Bates v. Batte Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari

    IN THE

SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1950

No. 741

GLADYS NOEL BATES and RICHARD JESS BROWN, 
Individually and on Behalf of the Negro Teachers and 
Principals in the Jackson Separate School District,

Petitioners
vs.

JOHN C. BATTE, President; R. M. HEDERMAN, JR., 
Secretary; R. W. NAEF, W. R. NEWMAN, JR., and 
W. D. McCAIN, Constituting the Board of Trustees of 
Jackson Separate School District, and K. P. WAL­
KER, Superintendent of Jackson Separate Schools,

Respondents

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
RUFUS CREEKMORE 
Standard Life Building 
Jackson, Mississippi 
Attorney for Respondents

E. W. STENNETT 
Of Counsel



1

CASES CITED
Page

Alabama Public Service Co., et al v. Southern Railway
Co.,___U .S.,____, 95 L. Ed 708 (decided May 21,

1951) ............................................................................  3
Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752, 91 L.

Ed. 1796 ...........................................................................  3
Amsinck v. Springfield Groc. Co., 7 Fed. (2d) 855 

(8th Cir.) ................................................................. 6 ,7 ,8
Breeding Motor Freight Lines v. Reconstruction Fi­

nance Corporation, 172 Fed. (2d) 416 (10th Cir.) . . .  7
Cameron v. Hodges, 127 U.S. 322, 32 L. Ed. 132.............  4
Gatlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 89 L. Ed. 911.......  6
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.

541, 93 L. Ed. 1521.........................................................  5
Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 64 L. Ed. 616.....................  6
Cook v. Davis, 178 Fed. (2d) 595...............................2, 3, 4
Commissioner v. Bedford, 325 U.S. 283, 89 L. Ed 1161 5, 6
Douglass v. Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 87 L. Ed. 1324 4
Field v. United States, 205 U.S. 292, 51 L. Ed. 807.........  1
First National Bank v. Weld, 264 U.S. 784, L. Ed.

784 ................................................................................ 2, 3
Florian v. United States, 114 Fed. (2d) 990, (7th Cir.) . . .  7
General Talking Pictures Corporation v. Western Elec­

tric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 82 L. Ed. 1273 ........................... 2
Good Shot v. United States, 179 U.S. 87, 45 L. Ed. 101... 4
Gorham Mfg Co. v. State Tax Com., 266 U.S. 265, 69 L.

Ed. 279 ...........................................................................2, 3
Hampton v. Thompson, 181 Fed. (2nd) 535 .....................  4



11
Page

Henderson v. United States, 399 U.S. 816, 94 L. Ed.
1302 .................................................................................  4

Herrick v. Cutcheon, 55 Fed. 6 (1st Cir.) ..................... 6, 7
In re: D’Arcy, 142 Fed. (2nd) 313 (3rd C ir.)............. 6, 8
King Iron Bridge Co. v. Otoe Co., 120 U.S. 225, 30 

L. Ed. 623 ........................................................................ 4
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 83 L. Ed. 1281...................  4
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Pillsbury, 154 

Fed. (2d) 599 (5th C ir.)................................................  8
Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 67 L. Ed.

922 .............................................................................1, 2
Mansfield, etc., Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 349, 28 

L. Ed. 462 .......................................................................  4
Mathews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 76 L. Ed. 447.............  3
McAllister v. Dick Towing Co., 175 Fed. (2d) 652...........  7
Meeker v. Baxter, 83 Fed. (2d) 183 (2nd C ir.)...............  7
Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 85 L. Ed. 1201.... 4
Morrow v. Wood, 126 Fed. (2d) 1021 (5th C ir.).............  8
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., 303 U.S. 41,

82 L. Ed. 638.....................................................................  3
Natural Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300,

82 L. Ed. 276...................................................................  3
Oneida Nav. Co. v. W. & S. Job. Co., 252 U.S. 521,

64 L. Ed. 697 ...................................................................  6
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 300, 78 

L. Ed. 8 1 0 .......................................................................  3
Parker v. Owensby, 141 U.S. 81, 35 L. Ed. 654.................  4
Peoples Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 149 Fed. (2d)

850 (9th Cir.) ............................................................. 6, 7



Ill
Page

Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461, 76 L. Ed. 
1226 ..............................................................................

Prentiss v. Alantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 150, 53 L. Ed.
161 .................... , ...........................................................2,

Rardin v. Messick, 76 Fed. (2d) 643 (7th Cir.) ........... 6,
Shanfrake Coal & Supply Co. v. Westchester Service 

Corp, 293 U.S. 449, 79 L. Ed. 583...................................
Southern Power Co. v. North Carolina Public Service 

Co., 263 U.S. 508, 68 L. Ed. 413......................................
St. Louis Amusement Co. v. Paramount, 156 Fed. (2d) 

400 (8th Cir.) ...........................................................6, 7,
St. Louis Amusement Co. v. Paramount, 158 Fed. (2d)

30 (8th Cir.) ............................................................6, 7,
Stratton v. St. Louis, Southwestern Ry. Co., 282 U.S.

10, 75 L. Ed. 135 ............................................................
Studer v. Moore, 153 Fed. (2d) 902 (2nd C ir.)...............
The Fanny D. v. Southern S. S. Co., 112 Fed. (2d) 

347 (5th Cir.) ..................................................................
The Mary Eddie, 60 U.S. 199, 15 L. Ed. 624.......................
The Santa Rita, 281 Fed. 760 (5th Cir.) .........................
Trudeau v. Barnes, 65 Fed. (2d) 563................................
Uhl v. Dalton, 151 Fed. (2d) 502 (9th C ir.)............. 6, 7,
United States v. Johnson, 268 U.S. 220, 69 L. Ed. 925 . . .
United States v. Hark, 320, U.S. 531, 88 L. Ed. 290.........

Utley v. St. Petersburg, 292 U.S. 106, 78 L. Ed. 1155....

Vaughan v. American Ins. Co., 15 Fed. (2d) 526 (5th 
Cir.) .................................................................................

Veritas Oil Corp. v. McLain, 4 Fed. (2d) 389 (5th Cir.) . .

3

3
7

4

1

8

8

4
7

8

6

6

4
8

2

6

3

8

8



iv
Page

Williamson v. Chicago Lumber Co., 59 Fed. (2d) 918. . .6, 8 
Wright v. Gibson, 120 Fed. (2d) 865 (9th C ir.)..........6, 7, 8

OTHER AUTHORITIES

43 Harvard Law Review, 33................................................  1

STATUTES

U.S.C.A. Title 8, Sec. 43......................................................
28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1291..........................................................
28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2107...................................................... 7,

SUPREME COURT RULES 

Rule 38-5 .............................................................................  2

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 5 4 .................................................................................  6
Rule 5 8 ................................................................................. 6
Rule 73(a) ....................................................................... 7, 8
Rule 79 (a) ...........................................................................  6

CO
 

LO
 

00



IN THE

SUPREME COURT  
OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1950

Mo. 741

GLADYS NOEL BATES and RICHARD JESS BROWN, 
Individually and on Behalf of the Negro Teachers and 
Principals in the Jackson Separate School District,

Petitioners
vs.

JOHN C. BATTE, President; R. M. HEDERMAN, JR., 
Secretary; R. W. NAEF, W. R. NEWMAN, JR., and 
W. D. McCAIN, Constituting the Board of Trustees of 
Jackson Separate School District, and K. P. WAL­
KER, Superintendent of Jackson Separate Schools,

Respondents

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
On this petition the court is not concerned with the 

question of whether the lower court’s decision was correct 
or incorrect. “Certiorari cannot serve as a relief merely 
from an erroneous result” ; nor is granting of the writ war­
ranted merely to review the evidence or inferences drawn 
therefrom. Frankfurter and Landis in 43 Harvard Law 
Review, 33 @ 52. Field v. United States, 205 U. S. 292, 
51 L. Ed. 807; Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U. S. 159, 
67 L. Ed. 922; Southern Power Co. v. North Carolina Pub-



2

lie Service Co., 263 U. S. 508, 68 L. Ed. 413; United States 
v. Johnson, 268 U. S. 220, 69 L. Ed. 925; General Talking 
Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U. S. 175, 82 L. 
Ed. 1273.

Therefore, we will not here undertake to show that 
the administrative remedies provided by the laws of the 
State of Mississippi (admittedly not exhausted by petition­
ers) are adequate and complete; nor to point out how simi­
lar are the material facts in this case, and how substanti­
ally alike is the administrative remedy provided under 
Mississippi law, to the facts in, and the administrative 
remedy provided under Georgia law in the case of Cook v. 
Davis, 178 F. (2d) 595 cert, denied 340 U. S. 811, 95 L. Ed. 
21 .

The court is now concerned only with the question 
of whether the writ should be granted in order to secure 
uniformity of decision between the various courts of appeal 
on the particular matter involved, or to bring up a case 
involving questions of importance which it is in the public 
interest to have decided by this court Magnum Import Co. 
v. Coty, 262 U. S. 159, 67 L. Ed. 922. There are present 
here none of the reasons suggested by Rule 38-5 which 
might influence the court to grant the writ. There is no 
conflict of decisions. There is no question of public im­
portance not heretofore settled by this court. On the con­
trary the principle upon which the lower court’s decision 
rests is one long established and well settled.

That administrative remedies provided by state law 
must be pursued and exhausted before resort may be had 
to judicial proceedings in a federal court is a principle 
well settled by the decisions of this court. Prentiss v. At­
lantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 150, 53 L. Ed. 161; First Na­
tional Bank v. Weld, 264 U. S. 784, 68 L. Ed. 784; Gorham 
Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Com. 266 U. S. 265, 69 L. Ed. 279;



3

Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 76 L. Ed. 
1226; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 300, 78 
L. Ed. 810; Utley v. St. Petersburg, 292 U. S. 106, 78 L. Ed. 
1155; Natural Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S. 
300, 82 L. Ed. 276.

The doctrine “is of especial force when resort is had 
to the Federal Courts to restrain the action of state offi­
cers; where the federal power impinges on state activities 
under our Federal system.” Cook v. Davis, 178 F. (2d) 
595 cert, denied 340 U. S. 811; 95 L. Ed. 21; Natural Gas 
Pipe Line Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S. 300 @ 311, 82 L. Ed. 
276; Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 76 L. Ed. 
1226; Mathews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 @ 525, 76 L. Ed. 
447. c f: Alabama Public Service Com. v. Southern Ry. Co., 
__ U.S. 95 L. Ed. 708, decided May 21, 1951.

That the right sought to be enforced is one conferred 
by Federal law, or one guaranteed by the Federal Consti­
tution does not in any wise affect the doctrine in its appli­
cation. Such a contention would be “at war with the long 
settled rule of judicial administration that no one is en­
titled to judicial relief for a supposed, or threatened injury 
until the prescribed administrative relief has been exhaust­
ed.” Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., 303 U. S. 41 
@ 50, 82 L. Ed. 638; Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 
U. S. 752, 91 L. Ed. 1796; Natural Gas Pine Line Co. v. 
Slattery, 302 U. S. 300, 82 L. Ed. 276; Utley v. St. Peters­
burg, 292 U. S. 106, 78 L. Ed. 1155; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. 
v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 399, 78 L. Ed. 810; Porter v. Investors 
Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, 76 L. Ed. 1226; Gorham Mfg. Co. 
v. State Tax Com. 266 U. S. 265; 69 L. Ed. 279; First Na­
tional Bank v. Weld, 264 U. S. 784, 68 L. Ed. 784; Prentiss 
v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 150, 53 L. Ed. 161.

That the right here asserted is conferred, or protected 
by the Civil Rights Statute (U.S.C.A. Title 8, Sec. 43) does 
not affect the doctrine. “Constitutional amendments and



4

federal statutes, dealing with race or color, were written, 
they have been interpreted and applied, not to discriminate 
in favor of Negroes, but to prevent discrimination against 
them, not to make, but to prevent a different rule for Ne­
groes from for whites.” Hampton v. Thompson, Cir. 5, 171 
F. (2d) 535. Where the remedy is administrative, and not 
judicial, the rule has been uniformly applied even as to 
cases brought under the Civil Rights statutes, Trudeau v. 
Barnes, Cir. 5, 65 F. (2d) 563 cert, denied 290 U. S. 659, 
78 L. Ed. 571, Cook v. Davis, Cir. 5, 178 F. (2d) 595 cert, 
denied 340 U. S. 811, 95 L. Ed. 21; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. 
S. 268, 83 L. Ed. 1281, cf; Douglass v. Jeanette, 319 U. S. 
157 @ 163, 87 L. Ed. 1324; Mitchell v. United States, 313 
U. S. 80, 85 L. Ed. 1201; Henderson v. United States, 399 
U. S. 816, 94 L. Ed. 1302.

II.

If the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction then this 
Court has no jurisdiction to grant the writ here prayed 
for. Shanfrake Coal & Supply Co. v. Westchester Service 
Corp., 293 U. S. 449, 79 L. Ed. 583, Stratton v. St. Louis, 
Southwestern Ry. Co. 282 U. S. 10, 75 L. Ed. 135; Mans­
field, etc. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 349, 28 L. Ed. 462; 
King Iron Bridge Co. v. Otoe Co. 120 U. S. 225, 30 L. Ed. 
623; Cameron v. Hodges, 127 U. S. 322, 32 L. Ed. 132; 
Parker v. Owensby, 141 U. S. 81, 35 L. Ed. 654; Good Shot 
v. United States, 179 U. S. 87, 45 L. Ed. 101.

In the Court of Appeals a motion was made to dismiss 
on the ground that no appeal was perfected from the final 
judgment entered in the District Court; the attempted ap­
peal being from an opinion of that court rather than from 
its judgment. The motion appears in the transcript at page 
267, and was based on these facts:

On February 22, 1950, the District Judge entered an 
opinion in this cause (Tr. p. 254-257) ; and on March 20,



5

1950, petitioners undertook to perfect an appeal therefrom 
to the Court of Appeals by filing with the Clerk of the Dis­
trict Court a notice of appeal and a cost bond Tr. pp. 258, 
259. The notice recited that the appeal is taken “from the 
judgment of the court entered on the 22nd day of Febru­
ary, 1950.”

The final judgment was entered on March 22, 1950 
Tr. p. 265.

No steps whatsoever were taken, within thirty days 
after the judgment of March 22, 1950, was entered, to per­
fect an appeal therefrom. However, on November 2, 1950, 
petitioners filed in the District Court their motion for an 
order authorizing them to amend nunc pro tunc the notice 
of appeal theretofore filed by them, or in the alternative 
for an order entering final judgment nunc pro tunc as of 
February 22, 1950. The District Court denied this motion, 
after entering findings of fact and conclusions of law among 
which were (a) non-excusable neglect of petitioners attor­
neys, and (b) lack of jurisdiction to enter the order. (These 
proceedings do not appear in the printed transcript, but 
were sent up in their original form to the Court of Appeals 
and from there to this Court).

The appellate jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal is 
derived from Section 1291 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S. 
C.A. Sec. 1291) and is limited to a review of final decisions 
except as otherwise therein specified. The final judgment 
rule is an historic characteristic of Federal Appellate Prac­
tice. It has been embedded in our jurisprudence since the 
Judiciary Act of 1789; and since that time the uniform pol­
icy of Congress and of settled rules of practice and proce­
dure has been to limit review to final decisions save only 
for those interlocutory orders and decrees specifically made 
appealable by statute. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan 
Corporation, 337 U. S. 541, 93 L. Ed. 1521; Commissioner



6

v. Bedford, 325 U. S. 283, 89 L. Ed. 1611; Catlin v. United 
States, 324 U. S. 229, 89 L. Ed. 911; United States v. Hark, 
320 U. S. 531, 88 L. Ed. 290; Oneida Nav. Co. v. W. & S. 
Job. Co., 252 U. S. 521, 64 L. Ed. 697; Collins v. Miller, 252 
U. S. 364, 64 L. Ed. 616; The Mary Eddie, 60 U. S. 199, 15 
L. Ed. 624.

The authorities uniformly hold that judgments become 
final only when they have been entered. Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 54, Rule 58, Rule 79(a) ; The Santa 
Rita, 281 Fed. 760, (5th Cir.) ; In Re: D’Arcy, 142 Fed. 
(2d) 313 (3rd Cir) ; Amsinck v. Springfield Groc. Co., 7 
Fed. (2d) 855, (8th Cir.) ; Williamson v. Chicago Lumber 
Corp., 59 Fed. (2d) 918 (8th Cir.) ; St. Louis Amusement 
Co. v. Paramount, 156 Fed. (2d) 400 (8th Cir.); St. Louis 
Amusement Co. v. Paramount, 158 Fed. (2d) 30 (8th Cir.); 
Uhl v. Dalton, 151 Fed. (2d) 502 (9th Cir.)

Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became ef­
fective in 1938 the question, as it relates to civil suits in the 
District Courts, has been removed from the field of con­
troversy by Rule 58, which provides that “the judgment is 
not effective before such entry.”

The authorities also uniformily hold that an opinion 
of the court is not a final judgment or decree, even though 
it may make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and 
direct the entry of a judgment or decree accordingly. Com­
missioner v. Bedford, 325 U. S. 283, 89 L. Ed. 1611; United 
States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531, 88 L. Ed. 290; Herrick v. 
Cutcheon, 55 Fed. 6 (1st Cir.) ; In Re: D’Arcy, 142 Fed. 
(2d) 313 (3rd Cir.) ; The Santa Rita, 281 Fed. 760 (5th 
Cir.); Rardin v. Messick, 78 Fed. (2d) 643 (7th Cir.); 
Amsinck v. Springfield Groc. Co., 7 Fed. (2d) 855 (8th Cir.) ; 
Williamson v. Chicago Lumber Co., 59 Fed. (2d) 918 (8th 
Cir.); Wright v. Gibson, 128 Fed. (2d) 865 (9th Cir.); 
Peoples Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 149 Fed. (2d) 850



7

(9th Cir.); Breeding Motor Freight Lines v. Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, 172 Fed. (2d) 416 (10th Cir.)

In the instant case notice of appeal was filed two days 
before any judgment was entered. The notice refers to “the 
judgment of this court entered on the 22nd day of February, 
1950” but there was no such judgment, the document thus 
referred to being the written opinion of the District Judge. 
Under these circumstances the appeal was premature and 
the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction to entertain 
it. Florian v. United States, 114 Fed. (2d) 990 (7th Cir.) ; 
reversed 312 U. S. 656, 85 L. Ed. 1105; Rardin v. Messick, 
78 Fed. (2d) 643 (7th Cir.) ; Herrick v. Cutcheon, 55 Fed. 
6 (1st Cir.) ; Meeker v. Baxter, 83 Fed. (2d) 183 (2nd 
Cir.); Studer v. Moore, 153 Fed. (2d) 902 (2nd Cir.) ; Mc­
Allister v. Dick Towing Co., 175 Fed. (2d) 652 (3rd Cir.) ; 
Amsinck v. Springfield Groc. Co., 7 Fed. (2d) 855 (8th 
Cir.) ; St. Louis Amusement Co. v. Paramount, 156 Fed. 
(2d) 400 (8th Cir.) ; St. Louis Amusement Co. v. Para­
mount, 158 Fed. (2d) 30 (8th Cir.) ; Wright v. Gibson, 128 
Fed. (2d) 865 (9th Cir.) ; Peoples Bank v. Federal Reserve 
Bank, 149 Fed. (2d) 850 (9th Cir.) ; Uhl v. Dalton, 151 Fed. 
(2d) 502 (9th Cir.) ; Breeding Motor Freight Lines v. Re­
construction Finance Corporation, 172 Fed. (2d) 416 (10th 
Cir.)

Rule 73(a) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Sec­
tion 2107 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2107) pro­
vide that no appeal, except as otherwise expressly provided, 
shall bring any judgment before a Court of Appeals for re­
view “unless notice of appeal is filed within thirty days 
after the entry of such judgment.” In the present case no 
notice of appeal was filed with the Clerk of the District 
Court within thirty days after the judgment of March 22, 
1950, was entered, or for that matter, at any time after it 
was entered. The efforts of petitioners to obtain an order 
authorizing them to amend, nunc pro tunc, the notice which



8

they had filed appealing from the Court’s opinion, or in 
the alternative for an order entering final judgment nunc 
pro tunc as of February 22, 1950, were unavailing. In this 
situation The Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction, 28 
U.S.C.A. Sec. 2107; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
73(a) ; In re: D’Arcy, 142 Fed. (2d) 313 (3rd Cir.) ; Veri­
tas Oil Corporation v. McLain, 4 Fed. (2d) 389 (5th Cir.) ; 
Vaughan v. American Insurance Co., 15 Fed. (2d) 526 (5th 
Cir.) ; The Fanny D. v. Southern S. S. Co., 112 Fed. (2d) 
347 (5th Cir.) ; Morrow v. Wood, 126 Fed. (2d) 1021 (5th 
Cir.); Amsinck v. Springfield Groc. Co., 7 Fed. (2d) 855 
(8th Cir.) ; Williamson v. Chicago Lumber Corp., 59 Fed. 
(2d) 918 (8th Cir.) ; St. Louis Amusement Co. v. Para­
mount, 156 Fed. (2d) 400 (8th Cir.) ; St. Louis Amusement 
Co. v. Paramount, 158 Fed. (2d) 30 (8th Cir.) ; Uhl v. Dal­
ton, 151 Fed. (2d) 502 (9th Cir.) ; Liberty Mutual Insur­
ance Co. v. Pillsbury, 154 Fed. (2d) 559 (9th Cir.)

CONCLUSION

For the reasons herein stated the petition for writ of 
certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,
RUFUS CREEKMORE 
Standard Life Building 
Jackson, Mississippi 
Attorney for Respondents

E. W. STENNETT 
Of Counsel.