y. 10013 

SUSAN FINKELSTEIN GABRIELLE K. McDONALD, Esq. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. Matthews & Branscomb 201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 600 301 Congress, Avenue San Antonio, Texas 78205 ~ suite 2050 
Austin, Texas 78701 

EDWARD B. CLOUTMAN, ITI ROBERT H. MOW, Jr. Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C. Hughes & Luce 3301 Elm 
2800 Momentum Place Dallas, Texas 75226-9222 1717 Main Street 
Dallas, Texas 75201  



  

JIM MATTOX 
MARY F. KELLER 
RENEA HICKS 
JAVIER GUAJARDO 
P.O. Box 12548 
Captial Station 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Ken Oden, Esq. 
Travis County Attorney 
P.O. Box 1748 
Austin, Texas 78767 

Mark H. Dettman 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 2559 
Midland, Texas 79702 

E. BRICE CUNNINGHAM, Esq. 
777 So. R.L. Thornton Freeway 
Suite 121 
Dallas, Texas 75203 

David R. Richards; Esq, -. . 
Special Counsel 
600 W. 7th Street 
Austin, Texas 78701 

Darrell Smith, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
10999 Interstate Highway 10, 
Suite 905 
San Antonio, Texas 78230 

4 TH 
  

ROLANDO L. RIOS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs