Fax from Carraway RE: Order designating Judge Thornburg as the third judge and the pretrial order in Shaw
Correspondence
October 25, 1999
41 pages
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Case Files, Cromartie Hardbacks. Fax from Carraway RE: Order designating Judge Thornburg as the third judge and the pretrial order in Shaw, 1999. f97cfb4c-dd0e-f011-9989-7c1e5267c7b6. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/e58f7854-a812-4029-9d5a-736d17d7e5f7/fax-from-carraway-re-order-designating-judge-thornburg-as-the-third-judge-and-the-pretrial-order-in-shaw. Accessed November 19, 2025.
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State of North Carolina
MILHAEL H. BASE (WE AT STE A LLAY oly 1GHCE HEPLY 1U- FEARGas S. Carraway, CLAS
ATTORNEY GENERAL P.O. BOX 629 Special Litigation
RALEIGH (919) 716-6900
27602-0629 (919) 716-6763 (fax)
TELECOPIER TRANSMITTAL SHEET
TO: Todd Cox
FAX:
FROM: Frances S. Carraway, CLAS
TELEPHONE NUMBER: (919) 716-6900
DATE: October 23, 1999
SUBJECT: Cromartie orders etc.
NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING TRANSMITTAL SHEET: 43
CONFIRM RECEIPT OF DOCUMENT (S) IF MARKED HERE:
COMMENTS: FYI This makes the delay in trial official. I’ve also included the order
designating Thornburg as the third judge along with the pretrial order in Shaw
Pw of
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| AED
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Cap 5 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
RALEIGH DIVISION
No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR
RUTH O. SHAW, et al,, )
and
JAMES ARTHUR "ART" POPE,
et 2i.,
Plaintiff - Intervenors,
Vv. PRE-TRIAL QRDER
JAMES B. HUNT. et al..
Defendants,
and
RALPH GINGLES, et al.,
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Defendant - Intervenors.
I. STIPULATIONS
As ordered, the stipulations and joint exhibits thereto
have been separately filed with the court.
1x. CONTENTIONS
i. act Contentions
(1) In 1991 and 1993, the Department of Justice
adopted a policy of requiring that redistricting plans enacted
after the 1990 census maximize the number of majority-minority
districts.
" | NNEEINN W BUNNU) UL
maximizing majority-black districts clear to those states which
S0°d 28:91. 66, SZ I) £99912616: XE 111 'WIJ3d4S SY ON
were subject, in whole or in part, to Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act.
(3) This policy guided the General Assembly in its
deliberations and resulted in the adoption of Chapter 601, which
| AT HJen maj inne] NMWENEN) WANORNERI NIONN RESIRESU HA
in the northeastern part of the State.
(4) There are five majority-black counties in NorLh
Carolina, all of which are located in the northeastern part of
disweix Gouroulinuwy The pwiulicuutoldid purl ul LLL Oulu 1v ulpu LULU
area with the largest concentration of the 40 North Carolina
counties subject to preclearance requirements under Section 5.
(5) In developing the Chapter 601 plan, the General
Assembly relied on computer technology; the only data on voters
available on the computer base pertained to age, race, and party;
there was no socioeconomic data available from the 1990 census,
as this data did not become available until January 1993.
(6) After enactment of Chapter 601, the General
Assembly -- with the assistance of staff member, Gerry Cohen, and
retained counsel, Leslie Winner -- presented to the Department of
Justice extensive materials, including transcripts of hearings
and floor debates. These materials were intended to persuade the
Department of Justice to grant preclearance.
(7) On December 17, 1991, at the request of Assistant
Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, John Dunne, a
meeting took place in his office between State and Federal
officials. At this meeting, Mr. Dunne made ¢lear that, because
90d 82:91 EL: GC WO £9L991LbTb aE 117 Wi133d45 ad IN
~~ over 20% of North Carolina’s population was African-American, it
would be necessary for two of the State’s twelve members of
Congress to be African-Americans.
(8) On Uedenpor 14, iva, JAR LURRS WEIS WW
Ms. Tiare Smiley, of the State Attorney General’s office to
inform the General Assembly that preclearance was denied; and
PURE SUISSAREAN EAE BOUUABLILIAEY UL Jd HULULU LA JULLILYYULAUA
diptrict in the scutheastexn pazt of the State,
(9) Accepting Mr. Dunut’vy bBugyestion would heave
imperilled Congressman Rose and perhap# other Damocratid
incumbents.
(10) Shortly after the letter of December 18, 1591 was
received, several North Carolina Demorraric members of Congress
suggested that the State initiate an action to seek judicial
preclearance trom a three-judge eourt in the District uf Culuwnbia
Circuit pursuant to Section 5.
(11) During this same period John Merritt, an employee
of a congressional committee chaired by Democratic Congressman
Charles Rose, received from State Représenrarive Hardawdy,
black Democrat, a plan proposing two majority-black districts, nf
which one would run through Durham and Greensboro to Charlotte
ail the other would bo in tha nesthara arse.
(12) Tuerealler John Mcrritt rcfinod Cho piaa with the
assistance of computer facilities and software of the National
CumnilLtee for an Bffcctivc Congroos (a Washingten, D.C.
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over 20% of North Carolina’s population was African-American, it
would be necessary for two of the State’s twelve members of
Congress to be African-Americans.
(8) On December 18, 1991, John Dunne wrote to
Ms. Tiare Smiley, of the State Attorney General's office to
inform the General Assembly that preclearance was denied; and
Dunne suggested the possibility of a second majority-black
district in the southeastern part of the State.
(9) Accepting Mr. Dunne’s suggestion would have
imperilled Congressman Rose and perhaps other Democratic
incumbents.
(10) Shortly array rne lacrer of Duteubur 18, 1351 was
received, several North Carolina Democratic members of Congress
suggested that the State initiate an action to seek judicial
preCleusuuct from a thicc judge couws dm the Distwiztr ~F Onl nmi a
Circuit pursuant to Section 5.
{11) During this same period John Merritt, an employee
of a congressional committee chaired by Democratic Congressman
Charles Rose, received from State Representative Hardaway, a
black Democrat, a plan proposing two majority-black districts, of
which one would run through Durham and Greensboro to Charlotte
and the nther wonld be in the northern area.
(12) Thereafter John Mexritt refined the plan with the
assistance of computer facilities and software of the National
Committee for an Effective Congress (a Washington, D.C.
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organization that supports Democratic candidates for Congress);
and then he transmitted the plan to the NAACP in North Carolina.
(13) Subsequently, the Merritt plan was presented at a
public hearing in Raleigh by Mary Peeler on behalf of the NAACP
on January 8, 1992; and, with some modification, it was adopted
as Chapter 7.
(14) In enacting Chapter 7, the General Assembly
proceeded on the assumption that preclearance from the Attorney
General of the United States could not be obtained for a
Congressional redistricting plan that did not contain two
majority-black Congressional districts.
(15) As was reflected in statements at the time, the
General Assembly enacted Chapter 7 wilh Lhe intent to assure the
election of two African-American members of Congress by creating
two majority-black districts.
(16) At the time of the enactment of Chapter 7, the
overriding legislative purpose was racial; and there was no
consideration by the General Assembly of socioeconomic data apart
from race.
(17) In ecomunecLlon wilh Lhe use of computer tcchnology
in redistricting after the 1990 census, the General Assembly had
acquired software from PSA, a vendor of such software. TO
facilitate the creation of a majority-minority districts, this
program was modified to permit the creation of districts that
would be "point contiguous". Becauge of this modification or
otherwise, significant discrepancies have been discovered by
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Plaintiffs in the computer program used for Congressional
redistricting by the General Assembly. As a result, it is not
certain that all of the Congressional distridt are gither
contiguous or equal in population.
(18) The criteria for Congressional redistricting used
by the General Assembly never included compactness, and in the
redistricting compactness was ignored and many political
subdivisions ware split hetwsen mars than one district.
(19) In seeking to justify the bizarre districts which
have been created by Chapter 7, the Defendants have relied on
socioeconomic data that were neither available to the
Legislature, nor considered by it while the redistricting was
unazayway.
(20) The districts that have been created by Chapter 7
cross many media markets; and this circumstance makes it
difficult for voters to obtain information about their
Representatives in Congress or for those Representatives to know
the voters or the various local officials in the district. Also,
this circumstance makes it more difficult for voters to learn
apour cuntlddles fur Cunyrwss ur fur candidates to have adequate
opportunity to inform voters about the candidates.
(21) Until the 1992 redistricting, the First District
had been coastal, but after the redistricting this was no longer
true. Until the 1992 redistricting, the First District had only
been located in the northeastern part of the State; but after
January 1992 this district extended almost to South Carolina.
60d ¥p:91 66. SZ 190 £9/9912616: Xe 4 1171 W1EL4S 95 J
Pan (22) Por the Chapter 7 redistricting plan, the First
District was extended southward in order to create a
majority-black district by including urban black neighborhoods in
Wilmington and in Fayetteville, neither of which cities had
previously been in the First District.
(23) In establishing the Twelfth District, the General
Assembly made no effort to determine that the white residents
would have anything in common other than race; and this also was
true for the Twelfth District.
(24) The population of North Carolina is mobile; and
many whites and African-Americans now resident in North Carolina
were not living in North Carolina when the Voting Rights Act of
1965 was enacted.
(25) During thc dcbatee and hearing on the
Congressional redistricting, no comment was made that any of the
district would conform or correspond in any way to the route of
the North Carolina Railroad or other corridor of the Piedmont
Crescent.
(26) The splitting of precincts and other political
subdivisions by Chapter 7 generated confusion among voters.
(27) As a result Of the rorty percenlL plurality
provision which took effect in 1990, the overwhelming Democratic
registration of African-Americans in North Carolina, and the
closed nature of Democratic primaries, it is unnecessary to
create majority-black Congressional district in order for
African-Americans to be elected to Congress.
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(28) In elections with white and black candidates,
Black voters jin North Carolina have demonstrated less willingness
to vote for white candidates than white voters have demonstrated
to vote for black candidates; and white crossover voting has
Lucredsea,
(28) The number of black elected office holders in
North Carolina is substantial and has greatly increased since
1965,
(30) Racial appeals greatly diminished in North
Carolina over the years.
(31) Black registration levels in Narth Cavolina are
close to those of whites; and in some district exceed the
registration rate for whites.
2, Legal Contentions
7 (1) In view of the overriding race-driven purpose of
the Chapter 7 redistricting plan, that plan constituted a racial
gerrymander.
(2) The Department of Justice greatly exceeded its
authority wnAdesr Qamtrisn & Af tha Vetiayg Righse Acb whon it
insisted that any Congressional plang for North Carolina include
tow majority black districts.
(3) The racial gerrymander created by Chapter 7 served
no compelling state interest and was not narrowly tailored by the
North Carolina General Assembly.
(4) Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment is
denied when, as with Chapter 7, voters are placed in particular
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Congressional districts for the purpose of assuring the election
Ul persuus who arc of & pawsseulax 274
(8) Thea creation of the two North Carolina
majority-black districts not only violated Equal Protection but
also abridged the right-to-vote of the Plaintiffs and all other
North Carolina voters in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.
(6) The creation of race-driven majority-black
Congressional Districts is contrary to Article I, § 2 of the
Constitution.
(7) The socioeconomic data that only became available
to the General Assembly after Chapter 7 was adopted may not be
relied on by the State to justify the enactment of Chapter 7.
(8) Because the black population of North Carolina is
relatively dispersed, a majority-black district cannot be created
in North Carolina without violating traditional redistricting
principles, such as compactness, contiguity, and recognition of
communities of interest and political subdivisions.
(9) In view of the overriding race-conscious purpose
of the Legislature in enacting Chapter 7, the second plan was
unconstitutional.
(10) All evidence of socioeconomic data is
inadmissible unless the General Assembly considered it prior to
enacting Chapter 7.
(11) Chapter 7 had the intended effect of segregating
the black voters of the First and Twelfth Districts from the
white voters of the other ten districts.
Z1'd ep:01 66: SC 1) £94991.616: XE 117 WI34S 90 Jy
(12) The use of single-member Congressional Districts
required by 2 U.S.C. § 2(C) is inconsistent with a system of
proportional representation.
(13) Under 2 U.S.C. § 2(a), if North Carolina fails to
redistrict in a constitutional manner, then eleven
Representatives must be chosen from the eleven districts that
existed prior to the 1000 census and the radistriqting, and one
Representative would be chosen at large.
(14) All voters of North Carolina, regardless of their
race, have a constitutional right to participate in an electoral
process that is racially neutral and that does not use racial
classifications.
(13) Tul iriyudivmeut by vho Dopartmons ef Jwekkwa Yhns
two majority-black Congressional districts be created did not in
any way create an immunity nor constitute a defense for the
defendants.
(16) Chapter 7 is not a narrowly tailored remedy but
instead ig a racial gerrymander.
(17) B11 of the Plaintiffs have suffered an injury to
rnair CONETITUCIOonal TigHEy oY NdVE dll ullier Nullll Carulliua
voters.
(18) In view of the passage of two years and the
conducting of one election since Plaintitfs sued, the Court
should grant immediate relief and enjoin any congressional
primaries under the present plan.
£1'd Pr:91 66: SZ 30 £929914616: XES 111 BI 345 od IN
B. Plaintiff - Yvenors.
With the exception of legal contention No. 8,
Plaintiff-intervenors’ adopt the contentions of plaintiffs and
also state as follows:
1. Factual Contentijong:
(1) That the overriding purpose behind the
North Carolina General Assembly’s enactment of Chapter
7 of the 1991 Session Laws (Special Bession) was
compliance with the United States Department of
Justice’s demand for two congressional districts with
black voting majorities in a manner that would not
jeopardize the reelection chances of incumbent
Democratic congressman.
(2) That, in creating the two majority black... .
districts contained in Chapter 7, the General REBRDIY
disregarded traditional districting principles such as
geographic compactness, contiguity, and respect for
political subdivisions.
2. Legal Contentions:
(1) That Chapter 7 violates Plaintiff-
intervenors constitutional right to the equal
protection of the laws by segregating them into
separate voting districts because of their race.
(2) That the state’a intentional use
racial classifications in enacting Chapter 7 is
1d PPO] 66. SZ 130 £929914616:XES 117 "HI)34S 9 IM
justified by a compelling state interest nox narrowly
tailored to meet any such interest.
Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors
1. Defendants and Defendants-Intervenors Contend that
Plaintiffs Cannot Prove a Racial Gerrymander.
ntentions a Racial Ger
(1) Defendants and defendant-intervenors
contend that plaintiffs have the initial burden of
proving that they have standing to pursue their
claim by establishing that the alleged racial
gerrymander has caused them to suffer the harm
alleged in their claim. The harm relied on by
plaintiffs to give them standing to pursue their
racial gerrymander claim is (1) that Congressmen
watt and Congresswoman Clayton do not need to
respond and will not respond to the needs of white
voters and (2) that the plan exacerbated racial
block voting. Such forms of harm may not be
presumed and must be established by specific
evidence. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,
131-32 (1986).
(2) Defendants and defendant - intervenors
contend that Federal law imposed a series of
obligAtLANE SN THE UBNErdL AQHEUWLY Ll edacllly
the congressional redistricting plan. First, one-
11
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person, one-vote principles established by the
Supreme Court in Baker v, Carr, 369 U.8. 186
(1962) and its progeny required the General
Assembly to have a new congressional redistricting
plan in place in time for the 1992 elections which
contained 12 districts with equal populations.
Second, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42
U.S.C, § 1973¢c, forbade the General Assembly from
implementing any plan for 1992 elections without
first obtaining preclearance of that plan from the
Department of Justice or the federal courts.
Third, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42
U.8.C. § 1973, required the General Assembly to
avoid dilution of the voting rights of minority
citizens.
(3) Defendants and defendant-intervenors also
contend that the discretion to determine how to
meet the requirements of federal law, what
additional criteria should be applied in enacting
a plan and what weight Should be given those
additional criteria was the prerogative of the
General Assembly. Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct.
1075, 1081 (1992) ("Today we renew our adherence
te the principles . . . which derive from
recognition that the Constitution leaves with the
States primary responsibility for the
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91 4d op:91.. 66: SC: 10 £929914616: XES 117 BIJ3d4S 99 ON
21d
apportionment of their federal congressional . . .
districts.")
(4) Defendants and defendant-intervenors
contend the plan enacted by the General Assembly
meets one-person, one-vote requirements, was
precleared by the Department of Justice and that
the courts have determined that the plan is not an
unlawful political gerrymander. Pope V. Blue, No.
3:92CV71-P (W.D.N.C. April 16, 1992), aff’d mem. ,
113 S.Ct. 30 (19%2).
(5) Plaintiffs’ only claim is that the plan
is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. They
have acknowledged that the burden of proof on that
issue rests with them. The parties, however,
disagree about the elements of a racial
gerrymander claim.
(6) Plaintiffs seem to contend that a racial
gerrymander claim has three elements: (a) that
the plan creates oddly shaped districts that 4o
not conform to existing political or natural
boundaries; (b) that the plan disproportionately
groups citizens in districts based on their race;
9r:91
and (c) that race was the cause Or predominate
cause of the shape of the districts.
(7) Defendants and defendant -intervenors
contend that proof of these three elements is not
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sufficient to establish a racial gerrymander for
the simple reason that Sections Z apd 5 Or the
Voting Rights Act required the General Assembly to
account for race in drawing the districts and
therefore that accounting for race cannot in and
of itself be unlawful. Stated differently, proof
that the General Assembly accounted for race is
not proof in this context of an unlawful
intention; it is proof of an intention to comply
with federal law.
(8) Defendants and dcfendant-intervennrs thus
contend that proof of a racial gerrymander
requires proof of a fourth element. This element
has two parts: (1) that there is no rational
explanation for the location and shape of the
districts other than race and (2) that the plan
has no rational basis other than race. Defendants
and defendant -intervenors contend that this
element is expressly required by Shaw, 113 S. Ct.
at 2832. ("We conclude that a plaintiff . . . may
state a claim by alleging that the legislation,
though race-neutral on its face, rationally canuot
be understood as anything other than an effort to
segregate voters into different districts on the
basis of race.") See also Marylanders for Fair
Representation v. Schafer, No. 5-92.510 (D-Md4.
14
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7. January 14, 1994) (three-judge court). Defendants
and defendant-intervenors further contend that
this fourth element is an entirely logical
requirement of a racial gerrymander claim.
Subject to the constraints of federal law,
redistricting rests within the sound discretion of
the states. Accounting for the requirements of
federal law, particularly the requirements of the
Voting Rights Act, in developing a redistricting
plan cannot be unlawful unless there is no
rational explanation for the location and shape of
the digtricts other than race Or unless the plan
has no rational basis other than race.
(8) Defendants and defendant -intervenors
contend that plaintiffs have the purden of proof
on this fourth element of their racial gerrymander
claim, just as they have the puraen uf pruul on
the first three elements. That burden is to prove
that there is no conceivable rational explanation
FOF rhe lovaliun and shapc of tha distriers orher
than race and that there is no rational basis for
the plan other than race. Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.8, 93, 111 (1979). Alternatively, defendants
and defendant-intervenors contend that if
plaintiffs prove the first three elements of their
claimg, they have established a prima facie case
15
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DZ °d 8:91
which would require defendants and defendant-
intervenors to articulate the rational explanation
for the location and shape of the districts or
rational basis for the plan. Proof of a prima
facie case, however, would not shift the burden of
proof to defendants and defendant-intervenors; it
would merely impose on defendants and defendant-
intervenors the burden of going forward with the
evidence. The ultimate burden of proving that
there is no rational explanation for the location
and shape of the districts other than race and
that there is no rational pasis for the plan other
than race rests with the plaintiffs. See Rarcher
v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 760 (concurring opinion)
("In order to overcome a prima facie case of
invalidity (of a redistricting plan], the State
may adduce ‘legitimate considerations incident to
the affectation of a rational state policy.’ ?; *1f
a state is unable to respond to a plaintiff's.
palma focic 0A66 by showing that it is supported
by adequate neutral criteria, I believe the court
could properly conclude thdl Lhe challecngcd schema
ig either totally irrational or entirely motivated
by a desire to curtail the political strength of
the affected group."). 66. SZ 190 $£99912616: XE 1171 WI33d4S a4: IN
V ti. (10) In sum, defendants and defendant -
intervenors contend that plaintiffs cannot prove a
racial gerrymander unless they establish by a
preponderance of the evidence both:
(a) that the location and shape of the
districts cannot be explained by legitimate
factors than race; and
(b) that the plan has no rational basis
other than race.
b. Factual Contentiong as to Racial GCerrymander
Slam,
(1) Defendants and defendant-intervenors
contend that plaintiffs have failed to prove they
have suffered the harm alleged in their complaint.
(2) Defendants and defendant-intervenors
conLund Ullal there is a rational explanation for
rhe location and shape of the districts other than
rdud,
(a) Prior to the enactment of the 1982
congressional plan, the location and shapes
of congressional district boundaries was the
result of the location and shapes of the
county boundaries themselves since the
General Assembly followed a policy of not
dividing counties. These boundaries were
17
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established based on historical and political
circumstances going back over 200 years.
(b) In 1982, the U.S. Department of Justice
objected to a 1968 constitutional amendment
adopting a policy of not dividing counties
and it also objected to the State'’s
congressional redistricting plan. The
General Assembly proceeded to enact a
congressional redistricting plan which
divided anme counties, naing precinet and
township boundaries. The boundaries and
shapes of precincts and townships tend to be
irregular. Township boundaries were created
based on individual historical and political
circumstances unique to each locality.
Precinct boundaries are drawn and redrawn by
local County Boards of Elections based on
historical, political and other local
circumstances unique to each county.
(¢) The shapes of the congressional
districts in the enacted plan, Chapter 7,
reflect the shapes of the building blocks
available on the legislative redistricting
database, which include county, township,
municipal and precinct boundaries as well as
prior house, senate and congressional
18
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~~ pounder lus, uld municipal ond sowashinp
boundaries, and census block boundaries.
Census block boundaries are established by
the U.S. Censug Bureau using only visible
features or township or municipal boundaries.
Prior to the drawing of any districts, some
sapsus plocky were divided by the U.8. conaus
Bureau and the legislative staff to provide
demographic data where precinct boundary
lines and township lines did not coincide
with census blocks. Similarly, census blocks
were also divided by the legislative staff to
provide demograpflf 83ata WiELE Leusus Llu
did not coincide with prior house, senate and
congressional district boundaries. The large
nurber of preexisting jurisdictional and
census block boundary lines available in the
database provide a panoply of building
blocks, each with its own origin, with which
to create congressional districts.
(d) The location and shapes of all
congressional districts were affected by the
strict one-person, one-vote requirements
applied to congressional redistricting. With
the computer tools available population
deviations can be reduced to zero Or one
13
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person, and the boundary lines where each
disctricro is "zeroed gut” are irregular.
(2) The location and shapes of districts
were also influenced by the General
Assembly's obligation to comply with §§ 2 and
5 of the Voting Rights Act.
(f) The location and shapes of the districts
were also affected by the General Assembly's
decision to create complimentary urban and
rural districts. In creating a district with
more than 80% of its population in urban
areas, it was necessary to remove areas with
low population density. Similarly, to create
a district in the sparsely populated eastern
i part of the state it was necessary to include
large land masses, and to limit the number of
people from towns with populations of more
than 20,000 in order to maintain a district
in which 80% of the people lived in towns of
less than 20,000 people.
(g) Protection of incumbents was another
major factor influencing the location and
shapes of the districts in the enacted
congressional districting plan. Decisions on
how and where to include and exclude
particular areas in the different districts
20
Cd 05:91 66.5 330 £99914616: Xe 111" WH13345- 9d ON
ald 16:91 6b.
were based on a desire to protect i1ncumbéils.
The shapes and widths of connecting areas and
the direction taken in connecting other areas
were also based on a desire to protect
incumbents.
(h) Specific political interests of
individual State legislators also resulted in
the inclugion or exclusion of specific areas
in different districts and affected the
anapas of rhe congressional diseriviy,
(i) Maintaining the existing partisan
balance in the State’s congressional
delegation was also a major factor
influencing the shape of the congressional
districts.
(3) Thare is ne £adexral srarntary Ar
constitutional requirement that Congressional
districts be compact or contiguous.
(x) There is no North Carolina Statutory OF
constitutional requirement that Congressional
districts be compact or contiguous.
(1) The criteria established by the
redistricting committees of the General
Assembly did not provide that Congressional
digtrinra ha geographically compact.
21
SC 130 £929914616: XEA 117 "BI23d4S Sd ON
(3) Defendants and defendant-intervenors
contend that there is a rational basis for the
districts other than race.
(a) In enacting the plan the General
Assembly emphasized the creation of districts
containing citizens with shared interests and
concerns over geographic compactness. The
General Assembly was "pushed" to deemphasize
geographic compactness because of the
stringent population equality standards
established by Baker and its progeny, because
of Voting Rights Act requirements and because
of a desire tc protect political interests.
It was "pulled" to emphasize communities of
interest because creation of communities of
interest is consistent with the purpose of
redistricting -- to provide fair and
effective representation for voters.
(b) Forming districts in which voters share
common interests and concerns allows a
representative better to know and represent
the needs of his or her constituents and thus
helps provide fair and effective
representation for voters.
(¢) In drawing the districts the General
Assembly also emphasized the creation of a
22
9d 5:97. 66.5% 390 £99914616: XE 111 WIJ34S 9” ON
distinctive urban Piedmont district (the
Twelfth District) and a distinctive rural
eastern district (the First District) over
geographic compactness.
(d) Forming distinctive districts allows for
broader representation of the diverse
interest of the State’s citizens by the
members of the congressional delegation as a
whole and thus helps provide for fair and
effective representation for more citizens.
(e) An analysis of the present day socio-
economic and demographic characteristics of
the citizens in each of the twelve districts
created by the congressional redistricting
plan establishes that the First District is a
distinctive district which groups together
citizens who have common interest and
concerns in that the citizens in the
district, black and white alike, are BOSrer
MAE AEE YWelk-Sovsabed Shan VhbiEsnE ah any
other district. That analysis also
establishes that the Twelfth District is a
distinctive district which groups together
citizens who have common interests and
concerns in that they reside in a district
far more urban than any other district.
23
2%: 4 2691 66. SC: 130 £9/9914616: XE 117 IBIJ34S SY ON
(f) Forming a distinctive digtrict comprised
of poorer and less well-educated citizens is
consistent with providing fair and effective
representation because education and income
influence voting behavior. Similarly,
forming a distinctive district comprised of
urban dwellers is congistent with providing
fair and effective representation because
urban dwellers have common needs and concerns
that influence voting behavior.
(g) A survey of the opinion of voters in the
First and Twelfth Districts establishes that
their common socio-economic interests produce
similar opinions among black and white voters
ZS on issues relevant to the responsibilities ot
members of Congress. This same survey also
establishes that the opinions of voters in
the First and Twelfth Districts on these
issues axe move similar than the opinions
among voters in the Fourth District, even
though the Fourth District is far more
geographically compact.
(h) The distinctive common interests of the
citizens in the First District are a product
of the district’s location within the Coastal
24
8C 'd £5:91 © 66: 5C 190 £949914616: XES 117 Wi133dS ad. ON
Plain where citizens share a common history,
culture and economy.
(i) The distinctive common interests now
possessed by citizens of the First District
will continue at least through this decade.
The area in which the First District is
located is experiencing, and will likely
continue to experience, economic stagnation
and population losses.
(4) The distinctive common interests of the
citizens in the Twelfth District are a
product of the district’s location within the
Piedmont Urban Crescent where citizens share
a common history, culture and economy. The
Twelfth District generally traces the axis of
the Piedmont Urban Crescent which extends in
an arc from Raleigh thru Durham, Greensboro,
Winston-Salem and Charlotte to Gastonia. The
Piedmont Urban Crescent is a recognized place
in North Carolina’s history, geography and
demography and traces its origins to the
construction of the North Carolina Railroad
in the 1800's, later cemented by the
construction of 1-85. Instruction regarding
the Piedmont Urban Crescent is a part of the
public school curriculum.
25
bl 'd £5197» 66; .92 130 £949912616: XE 117 W1034S 9d" IN
(k) The distinctive common interest of
citizens of the Twelfth pPistrxrict will
continue at least through this decade. The
Piedmont Crescent is, and likely will remain,
the center of urbanization and economic
growth in the State.
(3) Defendants and defendant -intervenors
contend that the General Assembly’s focus on
creation of communities of interest, rather than
on geographic compactness, was appropriate. Facts
supporting the contention are summarized below:
(a) There is no known, direct, empirical
relationship between geographic compactness
and providing fair and effective
representation for voters. Geographic
compactness may tend to promote fairer and
more effective representation of voters
because it tends to make travel and
communication easier. Modern transportation
and means of communications, however, make
geographic compactness less important for
providing fair and effective representation
than in earlier times.
(b) Modern transportation and communications
make the First and Twelfth Districts
substantially compact. Large parts of the
26
0g 'd $5:91. 66. SC 1d] £9/9914616: XS 1177 WIJ3dS 99 ON
ETI © TOR ET SAAT VPA
First District are connected by Interstate 40
and 95. The Twelfth District is linked .
together by Interstate 40, 77 and 85. The
average travel time from one end to the other .
of all twelve districts is 2.6 hours. The
travel time from one end of the First
District to another is 4.17 hours. The
travel time from one end of the Twelfth
District to another is 2.9 hours. More than
30,000 citizens commute among the counties in
the First District on a daily basis. More
than 100,000 citizens commute among the 10
counties in the Twelfth District on a daily
basis.
(¢) The average district is served by three
television markets. The voters in the First
District are served by four television
markets. The voters in the Twelfth District
are served by three television markets. The
total daily newspaper circulation in the
First District counties for the three largest
newspapers serving the district is 116,006.
The total daily newspaper circulation in the
Twelfth District counties for the four
largest newspapers serving the district is
337,577.
27
1£°d Ga:91 | 66. SZ 130 £9.9912b16:XeS 1171 BI23d4S 59 ON
(d) Geographic compactness is more important
for districts served by paxt-time legislators
with small budgets and small staffs, like the
members of the General Assembly, than for
districts served by full-time legislators
with larger budgets and staffs, like the
member of Congress.
(2) There is no evidence that the more
geographically compact a district is the more
alike the opinions of voters will be. To the
contrary, the opinions of voters in the First
and Twelfth Districts on issues relating to
the responsibilities of members of congress
appear more alike than the opinions of voters
in the geographically compact 4th district.
(f) Similarly, there is not evidence that
geographically compact districts group
together citizens better than less
geographically compact districts. To the
contrary, an analysis comparing the gocio-
economic and demographic characteristics of
citizens in the twelve districts in the 1932
congressional plan and the socio-economic and
demographic characteristics of citizens in
the eleven district in the 1982 congressional
plan establishes that the 1992 districts,
28
Zed G5:91 66: SZ £9/991.616: Xe 4 111 BIJ3d4S S56 ON
though less geographically compact than the
1982 districts, group citizens with common
interest and concerns better than the 1982
districts. This analysis also establishes
that the 1992 districts are more BOCiO-
economically distinctive than the 1982
districts.
2. Defendants and defendant-intervenors Contend that
Even If Plaintiffs Prove a Racial Gerrymander the
Plan is Narrowly Tailored to Serve Compelling
Interests.
a. Legal Contentiong as £oO Compelling Interests.
(1) Defendants and defendant-intervenors
contend that if plaintiffs prove a racial
gerryilander, Ll Cuuil must then dctormine whather
the plan is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling interest. Shaw, 113 S.. Cc. .at 2830
("if appellants’ allegations of a racial
gerrymander are not contradicted on remand, the
District Court must determine whether the General
Assembly’s reapportionment plan satisfies strict
scrutiny.)
(2) Defendants and defendant -intervenors
contend that the state had a compelling interest
in creating two majority-minority districts to
comply with the state’s burden under Section 5 of
29
ged 95:91 “66. SZ 10 £929914616: Xe 111 "WI33dS SY ON
the Voting Rights Act, as established by the
Attorney General, to prove that the submitted
change did not have the purposi¢ Of ailuting black
voting strength. Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156 (1980); 28 CFR § 51.52.
(3) Defendants and defendant-intervenors
contend that the state had a compelling interest
in creating two majority-minority districts to
comply with its burden under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act to establish that the submitted
change aia not violate Sevtluu 2 ul the Voting
Righte Aot. 28 CFR § B1.55(a) (2).
(4) Defendants and defendant-intervenors
contend that plaintiffs are foreclosed from
rr challenging in this Court the Attormey General's
Section 5 objection to Chapter 601 as this Court
has already determined because that conclusion was
left undisturbed by the Supreme Court.
(5) Defendants and defendant-intervenors
contend that the state had a compelling interest
in creating two majority-minority districts on the
basis of its power to eliminate racial
discrimination, to increase electoral opportunity
under Section 4 (f) of the Voting Rights Act, tO
achieve a broadly represeuLdilve cuuyressluual
delegation and to insure substantive
30
Fed 95:91 66: SZ 130 £929914616: XE 1171 BIO3dS 99 ON
representation of an historically submerged
minority.
(6) Defendants and defendant-intervenors
contend that Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1970), provides
an appropriate analytical framework for deciding
the compelling interest issues. In Bakke the
Court struck down a medical school admission
policy which made the race of applicants the sole
determinant in admissions decisions, but observed
that an alternative policy under which "race or
ethnic backgréutd 1B SIMPLY UNE HieueuL == LU Ue
weighed fairly against other elements" -- in a
process luleuded Lu aLtain a "diveroo etwudant
body" whéré a "Yopust extldiye ul ideas” would
occur would not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
As applied in this context, the Bakke analytical
framework would require the Court to determine
whether race was fairly weighed against other
redistricting criteria (e.g., creation of
communities of interest) to produce a
redistricting plan that provided representation
for North Carolina's diverse voters.
(7) Defendants and defendant-intexyvenors
contend that the General Assembly had a compelling
interest in complying with Section 2 of the Voting
31
Sf 'd 25:91 0 66: SZ. 330 £929914616: XE 117 "IBIJ34S 99 ON
JU —— p— Te REE ET RIV LT
Rights Act. A compelling interest tO comply with
Section 2 exists in this czes if thers Ave
reasonable grounds to believe that not creating
two majority-minority district may have violated
Section 2. Proof that failure to create two
majority-minorxity districts is not required.
Voinovich vi Quilter, 113 8. Ct. 1149, 1159
(1993); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476
U.S, 267, 292 (0'Connor, Jd., concurring) ; Johnson
v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480
U.Y8. blb, bbz (i1¥Li/) (OU Culler, T., conoux®&ng)
(8) Defendants and defendant-intervenors
contend that whether reasonable grounds existed to
believe that failure to draw two majority-minority
7 districts might have violated Section 2 ig to be
assessed by examining the threshold requirements
for a violation of Section 2 established in
Thornburg v. Gingles, 479 11.S. 30 (1986): (1)
whether the population of African-American
citizens is sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single
member district; (2) whether African-Americans are
politically cohesive; and (3) whether white
citizens usually vote as a block to defeat the
candidate of choice of African-American citizens.
Defendants and defendant - incervenors contend that
32
99d 85:91. 66: SC +30 $£9991.616: XES 117 BIJ3dS 99 ON
the Gingles geographic compactness requirement is
to be evaluated on a functional basis.
Marylanders for Fair Representation, supra;
Dillard v. Baldwin County Board of Elections, 686
®W Qupp. 148Q, 14RR-AR (MTN Al=x 1QRRAR)
(9) In the redistricting context, since the
goal of the state’s action is to avoid diluting
the voting strength of the black community, a plan
is narrowly tailored (1) if it creates only as
many majority-black districts as are necessary to
avoid vote dilution: (2) if the districts it
creates do not pack black voters in concentrations
yrealer Lau whal las reasonebly necessary to
provide black voters an equal opportunity to elect
a candidate of choice; and (3) if the plan also
accommodates other important state interests, such
as recognizing communities of interest and the
Protecrion Of incumpenls. Wueller ur aul Lue
districts in the plan are relatively
geographically compact, according to arbitrary
mathematical measures of compactness, is
irralavant +n a detarmination of whether the plan
is narrowly tailored to avoid a violation of § 2
uf the voulnyg Riylls Acl.
(10) Defendants and defendant - intervenors
rontend thar while thev have the burden of
1
8d 85:91 66: SC 30 9.991616: XE S 117 HI134S 99 ON
producing evidence of a compelling interest and
narrow tailoring, the burden of proving the
absence of a compelling interest and narrow
tailoring rests with the plaintiffs. Wygant, 476
U.S. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (*Itc is
incumbent upon [the plaintiffs] to prove their
case; they continue to bear the ultimate burden of
persuading the court that [the defendants’)
evidence did not support an inference of prior
discrimination and thus a remedial purpose, or
that the plan instituted on the basis of this
evidence was not gufficiently narrowly tailored.")
b. Factual Contentions as to Compelling Interest.
(1) Defendants and defendant-intexvenors
contend that the evidence described above
establishes that race was fairly weighed with
other legitimate redistricting criteria to create
a redistricting plan that provides for fair and
effective representation of North Carolina's
diverse population and thus that a compelling
interest hag heen estahliehad nndar Ralls,
(2) Defendants and defendant-intervenors
contend that there were reasonable grounds for the
General Assembly to believe that the threshold
elements of a Section 2 claim under Gingles could
be established if it had not created two majority-
34
82d 65:91 66, .5C 1] £9.991.616: Xe 4 11371 11 AS Od ON
minority districts. Specifically, defendants and
defendant intervenors contend that plaintiff-
intervenors’ Shaw Plan 2 provides reasonable
grounds to believe that the African-American
population is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in
a second district. Defendants and defendant-
intervenors further contend that the evidence
prepared by Dr. Richard Engstrom provides
reasonable grounds to believe that African-
Americans are politically cohesive and that
sufficient numbers of white citizens vote as a
block to defeat the candidate of choice of
AfLicausfingr ludny,
> (3) Defendants and defendant-intervenors
further contend that the plan is narrowly tailored
to remedy a possible Section 2 violation in that
the plan will remain in effect only until 2002, in
that the plan only creates two majority-minority
districts, in that the plan rreatas two districts
in which Afrjcan-Americans are only a bare
majAariby, fa yoy dhe plon de wabvhonxidl; buwud vi
legitimate non-racial redistricting criteria, in
that the plan fairly and legitimately balances
numerous competing legitimate criteria and in that
the plan causes no harm to white voters.
35
bt “d 65:91 . 66: SZ 140 £929914616: XES 111 "WIJ34S 99 ON
3. In addition to the foregoing contentions,
defendant -intervenors contend:
a. Each of the three Gingles requirements are
present:
(1) There is compelling evidence that
African-Americans are politically cohesive in
North Carolina.
(2) There is compelling evidence that white
votcro usually vote ap a bloc to defeat ths
candidate of choice of 2frigan-dmaricans.
(3) The population of African-Americans is
sufficiently large and geographically compact CTO
constitute majorities in two congressional
districts as evidenced by districting plans before
the General Assembly and as developed by the
parties in this litigation.
b. In addition to the three Gingles criteria, the
totality of the circumstances justifies the
state’s actions in enacting two majority-minority
districts: indeed such remedial action was
required because:
(1) there has been historic discrimination
in the electoral process in North Carolina,
luvludlyy vuuyLeasiunal Ledistcicring tho offeono
of which persist;
36
ord 00°21 66. SC ¥0 £9.991/616" XP 117 WIo3dsS 9g ON
(2) elections in North Carolina have been
stained by racial appeals, particularly when the
contest is between a white and African-American
candidate, practices which have continued into the
1590s.
(3) African-Americans in North Carolina
continue to exist at a severe socio-economic
disadvantage as compared to whites on every
conceivable measure such as income, housing,
AAT rSkwm; hoallll, ud su Ul. ley 48 Aus
disadvantaged in their ability to participate on
an equal basis in the political process.
(4) Prior to the redistricting which is the
subject of this case, African-Americans have met
or with defeat in every instance that they contested
for a Congressional seat in this century despite
energetic efforts by able, experienced candidates
who mounted serious campaigns. Each was able to
mobilize strong cohesive support in the African-
American community. Bach took his or her campaign
to the white community. And each was met with an
overwhelming white bloc vote which brought defeat.
27
wd 30:41 66..92 330 £9/991.616: Xe S 1171 1813345 93 IN
TIX. EXHIBITS
-- sole mh - ho
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Exhibit
Title
atm ul JU LlUil VilLam
202
203
204
205
208
207
208
208
210
ZF 4d 10:47 66: SC 330
of Stephen
An rrr ares dn mm. a —
Timothy O'Rourke
March 1984
speech to
Political
Scientists
Mary Brodgen
Affidavit
David Stradley
Declaration
John Sanders
Declaration
J. HK. Froelich,
Jr. Declaration
Philip Godwin
Declaration
Walter Jones,
Jr. Declaration
Karen Stewart
Letter
Sandra Grey
Herring Report
38
Objection
Hearsay
Hearsay
Hearsay, :
inadmissible opinion
Hearsay,
inadmissible opinion
Relevance, hearsay
Relevance, hearsay
£99914b16b: XE 1177 BIO3dS 98 ON
Exhibit 211 "White Mischief?" Relevance, hearsay
it The New
Republic,
December 10,
1990, pp. 9-10
B. Plaintiff-Intervenors
Number Title bijection
301 Notebook containing Map 11, 12, 14-16
Plaintiff Authenticity
Intervenarg, Mapa 1 -
23 with attached
explanations and
reports.
302 Large statewide map
of current
congressional
districts.
303 Large statewide map
of Shaw III plan.
304 Large map showiiy
ia outline of current
District 1.
208 Largc map showing
outline of current
District 12.
306 U.S. Geological
Survey maps
showing outline of
current
Distrior 1.
JV) U.S. La8ld8ical
Survey maps
showing outline of
current
District 12.
308 Large map showing
black
population
concentrations
in current District
— 1.
39
ld ZU.24T © 85, 5 390 £9L99TLBT18. AES LIT W113d5C "JN