Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board Motion to Dismiss or Affirm

    No. 98-405, 98-406

In The

Suprem e Court  of the United  States
October  Term, 199S 

---------------- ♦-----------------

JANTET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE UNITED STATES, -

Appellant, and

GEORGE PRICE, et a!.,

Appellants,
v.

BOSSIER FARISH SCHOOL EO.ARD,

'Appellee.
--------------------♦ --------------------

On A p p ea l  From The 
U n i ted  States Dis t r ic t  Cour t  

For The Dis t r ic t  Of  Colur~bia  
---------------- «.-----------------'

M O T I O N  TO D IS M IS S  OR AFFIRM

M ichael A. C arvin’* 
D avid H. T hompson 
C ooper, Cakvtn & 

Rosenthal, PLLC . 
2000 K Street,  N.W. 
Suite 401
Washington ,  D.C. 20006 
(202) 822-8950

*Counsel of Record _
-  t k - a

M ichael E. R osman 
H ans F. Bader
C enter for Individual Rights 
1233 20th Street,  N.W. 
W ashington,  D.C. 20036 
(202) 833-8400

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CD.. (BOO 22S-W64 
OR CALL COLLECT (*C2) 3*2-2831



I

C O U N T E R S T A T E M E N T ............................................................. 1

A R G U M E N T ...................................................................................... 9

I. THIS APPEAL IS N O N JU ST IC IA B L E  UNDER 
ARTICLE I I I ..........................................................................  9

II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT RULE THAT 
SECTION 5 REACHES ONLY RETROGRESSIVE 
I N T E N T ...................................................................................  14

III. THE PURPOSE INQUIRY UNDER SECTION 5 OF 
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT RELATES E X C L U ­
SIVELY TO RETRO GRESSIVE I N T E N T ................ 19

C O N C L U S I O N .................................................................................  30

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page



11

C ASr.S

Allen v. State Bd. o f  Election, 393 U.S. 544 (1969)......... 13. 22

Anderson v. City o f  Bessemer. 470 U.S. 564 (1985) .........  30

Arizonans f o r  Official English v. Arizona,  117 S. Ct.
1055 (1 9 9 7 ) ................................................................................. 9. 10

Arlington Heights  v. Metropolitan Hous. Dew Corp.,
492 U.S. 252 ( 1 9 7 7 ) .................................................... 16. 18, 19

Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 497 U.S. 916 ( 1 9 9 0 ) .............. 28

BankAmerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122
( 1 9 8 3 ) .................................................................................................  21

Beer  v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1975) 
........................................................................20, 21, 24, 25. 26, 27

Berry w Doles. 438 U.S. 190 ( 1 9 7 8 ) .......................................13

Burke  v. Barnes.  479 U.S. 361 (1 9 8 7 ) ....................... 9. 11, 12

Bushee  v. Smith. 549 F.Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982),
aff 'd ,  459 U.S. 1166 (1 9 8 3 ) ....................................................  28

Bush  v. Vera. 517 U.S. 952 (1 9 9 6 ) ............................................ 4

Church o f  Scientology  v. United States, 506 U.S. 9
( 1 9 9 2 ) .......................' . ..........................................................................9

City o f  Lockhart  v. United States, 460 U.S. 125 (1983)
. ............................................................................................ 20, 21, 24

City o f  Mobile  v. Bolden. 446 U.S. 55 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . . . 2 5 ,  26, 27

City o f  Pleasant  Grove  v. United States, 479 U.S. 462
( 1 9 8 7 ) .......................................................................................... 28, 29

City o f  R ichmond  v. United States, 422 U.S. 358
( 1 9 7 5 ) ................................................................................. 22, 25, 29

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page



Connecticut  N a t ’I Bank  v. Germain.  503 U.S. 249
( 1 9 9 2 ) .................................................................................................  20

Diamond  v. Charles.  476 U.S. 54 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ............................. 10

Estate o f  Cowart  v. Nicklos Dril ling Co., 505 U.S.
469 (1 9 9 2 ) ........................................................................................  20

Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) . . . .  16

Hall  v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969) ...................................... 10, 11

Johnson  v. DeGrandy,  512 U.S. 997 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ..............................  17

Lawyer  v. Dep t o f  Justice. 117 S. Ct. 2186 (1 9 9 7 ) .........  1 1

Lewis v. Continental  Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472 ( 1 9 9 0 ) .........9

Lopez v. Monterey County, 117 S. Ct. 340 ( 1 9 9 7 ) ...........  13

Lujan v. Defenders o f  Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) . . . .  10, 11

Magnolia  Bar Ass 'n  v. Lee, 994 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir.),
cert, denied.  510 U.S. 994 (1993) .................................................8

Miller  v. Johnson,  115 S. Ct. 2475 ( 1 9 9 5 ) ...........................  28

Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ..................  21

Morse  v. Republican Party, 517 U.S. 186 ( 1 9 9 6 ) .............. 12

Northeastern Fla. Chapter o f  Assoc ia ted  Gen. C on­
tractors  v. Jacksonvil le,  508 U.S. 656 ( 1 9 9 3 ) ................ 12

Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers I n t ’l Union v.
Missouri,  361 U.S. 363 (1960) ................................................ 12

Parham  v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1 9 7 9 ) ................................ 23

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -  Continued
Page



IV

Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U.S. 471
( 1 9 9 7 ) ............................................................. 4. 6. 15. IS. 24. 28

Robinson  v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843 ( 1 9 9 7 ) ...........  20

South Carolina v. Katzenbach,  383 U.S. 301 (1966) . . . .  22

Southern Chris tian Leadership  Conference  v. S e s ­
sions, 56 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1 9 9 5 ) .................................... 7

Thornburg  v. Gingles,  478 U.S. 30 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ..............................7

Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 ( 1 9 9 3 ) ...........................  27

Watkins v. Mabus,  502 U.S. 954 (1991) .................................. 10

Westwego Citizens f o r  Bet ter G o v ’t v. City o f  West-
wego, 906 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1 9 9 0 ) . . ' . ..............................7

Wright  v. Rockefeller,  376 U.S. 52 (1964) .............................. 26

C odes and R ules

42 U.S.C. § 1973c ...................................................................... 10, 20

28 C.F.R. §§ 51 .53-51 .58 .................................................................... 3

LA R.S. 17:52........................................................................................ 10

LA R.S. 17:71.5 A ................................................................................. 4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 2 (a ) ...........................................................................30

Fed. R. Evid. 201 ..................................................................................7

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -  Continued
Page



1

Appellee moves to dismiss or affirm on the ground that 
the Court lacks jurisdiction and that the question presented is 
so insubstantial as not to need further argument.

COUNTERSTATEMENT
Appellants desperately seek to obscure several d isposi­

tive factual issues that demonstrate that this Court should not 
review the validity of the Bossier  Parish School Board’s 
redistricting plan. Specifically, in adopting the plan at issue 
here, the School Board selected the only plan presented to it 
that conformed to state law. since private appellants '  m axim­
ization plan (the “NAACP plan” ) concededly constituted a 
facial violation of state law and thus was “null and void .” J.A. 
266. '  Moreover, the plan that was chosen had already been 
precleared by the Department of Justice just one year before. 
Standing alone, these two legitimate interests demonstrate 
that the School Board did not adopt its redistricting plan with 
a discriminatory purpose. The election results under this plan 
underscore this conclusion. There have been two elections 
conducted pursuant to the plan. In 1994, two black candidates 
were elected to the School Board, one from a district which 
was only 26.7% black. J.A. 47; jurisdic tional  statement of the 
United States at 5 n.3 (“U.S. J.S .” ). In 1998, these two black 
incumbents were reelected without opposit ion. In this e lec­
tion, a third black candidate ran for office and was elected 
over a white Republican in a district that is only 21.1% black. 
J.A. 47. Thus, under the School B oard ’s plan, there are now 
currently three black members on the School Board. Despite 
the success of minority candidates running under the plan, 
appellants seek to have this Court invalidate this plan on the 
ground that it was discriminatory for the School Board not to 
have adopted a racially gerrymandered redistricting plan with 
two black-majority districts.

1 In this brief, citations are to the Appendix (“App.”) filed with the 
jurisdictional statements in this appeal and to the Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 
filed in the prior appeal in this case.



In any event, a remand here to require the district court 
to consider whether it was necessary to adopt appellants '  
maximization plan would be both counterproductive  and 
futile. As the minority population of Bossier  Parish is already 
represented by three minorit \  members on the School Board, 
it would be nonsensical to require the School Board to adopt a 
plan that packs the black population into two octopus-like 
districts,  and thereby diminishes the prospects for electing a 
third minority member. Moreover, any such effort would be 
pointless as the next elections for the School Board will not 
be held until 2002. By that time, new census figures will be 
available, and the School Board will be required to redistrict 
prior to its next elections. Thus, the School Board plan will 
never again be utilized. As we demonstrate  below, this incon­
trovertible fact renders any decision as to the future applica­
tion of the plan wholly advisory  under  Article  III, as 
appellants have no legally cognizable  interest in enjoining an 
otherwise moribund law and appellee has no interest in a 
declaratory judgment  relating to a plan it has abandoned.

In light of appe l lan ts '  gross factual  d is tor t ions ,  an 
extended counter-statement of the case is required.

Bossier Parish is located in northwestern Louisiana and 
is governed by a Police Jury, the 12 members of which are 
elected from single-member districts for consecutive four- 
year terms. Although no electoral district of the Police Jury 
has ever had a majority of black voters, Jerome Darby, a black 
resident of Bossier Parish, had been elected three times (the 
last time without opposit ion) by 1992 to represent a majority- 
white district as a member of the Police Jury. App. 79a. 
Another black representative preceded Mr. Darby in that dis­
trict.

Because of demographic  shifts that were reflected in the 
1990 census, the Police Jury was obliged by Louisiana law to 
redraw its electoral districts. The aim of this redistricting was 
to change existing boundaries as little as possible while fash­
ioning districts of roughly the same population. App. 79a. On 
April 30. 1991, all members of the Police Jury, including



Jerome Darby, its black member, approved a plan containing 
two districts with substantial black populat ions,  but no dis­
trict with a black majority. Specifically, District Four was 
4 5 .29c black, and District Seven was 4 3 .9 9c black. App. 167a 
1 59. The plan was submitted to the Justice Department on 
May 28. 1991. and on July 29. 1991. the Attorney General 
precleared it. Contrary to the insinuations of the appellants, 
the Police Jury submitted all materials  required under Section 
5; a covered jurisdic t ion is under no obligation to submit 
objections received from citizens or special interest groups. 
28 C.F.R. §§ 51.53-51.58. After the Attorney G enera l ’s pre­
clearance. new elections were held. For the third consecutive 
time, Jerome Darby w'as elected from a majority-white  dis­
trict. App. 79a.

The Bossier Parish School Board was also required to 
redraw its electoral districts. Given that the School Board and 
the Police Jury had shared the same district boundaries until 
1980, the School Board approached the Police Jury to fo rm u­
late a common redistricting plan. App. 79a. The Police Jury 
rejected this overture and adopted its own redistricting plan. 
State law expressly prohibited the School Board from chang­
ing, splitting, or consolidating the precincts established by the 
Police Jury for the Police Jury 's  1991 redistricting plan. J.A. 
265-66 (“The boundaries of any election district for a new 
apportionment plan from which members of a school board 
are elected shall contain whole precincts established by the 
parish governing authority under R.S. 18:532 or 532.1 .” ). 
Thus, it would have been a facial violation of state law for the 
School Board to adopt the NA ACP plan, or for that matter  any 
plan that created a black majority district, because as the 
parties have stipulated: “ [i]t is impossible to draw, on a 
precinct level, a black-majori ty district in Bossier  Parish 
without cutting or splitting exist ing precinct  l ines .” App. 195a 
1 152. The failure to abide by this mandatory state law 
requirement would have rendered the Board 's  plan “null and 
void.” J.A. 266.



4

Appellants have sought to undermine the force of this 
state law requirement by consistently making the dem ons tra ­
bly false assertion that the School Board could have requested 
the Police Jury  to split precinct lines so that the NA ACP plan 
might be adopted. Appellants neglect to mention the u n am ­
biguous state law which makes clear that the School Board 
could not have gone back to the Police Jury in an effort to 
have precincts split. Under state law, the School Board was 
required to redistrict prior  to December  37, 1992.  J.A. 65; LA 
R.S. 17:71.5A. And under state law, the Police Jury could 
only make changes to its existing precincts after December  
31, 1992. J.A. 277. Thus, it was impossible  for either  the 
School Board or the Police Jury to sanction any precinct  splits 
prior to the mandatory deadline for the School Board to adopt 
a redistricting plan.2 This requirement under state law' that 
school boards and Police Juries use the same  precincts as 
“building blocks” for their districts is, of course, entirely 
r a t io n a l .3 Sp l i t t ing  p rec in c ts  by d ive rg en t  d i s t r ic t  l ines 
engenders substantial costs and creates significant voter  con ­
fusion. App. 107a; see Bush  v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 974-75

2 The United States argued in Bossier 1 that it was permissible for the 
Police Jury to consolidate precincts after January 1, 1993. See Transcript of 
Supreme Court Oral Argument at 55-56. This, of course, is irrelevant 
because there is nothing to consolidate if precincts have not been split in 
the first place. As noted, such splits could not occur because both the 
Police Jury and the School Board were barred from splitting precincts in 
the timeframe permitted under state law for the School Board to finalize its 
redistricting plan.

3 Although it is true, as appellants note, that the Police Jury and 
School Board used different district lines for the first time in the 1980s, 
they had never split precinct lines and there is no evidence that any of the 
redistricting plans submitted for the Board’s consideration by its 
cartographer created such splits. Appellants’ own witness was able to cite 
only three examples of other Louisiana jurisdictions that had split a “few” 
precincts, J.A. 137, and all of those apparently were done to accommodate 
the Justice Department objections, as permitted by state law. J.A. 277. That 
is not relevant here as the Justice Department had not interposed any 
objection here in December 1992.



(1996). Thus, even assuming (as the district court did to give 
appellants every benefit of the doubt) that the Police Jury 
somehow could have retroactively created 65 additional pre­
cincts to render the NAACP plan lawful, neither it nor the 
School Board had any rational reason to do so.

Moreover, the conclusion that state law prohibited the 
adoption of any plan creating a black-majori ty district was 
uniformly acknowledged by the parties at the time the School 
Board was considering which plan to adopt. Specifically, the 
School Board was correctly advised both by its cartographer 
and the Parish 's  District Attorney during the September 3, 
1992 meeting where the NAACP plan was presented that its 
massive number of precinct splits violated state law. App. 
83a-84a: App. 179a tft 102. Likewise,  the N A A CP itself 
acknowledged this state law prohibition in 1992. and merely 
contended that the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution required the School Board to ignore state law. 
J. A. 122.

Subsequently, George Price, president  of the local chap­
ter of the NAACP and an appel lant-intervenor in this case, 
submitted his own plan to the School Board that included two 
majority-black districts, the maximum possible number  of 
such districts and roughly proport ional  (2/12) to the Parish 's  
black population of 17.6%. App. 83a. The plan was drawn by 
William Cooper for the exclusive purpose of “c re a t in g ]  two 
majority black districts,” J.A. 260, wholly without regard to 
precinct  boundaries. The NAACP plan subordinates tradi­
t ional red is tr ic t ing  pr inciples ,  such as com p ac tn ess  and 
respect for the political boundaries of towns, the Police Jury 
districts and precincts. A district court in a related case said 
of a modified, “ improved” version of the N A A CP plan, that it 
“most nearly resembles an octopus as it stretches out to the 
nooks and crannies of the parish in order to collect enough 
black voting age population to create not one, but two, major­
ity-black districts in Bossier .” J.A. 38.

In direct contravention of Louis iana law, the NAACP 
plan splits 46 precincts, 65 times. P la in t i f f ’s Exh. 11, pp.



6

1-26: App. 29a. (Some of the precincts suffered more than a 
single split; thus requiring that they become three or more 
new precincts.) Of these. 17 precincts would have had less 
than 20 people in them. Plaintiff  s Exh. 11. pp. 1-26.

On September 3. 1992. the School Board responded to 
NAACP concerns by granting its request that a black person 
be appointed to the vacant seat on the Board. Far from being a 
“meaningless pall iat ive” as the government has previously 
contended. Brief for the Federal Appellant.  Reno  v. Bossier  
Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997) (No. 95-1455) (“Bossier  
/") at 28. the appointment of Jerome Blunt is indicative of 
"the Board 's demonstrable willingness to ensure  black repre­
sentation on the Board. . . . ” App. 112a (emphasis  in origi­
nal).

At the same September 1992 meeting, the Board also 
passed a motion of intention to adopt the Police Jury 's  redis­
tricting plan. The jury plan offered “the twin attractions of 
guaranteed preclearance and easy implementation (because no 
precinct lines would need [to be] redrawfn])” . App. 106a. By 
maintaining the integrity of the Police Jury 's  precincts, the 
School Board not only complied with Louisiana law, but also 
avoided the costs and disruptions that would have accom ­
panied the NAACP plan. Furthermore ,  the School Board 
understandably assumed that the Department of Justice would 
automatically preclear  a plan that was identical  to one the 
Department found to be entirely free of anv discriminatory 
purpose or effect just one year before. The plan also offered 
the substantial promise that black voters wmuld be able to 
elect a candidate of their choice as demonstrated by the fact 
that two districts were well over 407c black.

On January 4, 1993, the School Board submitted its plan 
to the Department of Justice for preclearance. Despite the 
identity between the Police Jury and School Board plans, the 
Department denied preclearance citing “new information,  par­
ticularly the 1991 [PJolice [J]ury elections held under the 
1991 redistricting plan and the 1992 redistricting process for 
the [Sjchool [Bjoard. App. 235a. Yet, the only noteworthy



7

event of the 1991 Police Jury elections was that Jerome Darby 
was once again re-elected, this time without opposit ion,  to 
represent a majority-white district.

The clearest evidence of the opportunity of Bossier 's  
black citizenry to participate meaningfully in the electoral 
process lies in the incontrovertible fact that three black candi­
dates have now been elected to the School Board in 1998 
under its p lan .4 The election of three black members  to the 
School Board under the new plan completely  refutes appel­
lants '  repeated claim that the “clearly foreseeable  effect"  of 
the plan was to prevent any black candidates from being 
elected. See, e.g., Brief for the Federal Appellant,  Bossier  I at 
22. It also conclusively refutes the wholly unsubstantia ted 
speculation of the Justice Department’s expert.  Dr. Engstrom, 
that the white population will not vote for black candidates in 
Bossier Parish.5

4 It is well established that a court may take judicial notice of any fact 
that is not subject to reasonable dispute and is capable of accurate and 
ready determination. See. e.g.. Fed. R. Evid. 201. Accordingly, appellate 
courts have routinely taken judicial notice of post-trial elections in voting 
rights cases given their clear relevance to the proceedings. See. e.g., 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Sessions. 56 F.3d 1281. 1288 
n.13 (11th Cir. 1995). cert, denied. 516 U.S. 1045 (1996) (“To provide a 
current depiction of the composition of the [Alabama Supreme Court] we 
have taken judicial notice of information not available at the time the 
district court rendered its decision.”); Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v. 
City of Westwego, 906 F.2d 1042. 1045 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that “given 
the long term nature and extreme costs necessarily associated with voting 
rights cases, it is appropriate to take into account elections occurring 
subsequent to trial.”).

5 There is no competent evidence of racial bloc voting in any local 
Bossier Parish elections. Specifically, Dr. Engstrom was concededly 
unable to find any racial bloc voting in any election for any Bossier Parish 
office, pursuant to either the “extreme case analysis [or] bivariate 
ecological regression analysis” endorsed by the Gingles plurality opinion. 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 52-53 (1986); J.A. at 115-21. The only 
election where racial bloc voting was found was one “exogenous” state 
judicial race (held not just in Bossier Parish), which obviously reflects



8

Two elections have been held under the redistricting plan 
adopted by the School Board. In 1994, two black candidates 
w'ere elected to the School Board. Julian Darby was elected 
from district 10. which is only 26.7% black. J.A. 47. Vassie 
Richardson, who is also black, was elected from district 4. 
which is 45% black. In the interim period between elections, 
the School Board appointed Kenneth Wiggins, an African- 
American, to fill a vacancy in district 8 on the School Board. 
In the 1998 elections, Mr. Wiggins was chal lenged by a white 
Republican opponent. Even though Mr. W igg ins’ district was 
only 21.1% black, he won re-election. See J.A. 47; Official 
Elections Results attached hereto at A4. Also, both Julian 
Darby and Vassie Richardson were again elected, this time 
without opposition. Id. at A8. As a result of these elect ions in 
which three black candidates have been elected to the School 
Board, it is now clear beyond a reasonable doubt that minor­
ities have a meaningful  opportunity to elect representa t ives of 
their choice in at least three districts under the School B oard ’s 
plan. They also enjoy 25% (3/12) of  the representation on the 
School Board in a parish with only 2 0 .7% black population 
and 17.69c black voting age population. App. 79a. Inexplica­
bly, appellants seek to undo this remarkable  success story of 
racially nonpolarized  voting and extra-proportional  represen­
tation of black School Board officials and replace it with a 
plan where black voters are packed into two  majority districts. 
Since such black majority districts are plainly not needed to 
provide black voters a viable opportunity to elect their prefer­
red candidates and three blacks have been elected in white- 
majority districts,  there is absolutely no beneficial purpose

different voting patterns than those for local representative office. J.A. 
113-15. See, e.g., Magnolia Bar Ass’n v. Lee, 994 F.2d 1143, 1149 (5th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 994 (1993). Even in this single race, the “racial 
polarization” led to the black candidate receiving 35.7% of the vote in a 
parish with a 17.6% black voting age population, a positive difference of 
18.1%. J.A. 57.



9

served by this racial gerrymander  and its “clearly foreseeable  
effect" is to dilute  black voting strength.

ARGUMENT
I. THIS APPEAL IS NONJUSTICIABLE UNDER ARTI­

CLE III.
Appellants seek to have this Court opine on the legal 

validity of a six-year-old redistricting plan that will never 
again be used in any election. Article III prevents such an 
advisory opinion as appellants lack standing and the case is 
now moot. It has long been recognized that the "case-or- 
controversy requirement [of Article III] subsists through all 
stages of federal judicial  proceedings, trial and appel la te .” 
Lewis  v. Continental  Bank Corp.. 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). 
Accordingly, "the standing Article III requires must be met by 
persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by 
persons appearing in courts of first instance."  Arizonans f o r  
Official English v. Arizona,  117 S. Ct. 1055, 1067 (1997) 
(citing Diamond  v. Charles. 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986)). L ike­
wise, "Article III of the Consti tution requires that there be a 
live case or controversy at the time that a federal court 
decides the case: it is not enough that there may have been a 
live case or controversy when the case was decided by the 
court whose judgment  we are reviewing.” Burke  v. Barnes,  
479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987) (citing Sosna  v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 
402 (1975)). Therefore, Article III requires a case to be 
dismissed as moot "if  an event occurs [pending review] that 
makes it impossible for the court to grant fany)effectual relief 
Whatever)  to a prevailing party.” Church o f  Scientology  
UnTTelfStates, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quoting Mills  v. Green , 
159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)).

This Court lacks jur isdiction over this appeal because,  
regardless of whether  the Court affirms or remands the lower 
cour t ’s declaratory judgment  preclearing the Board 's  1992 
redistricting plan, that p l a n |will~ never  again /be used for any 
purpose. One month after appellants filed their jur isdic t ional  
statements in this Court, the last election ever to be held



10

under the School Board 's  plan was conducted,  and three black 
candidates were elected. The School Board 's  plan will never 
again be utilized because under Louis iana law. the next 
School Board election will not take place until 2002. LA R.S. 
17:52. By that time, new federal decennial census data will un­
available, and thus the School Board will be required under 
this Court 's  one-person one-vote precedents to adopt a new 
apport ionment plan. Accordingly, the current plan is already a 
dead letter. In the terms of Section 5, the voting “prac t ice” at 
issue here will never again be “enforcelcjl” bv anv off icial in 
Bossier  Parish. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.

The Court has held that Section 5 challenges to election 
procedures that have already been implemented and that will 
not be enforced in the future are moot. In Watkins v. M a lm s . 
502 U.S. 954 (1991). the Court considered whether  “the 
preclearance requirements of Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act apply to the changes in the absentee ballot procedures 
adopted for the September 17 e lect ion . . . . ” As the election 
had already occurred and the challenged procedure would not 
be utilized in the fu ture , the Court held that “ [t]he completion 
of the September 17 election has rendered this claim moot 
with regard to the relief sought, i.e., an order enjoining the 
September 17 election for failure to comply with prec learance 
requirements.” 502 U.S. at 954-55. Likewise, in Hall v. B ea ls , 
396 U.S. 45 (1969). the Court held that a suit for injunctive 
relief against a voter residency requirement was moot because 
the election had already taken place jind, the statute was no 
longer in effect. ^ y C a j J l  , j e j j e c f  u

As these cases reflect, there are two related jurisdic tional  
bars to this Court 's  jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. First, 
neither party has any legally cognizable  interest in these 
proceedings.  As the parties “invoking federal ju r isd ic t ion ,” 
appellants “bear[ ] the burden” of establishing that they have 
a “ legally protected interest.” Lujan  v. Defenders o f  Wildl ife , 
504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). See Arizonans,  117 S. Ct. at 1067; 
Diamond  v. Charles , 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986). It is clear  that 
appellants, who seek only prospective relief, will not suffer



1

t\

1

it
<7

any injury in fact, let alone “actual or imminent” injury, under 
a plan that will never again be utilized and thus they have no 
standing to invoke this Court 's  jurisdict ion.  Lujan.  504 U.S. 
at 560 (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, this Court has 
made clear that " ‘[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not 
in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunc­
tive relief . . .  if unaccompanied by any continuing, present 
adverse effects. '  “ Lujan,  504 U.S. at 564 (quoting Los  
Angeles  v. Lyons.  461 U.S. 95. 102 (1983) (internal quotations 
omitted)).

Indeed, if the case is remanded, the School Board, as 
plaintiff, will voluntarily dismiss its suit because the Board 
obviously has no interest in obtaining a ruling on the validity 
of a law that no longer has force or effect. This is a classic 
case where resolution of the legal issues presented will have 
no concrete effect on the parties. By contrast,  in a typical 
Section 5 case, the requisite "controversy” exists because a 
covered jurisdict ion has an interest in eradicating the pre­
sumptive injunction Section 5 imposes on all voting changes. 
No such interest obtains, how'ever. where the voting practice 
in question will not be used even absent the presumptive 
injunction imposed by Section 5.

For essentially the same reason, the case is now' moot. 
This Court has repeatedly held that Article III precludes 
review of law's that have expired and thus have no further 
force or effect. See. e.g.. Burke.  479 U.S. at 363. Such cases 
are moot because w'here a party seeks injunctive relief and the 
law is no longer in effect, there is quite plainly no live case or 
controversy. Just so here, appel lan ts’ attempt to “prevent” the 
Board 's  redistricting plan from being used in any future 
election is o f |purely academic interest)because the Board will 
not and cannot use the plan for voting purposes regardless  of 
how the Court rules. See Lawyer Department  o f  Justice,
1 17 S. Ct. 2186, 2194 (1997) (“ ‘The real value of the judicial 
pronouncement -  what makes it a proper  judic ial  resolution of 
a “case or controversy” rather than an advisory opinion -  is in 
the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior o f  the

X



12

defendant towards the plainti ff . '  ” ) (quoting Hewitt  v. Helms. 
482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987)) (emphasis in original).

Stated somewhat differently, there is no relief  that the 
Court can grant which will redress appellants '  purported 
injuries. See. e.g.. Oil. Chemical and Atomic  Workers h i t ' l  
Union v. Missouri.  361 U.S. 363. 371 (1960); Northeastern  
Fla. Chapter o f  Associated Gen. Contractors v. Jacksonvil le.  
508 U.S. 656, 669-70 (1993) (O ’Connor,  J., d issent ing).6 Any 
relief entered in this action will have no effect: if a declara­
tory judgment  issues, the School B o a rd ’s plan will not be used 
for future elections; if a declaratory judgment  does not issue, 
the School Board 's  plan will not be used in future elections. 
Preventing enforcement of a law that is already a nullity 
cannot redress any injury.

In this regard, it is important  to recognize that this 
litigation cannot result in an order invalidating the 1998 
elections and requiring that new elect ions be held. Rather, all 
that the district court could do on remand is withdraw its prior 
declaratory judgment, and therefore prospectively  prohibit 
appellee from conduct ing future elect ions under this p lan , a 
result that is already compelled. Such an order, however, 
would have no effect on the 1998 elections conducted pur­
suant to the preclearance order already issued, just  as this 
C our t ’s prior remand had no effect on the 1994 elections.

Moreover, although it is irrelevant to whether this case 
presents a live controversy, we further  note that no other court 
could undo the 1998 elections for any alleged Section 5 
violation. Rather, the local Section 5 district courts  are 
sharply limited to addressing “ [t]he only issue” over which 
they have jurisdic t ion,  i.e., “whether  a part icular state enac t­
ment is subject to the provisions of the Voting Rights Act, and

6 Needless to say, a redistricting plan with a life span of 8 to 10 years 
is not “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Morse v. Republican 
Party, 517 U.S. 186, 235 n.48 (1996) (Stevens, J.). Moreover, the Board 7 
has “disavowed” future use of the practice at issue here and no monetary 
payments have been made by appellants. Id.



therefore must be submitted for approval before enforce­
ment.” Allen v. Stare Bd. o f  Elections.  393 U.S. 544. 558-59 
(1969). Thus, the local district courts may prospect ively 
enjoin elections where the voting change has not been submit­
ted and. as a corollary power in some circumstances, may 
order new elections where no such preclearance had been 
obtained prior to the election. See. e.g., Berry  v. Doles.  438 
U.S. 190 (1978). Here, however, the School Board elections 
in October of this year were held pursuant to a plan that had 
been submitted and precleared in conformance with Section 
5 .7 In light of this preclearance, the local law adopting the 
Board's redistricting plan is entitled to the same presumption 
of validity as any law not subject to Section 5's constraints 
and appellants did not seek to stay the D.C. district court 's  
order to prevent the October elections. Particularly since the 
local district court has no authority to second-guess the val­
idity of the preclearance order of the court below, it cannot 
undo the elections authorized by that court .8 Consequently, so 
far as we can discern, no Section 5 case has ever invalidated 
any election because it was based on a voting change that had 
been "erroneously” precleared by a court with jurisdict ion 
prior to the election. As a practical matter, of course, no 
rational equity court would undo an election where three 
districts have just elected black candidates in order to substi ­
tute a plan providing black voters with an opportunity to elect 
two candidates of their choice.

7 Specifically, the district court's order in this case stated that 
"plaintiff Bossier Parish School Board is given pre-clearance for its 
election plan adopted on October 1, 1992. and [ ] it shall have a declaratory 
judgment to that effect." Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, No. 94-01495 
(D.D.C. May 1, 1998).

8 Allen v. State Bd. of Elections. 393 U.S. 544, 549-50 (1969) 
(“Once the State has successfully complied with § 5 approval 
requirements, private parties may enjoin the enforcement of the new 
enactment only in traditional suits attacking its constitutionality; there is no 
further remedy provided by § 5.”); Lopez v. Monterey County, 117 S. Ct. 
340. 349 (1997): Berry. 438 U.S. at 193 (Brennan, J., concurring).



14

In short, even if Article III permitted it. there is simply 
no practical reason to determine whether  a six-year old redis- 
tricting plan that will never again be used and has resulted in 
the election of three black candidates was unlaw ful because it 
was allegedly “designed" to prevent the election of two black 
candidates. Given the dispositive nature of these threshold 
jurisdict ional  issues, this case does not warrant this Court 's  
plenary review as no substantial federal quest ions are prop­
erly before the Court.

II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT RULE THAT
SECTION 5 REACHES ONLY RETROGRESSIVE 
INTENT.
As they did in the first appeal in this case, 'the United 

States and private appellants seek to create a legal issue 
where none exists by misinterpret ing the actual rationale of 
the court below'. App. 10a (Silberman. J.. concurring) (*‘[T]he 
government filings in the Supreme Court were deceptive.").  
In its first Bossier  opinion, this Court expressly left “open for 
another day the question whether the § 5 purpose inquiry ever 
extends beyond the search for retrogressive intent." App. 45a. 
Appellants maintain that the court below resolved this legal 
issue by holding that, as a matter of law, only retrogressive 
intent can violate Section 5 and, as a consequence,  it did not 
address whether the Board possessed a discriminatory, albeit 
non-retrogressive. purpose. At the same time, however, appel­
lants also contend that the court below expressly “decl ined" 
to resolve this legal issue that the Court had reserved. U.S. 
J.S. at 12; Appellant-Intervenors’ Jurisdictional Statement 
(“ Int. J.S .” ) at 14. Appellants have therefore simultaneously 
taken the inherently contradictory positions that the court 
below resolved  the question of whether Section 5 reaches 
beyond retrogressive intent and that it declined  to resolve the 
question of whether Section 5 reaches beyond retrogressive 
intent. The truth, however, is that the district court did decline 
to resolve this legal question. It did so because it was unnec ­
essary to its decision since it had made the fa c tu a l  finding



15

that there was no evidence “ ‘that the Board enacted the 
[redistricting] plan with some non-retrogressive, but nev­
ertheless discriminatory, “purpose........  App. 3a n.2 (quoting
Bossier  /. 117 S. Ct. at 1501).

First, the lower court established that it was fully aware 
that the Court had “ left for another day the question" whether  
Section 5 prohibits actions taken with non-retrogressive d is­
criminatory intent. App. 3a. It then “decl ine[d]” to “answer 
the question the Court left for another day” because “the 
record will not support  a conclusion that extends beyond the 
presence or absence of retrogressive intent .” Id. (emphasis  
added). While the court could “ imagine a set of facts that 
would establish a ‘non-retrogressive,  but nevertheless d is­
criminatory. p u rpose ’ ” it found that “those imagined facts are 
not present here."  App. 3a-4a (emphasis added).

Thus, the district court plainly stated that resolution of 
the question whether  Section 5 prohibits a discriminatory, but 
non-retrogressive. purpose was unnecessary to decide this 
case because the facts supporting any such discriminatory 
purpose were “not present  here." It did not hold, as appel lants 
maintain, that if such discriminatory purpose were “present  
he re ,” the Board would  nonethe less  be enti t led to p re ­
clearance under Section 5 because that statute proscribes only 
"retrogressive” intent.

The rest of the co u r t ’s analysis further confirms that it 
was analyzing the question of “non-retrogressive,  but n ev ­
ertheless discriminatory, ‘purpose .’ ” First, it plainly stated 
that, as it had already ruled in Bossier  /, the School Board had 
the “d i f f ic u l t  ]” “burden to prove the absence  of  d iscr im ina­
tory intent.” App. 5a. (First emphasis in original,  second 
emphasis  added). Next, the court analyzed the B o a rd ’s rea­
sons for adopting the Police Jury plan in preference to the  
NAACP  plan, not whether  the Board had adopted the Police 
Jury plan for the purpose of putting minorit ies in a worse 
position than they enjoyed under the Board’s 1980 redis tr ic t­
ing plan. Thus, it squarely held that “the school boa rd ’s resort



16

to the pre-cleared Jury plan (which it mistakenly thought 
would easily be pre-cleared) and its focus on the fact that the 
Jury plan would not require precinct-spli tt ing, while the 
NAACP plan would,  were “legit imate, nondiscriminatory. 
motives.’ ” Id. Again, then, the court was holding that the 
Board 's  “motives’’ for adopting the Jury plan in preference to 
the NAACP plan were “legitimate [and] non-discriminatory" 
because the Police Jury plan better  furthered the race-neutral 
policy of preserving precincts than the NAACP plan. Com par­
ing the relative virtues of the Police Jury plan and the maxi­
mizing alternative proposed by the NAACP makes no sense if 
the court were analyzing only whether the Board 's  purpose 
was to cause retrogression. For “ [ re t rogress ion ,  by defini­
tion, requires a comparison of a jurisdic t ion 's  new voting plan 
with its existing plan."  App. 35a (emphasis added). In con­
trast, the court below analyzed whether the Board adopted the 
Pol ice  Jury plan over  the “ a l te rna t ive  vo t ing  prac t ice  

. benchmark” proposed by the NAACP for impermissible 
or “non-discriminatory” “motives.” App. 4a, 5a. This is clas­
sic “discriminatory purpose” analysis used in all Arlington  
Heights v. Metropoli tan Hons. Dew Corp., 429 U.S. 252 
(1977), and employment  cases -  i.e., whether  the minority 
applicant (or integrative alternative) was rejected for racial 
reasons or for “ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.” Fur- 
nco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 n.8 (1978).

Similarly, when the court analyzed the impact of the 
proposed plan under Arl ing ton  Heights  and this Court s 
remand, the district court did not look only at “ whether the 
Jury plan bears more heavily on blacks than the pre-exist ing 
plan.” App. 5a. Rather, after disposing of private appel lants’ 
argument that the Jury plan had such a retrogressive effect,  
the court analyzed the other “allegedly dilutive impacts of the 
Jury plan” that appellants had offered “ in support of its 
discriminatory  intent a rgument.” App. 6a (emphasis  added). 
Of course, as the district court was well aware, this Court  in 
Bossier  I had used the term “dilutive impact[ ]” to denote a



17

situation where a jurisdict ion chooses a plan that “dilutes" 
black votes as compared to a “reasonable alternative voting 
. . . benchmark" and in contradistinction to a plan which had a 
“retrogressive effect" because it diluted black votes more than 
the “existing plan.” App. 37a. 35a. See  App. 46a-47a. See 
also  App. l O a - l l a  (Silberman. J.. concurring).  Thus, as 
instructed by this Court on remand, the district court was 
analyzing whether the choice of the allegedly “dilutive" alter­
native reflected a “discriminatory intent .”

In this regard, the court found that the Board 's  plan could 
have reflected an impermissible purpose if it had “del iber­
ately attempted to break up voting blocks before they could 
be established or otherwise to divide and conquer  the black 
vote" by, for example, “f a i l in g ]  to respect communities of 
interest and cutting across attendance boundaries."  App. 6a. 
In this case, however, it found "an absence of such evidence 
in this record" and thus the discriminatory purpose assertion 
to be “too theoretical,  and too attenuated, to be probat ive.” 
Id.9 Thus, the court correctly considered and rejected appel­
lants '  assertion that the Board had “split . . . minority ne igh­
borhoods that would have been grouped into a single district 
. . . if the [Board] had employed the same line-drawing 
standards in minority neighborhoods as it used elsewhere in 
the jurisdiction." Johnson  v. D eG randy , 512 U.S. 991, 1015 
(1994). Examining such evidence of “ fragmentation" is s tan­
dard analysis in determining whether a jurisdic t ion was acting

9 To the contrary, as is demonstrated by the fact that the Police Jury 
plan was precleared after careful scrutiny by the Justice Department, the 
Board's plan kept intact any reasonable concentration of minority voters 
that was feasible under neutral principles and state law. In a parish with a 
20.1 % black population, this resulted in the creation of two districts with 
45% and 43.7% black populations, respectively, and four districts with 
black populations of between 21% and 29%. J.A. 47. It merely did not 
seek, as the NAACP plan concededly did, to unite through a race-conscious 
gerrymander widely dispersed black concentrations that never would have 
been united were their racial composition different.



18

with the discr iminatory  purpose of intentionally diluting 
minority voting strength.

Finally, the district court opinion clearly stated that it 
was adhering to the same “method of analysis" as its “earlier" 
decision. App. 5a. The earlier decision plainly focused exclu­
sively on whether  the NAACP plan was rejected for imper­
missible racial reasons, but did not focus on retrogressive 
intent. App. 105a. The concurring opinion emphasized in this 
r e g a rd  tha t  the  c o u r t  was a g a in  a n a l y z i n g  w h e t h e r  

' the School Board has failed to provide an adequate reason 
explaining why it declined to act on a proposal featuring two 
majority-black dis tr ic ts .’ " App. 9a (quoting App. 113a). It 
noted that it had both considered “dilut ive im p ac t” and 
applied the Arlington Heights  framework in its first opinion -  
contrary to appellants '  representation to this Court in the first 
Bossier  appeal. App. 10a. The concurrence then aff irmativelv 
stated that it engaged in such analysis again, while adding 
only that it was "now" dealing expressly with the Board 's 
compliance with the outstanding school desegregation decree. 
App. 11a. Thus, the concurrence further confirms that the 
district court opinion was simply fleshing out its first discrim­
inatory purpose analysis, and was not substituting some new 
legal s tandard that  focused exclus ively  on re t rogress ive  
intent.

To be sure, the majority opinion adverts on several occa­
sions to the Board 's  "retrogressive intent." App. 6a-7a. In 
context, however, this should not be read as indicat ing that 
the district court somehow had sub silentio  made the legal 
determination that only retrogressive intent violates the pur­
pose prong of Section 5. Rather, these statements must be 
read in conjunction with the district court 's  threshold decision 
that there was no evidence  of “non-retrogressive, but nonethe­
less discriminatory, ‘purpose . '  ” and its incorporation of its 
prior findings that the Board's  “change was undertaken with­
out a discriminatory purpose."  See  App. 105a. Given the 
absence of such discriminatory purpose evidence, the court 
below quite naturally sometimes phrased its conclusions in



19

terms of retrogressive intent. Since, in this opinion, the court 
had already found that rejection of the NAACP plan was done 
pursuant to “ legitimate, non-discriminatory motives.” it did 
not need to reiterate that finding when it was dealing with 
each of the separate pieces of the Arlington Heights  evidence. 
This is particularly true since, when considering each of the 
Arlington Heights  factors, it incorporated by reference the 
court ’s earlier decision -  in which it plainly did find that the 
plan was not motivated by discriminatory intent. See  App. 
6a-7a. Finally, as noted, the court often stated its conclusions 
in terms of “discr iminatory” purpose, not “retrogressive” pur­
pose. App. 5a. App. 6a (appellants had failed “ to rebut the 
non-discriminatory reasons advanced by the school board” for 
adopting its p lan ) .10

In short, it is quite implausible that the lower court would 
have resolved the legal question that this Court made clear 
was important and unsettled without discussing in any way 
the reasons for adopting this legal position. When coupled 
with the court ’s express refusal to resolve the legal question 
of Section 5's scope, the decision cannot reasonably be read 
as deciding that issue one way or another. At a minimum, this 
Court should not resolve that concededly unsettled legal issue 
in circumstances where it is. at best, ambiguously presented.

III. THE PURPOSE INQUIRY UNDER SECTION 5 OF 
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT RELATES EXCLU­
SIVELY TO RETROGRESSIVE INTENT.

If the Court concludes it has jurisdic t ion over a live “case 
or controversy" and decides to resolve the issue raised by 
appellants, the Court should affirm on the ground that the 
purpose inquiry under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
relates exclusively to retrogressive intent. This conclusion is

10 Similarly, while the court did say that the Board’s action reflected a 
‘'determination to maintain the status quo,” it is unclear whether the status 
quo referred to was the previously enacted Police Jury plan or the Board’s 
own 1980s redistricting plan. App. 7a.



20

mandated by the plain language of the statute, its purpose, 
and its structure.

It is a bedrock principle of this Cour t ’s statutory con­
struction jurisprudence that “ [wjhen the words of a statute are 
unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ' judicial 
inquiry is comple te . ’ ” Connecticut Na t ' l  Bank  v. Germain.  
503 U.S. 249. 254 (1992) (quoting Rubin  v. United States.  449 
U.S. 424, 430 (1981)). See also Robinson  v. Shell Oil Co., 117 
S. Ct. 843, 846 (1997) (“Our inquiry must cease if the statu­
tory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is 
coherent and consis ten t . ’ ” ) (quoting United States  v. Ron 
Pair Enterprises.  489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)); Estate o f  Cow art 
v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469. 475 (1992) (“ [W]hen a 
statute speaks with clarity to an issue, judicial  inquiry into the 
s tatu te’s meaning, in all but the most extraordinary c ircum­
stance, is f inished.” ). The interpretation of the term “purpose” 
under Section 5 presents just such a case where the text of the 
statute resolves its meaning. Section 5 provides in pertinent 
part that a covered jurisdict ion is entitled to a declaratory 
judgment  authorizing a proposed voting change where the 
practice at issue “does not have the purpose and will not have 
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account 
of race or color. . . . ” 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Under  the statute 
then, preclearance will be denied if a proposed change has 
either (1) the “purpose . . .  of  denying or abridging the right 
to vote on account of race or color” or (2) “the effect of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color.” Significantly, it is agreed by all that a proposed 
change has the “effect of denying or abridging the right to 
vote” only if it has retrogressive effect on minority voters. 
See, e.g., App. 46a (“we have adhered to the view that the 
only ‘effect’ that violates § 5 is a retrogressive one .” ); City o f  
Lockhart  v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 134 (1983); Beer  v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1975). Thus, the “pur­
pose . . .  of  denying or abridging the right to vo te” must  also 
be understood to relate exclusively to retrogression.



A contrary conclusion can only be reached if one 
assumes that the phrase “denying or abridging the right to 
vote on account of race or color” has a different meaning as it 
relates to purpose and effect. Such an interpretation would be 
absurd, as no principle of common usage, grammar, or logic 
would suggest a solitary phrase modifying two objects in the 
same sentence could have a different meaning as to each 
noun. Not surprisingly, appellants have not cited to a single 
case where this Court has endorsed such a counterintuitive 
and anomalous method of construing a statute. If the phrase 
“abridging or denying the right to vote" refers to retrogres­
sion as it relates to the term “effect ,” it inexorably follows 
that it must have the same meaning as it applies to the term 
“purpose .” See, e.g., BankAmerica Corp. v. United States. 462 
U.S. 122. 129 (1983) (“ [W]e reject as unreasonable  the con ­
tention that Congress intended the phrase ‘other than' to mean 
one thing when applied to ‘banks'  and another thing as 
applied to ‘common carriers. '  where the phrase ‘other than' 
modifies both words in the same c lause .” ): Mohasco Corp. v. 
Silver.  447 U.S. 807. 826 (1980).

Although resort to additional sources is unnecessary in 
light of the unambiguous meaning of the statute's plain lan­
guage. the purpose of Section 5 confirms the foregoing con­
clusion. The Court has repeatedly held that the purpose of 
Section 5 was “to halt actual retrogression in minority voting 
strength. . . . "  City o f  Lockhart, 460 U.S. at 133. Thus, in 
Lockhart.  “ ‘[sjince the new plan did not increase the degree 
of discrimination against [the City 's  Mexican-American pop­
ulation], it was entitled  to § 5 preclearance [because it was 
not retrogressive] .’ ” App. 36a (quoting Lockhart.  460 U.S. at 
134) (emphasis  added). Likewise, in B eer , the Court e labo­
rated: “the purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no 
voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a 
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect 
to their effective franchise of the electoral franchise.” 425 
U.S. at 141. See also Lockhart , 460 U.S. at 134 (“the aim of 
Section 5 was to prohibit  only  re t rogress ive  c h a n g e s ” )



(emphasis  added); City o f  Richmond  v. United S ta tes . 422 
U.S. 358. 388 (1975) (Brennan. J.. dissenting) ("the funda­
mental objective of § 5 [is] the protection of present  levels of 
voting effectiveness for the black populat ion. ' ' )  (emphasis in 
original).  As this Court explained in its prior opinion. Con­
gress achieved this "limited purpose" by " 'f reezing election 
procedures in the covered areas' " and thereby prevented 
further retrogression in the voting rights of minorit ies. App. 
34a (quoting Beer.  425 U.S. at 140) (internal citations omit­
ted).

This view of the “ limited purpose"  of Section 5 is 
entirely consistent with, and in fact necessitated by. the s truc­
ture of the statutory scheme. Although the provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act taken together certainly intended to "rid the 
country of racial discrimination in voting.” South Carolina v. 
Katzenhach.  383 U.S. 301. 315 (1966). it was left to Section 2 
of the statute to provide a remedy against existing forms of 
discrimination.  By contrast.  Section 5 was implicated only 
where a change  in a voting practice or procedure was p ro ­
posed by a covered jurisdict ion. By specifically linking appli­
cation of Section 5 to a change in a procedure, the statute 
necessarily assumes that Section 5 has no bearing on the 
perpetuation of existing practices, even if such practices are 
maintained for discriminatory purposes. Rather, Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution are the devices for 
stopping continued use of practices that w'ere adopted for a 
discriminator)  purpose. In short, the structure of the statute 
confirms what the text and purpose of Section 5 make clear: 
both the purpose and effect tests of this provision relate 
exclusively to retrogression.

The limited availability of Section 5 rel ief  is dictated by 
the “severe" burdens that this provision places upon the 
states. Allen.  393 U.S. at 556. See also Katzenhach.  383 U.S. 
at 334 (noting the “exceptional condit ions” that just if ied  the 
utilization of such an “uncommon exercise of congressional  
pow'er” ); id. at 360 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(S e c t io n  5 r e p re se n ts  "a rad ica l  d e g ra d a t io n  of  state



power. . . . ” ). Under Section 5. the normal heavy presumption 
of validity for state laws is reversed, and the state law is 
deemed presumptively unlawful  until the state has d em o n ­
strated an absence of retrogressive purpose and effect. C f  
Parham v. Hughes , 441 U.S. 347. 351 (1979). Consequently, 
it has long been recognized that significant “federalism costs 
[are] already implicated by § 5 preclearance." App. 38a (ci t­
ing Miller  v. Johnson,  515 U.S. 900, 926 (1995)). A ccord­
ingly. it was entirely appropriate  for Congress to have limited 
the reach of Section 5 ’s presumptive injunctive effect to 
voting procedures that were motivated by a retrogressive 
intent or that had a retrogressive effect. This creates no risk 
that minorities will be subjected to plainly purposeful dis­
crimination since such action will easily be prevented through 
Section 2 or const itutional challenges.

At bottom, appel lan ts’ attempt to refute the compell ing 
evidence of the “ limited purpose" of Section 5 stems from 
their belief that the Department of Justice should not preclear 
a plan that perpetuates "long-entrenched racial discr imina­
t ion.” U.S. J.S. at 20. But it is clear that Section 5 does  
plainly tolerate “co n t in u in g ]  in place a discriminatory status 
quo" since it reaches only alterations  of that status quo. Id. at 
25-26. Again. Section 2 and the Consti tution deal with efforts 
to maintain  discriminatory practices. Indeed, this Court in 
Bossier  / rejected an almost identical argument, i.e.. Section 5 
simply must be interpreted to prohibit clear Section 2 viola­
tions because otherwise the Attorney General  would be forced 
to preclear a change she believes is unlawfully d iscr imina­
tory. App. 37a. 62a. Since it is fully consistent  with Section 
5 ’s purpose and structure to conclude that the Attorney G en­
eral has no authority to withhold preclearance for “clear 
viola t ions’" of Section 2, it is equally legitimate to conclude 
that she is without authority to deny preclearance for const i tu­
tional violations. So recognizing the “ limited substant ive  
goal" of Section 5 in no way “tolerates” unlawfully d iscr imi­
natory practices, it simply recognizes that such practices



should be chal lenged under the laws which render them ille­
gal.

In the face of the unambiguous text and plain purpose of 
the statute, appellants improperly seek to invoke the legisla­
tive history of the 1982 reenactment of Section 5 as support 
for the proposit ion that the statute extends well beyond the 
search for retrogressive intent. Specifically, appellants  invoke 
a footnote in the 1982 Senate Report which, they claim, 
demonstrates that Congress understood that Section 5. as 
interpreted in Beer,  prohibited changes with a discriminatory 
purpose. U.S. J.S. at 19 (citing S. Rep. No. 417. 97th Cong.. 
2d Sess. 12 n.31 (1982)). But this Court has already twice 
ruled that the Senate Report’s understanding of Beer  in no 
way controls the interpretation of Section 5 if, as here, that 
legislative history is in any way inconsis tent with the sta tu te’s 
language and structure. First, relying on the very same Senate 
Report  footnote  offered by appel lan ts .  Jus t ice  Marshall  
a rgued in his L ockhar t  d issent  that  the 1982 C ongress  
believed “that the rule laid down in Beer  governed am el iora­
tive changes.” but did “not allow' covered jur isdic t ions to 
adopt voting procedures which maintain exist ing discr imina­
tion.” 460 U.S. at 145 (Marshall.  J., dissent ing) (emphasis in 
original). The Lockhart  court nonetheless ruled that Section 5 
permitted changes which either ameliorated or  maintained the 
prior system because that result was required by the s ta tu te’s 
language and structure. 460 U.S. at 134; App. 42a (describing 
Lockhart  as “reaching its holding over Justice M arsha l l ’s 
dissent, which raised the argument now advanced by appel­
lants regarding this passage in the Senate Repor t” ). Similarly, 
in Bossier I, this Court ruled that the Senate R epor t ’s plain 
statement that Congress understood Beer  to reach discr imina­
tory “results” did not authorize a Section 5 objection to 
challenge such results.  App. 42a. Thus, appe l lan ts ’ invocation 
of this very same footnote for the third time does not support 
their extra-textual  interpretation of Section 5.

To be sure, “Beer 's  dictum suggests  that any changes that 
viola te” the Consti tution also violate Section 5. App. 71a



(Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). See 
also App. 39a (Beer  "cited in dicta a few cases to illustrate 
when a redistricting plan might be found to be const i tu­
tionally offensive.” ). As an initial matter, of course, this 
dictum cannot alter the inexorable effect of the Section 5 
statutory language. In any event, it is not at all clear that the 
Beer  court believed that rejection of a proposed black-major-  
ity district(s) in a single-member redistricting scheme would 
constitute a constitutional violation, even if the rejection was 
motivated in part by racial concerns. Rather, although the law 
was unsettled because this Court had never struck down a 
single-member redistricting plan on constitutional grounds, 
the standard seemed to be that single-member redistricting 
schemes, as opposed to plans with mult i-member districts, 
violated the Constitution only if they caused retrogression. 
Thus, in City o f  Mobile  v. Bolden , 446 U.S. 55 (1980) -  the 
case establishing the constitutional standard for vote dilution 
cases -  the plurality noted that, under prior cases, a "dis tr ic t­
ing statute otherwise acceptable, may be invalid because it 
fences out a racial group so as to deprive them of their p re ­
existing municipal vote. Gomillion  v. Lightfoot , 364 U.S. 339 
( I9 6 0 ) .” City o f  Mobile,  446 U.S. at 69 n.14 (quoting Gaffney  
v. Cummings.  412 U.S. 735. 751 (1973) (emphasis added)). In 
contrast,  it noted that "m ult i -m em ber  d is t r ic ts” could be 
unconstitutional  without such retrogression in minori t ies '  
"pre-exist ing . . . vote.” if it were shown that at-large districts 
had been deliberately "employed  to minimize or cancel out 
the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting 
populat ion." Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotat ions 
and c itat ions omit ted) .  Thus,  the M obile  plural ity , and 
pre-Beer  cases, seemed to strongly indicate that a single­
member districting plan could violate the Constitution only if 
it caused retrogression by taking away minori t ies’ “ there­
tofore enjoyed  voting rights ,” but not by engaging in even a 
race-conscious failure to create a black majority district.  City 
o f  Richmond  v. United S ta tes , 422 U.S. 358, 378-79 (1975) 
(quoting Gomillion,  364 U.S. at 347) (emphasis  added). See

25



26

also City o f  Mobile.  446 U.S. at 85 n.4 (Stevens. J.. concur­
ring) (same); id. at 94 (“ [W]e must accept the choice to retain 
Mobile 's  commission form of government as constitutionally 
permissible even though that choice may well be the product 
of mixed motivation, some of which is invidious.").

This reading of Beer  is buttressed by the fact that the 
opinion, in explaining the constitutional standard to which it 
referred, stated that it could not “rat ionally” be argued that 
the Constitution was violated because a Louisiana jurisdic t ion 
(with a long history of discrimination) maintained a redis tr ict­
ing scheme that “almost inevitably would have the effect of 
diluting the maximum potential impact of the Negro vote.” 
Beer.  425 U.S. at 142 n.14, 136. See also id. at 142 n.14 (the 
chal lenged redistricting plan “does not remotely approach a 
violation of the constitutional standards enunciated in those 
cases” ). Obviously, if intentionally perpetuating a d iscr imina­
tory redistricting system did constitute a constitutional viola­
tion, it certainly could be reasonably asserted that the New 
Orleans redistricting plan violated that standard. Moreover, in 
1976 it was not at all clear that the rejection of a black  
majori ty  district consti tuted vote dilution since creating such 
a district “necessarily  decreases  the level of minority inf lu­
ence in surrounding districts,  and to that extent ‘d i lu tes’ the 
vote of minority voters in those other districts, and perhaps 
dilutes the influence of the minority group as a whole .” App. 
52a (Thomas, J.. concurring). The Court had explicitly noted 
that it was not possible to determine whether the absence or 
presence of minority-majority  districts diluted minority votes 
in Wright v. Rockefeller.  376 U.S. 52 (1964), the only case 
prior to Beer  involving a s ingle-member redistricting scheme: 
“Undoubtedly some of these voters . . . would prefer a more 
even distribution of minority groups among the four congres­
sional districts, but others . . . would argue strenuously that 
the kind of districts for which appellants contended would be 
undesirable and, because based on race or place of origin, 
would themselves be unconst i tu t ional .” Id. at 57-58.



27

More generally, of course, it was not at all settled when 
Beer  was decided in 1976 that the Consti tution embodied a 
"discriminators'  purpose standard, particularly in the \ ote 
dilution area. See App. 39a; City of Mobile .  446 U.S. at 62. 66 
(plurality opinion); id. at 85-86. 88-90 (Stevens, J.. concur­
ring); id. at 120 (Brennan. J., dissenting) (“Our vote-dilution 
decis ions ,  then, involve the fu n d am en ta l - in te re s t  branch, 
rather than the anti-discrimination branch, of our ju r ispru­
dence under the Equal Protection Clause.” ). Moreover,  it 
remains unclear to this day whether the Fifteenth Amendment 
-  the constitutional provision most closely mirroring the lan­
guage of Section 5 -  even reaches an intentionally d iscr imina­
tory vote dilution claim. See Voinovich v. Quil ter , 507 U.S. 
146. 159 (1993) (“This Court has not decided whether  the 
Fifteenth Amendment applies to vote-dilution claims. . . . '); 
App. 58a and cases cited therein.

In light of all this, it simply cannot be reliably inferred 
that the Beer  Court 's  reference in dicta to the constitutional 
standard denoted a discriminatory, albeit ; on-retrogressive, 
purpose -  even assuming that the Court 's  dicta could expand 
the scope of Section 5 to invalidate changes not violated by 
Section 5 itself. In addition. Beer  dealt with a situation where 
the jurisdiction was seeking preclearance of the redistricting 
plan for the f i r s t  time after Section 5 was enacted in 1965. In 
the early 1970s, a conscious effort to maintain the status quo 
would very often perpetuate a racially discriminatory system 
of the sort that the Voting Rights Act was designed to eradi­
cate. Here, in contrast,  the Board 's  pre-exist ing 1980 redis­
tricting plan was affirmatively found by the Attorney General 
to be free of any discriminatory purpose or effect.  (Moreover, 
of course, the Board 's  plan mirrored precisely a plan the 
Attorney General had found free of discriminatory purpose 
and effect just  one year before, when the Police Jury plan had 
been precleared.) Since maintenance of a non-discriminatory 
system cannot, under ordinary English usage, perpetuate a 
discriminatory system, a non-retrogressive plan will almost



28

never be “discriminatory" absent a retreat from the previously 
precleared system.

The rest of the cases cited by appellants can be disposed 
of summarily. Appellees '  assertion that the Court has previ­
ously resolved the question of whether Section 5 reaches 
beyond retrogressive intent is obviously belied by the fact 
that the Bossier I court reserved this unsettled question. App. 
45a-46a. Nor did either of the concurring opinions maintain 
that the Cour t ’s precedent required such a rule. App. 61a, 70a. 
7 6 a .* 11

The case upon which appellants  primarily rely. City o f  
Pleasant Grove  v. United S tates , 479 U.S. 462 (1987), drew 
no distinction between retrogressive and discriminatory pur­
pose and the result in that case had nothing to do with this 
distinction. In Pleasant Grove, the Court considered a cov­
ered jurisdic t ion 's  annexation of a parcel of land inhabited 
only by whites and an uninhabited parcel that was “ intended 
for white developments."  Id. at 468. Although the present 
retrogressive effect of these annexations was de m in im is , the 
Court stated that Section 5 reached “future effects” and that 
“an impermissible purpose under § 5 may relate to anticipated 
as well as present c ircumstances.” Id. at 471-72. The issue in

11 The court’s summary' affirmance in Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 
494 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983), is of little moment since 
summary' affirmances are of slight precedential value. See, e.g„ Ashland
Oil, Inc. v. Caryl, 497 U.S. 916, 920 n.* (1990). In any event, that decision 
is entirely consistent with the opinion below since the primary flaw in 
Busbee was that the submitting jurisdiction had “split a cohesive black 
community in Districts 4 and 5” thus causing minor retrogression in 
District 4, albeit not in District 5. Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 499. See id. at 
498. As noted, the court below considered and rejected the notion that the 
Board had split or “fragmented” any cohesive black community. In Miller 
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), the Court overturned the Justice 
Department's finding of discriminatory purpose as inconsistent with any 
understanding of that term and thus, as in Bossier I, resolution of the sort of 
purpose proscribed by Section 5 was “not necessary to [the court’s] 
decision." App. 45a.



29

Pleasant Grove, therefore, was simply whether Section 5 
reached anticipated circumstances, as well as present  c ircum­
stances, but it drew no distinction between “discriminatory 
purpose” and “retrogressive purpose.” Just as an annexation 
of land currently  populated by whites alone could make 
minority voters worse off than they were prior to the annexa­
tion (i .e . retrogression), so too could annexing land that it was 
anticipated would be populated by whites. Indeed, the district 
court opinion faithfully tracked Pleasant Grove's  distinction 
between future and present harm. Thus, the court found that 
Section 5's purpose prong would have been violated if there 
had been “any corroborating evidence that the School Board 
had deliberately attempted to break up voting blocks before  
they could be established  or otherwise to divide and conquer 
the black vote." App. 6a (emphasis added). Thus, whatever 
the rationale of Pleasant Grove,  it is in no way inconsis tent 
with the court be low ’s reasoning or resu l t .12

Finally, although appellants insinuate that the district 
court ’s factual findings are “unsupported.” U.S. J.S. at 24, 
this issue is not present here because, unlike their first appeal.

12 Likewise, the Court's decision in Cits of Richmond lends no 
support to appellants' interpretation of Section 5. There, the Court upheld 
an annexation that severely reduced the black population’s pre-existing 
voting strength notwithstanding this undisputed retrogressive effect. 422 
U.S. at 378. The Court then remanded the case to ensure that the 
motivation behind the annexation was not to cause such obvious 
retrogression in black voting strength, but was done for “verifiable, 
legitimate reasons." City of Richmond. 422 U.S. at 375. In doing so, the 
Court again equated “changes taken with the purpose of denying the vote 
on the grounds of race or color" with “ 'despoil[ing] colored citizens, and 
only colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoxed voting rights.' " Id. at 
378-79 (quoting Gomillion. 364 U.S. at 347) (emphasis added). Thus, 
Richmond merely holds that an indisputably retrogressive change, which 
might otherwise survive Section 5 review, will be struck down if the 
motive in undertaking the annexation was to cause such retrogression, 
rather than to accomplish some “legitimate” goal. It in no way suggests that 
a non-retrogressive change may be invalidated if motivated by a non- 
retrogressive purpose.



30

appellants have not contended that the district court 's  factual 
findings are "clearly erroneous." In any event, the district 
court 's factual finding as to a lack of discriminators intent is. 
at the very least, "plausible" and thus must be upheld under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52iaj.  Anderson v. City o f  Bessemer.  470 U.S. 
5 6 4 , 5 7 4  (1985) ("Where there are two permissible  views of 
the evidence, the factfinder 's  choice between them cannot be 
clearly erroneous.” ).

C O N C L U S IO N

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss the 
appeal or summarily affirm the judgment  of the court below.

Respectfully submitted.

M i c h a e l  E. R o s m a n  

H a n s  F. B a d e r

C e n t e r  f o r  I n d i v i d u a l  R i g h t s  

1233 20th Street. N.W. 
Washington. D.C. 20036 
(202) 833-8400

M i c h a e l  A. C a r v i n *  

D a v i d  H .  T h o m p s o n  

C o o p e r . C a r v i n  &

R o s e n t h a l . PLLC 
2000 K Street. N.W. 
Suite 401
Washington. D.C. 20006 
(202) 822-8950

* Counsel o f  Record



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SECRETARY OIF STATE

A A j 'c /e c re /c rvy  o f  ^ A /a /t.  ^  'c f /a /s  (2 c « t j / a / t a r ,  J  </o A e r c d y  <d c ( j'A y 'y  
the attached five (5) pages are true and correct copies of the Precinct by 
Precinct Returns for the following listed offices for the primary’ election 
scheduled and held on October 3, 1998, as per the originals on file in the
archives of this office.

Member of School Board, District 
Member of School Board, District 
Member of School Board, District 
Member of School Board, District

Parish of Bossier 
Parish of Bossier 
Parish of Bossier 
Parish of Bossier

Member of School Board, District 12, Parish of Bossier

A n  te s t im o n y  utAievecfi j f  A a ve  A er^ untc ±e(

m y  h a n d  a n d  c a u se d  f/ie SfeaA m y  6 /jtic x  

/c  Ae a ^ i x e d a (  (Ae ^ d y  A ^ atcn  AAcuyf cn , 

this the 3rd day of December, A.D., 1998.

Ad^ecre/ary

t.'S'Af-sSI?'. ~A~?rSd. i ss*V;?i

>



ELCRPT6 LA SECRETARY OF STATE . 12/03/98ELECTION RETURNS-FOR ELECTION DATE 10/03/98 ['AGE:. 1
OFFICE: Member of School Board District 2
PARISH: Bossier (One to be Elected)

CANDIDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Knotts Sterlin

Precinct Number
4- 3B 174 121 0 0 0 0 0
4- 4A 209 208 0 0 0 0 0
4- 4B 154 136 0 0 0 0 0
4- 1 IB 106 85 0 0 0 0 0

Group Subtotal 643 550 0 0 0 0 0

*ABS 24 15 0 0 0 0 0

Parish Total 667 565 0 0 0 0 0
54 . 14% 45.86% . 00% . 00% . 00% .00% . 00%

Grand Total 667 565 0 0 0 0 0
54.14% 45.86% . 00% . 00% . 00% . 00% . 00%

CANDIDATE LEGEND
1 Knotts
2 Sterling

"Mike" 
Floyd B.

32 
3 3



ELCRPT6 LA SECRETARY OF STATE 12/03/9• ELECTION RETURNS- FOR ELECTION DATE 10/03/98 PAGE ;
OFFICE: Member of School Board District 3
PARISH: Bossier (One to be Elected)

CANDIDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Finck Mitchel
Precinct Number

2- 1 112 235 0 0 0 0 02- 18B 122 30 0 0 0 0 02- 22 393 99 0 0 0 0 0Group Subtotal 627 364 0 0 0 0 0
4- 2 158 81 0 0 0 0 04- 3A 51 80 0 0 0 0 0Group Subtotal 209 161 0 0 0 0 0

*ABS 86 36 0 0 0 0 0
Parish Total 922 561 0 0 0 0 062.17% 37.83% . 00% 00% 00% . 00% . 00%
Grand Total 922 561 0 0 0 0 062.17% 37.83% . 00% 00% 00% . 00% . 00%

CANDIDATE LEGEND
1 Finck George C. 34
2 Mitchell James A. 35



ELCRFT6 LA SECRETARY OF STATE . 12/03/9
- ELECTION RETURNS-FOR ELECTION DATE 10/03/98 PAGE ;

OFFICE: Member of School Board District 8
PARISH: Bossier (One to be Elected)

CANDIDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Engi Wiggins

; recinct Number
2- 11 85 65 0 0 0 0 0
2- 12A 16 19 0 0 0 0 0
2- 17 B 26 59 0 0 0 0 0
2- 19 35 59 0 0 0 0 0

Croup Subtotal 162 202 0 0 0 0 0
"ABS 6 4 0 0 0 0 0

Parish Total 168 206 0 0 0 0 0
44.92% 55.08% . 00% 00% 00% . 00% .00%

Grand Total 168 206 0 0 0 0 0
44.92% 55.08% . 00% 00% 00% . 00% .00%

CANDIDATE LEGEND
1 Engi Jolene 3 6
2 Wiggins Kenneth M. 37



ELCRPT6
ELECTION LA SECRETARY OF STATE 

RETURNS - FOR ELECTION DATE 10/03/98 • 12/03/ 
PAGE ;

OFFICE: Member of 
PARISH: Bossier

CANDIDATE

School Board District 9
(One to be Elected)

1 2  3 4 5 6 7
Precinct Number 

2- 12C

Barnett

25

Simison

55 0 0 0 0 02- 13 35 67 0 0 0 0 02- 14 51 61 0 0 0 0 02- 20 56 100 0 0 0 0 02- 23 24 31 0 0 0 0 0Group Subtotal 191 314 0 0 0 0 0
* ABS 7 7 0 0 0 0 0

Parish Total 198 321 0 0 0 0 038.15% 61.85% . 00% 00% . 00% . 00% . 00%
Grand Total 198 321 0 0 0 0 038.15% 61.85% . 00% 00% . 00% . 00% . 00%

CANDIDATE LEGEND
1 Barnett "Brad" 38
2 Simison Gloria 39



ELCRPT6 LA SECRETARY OF STATE 12/03/* ELECTION RETURNS-FOR E-LECTION DATE 10/03/98 - PAGE ;
OFFICE: Member of School Board District 12
PARISH: Bossier (One to be Elected)

CANDIDATE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Jackson Knotts
Precinct Number

1- 1 153 117 0 0 0 0 0Group Subtotal 153 117 0 0 0 0 0
4- 8A 30 59 0 0 0 0 04- 8C 6 4 0 0 0 0 04- 10A 194 271 0 0 0 0 04- 10B 136 218 0 0 0 0 0Group Subtotal 366 552 0 0 0 0 0

* ABS 5 19 0 0 0 0 0
Parish Total 524 688 0 0 0 0 0

43.23% 56.77% . 00% 00% . 00% . 00% . 00%
Grand Total 524 688 0 0 0 0 0

43.23% 56.77% . 00% 00% . 00% . 00% . 00%

CANDIDATE LEGEND
1 Jackson Juanita S. 40
2 Knotts Mack D. 41



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Member of School Board, District 1, Parish of Bossier
Member of School Board, District 4 , Parish of Bossier
Member of School Board, District 5, Parish of Bossier
Member of School Board, District 6 , Parish of Bossier
Member of School Board, District 7 , Parish of Bossier
Member of School Board, District 10 , Parisn of 3ossier
Member of School Board, District 11, Parish of Bossier

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of December, A.D., 1998.

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the attached one (1) page is a true and correct copy of a list of unopposed 
candidates for the following listed offices for the primary election scheduled 
and held on October 3, 1998, as per the originals on file in the archives of 
this office.



PAGE 1| 12/07/98 14:56:59 STATE OP LOUISIANA
1998 ELECTION RESULTS

Office Title Office Description Parish
Lest Name First Name Total Votes Vote % Result

Member of School Board District 1 BOSSIER
Graham Michael M. 0 .00 U

Member of School Board District 4 BOSSIER
Richardson Vassie McCauley 0 .00 U

Member of School Board District 5 BOSSIBR
Cassibry Elizabeth S. "Libby" 0 .00 U

Member of School Board District 6 BOSSIER
Ray Mary M. "Mary Margaret" 0 .00 U

Member of School Board District 7 BOSSIBR
Slack "J. W." 0 .00 U
Member of School Board District 10 BOSSIBR
Darby Julian L. "Julius" 0 .00 U
Member of School Board District 11 BOSSIER
Dowden Gary K. 0 .00 U
• * * E N D  O P  R E P O R T  * * *