Rule 26(b) Statements on Plaintiffs Experts Cassimere and Logsdon

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January 17, 1983

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  • Case Files, Major v. Treen Hardbacks. Rule 26(b) Statements on Plaintiffs Experts Cassimere and Logsdon, 1983. 8755db34-c803-ef11-a1fd-6045bddc4804. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/e222735d-4918-42a4-8117-b425bbc181b0/rule-26-b-statements-on-plaintiffs-experts-cassimere-and-logsdon. Accessed November 05, 2025.

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    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

; BARBARA MAJOR, et al., CIVIL ACTION NO. 82-1192 

Plaintiffs SECTION C 

-against- THREE JUDGE COURT CASE   

| DAVID C. TREEN, etc., et al. CLASS ACTION 

RULE 26(b) STATEMENTS ON PLAINTIFFS’ 

EXPERTS CASSIMERE AND LOGSDON 
  

  

NOW INTO COURT come plaintiffs who set forth the following in regard 

to their experts Cassimere and Logsdon: 

A. Dr. Raphael Cassimere may testify as to the history of official 

and unofficial racial discrimination in the South and in Louisiana from Recon- 

struction until the early 1960's. It is expected that his testimony will parti- 

cularly focus on the techniques and politics of disenfranchisement of blacks 

during the period. His testimony will be based upon his own historical research 

and scholarly journals, as accepted in the community of professional historians. 

The substance of his testimony will be that in the South and in Louisiana a wide 

| variety of official and unofficial forms of discrimination have been used, and 

that the discrimination at times touched practically every aspect of the black 

Il existence, including the right to vote. Dr. Cassimere will not generate any 

new data, but will essentially provide an overview of the literature. 

B. Dr. Joe Logsdon may testify as to the role race has played in the 

I career of David Treen. It is expected that his testimony will focus on three 

areas: (1) Treen's association with the States Rights Party in the early 1960's], 

(2) Treen's public statements as he announced his candidacy for Congress on  



several occasions and his public statements after his defeat on several occa- 

sions and (3) Treen's voting record while a member of Congress. The factual 

basis for his testimony will be, among other things, the campaign biography   by Grover Rees, III, campaign literature of the early 1960's, newspaper accounts 

of Treen's statements,and congressional voting records. His conclusions will 

be that race has played a role in Dave Treen's career. 

Respectfully submitted, 

R. JAMES KELLOGG 

WILLIAM P. QUIGLEY 
STEVEN SCHECKMAN 

STANLEY HALPIN 

631 St. Charles Avenue 

New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 

504/524-0016 

Jack Greenberg 

James M. Nabrit, III 

Lowell Johnston 

Lani Guinier 

10 Columbus Circle 

Suite 2030 

New York, New York 10019 

  

) 

o * SN AL CLV A BY: A. ; 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS 
    

   



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

| BARBARA MAJOR, et al., CIVIL ACTION NO. 82-1192 

Plaintiffs SECTION C 

~against- THREE JUDGE COURT CASE   

| DAVID C. TREEN, etc., et al., CLASS ACTION 

Defendants 

UNCONTESTED MATERIAL FACTS 
  

The five plaintiffs in this matter are each black citizens of the 

Il United States and of the State of Louisiana residing and registered to vote in 

| the parish listed behind their name: Barbara Major (Jefferson), Michael Darnell 

| (Lafayette), Bernadine St. Cyr (Orleans), Brenda Quant (Orleans), and Annie A. 

I smart (East Baton Rouge). 

2, The Governor of the State of Louisiana, David C. Treen, is a 

II defendant in this action and, as Governor, has certain duties under the Election 

| Code of the State of Louisiana, La. R.S. Title 18, and also has the duty to 

{| support the laws of the State and of the United States and to see that the laws 

| are faithfully executed. 

' Brown is Secretary of State of the State of Louis- 3.  Jomes HB. "Jim 

iana and is a defendant in that capacity. As Secretary of State, Mr. Brown has 

| the duty to prepare and certify the ballots for all elections, promulgate all 

ll election returns and administer the election laws. 

4. This matter has been certified as a class action on behalf of all 

{i black persons who are residents and registered voters of the State of Louisiana.  



5. Reapportionment of congressional districts by the Louisiana Legis- 

lature is mandated by Article I, §2 of the United States Constitution and Art- 

§1 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. 

6. Congressional districts in Louisiana were last reapportioned in 

7. Under the 1980 census, the 1972 apportionment plan for congress- 

ional districts was malapportioned, with a maximum deviation of greater than 

8. The State of Louisiana has eight congressional districts, a 

i number it has had since 1933. 

9. The size of the ideal congressional district under the 1970 census 

i was 455,580 persons, and under the 1980 census, the figure rose to 525,497 per- 

sons. 

10. The Louisiana Legislature recognized at least as early as the be- 

ginning of 1981 that, due to the stringent population equality requirements 

| established by the "one-person, one-vote" cases in congressional reapportion- 

| ment, there was a need for reapportionment of the 1972 districts. 

11. In January, 1981, Senator Thomas H. Hudson, Chair of the Senate 

| Reapportionment Study Group, advised Governor David C. Treen of the need for 

| congressional and legislative reapportionment and recommended that reapportion- 

ment take place outside the regular legislative session to minimize interference 

| with regular legislative business. 

Governor Treen was aware of the need for congressional and legis- 

lative reapportionment independently of Senator Hudson and met with the Louis- 

jana congressional delegation concerning the matter in late 1980.  



13. No particular plans were discussed at the meeting in late 1980, 

if vue it was the concensus of the delegation that congressional reapportionment 

be accomplished at a time early enough so as not to interfere with the regularly 

scheduled elections in 1982. 

14. Governor Treen decided that the process should be scheduled for 

| a special session and he ordered a special two-week legislative session to con- 

| sider reapportionment to begin on November 2, 1981. 

15. The formal reapportionment process began in mid-July 1981 at the 

| close of the regular 1981 legislative session with the appointment of the mem- 

| bers of the congressional reapportionment subcommittee in both houses of the- 

| Legislature. 

16. These subcommittees were under the jurisdiction of the Senate 

|| Coomittee on Senate and Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on House 

ll and Governmental Affairs. 

17. Separate subcommittees were set up for reapportionment of both 

Il houses of the state legislature and the State Public Service Commission districtd, 

| which reapportionments were also considered and completed by the November special 

|| session. Those reapportionments are in no way challenged by or involved in the 

| instant proceedings. 

18. At the first meeting of the congressional reapportionment sub- 

| committees, which was a joint session, held on July 21, 1981, rules for congress- 

ll ional reapportionment were adopted. 

19. The subcommittees adopted rules limiting the maximum deviation 

| for congressional reapportionment to *1.00%. A rule was also enacted to avoid 

fdilution of minority voting strength.  



  

  

  

20. Hearings of the subcommittees were conducted from July through 

ll October 1981 at different regional locations throughout the state to allow the 

{ public to comment on congressional reapportionment. 

21. During these hearings, various proposals were presented and con- 

| sidered, including those of the Louisiana Congressional delegation. Although 

the delegation did not have access to the computer base used by the Legislature, 

it did develop its own proposals and was kept in consultation with the subcomm- 

ittees. 

22. Governor Treen publicly released three congressional reapportion- 

| ment proposals, denominated Treen WAN. "EB", and "C", but these were not present- 

i ed until October 22, 1981, which was late in the subcommittee hearing process. 

23. On November 2, 1981, the First Extraordinary Session of the 

ll Louisiana Legislature of 1981 convened to consider reapportionment matters. 

| Congressional reapportionment did not come before the full Legislature until 

that time. 

24. Various bills to reapportion the congressional districts were in- 

troduced during the session, including Senate Bills 4,5,6, 28 and 29 and House 

Bills 2, 25, and 26, but of these, only Senate Bill 5, House Bill 2 and their 

| amendments were seriously considered. 

25. All eight bills were filed on Monday, November 2, 1981, but only 

two bills were active after the second day of the Special Session. House Bill 

2 by Mr. Scott and Senate Bill 5 by Messrs. Nunez and Tiemann, with their 

amendments, served as wehicles for congressional reapportionment decisions 

in the Special Session. 

5 26. Senate Bill 5, as introduced in the Senate, has become known as 

the "Nunez Plan". It created seven white majority districts and one black 

4  



majority district. The plan in essence provided for a Jefferson Parish based 

district (72% of the First Congressional District would be in Jefferson Parish) 

and an Orleans based district (14.9% of the Second Congressional District would 

be in that Parish) and an Orleans based district (94.97% of the Second Congress- 

ional District would be in that Parish). The First District under the Nunez 

Plan as introduced would encompass the West Bank of Jefferson Parish {(i.e., the 

portion of Jefferson Parish on the west side of the Mississippi River), Plaque- 

mines and St. Bernard Parishes. The Second District would include only the 

large portion of Orleans Parish on the East Bank of the Mississippi River and 

| would be 57.1% black in population and 46.3 % black in registered voters. 

27. House Bill 2, as introduced in the House, has beome known as 

"Scott Plan". It would have provided for a 50.27% black population majority i 

the Second Congressional District, with 43.9% black registered voters. 

28. All the Senate bills on congressional reapportionment, including 

Senate Bill 5, were referred to the Senate Committee on the Senate and Govern- 

mental Affairs on Tuesday, November 3, 1981. 

29. All the House bills on congressional reapportionment, including 
| 

House Bill 2, were referred to the House Committee on the House and Governmental | 

t Affairs on Tuesday, November 3, 1981. 

30. On November 4, Senate Bill 5 was reported out of committee and 

onto the floor of the Senate. Several technical amendments in Senate Bill 5 

were adopted. Two substantive amendments to the bill were rejected by the   | Senate. One rejected amendment embodied one of Governor Treen's plans, Proposal 

{ A. On the same day, the Senate passed Senate Bill 5 as amended by a vote of 

ii 31 to 6 and sent it to the House.    



  

  

31. On November 4, House Bill 2 was reported out of committee with 

amendments. The amendments were significant as the committee voted 12 to 1 to 

| replace the "Scott Plan" with Governor Treen's Proposal B. By the same margin, 

the committee rejected an amendment to incorporate the Nunez Plan into House 

Bill 2. The bill as reported out of committee was placed on the House calendar, 

where it remained until Friday, November 6. 

32. On Thursday, November 5, Senate Bill 5 was received by the House 

| and referred to the Committee on House and Governmental Affairs. 

33. On Friday, November 6, in proceedings before the full House, an 

| amendment to substitute Governor Treen's Proposal A for Proposal B on House 

| Bill 2 was rejected by a vote of 51 to 47. 

34. On the same day, an amendment to substitute the Nunez Plan for 

|| Treen Proposal B was adopted by the House by a vote of 59 to 38. A floor amend- 

[| ment was offered to further change the plan to be similar (though not identical) 

to one of Treen's proposals but by a vote of 49 to 45, the House voted to de- 

cide the final passage of House Bill 2. House Bill 2, incorporating the Nunez 

Plan, was finally passed by the House by a vote of 61 to 38 and was sent to the 

| Senate. 

35. After the H.B. 2vote on Novmeber 6, Governor Treen issued a pub- 

lic statement that "Any bill in that form is unacceptable and without question 

| will be vetoed." 

36. After House Bill 2 was sent over to the Senate on November 6, it 

| was discovered that there had been a technical defect in the Bill. The amend- 

ment in the House which had substituted the Nunez Plan for Treen Proposal B 

left out one voting precinct in Jefferson Parish.  



37. The Senate leadership decided not to ratify House Bill 2 because 

it would afford Governor Treen a technical excuse to carry out his public 

threat of a veto and decided to wait over the weekend until Monday, November 9 

to straighten out the technical variance. 

38. Early in the day on Monday, November 9, Governor Treen held a 

news conference and released his "Reconciliation Plan', also referred to as 

"Plan X", which would provide for a reapportionment plan similar to his earlier 

three proposals and which would not include a black majority district in New 

! Orleans. Governor Treen also reiterated his threat to veto the Nunez Plan if 

further action were to be taken on it. 

39. Also on November 9, the full House considered Senate Bill 5, 

which had been reported out of committee with amendments incorporating a plan 

similar to those proposed by Governor Treen. A proposed amendment on the 

House floor to adopt the Nunez Plan was defeated by a vote of 54 to 45. An 

amendment to incorporate Treen's Plan X was adopted by a vote of 74 to 26. The 

amended bill was passed by a vote of 79 to 22 and returned to the Senate. 

40. Upon receipt of the amended Senate Bill 5, the Senate rejected 

the House amendments to its bill by a vote of 28 to 3, necessitating the 

appointment of a conference committee to work out the differences between the 

chambers. 

41. A formal conference committee was appointed on Tuesday, November 

10, which consisted of Senators Hudson, Nunez and O'Keefe and Representatives 

Alavio, Bruneau and Scott. 

42. The actual work of hammering out a settlement took place in the 

Senate Computer Room in the basement of the State Capitol basement. Partici- 

pants in the basement were Jefferson Parish Assessor Lawrence Chehardy, State 

“7  



AFL-CIO President Victor Bussie, Senate President O'Keefe and Senators Nunez 

and Laurcella, Representatives Alario, Congressman Gillis Long and aides to 

Congresswoman Lindy: Boggs, Long and Billy Tauzin and members of the Senate ad- 

ministrative services staff. No members of the Louisiana Legislative Black 

Caucus participated at these sessions, nor were the aides of Governor Treen or 

of Congressmen Livingston and Moore participants. 

43. On Tuesday, November 10, during the evening, the group finally 

reached agreement on a plan which became Act 20 and which is the subject matter 

this litigation. After the agreement was reached by the group, it was taken 

the Governor for his examination. 

44. On Wednesday, November 11, Governor Treen gave to representatives 

ff of the group his approval for the plan and stated he would not veto it. 

45. On the evening of Wednesday, November 11, the conference commit- 

tee formally met and adopted the compromise plan by a vote of 4 to 2 with 

| Representatives Scott and Alario dissenting. Representative Scott proposed 

amendments to create a majority black district in New Orleans, but those amend- 

ments were rejected. 

46. Both the full House and Senate passed the conference committee 

plan, the amended Senate Bill 5, on November 12, 1981, the last day of the 

| special session. 

47. Governor Treen signed the bill into law on November 19, 1981 as 

il Act 20 of the First Extraordinary Session of 1981. That Act is the subject 

i matter of this litigation.

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