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Case Files, Thornburg v. Gingles Working Files - Schnapper. Rybicki v. State Board of Elections of Illinois Court Opinion, 1982. 934ddde8-e292-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/4104e537-5273-4c8a-8512-faf0295790fa/rybicki-v-state-board-of-elections-of-illinois-court-opinion. Accessed August 19, 2025.
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5?4 I'EDERAL SUPPLEMENTt0E2 Since both sides were using suraaJned, one world expect that the rule would be that plaintiff would need to *dstablish a secondary meaning at a time before the defendant established such a meaning; but the opinion clearly does not say that' This eourt is inevitably bound by the law laid down by the Court of Appeals in this circuit, and by the Supreme Court of the United States, no matter what its own views and analysis of the law may be' In this case, since the plaintiff has never mar- keted wire or cable of any kind under the name "Lapp" (and this puts to the side the short lengths of insulated eonduetors of entrance bushings), there obviously cannot be any evidence of secondary meaning in the market for wires and cables, no matter how rational it may seem to sophisticated customers that the manufacturer of Lapp ceramic insulators and pole hardware and electrical capacitors should expand into wire and cable. Since defendant has rued the name "Lapp" for wire and cable, the rule of law laid down in the Scolf Paper case precludes the award of any injunctive relief. Despite the court's view that, aside from the rule of Scott Paper, the circumstances would call for some form of declaratory relief, a limited injunetion, and perhaps a reservation of jurisdiction to be invoked for further relief at the foot of the decree as the future unfolds, it is of the view that the rule of law just referred to bars that result' Submit order dismissing the complaint, without allowance of costs. Chester J. RYBICKI, et al., Plaintiffs, Y. ThE STATE BOARD OF EilECTIONS OF the STATE OF ILLINOIS' et al., Defendants. Mig:uel DeIVALLE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS OF the STATE OF ILLINOIS' et al., Defendants. Bruce CROSBY, et al., Plaintiffs, v, The STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS OF the STATE OF ILLINOIS' et al" Defendants. Nos. 8l C 6030, 8f C 6052 and 81 c 6093. United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D. Jan. 12, 1982' In consolidated reapportionment cases, three groups of plaintiffs challenged validi- ty of Illinois' 1981 state legislative redis- tricting plan. The District Court, Cudahy, Circuit Judge, held that: (i) Illinois Legis- lative Redistricting Commission's plan for redistricting the Illinois General Assembly v/as not invalid because Commission mem- bers considered, within limils, partisan ad- vantage when drawing district lines; (21 plan unconstitutionally diluted black v-otin g strength in eerbain districts on the Chica- go's south and west sides; and (3) Hispanic settlement agreement entered into by Illi- nois Legislative Redistricting Commission and plaintiffs who challenged state legisla- tive histricting plan on behalf of Hispanic voters would be accepbd and approved and incorporated into the plan and map for the State of Illinois' Order in accordance with oPinion' Bua, J., filed eoncurring oPinion' shir psn tll' r.s mis Get tior Cor mis Er? me poI tri't 8n6 3. m! url vol eqr An 1. r\ei no b. ml Gt Cr lir di 6. v( in n( di ni v A s t I I,. t Ii j i F D ; f. I F t F I i I --' RYBICKI y. STATIE BD. OF ELECTIONS OF SfAm Of ILL' Ctr. .. 57, F"guPP' tlf,2 (l!lt2) 1083 Grady, J., filed separate ' opinion in T.'States €=27(3) which he concuned in paf and dissented in Plaintiffs were required to show a dis- psrt.rcriminatorypurposeinoldertosustaina opinion supplemented, 574 F.Supp. claim that the state legislative redistricting lra? and 5?a F.supp. 1161. plan unconstitutionally diluted black voting strength; plaintiffs were first to be re- quired to establish a prima facie case of 1. States F27(3) _ purposeful vote dilution and thereafter bur- Illinois Legislative Redistricting Com- den- would then shift to defendants to es- mission's plan for redistricting the Illinois tablish that the redistricting in question General Assembly did not violate constitu- would have occurred even absent the pur- tional compactness standard. Ill.S.H.A. pose to dilute minority voting strength. Const. Art. 4, 5 3(a). U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 2. States e27(3) ^ 8. States @ZIG) Illinois Legislative Redistricting Com- mission's plan for redistrieting Illinois Gen- Illinois Legislative Redistricting com- eralAssemblywouldnotbeinvalidatedmission,splanforredistrictingthelllinois merely because it fractured a number of General Assembly unconstitutionally dilut- politicalsubdivisionlinesorcreateddis.edblackvotingstrengthincertaindistricts tricts which overlapped between Chicago on the Chicago's south and west sides' and its surrounding suburbs. U'S'C'A' Const'Arnend' 14' 3. Constitutional Law c=225.3(8) 9. States @27(3) Illinois tegislative Redistricting Com- Hispanic settlement agreement entered mission,s overlapping of Chicago and sub. into by Illinois I,egislative Redistricting urban districts did not impermissibly dilute Commission and plaintiffs who challenged vobes of suburban residents in violation of shte legislative districting plan on behalf equal protection clause of Fourteenth of Hispanic voters was fair' adequate and Amendment. U.S'C'A' Const'Amend' 14' reasonable to Hispanic voters' and other 4. Elections @12 minorities whose voting power was alleged- partisan poriticauy based ch auen ge s to yJYl"JLl"l*:ff":T, ff 3#'1fi ;:f":: redistricting and reapportionment may be al constitutional standards and therefore nonjusticiable' would be accepted and approved and incor- 5. states @27$) porated into the plan and map for the state Illinois lregislative Redistricting Com- of Illinois' mission's plan for redistricting the Illinois General Assembly was not invalid because l0' States @27G) commission members considered, within Adjustments would be made to Illinois limits, partisan advantage when drawing Legislative Redistrieting commission's plan district lines. - for redistricting the Illinois General Assem- 6. states e2?(s) . llil:":'ffi?,,1[1""h""11il::,:}",fil. Plaintiffs' claims, on behalf of black out upsetting the broader contours of the voters, that Illinois Legislative Redistrjc-t- plan which "pasred court's close scrutiny. ing Commission's plan for redistricting Illi- U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. nois General Assembly unconstitutionally ' diluted black voting strength were not eog- nizable under Fifteenth Amendment and voting Rights Act. u.s.c.A. const. Kenneth J. Jurek, Douglas A' Poe, Roger Amend.15;VotingRightsActoflg65,W.Barrett,Mayer,Brown&Platt,Chica. 52.asamended,42U.S'C.A.s19?S.go,IlI.,Jerrisl,eonard,Jerrisl.eonardand .,& 1084 Assoc., Ifashingtop, D.C., for plaintiffs in No.81 C 6030. n' Virginia Martinez, Raymond G. Romero, Mexican Americsn Legal Defense and Edu- cational Fund, Chicago, Ill., Lizette A. Can- tres, for plaintiffs in No. 81 C 6052. Carol Moseley Braun, Thomas P. Sulli- van, John A. Rupp, Jenner & Block, Rich- ard H. Newhouse, Jr., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs in No. 8l C 6093. Jeffrey D. Colman, Jenner & Block, Chi- cago, Ill., for plaintiffs in Nos. 81 C 6030, 8r c 6093. Chicago Urban League, Frank L. Bixby and Joan Perry Protess, Sybille C. Fritzsche, Chicago, Ill., amicus curiae in No. 81 C 6030. Lawrence T. Krulewich, Cook County Asst. State's Atty., Chicago, IIl., for inter- venor-defendant Kusper. Arthur C. Thorpe, Klein, Thorpe & Jen- kins, Ltd., Chicago, Ill., for Village of Oak Park. William J. Harte, Ltd., Jeffrey B. Whitt, Joseph N. Casciato, William J. Harte, Chi- cago, IIl., for John L. Lanigan, Michael J. Hamblet, The Legislative Redistricting Com'n, James Philip, Michael McCIain, Ar- thur Telcser, Martin Murphy, James Don- newald, James Skelton and Robert Casey. Tlrone C. Fahner, Atty. Gen. of Illinois, Paul P. Biebel, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Chica- go, Ill., for Michael J. Hamblet, James Phil- ip, Michael McClain, Arthur Telcser and Martin Murphy. John R. Keith, Springfield, I11., for John L. Lanigan, Michael J. Hamblet, Teresa M. Petrone, The Legislative Redistricting Com'n, James Donnewald, James Philip, Arthur Telcser, Martin Murphy, Michael McCIain, James Skelton, Robert Casey and Samuel Shapiro. John L. Swartz, Springfield, IIl., for The Legislative Redistricting Com'n, James Donnewald, Michael McClain, Martin Mur- phy, James Philip, Arthur Telcser, James Skelton, Robert Casey and Samuel Shapiro. l. All three cases were originally filed as class actions. The class action allegations u,ere u,ith- 67{ FEDERAL. ST'PPLEMEIYT MEMORANDUM OPINION Before CUDAHY, Circuit' Judge, and GRADY and BUA, District Judges. RYBICKI I CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. In these consolidated reapportionment cases, three gtoups of plaintiffs challenge the validity, under the federal and Illinois constitutions and related law, of Illinois, 1981 state legislative redistricting plan (the "Commission Plan"). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reject the Rybicki plaintiffs' allegations, on behalf of Republi- can and suburban interests, of noncompact- ness, partisan unfairness and impermissible fracturing of counties (and other political subdivisions) and suburban communities. We accept, in part, the Crosby plaintiffs, claim, on behalf of black voters, that the Commission Plan unconstitutionally dilutes black voting strength. As a remedy for this unconstitutional dilution of the black vote, we adopt certain modifications to the Commission Plan, identified as Court Ex- hibits 1A, 2A,7D and ?E (and related do'cu- ments). We also approve as fair, adequate and reasonable a Settlement Agreement reached between the DelValle plaintiffs, on behalf of Hispanic voters, and the Commis- sion defendants, and therefore approve cer- tain further modifications to the C,ommis- sion Plan, as stipulated in the Settlement Agreement. Background Three groups of plaintiffs in these con- solidated cases challenge the redistrieting plan adopted by the Illinois Legislative Re districting Commission (the "Commission") for the election of candidates to the Illinois General Assembly.r Plaintiffs in Rybicki a. State Board of Elections,.No. 81 C 6030, allege that the Commission Plan fails to accord suburban voters equal protection of the laws by disproportionately concentrat- ing voting power, and therefore legislative drawn prior to trial. &e Minurc Order (Na vember 23, l98l). -.*-4-r- + :. {n RYBICKI V. STATb NiT OT ELECNIONS OF STATE OF Cttc re 37't FSuPP.'llB2 (l9tl) rLL. 1085 fails to adopt lment llenge llinois linois' n (the u set rbicki publi- rpact- ssible litical dties. ttiffs' t the ilutes y for black o the t F*- docu- Iuate rment h, on trmis- I Cer- nmis- ment ,con- lbng e Re- lon") linois Dicki Eo3o, bto on of ftrat- Itive (No- representation, in ."the City of Chicago. They also allege that the plan is politically unfair, Jontains numerous non-compact dis- tricts and indiscriminately fractures politi- cal subdivisions. Plaintiffs in Crosby a. State Board of Electioru' No. 81 C 6093, allege that the Commission Plan intention- ally discriminates against black voters by diluting their voting strength and providing white voters a disproportionate opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Plain- tiffs in DelValle tt. State Board of Elec' tiozs, No. 81 C 6052, allege that the Com- mission's redistricting effort similarly di- lutes the voting power of Hispanics, there- by depriving them of a reasonable opportu- nity to elect representatives of their choice. All three complaints charge that the Plan violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu- tion, 42 U.S.C. S 19?3 (19?6), 42 U.S'C' S 1983 (19?6), and Ariicle I, 5 2 and Article IV, S 3 of the 19?0 Illinois Constitution.2 Jurisdiction in each case is alleged under 28 U.S.C. S 1343 (19?6) and the principles of pendent jurisdiction. Defendants in all three cases are James Edgar, the Secretary of State of Illinois, who is charged under Article IV, S 3 of the 19?0 Illinois Constitution, with publication of the legislative redistricting map; the Illinois State Board of Elections and its members who, pursuant to Ill.Rev.Stats. ch. 46, S 1A-8 (19?9), are primarily respon- sible for the administration and supervision of elections in Illinois; and the Illinois Leg- islative Redistricting Commission (and its Democratic members individually), which is charged pursuant to Article IV, 5 3 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution with the task of promulgating a redistricting plan in the 2. Article I, 5 2 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of iif., lib.tty or propeny without due process of law nor be denied equal protection of the lau's'" Article IV, $ 3 provides in relevanl part thal "legislative Districts shall be compact, contigu- ous and substantially equal in population'" 3. Defendanls Board of Elections and the Secre- tary of State did not adduce evidence at trial in "difense" of the Commission Plan. That task was undertaken by the five Democratic mem- event that the legislature such a plan.3 : On November 2, 1981, a three-judg9 court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 228a@'l (f9?6) to hear these cases and, on November 23, all three cases vrere consoli- ' dated for expedited consideration. Trial was concluded on December ?, 1981, after the eourt had heard testimony from 25 witnesses and received into evidence more than 200 exhibits. I. Facts A. Procedural Background ofthe 1981 Legislature Redistricting in Illi' nois Article IV, 5 3 of the 19?0 Illinois Consti- tution requires a redistricting of the Illinois General Assembly in the year following each federal decennial census. The Illinois Constitution provides the legislature with the first opportunity to adopt a plan that redistricts all legislative seats in the Illinois House and Senate in a manner such that an equal share of the population, under the most recent census, resides in each dis- trict.{ If the legislature does not adopt a plan by June 30 of the first year following the census, an eight-member Legislative Redistricting Commission must be formed. The Speaker and Minority l,eader of the Illinois House and the President and Minor- ity Leader of the Illinois Senate each ap point two members to the Commission. The Commission may not include more than four members from one political party nor more than four members who hold seats in the General Assembly. The eonstitution further requires that the Commission com- plete a plan by August 10 of the year it is convened. If the Commission fails to agree bers of the Commission. No appearance was filed on behalf of the four Republican members of the Conimissioh. 4. Throughout this opinion, the terms "legislative district" or "legislative seal" are used in their generic sense to refer generally to Senate or House districts. Whenever there is a need to differentiate, specific districts are denominated "Senate" or "House'' districts, as appropriate' ---,.dtEra-. lr. 1086 on a plan, the Illinots Supremg C,ourt pro vides the Secretary of Stat€ wlth the names of two persons from different political par- ties, one of whom is chosen by lot to be- come the ninth member of the Commission. The Commission then has until October 5 to file a redistricting plan approved by a ma- jority of its members. In view of the importance of legislative history to proof of a claim of intentional discrimination,s we set forth in some detail the background evidence of the redistrict- ing efforts of both the legislature and the Commission.6 During the first few months of 1981, the results of the federal census were delivered to ranking Illinois legisla- tive and exeeutive officials.T Figures in hand, the leaders of both parties immedi- ately engaged the services of consultants to aid in both the development and political analysis of the possible redistricting plans. The political data utilized by both parties included voting results and patterns at the census tract level for a variety of legisla- tive and statewide races run from 1978 through 1980. In the course of their preparations, the Democratic staff, under the direction of House Minority Leader Michael Madigan, solicited the views of all Democratic legis- lators. A number of black legislators told Madigan that blacks were underrepresent- ed both in the legislature as a whole and in the party caucuses. A House Select Com- mittee on Reapportionment also conducted public hearings to solicit the views of citi- zens in general. The Committee was ad- vised at these hearings in Chicago of the desire of the black community for greater representation in the legislature. 5. See llillage ol Arlington Heights v. Metropoli- tan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268, 97 S.Cr. 555, 565, 50 L.Ed.2d 45O (1977). 6. Our discussion of this background evidence is also necessary to convey the intensely political nature of the redisrricting process in Illinois. 7. The various parties to the suil stipulated to the accuracv of the census dara (although there was considerable testimony in the record about the "undercounting" of blacks and Hispanics). 6?4 FEDERAL SUPPLqMENT By May, 1981, Republican legislators had created a plan which they intrqduced in the Illinois House. The Democra'ts had also succeeded in developing a plan which they submitted to the state Senate.t A major impediment to passage of both plans, how- ever, was Madigan's fear that Governor Thompson, a Republican, would exercise his amendatory veto with respect to any plan presented to him. Consequently, nei- ther plan passed and, in July, the Legisla- tive Redistricting Commission was formed.e Before making his appointments, Madi- gan circulated among House Demoerats a form requesting that they submit their rec- ommendations for potential C,ommission ap pointees. Madigan stated that he had com- mitted himself to the appointment of one member from a racial or ethnie minority. Although most of the black legislators rec- ommended the appointment of Rep. Emil Jones, currently an Assistant Minority l,eader, Madigan followed the advice of other black legislators, two of whom are plaintiffs in this case, and appointed a for- mer State Representative and black com- munity leader, Corneal A. Davis. Apart from Davis, there was no black or Hispanic representation on the Commission or on ils staff. The Democratic and Republican Commis- sion members and their staffs worked sepa- rately and developed their own proposals. On the Democratic side, Madigan r0 and Martin Murphy (who is the Commissioner of Planning for the City of Chicago), worked on the Chicago and Cook C,ounty portions of their redistricting plan. Rep. Michael McClain, a Madigan appointee, E. House Bill 1903 and Senale Bill 278, which contain these respective plans, appear in Def. Exs. 52-54. 9. The Republican members appointed to the Commission were Sen. .hmes Phillip, Rep. Ar- thur Telcser, James M. Skelton and Robert Ca- sey. Their Democratic counterparts were Sen. James H. Donnewald, Rep. Michael F. McClain, Corneal A. Davis and Martin Murphy. 10. Although he was r,ot a member of the Com- mission, Madigan took the leading role in devel- opment of the Democratic Plan. -" 5Lg )f1,- BYBICKIv.STATE.BD..oFEI.ECTIo.!!.oFSTATEoFILL.1087 ' CliGr''5:"F.tuPP'r(f,2 (tlt2) bd lte aso by tior Ir- drew the mAp for the socalled "collar coun- ties" (which are thosE counties adjacent to Cgok), while Senator James Donnewald busied htmself with the downstate region' Commissioner Davis drew no district lines' The Democratic Map It for Chicago and C,ook County, which is the prototype for t}e map of those areas ultimately adopted by the Commission, was drawn according to a systematic procedure. The drafters began with the districts as they appeared in the 19?1 redistricting map.r2 They in- tended to enlarge those districts that had lost population and shrink those that had gained. Throughout the process, Madigan solicited the views of all legislators, includ- ing black legislators, eoncerning various aspects of the map' The map was complet- ed in rough form bY the end of June' Although Madigan testified that he made no attempt to hide the Cook County map from various black legislators and commu- nity leaders and Hispanics, only Commis- sioner Davis had the opportunity to study the entire Chicago and Cook County por- tions of the map at this stage or at any time prior to its adoption as the Commis- sion Plan on October 2, 1981.13 Notwithstanding the fact that the Deme crats had completed drafting the major por- tions of their map, the Commission held public hearings in Chicago on July 23, 1981, L obtain public suggestions for redistrict- ll. "Map" or "Plan" are used interchangeably to refer to a redistricting plan with its accompany' ing maps of legislative districts' 12. The l97l plan was adopted pursuant to a partisan compromise within the I-egislative Re- iistricting Commission. Cecil Partee, former President of the Illinois S€nate, testified in de- tail about the drafting prooess in l97l' See Tr' at l23Hl. Because it was the product of a compromise, certain features of the l97l map weri assertedly understood by the Democratic drafters to represent a politically fair solution to Dartisan differences. The compromise r'r'as iherefore accorded, at least by the Democrats' a great deal of precedential value' The outstand' ins feature of the compromise was that a num- fe? of the districts located in predominantly Democratic Chicago overlapped into largely Re- publican, suburban Cook County' Although the p.ocedures used for selecting the Commission memb"rs *'ho drerv the 1971 plan were later ing. A numhr of witnesses, including rep reeentatives of the blaCk and Hispanic com- munities, presented &reir views on redis- tricting 8t these hearings. Several black , witnesses testified that in the past blacks had fared poorly in the redistricting proc' ess; that percentagewise the black popula- tion had increased in relation to the white population in Chicago between 1970 and igbO; ana that any redistricting should ac- cord blacks greater representation' The Hispanics pointed out that they had no representation in the General Assembly and urgently requested an opportunity to secure such representation. See Plaintiffs' Ex. 52.t1 Among the other witnesses who testified at the hearings were representatives of the villages of Oak Park and Evanston, as well .r tl," Chi"rgo neighborhood of Hyde Park' These communities, which had been frac- tured by prior redistricting, all requested that each be included in only one district' Although the protestations of black wit- nesses produced no changes in the draft plan, the drafters did revise the plan to aecommodate the desires of these three geographical communities Unfortunately, the work of the eight- member Commission was doomed to failure from the start since neither side was will- ing seriously to negotiate with the other over various aspects of their respective ruled invalid, both the Illinois Supreme Court and a three-judge panel of this court upheld that plan againsi r"tio.rt federal and state constitu- iional ihailenges. See Givetti v' Illinois State Electoral Bd., 335 F.Supp' 779 (N'D'Ill'1971)' aff'd, ao6 U.S. 913, 92 S.Ct. t772,32 L'Ed'2d l13 Obzz); people et rel. *ott v' Griveni,s0 III'2d iso, nt N-.E.2d 881 (r97r), cert. denien' lJ u.s. 921, 92 S.Ct. 2460, 32 L.EA.2d 806 (1972)' 13. *e Def. Ex. 107' 14, At the time of the hearings in Chicago, Madi- san and lvtrrphy held private meetings with I,layor Jane B5rrne of Chicago, Senate President Phiiip nock, and George Dunne, Chairman. ol the iook County Regular Democratic Organiza' tion, for the purpose of displaying the drafi plan. No blaik or Hispanic political^ leaders were similarly consulted at this time Commis' sioner Davis was apparently unatvvare that such meetings were held. ior i.e lDy rei- rlr- d.t di- BA lc- rP )m- !tre [v. rcc- nil Itt' rof lnc br- lm- rrt Fic rfu lis Pa lls b{l ler p) !t\ h le, lbe lrr- E6- E1. lin, fi. Iel' tt't H. - -!4ldafa&- 1088 plans.' Whether this wss due to the lack of mutual trust that permeated ttri legislative attempts at redistricting, the intransigence of both sides w[th respect to particular redistricting issues, the unwillingness of anyone to assume responsibility for a com- promise or the Republicans' willingness to gamble on winning the draw for the ninth member is difficult to say. In any event, both sides stuck to their guns and, on Au- gust 9, the Democratic and Republican members of the Commission presented their respective plans for approval. With each side perceiving adverse political ef- fects from the plan of the other side, the eight Commission members split along par- ty lines on both proposals. Pursuant to the constitutional procedure (of drawing by lot), former Governor Samu- el Shapiro, a Democrat, was then selected to become the ninth member of the Com- mission on September 2, 1981. Governor Shapiro unsuccessfully urged a compro- mise between the Republican and Demo- cratic Commission members before he ulti- mately acceded to the Democratic propos- al.rs On October 2 the Commission met to vote on what had then become known as the "Shapiro Plan." 16 The Republican 15. Governor Shapiro insisted on one change in the plan developed by the Democratic Commis- sion members, namely that "independent" Dem- ocratic incumbent Senators Dawn Clark Netsch and William Marovitz be placed in separate districts. The original proposal of the Demo- cratic Commissioners had placed borh Netsch and Marovitz in Senate District 3. Governor Shapiro also asked that the population deviation of the plan be reduced. 16. During trial, issue was taken with the proce- dures employed by the Democratic Commission members in adopting their plan. The law re- quired that a plan be completed and adopred by Octob€r 5 and the rules adopted by the Commis- sion required that any plan considered for adoption must be presented at least 24 hours before a final vote was taken. Accordingly, a - meeting of the Commission was called by the Democrats for October 2 at 8:30 p.m. Although a map reflecting the plan was given to the Republican members on October l, a complete set of census materials supponing the plan were not distributed until the evening of October 2. Commissioner Case5', a Republican appointee, did not state hou, the Republican Commission members were prejudiced by this alleged failure by the Democrats to produce on time the more ,___..-.-- 674 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT Commissioners, now comprising an unenvi- able minority of four, criticized'the plan as being unduly partisan and hbving a dis- criminatory impact on minorities in Chica- go. Plaintiffs' Ex. 39 at 3$-42. The Shapi- ro Plan was adopted by a vote of five to four, and it was officially filed with the Illinois Secretary of State on October S, 1981. B. General Considerations We briefly describe the more salient fea- tures of the Commission Plan, together with an overview of the demographics of the State of Illinois before turning in detail to the evidence presented by the challeng- ers and defenders of the Plan at trial. With respect to general characteristics, the Plan divides the State into 59 Senate dis- tricts, each of which is in turn divided geographically into two House districts.rT The ideal population for each Senate dis- trict is 193,533. The total deviation of the Senate districts in the Commission Plan from this ideal is L.59%, with an average deviation of .29%. The ideal population for each of the 118 House districts is 96,76?. The total deviation from this ideal is 1.97%, with an average deviation of .42%.tF complex details of their plan, such as metes and bounds descriptions. 17. Under the 1971 reapportionment, the state was divided into 59 districts, each of which elected one senator and three representatives. The representatives u'ere elected al large from each district with the use of cumulative voting procedures. In November of 1980, this system of apportionment for the House was abolished by the so-called "Cutback Amendment." Under the Cutback Amendment, the size of the House was decreased from 177 seats to ll8 seats; mul- ti-member districts and cumulative voting were also eliminated. Under the new system, which is being implemented in Illinois for the first time in this redistricting process, the state is divided into 59 Senate districts each of which in turn is divided geographically into two single- member House districts.of equal population. 18. None of the plaintiffs in this case challenge the population deviations of the Commission Plan's legislative districts under the "one person, one vote" standard of Reynolds r'. Sirns, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). In- deed, refinements were made in the plan devel- oped by the Democratic Commission members, F"i fr. le lcr' i.n' ftr Ir& r5 if- Fe" fo' F" F{ br: rb B F i' L. b. 1., lg k F ,t I I I F i L F ts h BYBTCKT v. ST{ni BD. OF ELE(nIONS OF STATE OF ILL. 1089 . CttcuSTtFSuPP. lllt2 (19t2) A better understanhing of the details of smaller concentration of blacks exists in tlre Commission Plan and its impact on the the West Central poltion of Chicago, cen- plaintiffs in this case is facilitated by re- tered in the Austin neighborhood. It too is, viewing the demography of Illinois and, in over 85% black and contains approximately particular, of metropolitan Chicago. Evi- 300,000 blacks or 23% of Chicago's black dence presented at trial indicated that Illi- population. This area has been frequently " nois may, for reapportionment purposes, be denominated the West Side in this litigation divided into three or four areas: (1) Chica- and is referred to as such in this opinion. go, (2) Cook County outside Chicago, (3) the Bhcks also constitute a significant percent- five counties adjacent to Cook (the "collar age of the population in and around the counties": DuPage, Kane, Will, McHenry southern suburban municipalities of Har- and Lake), and (4) the remaining eounties vey, Robbins and Markham. The concen- (i.e., the "downstate counties"). Of the tration of blacks in this area of Cook Coun- 11,418,000 residents of Illinois, the 1980 ty is not as high as on the South and West census reveals that Chicago accounts for Sides, but it ranges fuom BS% tn over 8S%. 3,005,000 (28%), Cook County (including The total black population in this area--46,- Chicago) for 5,253,000 (46%), the collar 00G-is also relatively small. This south- counties for 1,849,000 (16%) and the down- ern area where blacks are concentrated has state counties for 4,316,000 (38%). See De- been denominated the South Suburban fendants'Ex. 121. Chicago and Cook County constitute, of course, the largest urban and suburban center in Illinois. The collar counties are generally characterized as suburban and the downstate counties as rural. The tri- partite (or quadrapartite) division of the state also generally correlates with political affiliation: Chicago is heavily Democratic while suburban Cook and the collar coun- ties are predominantly Republican, as are many of the downstate counties. Of the 5,253,190 residents of Cook Coun- ty, 1,308,763 are black (21.5%'). Approxi- mately 84% of the Cook County black popu- lation resides in Chicago, where the blacks comprise nearly 40% of the city's total pop ulation. The black population of Chicago is concentrated in two areas. The largest concentration is found in the South and Southeastern portions of Chicago, extend' ing roughly from the city-center "Loop" area to Chicago's southernmost boundary. This area is, for the most parl, ovet 85% black and it contains 792,000, sv $$.flc, of the city's blacks. The area in question is commonly referred to as the South Side and is so denominated in this opinion. A at the request of Gov. Shapiro, to makc the population deviation percentages as lou as pos- sible. A substantial Hispanic re population also resides in Illinois. The majority of Hispan- ics live in Chicago, where they number 422,061, or approximatnly 14% of the eity's population. In general, the Hispanic popu- lation is not as highly concentrated as the black population. The Hispanic population is more dispersed than the black popula- tion, with Hispanics residing in various ar- eas throughout Chicago. Notwithstanding this general dispersal, at least two major Hispanic aggregations are easily identified in Chicago, one on the Northwest Side and the other on the Southwest Side. C. Evidence Adduced at, Trial 1. The Rybicki Plaintiffs The Rybicki plaintiffs submitted various testimonial and documentary evidence to support their claims of suburban vote dilu- tion, lack of compactness of certain dis- tricts, excessive fracturing of political sub- divisions anf pohtical unfairness. Suburban Vote Dilution. The Rybicki plaintiffs argued that, based on changes in 19. Hispanics are persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central American, South Ameri- can, or other origins related to Spanish cultures regardless of race. J.-;.Jt_i -!-- *lfr) population between l9?0 and l98g,ro'*" colla,r counties are "entitled" to more and Chicago i8 "entitl6d,' to ferryer legislative districts than were accorded'to theie areas under the Commission Plan. Under the 19?i redistricting plan, Chica- go voters constituted part of the population in 20 Senate districts. Defendantst Ex. 12. Plaintiffs argue that in proportion to the City's 1980 population, the voters of Chica- go should control or constitute a majority in 31 House districts and only 1S.5 Senate districts. However, under the C,ommission Plan, Chicago voters ,,control', 85 House districts and l7 Senate districts.2t Plaintiffs similarly observe that the num- ber of districts controlled by collar county voters has not increased between 1gT0 and 1980, despite the population shifts from Chicago and Cook County to the collar counties evident in the lg80 census. Under tlre 1971 plan there were six Senate dis- tricts (then refered to as ,,Legislative,, districts) entirely within the collar counties and five that overlapped into adjacent coun- ties. Under the Commission plan, there - are still six Senate districts wholly within the collar counties, but the number of over- Iap districts has increased to nine.z2 Compactness. The Rybicki plaintiffs al- Iege that 15 House districts and 2 Senate districts are not compact.23 The noncom- pactness of tlese districts is evident, ac- 20. Th9 changes in the Chicago metropolitan area for the relevant ten year period ire set forrh below: Arca tgZO tgSO % Change Cbicrgo 3,369,357 3,OOS,0?2 _ tO.8 Cook Couoty t,493,266 Sri3,r90 _ 1.1 Colll' CouDti.s l,,t{B,tis t,B49,t3S +21.6 Sez Def. Ex. l2l. 21. The Rybicki plaintiffs credir Chicago with control of 38 House seats and 19 Senaie scats. They include in their count, however, two Sen_ ate districts and three Housc districts which oyell-ap - from Chicago into Cook County in which the population of the district is evenly balanced between Chicago and the suburbs or in which the majority of voters reside outside lhicago. Sec Rybicki pls. Findings of Fact at \t72. Zl. Seven Senate districts overlap into Cook County (19, 22, 23, 25, 29, 30 and ,10). Of these. *r" 5??Tnonn lr, suppLEMENT . cording to plaintiffs, both undei a visual analysis and as demonstrated by mathe- matieal standards. ln Schrhge o. Stata Board of Elections, 38 Ill.2d8?, bg IIl.Dec. 451, 4i|0 N.E.2d 483 (1981), the Illinois Su- preme Court invalidated former C,ommis_ sion House District 8g, which extended 125 miles at its longest point and six miles at its narmwest, a length to width ratio of roughly 21:1. By comparison, C,ommission Senate District lg, the most egregious dis- trict on plaintiffs' list, extends 86 miles at its longest point and is two miles wide at its narrowest, a ratio of 18:1.21 Defendants sought to minimize the sig- nificance of plaintiffs, compactner. .orn- plaints by introducing examples of oddly shaped districts from the court-approved 1971 redistricting effort. See Defendants, Exs. 61 and 62. Moreover, the Commis- sion's expert witness, Mr. Brace, testified that the irregular shapes appearing in the Commission Plan were necessitated in some circumstances to comply with the low (1%) population deviation standard em- ployed as a goal by the Commission. Mr. Brace also stated that the desire to aehieve some other redistricting goals, such as re spect for the integrity of political subdivi- sions, communities of interest or natural boundaries contributed to the irregularly shaped districts. Plaintiffs attempted to Cook County voters constitute a majority in all but two Senare districts (23, 3O). Of the two that overlap into downstate counties (32, g5), collar county voters constitute a majority in oni (32). Deft. Ex. a9. 23. These are House Districts 7, 22, 35, 37, 39, 41, 42, 50, 58, 77,80,84,87,95, tO4; and Senate Districts t9 and 46. 24. It is interesting from a forensic as well as a mathematical standpoint that defendants, calcu- lations of-extreme lengths and widths are quile different from plaintiffs'. Se, Def. Ex. 4g. De- fendants' ratios were obtained by comparing the longest length againsr thdwidesi (and therJfore the most extreme) width, rather than against the narrowest width. The result is that the House districts plaintiffs complain of (ag., 58, g7, 37, 104) have relatively innocuous ratios under de- fendants' criteria of 2.16:1, 1.26:1,1.46:1, 1.95:l and 1.66:1, respectively. RYBICKT v. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS OF STATE,OF ILL. tflgfl Ctrc.r JZa Ftrpp. l(B2 (trS2) rebut t'hese arguments by presenting their in every district.B dn u," basis of thisown "Coqlition Plan" which., they alleged, analysis, defendants conctuded that the /contained more compact districts.2u Bui Commission plan would produce in thethis alternative map also indjcates the diffi- f,1,dt;rjf "JTi;;1-;3ij;t,,,ilHfi fi :ffid';l'fi;rl.!i;',',:#ffi frT Iess stringent p,iputatlon deviation stan- can districts; and 23 "8rtring" districts. In dard; s nonethejess, as Defendant", ilhil the.Sen-atc, it would produce 2l "firm" and it 62 demonstrates, even the Coalition plan no "soft" Democratic districts; 25 "firm" contains a number of highly i""grl"i, "fon- and 3 "soft" Republican districts; and 10 gated distrigts.zz "swing" districts. Defendants observed political Fairness. The Rubicki olain- that.this alignment slightly favors the Re- tiffs also asserr that th" ;;;;;;";i;;- publicans.a compact distriets is evidence of the Com- mission's intent to preserve a dispropor- tionate number of Democratic incumbents. Moreover, plaintiffs allege that the exten_ sive use of "overlap,,districts designed to maintain the power of Chicago land hence, the Democratic Party) by fracturing subur_ ban areas, demonstrates the political un- fairness of the Commission plan. Defend_ ants vigorously deny that the Commission PIan is politically unfair. Evidence sub- mitted by the defendants indicated that his_ torically, Illinois has been a ,,swing staie,, which elects Democrats and Republcans in equal numbers to legislative and executive offices. See Defendants, Exs. ZB and 24. In-this connection, defendants analyzed the political effects of their map by examining past voting patterns for each census trac-t 25-, The three pJainriff groups jointl-v developed the Coalirion plan. It was utilizeJ ar triaf ro demonstrate that various alleged infirmiries in the Commission plan could L ."r.a in rh. redistricting process. Each group "l"o .""o-- mended, a-t various phases in ih" t.i"l, th. adoption of the Coalition plan as "n. *..rr. io. remed5ring the Commission plan,s deficiencies. 26. The total population deviation percentapes for House and Senare disrricrs ln the Coatiii. Plan were 1.955% and 1.646oh, respectively. See Def. Ex. ll8. 27. &e, ag., Senate District ll and House Dis- tricts 3l and 98. 2t. The polirical fairness of the plan was ana-Iped by revier,r,ing the voting p"r,".rrs u, ,h. census tract level for five different elections: The Universily of Illinois Trustee elections in 1978 and 1980; the State Senate elections for 1978 or 1980 (Senare terms being staggered); and the State Represcntative electi-ons f":, tiii Fractured Counties. The Rybicki plain- tiffs also introduced evidence demonstrat_ ing that the Commission plan indiserimi- nately fractures political subdivisions. Representative Lee Daniels of Dupage County testified at length that fracturiig can produce undesirable political conse_ quences, particularly when a legislator is charged with representing areaslhat have divergent political interests. Representa- tive Daniels pointed out that, even though Cook County and the collar counties haie seemingly antagonistic interests on issues of transportation, taxation and education, nine Senate districts overlap between these two areas. Witnesses for the Commission agreed that the fracturing of political subdivisions and !980. political strength was gauged by the number ol wins and los-s suslained bv each pany throughout the six elections. If one orrt, won all five elections, the district *,u.'.ori_ sidered a "firm" district. If rhe party *"n f"*of -the eleclions, the district was i"".ia.i"a"1oft," If a party won two or three of the elections, the district was denominated --. "swing" district. 29. Plaintiffs attack defendants, projections on the ground that the projections do not consider the residence of incumbents, the qualiry of the candidares.and trlyp. of campaign litety to bewaged. Plaintiffs have submittei "" ,p..ifi. evidence, however, contradicring tt. ,aiairf "idefendants' basic assumption that votine willtend to proceed roughiv .lorrg p.rry -lin.i. Moreover, we do nol believe thai tir. .*i.t.r,.. of the variables identified by rhc ptaintiffs nec_ essarily renders defendants, projeitions invalid. The very existence of g0 ,,firm,, U""* *. o* of a possible I I 8 mighr suggest rhar p"rry "ffiiiu-tion is a-highly significant faaor in vote. p.ef.i- ence in Illinois. f092 674 FEbERAT was not desirable; they disagreed, of course, as to how much fracturing was tolerable. the 1971 redistricting plan split 29 counties into two or more districts. D+ fendants' Ex. 75. Plaintiffs' evidence showed that the Commission Plan splits 48 counties into two or more districts, result- ing in L22 separate fractures. Cook Coun- ty outside Chicago is fragmented into nine parts, DuPage County into eight and Will County into seven. By comparison, the Coalition Plan splits 35 counties, resulting in 72 separate fractures. Focusing more closely on the Chicago metropolitan area, we note that in the 1g?1 plan, eleven Senate districts were entirely within Chicago while nine overlapped into Cook County.3o TVo districts overlapped from Cook County into the collar counties. See Defendants' Exs. 9, 10. Under the Commission Plan, eight Senate districts are wholly within Chicago, eleven overlap into Crcok County and seven overlap from Cook County into the collar region.st The alleged political result of overlap ping districts in the metropolitan Chicago area is that a disproportionate number of seats are "controlled" by Chicago and Cook County voters. Defendant Commission members admitted at trial and in their dep- ositions that they intended to achieve this result of widening the influence of Chicago voters.32 Defendants suggest that, in the absence of overlapping districts in the Chi- 3f. Of the eleven Senate districts that overlap into Cook County, Chicago voters are a majority in nine. Sez Def. Ex. 85. There are 15 House districts which overlap under the Commission PIan, of which Chicago voters constitute a ma- jority in 13. Of the seven Senate districts that overlap from Cook County into the collar coun- ties, Cook County voters constitute a majority in five. Ten House districts overlap into the collar counties, of which Cook voters are a clear ma- jority in six. The other four districts have roughly equal percentages of Cook and collar countv voters. See Def. Ex. 49. cago and C,ook County &rea, 8 redistrictinc plan grossly favors the Republican party] 2. Crosby Ptaintiffs The Crosby plaintiffs introduced several types of evidence attempting to establish that the Commission Plan was the product of purposeful discrimination to dilute black voting strength and to unconstitutionally ger4rmander districts in black population areas. Their proof may be categorized as evidence of (1) retrogression; (2) ,,packing,, and "fracturing" of the blaek population; (3) movements of large racial populations in certain areas to preserve the incumbenc- ies of white legislators; (4) "admissions" of certain Commission members; and (E) prior instances of discrimination allegedly prae- ticed by the regular Democratic Party or- ganization in Chicago. Retrogression. The evidence showed that while the black population increased, both absolutely and especially in relation to the white population in Chicago and Cook County between 1970 and 1980,33 the num- ber of districts where black voters had a "meaningful" opportunity to elect a candi date of their choice did not increase appre priately. At the time of the 1971 redistrict- ing, blacks constituted a majority in five Chicago Senate districts (2L, 22, 24, 26 and 29). When the 1980 census figures are applied to the 19?1 lines, blacks constitute a majority in six Senate districts (the for- mer five districts plus district 28). Under the Commission Plan, blacks will constitute Cbicrgo Rlcc 1970 % t980 % Wtttc l,959BlO 552% tze7-tpzz .,,A* Bhck 1,102,(x!0 32.7% t,r$,221 39.5* Cook Coutrty (tncluding Chicago) 30. Population breakdowns for the districts over- t2. SeeTr. at ll72 (Donnewald, cross); Murphy lappilq from chicago into cook county under Dep. at 130-13 l, li2-143i pl. Ex. 20.the l97t plan were not presented. Visual in- spection indicates that Chicago voters probably 33, The population changes between 1970 and :9n"t,,t"1.9.a majority of the population in the l9g0 were as follows:ntne otslrrcls. 32r7,O2t 62.3% 1,308,76i1 24.'!r% Sae Def. Ex. l2l. The figures for blacks may be somewhat un- derstated due ro a possible undercount of blacks in the census. Evidence suggested that blacks are likell' to hc undercounted at a rate of four times thar of r.hites. Whlte 3,9t1,01,1 n.0% Black l,l&i,475 2t.5% 6?4 FEbERAL SUPPLEMENT RYBICKI v. STATD'BD. OF ELECTIONS OF STATE OF ILL. . CltcgtTaF.tupD. l(IB2 (tr02) li a ,f r093 number of Senate districts as in 1971. group is concentrated into one or more a msjority in only five.df the Oommigsion Senate Districts (9, 12, 13, 16 and 17). Thus, althoggh blacks increased in popula- tion, both absolutely and especially in rela- tion to whites in Chicago between 1970 and 1980, they hold a majority in the same Blacks are also a majority in one less Sen- ate district tlan would have been the case had the current redistricting not occurred. By contrast, white representation in dis- tricts where Chicago voters constitute at least part of the population has not dimin- ished significantly. Under the 1971 district lines as applied to the 1980 census figures for districts wholly or partially located within Chicago, whites constitute a majori- ty in 14 of the 19 Senate districts 3a even though they account for only 45.5% of the population in those districts.ss The Com- mission Plan, under the 1980 census fig- ures, results in whites being in the majority in 14 of 19 36 Senate districts wholly or partially located in Chieago. Although the white population of the City of Chicago has declined, the Commission Plan, which em- ploys several more overlap districts than the 19?1 plan, actually increased tn 5I.l% the white population in these Chicago-area districts, thus explaining, in part at least, why 14 of 19 districts are still populated by a majority of whites. !i4. The number of House seats held by blacks and whites between 1970 and 1980 cannol be accurately compared since the Cutback Amend' ment reduced the size of the Illinois House and created single-member districts. 35. &a Def. Ex. 120; Pl. Ex. 30O. The number of districts controlled by whites may actually have been 15. As noted before, there were apparent- 11' 20 districts wholly or partially in Chicago under the l97l lines. &e Def. Ex. 12 (overlay). However, both plaintiffs and defendants used the figure 19 for purposes of this comparison. 36. Defendants claim that the number should be 13 rather than 14. The difference is based on plaintiffs' assumption that white voters control Senate District 10. Although whites make up only 190z6 of the voters in that district, with blacks making up 45o/o and Hispanics 36010, plaintiffs point out that the district contains a white incumbenl who is backed by a powerful political organization and is therefore likelv to be reelected. Paaking ond Frocturing. Packing and fracturing are the termd used by plaintiffs in this lawsuit to describe two somewhat different means of reducing the voting atrength of a geographically unified minori- ty group. Packing oecurs when a minority districts so that it constitutes an over- whelming majority in those districts (and part of its vote is "wasted"). Fracturing occurs when a geographically unified mi- nority group is unnecessarily split among a number of districts. All five of the majority black Senate districts located in Chicago under the Com- mission Plan have black concentrations in excess of 80% of the total district popula- tion.3? The black population is also highly concentrated in the 12 Chicago House dis- tricts in which blacks constitute a majority although black percentages in these dis- tricts are generally not as high as in the majority black Senate districts.3s Plaintiffs also contend that the packing on the West and, in particular, on the Sonth Side of Chicago was greatly furthered by drawing district lines which correspond to the racially segregated housing patterns evident in these areas. This South Side "wall," as plaintiffs refer to it, runs, for example, along the westernmost boundary of Commission House Districts 23 (94.337" 37. Senate District 9 is 81.350/o black; District 12 is 96.380/o black; District 13 is 83.930lo black; District 16 is 98.690lo black; and District l7 is 85.2602 black. 3E. Commission House District 27 contains a 66.402 black population; three Commission House districts (19, 26 and 34) contain black populations ranging between 729n and 7896; two Commission House districts (17 and l8) contain an 8lo/o black population; two other Commis- sion House districts (23 and 25) are betu'een 890,1 and 94% black; and four Commission House districts (29, 3l, 3.2 and 33) contain black populations exceeding 97ol0. As these figures illustrate, and as plaintiffs noted at trial, all majority black House districts contain black concentrations of 650.zo or greater. Horvever, the Crosby plaintiffs also argued that it would be difficult for blacks to elecl a candi- date of thcir choicc in an1' district that was less than 6.i0', bla.'k. See note 87 irtlra. L -ri.<- i#;lrr:* 1094 black), 24 (98.43% blac\), 31 (98.44% black) and 84 (73.37% black), and separytes these districts from predominantly white Com- mission House Districts 2l (4.03% black), 22 (4.18% black), 28 (9.27% black) and 29 (rr.56% black). Both fracturing and packing are alleged- ly evident in the voting districts on the West Side. Of the 300,000 blacks who reside on the West Side, approximately 160,000 reside in Commission House Dis- tricts 17 and 18, both of which are over 80% black. The rest of the black population is distributed among Commission House Dis- tricts 11, 19 and 20, which have black popu- lations of 48%,72% and 18%, respectively.se Defendants, of course, presented various reasons not related to packing and fractur- ing for the existence of district lines trac- ing racial boundaries on the South and West Sides, which will be discussed iny'o. During the course of this litigation, the Crosby plaintiffs presented several alterna- tive plans that they claim would more fair- ly qnd equitably promote the interests of black voters in Chicago. The Coalition Plan, which was offered as a eompletely packaged alternative to the Commission Plan, contains districts which incorporate more white areas into black-controlled dis- tricts, thereby enhancing black voting strength. By creating districts which over- lap from black areas into neighboring white areas the Coalition Plan produces five Senate districts on the South Side with black populations ranging from 70% tD 85%. (There are four majority black Sen- ate districts on the South Side under the Commission Plan.) The C,oalition Plan would also avoid alleged packing and frac- turing of the black population on Chicago's West Side, by creating two black Senate districts (with black populations of 66% and 84%) and four black House districts (with black populations of 65%, 67%, 72% and 96%). (There is one black Senate district 39. Plaintiffs also identify an instance of fractur- ing in the South Suburban area of Cook County. At the conjunction of Commission House Dis- tricts 27, 36 and 78, a black popularion of ap- proximatell' 46,000 is scattered among these three districts. Blaci:s constitute l60/o of Com- 574 FEDERAL SUPPLEMEIYT and three black House districts in this area under the Commission Plan.) ' After trial was completed, anothe. plan, denominated the "Crosby Plan," was presented to the court as an offer of proof. This plan reconfigures most of the Commis- sion Senate and House districts located within Chicago and Cook County by al- legedly reducing the coincidence of racial and electoral boundaries and increasing the number of districts in which blacks consti- tute a majority of the population. Mooements of Racial Populatiorx To Presente White Incumbencies. Plaintiffs presented evidence of racial population shifts in several districts, allegedly moti- vated by the desire to preserve the incum- bencies of various white legislators or pG tential white candidates on both the South and West Sides. These districts included Commission Senate District 14, where in- cumbent Senator Jeremiah Joyce resides, Commission Senate District 18, where in- cumbent Senator Glenn Dawson resides, and various West Side districts, particular- ly Commission Senate District 8, home of Senator Philip Rock and Commission House District 15, which is part of Senate District 8. A detailed analysis of these population movements, which we regard as very sig- nificant, is included in Section lll infra. Alleged Admissions of Defendants. The drafters of the Commission Plan ae- knowledged that, at the time they drew the Map, they were aware of the relationship between legislative districts and racial de- mographics in the City of Chicago. Throughout the line drawing process, the drafters possessed color coded maps re- fleeting the location and the degree of con- centration of blacks and Hispanics in met- ropolitan Chicago. Extensive population statistics reflecting the percentages of mi- nority groups as well as sfiltistics showing their population growth between 19?0 and mission House District 36 and 29.60/o of Com- mission House 78. In District 27, however, the blacks from the South Suburban area arejoined with blacks from Chicago to the north to consti- tute a majority of 66.370/o in Commission House District 27. t I T c B' u d c r: n s ti tI G n gl 8l pr C in tI oi C, la pl in m zt cir di ca EI PI cil (ir trr ml wl fo {0 I I I ( I ( al. , a I ^ _.,;trEit*[ _. - 1980 Bion. RYBICKI v. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS OF STATE OF ILL. 1095r c,tr. B f?a F.tupp. tln2 (t9Sz) were also available to the 'Commis- Interests of Blacks d,nd Hispanics. De- fendants introduced evidence indicating / that the Democratic Party has strongly espoused the cause of blacks in Illinois. They noted that the Democratic Party has sponsored and passed civil rights legisla- tion, social welfare legislation and legisla- tion providing for bilingual education-all matters of special concern to blacks and Hispanics. Blacks in Illinois are over- whelmingly Democratic. 3. DelValle Plaintiffs. The DelValle plaintiffs alleged that the Commission Plan intentionally dilutes His- panic voting strength by fracturing the two largest Hispanic concentrations in Chicago among several House and Senate districts. The evidence presented at trial revealed that Representative Madigan and Commis- sioner Murphy were aware of the dilutive impact of the relevant distriets on the His- panic community. The Commission wit- nesses justified their choice of district lines by arguing that the Commission Plan ac- commodated projected migration patterns of Chicago Hispanics and, thus, that the ehallenged districts will eventually maxim- ize Hispanic voting strength. As a result of directions from the court to the Commis- sion and negotiations between the Hispanic plaintiffs and the Commission defendants, a Settlement was reached between these parties on January 7, 1982. The Hispanic plaintiffs believe that this Settlement Agreement provides Hispanics residing in both the Pilsen-Little Village (Mexican- American) area and the Humboldt Park- West Town (Puerto Rican) area a fair and reasonable (and, in faet, the best achieva- 42. United States * City of Chicago, Nos. 73 C 661 and 80 C ?590 (N.D.Ill. March 13, 1980) (consent decree). 43. Gautreaut y. Chicago Housing Authority, 5O3 F.2d 930 (7th Cir.), afl d sub nom. Hilk v. Gau- treaut, 425 U.S. 284, 96 S.Cr. 1538, 47 L.Ed.2d 792 (1976). 44. United States v. Bc,ard c'i l:riucarion, 88 F.R.D. 679 (N.D.Ill.l980) (cons:r.,, decree). Representative Madigan who, together with Commissioner Murphy, drew the Chi cago portion of the plan, stated that he studied the maps and that he was aware of the pereentages of blacks placed in each district.'0 Representative Madigan and C,ommissioner Murphy also testified that racial factors, including the existenee of racial feeling antagonistic to blacks in some South and Southwest Side white communi- ties, were taken into account in drawing the district boundaries. See Tr. at 1432 (remarks of Rep. Madigan); 1838-39 (re- marks of Comm'r Murphy). Neither Madi- gan nor Murphy indicated, however, that any district lines were drawn for the pur- pose of diluting black voting strength. History of Ciuil Rights Violatiorc in Chicago. To strengthen the inference of intentional discrimination against blaeks, the Crosby plaintiffs introduced evidence of past racial discrimination by the City of Chicago and, allegedly, by the City's regu- Iar Democratic organization. In particular, plaintiffs pointed to several lawsuits involv- ing the Chicago Police rr and Fire Depart- ments,l2 the Chicago Housing Authority,r3 and the Board of Education a{ in which the city defendants were either found to have discriminated against blacks or entered into consent decrees which recognized the exist- ence of racial bias within the agency. Plaintiffs noted that the heads of all three city agencies are appointed by the Mayor (inevitably a Democrat). Plaintiffs also in- troduced evidence of the new Chicago ward map, which they asserted to be biased, and which furnished a guide in some instances for the challenged legislative redistricting. l{). Defendants were also alerted to the effects of their plan on the black and Hispanic communi- ties at the July 23 public hearing in Chicago. Madigan received some of the same information during meetings with black members of the House during May and June and during a Dem- ocratic caucus at the close of the legislative session. 4t. United Stares v City ol Chicago,4ll F.Supp. 218 (N.D.lll.lq76). afl'd, 549 F.2d 4l-< (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 434 ti.S. 875, 96 S.Cr. 225, 54 L.Ed.2d 155 (1o77). 1096 ble) ofportunity to elect candidqtes of their choice to t}e Illinois GeneralAssembly.'6 II. ConrplainL of the Rybicki Ptain- tiffs: Cornpactness, City-Suburban Oaerlap, and Political Fointess T:he Rybiclci plaintiffs allege that the Commission Plan unlawfully discriminates against suburban voters in the Chicago area, that the Plan contains noncompact districts, that political subdivisions are un- necessarily fractured and that the Plan is not politically fair.r6 We first consider the claims of noncompactness under Illinois law befor.e considering the claims of dis- crimination against suburban voters and political fairness under the appropriate fed- eral constitutional standards. We also con- sider fracturing of political suMivisions un- der the appropriate law. A. Compactness tll Arl. IV, 5 3(a), Ill. Corxt. (1970), provides that "fl]egislative districts shall be 'compact, contiguous and substantial)y equal in population." {7 The substance of this provision was first incorporated into the Illinois Constitution of 1870, and the drafters of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 reincorporated the provision into the cur- rent constitution. See 6 Record of Pro- ceedings, Si^rth lllinois Constitutional Conoention, 1352-53 (1972). Although sel- dom interpreted by the Illinois courts, see, e.9., People er rel. Woodyatt a. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451, 40 N.E. 30? (1895); People er rel. Scott o. Griaetti, 50 Ill.zd 156, 277 N.E.2d 881 (1971) cert. denied, 407 U.S. {5. A more detailed discussion of the DelValle plaintiffs' claims, as well as of the Hispanic Settlement Agreement, appears in Section IV inlra- 45. The Rybicki complaint also alleges unconsti- tutional racial vote dilution. That issue, which was presented at trial by the Crosby and Del- Valle plarntiffs, is dealt with in subsequent Parts of this opinion. {7. We have pendent jurisdiction to consider this state law claim. As noted previously, equality of population in the districts is not an issue in this case. Moreover, no evidence was intro- duced at trial that any district is non-contigu- -_-.. 67{ FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT YS- 921, 92 S.Ct. 2460, 32 L.Ed.zd 806 (1972), this provision was most recentfi constnred by the Illinois Supreme Court in Schrage o. State Board of Electioru, 88 Ill.zd 87, 58 Ill.Dec. 451, 430 N.E.2d 483 (1981), a case arising out of the redistricting plan pres- ently under challenge. ln Schrqe, the Illinois Supreme C,ourt considered a chal- lenge under this provision to one represent- ative district (the 89th) oeated by the Com- mission Plan. In the course of invalidating the C,ommission Plan with respect to this district (and, concomitantly, to the 90th rep resentative district), the court adopted an "eyeball" standard to determine if a given district met the compactness require ment: 18 It is possible to establish a mathemati cally precise standard of compaet- ness. . . . However, we find it unneces- sary to adopt such a procedure in this case. Rather, we can rely on a visual examination of the questioned district as other courts have done.... A visual examination of Representa- tive District 89 reveals a tortured, ex- tremely elongated form which is not com- pact in any sense. . . . Nor were the plaintiffs able to advance any reason which might possibly justify such a radi- cal departure from the constitutional re quirement of compactness in this case. Schrage,83 Ill.zd at 98, 58 Ill.Dec. 451, 430 N.E.2d 483. Plaintiffs have directed our attention to numerous districts which allegedly lack ous. Hence, we have not considered any ques. tion of contiguity. tlE. The courl also emphasized that adherence to the compactness standard was important with respect to the challenged district because Com- mission House District 89's extremelv eloncated shape mighr "significantly impede[ i *,it"l-.on- stituent-represental ive communication," *hrage, al 100, 58 Ill.Dec. 451, 430 N.E.2d 483. We note that plaintiffs here did not allege, nor present any evidence to the effect, thal such communication would be jeopardized in any of the assertedly noncompact Commission Plan districts challenged in the instant proceeding. . -*- -3- EnIr- f ,/v RYBICKI V. STATO gti. OT ELECTIONS OF STATE OF ILL. Glrc er J7l F3upp. tllB2 (19t2) Bl. lr. h F Fil lG F 13 L l" b F F l. > I ll t i i I F t t ) I' I I t, I compactness.r0 Se1€ral other witnesses identified districts that, in their opinion, represented such shapes 8s a "microscope" or a "B-uddha" and thus lacked compact- ness. Finally, plaintiffs have also directed our attention to examples of legislative dis- tricts found to be noncompact in cases oth- er than Schrage but interpreting similar requirements of compactness. See, e.9., Preisler a. Doherty, 365 Mo. 460, 284 S.W.zd a27 $955),; State er rel. Barrett o. Hitchcock, 241 Mo.433, 146 S.W. 40 (1912); In re Sherirl, 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907).50 We have examined the districts described by plaintiffs as noncompact and conclude that under the principles articulated in Schrage, none of the districts in the Com- mission Plan reveal "a tortured, extremely elongated [or other] form which is not com- pact in any sense." Schrage, 88 Ill.2d at 98, 58 Ill.Dec. 451, 430 N.E.2d 483. In reaching this conclusion, we are, of course, mindful that the compaetness standard is recognized by Illinois as a means to "im- prov[e] legislative representation through seeking to insure that districts are not ger- rymandered," 6 Record of Proceedings, Sicth lllinois Corxtitutional Conuention 1353 (1972) (Report of the Legislative Comm.). Consistent with this goal, the Illi- nois Supreme Court reemphasized in Schrage that the constitutional compaet- ness standard cannot be ignored. Schraqe, at 96, 58 Ill.Dec. 451, 430 N.E.2d 483. We clearly recognize the importance of the compactness standard not only because Illi- nois law and its interpretation by Illinois 49. See discussion ante at 1097. These dis- tricls include Commission Senate Districts 17, 18, 19 and 46; and Commission House Districts 7, 22, 35, 37, 39, 4r, 42, 50, 58, 77, 80, 84, 87, 95 and 104. Plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Hofeller, articu- lated another test for compactness (different from the lengthro-width comparison test) that involved drawing a polygon around the outside of a district and comparing the area inside the district to the area outside the district but with- in the line segments of the polygon. The evi- dence did not establish, however, that Dr. Hofel- ler anall'zed any districts using this method. 50. See generalh ln re lzgislative Districting ol General Asscmbh,, 193 N.W.2d 784 (lou,a 1972): Acker r. /-., i, i78 Ccilo. 175, 496 P.2d 75 (1972). 1097 courts is controlling on this issue but also because we agree wilh the underlying poli- cies and ideals on which Schrage is based. - Nevertheless, we are aware of the various' difficulties involved in drawing legislative districts and the constraints imposed by the one-person, one-vote standard, the impera- tives of census tract data, the desire to follow natural, ecological and political boundaries, and the competing demands of incumbents, voters and the courls. Bearing in mind these considerations, we not€ that no other districts in the Commis- sion Plan are as relatively noncompact as Commission House Districts 89 and 90 (be- fore their modification by the Illinois Su- preme Court in Schrage).it Indeed, al- though plaintiffs identified many districts in the Commission Plan as noncompact, a quick perusal of the plaintiffs' alternative Coalition Plan reveals that it contains dis- tricts also comparatively lacking in strict compactness. This comparison with the Coalition Plan is significant because it re- veals the problems with compactness which pervade many approaches to similar redis- tricting problems. Thus, we decline to in- validate the Commission Plan, or any of its individual districts, as lacking in compact- ness in the sense required by the Illinois Constitution. B. Fracturing Political Subdioision Boundaries, Oaerlap Between Ur- ban and Suburban Districts and Suburban Vote Dilution Plaintiffs contend that the Commission Plan unduly fractures or splits political 51. Defendants have, for the mosl pan, justified an1' slight deviations from normal "compact- ness" by demonstrating that the districts were drawn as such to recognize alleged communities of interest, to follow natural, ecological or polit- ical boundaries or to satisfl'population equality standards. Such justifications are appropriately considered, given that Illinois does not require perfect comptctness', Schrage, 88 Ill.2d at 96, 58 Ill.Dec. 451, 430 N.E.2d 483. The explanations proffered tend to rebut the inference that the arguable lack of normal "compactness" was re- lated to efforts at gerrymandering. I I I I ; 1098 574 FEDERAL gUPPLEMENT suMivieions in lllinojs, especially eoun' ties.c By drawing districts wldch "over- lap" a county line, plaintiffs argue that the. defendants violated their own criteria of keeping political subdiuisions and their con' comitant communities of interest intact within the same legislative district'ts The most vehemently criticized fracturing noted in the Crcmmission Plan involves districts that "overlap" between the City of Chicago and Cook County. There was also strong criticism of the number of districts which "overlap" between Cook County and the "collar" counties.il According to the plain- tiffs, the net effect of districts which over- lap from Chicago into the suburbs is the impermissible minimization of the voting strength of suburban residents (who are predominantly Republican voters in con- trast to the predominantly Democratic vot- ers residing in Chicago). This alleged mini- mization of suburban voting strength as- sertedly violates the Fourteenth Amend- ment's guarantee of equal protection. Although they do not deny that their plan in fact fractures many political subdi- visions, several Commission members testi- fied that two of their guiding criteria in designing districts were to minimize the number of fractures and to maintain com- munities of interest. Defendants argue that the Commission Plan does not unduly violate these redistricting criteria' Defend- ants also concede that they intentionally 52. Illinois is comprised of 102 counties' Under the Commission Flan, +8 counties are fractured, ia, they contain districts that cross over county lines. -Some of these counties are fractured a number of times thus creating a total of 122 s€parate fractures of county boundary lines in the Commission Plan. 53. The Village of Oak Park, Illinois, a suburban community west of Chicago, filed a brief -as amicus curiae urging the court to adopt a redis- tricting plan that avoids any unnecessary frac' turing oi the community among legislative dis- trictslontaining parts of its population' Unfor- tunately, although we recognize the merit of Oak Park's objections (based on fracturing) to portions of thi remedy we have adopted in this proceeding, we feel that the black voting dilu- iion claim, which was addressed in part by certain changes in the border area of Chicago and Oak Park, must be accorded high priority' Since we have relied on the Commission to ia;: " crcst€d districts that overlap between Chi' cago and aurrounding ar€as in Cgok Ooun' ty and between C,ook County and the collar crounties. The bulk of the overlip districts between Chicago and its suburbs were cne. ated, according to the Commission mem- bers, by generally following the district lines from the 1971 districting plan, with adjustments where necessary to add or subtract population to meet the population equality standard. Moreover, defendants concede that a major motivating factor for creating overlap districts was to enhance and maximize the influence of Chicago, its voters and the Democratic party in the General Assembly. We address first the question of alleged indiscriminate fractur- ing of political subdivision boundaries be fore considering the claim of suburban vote dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment. I2l Plaintiffs argue that the "overlap" district lines, as well as other district lines which indiscriminately fracture municipal, township and county boundaries, impermis- sibly split recognized communities of inter- est by indiscriminately fracturing political subdivision boundaries. As evidence of this, plaintiffs point to various examples of alleged divergence of interest between the residents of Chicago and suburbanites, or between residents of one county (particu- larly Cook County) or of a group of coun- ties and residents of neighboring coun- ties.ss Although this argument has some address the details of the necessary census tract shifts, we cannot without risking loss of control of the process, accommodate all other objec- tions. 3f. The counties surrounding Cook-I-ake, McHenry, Kane, DuPage and Will Counties---are commonly referred to as the collar counties' Eleven Senate districts and fifteen House dis' tricts include areas both within and without the City of Chicago and are thus denominated as o,rirlap districts. Chicago residents account for -or. ih", 50% of the population in nine of these Senate districts. Se'ven legislative districts overlap between Cook, Will, l-ake and DuPage Counties. 55. Most of the examples relied upon by the plaintiffs compare the inlerests of voters in the collar countiei to tlre interests of voters in Chi- cago and in Cook County. Plaintiffs also nole --.r**L* hi ln- llar ttB B rn- ist ittt or OD rts br loe its he l'e lF |} t€ rt l" B r[ t F d rf r I i l- l- )- ! .RYBICKI v. STATE BD. OF ELE(IIONS OF STATE OF ILL. I Clte u J7{ FSupp. tlEA (l9t l) 1099 force, plaintiffs have not cited any legal 92 S.Ct. 2460, 82 LlEd.zd 806 (1972), and authori$ which would require (or autho the Democratic C,ommission members re.7 rize) us to invalidate the Commission Plan lied on that decision when they drafted on such a ground.s In fact, the 1970 llli- their plan. Cf. In re lllinois Congression- nois C.onstitution did not reenact those pro al Districts Reapportionment Cases, No. " visions of the 1870 Constitution that re 81 C 3915, slip op. at 24-25 (N.D.Ill. Nov. quired districts outside Cook County to "be 23, 1981), affd sub nom. McClory o. Otto, bounded by county lines unless the popula- 454 U.S. 1130, 102 S.Ct.985, 71L.Ed.zd2U tion of any county entitled it to more than (1982) (approving Congressional redistrict- one representative district." Art. IV, 5 7, ing that creates districts which overlap be. Ill. Corxt., (1970) (repealed).5? Moreover, tween Chicago and suburbs).Et Thus, ,rre districts that overlap between Chicago and are unwilling to condemn the Commission suburban Cook County were approved by Plan merely because it fractures a number the Illinois Supreme Court in People er rel. of political subdivision lines or creates dis- Scott a. Griaetti, 50 Ill.zd 156, 277 N.E.2d tricts that overlap between Chicago and its 881, 888 (1971), cert. denied,407 U.S. 921, surrounding suburbs.se that Cook County and Chicago are treated dif- f.erently under state law than other areas with respect to real estate taxes, budgeting authority, etc., thus indicating divergent interests between Chicago and Cook County voters and other vot- ers. 56. In S*o/zick v. State Electoral Board, 336 F.Supp. 839 (N.D.Ill.l97l), the court purported to reject a redistricting plan because in an at- tempt to create compact and contiguous dis- tricts, it failed to respect political boundaries. The statements made in Skolnick which subordi- nate compactness to respect for political bound- aries did not purport to interpret Illinois law. As we discuss elsewhere, Illinois recently deem- phasized the significance of political boundaries while revitalizing the compactness standard in *hrage. Moreover, the Skolnick opinion did not purport to hold that preservation of tradi- tional political boundaries was mandated by the federal Constitution. Indeed, in a similar case involving a challenge to the population devia- tions of a state redistricting plan, the Supreme Court also denied any special constitutional privilege for political boundaries by noting that "[r]ecognition that a state may properly seek to protect the integrity of political subdivisions or historical boundary lines permits no more than 'minor deviations' from the basic requirement that legislative districts must be 'as nearly of equal population as is practicable."' Connor v. Finch,43t U.S. 407, 419, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1836, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977) (quoting Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710, 84 S.Ct. t449, 1458, t2 L.Ed.2d 620 (1964)). We believe this principle is also appropriate in an Equal Protection chal- lenge alleging vote dilution as in this case. 57. The intent underlying this deletion was clear- ly expressed by one of the drafters of the 1970 Constitution as follows: 'The least we can do is not to mandate the legislature to follow munici- pal boundaries, county boundaries, or others, but to apportion this state as near as possible on a basis of equal population." 4 Record ol ho- ceedings, Si*th lllinois Constitutional Convention 2937 (1970) (remarks of Delegate Nicholson). 5E. The Illinois Supreme Court's most recent de- cision in Schrage v. State Board ol Elections, SE Ill.2d 87, 58 Ill.Dec. 451, 430 N.E.2d 483 (1981), is not to the contrary. To be sure, in Schrage, at 104, 58 Ill.Dec. 451, 430 N.E.2d 483, the court noted that "'[i]ndiscriminate districting, with- out regard for polirical subdivisions or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerryman- dering"' (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 57U79, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1390-91, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964)). The challenged district in that case-House District 89-involved the indis- criminate disregard of political subdivision boundaries, since that district fractured at least six counties and numerous townships. But, nol- withstanding its discussion of political bounda- ries, it is also clear that the *hrage court was primarily concerned with the compactness of the district in question. Indeed, the court's stat- ed reason for invalidating the Commission Plan as to District 89 was not the fracturing of coun- ty lines per se bul rather the production of a noncompact district by fracturing. As previous- ly noted, we have found no other districts in the Commission Plan which violate the compact- ness standard. We think it would be incorrect to interpret the khrage language on fracturing in a context llolated from the question of com- pactness. 59. Witnesses for the Rybicki plaintiffs sharply criticized the Commission Plan's apparent indis- criminate fracturing of DuPage County, among other collar counties. At the request of rhe court during the trial, the Commission made several changes in its Plan to accommodate some of the objections of all plaintiff s, including the Rybicki plaintiffs, in an effort to rearh a i.I ,/ . 5?4 FEDERAL SUPPLE1ItrENT , 1100 t3l 'The Rybicki'plaintiffs also allege Oat- ttre Commission Plan'sr.bverlapping Cti"agoltoUurban districts impermissibly dilud the votes-of suburban residents' if,"r. ou"tt"p districts were carefully de "ign"a, pUiniifts contend, so that most of tt-". .*t in a majority of Chicago resi- dents.* The voting strength of the subur- ban ,esidents of these districts is allegedly aifrt"a because the districts are controlled UV tf," majority Chicago voters and their political organizations.6r Although this argument has appeal' we reiect it for two reasons-{ne grounded in -Ji.u. the other in the Constitution' The 'Rybiciki plaintiffs' argument *'- b" :o driced to'the simple proposition that the Commission intentionally failed to increase the numbe. of "suburban" districts 52 even itorgt Chicago lost population and the rrUriU. gained population during the igzO'r. Tt " C-oulition Plan espoused by the Rybicki plaintiffs would cure this alleged ltiitmity-Uy reducing the number of over- lap districts, thereby increasing the number oi di"t"i.t" located wholly outside Chicago' ihis strift would reduce the number of dis- tricts "controlled" by Chicago voters' Of course, at the heart of the Rybicki plain' tiffs' claim seems to be the concept that Chicago voters are the highly disciplined "agen-L" of that city's political interests linltuaing the interests of its dominant po- iitlcat orlanizationsFand that these inter- ests are in major part inimical to the inter- ests of suburban voters' We think there settlement. &e Court Exhibits lA' 2A and 2E G"Jt"pp""i.g documents)' We are accepfing )i"*-"Lin...i changes as they affect DuPage i""t,i ,tJ the otheicollar counties' The sug- i..ii"; itln. -Rvbicki plaintiffs' offer of Proof Efi-;. Decem6er l1' l98l (in oppositio-n ro il;;;il i;hibits), that the majoritv of the ;;-;;;, be allowed to draw the chicago ii."i.i. *f,if. the Rybicki plaintiff.s be permit- ;;;-; 4."* all distiicts in the collar counties [-, to riot"te the thrust of Illinois redistrict- ili"'it"..a"... The defendant Commission i *'"r,rJi ll-...*olled bv its majori t v' is- c harged under Illinois law with responsibility lor reclts' iricting the General Assembl-v-' We are also ;;;;fi.s the changes made b-v ,th" ,]11":'. Court Eihibits in connection with the clarm: ol ;h.';';;-;;d Detvatte plaintifls \'\'c think anv furthir changes are unnecessar'\' an(i \\'('trld may be some reality to this concept al- though the record is quite uninformativ-e on the lubject in general' We also believe that the concept may exaggerbte t}e sub- missivenes. oi Chiogo voters and the cross antagonism of City and suburban i-nterests. It is not disputed that, on some questions, some residents of Chicago may s'uppo"t positions strongly in conflict with those supported by their suburban counter- """tt. fiut to extrapolate from this modest -assumption to a rule that Chicago residents *ott U" excluded from any district inc-lud- ing .oUr,tU"n residents is unsupported ei- th-er by logic or by the record before us' it" "*tt"t* parochialism in legislative dis- iricting seemingly espoused by the Rybicki olaintiffs is not required by law and has some tendency to derogate the intelligence and independinee of the average modern uot".. We think this approach may be somewhat more reflective of traditionally iallowed concepts than of current reality' Our conclusion is not at odds with the Constitution. The Rybicki plaintiffs argue that any dilution of the votes of suburban residenL by their inclusion in a Chicago majority district violates the Equal Protec- tion Ctause of the Fourteenth Amendment' e,ttf,ougt acknowledging that no clearly apposite Supreme Court (or even lower "or*; pt"""aent directly supports this as- sertion, the plaintiffs argue that the Colrt has recognized that, in addition to racial or ethnic minorities, political groups of any nature may also assert a claim of unconsti- not be congruent with the rest of the map as modified. 60. &e nole 54 suPra' 6t. We may fairly characterize the evidence --nresented u, t.i"l'.o'"ttning the partisan po.li- iics of these geographic areas by noting that tne -"t.iiiv "f v'oreis ieslding in Chicago *: D:i ocrats while the majority of their suburban .o,rnrerparts are Republicans' To the extent iir'i'rl"itriffi claim -of suburban vote dilution i.r"r'r.. p""i*n political concerns' r'r'e address those concerns xPatatels-' infra' 62. ln the context of this discussion' we use the -!".t*i. term "suburbs" to refer to Cook County iutside Chicago, together with the collar coun' ties. I i t*__ ,ne nay vit}l d- ton h,ve rub- the ben ter- lest lnts lud- ei- us. dis- icki has nce em be rlly iw. the rue )an rgo EC- [lt. rly ver 8S- urt or tny sti- ,aS ECe oli- the !m- ,an Ent ion lEss the Dty un- RYBTCKT v. STAIh nh. Or ELECTTONS OF STATE OF rLL. 1r0l . CltcrrsTaFsupp. tlB2 (19t2) tutional vote dilutiqf.B We decline to give eas of our heterogeneous cities and ur- the dicta or separate opinio4s cited by ban areas. : plaintifJs such an authoritative interpreta- tion, especially in light of refusals by the Supreme C,ourt to accord to political or other identifiable groups the same Four- teenth Amendment protections in the elec- toral context as are aecorded to racial and ethnic minorities. As Justice White, writ- ing for the majority, explained in Whit- comb a. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971): The District Court's holding, although on the facts of this case limited to guar- anteeing one racial g"oup representation, is not easily contained. It is expressive of the more general proposition that any group with distinctive interests must be represented in legislative halls if it is numerous enough to command at least one seat and represents a majority living in an area sufficiently compact to consti- tute a single-member district. This ap- proaeh would make it difficult to reject claims of Demoerats, Republicans, or members of any political organization in Marion County who live in what would be safe districts in a single-member dis- trict system but who in one year or an- other, or year after year, are submerged in a one-sided multlmember district vote. There are also union oriented workers, the university community, religious or ethnic groups occupying identifiable ar- 53. Plaintiffs cite statements from Reytolds v. Sims,377 U.S. 533, 56? n.43,84 S.Ct. 1362, 1384 n.43, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), and Dallas County v. Reese,42l U.S. 477, 48O,95 S.Ct. 1706, 1707, 44 L.EA.2d 312 (1975) (per curiam), to indicate that the Court has at least contemplated the protection of suburbanites or other groups from vote dilution. We note that the Court's state- ments regarding "fast-moving suburban areas" h Reytolds were expressly related to the possi- bility of a suburban-based population equality (i.e., one-person, one-vote) challenge. We do not view this sort of claim as necessarily compa- rable to a vote dilution claim such as the instant one, which is unaccompanied by any contention that districts do not contain equal population. Similarly, the statement plaintiffs rely upon from Rease was the Court's attempt to explain that, under Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 1 12, 87 S.Ct. 1554, l8 LEd.2d 656 (1967), a single-member 403 U.S. at 156, 91 S.Ct. at 18?5-76 (foot7 notes omitted). Accord, City of Mobile o. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 78 n. 26, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 1506 n.26, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980). ,See " also Cotxitts a. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 844-45 (?th Cir.), cert. de- nied, 409 U.S. 893, 93 S.Ct. 85, 84 L.Ed.zd 181 (1972); Graaes 7). Barlrcs, 343 F.Supp. 704,733-34 (W.D.Tex.1972), affd in part and rea'd in part sub nom. White a. Re- gester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973). C. Political Fairness A great deal of testimony was introduced at trial about the "political fairness" of the Commission Plan (and the Coalition Plan as well). The Rybicki piaintiffs argue that "[u]nder the guise of political fairness, the Democratic Commission members have dra_wn a map which sacrifices compactness and the integrity of political subdivisions for the preservation of incumbency." Ry- bicki Post Trial Brief at 26. We have already concluded that the Commission Plan neither lacks compactness nor imper- missibly ignores the integrity of political subdivisions. We now conclude that what the Rybicki plaintiffs eall the Commission's "overt political gerrymandering," Rybicki Post Tlial Brief at 27, similarly does not require us tp invalidate the Commission Plan. districting scheme actually operated on a coun- ty-wide basis as an at-large districting scheme which would "dilute" the votes of some city or county residents by violating the population equality principle. The only other authorities cited by plaintiffs for the proposition that suburbanites are pro- tected from vote dilution are several opinions by Justice Stevens, see City ol Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.55,86, r00 S.Ct. 1490, 1509,64 L.Ed.2d 47 (t980) (Slbvens,'J., concurring in judgment); Cousins v. City Council ol Chicago,466 F.2d 83O, 853 (7th Cir.) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. de- nied, 409 u.s. 893, 93 S.Ct. 85, 34 L.Ed.2d r8l (1972). Despite our great respect for the wis- dom and insight of Justice Stevens, we note that no olher Supreme Court Justice nor any other judge of this circuil has followed Justice Stevens and adopted his views on this subject. a.._ // 674 FEDEBALSUPPLEMENT [$ -: 1102 l4I' As a prerequisite to our consider&- tion of this issue, we note tt}at partisan politically-based challenges to redistricting and reapportionrnent may be nonjusticiable. See llMCA, Inc. o. Lomenzo,882 U.S. 4, 86 S.Ct. ?4, 15 L.Ed.zd 2 (per eluriam), affg 238 F.Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.7965); Cou"siw a. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.zd 830, 81445 (?th Cir.), cert. dcnied, 409 U.S. 893, 93 S.Ct. 85, 34 L.Ed.2d 181 (1972). Although plaintiffs seem ambivalent in their approach to political end-result as a test of fairness, they do contend that the Democratic-controlled Commission improp erly designed districts to maximize the number of Democrats likely to be elected to the lllinois General Assembly. Never- theless, we consider the political fairness issue here because it is inexorably linked to the questions of compactness and the integ- rity of political subdivision boundaries, see Wendler a. Stone, 350 F.Supp. 838, 841 (S.D.Fla.19?2) (Roettger, J., dissenting), and because the fairness question may re- quire us to interpret the Court's decision in Gaffney a. Cummings, 412 U.S. ?35, 93 s.ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973). t51 Plaintiffs' political fairness argu- ment is premised upon the assertion that the C,ommission members, although claim- ing to have created a districting plan that fairly represents the balance between Re- publican and Democratic political strength in Illinois, purposefully designed districts that maximized Democratic voting strength while minimizing and fracturing Republi- can voting power. Plaintiffs also assert that the C,ommission purposefully "gerry- mandered" districts "to enhance the ability of Democratic incumbents . . . to get re- elected." Rybicki Post T?ial Brief at 27. Aside from the questions of detailed techniques, such as the alleged creation of noncompact districts and the dilution of the suburban vote (which we have discussed, supra), plaintiffs apparently assert the broader proposition that the end-result of these efforts-an overall bias toward a f)emocratic legislature-is constitutionally impermissible. We note, however, that the Rybicki plaintiffs never presented evidence of what result in detail they expected fium the C.ommission Map. The Commission, on the other hand, did adduce sirch evidence. We believe that plaintiffs' argument with respect to the fairness of political result misconstrues the Supreme Crcurt's decision in Gaffney a. Cutnmings,4l2 U.S. ?35, 9g S.Ct. 2321, 3? L.Ed.zd 298 (1973). \n Gaff- ney, a state redistrieting plan was con- sciously designed, in "the spirit of 'political fairaess,'" to "achieve a rough approxima- tion of the statewide political strengths of the Democratic and Republican Parties.,' 412 U.S. at 752, 93 S.Ct. at 2331. The challengers in Gaffney contended, how- ever, that the plan was "nothing less than a gigantic political gerrymander, invidious- ly discriminatory under the Fourteenth Amendment." 412 U.S. at 752,93 S.Ct. at 2331 (footnote omitted). The Court, in rejecting the challengers' claim, intimated that a plan, in order to pass muster, did not necessarily have to be wholly "politically fair" in end-result or designed with total even-handedness to re- flect the respective strengths of political parties in a state. Even a plan that re flected some partisan leanings on the part of its drafters should not be invalidated solely because the drafters of the plan indulged some partisan political biases. Based in part on Gaffney, we do not think it the function of the courts to attempt to totally depolitieize a process so inherently political as districting. As Justice White, speaking for the majority in Gaffney, ex- plained: We are quite unconvinced that the re apportionment plan offered by the three. member Board violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it attempted to re flect the relative strength of the parties in locating and defining election districts. It would be idle, we think, to contend that any political €orwidbration taken into account in fashioning a reappor- tionment plan is sufficient to inaali- date it. Our cases indicate quite the contrary .... The very essence of dis- tricting is to produce a different-a more "politically fair"-result than would be - ---..{4 -- h It t, \ h hI 7-I ltl t- F llI h t- h t- h It t' |" b ir ts N ; rt p D t. I b F F, t- ; > h F b It It l 7- 5- F ! F r ,/ .. RyBrcKr v. sTATd nn..or ET,ECIUONS OF STATE OF ILL. 1103 - Clt"t37'F3uPP'lllt2 (l$r) reached with electiphs at large, in which Notwithstanding the asserted and appar- the winning party would takB 100% of ent ststewide balance. between the two ma' tlrelegislativeseats.Politicsandpotit-jorpartiesachieved!vtl"''"1:l]:t"s,t^tl, ical lons;derations ore inseparable still contend that the commission rlan' from districting and apporti-onment must fail because it was intentionally de' The reatiiy is that d.istricting in- signed to produce in end-result a maximum , evitably nas aia is intend.ed to haae Democratic party representation' This ar- substaitial politicat consequences' gument, however' does not' as we have 412 U.S. at 752-53,93 S'Ct. at 2331-32 suggested' rise to the level of a Constitu- (emphasissupplied).tionalcontention.AlthoughtheCourtin We believe that the Gaffney decision in Gaffiey refused to abstain entirely from no sense mandates the invalidation of the judicial scrutiny of a state redistricting CommissionPlansolelyonthegroundsplanmotivatedinpartbypoliticalfactors, that Commission members considered parti- it'" Coo"t expressly limited the permissible san political advantage when drafting the scope of the challenge to such a plan: plan.s In any event the Commission What is done in so arranging for election' presented extensive evidence to demon- or to achieve political ends or allocate strate that its PIan, tit e tfre ptan approved political power' is not wholly exempt in Gaffney, would achieve a fair represen- from judicial scrutiny under the Four- tation of the two major parties in Illinois teenth Amendment' As we have indi- based upon past election results. Indeed, cated, for example, multimember dis- under the Commission Plan, the Republican tricts may be vulnerable' if racial or po- party may control more relatively secure litical groups haae been fenced' out of seats in the General Assembly than the the political process and their ttoting Democratic party.6b cf. In re congres- strength inuidiously minimized' Be' sional Districts Reapportionment Cases, yond this' we haoe not aentured far or No.81C3915,slipop.at2l-22(N'D'In'attemptedtheimpossibletaskofertir- Nov. 23, l98l), affd sub nom' McClory a' pating politics from what are the essen- otto, 454 u.s. 1130, 102 s.ct. 985, ?l tialty political processes of the soaer' L.Ed.2d 284 (1982) (6tto ptan preferable eign States' because it approximates statewide political 412 U.S. at754,93 S'Ct' at2332 (emphasis strength of two major partiesf. The supplied) (citations omitted)' It would be Court's admonition in"Gffiey is, we be- "qu"tty absurd fo-r-us to attempt to take Iieve, equally applicable "h"r"i "[4udi.iul the politics out of legislative redistricting' interest should be at its lowest ebb when a Plaintiffs do not assert, nor can they as- State purports fairly to al]ocate political sert, that the Democratic.control]ed Com. power to the parties in accordance with mission attempted to fence out or invidious- their voting strength and, within quite tol- ly minimize Republican voting strength in erable limits, su"ce"d. in doing sL." 412 Iitinois' Similarly, we do not, in general' U.S. at ?54, 93 S.Ct. at 2332. find fault with the efforts of Democratic 6l.Thisanalysisdoesnotapply,however,totheDemocratic,25,.firm',Republican,3,.soft',Re. extent that purposeful diluiion of minority vol- publican ard l0 "swing" seats' Plaintiffs chal- -g ;;rffif ;;ir,.r ,r,*'p""isan politiTi con- i.ng. th. defendants'use of this data' especiallv cerns may be the issu-e 'S"t S"ttio" lll infro' the-results of trustee elections and of legislative 6s. Bascd upon an anarvsis or the re78 1nj,.re!o :F::l';,:'r,::*;\t:l'.t:::i*;l:L"."efii election returns from the University ot llllnors Assembly. W. tot., however, that plaintiffs I:'&.J,,:.Ji:l:.:y,#"*#,J,1l::"::,,ff"",:: ;;;;;"1 produced anv arternative svstematic that its Plan will provide 39 "firm" Democratic' methodolngy for more accurately predicting 5 "soft" Democratic, 4l "firm" Republican, 10 election rJsults and' thus' we must accept the "soft" Republican and 23 "swing" seats .in -the defendanrs' evidence as the most systematic Illinois Housc or r."p..,"ntuii;; F"t the Illi' a\ailabi' ' nois Senalc, thc Commission estimates 21 "firm" t f. 1104 C,ommission members to protect incumbent Democratic legislators. Indied, the Su- preme C,ourt has expreasly indicated that a redistricting planis not pcr se invalid mere- ly because the drafters considered the ef- fect of district lines on incumbents of ei- ther party. See lYhite a. Weber,4f2 U.S. ?83, ?91, 93 S.Ct. 2349, 2352,3? L.Ed.zd 335 (19?3); Burns a. Richardsoa B8a U.S. 73, 89 n. 16, 86 S.Ct. l2fl6, tnb n. 16, t6 L.Ed.2d 376 (1966).66 Plaintiffs have not persuaded us that attempts by the Demo- cratic-controlled Commission to protect some of its members or other Democratic incumbents would invidiously minimize Re. publican voting strength. In sum, we do not believe that the role of courts in addressing alleged unfairness to political parties is equivalent to their role in evaluating unfairness to racial and ethnic minorities. The major political parties (ab- sent "fencing out" or invidious minimiza- tion) are presumed to have the capacity to protect their own interests in the political process. The federal courts are not in business to compensate for political errors, misfortunes or strokes of fate, which may Ieave political parties at some temporary disadvantage. The case for judicial action on behalf of blacks and Hispanics is signifi- cantly different. We conclude that the Commission Plan is not invalid because the Commission mem- bers considered (within limits) partisan ad- vantage when drawing district lines.6? 66. As will be indicated infra, hou,ever, the rela- tionship of incumbency to race may call for another analysis. 67. Somewhat related to their political fairness conc€rns, the Rybicki plaintiffs also alleged that the Democratic Commission members acted in bad faith by failing to provide their Republican counterparts with copies of the 'shapiro plan,, sufficiently in advance of the October 2, 1981, Commission meeting, at which the plan was adopted by a 5 to 4 vote atong party lines. Even if plaintiffs could clearly demonstrate some de. gree of "bad faith" on the part of the Democrats, we find that the plaintiffs have not shown that the Republican Commission members were prejudiced by the Democrats' conduct prior to the adoption of the Shapiro PIan. By voting unanimously againsl the Plan, the Republicans merely did whal appeared to be inevitable un- li':- 67I FEDEBAL.SUPPLEMENT III. Complaint of the Crosby plain- tifft: Dilution of Qlark Voting Strength The Croaby plaintiffs have alleged that the Commission unconstitutionally discrimi- nated against black voters in this redistrict- ing by intentionally diluting their voting strength and thereby denying them a fair electoral opportunity. These plaintiffs con- tend that the Commission Plan is a product of racial gerrymandering designed to limit the participation of blacks and Hispanics in t}re Illinois electoral process and to protect various white incumbents whose districts have become, in the lg?Glg80 period, heavily populated by blacks and Hispan- ics.s According to the Crosbu plaintiffs, the white leaders of the Chicago Democrat- ic organization purposefully set out to un- dermine the vote of the black electcrate and were successful in their efforts under the C,ommission Plan.ce A. Fifi,eenth Amendment and the Vot- ing Rights Act 16l First, we address the question whether, if proven, plaintiffs' claims of vote dilution are properly cognizable under the Fifteenth as well as the Fourteenth Amendment. Although an answer to this question may not emerge with blinding clarity from the Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Mobile o. Bolden, 446 u.s. 55, 100 s.ct. 1490, 64 L.Dd.zd 47 der all the circumstances. It is not clear what they might have done differently even if every detail of the Democrats'plan had been delivered to them weeks earlier. 6E. The allegations relating to the effect of the Commission Plan on Hispanics are not con- sidered in this section since the Hispanic plain- tiffs reached a settlement of their claims with the Commission after trial, as set forrh in the Hispanic Settlement Agrreement and discussed in Section [V of this opinion. 69. Although their complaint concerns all black residents and voters in lllinois, the Crosby plain- tiffs concentrated their effor1s at trial on those portions of the Commission Plan containing House or Senate districts located in whole or in part within the Citl' of Chicago. h- ;0 lft ni 3+ ig dr )D lct rdt in lgt t8 d, G b, rt- !F b er tt- E fr h 5 g rt t6 .:I It ry d tude,"' and that this constitutional prohibi- tion "does not entail the right to have Ne' gro candidates elected." 446 U'S' at 65, ioo S.Ct. at 1498. Relying on the district court's explicit finding "that Negroes in Mobile 'register and vote without hin- drance,'" the four-justice plurality held that both "the District Court and the Court of Appeals were in error in believing that the appellants invaded the protection of [the Fifteenth] Amendment in the present iase." 446 U.S' at 65, 100 S'Ct' at 1498'70 We believe that under Bolden, plaintiffs' allegations of racial gerrymandering in the instant case, which do not implicate the rights of minority group members to regis- ter and vote without hindrance, but can only entail the asserted right to have candi- dates favored by the protected groups elected, similarly fail to invade the province of the Fifteenth Amendment. 70. Justices Stevens (446 U'S' at 8zt-85)' White (446 U.S. at lO2) and Marshall (2t46 U'S' at 10445, 125-29) expressly stated that a vote dilu' tion claim is cognizable under the Fifteenth Amendment. Because Justices Brennan and Blackmun did not articulate their view on this queslion, the majority view is unknown' In these circumstances, we believe it is appropriate io "aopt the plurality view of -the Fifteenth Amendmenl-i view which is also consistent with our reading of prior appellate opinions on this subject. See McMillan v' Escambia County' 638 F.2d 1239, 1243 n' 9 (5th Cit'\' cert' dls' iioed s"t nom. City of Petuacola v' lenkins' 102 S.Ct. 17 (1981). Even if Justice Brennan's opinion can be interpreted as an implicit ap- proval of the application of the Fifteenth imendment in vote dilution cases, this would not alter the result we reach in the instanl case (as lhc Croshv plaintiffs apparently argue)' It is evident rhar onll' two Justices-Brennan and Marshall--r,ilopt the "discriminatory impact" E D. 0- h I d t l- E e n - _:ii*i&_ )- t 1105 'F RYBICKI v. STATE BD. OF ELECTTONS OF STATE OF ILL' clrc rr 3710 FSiTPP' r@ (lg0a) (1980), we'think that.decision furnishes tle Accordingly' the black plaintiffs in this most suthoritative $uide to the matter. In eaae eannot Fecover under either the Fif- Bold,eathe four pt,,,ality justies (Justices teent.h Amendment br under Section 2 of Stcwart, Burger, powett and Rehnquist), in the Voting Rights Act' 42 U'S'C' S 19?3' considering the constitutionality of the at- iiSZOl, wh]ch the Bolden C'ourt held to bd large system of elections required by the equivalent in basic content and effect to commission form of government in Mobile, the Fifteenth Amendment. City of Mobile , Alabama, held that the Fifteenth Amend- o' Bold'en' 446 U'S' at 60-61' 100 S'Ct' at ment "prohibits only purposefully discrimi- 149f96; see McMillon tt' EscamAia Coun- natory denial or abridgment by govern. ty, 638 F.2d 1239, |242 n.8 (5th Cir.), cert. ment of the freedom to iot 'on acciunt of iismissed' 453 U'S' 946' 102 S'Ct' 1?' 69 "a"", color, or previous condition of servi- L'Ed'zd 1033 (1981)' B. Fourteenth Amendment The primary issue in this case is thus whether the Crosby plaintiffs' vote dilution claim entitles them to any relief under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bolden, of course, held that voting strength dilution challenges to legis- lative apportionments "could violate the Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic mi- norities." 446 U.S. at 66, 100 S'Ct' at 1499.?r The Bolden Court went on to hold that, to sustain a voting strength dilution claim, a "plaintiff must prove that the dis- puted plan was 'conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial " ' discrimination.'" 446 U.S. at 66, 1499 (quoting Whitcomb tt. Chattis,403 U'S' 124, ras, gt s.ct. 1858, 1872, 29 L.Ed.zd 363 standard for a Fifteenth Amendment claim' tl46 U.S. at 94, l3G4l; Justice Stevens, although accepting an "objective" approach, rejected any acr<rrs-thi'boatd application of the discrimina- tory impact standard, 446 U-S' at 8t-86, 90' But five Justices-the plurality Justices, 446 U'S' at 63-65, and Justice White, 446 U'S' at 95, l0l-03 -expressly held that the Fifteenth Amendment requires proof of discriminatory purpose or rn' t.ni. th"t, even if we were to recognize plain- tiffs' claims here under the Fifteenth Amend- ment, we would apply the same standard--dis- criminatory purposHs we do under the Four- teenth Arqpndment, as discussed inlra 71. Sce also Cousins v. City Council of Chicago' 466 F.2d 830, 841 (7th Cir.), cert' denied, 48 U.S. 893, 93 S.Ct. 85, 34 L.Ed.2d 181 (1972) (even though quantitative equality is preserved' members of a racial or ethnic group are protect- ed from invidious minimization of their voting strengh). 1106 ' .. r-,-" i, / 574 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT (fg?f). Thus, we must detcrmine wtrither plaintiffs here have,demonstrated th;a th; C,ommission plan was purpnsefully de signed to foster racial discriminatior. g6. fore we make this determination, horu"u-"i, ^.:r"of preliminary questions concerning the nature of evidence acceptable to provi purposeful discrjmination and the appiopri_ ate burdens of proof must be "aai".rJ.l. Nature of Evidence and Burdens of proof I7l ln Bolden ,.[t]here were five clear votes^(Stewart, Burger, powell, Rehnquist 1,ni s.!eve.ns: JJ.) agaircr the'propoition that discriminatory impact "ton" i. .uiii cient in vote dilution eases.,, McMillan, 638 F.2d at L24B (emphasis supptied)- Ii reaching this conclusion, the Bilien Coui relied upon Washington a. Dauis,426 U.S. ?2_?_:96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 5e? (1ei6); Village of Arlington Heights a. Ariopoi'_ l2y H-2usinO Deuetopment Corp., 429'U.S. 252; 97 S.Cr. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 'qio Q;lT:; and Personnet Administrator of U*ri'- ylyletts u. Feeney, 442 U.S. ZSO, gg i.Ci. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 820 (1929) as iliustrative of the requirement that a plaintiff musi demonstrate purposeful dlscrimination in order to prevail under the Equal protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Bolden plurality also relied o, p;;;; ous electoral discrimination cases ,u.h ",Whi_te u. Regester, 412 U.S. ?55, 93 S.CL 2332,37 L.Ed.2d 814 (19?g), and Whitcomb a. Chayis, 408 U.S. LZ4, gt S.Ct. 18b8, ,9 L.Ed.2d 368 (19T1), to support their discrim_ inatory purpose rationale. We agree thai a discriminatory purpose must be shown in this case for plaintiffs to sustain a claim of racial vote dilution violative of the Four_ teenth Amendment. In .l/illage of Arlington Heights a. Met- r.o3^o!i-tyn Housing Deaelopment Corp., 12! U S 252, 266, e7 S.Ct: 555, 564, ;0 _LjP_d.2d 450 (1977), the Court ,ot"a if,ul "[d]etermining whether invidious discrimi_ l"to.y purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into s'uch cir- cumstantial and direct evidence of intent asma)' be available.,, The Fifth Circuitrecently summarized the evidentiary sources alluded tn in Arlington Heights which are useful for "rrerring tf,e eii"i- ence of purposeful discrimineiion as fol- lows: (1) the historical background of the ac- tion, particularly if a series of actions have been taken for invidious pr"por"r; 12) ttl" specific sequence of euents tead- mg up to the challenged action; (B) any procedural departures from the ;;"*; procedural sequence; (4) any substantive departure from normal prl""au"", i.". whether factors normally considered imlportant by the decision-maker strongly favor a decision contrary to the Jne reached; and (5) the legislative historyl especially where contemporary rt t"_ ments by members of the decisionmaking body exist. Mc,Millan,688 F.2d at 1248. The Supreme Court,s opinion in Arling_ ton Heights also demonstrates that in o-r_ der to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation, a plaintiff need not p"or" tt"i ii" challenged action was motivated sot"ty-iy a purpose to discriminate: Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decisio=n motivat_ ed solely by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the .,domi- nant" or "primarv', one. In fact, it is because Iegislators and administ"ators are properlv eoncerned with balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of- their decisions, absent a ihowing of arbitrariness or irrationality. But ricial discrimination is not just another eompet- rng consrderation. When there is aproof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motiaating forioi ln' tii decisictn, this jud,icial - diference is ni longer justi.fied. V. illag-e of Arlington Heigt4ts u. Metropoli- tan Hou.sing Deuelopmeni Corp.,42g U.S.at 26546, 9Z S.Ct. at 563_S4 (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted). _ Similarly, it seerns clear that Bolden does not require that the purpose to ;;r: criminate be the ozly underh ing pu"po." -.selflEr.*--- .RYBICKI.V. STATE BD. OF ELECIIONS OF STATE OF ILL. ll0? \ Cltcu5TlFSupp. l(tr2 (19E2) *tB it fol- ac- )n8 88; rd- ny nl ve D- ly rc for the challenged redistrieting decisions. The plurality opinion in Bolden relied upon Arlingtnn Height^s and Davis for its inter- pretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and as indicated above, Adington Heights specifically rejects the "sole purpose" test. Justice Stevens' apparent contrary view garnered no support from other Justices.T2 The more challenging question is wheth- er the analysis of lfl. Healthy City School District Board of Education u. Doyle, 429 u.s. ?74, 9? S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.zd 47r (1977), is appropriately applied to mixed motive redistricting cases such as the one at bar. Under the principles of Mt. Healthy (decided the same day as Arling- ton Heights ), if plaintiffs are able to show that a discriminatory purpose was one of the factors in the redistricting, the burden shifts to the defendant Commissioners to demonstrate that the same redistricting would have occurred even if a discriminato- ry purpose had not motivated the Commis- sioners. In the case at bar, the Crosby plaintiffs argue vigorously that the Mt. Healthy analysis is inappropriate while de- fendants, relying on Giah.an o. llestera Line Consolidated School District, 439 u.s. 410, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.zd 619 (1979); Wren o. Jones, 635 F.zd 1277 (7th Cir.1980); and Nekolny t:. Painte4 653 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir.r981), as well as Mt. Healthy itself, argue with equal vigor that the Mt. Healthy analysis applies. Defendants further contend that the ap plicable burden of proof in voting dilution cases has been modified by the Supreme C,ourt's recent decision in Teras Depo.rt- ment of Community Affairs o. Burdine, 450 U.S.248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.E,d.zd207 (1981). They argue that under Burdine, once defendant Commissioners have artieu- Iated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea- son for the challenged redistricting plan, the burden shifts back to plaintiffs to dem- Zl. The concurring opinion of Justice Stevens in Bolden, in which none of the other Justices joined, apparently espoused the position that only decisions which were "totally irrational or entirely motivated by a desire to curtail the political strengh of the minority" would violatc the Fourteenth Amendment. 446 U.S. at 90, 100 onstrate that defendants' purported expla- nation is merely a pretext for intentional,/ diserimination. We agree that the principles of Mt. Healthy are applicable to the instant case. The Supreme C,ourt in Adington Heights explicitly noted and approved the applica- tion of the Mt. Healthy burden of proof standard to raee discrimination claims: Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially dis- criminatory purpose would not necessari- ly have required invalidation of the ehal- lenged decision. Such proof would, how- ever, have shifted to the Village the bur- den of establishing that the same deci- sion would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been con- sidered. If this were established, the complaining party in a case of this kind no longer fairly could attribute the injury complained of to improper consideration of a discriminatory purpose. In such circumstances, there would be no justifi- cation for judicial interference with the challenged decision. But in this ease re spondenls failed to make the required threshold showing. See Mt. Healthy City Board of Education a. Doyle, post, [429 U.S.] p.274 [97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.zd 471). 429 U.S. at 210-71 n. 2L,97 S.Ct. at 566 n. 27, And although Arlington Heights is not itself a vote dilution case, it furnishes a controlling precedent for intentional dis- crimination as a neeessary element of ra- cial vote dilution. See City of Mobile a. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 6G{8, 100 S.Ct. at 1499-1500. Applying the Mt. Healthy analysis to the instant case involves the following analyti- cal steps. First, plaintiffs must establish a prima facie tase of purposeful vote dilu- tion under the principles established in White o. Regester, Arlingt,on Heights and S.Ct. al 1512. Concomitantly, Justice Stevens also noled that decisions affecti;rg voting rights could still be valid even if motivated in part by "irrational or invidio',rs faclors." 446 U.S. at 91, 100 S.Ct. al 1512. No othr ' -lustice has, to our knowledge, sto()d u'ith Justirt Stevens on this interpretation of the tcual I',.()tcction Clausc. Y, F s t- t "r I Ir-. 1108 Bolden. Assuming that plaintiffs are able to make such s prima.facie showing, the burden would then shift to the defendant Commissioners to establish that the redis- tricting in question _would have occurred even absent the purpose to dilute minority voting strength. Thus, following the seheme of Wren a. Jones, 635 F.zd Lnl, 128f86 (?th Cir.1980), once plaintiffs have demonstrated that racial discrimination substantially influenced the redistricting process, the defendant Commissioners must persuade the court, by a preponder- ance of the evidence, that they would have arrived at the same decisions and adopted the same redistricting scheme even absent the prohibited racial motivation. We acknowledge that once plaintiffs have established a prima facie ease, lhe Mt. Healthy analysis places upon defend- ants the heavy burden of demonstrating that the same redistricting process would have occurred, even in the absence of any prohibited motive. We also recognize that in the context of very complex reapportion- ment decisions the diseharge of such a bur- den may be exceedingly difficult. But we also believe that under Bolden, establish- nrent by plaintiffs of their prima facie ease is quite difficult. Therefore, we feel strongly that onee plaintiffs have sustained a prima facie claim, it is not unreasonable to shift to defendants the burden of show- ing that the same decision would have been reached even absent the influence of any discriminatory purpose. We do not agree with the defendants' further contention that the three-part bur- den of proof test set forth in Teras Depart- ment of Community Affairs a. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,10t S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.zd 201 (198i), is applicable trr the instant case. Burdine involved not a constitutional mixed-motive question, but a claim of dis- parate treatment under Title VII of the 73. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Burdine ex. plicitly recognized that "the factual issues and therefore the character of the evidence present- ed, differ u'hen the plaintiff claims that a facial, Iy neulral employment policl' has a discrimirra. tory impacl on protected classes." ,150 L.S. at 252 n. 5, l0l S.Ct. at 1093 n. 5. ozfinofin i. suPPLEMENT .,r I Civil RighB Act bf 1964.?3 The three.part burden of proof analysis articulated in Burdine, although appropriate 'for as- r eertaining the one "true reason" for a par- ticular employment-related action, does not deal with the problem of evaluating mixed- motive decisions made by a multi-member legislative or administrative body. In the latter context, unlike in Burdine, the role of plaintiffs' prima facie case is not to "eliminate the most common nondiscrimina- tory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection," 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094, but to establish the influence of at least some impermissible purpose in the decision-mak- ing process. Once this has been estab- lished, the judicial task becomes one of determining whether the relevant state ac- tors would have arrived at the same deci- sion even absent the effect of that admit- tedly improper purpose. We believe that the two-part burden of proof test articulat- ed in Mt. Healthy and Arlington Heights, rather than the "pretext" analysis em- ployed in Burdine, is most appropriate to this task. 2. Eaidence of Purposeful Vote Dilution on Chicago's South and West Sides t8l With respect to the Crosby plain- tiffs' claims, we believe that purposeful dilution of black voting strength, in several significant instances, has been demonstrat- ed in the instant case. First, under the 1980 census as applied to the 1971 Chicago area legislative redistricting lines, blacks constitute a majority in six Senate districts (former districts 21, 22, 24, 26,28 and 29). Under the 1980 census as applied to the C,ommission Plan, blacks will constitute a majority in only five Chicago area Senate districts (Commission Senate Districts 9, 12, 13, 16 and 17). This simple statistic is evidence of retrogression 7{ from which a strong inference of a purpose to dilute may 74. Retrogression, in the contlxt of reapportion- ment and redistricting, represen:s a lessening or decrease in the voting strenglh of a cohesive voting bloc (such as a racial group) measured over time. Fp.rt din RYBICKI v. S'TATE tsD. O{ ELECTIONS OF STATS OF ILL. f l09 ' Gltc re t1l FSnpp, llB:! (19t2) be drawn.?5 In a{dition, Dr. Amy Tsui, a Joyce's incumbency, was to dilute the vot- sociologist and dlrnographer from the Uni- ing strength of tlre nearly ?3,fi)0 blacks versity of Chicago, testified that in her who remained in'Commission Senate Dis- opinien, implementation of the Commission trict 14 after the shift in populations. ,r{t Plan would result in a lessening<r retro may, of course, be argued that this manipu- gression<f the voting strength in Senate lation of racial populations in the district districts presently held by Chicago area was accomplished for the purpose of mairl- blacks under the 19?1 redistricting plan. taining the incumbency of a white Senator More precise and identifiable indications of a purpose to dilute may be found in the actions of the redistricting Commissioners with respect to Senate Districts 14 and 18 of the Commission Plan. Under the Com- mission Plan, black voting strength in for- mer Senate District 28 under the 1971 dis- trict boundaries has been fractured by the creation of Commission Senate District 14, the district in which white incumbent Sena- tor Jeremiah Joyce resides. Under 1970 census figures, District 28 was 73.8% white and 21.6% black. Under 1980 census fig- ures, the black population of District 28 is now 106,830, making the district approxi- mately 57.7% black and 39% white. To reach the ideal population for a Senate district, after the 1980 census, present Dis- trict 28 had to be increased by approxi- mately 8,000 persons. The Commission, in the course of adding the necessary 8,000 persons to District 28, removed 34,000 blacks from that District and added 42,000 whites, thereby redueing the black population percentage in the new- ly ereated Commission district ta 38%.76 The result of this shift in racial popula- tions, apparently to preserve Senator 75. Sec City of Port Arthur v. United States, SlT F.Supp. 987, 1022 (D.D.C.l98l) (adoption of an- nexation plan which significantly diminishes black voting strength evinces "invidious mo tive"); Hale County v. United Stat*,496 F.Supp. 1206, 1218 (D.D.C.1980) (retrogressive effect of changing to at-large voting system supports in- ference of discriminatory purpose). Cl. Beer v. united states, 425 u.s. 130, 141, 96 s.ct. 1357, 1363, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1976) (Voting tughts Act prohibits reapportionments that "would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minori- ties with respect to their effective exercise of the elecloral franchise."); City ol Rome v. United states, 446 U.S. 156, 185, 100 S.Cr. 1548, 1566, 64 L.E,d.2d 119 (1980) (same). 76. A comparison of racial population percent- ages in former legislative districts (created in lr- and was not necessarily indicative of an intent to discriminate against blacks gzo blacks. We believe, however, that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the requirements of incumbency are so closely intertwined with the need for racial dilution that an intent to maintain a safe, primarily white, district for Senator Joyce is virtually coterminous with a pu{pose to practice ra- cial discrimination. Cf, McMillan a. Es- cambia County, 638 F.zd 1239, 1245 (sth Ci.), cert. dismi.ssed, 453 U.S. 946, 102 s.ct. 17, 69 L.Ed.zd 1033 (1981), ("[T]he desire to retain one's incumbency zzoc- companied bg other evidence ought not to be equated with an intent to discriminate against blacks quablacks.") (emphasis sup plied).77 Similarly, black voting strength in for- mer Senate District 30 under the 1971 dis- trict boundaries has been diluted in the course of creating C,ommission Senate Dis- trict 18, the district in which white incum- bent Senator Glenn Dawson resides. Un- der 1970 census figures, District 30 was 73.2% white and 26.1% black. Under 1980 census figures District 30 would be 46% white, 45.1%'black and 8.9% Hispanic. The l97l) with percentages in the districts as re- drawn by the Commission is pertinent parlicu- larly because the drafters of the Commission's Chicago area districts testified rhat they attempt- ed to follow the l97l boundaries, readjusting lines where necessary to add or subtract popula- tion as mandated by the 1980 census. 7/. Other evidence of discriminatory intent is abundant-here, thus distinguishing the instant case fror.,:i McMiilan. As described belou', racial population shifts, purportedly desigrred to pre- serve white incumbencies, are evident in several other Chicago districts. Moreover, black popu- lation has been purposefully packed or frac- tured in certain distrrcts, resulting in a dilution of black voting strength. ' ts- rPAr- t Dot L€d- nber r the rule tto dn8- oD," rt to ome nah- t8b- rof | 8f- leci- mit- ;hat dat- Lrs. tm- tto iin- f,uI ral rt- [re rgo t<s Plc B) he a Itr 9, is a D trl. l)t ve td l# llt0 black population in District 80 is currently 85,997. To reach ideal popuLition for a Senate district, after the 1980 census, Dis, trict 30 had to for increased by approxi- mately 2,0fi) persons. In t}re course of adding the approximate- ly 2,000 persons necessary to bring District 80 to ideal population, the Commission in- creased the white population in what is now Commission Senate District 18 by nearly 30,000 and decreased the black pop ulation by over 40,000 persons. Under the Commission Plan, Commission Senate Dis- trict 18 will be approximately 60.4% white, 23.4% black and 16.2% Hispanic. The vot- ing strength of the 45,000 blacks left in C,ommission Senate District 18 has thus been dissipated. As explained earlier, we believe that these shifts in racial popula- tion, even if undertaken for the immediate purpose of providing a safe Senate seat for white Senator Dawson, are so closely linked to a desire to minimize black voting strength that they constitute strong evi- dence of a discriminatory purpose.?E Much of the black population that was formerly in the districts of Senators Joyce and Dawson has been moved into a new district, Commission Senate District 1?, which replaces former Senate District 29 under the 1971 redistricting plan. Former Senate District 29 was represented by black Senator Charles Chew; he now re- sides in Commission Senate District 16 to- gether with blaek Senator James Taylor, 7E. The Commission's efforts designed lo save the seats of white incumbents in Chicago, such as Senator Dawson, can only be construed as exercises in purposeful discrimination. Unlike most effons to save the seats of incumbent legislators, which can be explained by partisan political concerns, partisan politics does not ex- plain the Commission's actions in this case. Ir is undisputed that the vast majority, if not all, of the legislators likely to be elected from black areas in Chicago will be Democrats, regardless whether the candidate is white or black. Thus, the Commission's preference for a white incum- bent over a potentially black challenger seems clearly to reflect racial rather than partisan po- litical concerns. 79. Blacks comprise approximalely 85026 of the population in Commission Senate Districr 17. , 674 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT and there is no incumbent Senator in Die- trict l7 under the C.ommiqiion plan. Blacks are unnecessarily coneentrated in Commission Senate District l?,?e and the resultant "packing" of black votes wastee such votes. See Beer a. United Stotes, 4ZE U.S. 130, 154 n. 12, 96 S.Ct. 1BS?, lB?0 n. 12,47 L.Ed.2d 629 (19?G) (Marshall, J., dis- senting) ("Is it not as common for minori- ties to be gerrymandered into the same district as into separate ones?',); Neoett a. Sides, 571F.2d 209, 219 (sth Ci.tg,t8), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951, 100 S.Ct. 2916, 64 L.Ed.zd 807 (1980) ("compartmentalizing or fencing out a group" constitutes uneonsti- tutional gerrymandering). See also Note, Constitutional Challenges to Gerryman- ders, 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 84b, 846 and n. g (1978) ("concentrating a voting block into one district of nearly unanimous opiniotr . . . wastes" the votes of the supermajori- ty). This unnecessary packing represents intentional dilution of the black vote.8o Again we believe that the immediate purpose of these movements of racial popu- lations was primarily to preserve the in- cumbencies of two white Senators. But this process was so intimately intertwined with, and dependent on, racial discrimina- tion and dilution of minority voting strength that purposeful dilution has been clearly demonstrated in the construction of Commission Senate Districts 14, l? and 19.8r E0. An intent ro dilure is also evidenr from the gerrymandering that was necessary to creal.e this district. In the course of creating this un- usually-shaped district, the Commission dropped a "finger" from the Chicago ponions of the district lo reach into pan of the South Sub- urban Cook County area where a substantial blact population resides. While a small portion of this black suburban area was fractured off for inclusion in Senate District 17, the remain- ing portions of this black population center were further fractured betyeen two other sub- urban Senate districts. El. We recognize, of course, that under circum- stances other than those presented in lhis case, the adjustment of legislative districts to accom- modate incumbencies would nol necessarily re- presenl purposeful racial discrirnination. See Burns v. Richard.son,384 U.S. 73, 89 & n. 16, g6 t I ! I D ; f I BYBICKI.v. srArE 33;?,1,',*1?.S1?5:,o'srArE or ILL' 1111 onChicago,sl{estSidethcreisalsoDistrictl8.Thiscqrnmissiondraftingex. evidence of racial ,ot" oiotion primarily "r"ir. ".rrttetl in a furthet packing of - with respect to the uf""-f.- pop,riation in ui""t t"tirg strength. in Commiseion Sen-/ commission Senate District g, and also to a "t oitt l.i9, increasing the black popula- degree in senate oirti"t" s and 10. Black tion to 81.4% of' the district's total popula- , voting strength in to'-"' Senate District tion' Some of those black voters whose 18underthe19?lredistrictingplanhasvoteswerenotwastedbybeingpackedinto been fractured by the cieation "of commis- senate District I found that they were now sion Senate District 8, in which white-in- fractured from the rest of the black com- ;;il;a senator Phlip 'Ro;; ""'ia"'' un- fn:y J*#tir',:T:?,"il.-T'ffi:":: $::J,I',r"iT$rf"ffi; jfiHrT,::f *"inJ"i 'n""" i"ctuaea in iommission Under 1980 census figures, the black popu- House District 19 (72'7% black)' ]ation of District 18 is 68,?63 or approxl. The Commission also apparently succeed. mately 36.7% of tne nis#ct,s popot"ti*. ed in halting and reversing growing black To reach iaeal poputaiion for a Senate Dis- uotirg strength in. another Senate district trict under tt" co*mlr.ion plan, District repre-sented !l Yli* incumbents' Former 18hadtobeincreasedbyapproximatelys"nut.Districtlgunderthelg?0district 6,000 persons. In the-couise oi ir.r"ari.,g boundaries is represented by white senator former District 18 by the required 6'000 Edwa'a Nedza' In 1980' the population persons, the Commision aaaed nearly 56'- Ut""ftao*n in this district by race was 26% 000 whites to wt ai it now Commission *t'it"' ssZ black and 39% Hispanic' The Senate District S, "oa '"*o;ed over 51'000 corespo"ding Commission Senate District blacks.8z Commission S"'"tt District 8 is 6' in which wirite Se'nators Nezda and Ste- nowabout86%white,9%blackandS%ve'Nast'nowlive'hasanincreasedwhite Hispanic.s3 Ti,e ut"ci-'pipot"iio'*'no'ua population ': ^4'y" with a reduced black from former senate iiiliiJrs did not' of iopot'ti* of 24% and an Hispanit popula- course, disappear into li'it' "l'' The Com- tion of 29% ' missionhadtomaa,,ewdistrictfortheseTheCommissionpointswithsomepride blacks, and they tounJ.uct a district close to commission senate District 10, a "major- by-already f,""rify iopofut"a UV Ufa,cfs' ity minority" district e in which white in- Former Senate Oi.t.iii'Zf, represented by cumbent Slnator John D'Arco resides' as black senatp, prrr""n -coriir., contained, evidence that the commission did not dilute under the 1gg0 census, a black majority of minority voting strength on the west side' 7g%. Thecommission'redrew this district, Althoulh the commission did not substan- now denomirat a sJnut" District 9 under tially Jter either the population percent- theCommissionPlan,byincludingsomeof"g"totthe-boundariesofthisdistriet'the the blacks "".nouuJ',iio* for-", Senate c-om*isrior's actions with respect to Dis- Commission Senate District 8 by asserting thal t-fr"* ttiftt were made to comply-with the re- ;;:;;i ih" village of oak Park that it not be fractured among two or more districts (as in the ;;r;;. ; his dissent, Judge Gr-adv .apparentlv ....ptt drfendants' explanation lor the conllgu- .riir'" "f Senate District 18' Even if this expla- ""ii"" it to be accepted, we do not believe it is ;di;t.* to justifv ihe serious dilution of black "oiing .,."tg,h. Such selective redistricting *o"iE upp"ui to honor municipal interests in p*f...nt. to racial vote dilution claims in a way which we cannot accePt' 84. Commission Senate District l0 is 20026 white' 44% black and 35% HisPanic' I I : 't 3 D n i- I ? t- F t il t- I t T t I F F ! r d b I > r t- t- S.ct. 1286, 1295 & n. 16, 16 L'Ed'2d 375 (1966);'iriiii" ". Escambia Countv' 638 F'11 -17'3--al ;t;; i;ih cir.\, cerr. dbmissed,4s3 u's' e46' toz S.Ct. 17, 6s L-Ed.2d 1033 (1981)' 82. This shift of blacks out of former Senate "ti.i.i", ia uppu..ntly amounted to the removal ;i;;.t of the btack population from the south- .."'p* .fifr"i s""ui" iistrict' Thus' this shift oi 6r".t population and its replacement by whites amounted to dilution to the extenl oI ;;;;t-";; House district (since the blacks were .plit b",*."., Contrnis'ion districls)' 83. Defendants att('i:lr' r to cxplain the popula- --iion ,f,ittt in f r';l '' \r ilale District l8 and i. I 6 ttlz trict l0 do not neceasarily "onbrd,", ,h" pattcrn of purposeful votc dilution at the ' expense of black eitizens. The Commis- sion's own witnesses readily admitted that it was unlikely that a black or Hispanic would be slated by the regular Democratic organization in this district. Henee, it is improbable that a black or Hispanic candi- date could win an election against the white incumbent even though whites account for only 20% of the district's popu- lation. The split "majority minority" sim- ply could not be expeeted to elect a candi- date from within its own ranks against an organization-backed white ineumbent.ss Thus, 158,129 of the approximately 300,- 000 blacks residing in Chicago's West Side have been packed into Commission Senate Distriet 9 consisting of two concentrated Commission House Districts 1? and 18. The remaining population has been frac- tured, primarily among Commission House Districts 11, 15 and 19. Under thb Com- mission Plan, therefore, West Side blacks will have a decisive majority only in Senate Commission District 9 from which they will presumably be able to elect a Senator of their choice. They will have deeisive ma- jorities only in House Districts 17, 18 and 19 from which they will presumably be able to elect Representatives of their choice. The net effect of these racial population changes has been the purposeful dilution of the black voting strength on the West Side by at least one House District.86 3. Election Districts and Racially Segregated Housing Patterrts Plaintiffs also argue strenuously that the boundary lines for Commission House Dis- tricts 1? and 18 on the West Side and Commission House Districts 23, U,25,31, 33 and 34 on the South Side trace in great E5. Although we have clearly not included this Senate district among those where blacks are accorded a meaningful opportunity to elecl a candidate of their choice, we retain the hope thal under changed political circumstances, it could provide an opportunity for a minorily' candidale. E6. As noted previously, we find insufficient an apparent explanation that the various popul:, tion shifts in the South and West Side disrrii:ts 6?4 FEDERAL SUPPLEMiNT measure the boundaries of t}re heavy black concentrations in Chicago. They'argue, iz- ter alia, that these lines create a racially- defined "wall" around the residentially-aeg- regated black communities in Chicago, thereby appearing to confer an official gov- ernmental sanction on the residential racial segregation which exists in Chicago. At the outset, we reject plaintiffs sug- gestion that any consideration of racial fac- tors in the districting process automatically constitutes invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court in United Jewish Organizations, Inc. o. Carey,430 U.S. 144,97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977) ("UJO ") explicitly held that consideration of race in legislative ap- portionment did not constitute a per se violation of either the Fourteenth or the Fifteenth Amendment. In UJO, a group of Hasidic Jews challenged a New York reap- portiohment plan which split the Hasidic community among several state legislative districts, on the ground that racial consid- erations played a major role in the plan's formulation and adoption. In upholding the p)an, the Supreme Court stated: Contrary to petitioners' first argument, neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment mandates any per se rule against using racial factors in districting and apportionment. Nor is petitioners' second argument valid. The permissible use of raeial eriteria is not confined to elim.inating the effects of past discrimi- n.atory districting or apportionment. 430 U.S. at 161, 97 S.Ct. at 100? (emphasis supplied). Although the Court's opinion in UJO re- lied in part on the fact that the New York plan was adopted in order to comply with the nondilution requirements of Section 5 were effected to preserve i?rcumbents' seats in the General Assembly. Defendants have not indicated hou' the purpose to preserve incum- bencies can be unraveled from simple racial motives. Thus, we hold that the defendants have not discharged their burden of proof under Mt. Healthy of demonstrating that similar dis- trict lines u'ould har,e been drawn absent the purposc to ciilutc thc black vote. /a RYBICKI v. -of the 1965 Voting kights Act, at least five Justices agrced that the challenged redis- trictingalan, and the explicit consideration of race it embodied, would be valid "[w]hether or not the plan was authorized by or was in compliance with 5 5 of the Voting Rights Act." 430 U.S. at 165, 97 S.Ct. at 1009 (Opinion of White, J., joined by Stevens, J. and Rehnquist, J.). See also 430 U.S. at 1?9, 9? S.Ct. at 101&-17 (Stew- art, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). As Justice Whit€ ex- plained: It is true that New York deliberately increased the nonwhite majorities in cer- tain districts in order to enhance the op portunity for election of nonwhite repre- sentatives from those districts. Never- theless, there was no fencing out of the white population from participation in the political processes of the county, and the plan did not minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength. 430 U.S. at 165, 9? S.Ct. at 1010. Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion invoked a similar rationale: The petitioners' contention is essentially that racial awareness in legislative reap- portionment is unconstitutional per se' Acceptance of their position would mark an egregious departure from the way this Court has in the past analyzed the constitutionality of claimed discrimina- tion in dealing u'ith the elective franchise on the basis of race. The petitioners have made no showing that a racial criterion was used as a basis for denying them their right to vote, in contravention of the Fifteenth Amend- ment.... TheY have made no showing E?. The 65% figure is a general guideline *'hich has been used by the Department of Justice' reapportionment experts and the courts as a ..iir.. of the minority population in a district needed for minority voters to have a meaningful opporrunity to elect a candidate of their choice' Si Uitstsitppi t'. United States, 49O F'Supp 569 (n.O.C.tSZSl, afl'd' a44 U.S. 1050, l0o S'Ct' 994, 62 L.Ed.zd 739 (1980). The 650lo guideline' which the Supreme Coun characterized as "rea- sonable" in llnited lewbh Organizations' lnc' v' Carey,43O U.S. 144, 164, 97 S.Ct' 996, 1009, 5l L.Ed.2d 229 (1977), takes into account the younger median population age and the lower srfi; BD.'oF ELEcnoNS oF srATE oF ILL. llf S Clt r. 37a FSuPP. lllt2 (19&t) i# IF t t t I I I I I that the redistricting scheme sr88 em- ployed as part of a-"contrivance to segre gate"; to minimize or sancel out the vot-, ing strength of a minority class or inter' est; or otherqrise to impair or burden the opportunity of affected persons to partic- ' ipate in the political Process. 430 U.S. at 179, 9? S.Ct. at 1017. The Supreme Court's analYsis in UJO indicates that plaintiffs here must do more than show that racial considerations have played some role in the drawing of voting lines on the South Side. In addition, they must demonstrate that the state used its redistricting authority as part of a "contri- vance to segregate" or that the challenged line or lines were designed to minimize or dilute the voting strength of minority vot- ers. With respect to the Crosby plaintiffs' aote dilutiot claims (which are the pri- mary claims advanced in this case), the most relevant district lines are the lines drawn along the western edge of areas that are 85% or more percent black on the South Side of Chicago. The challenged South Side district lines are pertinent here insofar as they arguably contribute to the "packing" of the black population' Plain- tiffs' contention is that black voters are "packed" into South Side Senate and House districts, thus maintaining a situation where blacks eomprise a very high percent- age of the population in a number of these districts. According to the "packing" theo ry, black votes are "wasted" to the extent that blaek population percentages greatly exceed the percentage-suggested to be 657nei needed in voting districts to elect voter registration and turnout of minority citi- zens. Testimonf in the instant case established that Representaiive Madigan and his staff were made awar[ of the 650/6 guideline by Mr' Brace, their consultant, during the summer of 1981' (Tr. ar 1957). At trial, witnesses for both sides referred approvingly to the 5596 figure' (Tsui, Tr. at 26-27; Neu'house, Tr. at 623; Hofeller, Tr. at 403-O4; Brace, Tr' at 195G57)' More' over, defendants'experl testified that the 6570 guideline had been used in statc reapportion- ment and redistricting. (Bracc Tr' al 1957)' The 6596 standard u'as also rcfc;'l.td t() in tlte -1114 black candidates. Thus, the argumenf is that if the South Side district linqp did not correspond so closely to black tesidential patterns, substantial white populations from such areas aB Bridgeport, Canary- ville, Marquette Park and Marquette Man- or could be included as minorities in the black-controlled districts, thereby increas- ing the power of black votes. The Coali- tion Plan presented by the plaintiffs illus- trates this potential by creating more South Side districts in which there is a substantial white minority but where the black percentage exceeds 657*the per- centage presumed adequate for control. Plaintiffs therefore argue that the South Side district lines must be redrawn in order to alleviate "packing" and its eoncomitant vote dilution and, in effect, to increase black voting power by including a more surbstantial white population base in majori- ty black districts. As we have indicated, plaintiffs in this case must demonstrate purposeful vote di- Iution in order to prevail. City of Mobile a. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1519, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980). Moreover, we must be convinced, under the Mt. Healthy standard, that different electoral boundary lines would have been drawn in the absence of a discriminatory purpose. We find that the evidence before us fails to establish a sub- recent opinion of the three-judge court in In re Illinois Congr*sional Disticts Reapportionment Casas, No. 8l C 1395, slip op. at l9 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 23, 1981), a/f'd sub nom. McClory y. Otto, 454 u.s. 1130, 102 s.ct. 985, 71 L.Ed.2d 284 0982). EE. Representative Madigan testified: O. [By Mr. Harte] Former District 20 was the first district drawn[?] A. [By Rep. Madigan] The next district drawn*was former*District 22. * * I was also concerned that the 22nd District not move west because, if it did, it u'ould mean that it would be a majority black dis- trict with black legislators expected to repre- sent the communilies of Bridgeport and Cana- ryville. I have lived in Chicago all of my life. I know of my knou,ledge that there are very strong racial attitudes in the communities of Bridgeport and Canary.ryille and lhat ir would not be in mv opinion a u'ise judgment lcr / 6VI FEDERAL EUPPLEMENT stantial purpose on the part of the defend- ants to dilute the black vote on the South Side through "packing". Cf.. Canton ' Branch, N.A.A.C.P. u. City of Cdnton, 412 F.Supp. 859, 868 (S.D.Miss.1978). Even had such a purpose been established, more- over, we think that defendants have dem- onstrated that the South Side districts would have been drawn as they were even absent any motive to dilute black voting strength. See Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education o. Doyle, 42g u.s. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 4?1 (19?7). Defendants explain the congruence of electoral and racial boundaries on bases other than those involving purposeful vote dilution. For example, Representative Mi- chael Madigan, who drew the districts, tes- tified that he actively considered the inter- ests of black Representatives in fashioning the challenged South Side boundaries.8s In addition, a number of black South Side legislators testified that the inclusion of neighboring white areas in their districts would place them in political peril and might lead to the nomination of a white in the Democratic primary. Success in the Democratic primary is tantamount to elec- tion in both the predominantly black and the predominantly white districts in this area.8e Some of these black legislators cause this majority black district to include parts of these lwo communities. Therefore- Q. Excuse me. Have you consulted u'ith the black legisla- tors in that regard also? A. Yes, I had, and, in particular, with regard to this district; this is the district that had been represented by former Representative Davis, who at this time was serving as a mem- ber of the reapportionment commission. He and I specifically discussed the abilitS, of a black representative to represent the people of Bridgeport. And it was his judgment that it would not be wise to have a majority black district include part of Bridgeport. Tr. at 1376-78 . 89. On the West Side, the Commission has put white voters from census tracts in Cicero into the heavily black Commission House Districts 17 and 18. The Crosby plaintiffs contend this is inconsistenl with the Commission's failure or refusal to put somewhat similar u'hite census tracts into the South Side districts. Although **8k,.. l+ lb )r Jz lo 5 L lr p ts DI E lr rf tr b li F F g D e t ; I 0 I F i I I RYBICKI V. STAm BD. OT' ELECUONS OF STATE OF ILL. Clrc u 57{ FSupp. lflU (I9t2) elso t€stified to the-difficulty or impossibili- U.S. 915, 101 S.Ct., 339, 66 L.Ed.zd f62 ty of tlreir campaigiring effectively in adja- (1980), opinion reinstatcd., 664 F.2d f069 cent white neighborhoods, and some testi- (?th Cir.l981). Obviously, this court can-- fied th'at they did not believe they could not and does not condone racial animosity' effectively represent white voters in adja- or ill-feeling between the races on the cent areas.il The record also contains evi- South Side of Chicago. But we think it our dence of racial animosity in white areas obligation to confine ttie present inquiries such as Bridgeport and Canaryville, which to the issues of voting dilution which are are adjacent to the "wall" separating black the basis of the complaint in this case. It and white residential areas on the South is true that the "packing" of black votes on Side. Some of these reasons, of course, recog- nize the existence of racial animus or ill- feeling as a factor deterring the inclusion of white areas in highly-concentrated black districts. But such recognition by no means establishes a purpose to dilute the black vote. Cf. Johnson o. Board of Edu' cation of Chicago, 604 F.2d 504 (?th Cir. 1979), aarated for possible mootness, 449 we do nol regard the argument as crucial, we note that the white Cicero voters are apparently predominantly Republican and, therefore, pre' sumably incapable of winning control of a pre- dominantly black district with a white candi- date in the Democratic primary. 90. Black Representative Ethel Alexander testi' fied: Q. [Bv Mr. Harte] What about the areas of Bridgeport, Canaryville, Marquette Park and Mount Greenwood, Beverly, and here in He- gewisch, do those give you concern as to risks that could be entertained by black legislators running in that area? A. [By Rep. Alexander] There would defi- nitely be some risk for any black candidate that would be running in lhose areas. Q. Is it, in your judgment, a legitimate con- cern for persons drawing the line to remove that risk? A. I would hope so, yes. Q. And you are familiar, are you not with the ecological boundary, or the differences in the communities, the white community, say, in Bridgeport and the black community in the east, Canaryville, and the rest of these, are you no1? A. Yes, I am. Q. And would, in your judgment, there be an antagonism which a white or black legislator would have to deal with in those communi- ties? A. Yes, there would be. A black legislator running in that kind of a district, nine times out of 10, or a hundred per cent, would not even have an opportunil;- to campaign in that area. He jusl wouldn't cross over and presenl himself as a candidate in thosc kintis of areas. ii.',t,: - lt15 the South Side in highly concentrated black areas tends to "waste" the black vote. But it is also true that considerably greater dilution of the black vote could presumably have been achieved by "fracturing" parts of the black areas into minority fragments attached to neighboring white majority dis- tricts, so that the vot€rs in these fragments would lose the opportunity to elect a candi- date of their choice.e' It would be too volatile; conditions that his- torically have been there have been shown with regards to those areas. Tt. at 1026-27. Similarly, Black Representative Sylvester Rhem testified: O. [By Mr. Harre] Is there a concern with you, Representative Rhem, as to winning in a primary in thal area? A. [By Rep. Rhem] It is my opinion that I would not be able to win. I feel that the districts hcre, the Bridgeport people vote as a block. The problems are different than what the blacks are, and I just could nol communi- cate. Q. There would be antagonism between the two?t A. In my opinion, yes. Q. If you happened to be elected, would you be able to s€n'e in your judgmenl the white constituencv in that area? A. I would do my best. I would say that there would be some hostil- ity toward me, but if I was fortunate enough to u'in, I would do the best that I can. Q. Were your views considered in the redis- tricting process by the leadership? A. Yes. Tr. at 106l-62. &e also Tr. at 1621-28 (testimo- ny of Corn&l Davis). 9t. Moreover, although not directly relevanl here, it is arguable that the inclusion of areas such as Bridgeport and Canaryville in highly concentrated black voting districts might consti- ture objectionable "fracturing" of the white vote. See United Jewbh Organizatiotts, Inc. v. Carey, 430 ti.S 144, 97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.E,d.2d 229 (197 t- J. i.-.gE*.-.- a- 674 FEDERAL SUPPLEMEI{Ttr16 At certain points in this litigation, plain- tiffs have suggested that thqErawing of district boundaries which track raeially segT regated housing pgtterns tends to stigma- tize racial minorities and to infringe upon the associational rights of minority voters. However, the reeord in this case is barren of any indication that black voters on the South Side are, or feel themselves to be, stigmatized by the challenged electoral boundaries, or that such voters would pre- fer to be associated, for voting purposes, with predominantly white neighborhoods such as Bridgeport and Canaryville. In- deed, the only testimony offered at trial concerning the allegedly stigmatizing ef- fects of South Side voting distriets was the statement of Representative Carol Mose- ley-Braun, a black legislator representing portions of Hyde Park and the South Side lakefront.e2 While we acknowledge the im- portance of Representative Braun's con- cerns, and have carefully considered her testimony, we believe that in the particular -context of redistricting, the desirability of perfectly integrated voting districts must be balanced against the ability of blacks 9!. Representative Braun testified in part as fol- lows: Q. [By Mr. Sullivan] Do you have any com- ments that distinguish between the west and the south sides of Chicago on the original map? A. [By Representative Braun] On the south side the most stunning aspect, in my opinion, of that map is the wall that it draws around the black community. It segregales the black community from the rest of Chicago. Q. Mrs. Braun, in the testimony ihut hu, been given in the coun there has been justifi cation by several witnesses for reliance on the Commission map on the grounds that there is racial tension in some of these areas. Have you heard that testimony? A. I have. Q. Do you wish to comment on that point to the Court? A. The history of this country has been marked by racial tension. It is something that people who are fair-minded, who believe in democracy, who believe in integration, have to get around. There was racial tension in the South when the desegregation of the buses occurred, desegregation of the lunch counters and of the schools. There is still and otler minority grcups to elect candi- dates of their choice to the relevant politi- cal bodies. In this regard, rryE note that at-large voting systems, which theoretieally offer the maximum degree of integration, or "color-blindness," are generally regard- ed as disadvantageous to minorities and have been repeatedly attacked on the ground that they unconstitutionally dilute black voting strength.es Our point here is not that racial polarization and stigma are unimportant concerns, but merely that in the particular context of legislative reap portionment, a purely color-blind (or inte- grationist) approach is likely to impede rather than enhance minority participation and effectiveness in the political process. There is thus little or no direct evidence in the reeord that the alleged South Side "wall" was drawn for the purpose of dilut- ing black voting strength. Certainly, we find it more difficult ta infer such a pur- pose from the existence of the line than to infer such a purpose (as we have above) from the manipulation of racial populations in Commission Senate Districts 9, 14, 77 racial tension. There is still racial tension in Chicago. But it seems to me that is a very poor reason to segregate people and to have an official imprimatur on the creation of a legislative ghetto in Chicago, and that is what this map, in my opinion, does. Tr. at 2O58, 2062. Plaintiffs' other witnesses, including Senator Richard Newhouse, testified in general about the separation of black and whire communities, indicating their preference for a redistricting plan that would include more white areas in majority black districts. Se€ Tr. at 64647, 650-52, 666-75 (remarks of Sen. Newhouse). 93. See, e.9., Cily o/ Mobile v. Bolden,446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1519, 64 L.Ed.2d a7 (1980); Wite v. Regester,4l2 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332,37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis,4O3 U.S' 124, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971); Iadse v. Button,639 F.2d 1358 (sth Cir.l98l), prob. iuris. noted, 454 U.S. 811, 102 $.Ct. 86, 70 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981); McMillan v. Escambia County,638 F.2d 1239 (sth Cir.), cert. dbmbsed,453 U.S. 946, lO2 S.Ct. 17, 69 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1981); Aranda v. Van Sickle, &O F.2d 1267 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951, 100 S.Ct. 2916, 64 L.Ed.2d 808 (1980). &e generally Bonaphel, Minoity Chal- lenges to At-Large Electiotts: The Dilution hob' lem, l0 Ga.L.Rev.353 (1976). --rlga-,;4:* *. / RYBICKI v. STATE lit' 'r ' ; ,i PD. OF ELECTIONS OF STATE OF ILL. Crrc r. 5?a FSuPD. l(f,2 tl9E2) lllT end 18.9r Moreover, it seems clear to us In addition to their vote dilution argu- that the challenged ti'stricts would have ment, we understand plaintiffs to contend been drawn as they were withou; any ref- that the South Side diqtrict lines represent erence to a purpose to dilute the black vote illegal racial gerrymandering of the sort even if such a purpose were presumed or con-demned in-Gomillion o. Light1oot, ZOa / proven. Nothing is before us to suggest U.S.339,81 S.Ct. l25,5L.Ed.zd 1f0 (1960)' it "t tt " challenged electoral boundaries We recognize that allegations of racial ger- &re, in and of themselves, invidiously dis- rymandering present a suspect circum- criminatory. Apart from questions of dilu- stance requiring close judicial scrutiny, and tion and to frt "* this record discloses, o that such gerrymandering, to the extent it uote cast on the predominantty black exists, carries strong connotations of invidi- South Side is precisety equal in weight to ous racial discrimination. As the Supreme one cast in Bridgeport. Court has repeatedly indicated, however, We also note that any adverse impaet of the gravamen of a racial gerrymandering the South Side district lines from the point claim is the deliberate "fencing out" of a of view of voting dilution would necessarily racial or ethnic minority-that is' the exclu- be felt by the black community as a whole sion or "canceling out" of such group's in the City of Chicago as a result of the political influence in the relevant govern- "wasting" of votes which would otherwise mental unit' No such exclusionary pur- be available to form additional black major- pose or effect has been demonstrated in ity districts. Such a dilutive effect is thus the instant case' not specific to blacks living near the al- Gomillion a. Lightfuot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 leged "wall," who in fact have the opportu- S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960) presents the nily to vote for and elect candidates of paradigmatic example of unconstitutional their choice. Moreover, as suggested racial gerrymandering. ln Gomillion, Lhe above, a more marked dilutive effect on the Alabama legislature had redrawn the black vote would have been achieved by boundaries of the City of Tuskegee, alter- running fingers from the whiLe communi- ing its shape from a square to a "strangely ties to ihe West into the concentrated black irregular twenty-eight-sided figure'" 364 area so as to fracture the black vote and, in U.S. at 341. Plaintiffs in Gomillion al' effect, cancel it out in majority white dis- leged that the redefined municipal bounda- tricts. Such a configuration would no ries eliminated all but four or five of the doubt suggest purposeful dilution of the city's 400 black voters without eliminating black vote much more clearly than the ex- a single white voter. The Supreme Court istence of a line which tracks, in part, the held that plaintiffs' allegations, if proven, diyision between predominantly black and clearly established invidious racial discrimi- predominantly white communities.es nation under the Fifteenth Amendment'$ 9f. Comparable lines, conforming at least in part to the boundaries of heary black concentra- tions, have existed for many years antedating the present redistricting' 95. Judge Grady, in finding the South Side dis- tricl lines unconstitutional per se' prescribes as a "remedy" the drawing of a whole new Chicago map along "color-blind" lines. Since any hu' ma-n redislricter is well aware of the racial concentrations in the City, we can only suppose that a racially "neutral" map would have to be constructed bl' a computer. We have grave doubts as to whether such a "color-blind" map would be accepted as neutral bl anv of the parties to this lawsuit. Moreover, it seems to us thal anl i'orm of "neutral" construction of compact dl:;r r;ts *'ill, as a matter of mathematical probability, leave the black South Side in just as "packed" a condi- tion as exists under the Commission Plan. For the electoral boundaries on the South Side did not "create" the heavy black voting concentra- tions; these lines merely stand in the way of affirmative compensation for highly concentrat- ed black populations through the inclusion of neighboring white areas in the black-controlled districts. ! 96. Justice Whittaker, in a concurring opinion, indicated that he would rest the Court's decision not on the Fifteenth Amendment but on the Equal Protection CIause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Citing Brown v. Board ol Educa' tion, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (195a), and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. l, 78 S'Ct. , 6?4 FEDEBALSUPPLEMENT @* t i lllS The Supreme Court s holding relied heavily gn tL-" exclusionary aspeclpT Alabama,s boundary rredrawing scheme:- -t- The result of the Act is to deprive the _N"g, petition6rs diseriminatorily of tf," benefits of residence in Tuskegee, inctua- ing, inter alia, the right to *t i, ,"- nicipal elections. - These allegations, if proven would abundantly establish that Act 140 was not an ordinary geographic redistricting measure even within familiar abuses of gerrymandering. If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be irre- sistible, tantamount for all practical pur- poses to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislature is solely concerneil urith segregating white and colored. aot_ e.rs by feneing Negro citizens out of town so as to depriae them of theii pre-eristing munieipal aote. casg of ghettoizing the Island of lflanhat_ tan'Bo as 'to create a white qiingressionat district and a non-white CongiesJion"f iir-triict.'" 376 U.S. at 54, g4 S.Ct. at eOa. Despite these allegations, and despite the prcsentation of considerable evidence indi_ cating that racial factons trad played soml rnole in the redistrieting process, both the threejudge district court and the SupremJ C,ourt_ rejected plaintiffs' constitutional alltack.r The Supreme Court, in its opinion. expressly contrasted the invidious-raciai gerrymandering at issue in Gomillion a.Ligltfoot, and emphasized the lack of an exclusionary motive behind the New yoit< state redistricting scheme: - We accept the District Court's finding that appellants have not shown that thE challenged part of the New york Aci was the product of a state contrivance to segregate on the basis of race or place of origin. That finding was cruciai to ap pellants' case ,rs they presented it, and for that reason their challenge cannot be sustained. 364 U.S. at B4t, 81 S.Ct. at t}l (emphasis supplied). ^ \t \riOht o. Rockefeilea 8?6 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 603, t1 L.Ed.zd 512 (1964), plaintiffs also alleged racial gerrymandering in the drawing of election districts. In th*eir com_ plaint, the Wright plaintiffs claimed that a N."y. I:r.\ state reapportionment statute, which divided Manhattan into four eleetorai districts, violated the Fourteenth and Fif_ P"rlh Amendments by ,.establish[ing] ina- tional, discriminatory and unequal Colr-g"e._ sional Districts in the County of Ne* ?o.t and ftyl segregat{ingl eligible voters by :1""^ 1nd place of origin.,, 8Z6 U.S. at 5i, 84 S.Ct. at 604. Arguing before a three- jud_ge district eourt, counsel for plaintiffs in Wright further contended that ihe chal- lenged redistricting scheme presented ,, ,a 376 U.S. at 58, 84 S.Ct. at 606. The Supreme Court,s decision in United !!*Xn Organizations, Inc. a. Carey, 480 u.s. 144, 9? S.Ct. ee6, 51 t.na.ii zzi (1977), also underscores the element of ex_ clusion or "caneeling out,' naaurr"ry to support a claim of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. The C,ourt in UJO held that a redistrieting body may properly take raee into aceount so long as its redistricting plan does not "slur or stigma[ti ref,, an] raeial group, and does not ,,fence out,' "racial or ethnic group from the political process, or "minimize or unfairly cancel o-ut" that group's voting strengih. 480 U.S. at t6S, 9? S.Ct. at 1009_10.et Similar_ l.+01, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 095g), Jusiice Whittaker srar- tionment scheme. &e Wright,376 U.S. at 5g, g4. ed rhat Atabama,s purpose .bJ .f.;;i"s N;; scr. .r eoe .il, gilrityBickerstaff, a*ppor,-crtrzens our of' Tuskegee poritics wi tan-ta. ,:::y"":.e iri"'-i$iorures: A Guide ror thefi.li !1Hi1{l,,'r"i_,r"j.segregation. 364 u.s. te80\, 34 s*.r-j. rrri, Zaz aeso).. e7.. rt mav have been significanr in-wrishr rhat "irrftf*#i:':x.";!r,i,'i.i.r3.3*;r11"#btack congressman Adim crayon p;;ii, ;; s.ct. 2916, u'i.ad.li"8o7 (1980) (unconstitu_represented the allegedly segregared Isrh con_ rional racial g...y;;;:, infringes right ro ef.gressional Disrricr in New.yorf- cir1, *ar pe, r".rir" J..roi"i p".ii.ii",i", ,,bv compartmen_mitted to intcrvene as a .det'endan -rupp"ii.g talizing ., r"r.*[ .ri "'group..or ,,by.sricing upthe constitutionalitl' of tt.' ctr.tt.ng_J'upp",l a compacr minoriry,,); Robtn.sott r. Commission. siifJftr- p N P F lc Ft E e t- I, il t I t RYBICKI V. STATb BD. OF ELEC"IONS OF STATE OF ILL. tl19 ty, n Gaffuey ts. c4!nminss,nrrt;.';;:";T,ffiize or canoer out brack voting 93 S.Ct. 232L, 37 L.Ed.2d 298,(1973), the strength. : supreme c'ourt recognized that redistrict- Moreover, we believe there is a finda-/ing plans may be vulnerable to constitu- *::;:;;^:::^- ;.^:-::^:_ l:^-^r 6*6^L ,,," *^,^,'].'--:^-,;^;"_:..: mental tenslon between plaintiffs' apparent;ffiffi;#"d# have been fenced out of the political proc- _^; held that racial bloc voting-the idea that black vot- ess,,, 412 U.S. at ?54, 93 S.Ct. at 2332, or if go's south side' and the voting dilution ' district Iines have been used "to minimize theory which lies at the heart of plaintiffs' or cancel out the voting strength of racial constitutional challenge in the instant case' or political elements of th" uoting popula- cf' whitcomb tt' chattis, 403 u's' L24, 156 tion.,, 412 U.S. at 7BS,98 S.Ct. it-ZeZZ n. 34, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1875 n. 34, 29 L.Ed.2d (quoting Fortson p. Dorsey, B?9 U.S. 4BB, 363 (19?1). Voting dilution claims, includ- nSS, A5 S.Ct. 4g8, b01, 18 L.Ed.2d 401 ing this one, are premised at least in part (1965). Conversely, the Gaffney Cnurt on .tl:.frankly race consciols theory of I I t I : [C]ourts have [no] constitutional warrant ers will vote overwhelmingly for black can- tolnvalidate "it"L plan, otherwise with- didates while white voters will support non- in tolerable population limits, because it minority candidates' Indeed, the main fo undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate cus of the crosby plaintiffs' claims here is the political strength of any group or that there have been intentional efforts to party, but to recognize it and, through minimize the impact of black bloc voting. districting, provide a rough sort of pro- We thus find it difficult to accept plain- portional representation in the legislative tiffs' argument that the drawing of district halls of the State. lines which track, in some measure, the 412 U.S. at754,93 S.Ct. at2332. See also boundaries of raciallv identified communi- United Jewish Organizatiow, Inc. u. Car- ties is tantamount to government spon- ey, 430 U.S. at 168, 97 S.Ct. at 1011 sored segregation. The immediate effect We believe that the instant case presents of the alleged districting "wall" in the in- a situation much more akin to that in stant case is that black voters residing in Wright and tlJO than to the situation in the vicinity of the wall will have the oppor- Gomitlion u. Lightfuot. Unlike the bound- tunity to vote for and elect candidates of ary adjustment in Gomillion, the South their choice-precisely the opportunity Side redistricting at issue here was not sought in this case. Absent a showing of designed to "fence out" blacks or to impede racial vote dilution or the fencing out of their participation in Chicago politics. Nor minorit.v voters, we do not believe black do the challenged district lines "slur or voters are being denied equal protection stigmatize" a racial minority. Moreover, merely because their districts contain few as was the case in Wright a. Rockefeller, white residents who may share the oppor- black politicians representing the affected tunity to vote for the same legislative can- districts have testified in support of the didates. As we emphasized earlier, under challenged district lines and have ex- the Commission Plan, a vote cast on the pressed their discomfort with plaintiffs' black South Side has precisely the same proposed alternatives. See note 90 supra. weight as a vote cast in Bridgeport. We do Under these circumstances, we do not be- not foreclose the possibility that under Iieve that the South Side redistricting rep some circumitance's, the dra*'ing of elec- resents either an unconstitutional racial tion district lines which track racially seg- gerrymander or an impermissible attempt regated housing patterns could amount to ers Court,505 F.2d 674,679 (5th Cir.1974) (ra- cial gerrymander found where precinct lines were drau,n so as to fragment an otherwise "compact and cohesive" black voting communi- t1'); Cotsr'ns v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 841 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,409 U.S. 893, 93 S.Ct. 85, 34 L.Ed.2d 181 (1972) (members of racial and ethnic groups constitutionally pro. tected from purposeful maneuvers to deprive them of political effectiveness). \t.*;; t 1120 state imposed segregation'and thus onsti- tute invidious discrimination undEr the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gomillion a. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.zd 1r0 (1960); Wright o. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52,5H,2,84 S.Ct. 603, 60H8, 11 L.Ed.zd 512 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting). We merely hold that such circumstances have not been demonstrated in the instant case.s 4. Other Euidence of Racial Discrirnination The Crosby plaintiffs presented other, more general, evidence which they allege demonstrates a discriminatory purpose on the part of the Commission. We have con- sidered this evidence, as summarized be- low, but we do not find it dispositive in resolving the issues presented in this case. We think, however, that it is at least con- sistent with our findings and with the rem- edies we have provided. First, the plaintiffs directed the court's attention to their alternative Coalition Plan. They suggest that the assertedly simple, compact districts of the Coalition PIan pro- vide a more meaningful opportunity for black and Hispanic voters to elect candi- dates of their choice than the "strange configurations" charaeteristic of districts in the Commission Plan. Although the exist- ence of alternative patterns of redistricting does not, standing alone, support an infer- ence of discriminatory purpose, the Coali- tion Plan does demonstrate the feasibility of avoiding retrogression of black voting strength through the creation of additional 99. Judge Grady's dissent fundamentally mis- characterizes the thrust of our analysis. Our opinion does not sanction state-imposed segre- gation nor does it even remotely adopt some "separate but better ofl'theory noted by Justice Douglas in dissent in Wright r'. Rockefeller. The portions of our opinion that Judge Grady quotes prominently merely point out the obvious ten- sion (if not contradiction) between recognizing claims based on the dilution of racial bloc vot- ing, on the one hand, and proposing a "color- blind" redistricting process on the other. Like the Supreme Court in Wright, we have specif- ically held that the South Side voting districts are nol "the product of a state contrivance to segtregale." 376 U.S. at 58, 84 S.Ct. al 606. Given this hr,lding. the post-Brort'n segregation 574 FEDERAL SUPPTEMENT voting districts in which blacks will have a meaningful opportunity to elect a candidate of'their choice. The Coalition Plan is thus of some, albeit limited, probative value in establishing purposeful dilution of black voting strength in at least some of the Commission's districts. Cl Cou.sins a. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.zd 830, 84H4 (?th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893, 93 S.Ct. 85, 34 L.Ed.2d 181 (19?2). Plaintiffs also contend that the drafters' use of anticipated ward boundaries in the City of Chicago, which are alleged to be diseriminatory, tend to establish intentional racial discrimination. Since ward bounda- ries have not been adjudicated to be dis- criminatory, we cannot conclude that the relation of legislative lines to ward lines is any more than marginally relevant to racial dilution by the legislative redistricting at this time. Moreover, alleged retrogression in the wards (which we understand to be a plausible basis of challenge to them) does not necessarily infect legislative districts, since legislative district lines only partially correspond to ward lines. Plaintiffs have also cited as evidence of purposeful dilution "[t]he pattern of the racial discrimination in whieh the Demo- cratic organization has long engaged in Cook County, through the Chicago Police Department, the Chicago Housing Authori- ty, the Chicago Board of Education, the Chicago Public Library, and the Chicago Park District." Crosby Post Trial Brief at 3. Plaintiffs allege that the heads of each of these governmental bodies is appointed cases relied on by Judge Grady, all of which involved the use of aa etplicit racial classifica- rion by the government, are totally inapposite to the instant case. We agree with Judge Grady that explicit racial classifications are inherently stigmatizing and need no evidentiary support. However, we also believe, and the Supreme Court has held, that state action which oz its lace relies on criteria other thf,n race' (sucb as neighborhood affiliation) requires a far more sophisticated analysis. Compare Brown r,. Board ol Education,349 U.S. 294,75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955), with Washington p. Davb, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.E,d.2d 597 (1976) and Village ol Arlington Heights v. Metro- politan Housing Derelopmenr Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2a 15t, (1977). by rlel th, th, nir tio ru a$ m( les by th, de elr th, l5 mt cal zgl lea Ur be of pu w€ ou va col dis tor to thr 10 Su dis tio dis fin sy m( ter dis l0( t t I ( *gll4r.--.- ,f,j I RYBICKIv.STATEBD.oFELECHoNSoFSTATEoFILL'1121 ,Ctr! u 37t FSuPP' t962 (19t2) by the Mayor. (and requim ir," *.n1or- 'c,ourt ii Botdrn also rejecied the lower rence of the Chicago CityCouncil), and that court's reliance on past official discrimina- these offices t "r" tong\"", contolea uv tion as evidence of present discriminatory if," O".o"otic organization' We' recog- intent i.j" ffi-driov*J* or other discrimina- [T]he District Court and the Court of tioo rr"" been alleged and/or proven in 'tipe"tt supported their conclusion by rn"ry "r these City activities' we are also tlrawing upon the substantial history of awaie that raciai prejudice continues to official racial discrimination in Alabama' ;;;ii"ta itself throughout the city of chi- But past discrimination cannot' in the ogo "na in that City's Democratic organi- manner of original sin' condemn govern- ,"[ion, as well as throughout many other mental action that is not in itself unlaw- r"rai"g organizations in Itlinois and the ful' The ultimate question remains ii;ttJ stals (including the eourts)' we whether a discriminatory intent has-been believe that these perceptions are worthy- proved in a given case' More distant of consideration in evaluating the issue of instances of official discrimination in oth- p"tp"."t.r dilution of voting strength' and er cases are of limited help in resolving *" i"r. considered them fully in making that question. our assessment. An analysis of the rele- 446 U.S. at ?4, 100 S.Ct. at 1503. vant Supreme Court precedents, however' convinces us that such general evidence of The Supreme Court in Bolden was care- discrimination, not directly related to elec- ful to distinguish it^s earlier decision in toral participation, is, in ilelf, insufficient White a' Regester' 412 U'S' ?55' 93 S'Ct' to establish purposeful vote dilution under 2332' 31 L'Ed'2d 314 (19?3)' in which the the Fourteenth Amendment. court had held that multi-member legisla- rn city or Mobite,. Botden446 u.s. 5b, iffirtt:'i:1,Tffi:ffi':;Ti::XffJ'"|]- aisirict court's reliance on racial discrimina- which "the political tion in municipal ".prov-"nt and in the r:::!:;rt#; ll .,o*ination und "1""- dispensing of public services to support " il; were not equally open to participation finiing that the City's at-large electoral UV ,f," group[s] in question." 446 U.S. at ffiff; ^".?*Ti"Jfi-ii:ffi:'I:+ffiit ::+;n ';,'S.t "l;:f (quo'iing 412 u s tection Clause proscribes purposeful racial discriminationbyanyunitofstategovern.Inanalyzingtheproblemsbeforeitin ment, the Supreme CouJpl"'tity n"onethe- White u' Regester' the Supreme Court un- less held that ,,eviden.. of dl..iirnination derscored the district court's reference to bywhiteofficials...isre]evantonlyasthehistoryofofficia]racialdiscrimination themosttenuousund.i..o*.tantialeviinTexas,whichhadattimestouchedthe dence of the constiiutional validity of the rights of Negroes. to register, vote, and electoral system .,ri"r-*iLr, they attained oii',".*ire participate in democratic their offices. ,, 446 u.s. at ?4, 100 S.Ct. at processes. The district court had also 1503 (footnote omitted)' The Supreme found that lfit.In.l4hitev'Regester,theSupremeCourttheplaintiffs,b.urdenwas..toproduceevidence statedthatmulti.memberdistrictswererlolperto,,ppo'tfindings.thatthepoliticalprocesses se unconstitutiorr"f, irl-r,oi.J tnat it had enie.- leading to nonination and election were not tained claims ,h., -ri,l-nl.-ber districts were equall] open to particiPation ty the group .in being used inriaio.,riv to."r..f .", or mini- qi.rtion-ttatitsmembersI,"d.i.=.TI"l^T,':l' mize the 'otlt'g 't'"n!h- "f-tutiat groups' The t'han did other residents in the district to partlcr- coun stated rtrar to siriain such ciaimi,.it was f"i" in tr,. political Frocesses and to elect legis- not enough tr'"t tt't-'"ti"i group allegedlv dis [uro" of their choice'" 412 u's' at 766' 93 s'ct' ".irninut.ia against had not held legislative seats at' 2339' it--p."p"tti.. to its voting potential' Instead I i L -".i,lads* tt22 674 FEDERAI SUPPLEITTENT . since 'Reconstruction days, tlrere had Although racism certainly exists in the been only two Negroes in tre Dallas city of Chicago and in ttrai city s t;; Qrnty delegation to the Texas House of , cratic organization, the record Lfo"" u" Representatives and that these two were does not disclose a history of overt and the only two Negroes ever slated by the systematic electoral discrimination "o*p"-Dallas C,ommittee for Responsible rable to that identified by the district court Government (DCRG), a whitedominated in white a. Regester. For example, Illinois organization that is in effective control has never had a white primary or a poll of Democratic Party candidate slating in tax. Moreover, unlike the organization Dallas C.ounty. previously in control of the Democratic 412 U.S. at ?66, 9B S.Ct. at 2889. More- party in Dallas County, the Democratic over, the district court had noted that the organization in the City of Chicago depends DCRG "did not need the support of the upon the support of the black community Negro community to win elections in the to win elections and must, therefore, be at county, and it dla not therefore exhibit least somewhat responsive to the needs and good-faith concern for the political and oth- aspirations of black voters. The record in er needs and aspirations of the Negro com- the instant case does not suggest that eaus- munity." 412 il.S. at 76G4;7, gB S.Ct. at es helpful to blacks have.been ignored by 23Sil0 (footnote omitted). Finally, the the Democratic organization; in fact, jusl district court had pointed out ,,that as the opposite seems to be the case' The recently as 19?0 th; pCRGI was relying Democratic Party in Illinois has been a upon 'racial campaign taetics in white pre- principal exponent of civil rights legislation eincts to defeat candidates that had the and of social legislation important to overwhelming support of the black eommu- blacks' It has also supported bilingual ed- nity."' 412 u.s. at 767, g8 s.ct. at 2s40 ucation' an issue of particular importance (quoting 343 F.Supp. at 727). Based upon $.f,,}*il";,.",'*;:1r,n"",ii,"11,:ff1 ::this and other evidence the district eourt had conctuded that ,,,the black community l",ilXffi,j"# :f i','.T;r:]r::LX.ffT; has. been effectively excluded from partici- White a. Regester.pation in the Democratic primary selection process,' and was therefore generally not On the other hand poor socioeconomic permitted to enter into the potitiot p.L""r. conditions, unemploym-ent, low voter regis- in a reliable and meaningfui manner.', 412 tration and the like afflict both the black U.S. at 767, 93 S.Ct. at 2340 (quoting 348 and the Hispanic communities in Chicago to F.Supp. at726). -- \r------6 v-v an ext€nt which may be eomparable to that rhe district courr in white a. Resester i,ffi::A:# ,Y:':;"[ i;X1',fir,rT.: ;:l.reached similar conclusions with respect to eral evidence of racial discrimination in thethe Mexican-American community in Bexar City of Chicago supports our present find_County. Indeed, the district court found ings of purposeful vote dilution, we place t'hat the typical Mexican-American suffered greater reliance on such specific factors asa cultural and language barrier that se- retrogression in black legislative represen_ verely impeded his participation in political tation and the manipulation of raciai popu- life, and that this " 'cultural ineompatibility lations in the interest of white incumbents " ' conjoined with the poll tax and the to demonstrate purposeful racial vote dilu- most restrictive voter registration proce- tion than we do o, th" ggneral acts and dures in the nation have operated to effec- attitudes of city and state officials. tively deny Mexican-Americans access to the political processes in Texas even longer Iv. Complaint of the Del.Valle plain- than the Blacks were formerly denied ac- tiffs: Dilution of Hispanic Voting cess to the white primary.' " 4lZ U.S. at Strength 768, 93 S.Ct. at 2340 (quoting 348 F.Supp. tgl At trial, the DelValle plaintiffs at 731). presented evidence in an effort -to prou" --- . ...'grt* I\d)-. /\_./- ". RYBICKI V. STAIE BD. OF ELECTI T'IS OF STATE OF'ILL' Clrc u !71 FSuPP' t{}B2 (t9t2) that the Commission Purposefully diluted Hispanie voting strength. There,are aP proximately 425,000 Hispanics residing in the City of Chicago, comprising 14% of the City's total population. Although not near- ly as concentrated as the blacks, the major- ity of Chicago's Hispanic population reside in two large aggregations, referred to at trial as the Northwest Hispanic group (pri- marily Puerlo Ricans residing in the West Town and Humboldt Park neighborhoods) and the Southwest Hispanic group (primari- ly Mexican-Americans residing in the Pil- sen and Little Village neighborhoods)'ror The DelValle plaintiffs contended that al- though Commissioner Murphy and Repre- sentative Madigan were aware of these siz- able Hispanic population cent€rs, they in- tentionally fractured both Hispanic commu- nities by dividing each community among four separate legislative districts. Murphy and Madigan justified their decision by claiming that these districts were designed to accommodate future growth and migra- tion patterns which they allege are charac- teristic of these Hispanic communities' Commissioner Murphy analogized this jus- tification to buying a snowsuit for a young child-purehasing a suit several sizes larg- er than the growing child's present dimen- sions is warranted in order to allow the child to grow into the suit and thus prolong its use. l0l. A third identifiable but much smaller His- panic concentration exists on Chicago's far Southeast Side. lUl. No Hispanic has ever been elected to the Illinois General Assembll'. 103. The parties' final Stipulation of Settlement makes minor changes in these Court Exhibits in order to correct an error appearing in the metes and bounds descriptions of Representative Dis- tricts 9 and 10. See l*tter to this coun from William J. Harte (Jan. 7, 1982). The court ac- cepts these changes as well as any other minor adlustments which may be necessary to pul into effect the terms of the Settlement Agreement' Any further adjustments will be reported promptly to the court, u'hich retains jurisdiction for this purPose. We also note that although the Hispanic Set- tlemenl *'ill increase the tolal deviation for Commission PIan House districts to approxi- matell 2.4a'r, and lo appro>::n.iatell l'80lo for Commtssion Senate districts, these deviations The Hispanics challe4ged this explana' tion by noting that no.other racial, ethnic or political group was fitted to "snowsuit" districts and that the Commission's actions / served to exacerbate existing underrepre sentation of Hispanic interests in the Gen- eral Assembly.ro2 The DelValle plaintiffs adduced considerable additional evidence concerning further unsuccessful efforts to alert the Commission to their needs, changes in proposed districts to their detri- ment based on incumbent and other influ- ences, the depressed soeio-economic condi- tion of their constitueney and various other factors tending to show vote dilution. During and after the trial and at the urging of the court, representatives of the Commission and the DelValle plaintiffs de- veloped several alternative configurations for the districts in the two Chieago Hispan- ic communities. Negotiations between the parties (fortified by instruetions from the court as to modifications of the Commis- sion Plan) eventually resulted in a settle- ment proposal, embodied in Court Exhibits ?D and ?E, which was accepted by both the Commission and the DelValle plaintiffs'lo3 Under the resulting Hispanic Settlement )Agreement, Hispanics will constitute ap- proximately 7l% of the population in Com- mission House District 20, encompassing the Pilsen and Little Village neighbor- hoods.tor The DelValle plaintiffs believe are rvell u,'ithin the guidelines approved by the Supreme Court for both a court-developed plan, ,"i Corrro, t'. Finch,431 U.S. 407, 97 S'Ct' 1828, 52 L.Ed. 465 (1977), and a plan developed by the state legislature or a constitutionally created agency. See Mahan v. Hou'el!, 410 U'S' 315, lla-2s,93 s.cl. 979, 986-87, 3s L.Ed.2d 320 ( le73). l0{. The Hispanic Settlement Agreement reads in part as follows: . . . the Hispanic plaintiffs believe that Senate Districts 3,4,5,6, 10, ll and 18, and House Districts 5,6.7,8,9, 10, ll, 12,20,21,22 and 35, as const-ituted in the [Settlement Agree- ment], fairly and reasonably provide Hispan- ics in those districts u'ith the right to partici- pate and vote in electing representatives from ihose districts to the Illinois General Assem- bl1' without fear of dilution of their vote con- sidering the 1980 Censu-< data and the geo graphiC location of co:r: en:rations of Hispan- ic population. . t - -.--.,gaiEryt, *.i\ lr23 ttz4 6?4 FEDdRAL .suppLnMrtrr that Hispanic residents of*this area will now have a meaningful opportunity to efect a candidate of their choice to the Illinois legislature. On- Chicago,s Northwest Side, Hispanics will constitute approximately 63% of the population in Commission House District g and 50% of the population in Commission House District 10. C,ommis- sion Senate District S, which encompasses these two House districts, will eontain an Hispanic population of approximatnly 56%. The DelValle plaintiffs believe that the Settlement Agreement similarly accords Hispanics residing in this area the best achievable opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Under all the circumstances, we find that the Hispanic Settlement Agreement is fair, adequate and reasonable to Hispanics and affords them a fair opportunity to elect candidates of their choice to the General Assembly. Under the Settlement Agree- ment there is no purposeful dilution of the - Hispanic vote. We further find that the Hispanic Settlement is fair to other minori_ ties whose voting power is allegedly sub- ject to dilution. In addirtion, we find that the Settlement Agreement is fair to the C,ommission and to all the voters of the State of Illinois, and is in accordanee with state and federal constitutional standards. We therefore accept and approve those por- tions of Court Exhibit plans 1A, ?D and ?E (together with other supporting documents that relate to redistricting of the House Districts 9, 10 and 20 and related districts) as a reasonable settlement of the DelValle claims. The changes produced by the His- panic Settlement Agreement have been in- Because no class was certified in this case, the parties needed only to secure the approval of the named plaintiffs for this settlement. Attor_ neys for the DelValle plaintiffs diligently se_ cured such approval. lO5. We are providing specific remedies de_ signed to cure specific unconstitutional featuresof the Commission plan. Contrary t" J;;;; Grady's appaxent assertion, this is not ..affirm"a- tive action," and we do not believe affirmative action is mandated in these circumstances. &e l,Uhitcomb y. Chavb,403 U.S. 124, 156_A, gt S.Cr. 1858, tB75-Z7,29L.H,.2d 363 (1971). Nor eorporated into the plan and Map for the State of Illinois approved by this opinion. V. Rernedy tl0l We have held that the Commission Plan unconstitutionally dilutes the voting strength of blacks in two areas: first, in Commission Senate Districts g and g (Com_ mission House Districts 15, l? and lg) on Chieago's West Side; and second, in Com- mission Senate Districts t4, t7 and 1g (Commission House Distri cts 27, Zg, gB, g4, 35 and 36) on Chicago's South Side. Our work is not finished, however, with this finding of liability. In redistricting and reapportionment cases, the Supreme Court has instructed us to provide for a remedy that cures the unconstitutional u.p".t oi" redistrieting plan.tos See, e.g., Connor a. Finch,431 U.S. 407, 4t4-15,9? S.Ct. lg2g, 1833-34, 52 L.Ed.Zd 465 (L977); Mahan a. Howell, 410 U.S. B1S, Bg0-Bg, 99 S.Ct. 9?9, 987-89, 35 L.Ed.2d 820 (1928); Reynotds o. Sims, 377 U.S. SBg, 584-87,84 S.Ct. 1862, 1393-94, 12 L.Ed.zd 806 (196a); Roman o. Sincock, 372 U.S. 695, ?10-11, g4 S.Ct. 1449, 1458-59, 12 L.Ed.Zd 620 (1964). See also Robir*on a. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674 (sth Cir.l9?4); Graues o. B_anteq 408 F.Supp. 1050 (W.D.Tex.19?6). Because our finding of liability is limited to two relatively small groups of districts, we believe that the remedy should be designed to ameliorate the effects of unconstitution- al vote dilution in those two areas. Cf White u. Regester, 412 U.S. 255, gB S.Ci. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 814 (19?g) (approving dis- have we adopted- a theory of proportional repre_ sentation-, as Judge Grady initially suggests, but is later forced to retreat from, in hii dissent. Rather, our remedy comprts with the mandate of the Supreme Court that once purposeful dis. crimination has been found, a fedeial court is authorized, under its inherent equitable powers, to take race into account in fashioning an ap propriate and effective remedy. See e_g., Millik- 11 u. Bradlet (Milliken.t , 433 U.S. 26i,2BO_88, 97 S.Cr. 2749, 2756-41, 53 L.Ed.2d laS ltsttS; Swann v. Board o/ Education,402 U.S. t,2-5, Cl S.Ct. 1267, 1280, 28 L.EA.2d s51 0971). ur lis nd rt ty a o. 8, a. 9, v. ) t e I I t. ) .t I j. t{ 'r BYBICKI v. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS OF STATE OF ILL' 1125 *' Clte u 571 FSuPP' to{l:l (tg{xl) trict court order that disestablislred multi- contours of the Plan which have passed our member districts in two Texas counties).rffi close scrutiny.loE / During the course of trial, the Commis- To recapitulate, the remedy we have ;'":?"fiX::",i,S:","i:T,,l,l"liiltil;ilTJf :,Till["ffi i]",H:]i'ii"i,l1li: Court Exhibit Plans) to incorporate adjust- ing by one Senate "nd on" House district ffi$#,,,ffi ":['ff]"!i[iff iil.''.ilt.lh*tf ;;::"*:.ff ;HiHiJl[] ed at the districts we have now identified to elect a candidate of their choice to the as the products of unconstitutional dilution Illinois General ,Assembly. We have also of black voting strength.roT We believe approved as fair a Settlement Agreement that the adjustments to the Commission that provides Hispanic voters residing on Plan embodied in Court Exhibits 1A (South both the Northwest and Southwest Sides of Side black objections), 2A (suburban objec- Chicago a meaningful opportunity to partic- tions) and 7B (West Side black objections ipate in state electoral politics. Finally, we and Hispanic settlement), together with have accepted certain modifications in the their supporting documents, computer Map proffered by the Commission for the printouts and metes and bounds descrip Chicago suburbs. tions, adequately purge the Commission plan of unconstitutional vote dilution and The court therefore enters the following other errors without upsetting the broader ORDER: 106. We do not believe it appropriate to discard l0E. Several plaintiff and amicus parties have theentireCommissionPlan'becausepartof itis urged us to adopt alternative plans that they infected by an unconstitutional purpose to di- have formulated during the course of litiSation lute. Such a broad remedy is appropriate when as remedies for various defects they or we per- the unconstitutional element pervades the entire ceive in the Commission Plan. These parties plan. Cl. Kirkpatrick v. Prebler,394 U.S. 526, have not cited any controlling authority that 'SS S.Ct.'1225,22 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969) (congres- would require us to adopt such alternative sional districting statute for Missouri invalida- plans. We also note that, in view of the specific ted in its entireiy since legislature relied on and relatively localized defects we have found, inaccurate population data and creatcd largc adopting such an "outside" plan in its entirety population deviations). would inappropriatelv preempt the redistricting lo7. courr Exhibit lA correcred the substantia, ::f:i:'"J"'"'*:tX"*r?;:?:.'if',:,*1"['i: vote dilution found in the Commission Plan by See White r Weber,4l2 U.S. 783,795,93 S.Ct. reconfignring (among others) House Districts ?J48,2354, 37 L.E,d.2d 335 (1973); Whitcontb v. 33,34,35 and 36, resuhing in tu'o Senate dis- Chavb, 4O3 U.S. 124, l6(Xl, 9l S'Cl. t858, tricts (District 17, u'ith a 700,6 black population, fi77-78, 29 L-Ed.2d 363 (1971); Reynolds t. and District 18, with a 660lo black population) Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584-87, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1393- where blacks will have a meaningful opportuni- 94, 12L.p,d.zd 506 (1964). We think it would be ty to elect candidates of their choice, in contrast foolish to "dra*, our own map" or have a third to orre Senale district under the original Com- party draw a map for us when we are able, b5, mission Plan. Coun Exhibit 78 (which incorpo- addiessing instructions to the Commission, to rates the Hispanic Settlement Agreement inte- eliminate the unconstitutional (and therefore grated wrh Court Exhibit 58) reconfigures nu- unacceptable) fearures of the Commission Plan. I::::, 3jl1?i J::JhllrE3.[:i1,Y.,.1 lffi:: x.fffi #ii1ff],ij,'H;]?tl (District 9, with a 74o/o black population) and whicir was flled wtih rhe courl several weeks four Housr- districts_(District 15 (660lo black), after trial as an offer of proof and the ,,plan" District 17 (72oh black), District l8 (7701, black) and District 19 (76o/oblack) where blacks have u submitted by the amicus Village of oak Park meaningful opportunily to elect representatives shortl-v- before this opinion was issued' would of their choice in contrasl ro onl' ore senate undoubtedly raise numerous problems if they district and threeHousedistricrs under the orig- were to be explored in depth' we do not be- inal commission Plan. Corrrr F-xhibir 2A, u'hich lieve such broadening of the issues is tolerable has alreadv been integrattil r',lh these adiust' given the time constraints of this litigation and menrs to the commissron I'la' rs also adopted the lack of findings by the court requiring a in order, inter alia, to allcr..,' :irr ripple effect srveeping restructuring of the Commisslon Plan of adjustments in thc Con:: . :. Piai. or its effective replacement' lt26 t 674 FEDDR{L SUPPLEMEM - TI" foregoing memorandurc opinion is hereby adopted as findings "of iact and conclusions of law in this proceeding. It is therefore orderedthat the State Board of Elections put into effect the Commission Plan, as amended by Court Exhibits lA, 24,7B,7D and ?E.t0{ It is further orderej that said plan of reapportionment govern the election of Representatives "nd-S"nu_tors to the Illinois General Assembly, be- ginning with the 1g82 primary and general elections and continuing thereaftei until these districts are again reapportioned in aecordance with law.lto BUA, District Judge (eoncurring): I fully concur in Judge Cudahy,s well_ reasoned and exhaustive opinion. I write specially merely to more fully respond to Judge Grady's discussion of the setilement agreement executed between the defend_ ants and the DelValle plaintiffs. As has been repeatedly emphasized,,,[flederal courts look with great favor upon the vol- untary resolution of litigation through set_ tlement." Airline Steward, and. Stiu,ard,_ esses Assn. o. Trans World Airlines, 680 F.2d 1164, tl66 (?th Cir.l980), cert. grant- ed, 450 U.S. 979, 101 S.Ct. 1511, 6Z L.Oa.Za 813 (1981); Metropolitan Housing Deuel- opment Corp. a. Village of Arlington Heights,6rG F.2d 1006, 1019 (?th Cir.lb80); Airline Stewards and Steward,esses Assn'. o. American Airlines,, S?g F.2d 960, 968 (?th Cir.19?8), cert. denied, 489 U.S. g?6, 99 S.Ct. 214, 58 L.Ed.zd 190 (19?9). ,,Settle- ments are entered into because of ,the un- certainties of outcome in litigation, as well as the avoidanee of wasteful litigation and expense . . .' " Airline Stewards, b?B F.2d 1t 963 (quoting Florida Trailer and Equipment Co. u. Deal, Zg4 \.Zd 567, 57i (5th Cir.1960)). Thus, in reviewing a settle_ ment agreement, a court .,should not at- tempt to decide the merits of the controver_ sy .. . ftecause] [a]ny virtue which mav reside in a compromise is based upon doin! away with the effect of such a decision.i P_gtterson a. Stoaall, 5ZB F.Zd t0g, il4 (?th Cir.1976). It is with these considerations in mind that this eourt has accepted the Del- Valle settlement agreement. GRADY, District Judge (eoncurring in part and dissenting in part). I join in the decision of the court which finds against the Republican and suburban (Rybicki) plaintiffs. I concur in part and dissent in part as to the finding oi ti"lititj to the black (Crosby) plaintiffs and disseni from the remedy. I also dissent from the approval of the Hispanic (DelValle) settle- ment. The Crosby Plaintffi I agree with the majority that the Demo crat members of the Commission intention_ ally diluted black voting strength in draw_ ing the boundaries for Senate bi.t"i.ts ta, 17 and 18. While the lines were drawn in this manner to protect the ineumbencies of white Senators Joyce and Dawson, this pro tection .was accomplished by racial gerry- mandering. The thinking of the Democrat Commission members obviously was that Senators Joyce and Dawson would have better chanees for reelection if they ran in districts in which whites rather than blacks were the majority; the lines were drawn according to this raeial hypothesis, giving Dawson and Joyce each a gu"ry*"n-d"""i lo!l' Metes and bounds descriptions for all final corrections or modifications not deemed appro.district boundaries are contained i" u a""um.ni priate.filed by the Commission on January l, f Sgi,;. *ff:t#i"l#::*Tili::'J.:1,:1,*Xfj: ,0. Because or the derav sttributabre to this errors). The-Commission is directed to contin- proceeding, an order was isiued on Januar5r 12, ue to endeavor to work wrrh the ;;;;#;; 1982,- enjoining various statutory deadlinei im- State Board of Elections to corrict any further posed by Illinois law on the eleciion procedures minor errors in the Plan whi.h ;.tt;;;;;: preceding the scheduled primary election in ere!, in order to render the Plan fuliv ""*iri-t March. That order sets out a new timetable with.this.opinion. Any furthe. coi.ecti;":-;; developed bl the State Board of Elections. We moditications of an5'aspect of the Plan shall be approve the neu, timetable and order that it bepromptly reported to this court. This courr applied to the forthcoming primary election.shall retain juridiction ro aiopp."u" urr. ,r.t, ,d Frt hl6 ;lt- hr hv hg P." ftfi lin )el- m bh EN nd by at h€ le white district andlacking the black popula- black vote *"r dpn" for the purpose of tion into the grotesquely cohfigured Dis- denying black people a voice in the legisla- trict 17. A clearer example of an intention- ture and in the councils of the Demoeratfc al dilution of racial voting strength would Party. The major premise of the argument RYBICKI not be easy to find. I am not persuaded that the same inten- tional racial dilution has taken place on the west side in regard to Senate Districts 8, I and 10. The boundaries of Senate District 8, for instance, have been shown to be the result of a request by the Village of Oak Park that it be located entirely within one district, without fracturing. The bounda- ries of District 8 do indeed follow the mu- nicipal boundary of Oak Park. Because of the differences I have with the majority concerning another aspect of the liability question and the whole matter of remedy, it is not necessary to extend this opinion by further discussion of the west side districts. Whether or not inten- tional dilution has been shown there, the west side districts drawn by the Commis- sion would have to be set aside in my view simply because I believe virtually the entire map as it affects concentrations of black residents in Chicago has tp be redrawn. I agree with the majority that, except in the case of Senate Districts 14, 17, and 18, discussed supra, plaintiffs have failed to show the boundary lines were drawn for the purpose of diluting the black vote. Plaintiffs elaim that the "wall" on the South Side was drawn with the intention of compacting the black population into the least possible number of districts in which their votes would elect candidates of their choice. The Commission map, according to plaintiffs, affords only five such districts. Plaintiffs argue that this "dilution" of the l. The Crosby complaint does not specifically allege this theory and could be read as being entirely confined to the question of dilution. However, during the course of the trial, counsel for plaintiffs made clear in argument that they were objecting to the Commission plan on the basis of racial stigma as well as dilution. If there is any problem about the pleadings in this regard, I would simply allow the Crosby plain- tiffs to amend at this time to conform u,ith the proof. Rule 15(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 2. In addition to the testimony quoted in the majority opinion, ante al lll4, Madigan testi- fied on cross examination as follows: 4 f v. STATE BD. Or ELECIIONS OF STATE OF ILL. ll27 Cltc rl 37'l FSupp. l0t2 (19t2) t> n- f- t, D )f t- rt $ e B B I is that if blacks had two more senatorial districts, the interests of black peopli which plaintiffs say are in conflict with the interests of the Democratic leadership- would be given priority by the candidates elected. Plaintiffs' own evidence, if true, indicates that this is at best a doubtful proposition. Electoral districts which are almost solidly black have traditionally sent organization Democrats to the legislature. Plaintiffs Newhouse and Braun, a black Democratic senator and a black Democratic representative respectively, both testified that most of their black colleagues in the legislature are under the thumb of the Democratic leadership and do not adequate- ly represent their black constituents. These black legislators are said to be loyal, hand-picked candidates the Democratic or- ganization is able to slate and elect in the solid black districts. If this is true, it is difficult to see what the Democratic organi- zation would have to lose from the creation of two more black senatorial districts. Plaintiffs have another objection to the "wall," however, and unlike the majority, I believe it is a valid one. Plaintiffs com- plain that the black residents of the walled- in districts are stigmatized by being sepa- rated from the white population on the basis of race.r By the defendants' own admissions, the boundaries of various districts in the City of Chicago have been drawn along white and black racial lines.2 White and black BY MR. SULLIVAN: Q We have established, I believe, that there were accommodations made in respect of the yieu' of Evanston, Oak Park, Hyde Park, the Marovitz,/Netsch matter, and I think you testified that you made certain accommo- dations to the Bridgeport community in draw- ing your map, is that right, and the Canary- ville community and the Marquette Park com- munity? A It was my judgment that it would not be wise to have majority black districts repre- senting those communities. i ,3I 1128 populations have been separated in air ef- fort to'avoid raeial ttnsions and to facili- tate the conduet of political lcampaigns. Various witnesses testified, for instance,' that if the neighborhoods of Bridgeport and Cana4rville were combined in electoral districts with the black neighborhoods to the east of them, creating predominantly black districts, it would be difficult for the black candidates to carry on their cam- paigns in the white neighborhoods. Sever- al black incumbents testified they would not attempt to campaign in such solid white neighborhoods as Bridgeport and Canary- ville. These were the main reasons given for drawing the lines of the South Side eleetoral districts almost precisely along the boundaries of t}le areas shown on de- mographic maps as containing the highest concentrations of blaek population. The metaphorie reference to a "wall,,is entirely apt.3 The reasons assigned by the Commission for the drawing of these racial lines do not pass constitutional muster. With narrow exceptions, the Constitution does not per- mit state aetion based upon race. This case is not within one of the narrow excep- tions. I believe the lines drawn by the Q Because of the racist attitude of the white people living in those communities? A Because of the strong racial feelings, it would have been very difficuh for a black p€rson to repres€nt the communities. Q What community is this down here intn A Cicero. Q Aren't there hard feelings between the I-awndale and the Cicero areas? A There are some, and I specifically raised that question with Representative Henry. He told me thar- Q Excuse me. I don't want to get into all this hearsay on my cross-examination. In any event, you accommodated those ra- cial feelings of these communities, didn,t you? A I don't knor,r' if your form of questioning is correct. Q You took them into consideration in drawing your lines? A Yes, I did. Tr. l43l-1432. Commissioner Murphy who, along with Madi- gan, drew the lines in Chicago testified on cross. examination as follows: BY MR. COLEMAN: /l #l reonnll, suppLEMENT iil ,." Commission Jt i.t p,r"posefully Beparete white from black voters on the soutl side of Chicago sre constitutionally impermissi- ble and must be voided. I reach this con- clusion without regard to whether the lines have the effect of "diluting" the blaek vote. The majority concludes that, since the evidence fails to show the wall is intention- ally designed to dilute the black vote, it is constitutionally permissible.r As I read the majority opinion, my colleagues find no fault with the idea of racial separation per se and, indeed, express the view that it can be a good thing under the circumstances of this case. The majority sees an antago- nism between the desire of blacks for racial integration on the one hand and for bloc voting strength on the other. The majority reasons that if the blacks are put into voting districts with whites they will Iose their opportunity to elect candidates of their choice; therefore, it is in the interest of black voters that they be segregated into districts of their own. In this connec- tion, the majority cites the testimony of the various black legislators that they would not fare well in districts that were not predominantly black. Q Shall we call it a line around the major black concentrations of population in the City of Chicago? Would you accepr thar? A Yes. Q That there is a line that the Commission draws around the black communitv and on the South and West Sides? you agree with that? A Yes. Q And one of the reasons why thal line was drawn was because to the west of the line on the South Side there are primarily white communities that you believe have a commu_ nity of interest thal is separate from the black communilies to the easl of the line, isn,t thar correct? A Partly. Q And it was a concern of yours that if the black populations to the easi and the whire populations to the west were put into the same districts, that there, might be friction. A Yes. Tr.1837-1838. 3. See map in the Appendix to this opinion. {. In fact, the ultimate decision of the majority is that the u'all is consritutionally required" as will be demonstrated larer in this opinion. I I l l i t ( i I il c. 6 v tl c 0 P Jr tl 5. JdL-r * RYBICKI v. SJ,tlD BD. OF.ELEpTIONS OF STATE OF ILL.' Cttcer3zaF.8upp. rrc (r9S,t) t,, lrte Id€ lri E- tg Dte. the lon- Iis the no W icn rof Ec lisI hc fty Ito EE of '8tled Dc- he Itd bt br t' ln lD th l. l. t tr- Ftl I I This Argument of the majority misses one of plaintiffs' lhain points: in order for a black candidate to win, it is hot necessary tlrat the distriet be 95 per cent black. Therc can be a significant white population and a blaek can still win. The evidence shows tlrat there arne two black legislators in lllinois---one of them from Chicage who are regularly reelected from majority white districts.s A district which is 65 per cent black will, as all parties agree, afford black voters a better than even chance of electing a candidate of their choice. Thus, the majority rationale for the wall-that it is necessary or at least desirable from the standpoint of enhancing the political strength of blacks as a bloc-{oes not com- port with the evidence and does not with- stand analysis. I would have trouble with the majority theory even if I did believe that the elector- al fortunes of blacks depend upon their having House districts in which they com- prise majorities of 94.83, 98.43, 98.44, g?.01 and 89.62 per cent (the percentages in House Districts 23,24,31, 33 and 25). This is because I believe stateenforced racial separation cannot be tolerated ander any circumstances, regardless of motive, even if the motive is apparently benign. The matter was well stated by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Wright a. Rock- efeller, 376 U.S. 52, 59-{7,84 S.Ct. 609, 606-11, 11 L.Ed.Zd 512 (1963), a case in which certain intervenors sought to justify the creation of a racially segregated con- gressional district in the City of New York. One of the intervenors was Adam Clayton Powell, the black incumbent Congressman. Justice Douglas described t}re argument of the intervenors in this way: The intervenors are persons who ap parently have a vested interest in control of the segregated Eighteenth District. They and the State seem to support this segregation not on the "separate but equal" theory of Plessy o. Ferguson, [163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 5. Rep. Jesse White (former District t3), a black, is elected by a constituency in Chicago that is 73 per cent white. Downstate, Sen. Kenneth Hall (former District 57), also a black, is elected by a 5il F-Stpp.-26 lt29 256) rupra, bui on another theory. Their theory might be called the theory of "separate bui better off,-a theory that has been used before. A like arg6- ment was made in Buchanan o. Worlcy, %5 U.S. 60, 81, [88 S.Ct. 16, 20, 62 L.E4, 1491 in support of municipal segregation of residential areas; iD District of Co- lumbia a. Thornpson, S4G U.S. 100, [?B S.Ct. 1007, 97 L.Ed. 14801 in support of segregation in restaurants; in Watson a. Mernphis,373 U.S. 526, [83 S.Ct. 1814, 10 L.Ed.zd 5291 in support of delayed inte- gration of municipal parks. Indeed, the final argument of John W. Davis for South Carolina rn Broum o. Board of Education, supra, ended with the words, "The good is sometimes better than the best." The fact that Negro political leaders find advantage in this nearly solid Negro and Puerto Rican district is irrelevant to our problem. Rotten borrughs were long a curse of democratic processes. Racial boroughs are also at war with democratic standards. 376 U.S. at 62, U S.Ct. at 608. Unlike the majority in the instant case, the majority in Wright a. Rockefeller did not adopt the "separate but better off" theory. The ba- sis of the majority opinion in Wrighl which upheld the challenged apportionment, was that the lower court finding that the bound- aries had not deliberately been drawn along racial lines was not clearly errone- ous. Commenting on the general question of racial bloe voting and goveramental action desigaed to facilitate that practice, Justiee Douglas concluded: Racial electoral registers, like religious ones, have no place in a society that honors the Lincoln tradition-"of the people, by the .people, for the people.,, Here the individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color. The princi- ple of equality is at war with the notion constituency that is 6O per cent white. There was also evidence that Sen. Earlean Collins (for- mer District 2l) receives a substantial vote from uhires in her Chicag<, disrrict. E E I L * --&-- r;\.. r1 6?4 FEDERAL, SUPPLEMENT1130 that District A must be represented by a Negto, as it is with the notion'that Dis- trict B must be represented by a Cauca' I sian, District C by-a Jew, District D by a Catholie, and so on. Cf. Gray a- Sand- ers,372 U.S. 368, 3?9 [83 S.Ct. 801, 808, I L.Ed.zd 8211. The racial electoral regis' ter system weights votes along one racial line more heavily than it does other votes. That system, by whatever name it is called, is a divisive force in a commu- nity, emphasizing differences between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the eonstitutional sense. Of course race, like religion, plays an important role in the choices which individual vot- ers make from among various candi- dates. But government has no business designing electoral districts along racial or religious lines. We held in Akins a' Teras, 325 U.S. 398, 403, [65 S'Ct' 1276' 1279, 89 L.Ed. 16921 and in Brown o' Allen,344 U.S. 443, 471, [73 S.Ct' 397' 4L4, g7 L.Ed. 4691 that courts in seleeting juries need not-indeed should not-give - each jury list the proportional racial com- plexion that the community has. If race is not a proper criterion for drawing a jury list, how can it be in designing an electoral district? It And.erson a. Martin,375 U'S' 399' [84 S.Ct. 454, 11' L.Ed.2d 430] we barred Louisiana from putting on a ballot oppo- site a Negro candidate's name the word, "Negro," as it was a device encouraging raeial discrimination' When we said in that case that a State may not encourage its citizens "to vote for a candidate solely on account of race," id.., at 404, [84 S'Ct' at 456] I had assumed that we would hold o fortiori that no State could make an electoral district out of any raeial bloc unless the electoral unit represented an actual neighborhood. Yet we violate that princiPle here. When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiraeial, mul- tireligious communities that our Consti- tution seeks to weld together as one be- come separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion rather than to politi- cal issues are generated; communities f geek not the best representative but the best racial or religious partisan' Since that system is at war with the democrat' ic ideal, it should find no footing here' "separate but equal" and "separate but better off" have no mone place in voting districts than they have in schools, parks, railroad terminals, or any other facility serving the Public. 3?6 U.S. at 66-67, 84 S.Ct. at 61f11' Although Justice Douglas' views were expressed in a dissenting opinion (eon- curred in by Justiee Goldberg), there is no reason to believe that those views would not have been agreeable to the majority had they found the district lines to have been racially motivated, as is the case here, and then reached the "separate but better off" argument of the intervenors. It seems to me that the above-quoted lan- guage of Justiee Douglas, considered in light of the authorities he cites, would re' present the position of the Supreme Court today. If the case for racial segregation to en- hance minority voting strength is weak, the case for what I regard as the more promi- nent motivation for the wall is even weak- er. I am not persuaded that the Democrat Commission members were motivated by a desire to enhance black voting power' I found equally unconvincing the rote re- sponses given by the regular Democrat or- ganization black legislators to leading [uestion about whether they feared diffi- culties in the primary if they were to run in districts with less than 90 or 95 per cent black population' In short, my view of the evidence is that a desire to accommodate black voters had little if anything to do with the creation of the wall. The real reason for the wall-and it was not con- cealed, it was just denied the top billing it deserved-was the desire of the Democrat Commission members to ensure that the white populations west of the wall would continue to be represented by white legisla' tors. This concern was based upon the candidly expressed belief that the antago nisms between whites and blacks make it impracticable for any legislator, white or *--.*r*- W,;. --- B ! 7 L I I t r RyBrcKr v. sT.{TE SD. Or ELECuONS OF STATE OF ILL. . l13lCtr... S?a FSupp. ltf2 (t9t2) btack,- to rlpresent [heir interests simulta- aeries of per curiomdecisions an immedi- neously. As I understand- tlrg,opinion of ate end to segregatidn in all public places. my colleagues, they regard this appr.ehen- Muir a. t ouisuitte park Thealrial Associ- Ision aB 6 proper basis for drawing district ation, 847 u.s. g?1, ?4 s.ct. ?gs, ;i;i; Iines. I do not, for the reasons expressed l1l2 (1984), aacating 2oz F.zd z?s (6th by Justice Douglas in wright a. Eockefer- cir.rgsg) (parks); Holmes a. city of Atiai_ ler, supra. If it is constitutionally permis- to. Bil u.S. azs, zs s.ct. 141, ro6 uoa. zzo sible to draw segregated voting district (rgsb), reu,g 2zB F.2d 98 (Eth cir.l955) Golfboundaries on the theory that the races are courses); Moyo, of Baltimore ,. ootioi, antagonistic, I fail to see why it would not 850 u.s. g77: 76 s.ct. rge, 100 L.Ed. ??; be equally valid to draw segregated school (tgsg), affg 220 F.2d gg6 (4th cir.lgss) attendance boundaries on the same theory. @ublic Ueactres); New Orleans park Im- Yet, no one needs to be told that the latter proaement Association a. Detiege, gsg proposition is clearly untenable. U.S. 54, ?9 S.Ct. 99, B L.Ed.2a aO (fSSA), My colleagues also find the "wall" con- affg 252 F.zd 122 (5th Cir.1958) (parks); stitutionally permissible since it does not State Athletic Commission a. Dorsey, BSg stigmatize blacks. I believe the wall stig- U.S. 533, 79 S.Ct. 113?, 3 L.Ed.2d f02g matizes blacks and restricts their freedom (1959), affg 168 F.Supp. f49 @.D.La.lgs8) of political association. It is no answer to (athletic events); Turner a. City of Mem- say, as the majority does, that "... the phis,369 U.S.350,82 S.Ct. 805, ? L.Ed.2d record in this case is barren of any indica- 762 (1962), aacating 199 F.Supp. b8b (w.D. tion tlrat black voters on the South Side Tenn.1961) (restaurants); Johnson o. Vir_ are, or feel themselves to be, stigmatized ginia, 3?3 U.S. 61, 88 S.Ct. 10b8, l0 by the challenge to the electoral bounda- L.Ed.2d 195 (1963) (courtroom seating); ries, or that such voters would prefer to be schiro o. Bynum, 375 u.s. gg5, g4 s.Ct. associated, for voting purposes, with pre- 452, 11 L.Ed.zd 4lZ (1964), affg ZLg dominantly white neighborhoods such as F.Supp. 204 (E.D.L,a.lg6B) (audito"iums). Bridgeport and Canaryville." O. 1116). In not one of these cases did the Supreme First of all, as the majority points out, one Court or those lower cour[s that were af- of the plaintiffs, Carol Mosely-Braun, did firmed find it necessary to explore the testify that she regarded the segregation question whether blacks were stigmatized as a stigma. Secondly, the attorneys for by the segregation. As Judge wisdom the Crosby plaintiffs vehemently argued stated in Dorsey, segregation based on that blacks were harmed by the segrega- race is "inherently discriminatory and a !on. Most importantly, it is too late in the violation of the Equal Protection Clause of day to require evidence in support of the the Fourteenth Amendment.,' 16g F.supp. proposition that racial segregation is stig- at 151. Beyond statements such as these, matizing. To say that it is not, or to re- the courts struck down all forms of segre quire proof each time that it is, is to ignore gation on the basis of nothing more thJn athe last quarter century of precedents citation tn Brourn or cases relying on starting with Brown a. Board of Educa- Brown. Thus, in segregation orlr,ltig- tion, 349 u.s. 294, 7b s.ct. ?sB, 99 L.Ed. ma may be presumed.i ln tt" instani casI, 1083 (1955). In the decade following the defendants adduced no evidence to re- Broum, the Supreme Court ordered in a but the presumption.? 6. {Tlhe essential issue [of stigma] is ooe of lact -whether segregation involves special harm for Negroes and therefore violates the constitution- al standard of equality. But the basic factual issue cannot be relitigated in each case u,hich 7. involves the quesrion. [T]he relevance of thc issues on which the social scientists u,rote and testified is inescapable [and] leads to a gener.:l constrtutional mling which will govern subsc quent cases until the basic factual assumptions can be shown to be wrong ....,, Honnold, Book Review, 33 Ind.L.J. 612, 6l,t-6l5 (1958). Unlike the majority, I do not believe that ra- cial discrimination m'rst be "explicitly" provided for in a stature before a presumption'oiinvalidi_ rv arraches. Ante at il gl. ln yick luo v. Hopkins, ll8 U.S. 356,373,6 S.Ct. lo6,t, 1073, 30 ,- I#,ts- ,-,.,*.5?. FBDEBTL Sutfi,r!ilElma,jiz Again, it should be noted t'hat the black malJrities in the walled-in districts far ex' ceed any percentage necessary-to P"Il' L tn" Ll*tion of a black candidate' fie majority does not even attempt to suggest f,"* tf,l, blacks in, say, Senatte District 16- witt Uenetit from being 98'69 per cent of tt e etectorate in that district or how the SO.SA p"t cent majority in District.lz Tt] U" U"tt"t off than if they were only a ?0 per cent majority in that district' The ma' ioriw savs-thai "... the desirability of perflctfy- integrated voting districts- must [e balanced against the ability of blacks and other minority grcups to elect candi- dates of their choice to the relevant politi- cal bodies'" Ante at p. 1116' I doubt that ;y;;;-;"gres for iPerfectlY integrated uoi"g dislricts." Given the segregated housilng patterns in Chicago, there must in tf," U"Jt of pl"ttt be some districts in which blacks """ " high"t percentage than they are in the city at large' "Perfect integra- tion" is not the goal. The goal in this case should be the avoidance of deliberate' gov- ernmentally mandated segregation' Elen if one were to accept the proposition that such segregation is permissible to augment blaek voting strength, segregation in ey.' ir"s of thairequired to elect a black candi- date would have to be justified on some oif,", g"oond. The majority has suggested no oth'", justification for the solid black districts. The courts have long recognized that the freedom to associate with others to effect political change, be it through joining a loup that advocates a particular doctrine i, ornp"ig.ring to elect a representative'-is among'the highest values protected !V t1e First imendment. Witney a' Cal'ifornia' 2?4 u.s. 857, 41 s.ct' 641, ?1 L'Ed' 1095 (1921) (J. Brandeis, dissenting); Buck\y 1t'- Vateo,424 U.S' 1, 96 S'Ct' 612,46 L'Ed'2d 659 (i9?6). The harm occasioned by the L.EA.22O (1886), it was stated that 'Though-the "r.ili,*ri U" r"ii on its face and impartial in ;;;";;;"., vet, if it is applied and.. adminis- tired by public authority with an evil eye ano ."-"t*rtf hand, so as practically to make ".:"tt "ita illegal discriminations betu'een per' *i, itt similar-circumstances, material -to their ililJ;;al of equal justice is still within virtualty total aegrpgatiol of the races by ,"trg futt cts, i,d *," 6onsequent limita- tion i-t places on the ability of blacks and whites to join together in the eampaign processl .ot t, the heart of our principle of self'government. The RemedY I disagree with seversl aspects 9f the remedy the majority accords the Crosby plaintiifs. First, the majority remedy aaopts the wall which was part of th" eT- mission plan. To my knowledge, this is the first time a federal court has ordered a state to segregate the races' There is some attenuation by reason of the fact that the wall was first devised by the Commis- sion, but the fact remains that these segre gated districts are part of an overall plan it i"tr tt " majority is ordering the state to put into effeci. The departures the^majori' iy t as ordered from the original C'ommis- sion plan are necessarily based upon- t'|e re.ainde. of the map being configured the way it is. The districts are pieces of a jigsaw puzzle and each piece must fit' The plan ordered by my colleagues does give the blacks six senatorial districts in it i.t tt "y are likely to elect a candidate' rather than the five they would have under the Commission plan. The court plan also gives the blacks 13 rather than the 12 fto.rr" districts provided by the Commis- sion plan. The manner in which this result has ieen obtained is the basis for my second objection to the majority remedy' The district boundaries have been drawn along racial lines for the purpose of yield- ing black majorities of 65 per cent or more in selected diitricts. Just as the line form- ing the boundaries of the "wall" districts hi been precisely drawn along the west' ern edge of the heaviest black concentra- tion, so also the boundaries of the court-or- dered districts outside the walled area have the prohibition of the Constitution'" The point it "i*"*ft" academic in our casg because the ii** .f Messrs. Madigan and MurphS'. is. not iust a matter of inference' They testitled--as 'il;l*itit; ; could t'e-that thev intentionallv ai"it trrJ wall so as to separate whites from blacks. been p and so black graPhir The been e: itisa the n propos tled Second of the AFE EI which the pr these 1 It ir ariver veals I colleal did no the gr able t severa Comm were ( settler cusse( the cr court. ed dif would impos tlemer the cr missic ternal reprer missi< group that c not b sion. sion alterr as ttc, sion. Court t. Ttr was his : graphic maps. The rationale for this method has not been explicitly stated by my colleagues, but it is apparent from what has been done. fire majority has obviously adopted the proposition that racial minorities are enti. tled to proportional representation. Secondly, they have accepted the argument of the plaintiffs that blacks and Hispanics are entitled to be placed in districts in which they will form at least 65 per cent of the population. I disagree with both of these propositions. It is important to know how the court arrived at its remedy, for the process re- veals the principles of reapportionment my colleagues have .embraced. The majority did not have to structure its own plan from the ground up. Instead, the majority was able to produce a court plan by splicing several already available maps onto the Commission plan. These additional maps were drawn by the parties in the course of settlement negotiations. The parties dis- cussed settlement throughout the trial of the ease, with the encouragement of the court. Everyone realized the case present- ed difficult problems and that a settlement would probably be preferable to a solution imposed by the court. To make these set- tlement discussions as concrete as possible, the court requested counsel for the Com- mission defendants to prepare various al- ternative ilistrict eonfigurations that would represent a compromise between the Com- mission plan and the demands of the three groups of plaintiffs.8 It was stipulated that counsel's efforts in this regard would not be taken as any concession or admis- sion. Thereafter, counsel for the Commis- sion spent long hours preparing various alternative maps which were then received as "court exhibits" for purposes of discus- sion. The principal exhibit was marked Court Exhibit 1A. 8. The reason the attorney for the Commission was requested to draw these maps is that he and his associates were the only ones with adequate u33 waa clear that any district which did not have at least a 65 per cent black or Hispan- ic population would not be regarded by either the Crosby or DelValle plaintiffs as a district in which blacks or Hispanics would have, using plaintiffs' tcrminology, "a meaningful opportunity to elect repre- sentatives of their choice." Witnesses for both sides acknowledged that "an informal guideline" of 65 per cent has been used in reapportionments to obtain effective minor- ity representation. The figure is arrived at by starting with 50 per cent and adding to it a 5 per cent allowance for the fact that minority populations are generally younger than white populations (and therefore have fewer members of voting age), a 5 per cent allowance on the basis that fewer minority members than whites register to vote, and another 5 per cent on the basis that the turnout of registered minority voters at the polls is less than the turnout of registered white voters. No witness testified .to the accuracy of these estimates even in gener- al, let alone as they might apply to Chiea- go. The 5 per cent allowance for each of the three factors appears to be arbitrary, and whether it has any relation to faet is, on the basis of this record, anyone's guess. At no time did the defendants agree that the "65 per cent formula" was factually legitimate or that its use could legally be required by this court. The DelValle plaintiffs were not satis- fied with the court exhibits insofar as they pertained to the Hispanic communities. Therefore, the DelValle plaintiffs prcpared their own "settlement" map and this be- came known as DelValle Exhibit 208. The Crosbl phintiffs and the defend- ants, despite considerable effort, were un- able to settle. lVhile the court was not privy to their discussions, in subsequent briefs the plaintiffs indicated that the ma- knowledge of the geography and demography involved in the case. F RYBICKI v. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS OF STATE OF ILL. been precisely drawi "rong ,r,"offfri;:-' tfiJ'}L" criteria, counset used in pre and Bometimes tortuous contours of heavy paring the court exhibits was the 65 per - black cohcentrations as shown on demo cent formula urged by plaintiffs, ginee it / tlt{ *r .- , * nl{I$nrhu gUPPLEMENT jor stumbling block was that Court Exhibit' 1A retained t}re "wall" intect. After the trial was eoncludefr my col- leagues desired to examine s map which , would incorporutn DelValle Exhibit 208 into C,ourt's Exhibit 1A. Aecordingly, counsel for the Commission was directed to prepare such a map, which he promptly did and furnished to the court. Shortly there after, we were informed by counsel for the C,ommission and the DelValle plaintiffs that those parties had settled the case be- tween themselves by agreeing to the com- bination of DelValle Exhibit 208 and Court Exhibit rA. It should be emphasized that the Com- mission defendants have at no time agreed that Court's Exhibit 1A is an appropriate map insofar as the Crosby plaintiffs are concerned. They have not acceded to the proposition that racial minorities are enti- tled to proportional representation nor have they coneeded the propriety of the 65 per cent formula. During final argument, counsel for the Commission reiterated his position that the court's exhibits were not offered by the Commission and that the Commission was standing by its original plan. What the majority has now done is to adopt as the court's remedy Court Exhibit 1A combined with DelValle Exhibit 208. Because it has ready-made maps it can adopt by simple reference, the majority be- lieves it need not explain how these particu- lar lines came to be drawn and what their legal basis is. The entire exposition is con- tained in footnote 107 of the majority opin- ion, which refers to the court exhibits and describes the percentages of minority popu- lation which will be contained in each of the revised districts. The absence of a detailed explanation of the plan seems to be ad- dressed by this statement in footnote 10? of the majority opinion: \[Ie think it would be foolish to "draw our own map" or have a third party draw a map for us when we are able, by in- structing the Commission, to eliminate 9. A plurality of the court, however, holds a contrary view. See Part IV of the opinion of lr..-. - .f Itt.,).,'' 'the unconstitgtional (and therefono unac- ceptable) features of the Commiesion plan. In evaluating the court's rer4edy, it is important to distinguish this case from one arising under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, or a case in which, due to previous intentional discrimination, affirmative ac- tion in favor of racial or ethnic groups may be permitted or even required. United Jewish Organizations a. Carey, 430 U.S. t44, 97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.Ed.zd 2n $977). Swann a. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board, of Education 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. L267, 28 L.Ed.zd 554 (1971) (school desegregation). The State of Illinois is not subject to Sec- tions 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1973, so there is no question of the need for affirmative action to comply with that Act. It is arguable that where the Voting Rights Act does not apply a state may not voluntarily reapportion its electoral districts so as to strengthen the voting power of a racial minority at the expense of the white majority. See the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan in United Jewish Organizations, supra, 430 U.S. 144 at 168-179, 97 S.Ct. 996 at 1011- 17, 51 L.Ed.2d 229.e However, we are not dealing here with what the State of Illinois might voluntarily have done. We have re. jected the reapportionment map the state, through its constitutionally authorized Commission, had decided upon. The ques- tion before us now is what the state can be required to do as an alternative to the rejected plan. The majority opinion re- quires the state to reapportion its electoral districts so as to afford proportional rey resentation to racial and ethnic minorities. The exhibits which t}e majority superim- poses upon t}e Commission map to create the court-imposed plan are expressly drawn along the lines of census tracts which have known numbers of whites, blacks and His- panics. The lines have been drawn in a way that will give the bla'cks and Hispanics great€r bloc voting strength than they would have under the C,ommission map, Justice Whire, 430 U.S. at 165-168, 97 S.Ct. at 1009-1 1. f RYBICKI v. STAIE BD. OF ELECTIONS OF STATE OF ILL. u35 and this is ttre soletifferenee *ffffltI"'tffi:'ffi'"" considersrion and determina- C,ommission plan and the eou#phn. The tton, Reynolds a.'Sims, g?? U.S. at 586- court plan does not give the blacks the [84 S.Ct. at 1394] for a st&te legislatun/ maximum possible bloc voting strength is the institution that is by far the best they desire-and for that reason will still situated to identify and then reconcile , be regarded as "discriminatory" by the traditional stata policies within t.he con- Crosby plaintiffs-but it is nonetheless an s6tutionally mandated framework of adoption of the proposition that racial and ethnic groups are entitled to have the substantial population equality' The fed- boundaries of erectoral districts drawn in a ;ni,;:"nriJr;"ffi:#ffiT"':"1"; way that will enhance their bloc voting times conflicting state apportionmentstrength' policies in the people's name. In the In a number of cases, the Supreme C,ourt wake of a legislature,s failure constitu- has made it clear that the district court's tionally to reconcile these conflieting remedy in a reapportionment case may be state and federal goals, a federal court is an abuse of its equitable discretion if it is left with the unwelcome obligation of not founded on solid constitutional performing in the legislature's stead, grounds. It is, of course, true that "[o]nce while lacking the political authoritative_ a right and a violation have been shown, ness that the legislature can bring to the the scope of a district court's equitable task. In such circumstances, that must powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for be accomplished circumspeetly, and in a breadth and flexibility are inherent in equi- manner ,,free from any taint of arbitrari- table remedies." Suann o. Board of Edu- ness or discrimination.,, Roman o. Sin- cation, d02 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1276, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (19?1). However, as the cock' 317 U'S' 695' 710 [84 S'Ct' 1449' C,ourt cautioned in whitcomb u. Chads, L458' 12 L'Ed'2d 6201' 40g U.S. 124, L6L,91 S.Ct. lg5g, lg?g, 29 Connor a. Finch, 431 U.S. at 414415, 97 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971), "The remedial powers S'Ct' at 1833-34' of an equity court must be adequate to the For the reasons stated in Connor, the task, but they are not unlimited. Here the Supreme Court has held that a federal District Court erred in so broadly brushing court abuses its equitable discretion when aside state apportionment policy without it creates a plan containing districts with solid constitutional or equitable grounds population deviations that are unnecessari- for doing so." ly large, Chapman a. Meier (5.9S per cent The Court has also made it clear that " deviation), and when it mandates the use of courtordered reapportionment plan will be a multi-member district plan, Connor o. held to stricter standards of constitutionali- Finch, East Canoll Pa*h School Board ty than those governing plans adopted by a tt. Marshall. On the other hand, the Court legislature. Connor o. Finch, 431 U.S. has approved plans submitted by a legisla- 407,97 S.Ct. f828, 52 L.Ed.zd 465 (19?7); ture in which the population deviation is Chaprnan a. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 18-19, 95 significantly higher than that in Chapman. S.Ct. 751, 761-52, 42 L.FA,.Zd 766 (1975); See, e.9., Mahan o. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, East Carroll Parish School Board o. Mar- 93 S.Ct 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1972) (16.4 per shall, 424 U.S. 636, 639, 96 S.Ct. 1083, cent deviation), and White a. Regester, 412 1085, 4? L.Ed.2d 296 (f9?6). The rationale U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. ?332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 is set forth in Connor: (1973) (9.9 per cent deviation). It has also These high standards refleet t}re unusual approved, in certain circumstanees, the use position of federal courts as draftsmen of multi-member districts in legislative of reapportionment plans. We have re- plans. See, e.9., Wiitcomb a. Chads, 403 peatedly emphasized that "legislative re- LT.S 124, 91 S.Ct. 1E58, 29 L.Ed.zd 363 apportionment is primarily a matter for (1[i7l). :, r136 ,./. 674 FEDERAL SUPPI{EMENT f Most recently, the Flfth.Circuit C,ourt of Appeals held that a District Court ebuses its equitable discretion when it premises a remedial plan on propo5tional representa- tion of minorities. Manhall a. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927 (5th Cir.lg?8), cert. denied tub nom East Camoll Parish Police Jury o. Marshall,442 U.S. 909, 99 S.Ct. 2820, 61 L.Ed.zd n4 0979). ln Marchall a. Ed- utards, the court had before it a plan or- dered by the district court to remedy a prior history of franchise dilution. See Zimmer o. McKeithen, 485 F.zd 1297 (5th Cir.1973). In developing its remedy, the Iower court sought to create districts in East Carroll Parish exactly proportional to t}re Parish's black population. Noting that the question whether equitable standards permit a court to approve such a plan was one of first impression, the court looked to the Srrpreme Court's then most recent pro nouncement in United Jewish Organiza- tiorx a. Careg for guidance. The Court of Appeals observed that although United Jewish Organizations established that, as a matter of state policy, a legislature may voluntarily adopt a plan based on propor- tional representation, the case provided federal courts with no such license: At this time, we read the decisions of the Supreme Court as admonishing lower federal courts to act cautiously in reap portionments and to leave racially pro portional representation to legislative bodies, at least in the absence of some impelling reason to take it into account, lO. ln Taylor v. McKeithen,407 U.S. 191, 193- t94, 92 S.Ct. 1980, l98l-82, 32 L.EA.2d 648 (t972), the Supreme Court recognized that a court-ordered redisrricting plan premised on the principle of "benign discrimination" Pres€nts difficult and, at that time, unresolved issues: An examination of the record in this case suggests that the Court of Appeals may have believed that benign districting by federal judges is its€lf unconstitutional gerrymander- ing even where (a) it is employed to overcome the residual cffects of past state dilution of Negro voting strength and (b) the only alter- native is to leave intact the traditional "safe white districts. If that were in fact the rea- soning of the lower court, then this petition would presenl an important federal question of the extenl to which the broad equitable pou,ers of a federal courl, Swann v, Charlotte- Mecl:brtburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. l, for example, where the correction of his- toric racial discrimination and not merely proper representation is involved. I 582 F.zd at 936. the Court of Appeals concluded with some advice to the district court on fashioning an acceptable remedy: The judge must analyze the plan and determine that the probable results arc such that minority strength is not dilut- ed. But this legitimate concern with the outcome cannot justify a strict propor- tionality brought about by manipulation of district lines .... The boundari* should be draum uith an eye to com- pactness, contiguou^mess, and the pres- ertsation of natural, political and tra- ditional boundaries; zol racially bal- anced representation. We are not legis- latures. 582 F.2d at 937 (emphasis supplied). Thus, in Marshall, it was held an abuse of discretion to remedy a long history of vote dilution with a plan premised on pro- portional representation. The remedy adopted by the majority in the instant case presents one further turn of the screw. Here, the issue is whether a federal court may require a state that is not subject to the Voting Rights Act and has not been shown to have engaged in voting dilution in the past to adopt a race-eonscious remedy that deliberately creates districts in which blacks constitute at least a 65 per cent majority.ro In my view, the court is with- ls, [9] s.ct. t267, 1275,28 L.En.2d 554] are limited by the colorblind concept of Gomil- lion v. Light'foor, 364 U.S. 339 [8] S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d ll0l, and Wright v. Rocke/eller,376 U.S. 52, 57, 67 184 S.ct. 603, 605, 6ll, ll L.il.zd 5l2l (Douglas, J., dissenting). In re- apportionment cases, :ts Justice Stewart has observed, "the federal couns are often going to be faced with hard remedial problems" in minimizing the friction between their reme- dies and legitimate state policies. Sttry-Seu- enth Minnesota State *nate v.Bezns,.106 U.S. r87,2O4 [92 S.Ct. 1477, 1487,32 L.Ed.2d l] (dissenting opinion). While some courts have held that the Supreme Court's opinion in United lewbh OrganiTations answered this question in the affirmative, sce, e.g., Kirksey p. Board ol Superubors ol Hinds County,554 F.2d 139, 151 (5th Cir.l977), I be- lieve this is a mistaken reading of the case. C 7 (r b fr 8' nl o c( pl id fi, fr rt tt tt tI cl tir ra m p) e2 th ul h - --.:3* 'RYBICKI v. STATE BD. OF ELECTTONS oF STATE OF rLL. llg? Cltc rr 57a FSupp. rllB2 (1962) out "solid constitutional gmufrds" for do is six or seven, bdt whether the districts lllt 8Or I begin with the Supreme Court's latest expression, Mobile o. Bolden, 446 U.S. SS, 78-?9, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 1506, 64 L.Dd_zd 47 (1980) Glurality opinion) since that case both confirmed and extended the holding of Marshall o. Edwards. There the Court stated: It is, of course, true that the right of a penson to vote on an equal basis with other voters draws much of its signifi- cance from the political associations that its exercise reflects, but it is an altogeth- er different matber to conclude that polit- ical groups themselves have an indepen- dent constitutional claim to representa- tion. And the C,ourt's decisions hold squarely that they do not [citations omit- tedl. The fact is that the Court has sternly set its face against the claim, however phrased, that the C,onstitution somehow guarantees proportional representation. According to the plurality in Mobile, it is not only strict proportional representation that is beyond the equitable power of a court to require. Rather, it is any kind of plan that requires a racial, ethnic or other identifiable group to be given representa- tion as such a group. In the quotation from Mobile, su.pra, the plurality opinion rebuffs the idea "that political groups themselves have an ind.epend.ent constitu- tional claim to representation" by noting that the Court has consistently rejected the claim "however phrased, that the Constitu- tion somehow guarantees proportional representatioz " (emphasis added). The majority in the instant case claims that its plan is not proportional representation be. cause the blacks will have six rather than the seven Senate districts they would have under strict proportional representation. In my view, the question is not whether it First, as Marshall v. Edwards recognizes, IJnited Jewish Organiztrrozs addressed only what a /eg. islature, not a federal court, could do to in- crease minority representation. Moreover, even with respect to a legislature's power, I)nir- ed Jewish Organi4.tiotts did not address thr question whether, in the absence of a histon' ol have been drawn on the invalid premis6 that blacks have a constitutional right to district lines that will enable them to vote, as a 8roup. Even apart from the holding of. MoAib a. Bolden, the majority's remedy suffers from a further defect. As indicated in Connor a. Finch, a court abuses its equita- ble discretion when it adopts a remedy that usurps the prerogative of the state legisla- ture to make critical policy choices in con- nection with reapportionment. Justice Stewart succinctly stated the job of federal courts in these cases: "In the reapportion- ment context, it is the duty of a court seeking to remedy an unconstitutional ap portionment to right the constitutional wrong while minimizing disturbance of le. gitimate state policies." Sitty-Seaenth Minnesota State Senate a. Beens,406 U.S. t87, 202, 92 S.Ct. 1477, 7496, 32 L.Ed.zd 1 (1e?2). The majority's remedy does not merely conflict with legitimate state policies re- garding reapportionment, it preempts the state from forming the policies. As Mobile a. Bolden makes clear, the object of the remedy in any vote dilution case is to give the minority group equal access to the political processes leading to nomination and election. This is all the cases have ever held. United Jeuish Organizatiorx, 430 U.S. at 165, 97 S.Ct. at t009-t0; White o. Regester,412 U.S. 755,765-767, gB S.Ct. 2332, 2339-{0, 37 L.Ed.zd }La g97g; Whit- cornb 1). Chauis,403 U.S. at 149, 91 S.Ct. at 1872. Equality of access may be effected in several ways. The legislature may choose to draw "safe" minority districts or it may ehoose to spread, but not intention- ally to fracture, the minority population over a few districti. It is clear, however, that neither choice is constitutionally man- dated. Mobile tt. Bolden, supra; Whit- state action causing vote dilution, the legislature could constitutionally apportion the state on the basis of race. A fortiori, whether a federal court, in the absence of official discrimination, mav reapportion a state along racial lines is a qucstion United letish Organizations tjlmply ioes not answer. 1138 6?4 FEDERAL SI.]PPLEMENI ' cornb 1). Chottis, 403 U.S' 8t 156-15?, 91 S.Ct. at 18?f?6. How equality of access is achieved in a given stst€ is thus a policy choice that has been left, in the first in' stance, to the legislatures. IVhere there is a history of official dis' crimination in connection with exercise of the franchise, a court may be justified in fashioning a remedy, such as "safe" black districts, that remove the "structure and residual effects of the past." Kirksey,554 F.2d at l5l; Marshall o- Edwards, 582 F.2d at 936. See also (Iniaersity of Cali- fornia Regents a. Bakke,438 U'S' 265, 98 s.ct. zzgg, 5? L.Ed.zd ?50 (19?8). where there is no history of discrimination, a fed- eral court has no business imposing on a state a policy-the creation of black dis- tricts and white districts-that represents an extreme departure from prior reappor- tionments. 208, nothing more. The remedy Cqurt Ex- ,hibit 1A provides for the blacks is simply the settlement offer made by counsel for the Commission. It does not purport to be based upon any constitutional principle at all; it was merely a way of trying to dis- pose of the case. DetValle Exhibit 208 is iifferent in one respect, in that it does not represent a compromise. It represents to tai victory for the Hispanic plaintiffs, who drew this particular exhibit in such a way as to afford the Hispanic communities the maximum possible representation consist- ent with requirements that legislative dis- tricts be compact and contiguous' But I do not see that the Hispanic component of the majority plan is any more constitutionally based than the black comPonent' The majority plan is not only a substitu- tion of the court's policy for that of the legislature, it is the imposition of a- policy *rat tras no constitutional basis' It is a political compromise. It lies half way be- iween the Commission plan and the Coali- tion plan proposed by the plaintiffs' This is apparent from simply looking at the ma- jority plan: it gives the blacks six senate districts in which they have a 65 per cent majority rather than the five contained in the C,ommission plan or the seven provided in the Coalition plan and still demanded by the plaintiffs. It gives the blacks 13 House districts in which they are at least a 65 per cent majority rather than the 12 found in the C,ommission plan or the 14 in the Coali- tion plan. Thus, on its face, the majority plan appears to be a compromise arrived at Ly the iime-honored method of splitting the dlfference. But this conclusion need not be based merely upon looking at the various plans. That would be a matter of infer- "n"*, good one, but still subject to the usual resenrations about circumstantial evi- dence. It is not necessary to rely on infer' ence here. To the extent that anyone can know anything, we know that the majority plan is ihe result of political compromise L"".o." we know it is based entirely upon Court's Exhibit's 1A and DelValle Exhibit The majority remedy does not stop with ordering proportional representation for minorities. It actually goes beyond that and orders that blacks and Hispanics be given special treatment by way of the 65 per cent formula. The majority's discus- sion of the guideline is, like its discussion of the majority plan itself, contained in footnote 8?. The footnote recites that dur- ing the testimony "both sides referred ap provingly to the 65 per cent figure'" I recall no such "approving" reference by any defense witness. Defendants acknowl- edled that such a formula has been used in reapportionment cases but did not concede its propriety. The only witness for defend- ants referred to in the footnote was Kim- ball Brace, a professional reapportioner, and while he said he has used the guideline himself in other cases, he did not say he believes it is valid. This is the first court to order Lhe imple mentation of such a guideline' I believe the order is without evidentiary basis and without legal precedent. Furthermore, I believe it i; baa Public folicY.' ln tlnited Jeuish Organizations tt' Car- ey, 430 U.S. 144, 164, 9? S.Ct' 996, 1009, 51 i.fa.za 229 (1977\, a voting rights case where affirmative action was required to remedy past discrimination, the Court stat- ed (opinions of J. Powell and Justices Bren. nan, White, Marshall and Blackmun); Cali- fano o. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. L99, Z?5, g7 s.cr. 1021, 1035, 51 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977) (J. Stevens, concurring); Stanton a. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, t4-t5, 95 S.Ct. t3?3, 13?8, 43 L.Ed.zd 688 (1975); DeFunis a. Odegaard,, 416 U.S. 312, 343, 94 S.Ct. 1?04, 1?19, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (19?4) (J. Douglas, dissenting). It seems to me that the 65 per cent formu- la, applied routinely in favor of minorities without referrnce to whether they have been fenced out of the electoral process, is indeed a suggestion of their inferiority. The evidence is undisputed in this case that there has never been any racial or ethnic bar to voting in the State of lllinois. There has never been a poll tax here, nor a litera- cy test, nor any history of racial intimida- tion in electoral matters. There is no ques- ll. If this were to be tested against the one-per- son-one-vote principle, I am not sure what the answer would be, It does seem, at least on the u39 Despite the deficiencies of the record be fore us, I do not doubt that a factual basis for each of the predicates of the 65 per cent formula-younger age, Iower registra- tion, lower tumout--+ould be demonstrat- ed. (I do doubt that there is any factual basis for the 5 per cent allowance for eaeh of these factors; I suspect this is entirely arbitrary). I am willing to assume that tlre Illinois legislature could validly make an allowance for these factors in drawing the boundaries of legislative districts.tt But I do not think it is proper for this court to order the State of lllinois to make such an allowance. Granting that the black and Hispanic pofuhtions have a higher birth rate than whites and t}tus have a lower average age, how does this translate into a constitutional principle that the states must tlrerefore allow the blacks and Hispanics of face of it, that these compensatory formulas give an added weight to each minority vote. RYBICKI v. sTITn BD. oF.ELnItIoxs oF STAT; oF ILL. Clrc B S7a F5upp. t0t2 (t9S2) r- 7r B t t t t We think it was'tlasonable for the Attor- tion that blacks in'this count4r have had ney General to conelude in this case that enorrnous obstaelets to overcome and that a substantial non'white population ma- the effects of slavery and discriminati/njority-in the vicinity of 65 per cent- are difficult to extinpate. On the otlrer would be required to achieve a non-white hand, registering to vote and turaing up at majority of eligible voters. @mphasis in the polling place to cast that votc is s;e original). thing millions of blacks are able to do. This language furaishes no authority for This is because, in a state like Illinois, requiring a state to use a 65 per cent whatever racial barriers there are in mat- formula, nor does it even support the prop ters sueh as housing and employment, osition t}lat a state's voluntary use of a 65 there are none barring access to the voter,s per cent formula would be reasonable in registration office or to the polling place. every qase. Various groups of immigrants to this Justice Brennan, concurring in United country have faced and are still facing Jewbh Organizatioas, explored the impli- difficult problems of adjustment that intei cations of preferential treatment such as fere with their participation in the electoral the 65 per cent formula: process. Many of these people do not Furthermore, even preferential treat- speak English when they arrive in this ment may act to stigmatize its recipient count4r but take the trouble to learn it. groups, for although intended to correct Millions of immigrants have encountered systematic or institutional inequities, discrirnination in employment. All immi- such a policy may imply to some the grants, regardless of their national origin, recipient's inferiority and especial need have had to do something to gain the fran- for proteetion. chise that no black in modern times has had 4B0U.S. atlTB_L74,gTS.Ct.at1014. See to do: they have had to go through the also (Jniaersity of Califomia Regents u. lengthy and not altogether undemanding Bakke, 439 U.S. 265, 2gg, 360, gg s.ct. process of becoming citizens of the united n33,2752,2783-84, 57 L.Ed.zd ?50 (19?8) States. I 6?4 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT against them in electoral matters' There ie no such history. The black and Hisppnic pUir{titfs are being given the benefit of this 65 per eent guideline solely because of the testirnony that blacles and Hbpanics are younger, register less and, aote les*. It follows, it seems to me, that any group whieh can make a similar claim vis-a-vis the white population, or any identifiable white ethnic group that can make the claim vis'a- vis the white population at large, can re' quest the same relief. A further problem with the 65 per cent formula is that it seems to be inconsistent with the cases in this Circuit which hold that a defendant in a criminal case cannot complain that grand and petit jurors were selected from a voting list which contains disproportionately few young persons and blacks. See [Jnited States a. Dellinger, 472F.2d 340, 364-366 (?th Cir'19?2); Unit- ed, States a. Gast, 457 tr.zd 141 (?th Cir' lg72). As Justice Douglas asked in his dissent in Wright a. Rockefeller, supra, "If race is not a proper criterion for drawing a jury list, how can it be in designing an electoral district?" 3?6 U.S. at 67, 84 S'Ct' at 611. This completes my criticism of the reme dy ordered by the majority. I will describe briefly the remedy I think appropriate for the Crosby plaintiffs. The relief I would grant would be a map drawn according to the traditional neutral criteria, without re' gard to what I believe is the constitutional- ly impermissible consideration of race or ethnic character. Such a map would con- sist of compact and contiguous districts, drawn with due regard to the one-person- one-vote requirement as well as natural $ates are required to include aliens, ttan' sients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of crime in the apportionment base by which their legislatorJ are distributJd and' against which compliance with the Equal Protection Clause is to be measured. (Emphasis added). 13. The entire testimonv al the trial concerning the 55 per cent formula '*'ould not occupy more than three or four pages of transcript' 1140 voting age to cast supercharged bal[ots? Granting that blacks and Hispanics of vot- ing age have a lesser registration rate than whites, how, in the absenc6 of any etste'im- posed bar to registration, can a federal court interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to require a gerrymander on t'his account?rz And how does the failure of a qualified, registered voter to appear at the polls on election day become a constitution- al question? There maY be something about failing to vote that is racially or ethnically based, but it would take a great deal more time than was spent on the mat- ter in this trial to show what it is.r' The Illinois legislature might see fit to draw boundary lines in a way that will relieve blacks and Hispanics of the consequences of failing to cast the votes they are eligible to cast, but it seems to me that is a decision for the legislature to make, not one for this court to dictate. One wonders just how far this matter of electoral subsidies goes, and where it will end. What if it could be shown that natu- ralized citizens of Lithuanian extraction in Chicago are registered to vote in lesser percentages than native-born citizens of Irish and Polish extraction? Is this an Equal Protection question? What if His- panics have a lower average age than blacks; are the Hispanics entitled to more than the 5 per cent allowance for age, or does the black allowance become reduced? The questions are unending, and it does not seem to me that the majority opinion pro vides any answers. It certainly is not an answer to say that the blacks and Hispan- ics in this case are being given the advan- tage of the 65 per cent guideline because of a prior history of state discrimination 12. In the case of the Hispanics, the low registra- tion may in part be due to the fact that many Himaniis ari not American citizens' The ma- joriiy decision, in adopting the 15 per cgnt- f9r; mula for the Hispanics, accepts the doubtful proposition that American citizens of Hispanic extiaction are entitled to have their voting pow- er enhanced because of the presence of Hispan' ic aliens in the community. Sez Burns v' Rich- ardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92, 86 S'Ct. 1286' 1296, 16 L.En.2d 376 (1966): Neither in Reytolds r'' Sirzs nor in any other decision has this Court suggested that the an( a.) Ma wo' wh wo dor Lg. cou the pla tha er m8 fir: Cor dra ttnG gr0 alr oft wiI lav tior l \trol per cag the son har for ma. tior clei nor dra ly: quz isl poi: wh, disr firr I dre ma. dra 14. ly . .rdi* RYBICKi v. STATE BD. OF ELEC:IIONS Or STATE OF ILL' 1141 tclr. rt t7a F'tuPP' t@ (f9sa) and political boundaries. See, e.g., Connor redistrict€r is well aware of the racial eon'/ a. F,inct\ 431 u.s. at 425,9? s.at. at 1889; centrations in the city ...." The majority Monhail 1. Edwards,682 F.Zd at 93?. It also expresseB "grave doubts as to whether would be a colorblind mop. I do not know such a 'colorblind' map would be aceepted ' what the effect on minority bloc voting as neutral by any of the parties to this would be, but since my remedy would take lawsuit'" down the wall and would not gerrymander against blacks, I do not see how blacks could have fewer majority districts than they would have under the Commission plan. C,onceivably, they would have more than the court plan provides. But whatev' er the bloc voting effect of a colorblind map might be, it would be unintended. That, in my view, is the onlY waY the Crcnstitution permits. There is no way to draw racially conscious lines that will be "neutral." If the lines glve minority groups anything less than strict proportion- al representation based on their percentage of the population as a whole, the minorities will claim their vote was "diluted;" yet, the law is clear that proportional representa- tion is not a constitutional requirement. My instructions to a eourt reapportioner would be to draw contiguous, compact, one- person-one-vote districts in the City of Chi- cago, starting at some point on the edge of the lake (selected either arbitrarily or with some neutral logic the reapportioner might have) and work out from there. I would forbid any initial reference to demographic maps showing racial and ethnic distribu- tion. If the end result turned out to be clearly unfair to some racial or ethnic mi' nority, this would be cause for some re drawing. I do not suggest that a complete- ly random map would necessarily be ade- quate on the first try. What I do suggest is that it is the only appropriate starting point for a court-ordered plan in a case where there is no prior history of official discrimination, and thus, no basis for af- firmative action. The majority opinion, in footnote 95, ad- dresses itself to the idea of a colorblind map and concludes that it would have to be drawn by a computer because "any hunton ll. I am not referring to a situation where racial- ly conscious lines would have to be dr:'u'r' in It seems to me a non sequitur to say that because a redistricter would be aware of the racial concentrations in the city he would be unable to draw a map that ig- nored racial concentrations. To know something is not to be controlled by it, unless, of course, one wants to be. Much of our civil rights legislation is based upon the premise that decisionmakers can and should make decisions without regard to race, religion, national origin, or other in- vidious factors. Employers who obviously know the race or sex of job applicants are required by law to make hiring decisions without regard to race or sex. If the ma- jority opinion is eorrect, this would be im- possible. Yet, it is done every day. Fair Housing laws require sellers and landlords to sell and rent real estate without regard to race, religion or national orign. The same laws also require realtors to show available housing on a nondiscriminatory basis. These are person-to-person' faceto- face dealings. There is no doubt that the seller of a home or a landlord or a realtor knows the race of the applicant. Age dis- crimination laws provide another example of a situation where the decision-maker is expected to act without regard to a particu- lar factor even though he knows that fac- tor exists. A closer analogy to the drawing of elec- toral district lines would be the drawing of school atbendance boundary lines. Surely our law presumes that school attendance boundaries tan be drawn along neutral lines, without regard to race, because this is what federal law requires.r{ If the ma- jority opinion is correet about the frailty of a "human" decisionmaker, it would be im- possible to draw school attendance bounda- ries which are not based upon race' Again, order to correcl for past discrimination. 674 FEDERAL.SUPPLEMEM i**;l - tt42 however, I hope it is safd to say tlrat ttre vast majority of school districts \n this country have boundary lines which have not been drawn on the iasis of race. The computer will be involved whether the lines are colorblind or not, since so much of the redistricting process is based upon computer data. The census informa- tion itself, which provides tle reapportioner his most important data base, is computer- generated. All of the maps received in evidence, including Court Exhibit 1A and DelValle Exhibit 208, which the majority adopts as its plan, are drawa from data supplied by computers. (The information could, of course, be derived in other ways; the computer merely speeds up the proc- ess). Finally, I would not worry about whether any of the parties to this lawsuit would consider a colorblind map to be neutral. All of the plaintiffs in this case desire not a neutral map but one which will maximize their group voting potential. The DelValle plaintiffs have achieved this under the court-ordered plan. I assume they will be fully satisfied with the court plan. ?he Crosby plaintiffs, on the other hand, have not achieved the maximum bloc voting strength for blacks which they sought in this lawsuit, and I suspeet they will be no happier with the court plan than they were wit}l the Commission plan. I believe these cases must be decided aecording to the law, not according to what the parties want or think they should have. The majority's concern n"ith whether the parties would "accept" a colorblind map reveals again the desire of the majority for compromise. The drawing of a colorblind map might have pitfalls of which I am unaware. Should that prove true, adjustments would have to be made. \flhatever the difficulties might be, I think they would be less for- midable than those which are found in the majority plan. If we were to tell a reap portioner to draw a colorblind map, he would have instructions he could under- stand. I do not know what instructions are given b5 the majority decision. The ration- ale for the lines being drawn as they are is not stated. Ihe result is in reality a politi- cal compromise, but the opinion dqgs not sdy so. It gives no guidance to th'e next set of reapportioners who will have the task of drawing a map that complies with the Constitution. Heretofore, it has been thought sufficient to avoid purposeful dis- crimination or dilution of minority voting strength. Now, some unspecified degree of affirmative action is required, even with- out a prior finding of official discrimina- tion. Perhaps the explanation omitted from the majority opinion cau be spelled out in future cases. On the basis of to- day's decision, I suspect there will be plen- ty of them. The DelValle Plaintiffs The majority opinion adopts the Hispanic post-trial settlement with the Commission as part of the courtordered plan and finds that the settlement is "fair." The parties were, of course, free to settle the case and were encouraged by the eourt to do so. If that was all that oecurred here, I would have no occasion to dissent. But this set- tlement is receiving the imprimatur of this court, both by its incorporation into the court's judgment order and by the specific finding of the majority that the settlement is "fair." Thus, the settlement will appar- ently have precedential value. In future reapportionments, Hispanics and other groups, could believe, quite reasonably, that they are entitled to the same treat- ment the Hispanics receive in the settle ment adopted by the court today. For this reason, I am compelled to state that, in my view, the settlement is not fair. It gives the Hispanics full relief when, under the evidence, they are entitled to none. The Hispanic plaintiffs, in my opinion, have not met their burden of showing that the defendants purposefully diseriminated against them because of thef Hispanic an- cestry. It is true that the Commission map is not drawn so as to maximize the voting strength of either the Puerto Rican commu- nity on the near north side of the City or the Mexican-American community on the south side. The lines could have been drawn so as to form districts which would c s c p t v t n a n v ti S C v, k U c( T r{ pr M CI l5 *--*&,-- I F Itt bt E I, E E F t- d d )- F tiebreaking member of the Commission. Shapiro told the Democrat members of the Commission that the one condition of his voting for their map was that they revise it to make separate districts for Netsch and Marovitz. If defendants had not made that concession they would have had no map. There is no evidence that Governor Shapi- ro, in causing the lines to be drawn so as to provide separate districts for Netsch and Maroyitz, did so because he desired to dis- criminate against Hispanics. This situation 15. The coun received into evidence the map that the Commission had prepared for adoption prior to the intercession of Governor Shapiro on group of residents was not afforded the same consideration as other groups of resi- dents. The evidence showed that the Com- mission was beleagered with requests and demands of all kinds, many of which were in conflict, so that, necessarily, not every- one could be satisfied. There must always be disappointed suitors in every reappor- tionment. The fact that the suitor happens to be white, black or Hispanic does not show that this was the reason for the deci- sion. behalf of Netsch and Marovitz. Def. Ex. 81. This n:a; ((,!ld not reasonably be regarded as an intcnl ir,iral dilution of the Hispanic vote. RYBTCKI v. BTATE bO. OT.ELBCTIONS OF STATE OF ILL.. clrc.t t7a F.8rtpp. llf,2 (l*l) e t I I t f t l ) : t concentrate larger numbers of Hiapanic is unlike that on tbe South Side involving vot€rs, thus making more likely the elec- Senators Joyce and Dawson. there, the tion of a candidate of their'choice. But districts were gerrymandered precisely bf| there'is no showing that the failure of the cause the Commission believed blac(s Commission to draw the lines in that man- would not vot€ for Joyce and Dawson. On ner was the result of purposeful discrimi- the North Side, Netsch and Marovita were nation against Hispanics. Unlike the situ- not going to be in districts with heavy ation regarding the black population of the Hispanic concentrations in any event. Th; City, there was no testimony that anyone only question was whether they would be wanted to put the Hispanics in districts placed in one district or in separate dis- separate from whites or other identifiable groop.. rhere was no testimony concern- ffI;r#J";:ffit:iffi".lilH*?,'fr#ing tension between Hispanics and whites tions of the districts to the west, where or any perceived difficulties that a white candidate or a Hispanic candidate might ril;:1"-"J,r":ii:'"1il!j:'""*':"ll?r*l experience running in a district composed that, without the intervention by former of a majority of Hispanic and a minority of Governor Shapiro, the Commisrion ."p white voters' This is not to say that such would have given the puerto Rican commu- tensions do not exist or that such difficul- ties might not be encountered. rhe point ltffi'ff"1::J,":1"'3:'1,--,:fTill,,* t' is they were not part of the evidence, and there is no reason to eonclude that any Plaintiffs also point out that the Commis- such ethnic-political considerations played " sion acceded to the requests of Evanston part in the way the lines effecting the and Oak Park not to be divided, while ig- Hispanic neighborhoods were drawn. noring the requests of Hispanic leaders What the evidence does disclose, withgt that the Hispanic neighborhoods in Chicago contradiction, is that the lines were drain be given the same treatment. Plaintiffs so as to protect and enhance the reelection ar8rue that this disparate treatment of the chances of incumbent legislators. It hap various requests is, of itself, unconstitu- pens that those legislators are white, but tional discrimination against the Hispanic the evidence does not show this is why they eommunity. While the argument has some were favored. They were favored because equitable appeal, I believe it must be reject- they are incumbents. Some of them are ed. Failure or refusal to comply with the members of the Democratic organization, request of Hispanics, even while complying and two of them, Senators Netseh and Ma- with similar requests by other groups, does rovitz, were favored because of the inter- not show purposeful ethnic discrimina- vention of former Governor Shapiro, the tion. What it shows is that a particular r143 'tlf ,,l44 674 FEDERAL.gUPPLEMENI, , . There are good reasons for including an supported by any credible evidence. Jt i8 entire city, such as Evanston or Oak*Park, ironic that this post-event rationalieation within one electoral district rather than oft'ered by the defendants is now the princi- splitting it up. It eannOt be argued that pal evidence against them. the Commission complied with unmeritori- ous requests by these municipalities and Even assuming that Madigan and Mur- yet ignored legitimate demands by the His- phy did consider probable Hispanic residen' panic communities. -J ---- --'- tial trends at the time they were drawing There is no doubt that the commission the map' it seems to me that such a consid- knew the effect of its lines on the Hispanic eration would still be in the "in spite of' communities. It knew that the voting category rather than the "because of' cate' strength in each of the communities would gory' The lines were not drawn as they be divided in such a manner that there were because of the direction of anticipated woutd be no dlstnct ln wnrcn .Erspanlcs, as Hispanic migration' They were drawn that a bloc, would be likely to elect a candidate way because of Governor Shapiro's insis- of their choice. Plaintiffs placed heavy tence that Senators Netsch and Marovitz emphasis on this awareness. However, as be accommodated' The snowsuit theory' the Supreme Court has held, the discrimi- assuming it played a role, was simply a natory intent required for a constitutional prediction that the Netsch-Marovitz conces- violation means more than that the deci- sion would not hurt the Hispanics in the sionmaker was aware of the consequences; Iong run because they would "grow into" it means that the decisionmaker selected the districts as drawn. the particular course of action not merely Conclusion: "in spite of" but at least in part "because of its adverse affects upon the objecting what has happened here' in my view' is group. Mobile a. Bold,en,446n.s.55,72 that a federal court has adopted as consti- n. 1?, 100 s.ct. 1490, 1502 n. 77, 64 L.Ed.26 tutional requirements the racial considera- 4? (1g?g), quoting from Personnel Admin- tions which the constitution permits a state istrator o/ lt*i ,. Feeney, 442 lJ.s. zs6, voluntarily to consider. It is undoubtedly 27g, gg i.Ct. zzzz, 2296, 60 L.Ed.2d 8?0 good government and good politics to try (f9?9). It is clear that the Commissioners to accommodate as many competing de acted ,,in spite of, the adverse affect upon mands as the law and reason will allow the block voting strength of the Hispanic when a state is reapportioned. Obviously, communities. There is no evidence, how- one of the prime demands in recent times ever, that the Commission acted, even in has been that of racial and ethnic minori- part, "because of" that adverse effect. ties for fair treatment. Thus, the state plaintiffs also argued at trial, and the reapportioner works with a mass of demo- majority appears to agree, that the C,om- graphic information which inevitably be- mission,s ,,snowsuit theory,' about the His- comes depicted in demographic maps, panics amounted to intentional ethnic dis- showing the concentrations of blacks and crimination. This is as close as the plain- Hispanies' This is all made possible by the tiffs came to the necessary showing, but it census conducted every ten years, which falls short. First, it is clear to me that the reveals this information. Federal courts ,'snowsuit theory" was a defense devised in are therefore always going to be confront- preparation for irial. It was not something ed with an abundance of .demographic the-reapportioners had in mind when draw- maps, showing where blacks and Hispanics ing the Commission map. The notion that live. At the present time, we have no maps Michael Madigan and Martin Murphy, the showing where other ethnic groups live, authors of the Chicago portion of the Com- but if called upon, the computer eould prob mission map, gave careful consideration to ably deliver them. It seems to me impor- the probable direction of future Hispanic tant for federal courts to realize that this population movement is not one I find to be information, in all its splendor, ma1: be very u8 do aI th' fn tio ha 8U A; mt Fr oor be evr tul sta tio th: tut at i8 tion nci- hr- len- ing sid- of' rte ley ted ut ris- )8- he o" l8 ti- l- E v v > f, ?, B t- e ' RYBIGKT v. STATE pD. OF ELECTIONS OF STATE OF ILL. lf4$ ueefur to tlre state "."ppoition"I",ifif''*u\o*ndix To The Dissent t,does.not form the basis for a rule of feder- al law. I believe that my colleagues, with This Appendix consists of a map of the the best of intentions, have been diverte6 House Districts on the South side of Chiqg- from their proper inquiry by " p""o""rp"- go as they appear in both the Commission tion with the census a"t". tn r;;;-,f; Plan and the plan ordered by the court. have tried to do a better job with the cen- The shaded portions of the map represent sus data than the state legislature did. those census tracts in which Blacks make Apart from the question of the wall, they up at least 85 percent of the population. In may have succeeded in doing exactly thai. the unshaded portions, Blacks constitute FYom the standpoint of social policy, the less than 20 percent of the population. The court plan imposed by my colleagues may healy dark line drawn along tlre western- be better than the commission plan. How- most boundary of House Districts zB, 24, ever, it is not our proper office to substi- 31, 33, 21 and 84 represents what is re tute our social philosophies for those of the ferred to in both opinions as the ,,wall.,, state legislature. our very rimited func- The white neighborhoods of Bridgeport, tion in reapportionment cases is to see to it Canaryville, Gage Park, Marquette tit{anor that the requirements of the federal consti- and Marquette -Park lie immediately westtution are observed. of Districts ZB, 24, 81 and BB. Itz U, & , I ! I I 1146 I 6?{ T'EDERAL SI'PPLEITTENT I t I "..i i i,..:o t. I : -) .-- P.8G l{e I rn I I I NORTIT !it'-l i i Lokc lltchlgan ll c ti i i: i!i E;;: :.h!, , I t I tl, I I a ttto DEGrrrErcS ' co:ocrrrar rsrrltEf,la?wl Liras