Nixon v. Condon Motion for Leave to Participate in the Reargument
Public Court Documents
February 3, 1931
Cite this item
-
Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Nixon v. Condon Motion for Leave to Participate in the Reargument, 1931. 225fe4a7-bf9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/e5495fd8-160b-4973-8c95-9caa99227c5b/nixon-v-condon-motion-for-leave-to-participate-in-the-reargument. Accessed December 04, 2025.
Copied!
(Hmtrt of tljr llnttrii
OCTOBER TERM, 1931
No. 265
L. A. NIXON,
Petitioner,
against
JAMES CONDON and C. H. KOLLE
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PARTICIPATE
IN THE REARGUMENT
J. ALSTON ATKINS,
CARTER W. WESLEY,
Attorneys for Movants.
J. M. NABRIT, Jr.,
NABRIT, ATKINS and WESLEY
CHARLES H. HOUSTON,
Of Counsel
Supreme Court of tlj? Ittitri ^tatro
OCTOBER TERM, 1931
No. 265
L. A. NIXON,
Petitioner,
against
JAMES CONDON and C. H. KOLLE
Respondents.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PARTICIPATE
IN THE REARGUMENT
TO THE HONORABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES:
C. N. Love, Julius White, The Houston Informer and
Texas Freeman, and their attorneys herein, individually and
on behalf of all other Negroes in the City of Houston, Har
ris County, and State of Texas, who are not otherwise rep
resented, hereby respectfully move this Honorable Court
for leave to participate, as amici curiae or otherwise as the
Court may direct, in the reargument of the above styled
and numbered cause, which reargument was by this Court,
on Monday, January 18, 1932, ordered.
In support of this motion, movants respectfully show to
the Court as follows:
1. That, on October 5, 1931, this Court granted the mov
ants leave to file a brief in support of the petition for writ
of certiorari, and that said brief, in the opinion of movants,
submits a different point of view, a different analysis of
the issues involved, and important arguments which are
2
different from those submitted in the brief of petitioner in
support of his application for the writ.
2. That, on December 8, 1931, the writ of certiorari hav
ing- been theretofore granted, this Court granted to mov
ants leave to file a brief upon the merits, and that said
brief, in the opinion of movants, submits a different point
of view, a different analysis of the issues involved, and im
portant arguments which are different from those submit
ted in the brief of petitioner upon the merits.
3. That, on January 7, 1932, the case was submitted up
on oral argument by counsel for petitioner. These mov
ants are advised and believe that the case was argued upon
the theory of counsel for petitioner that there was proper
ly involved in the case a question of party membership, and
that the universal rule that in party matters the party is
supreme was inapplicable in this case because the State of
Texas had so far acted in the matter as to deprive the par
ty of the power, which it otherwise possesses. As evidence
the following quotations are cited:
“The only issue in this case is, then, the question
of whether the acts of the respondents was state ac
tion.” Page 12 of Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits.
“ The State being the supreme sovereignty, it
must be deemed to have superseded whatever sov
ereign powers political parties may previously have
had with respect to the control of primaries and par
ty membership.” Page 21 of Petitioner’s Brief on
the Merits.
4. That, under the point of view of movants and their
analysis of the issues involved, there is properly no question
3
of party membership involved in the case; the fundamental
issue, movants think, being the power of any State,
whether Michigan or Texas, to provide for a statutory elec
tion in which the State guarantees to certain of its citizens
the right to participate, while declining to guarantee such
right to others of its citizens, when they are sought to be
deprived of that right on the ground of race and color alone.
Under this point of view and analysis, movants believe
that, in view of the following language of the Circuit Court
of Appeals in this case, to wit:
“It is of course to be conceded, since the decision
in Nixon v. Herndon, supra, that the right of a
qualified citizen to vote extends to primary elections
as well as to general elections.” Nixon v. Condon,
et al. 49 Fed. (2nd) 1012, 1013,
and, in view of the fact that this Court has jurisdiction by
reason of the substantial contentions that the Texas statute
involved is unconstitutional, it is wholly immaterial wheth
er the defendants’ action is state action or not, this court’s
jurisdictional power extending to the relief against any le
gal wrong disclosed by the record.
5. That, should this Court decide the questions involv
ed in this case adversely to the petitioner, not only he, but
the 854,964 Negroes in Texas (according to the 1930 cen
sus), as well as millions of other Negroes all over the South,
where, as a matter of common knowledge, the same system
of disfranchising Negroes is in operation, will be perpetual
ly denied the right to vote; which, as a matter of common
4
knowledge in Texas, means a denial of good streets, drain
age, lights, and adequate police and fire protection m Ne
gro neighborhoods; a denial of a fair proportion of parks
and playgrounds; a denial of adequate library facilities; a
denial of adequate educational opportunities; a denial of
adequate hospitals and other health rehabilitating institu
tions; denial of adequate care to Negro delinquents and un
fortunates; and a denial of anything like a semblance of
justice in the distribution of all of the other civic benefits
which flow from the State to its citizens, the burdens of
citizenship in Texas being distributed, as a matter of com
mon knowledge, without regard to race or color. Movants
respectfully ask the court to judicially notice these matters
of common knowledge.
6. That, under the circumstances set out in this motion,
movants believe that the matters involved are so grave, and
the millions of lives to be affected so numerous, that the
point of view and analysis contained in the briefs which this
Court has permitted movants to file in this case, should
have opportunity to be submitted to this Honorable Court
upon oral argument before this case is decided upon its
merits.
Movants and their attorneys feel it not improper also to
suggest to this Court, that because they have to live in Tex
as under the system being considered in this case, they are
justified in urging the peculiar pertinence here of the fol
lowing words of Mr. Justice Holmes in the case of Diaz v.
5
Gonzalez y Lugo, 67 L. ed. 550, 552:
“When we contemplate such a system from the
outside it seems like a wall of stone, every part even
with all the others, except so far as our own local
education may lead us to see subordinations to
which we are accustomed. But to one brought up
within it, varying emphasis, tacit assumptions, un
written practices, a thousand influences gained only
from life, may give to the different parts wholly
new values that logic and grammar never could have
got from the books.”
WHEREFORE, premises considered, movants and their
attorneys pray that this Honorable Court may grant them
leave to participate in the reargument of this case.
Dated February 3, 1932.
C. N. LOVE
JULIUS WHITE
THE HOUSTON INFORMER AND TEXAS
FREEMAN
By G. H. WEBSTER, President
J. ALSTON ATKINS,
One of Attorneys for Movants
Office and Post Office Address
409 Smith Street, Houston, Texas.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF HARRIS
Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day per
sonally appeared C. N. Love, Julius White, G. H. Webster,
and J. Alston Atkins, who, having been by me first duly
sworn, on their oaths depose and say:
That they are the identical parties who executed the
6
within and foregoing motion, and that the allegations set
forth therein are true, according to their best knowledge
and belief.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of
February, A. D. 1932.
LELAND D. EWING
Notary Public in and for Harris County,
Texas.
My commission expires June 1, 1933.
(SEAL)
Certificate of Counsel
I hereby certify that in my opinion the foregoing Motion
for Leave to Participate in the Reargument is well found
ed in law and is filed in good faith and not for delay.
J. ALSTON ATKINS,
One of Attorneys for Movants.