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September 29, 1999

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. United States v. Woods Brief and Additional Appendix for Petitioner-Appellee, 1969. 7176b2dc-c79a-ee11-be37-000d3a574715. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/43eddd18-9c39-4b44-95cd-6347caee2b92/united-states-v-woods-brief-and-additional-appendix-for-petitioner-appellee. Accessed August 19, 2025.
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3n tfje U n i t e d S t a t e s C o u r t o f A p p e a l s : Jfor t̂ e &ebentfj Circuit No. 1 8 3 8 9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel., ALBERT A. RABY, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. JOSEPH r. WOODS, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, and WINSTON MOORE, Warden of the Cook County Jail, Respond,ents-Appellants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Honorable Jambs B. Parsons, Judge Presiding. BRIEF AND ADDITIONAL APPENDIX FOR PETITIONER-APPELLEE L eo E. H olt and M aria A . E uden 30 W. Washington Street Chicago, Illinois (10602 ANdover 3-6054 Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellee M IP W E S T L A W P R I N T I N G C D . . C H I C A G O 6 0 6 0 1 . F I N A N C I A L 6 - 3 9 8 8 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Statement of Facts .................................................. 1 Argument ............................................... 3 I. The District Court Judge Correctly Deter mined That The Instruction Given The Jury In Petitioner’s State Trial Deprived Petitioner Of Due Process Of L a w ...................................... 3 II. The Petitioner-Appellee Should Be Discharged From The Custody Of The Respondents Because His State Trial Violated The Provisions Of The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause ..... 8 Conclusion ........................................................................... 14 T able Of A uthorities Application of DeToro, 247 F. Supp. 840 .................... 11 City of Chicago v. The Union Ice Cream Co., 252 111. 311 ..................................................................................... 9 City of Decatur v. Schlick, 269 111. 181 ......................... 9 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 ........................................ 11 Davis v. Maryland House of Correction, 247 F. Supp. 869 ...................................................................................... 11 Evans v. Cunningham, 335 F. 2d 491 .......................... 9, 12 Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 ........................................ 11 11 Hankins v. People, 106 111. 628 ........................................ 9 Ohio, Indiana & Western Bailway Co. v. People, 39 111. App. 473 .................................................................. 9 Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Snpp. 225 ............... 11 People v. Behymer, 48 111. App. 2d 218........................ 9 Bobbins v. People, 95 111. 175 ...................................... 9 Bowe v. Peyton, 383 F. 2d 709 ...................................... 11 Thomas v. Cunningham, 335 F. 2d 67 .......................... 11 Village of Winnetka v. Sinnett, 272 111. App. 143 ..... 9 Village of Mt. Prospect v. Malouf, 103 111. App. 2d 88 9 Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 .................. ............... 8, 12 Wragg v. Penn Township, 94 III. 11 ..............................8, 9 Sokol, Federal Habeas Corpus, Sec. 23 (2d Ed.) ..... 11 Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution .. 9 Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti tution .............................................................................. 9 28 U.S.C.A., Section 2254 ............................................... 9 Chapter 38, Section 3-3, Hlinois Bevised Statutes .... 12 Hlntije tim'teti s ta tes Court ot Appeals Jf or tfje ibetocntf) Circuit No. 1 8 3 8 9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel., ALBERT A. RABY, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. JOSEPH I. WOODS, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, and WINSTON MOORE, Warden of the Cook County Jail, Respondents-Appellants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Honorable James B. Parsons, Judge Presiding. BRIEF FOR PETITIONER-APPELLEE. — 2— STATEMENT OF FACTS. The District Judge, after hearing, determined the facts to be that the petitioner organized a protest demonstra tion against the retention of then Superintendent Ben jamin Willis. (Rec. 8, Add. App. 6). That the demon strators marched around City Hall while petitioner en tered the building for a conference with the Mayor. (Rec. 8, Add. App. 6). When petitioner returned he told the demonstrators that his conference with the Mayor had been unsatisfactory. Petitioner and other demonstrators then proceeded to the intersection of Randolph and La Salle Streets and sat in the intersection. (Rec. 9, Add. App. 6-7). Petitioner remained on the ground after being told he was under arrest. (Rec. 9-10, Add. App. 7). Petitioner was then charged with the violation of five state statutes and one municipal ordinance violation. (State Rec. 80-81, Add. App. 1-2). Prior to the commence ment of the State trial petitioner presented a motion to the State court for discharge on the ground that trial violated the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy provi sion. (State Rec. 80-81, Add. App. 1-2). This motion was denied. (State Rec. 244, Add. App. 2). ARGUMENT. — 3— I. THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE CORRECTLY DETER MINED THAT THE INSTRUCTION GIVEN THE JURY IN PETITIONER’S STATE TRIAL DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW. The appellants argue first, that the District Judge determined all the issues of law and fact in favor of the respondents. (Appellant’s Brief, p. 4). I f the appellants mean to suggest that the court determined the facts to be that Raby was limp prior to his arrest and remained in that position after his arrest, then we agree for that is what the court determined. (Rec. 9-12, Add. App. 6-9). The appellants next argue that the court’s finding that the instruction to the jury denied Rahy due process of law in that the instruction was tantamount to a directed verdict is based upon a misapprehension of the law. The district Judge in announcing his decision said, “ . . . In considering the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the question of resistance of arrest, I not only re viewed the full transcript of the trial and the decision of the Illinois Court hut, in addition, conducted a full retrial of the entire incident. . . (Rec. 10, Add. App. 7-8). The appellants argue that the District Judge clearly erred in that he failed to fully read the instructions. (Appellants’ Brief, p. 5). Yet it is clear that the District Judge fully read the state court transcript and the opin ion of the Illinois court and was fully aware of the in structions tendered to the jury. In fact the District Judge 4- in Ms opiMon recited two of the instructions given by the state court on the issue of resisting arrest. The other instruction is a mere recitation of the state statute, and it can hardly be argued that the District Judge was not aware of the statute or the instruction given regarding it. (Rec. 13-14, App. 9-11). The District Judge’s opinion discusses the law appli cable to the facts and the state court instruction. The District Judge said: There are two steps in performing an arrest. The first is the speaking of such words or the performing of such acts as brings to the conscience of the person arrested the fact that he is being placed under arrest. The second is the taking of such person into cus tody. Even that step may be performed verbally or by the performance of some act. The two steps in many instances merge into one. Under no circumstances, however, is the arrested person obliged under Illinois law to aid the arrest ing officer in effecting his own arrest. He need not affirmatively perform upon himself the act which is the duty of the arresting officer to perform. He is not required, even if commanded to do so, to place the handcuffs around his wrists, even if mechanically it were possible for him to do so, nor need he lock the door to his own cell, even if that were also me chanically capable of being done. The Illinois statute is written differently from the statutes of the other states. The Illinois statute is written in broad sweeping language and does not, as the CaliforMa statute, for example, follow in the cases cited by defendants detailed various types of resistance or obstruction. — 5— It is, thus, proper to say that the Illinois statute is satisfied when the arrestee refrains from inten tionally acting affirmatively in any manner which would in the slightest degree frustrate or prevent the officer from carrying out the arrest. I f the use of the phrase “ passive resistance” is to be read as applicable to the Illinois statute, in which statute it does not appear, it must be read in such a manner as to require that the arrested person intentionally, and after being made conscious of the fact that he is being arrested, performed affirmatively some type of passivity which he was not performing immedi ately before the beginning of the arresting process. I find from the transcript of the state trial and from the evidence produced before me that from the type of instruction given by the trial judge to the jury it would now be, as it was then, impossible for a jury to reach any type of intelligent evaluation of the defendant’s conduct as it was presented in the evidence at trial in order that the jury come to a conclusion that he, the petitioner, violated the Illinois Resistance of Arrest Statute. It was particularly incumbent upon the trial judge in the light of the closing argument of the prose cutor to elaborate in detail what he meant by the phrase “ passive resistance.” It is axiomatic that a jury must be informed of the nature of the charge against the defendant and intelligently instructed as to the nature of that offense before it can per form its proper function in the judicial process. Under the language of the instruction given, the jury was obliged to convict the defendant under any set of facts that might have been presented. I find, — 6— therefore, that the instruction to the jury was so inadequate that the petitioner was deprived of due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend ment. I do not find that the use of the phrase “ passive resistance” may not be included in the instructions of the judge to the jury, but the instructions must be broad enough that the jury can understand what is meant at law by “ passive resistance” in order that it not include conduct which is not in fact affir mative conduct on the part of the arrested person. (Rec. 15-18, Add. App. 11-13). The instruction is a model of what an instruction should not be. Under the language of the instruction the jury had no choice but to convict the petitioner, or else disregard their oath to follow the instructions of the court. The difficulty with this instruction is, that given the everyday, ordinary, plain meaning of words, the defend ant must be found guilty under any circumstances. Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Second Edition defines these terms as follows: Active: 1. acting, functioning; moving; working. 2. capable of acting, functioning, etc. 3. causing action motion or change. 4. characterized by quick motion or the disposition to move with speed; nimble; lively; brisk; agile; as an active animal. . . . Passive: 1. receiving impressions from external agents; not acting; being the object of action rather than the subject. The mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple ideas. 2. unresisting; not opposing; receiving or suffering without resistance; as passive submission to the law. 3. mentally or phys — 7- ically inactive; lifeless; unenthusiastic; unrespon sive. . . . Without any help in defining these terms, and without any limiting instruction defining the nature of the crime, the jury is left to sift for itself the conduct or the lack of conduct involved in this charge. If anything is clear, it is that the legislature did not intend to sweep all human conduct (active), or lack of human conduct (pas sive), into the over-broad, vague, sweeping statute. Noth ing in logic or legal experience suggests that the legisla ture intended to enact such an overbroad, all-encompass ing act. Certainly it is manifest that such a statute could not stand the test of constitutional due process. The law of this case, as given to the jury, is that the petitioner should be convicted under these circumstances: if he was acting; if he was not acting; if he was func tioning; if he was not functioning; if he was causing action; if he was being the object of action; if he was resisting; if he was not opposing. If the state trial judge has accurately interpretated this statute in his instruc tion, then there can hardly be any doubt that the statute is unconstitutionally void for vagueness and overbreadth. The appellants next argue that the rule announced by the District Judge is incorrect and results in an impos sible burden upon police officers. Appellants then cite certain examples of how the rule would operate. (Appel lants’ Brief, pp. 6-7). Such a method of interpretation could, of course, be applied to drain the sense and mean ing out of any constitutional or statutory provision, or court opinion. In no case has the statute been applied or construed in the irrational manner the appellants suggest, and there is little likelihood that any court would so construe it. 8- II. THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE SHOULD BE DISCHARGED FROM THE CUSTODY OF THE RESPONDENTS BECAUSE HIS STATE TRIAL VIOLATED THE PROVISIONS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT’S DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE. Prior to the commencement of the State trial the peti tioner presented to the State Court a motion to dismiss the complaints against him based npon a prior trial in the state court on charges of violating a municipal ordi nance of the City of Chicago. Petitioner alleged that the State trial out of which his convictions grew was viola tive of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, in that the City of Chicago had tried petitioner for obstructing traffic which offense grew out of the very same conduct which was the subject of the second State trial. Petitioner alleged that the instant state trial placed him twice in jeopardy for the same conduct. This contention was denied by the State trial court. Subsequent to the ruling of the district court in the instant case the United States Supreme Court decided Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387. In Waller the Supreme Court repudiated the doctrine that municipalities were vested with such sovereign powers as to enable them to prosecute for violations of ordinances notwithstanding a prior state prosecution, or vice versa. The Waller court overruled a long line of cases in Illinois commencing with Wragg v. Penn Town ship, 94 111. 11 (1879). It is now clear that municipalities possess no sovereign power independently of the State, and therefore the State and a municipality cannot constitutionally punish a per — 9 — son for the same conduct. Such trials are repugnant to the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The issue here was not presented to the Illinois Su preme Court and the question arises whether it is prop erly before this court, petitioner admittedly having not exhausted the issue. In the face of a long line of Illinois decisions, standing for the proposition that a municipality and the state could constitutionally punish for the same conduct, Wragg v. Penn Township, 94 111. 11 (1879); Robbins v. People, 95 111. 175 (1880); Hankins v. People, 106 111. 628 (1883); City of Chicago v. The Union Ice Cream Co., 252 111. 311 (1911); City of Decatur v. Schlick, 269 111. 181 (1915); Ohio, Indiana & Western Railway Co. v. People, 39 111. App. 473 (1888); Village of Winnetka v. Sinnett, 272 111. App. 143 (1933); People v. Behymer, 48 111. App. 2d 218 (1964); and Village of Mt. Prospect v. Malouf, 103 Til. App. 2d 88 (1968), the petitioner did not urge the matter on appeal in the State, nor before the district court on his habeas petition. 28 U.S.C.A., Sec. 2254, provides that no exhaustion is necessary where there is “ the existence of circumstances rendering such (state) process ineffec tive to protect the rights of the prisoner.” In Evans v. Cunningham, 335 F. 2d 491, the court had substantially the same problem before it. There the court said: Evans has not undertaken to present his legal con tention to the state courts. The reason he advances for not having done so is a recent decision of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. . . . Over a period of many years there developed a judicially fashioned doctrine that a federal court 10— could not entertain a writ of habeas corpus filed by a state prisoner unless the state prisoner had pre viously exhausted available state remedies. The judi cially fashioned rule was codified in 1948 as 28 U.S.C.A., Sec. 2254. . . . The prohibition of Sec. 2254 is mandatory, but the section, itself contains two exceptions to the rule. The prohibitive rule does not apply if the state pro vides no remedy or if there are circumstances which make resort to the state remedy ineffective and futile. The latter exception seems applicable here. It is true that this petitioner, Evans, is not the same petitioner whose identical contention the Su preme Court of Appeals of Virginia considered and decided in Sims v. Cunningham. The Sims case stands however, as the authoritative and considered judg ment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. It was decided only two years ago as of this writing and was even younger than that when Evans filed his petition in the District Court. Since 1962 there has been no substantial change in the composition of Virginia’s [Supreme Court of Appeals, and there is no suggestion of any possible reason to suppose that the Court might reconsider its considererd judgment in the recent Sims case. Under these cir cumstances, any competent lawyer would advise Evans that he was wasting his time if he undertook to persuade the Virginia Court of Appeals to re verse itself, unless he was armed with some fresh argument which Sims had not presented. Evans had none. His outstandingly able, court-appointed counsel can only reiterate the same contentions on the sub stantive issue which Sims presented to the Virginia Court, though his reiteration is through and com plete. . . . Here, Evans and Sims are not the same indi vidual. They were not codefendants, nor were they charged with complicity in the same crime. With — 11- respect to their substantive contention here, however, they stand as if identical. The substantive question, which is uncomplicated by any factual controversy, is the same whether presented to us by Sims or Evans. It appears unnecessary under the exhaustion of remedies doctrine that we decline to reach the merits of the issue as tendered by Evans, when we would be compelled to reach the merits of the same issue if it were tendered by Sims. This is in keeping with the teaching of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S. Ct. 822, 9 L. Ed. 837. (Emphasis supplied.) Just as Evans and Sims stood as if identical, so Eaby stood as if identical to Wragg, Robbins, Hankins, The Union Ice Cream Co., Schlick, Ohio, Indiana & Western Railway Co., Sinnett and Behymer. The long line of cases in Illinois prior to the enactment of the new Illi nois Criminal Code, and the decision in Behymer subse quent to the enactment of the Code made it a futile gesture for Eaby to present the issue to the State Su preme Court, and also a futile gesture to present the issue to the district court. But such failure under the circumstances does not constitute failure to exhaust state remedies, or a deliberate bypass of state remedies. See: Barr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200; Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519; Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F. 2d 709; Thomas v. Cun ningham, 335 F. 2d 67; Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225; Application of DeToro, 247 F. Supp. 840; Davis v. Maryland House of Correction, 247 F. Supp. 869. See also: Sokol, Federal Habeas Corpus, Sec. 23 (2d Ed.). The next obstacle to reaching the merits of petitioner- appellee’s contention is whether this Honorable Court can decide the issue in view of the fact that petitioner’s contention was not presented to the district court. The issue here sought to be presented was not controverted 12- in the State court. The State court merely applied the doctrine of stare decisis and denied Raby’s motion to dismiss. In this posture there is no factual controversy, only a pure question of law. The Waller court opinion very clearly holds that a trial based upon a state statute subsequent to trial by a municipality for the same offense is constitutionally impermissible. In Evans v. Cunningham, 335 F. 2d 491, 496, the court had before it the question of the propriety of a review ing court determining the merits of a case without a prior ruling by the district court on the issue. There the court said: Ordinarily we would not undertake to dispose of a case on the merits if the District Court had faded to reach them on procedural grounds. If we found the procedural ground insufficient to support dismissal, we would usually remand the case to the District Court to consider and determine the case on the merits. There are obvious advantages in that prac tice, particularly to the appellate court which thus gains the benefit of a decision on the merits to en lighten its appellate reconsideration. Here, however, there are no factual questions to resolve, and an opinion by a District Judge on the legal issue could hardly be more enlightening to the appellate process than the full opinion of the Supreme Court of Ap peals of Virginia on the merits of the issue. Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, we think a remand to the District Court to consider the case on the merits would only delay decision without service of any useful purpose. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 3-3, Chapter 38, Illinois Revised Statutes pro vides: (a) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one offense, — 13— the defendant may be prosecuted for each such of fense. (b) If the several offenses are known to the proper prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution, except as provided in Subsection (c), if they are based on the same act. (c) When 2 or more offenses are charged as required by Subsection (b), the court in the interest of justice may order that one or more of such charges shall be tried separately. The provisions of Section 3-3 and the decision in Waller made it mandatory that either the City or the State prosecute the defendant for all known offenses in a single trial. Clearly it was known to both prosecuting authorities what the conduct of the petitioner was and what charges were pending against him. To hold that the petitioner can be prosecuted by the City and the State denies to the petitioner protection from double jeopardy as guaranteed to him by the Fifth and Four teenth Amendments and the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed to petitioner by the Fourteenth Amend ment. Under the circumstances of the instant case it would serve no useful purpose to remand the cause to the Dis trict Court for decision, particularly where there are no factual issues that require determination. The status of the prevailing law and the record before the State trial court are clear. It is respectfully submitted there fore that this court should reach the issue here pre sented on the merits. 14- CONCLUSION. For the above and foregoing reasons the District Court Judge should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted, L eo E . H olt and M aria A. E lden 30 W. Washington Street Chicago, Illinois 60602 ANdover 3-6054 Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellee 3fn ifje ^Hntteb States Court of Appeals Jfor tfje g>£bentfj Circuit No. 1 8 3 8 9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel., ALBERT A. RABY, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. JOSEPH I. WOODS, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, and WINSTON MOORE, Warden of the Cook County Jail, Respondents-Appellants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Honorable James B. Parsons, Judge Presiding. ADDITIONAL APPENDIX FOR APPELLEE INDEX TO APPENDIX PAGE Petition to Discharge ....................................................... 1-2 Motion to Strike and Dismiss Denied .......................... 2 Transcript of Proceedings ............................................. 3-14 Petition to Discharge 1 REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IN STATE COURT 80 PETITION FOR DISCHARGE: (Caption omitted) Now comes the defendant, Albert A. Raby, by his at torney, Leo E. Holt, and moves the Court to enter an order discharging the defendant, and as ground for said petition shows unto the court the following: 1. That the defendant was arrested on June 28, 1965, at Randolph and LaSalle Streets in the City of Chicago, Illinois. 2. That the defendant was subsequently charged in separate complaints of violating Chapter 27, Sec. 291 of the Municipal Code of Chicago, Chapter 38, Sec. 26- 1(a)(1) of the Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 38, Sec. 31-1 of the Illinois Revised Stautes, Chapter 38, Sec. 8-1 of the Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 38, Sec. 26-1(1) of the Illinois Revised Stautes and Chap ter 23, Sec. 20-11 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. 3. That on or about January 24,1966, the defendant was tried before the Court and jury for violating Chapter 27, Sec. 291 of the Municipal Code of Chicago which trial resulted in the judge declaring a mistrial. 4. That again on or about March 21, 1966, the de fendant was put to trial for violating Chapter 27, Sec. 291 of the Municipal Code of Chicago; that subsequent trial on March 21, 1966, violated the defendant’s con stitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article n, Sec. 10 and 2 of the Illinois State Constitution ’ that said trial result ed in a conviction against the defendant and the de fendant is now perfecting an appeal to the Illinois Su preme Court. 2 Petition to Discharge 81 5. That the occurrence alleged in the instant case grew out of the same act for which the defendant has already been tried and found guilty and the prosecu tion knew at all times that act or acts, whether or not criminal, had been committed by the defendant at the alleged time and place. 6. That the complaint which seeks to charge the de fendant with Disorderly Conduct is defective and void for the reason that the statute under which the com plaint is laid is unconstitutional for the reason of vagueness. 7. That the complaint which seeks to charge the defendant with Resisting Arrest is wholly defective in that it fails to inform the defendant of the nature of charge against him in order to allow him an opportu nity to prepare his defense. 8. That a trial of the instant case will violate the defendant’s constitutional rights under the provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Consti tution and Article II, Section 9 of the Illinois Constitu tion, and further that said trial will violate the express provisions of Chapter 38, Sec. 3-3(b), 3 -4(b)(l) and 102-15 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. 9. Defendant attaches hereto his Memorandum of Law in support of his petition for discharge. Wherefore, the defendant prays that the court will strike the complaints filed herein and that he be dis charged. / s / Leo E. Holt Attorney for Defendant 244 The Court: Motion to strike and dismiss is denied. The motion to amend the complaint is sustained. Transcript of Proceedings 3 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS had in the above-entitled cause, before the Honorable James B. Parsons, one of the Judges of said Court, in his courtroom in the United States Courthouse, Chi cago, Illinois, on December 31, 1969, at 3 :45 o’clock p.m. 3 The Court: Surely. United States of America ex 4 rel Albert Raby, Petitioner, versus Joseph I. Woods, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, and Winston Moore, Warden of the Cook County Jail, Respondents, in this Court No. 69 C 633. The clarion issue rung forth by this case rises out of the recent efforts of people to express themselves in their drive for total participation in the democratic society that began a short decade ago and was emoted by what was called demonstrations, which were dramas acted out before television news media cameras and beamed into the consciences and concerns of the na tion. Indeed, there had been during the labor movements of the 1920’s and 1930’s demonstrations which our Su preme Court labelled as expressions of speech guaran teed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. They took the form of parades, picketing and public editorialism, but in the last decade there has been added to them dimension, to-wit, the submitting of themselves to arrest under traditional statutes and ordinances denouncing what they called or what was called disturbances of the peace. Those who engaged in these demonstrations delib erately, intentionally placed themselves in positions 4 Transcript of Proceedings 5 from which in the eyes of the public awareness they would be arrested and, being so arrested, would by such arrests dramatize as a part of their expression of speech their concern about matters public. This matter is before me on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to Section 3341 of Title 28, United States Code. The petitioner, Albert A. Raby, a Negro civil rights worker, was arrested on June 28, 1965 in the course of a civil rights “ sit-in demonstration.” He was charged with disorderly conduct, being in violation of Chapter 38, Section 26 -l(a )(l) of the Illinois Revised Statutes and with resistance of arrest in violation of Chapter 38, Section 31 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. He was tried before a jury and convicted of these charges in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Municipal Department, First District. He was fined $500 for disorderly conduct and sentenced to serve three months in the Cook County Jail for resisting arrest. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed his convic tion and a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States was denied. 6 On the face of the petition I find a cause of action to be State remedies having been exhausted and res pondents having been properly served with process in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Federal Court, I find that I have jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter under the Habeus (sic) Corpus Act of the United States. The opinion and decision which follow have the fol lowing results: first, the Illinois disorderly conduct statute is found constitutional on its face and as ap- Transcript of Proceedings 5 plied to the conduct of the petitioner, and the restraint heretofore placed by me upon the clerk of the Munic ipal Court to prevent his utilizing the bond money posted by petitioner in payment of his fine is removed and dissolved and he may use that money for the pay ment of that fine for disorderly conduct. Second, the Illinois Resistance of Arrest Statute is found constitutional on its face in all of its aspects, however, the state court’s instruction to the jury re garding the statute was so inadequate that the peti tioner was deprived of due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and must be, and here by is, discharged from the 90 day jail sentence im posed upon him as a result of the jury’s verdict. Early in the proceedings before me the petitioner conceded that his conduct was clearly violative of the disorderly conduct statute, should it be constitutional on its face, and early in the proceedings I informed the parties that, relying on my decision in an earlier case, to-wit, United States versus Woodard, affirmed by the Seventh Circuit at 376 Fed. 2d 136, I considered the statute constitutional. I found, as in this case, and as in that case, the stat ute not to be unduly broad nor far reaching, and not to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. In addition, in order to be consistent in his testi mony as to the purpose of his conduct, petitioner must be held to have conceded that he had no standing to contest the constitutionality of that statute since, as he testified, he did what he did for the express purpose of getting arrested; conducting himself in the manner in which he did was part of his planned demonstration. 6 Transcript of Proceedings I understand it to be a demonstration against the po licy of the City of Chicago then maintained in retaining one Benjamin J. Willis as superintendent of the schools of the City of Chicago. 8 The case narrows itself before me to two simple but rather difficult issues; first, the constitutionality of the Resistance of Arrest Statute, as amended, and, second, the constitutionality of the court’s charge or instruction to the jury with regard to the meaning of the words of that statute. Before conducting a hearing in the case I announced my decision on the disorderly conduct issue and the parties were directed to present evidence and argu ment only as to the question of the constitutionality of the resistance of arrest statute and on the instruction of the trial court to the jury with relation thereto. What happened and the circumstances under which it happened are an important consideration at this point. The petitioner, Albert A. Raby, organized a protest demonstration against the retention of Super intendent Willis. The demonstrators met according to plans and marched to City Hall where, while the dem onstrators waited outside, Mr. Raby entered the build ing for a conference with the Mayor. When he returned to his group from the Mayor’s office he spoke to them from a elevated position beside the steps of the City Hall. He stated that his efforts inside had been un satisfactory. 9 He then called upon all who wished to accompany him to proceed with the second phase of the protest demonstration. This consisted of moving to the corner of the streets by the City Hall and out into the inter section of Randolph and Clark Streets, where they Transcript of Proceedings 7 would sit in the streets at their intersections and where they would “get themselves arrested.” It was a busy part of the day, traffic was heavy, police were available and, of course, television cameras and members of numerous news media were there. By their sitting in the center of the intersection, traffic was tied up for some distance in all four direc tions. The officer in charge of the police on duty there announced to the demonstrators that unless they re moved themselves from the intersection they would be placed under arrest for obstructing traffic and for dis orderly conduct. The demonstrators did not move and the police had to move in. This was their duty and this they did. As they approached each “ sitter-in” or groups of “ sitter-in,” they announced, “You are under arrest. Get up and get into the police van.” Some obeyed. Others had to be carried to the vans. Ruby remained on the ground and had to be carried 10 to the van. He was among the last of the demonstrators who had to be so removed. The Illinois Resistance of Arrest Statute, Chapter 38, Illinois Revised Statutes, Section 31-1, provides as follows: “ A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance of one known to the person to be a peace officer of any authorized act within his of ficial capacity shall be fined not to exceed $500 or imprisoned in a penal institution other than the penitentiary not to exceed one year, or both.” Raby remained on the ground and had to be carried. In considering the petition for a writ of habeus (sic) corpus on the question of resistance of arrest, I not only reviewed the full transcript of the trial and the 8 Transcript of Proceedings decisions of the Illinois courts but, in addition, con ducted a full retrial of the entire incident. The same witnesses who testified at the initial state trial tes tified in the same manner before me. In addition, I admitted into evidence by description an actual demonstration of the carrying of a person presumably seated on the ground, the courtroom floor as it was here, by four presumed officers, indeed, the attorneys in the case, as it was here, in the manner in 11 which, according to the testimony given by certain of the witnesses, Raby was carried by the police, and at a distance, according to the testimony of certain of the witnesses, the parties had to carry him in order that he be taken to the van. There was testimony, of course, that after being carried for a certain distance he announced that he would stand up and walk the rest of the way and enter the van. I observed to the record, as I now observe, that had the person carried not asserted a muscular tightening of his arms, toward his body and his fore legs toward his thighs, his arms and legs would have slipped upward upon being lifted, and the four officers would have had to move him holding him by the wrists and ankles, his sitting portions dragging or bumping along on the ground. This is a matter of which I take notice and which was demonstrated before me. Actually, this is what happened to the petitioner here. After he had been carried part of the distance from where he sat to where he volunteered to walk the rest of the way, his arms slipped up and he had to be carried by his wrists, causing him to be dragged or bumped along the ground. Transcript of Proceedings 9 Whether Raby intentionally or by sheer exhaustion decreased the effort asserted by him that was in aid 12 of the effort assumed by the arresting officers to cause his removal, has a substantial bearing on whether he intentionally—and the statute requires that it be in tentional—resisted arrest, and a further bearing on whether he ‘‘merely went limp.” This matter of “merely going limp” has been given as an important factor in determining whether in any specific case there was an actual resisting of arrest. This language is to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Raby’s appeal, when it stated that resistance can be passive as well as active, and naming as one of the examples merely going limp. It also is to be found in the latest decision of this court when, in the Landry case, my brother, Judge Hubert Will, stated: “Resistance can be passive as well as active,” naming as one of the examples, “merely going limp.” It further is to be found in the closing arguments of the attorney in the prosecution of Raby in the original case, when he said, and I quote from page 942 of the transcript: “ The second issue, did, on the 28th of June, 1965, a Monday night at approximately 5 :00 o’clock, Mr. Raby resist arrest through passive resistance. We 13 are not claiming he is violent; it was through pas sive resistance, and the court will instruct you that resistance does not have to be active and that passive resistance by him going limp is every bit as much resistance as if he took a shovel and hit someone over the head.” 10 Transcript of Proceedings Of even more severe concern is the instruction of the judge to the jury. He stated at page 949-950 of the transcript: “You are instructed that the defendant, Albert Eaby, is charged with committing the offense of obstructing and resisting a peace officer on June 28, 1965, at LaSalle and Randolph Streets, in that he resisted a police officer in the performance of his duty by, when placed under arrest by said of ficer, refusing to voluntarily accompany arresting officer and had to be physically carried away, in violation of Chapter 38, Section 31-1, Illinois Re vised Statutes, and against the peace and dignity of the people of the State of Illinois, which charge said defendant denies. “ The court instructs the jury as a matter of law 14 that resisting a peace officer in the performance of his duty may be passive as well as active. To in terfere and obstruct does not require active resist ance and force.” Respondents urge that this is a well established principle of law and cite certain state decisions as well as Judge W ill’s decision in the Landry case as exam ples. One such case, to-wit, In Re Bacon, cited at 240 California Appellate, Second Division 34, 49 California Reports, 322 at 333, 1966, and I quote: “ The present case is controlled by the principles hereinbefore discussed to the effect that where the arrest is lawful, a person arrested may not use passive resistance or interpose any obstacles which in any manner impede, hinder, interrupt, prevent or delay such arrest. “We hold, therefore, that a person who goes limp, and therefore requires the arresting officer Transcript of Proceedings 11 to drag or bodily lift and carry him in order to effect his arrest, causes such delay and obstruction to lawful arrest as to constitute the offense of resisting an officer, as defined in Section 148.” That case was followed in another case cited at 53 15 California Reports 198, and still another California case, which was cited to me by respondents, at 68 Cali fornia Reports 160, and by Judge Will’s decision in the Landry case, which is found at 280 Federal Supple ment 959. I find, however, that except for the Landry case, in each of the other cases the statute is substantially dif ferent. It is well established that except where the statutory provision carries sufficient safeguards against a denial of due process of law, a peace officer performing an arrest accepts his prisoner as he finds him. There are two steps in performing an arrest. The first is the speaking of such words or the performing of such acts ars brings to the conscience of the person arrested the fact that he is being placed under arrest. The second is the taking of such person into custody. Even that step may be performed verbally or by the performance of some act. The two steps in many instances merge into one. Under no circumstances, however, is the arrested per son obliged under Illinois law to aid the arresting of ficer in effecting his own arrest. He need not affirm atively perform upon himself the act which is the duty of the arresting officer to perform. He is not required, even if commanded to do so, to place the handcuffs 16 around his wrists, even if mechanically it were pos sible for him to do so, nor need he lock the door to his own cell, even if that were also mechanically capable of being done. 12 Transcript of Proceedings The Illinois statute is written differently from the statutes of the other states. The Illinois statute is written in broad sweeping language and does not, as the California statute, for example, follow in the cases cited by defendants detailed various types of resist- tance or obstruction. It is, thus, proper to say that the Illinois statute is satisfied when the arrestee refrains from intentionally acting affirmatively in any manner which would in the slightest degree frustrate or prevent the officer from carrying out the arrest. If the use of the phrase “ pas sive resistance” is to be read as applicable to the Illi nois statute, in which statute it does not appear, it must be read in such a manner as to require that the arrested person intentionally, and after being made conscious of the fact that he is being arrested, per formed affirmatively some type of passivity which he was not performing immediately before the beginning of the arresting process. May I repeat that paragraph. If the use of the 17 phrase “passive resistance” is to be read as applicable to the Illinois statute, in which the words do not ap pear, it must be read in such a manner as to require that the arrested person intentionally, and after being made conscious of the fact that he was being arrested, performed affirmatively some type of passivity—or “passiveness’—would that be the right word?—some type of passiveness which he was not performing im mediately before the arrest. I am confident that this is the interpretation intended by Judge Will in the Landry case when he used as an example “ going limp” as against “ remaining limp.” I find from the transcript of the state trial and from the evidence produced before me that from the type of Transcript of Proceedings 13 instruction given by the trial judge to the jury it would now be, as it was then, impossible for a jury to reach any type of intelligent evaluation of the defendant’s conduct as it was presented in the evidence at trial in order that jury come to a conclusion that he, the petitioner, violated the Illinois Resistance of Arrest Statute. It was particularly incumbent upon the trial judge in light of the closing argument of the prosecutor to elaborate in detail what he meant by the phrase “ pas sive resistance.” It is axiomatic that a jury must be 18 informed of the nature of the charge against the de fendant and intelligently instructed as to the nature of that offense before it can perform its proper func tion in the judicial process. Under the language of the instruction given, the jury was obliged to convict the defendant under any set of facts that might have been presented. I find, therefore, that the instruction to the jury was so inadequate that the petitioner was deprived of due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. I do not find that the use of the phrase “passive resistance” may not be included in the instructions of the judge to the jury, but the instructions must be broad enough that the jury can understand what is meant at law by “passive resistance” in order that it not include conduct which is not in fact affirmative conduct on the part of the arrested person. This matter being heard by me as a Federal Court on a writ of habeus (sic) corpus, and not be (sic) me as a reviewing court, it is without my authority to remand the case for a new trial. The traditional rem edy for a writ when it is allowed and confirmed, as 14 Transcript of Proceedings herein it is being done, is to direct the respondent to release the prisoner from his confinement, or if it is a technical confinement, as it is here, the threat of 19 confinement, on the ground that to retain him so con fined would be a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and it is so ordered. The clerk is directed to enter this order forthwith. The execution of the order is stayed for a period of two weeks in order to give respondents sufficient time to make motions for rehearing or to make such other motions or perform such other matters as they may choose. Respectfully submitted, L eo E . H olt and M aria A. E ldest 30 W. Washington Street Chicago, Illinois 60602 ANdover 3-6054 Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellee N o. 1 8 3 8 9