Fax from Carraway RE: Order designating Judge Thornburg as the third judge and the pretrial order in Shaw
Correspondence
October 25, 1999

41 pages
Cite this item
-
Case Files, Cromartie Hardbacks. Fax from Carraway RE: Order designating Judge Thornburg as the third judge and the pretrial order in Shaw, 1999. f97cfb4c-dd0e-f011-9989-7c1e5267c7b6. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/e58f7854-a812-4029-9d5a-736d17d7e5f7/fax-from-carraway-re-order-designating-judge-thornburg-as-the-third-judge-and-the-pretrial-order-in-shaw. Accessed June 14, 2025.
Copied!
State of North Carolina MILHAEL H. BASE (WE AT STE A LLAY oly 1GHCE HEPLY 1U- FEARGas S. Carraway, CLAS ATTORNEY GENERAL P.O. BOX 629 Special Litigation RALEIGH (919) 716-6900 27602-0629 (919) 716-6763 (fax) TELECOPIER TRANSMITTAL SHEET TO: Todd Cox FAX: FROM: Frances S. Carraway, CLAS TELEPHONE NUMBER: (919) 716-6900 DATE: October 23, 1999 SUBJECT: Cromartie orders etc. NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING TRANSMITTAL SHEET: 43 CONFIRM RECEIPT OF DOCUMENT (S) IF MARKED HERE: COMMENTS: FYI This makes the delay in trial official. I’ve also included the order designating Thornburg as the third judge along with the pretrial order in Shaw Pw of CONFIDENTIALI OTE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS FACSIMILE MESSAGE IS LEGALLY PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY NAMED ABOVE. IF THE READER OF THIS JPL SIMUL) JJ AVI A 2 FAN) ALVA AJA VARIES ALLY ODOC NEN Cary MTC WT 0ST TT VEYITL EIR YT RINT TITTY VT AT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPY OF THIS TELECOPY IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS TELECOPY IN ERROR, PLEASE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY US BY TELEPHONE AND RETURN THE ORIGINAL MESSAGE TO US AT THE ADDRESS ABOVE VIA UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE. THANK YOU. 10°d of:91. 66. SC 130 £99914616: XES 117 BI12348 9d I | AED oy [ep IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Cap 5 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA RALEIGH DIVISION No. 92-202-CIV-5-BR RUTH O. SHAW, et al,, ) and JAMES ARTHUR "ART" POPE, et 2i., Plaintiff - Intervenors, Vv. PRE-TRIAL QRDER JAMES B. HUNT. et al.. Defendants, and RALPH GINGLES, et al., N a t ” N a t N a N a t N a N t ? p l N T tl V n V o g t N a i l e e r N o a V a a l a ” N a “ m g t “ i Defendant - Intervenors. I. STIPULATIONS As ordered, the stipulations and joint exhibits thereto have been separately filed with the court. 1x. CONTENTIONS i. act Contentions (1) In 1991 and 1993, the Department of Justice adopted a policy of requiring that redistricting plans enacted after the 1990 census maximize the number of majority-minority districts. " | NNEEINN W BUNNU) UL maximizing majority-black districts clear to those states which S0°d 28:91. 66, SZ I) £99912616: XE 111 'WIJ3d4S SY ON were subject, in whole or in part, to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. (3) This policy guided the General Assembly in its deliberations and resulted in the adoption of Chapter 601, which | AT HJen maj inne] NMWENEN) WANORNERI NIONN RESIRESU HA in the northeastern part of the State. (4) There are five majority-black counties in NorLh Carolina, all of which are located in the northeastern part of disweix Gouroulinuwy The pwiulicuutoldid purl ul LLL Oulu 1v ulpu LULU area with the largest concentration of the 40 North Carolina counties subject to preclearance requirements under Section 5. (5) In developing the Chapter 601 plan, the General Assembly relied on computer technology; the only data on voters available on the computer base pertained to age, race, and party; there was no socioeconomic data available from the 1990 census, as this data did not become available until January 1993. (6) After enactment of Chapter 601, the General Assembly -- with the assistance of staff member, Gerry Cohen, and retained counsel, Leslie Winner -- presented to the Department of Justice extensive materials, including transcripts of hearings and floor debates. These materials were intended to persuade the Department of Justice to grant preclearance. (7) On December 17, 1991, at the request of Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, John Dunne, a meeting took place in his office between State and Federal officials. At this meeting, Mr. Dunne made ¢lear that, because 90d 82:91 EL: GC WO £9L991LbTb aE 117 Wi133d45 ad IN ~~ over 20% of North Carolina’s population was African-American, it would be necessary for two of the State’s twelve members of Congress to be African-Americans. (8) On Uedenpor 14, iva, JAR LURRS WEIS WW Ms. Tiare Smiley, of the State Attorney General’s office to inform the General Assembly that preclearance was denied; and PURE SUISSAREAN EAE BOUUABLILIAEY UL Jd HULULU LA JULLILYYULAUA diptrict in the scutheastexn pazt of the State, (9) Accepting Mr. Dunut’vy bBugyestion would heave imperilled Congressman Rose and perhap# other Damocratid incumbents. (10) Shortly after the letter of December 18, 1591 was received, several North Carolina Demorraric members of Congress suggested that the State initiate an action to seek judicial preclearance trom a three-judge eourt in the District uf Culuwnbia Circuit pursuant to Section 5. (11) During this same period John Merritt, an employee of a congressional committee chaired by Democratic Congressman Charles Rose, received from State Représenrarive Hardawdy, black Democrat, a plan proposing two majority-black districts, nf which one would run through Durham and Greensboro to Charlotte ail the other would bo in tha nesthara arse. (12) Tuerealler John Mcrritt rcfinod Cho piaa with the assistance of computer facilities and software of the National CumnilLtee for an Bffcctivc Congroos (a Washingten, D.C. 20d 62:91: 66: SZ 10 $£9991616: XE 111 'IBIJ3d4S SY ON over 20% of North Carolina’s population was African-American, it would be necessary for two of the State’s twelve members of Congress to be African-Americans. (8) On December 18, 1991, John Dunne wrote to Ms. Tiare Smiley, of the State Attorney General's office to inform the General Assembly that preclearance was denied; and Dunne suggested the possibility of a second majority-black district in the southeastern part of the State. (9) Accepting Mr. Dunne’s suggestion would have imperilled Congressman Rose and perhaps other Democratic incumbents. (10) Shortly array rne lacrer of Duteubur 18, 1351 was received, several North Carolina Democratic members of Congress suggested that the State initiate an action to seek judicial preCleusuuct from a thicc judge couws dm the Distwiztr ~F Onl nmi a Circuit pursuant to Section 5. {11) During this same period John Merritt, an employee of a congressional committee chaired by Democratic Congressman Charles Rose, received from State Representative Hardaway, a black Democrat, a plan proposing two majority-black districts, of which one would run through Durham and Greensboro to Charlotte and the nther wonld be in the northern area. (12) Thereafter John Mexritt refined the plan with the assistance of computer facilities and software of the National Committee for an Effective Congress (a Washington, D.C. 20°d Op:91 66 SZ +30 £99914616:XeS 111" WIH4S 9d ON organization that supports Democratic candidates for Congress); and then he transmitted the plan to the NAACP in North Carolina. (13) Subsequently, the Merritt plan was presented at a public hearing in Raleigh by Mary Peeler on behalf of the NAACP on January 8, 1992; and, with some modification, it was adopted as Chapter 7. (14) In enacting Chapter 7, the General Assembly proceeded on the assumption that preclearance from the Attorney General of the United States could not be obtained for a Congressional redistricting plan that did not contain two majority-black Congressional districts. (15) As was reflected in statements at the time, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 7 wilh Lhe intent to assure the election of two African-American members of Congress by creating two majority-black districts. (16) At the time of the enactment of Chapter 7, the overriding legislative purpose was racial; and there was no consideration by the General Assembly of socioeconomic data apart from race. (17) In ecomunecLlon wilh Lhe use of computer tcchnology in redistricting after the 1990 census, the General Assembly had acquired software from PSA, a vendor of such software. TO facilitate the creation of a majority-minority districts, this program was modified to permit the creation of districts that would be "point contiguous". Becauge of this modification or otherwise, significant discrepancies have been discovered by 80d Op:91 66: SZ 130 £9/991.616: Xe 4 1171 WIAs ad JN Plaintiffs in the computer program used for Congressional redistricting by the General Assembly. As a result, it is not certain that all of the Congressional distridt are gither contiguous or equal in population. (18) The criteria for Congressional redistricting used by the General Assembly never included compactness, and in the redistricting compactness was ignored and many political subdivisions ware split hetwsen mars than one district. (19) In seeking to justify the bizarre districts which have been created by Chapter 7, the Defendants have relied on socioeconomic data that were neither available to the Legislature, nor considered by it while the redistricting was unazayway. (20) The districts that have been created by Chapter 7 cross many media markets; and this circumstance makes it difficult for voters to obtain information about their Representatives in Congress or for those Representatives to know the voters or the various local officials in the district. Also, this circumstance makes it more difficult for voters to learn apour cuntlddles fur Cunyrwss ur fur candidates to have adequate opportunity to inform voters about the candidates. (21) Until the 1992 redistricting, the First District had been coastal, but after the redistricting this was no longer true. Until the 1992 redistricting, the First District had only been located in the northeastern part of the State; but after January 1992 this district extended almost to South Carolina. 60d ¥p:91 66. SZ 190 £9/9912616: Xe 4 1171 W1EL4S 95 J Pan (22) Por the Chapter 7 redistricting plan, the First District was extended southward in order to create a majority-black district by including urban black neighborhoods in Wilmington and in Fayetteville, neither of which cities had previously been in the First District. (23) In establishing the Twelfth District, the General Assembly made no effort to determine that the white residents would have anything in common other than race; and this also was true for the Twelfth District. (24) The population of North Carolina is mobile; and many whites and African-Americans now resident in North Carolina were not living in North Carolina when the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted. (25) During thc dcbatee and hearing on the Congressional redistricting, no comment was made that any of the district would conform or correspond in any way to the route of the North Carolina Railroad or other corridor of the Piedmont Crescent. (26) The splitting of precincts and other political subdivisions by Chapter 7 generated confusion among voters. (27) As a result Of the rorty percenlL plurality provision which took effect in 1990, the overwhelming Democratic registration of African-Americans in North Carolina, and the closed nature of Democratic primaries, it is unnecessary to create majority-black Congressional district in order for African-Americans to be elected to Congress. Old Zp:91 66: 2 30 £99912616: XE 111 BI23d4S 99 ON (28) In elections with white and black candidates, Black voters jin North Carolina have demonstrated less willingness to vote for white candidates than white voters have demonstrated to vote for black candidates; and white crossover voting has Lucredsea, (28) The number of black elected office holders in North Carolina is substantial and has greatly increased since 1965, (30) Racial appeals greatly diminished in North Carolina over the years. (31) Black registration levels in Narth Cavolina are close to those of whites; and in some district exceed the registration rate for whites. 2, Legal Contentions 7 (1) In view of the overriding race-driven purpose of the Chapter 7 redistricting plan, that plan constituted a racial gerrymander. (2) The Department of Justice greatly exceeded its authority wnAdesr Qamtrisn & Af tha Vetiayg Righse Acb whon it insisted that any Congressional plang for North Carolina include tow majority black districts. (3) The racial gerrymander created by Chapter 7 served no compelling state interest and was not narrowly tailored by the North Carolina General Assembly. (4) Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment is denied when, as with Chapter 7, voters are placed in particular 11'd Zp:91 06: SE AI) $£99914b16: XE 117 H1345 9d ON Congressional districts for the purpose of assuring the election Ul persuus who arc of & pawsseulax 274 (8) Thea creation of the two North Carolina majority-black districts not only violated Equal Protection but also abridged the right-to-vote of the Plaintiffs and all other North Carolina voters in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. (6) The creation of race-driven majority-black Congressional Districts is contrary to Article I, § 2 of the Constitution. (7) The socioeconomic data that only became available to the General Assembly after Chapter 7 was adopted may not be relied on by the State to justify the enactment of Chapter 7. (8) Because the black population of North Carolina is relatively dispersed, a majority-black district cannot be created in North Carolina without violating traditional redistricting principles, such as compactness, contiguity, and recognition of communities of interest and political subdivisions. (9) In view of the overriding race-conscious purpose of the Legislature in enacting Chapter 7, the second plan was unconstitutional. (10) All evidence of socioeconomic data is inadmissible unless the General Assembly considered it prior to enacting Chapter 7. (11) Chapter 7 had the intended effect of segregating the black voters of the First and Twelfth Districts from the white voters of the other ten districts. Z1'd ep:01 66: SC 1) £94991.616: XE 117 WI34S 90 Jy (12) The use of single-member Congressional Districts required by 2 U.S.C. § 2(C) is inconsistent with a system of proportional representation. (13) Under 2 U.S.C. § 2(a), if North Carolina fails to redistrict in a constitutional manner, then eleven Representatives must be chosen from the eleven districts that existed prior to the 1000 census and the radistriqting, and one Representative would be chosen at large. (14) All voters of North Carolina, regardless of their race, have a constitutional right to participate in an electoral process that is racially neutral and that does not use racial classifications. (13) Tul iriyudivmeut by vho Dopartmons ef Jwekkwa Yhns two majority-black Congressional districts be created did not in any way create an immunity nor constitute a defense for the defendants. (16) Chapter 7 is not a narrowly tailored remedy but instead ig a racial gerrymander. (17) B11 of the Plaintiffs have suffered an injury to rnair CONETITUCIOonal TigHEy oY NdVE dll ullier Nullll Carulliua voters. (18) In view of the passage of two years and the conducting of one election since Plaintitfs sued, the Court should grant immediate relief and enjoin any congressional primaries under the present plan. £1'd Pr:91 66: SZ 30 £929914616: XES 111 BI 345 od IN B. Plaintiff - Yvenors. With the exception of legal contention No. 8, Plaintiff-intervenors’ adopt the contentions of plaintiffs and also state as follows: 1. Factual Contentijong: (1) That the overriding purpose behind the North Carolina General Assembly’s enactment of Chapter 7 of the 1991 Session Laws (Special Bession) was compliance with the United States Department of Justice’s demand for two congressional districts with black voting majorities in a manner that would not jeopardize the reelection chances of incumbent Democratic congressman. (2) That, in creating the two majority black... . districts contained in Chapter 7, the General REBRDIY disregarded traditional districting principles such as geographic compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions. 2. Legal Contentions: (1) That Chapter 7 violates Plaintiff- intervenors constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws by segregating them into separate voting districts because of their race. (2) That the state’a intentional use racial classifications in enacting Chapter 7 is 1d PPO] 66. SZ 130 £929914616:XES 117 "HI)34S 9 IM justified by a compelling state interest nox narrowly tailored to meet any such interest. Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors 1. Defendants and Defendants-Intervenors Contend that Plaintiffs Cannot Prove a Racial Gerrymander. ntentions a Racial Ger (1) Defendants and defendant-intervenors contend that plaintiffs have the initial burden of proving that they have standing to pursue their claim by establishing that the alleged racial gerrymander has caused them to suffer the harm alleged in their claim. The harm relied on by plaintiffs to give them standing to pursue their racial gerrymander claim is (1) that Congressmen watt and Congresswoman Clayton do not need to respond and will not respond to the needs of white voters and (2) that the plan exacerbated racial block voting. Such forms of harm may not be presumed and must be established by specific evidence. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131-32 (1986). (2) Defendants and defendant - intervenors contend that Federal law imposed a series of obligAtLANE SN THE UBNErdL AQHEUWLY Ll edacllly the congressional redistricting plan. First, one- 11 Sl 'd SPr:91 66.SC 330 £949912616: XE 1177 IBIJ34S 99 ON person, one-vote principles established by the Supreme Court in Baker v, Carr, 369 U.8. 186 (1962) and its progeny required the General Assembly to have a new congressional redistricting plan in place in time for the 1992 elections which contained 12 districts with equal populations. Second, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C, § 1973¢c, forbade the General Assembly from implementing any plan for 1992 elections without first obtaining preclearance of that plan from the Department of Justice or the federal courts. Third, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.8.C. § 1973, required the General Assembly to avoid dilution of the voting rights of minority citizens. (3) Defendants and defendant-intervenors also contend that the discretion to determine how to meet the requirements of federal law, what additional criteria should be applied in enacting a plan and what weight Should be given those additional criteria was the prerogative of the General Assembly. Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1081 (1992) ("Today we renew our adherence te the principles . . . which derive from recognition that the Constitution leaves with the States primary responsibility for the 12 91 4d op:91.. 66: SC: 10 £929914616: XES 117 BIJ3d4S 99 ON 21d apportionment of their federal congressional . . . districts.") (4) Defendants and defendant-intervenors contend the plan enacted by the General Assembly meets one-person, one-vote requirements, was precleared by the Department of Justice and that the courts have determined that the plan is not an unlawful political gerrymander. Pope V. Blue, No. 3:92CV71-P (W.D.N.C. April 16, 1992), aff’d mem. , 113 S.Ct. 30 (19%2). (5) Plaintiffs’ only claim is that the plan is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. They have acknowledged that the burden of proof on that issue rests with them. The parties, however, disagree about the elements of a racial gerrymander claim. (6) Plaintiffs seem to contend that a racial gerrymander claim has three elements: (a) that the plan creates oddly shaped districts that 4o not conform to existing political or natural boundaries; (b) that the plan disproportionately groups citizens in districts based on their race; 9r:91 and (c) that race was the cause Or predominate cause of the shape of the districts. (7) Defendants and defendant -intervenors contend that proof of these three elements is not 13 66. SC +30 £929914616: Xe 1171 WIJ3dS Sd On sufficient to establish a racial gerrymander for the simple reason that Sections Z apd 5 Or the Voting Rights Act required the General Assembly to account for race in drawing the districts and therefore that accounting for race cannot in and of itself be unlawful. Stated differently, proof that the General Assembly accounted for race is not proof in this context of an unlawful intention; it is proof of an intention to comply with federal law. (8) Defendants and dcfendant-intervennrs thus contend that proof of a racial gerrymander requires proof of a fourth element. This element has two parts: (1) that there is no rational explanation for the location and shape of the districts other than race and (2) that the plan has no rational basis other than race. Defendants and defendant -intervenors contend that this element is expressly required by Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832. ("We conclude that a plaintiff . . . may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally canuot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate voters into different districts on the basis of race.") See also Marylanders for Fair Representation v. Schafer, No. 5-92.510 (D-Md4. 14 81 'd P:91 +. 66. 92 330 £99914616: XE 117 HI13345:90 DN 7. January 14, 1994) (three-judge court). Defendants and defendant-intervenors further contend that this fourth element is an entirely logical requirement of a racial gerrymander claim. Subject to the constraints of federal law, redistricting rests within the sound discretion of the states. Accounting for the requirements of federal law, particularly the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, in developing a redistricting plan cannot be unlawful unless there is no rational explanation for the location and shape of the digtricts other than race Or unless the plan has no rational basis other than race. (8) Defendants and defendant -intervenors contend that plaintiffs have the purden of proof on this fourth element of their racial gerrymander claim, just as they have the puraen uf pruul on the first three elements. That burden is to prove that there is no conceivable rational explanation FOF rhe lovaliun and shapc of tha distriers orher than race and that there is no rational basis for the plan other than race. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.8, 93, 111 (1979). Alternatively, defendants and defendant-intervenors contend that if plaintiffs prove the first three elements of their claimg, they have established a prima facie case 15 bl 'd 2:91 66, SZ) £929914616: XeS 1171 BIJ3d4S 98 ON DZ °d 8:91 which would require defendants and defendant- intervenors to articulate the rational explanation for the location and shape of the districts or rational basis for the plan. Proof of a prima facie case, however, would not shift the burden of proof to defendants and defendant-intervenors; it would merely impose on defendants and defendant- intervenors the burden of going forward with the evidence. The ultimate burden of proving that there is no rational explanation for the location and shape of the districts other than race and that there is no rational pasis for the plan other than race rests with the plaintiffs. See Rarcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 760 (concurring opinion) ("In order to overcome a prima facie case of invalidity (of a redistricting plan], the State may adduce ‘legitimate considerations incident to the affectation of a rational state policy.’ ?; *1f a state is unable to respond to a plaintiff's. palma focic 0A66 by showing that it is supported by adequate neutral criteria, I believe the court could properly conclude thdl Lhe challecngcd schema ig either totally irrational or entirely motivated by a desire to curtail the political strength of the affected group."). 66. SZ 190 $£99912616: XE 1171 WI33d4S a4: IN V ti. (10) In sum, defendants and defendant - intervenors contend that plaintiffs cannot prove a racial gerrymander unless they establish by a preponderance of the evidence both: (a) that the location and shape of the districts cannot be explained by legitimate factors than race; and (b) that the plan has no rational basis other than race. b. Factual Contentiong as to Racial GCerrymander Slam, (1) Defendants and defendant-intervenors contend that plaintiffs have failed to prove they have suffered the harm alleged in their complaint. (2) Defendants and defendant-intervenors conLund Ullal there is a rational explanation for rhe location and shape of the districts other than rdud, (a) Prior to the enactment of the 1982 congressional plan, the location and shapes of congressional district boundaries was the result of the location and shapes of the county boundaries themselves since the General Assembly followed a policy of not dividing counties. These boundaries were 17 1¢°d 6P:91 66: SZ 130 £949914616: XE 1171 0134S ae ON established based on historical and political circumstances going back over 200 years. (b) In 1982, the U.S. Department of Justice objected to a 1968 constitutional amendment adopting a policy of not dividing counties and it also objected to the State'’s congressional redistricting plan. The General Assembly proceeded to enact a congressional redistricting plan which divided anme counties, naing precinet and township boundaries. The boundaries and shapes of precincts and townships tend to be irregular. Township boundaries were created based on individual historical and political circumstances unique to each locality. Precinct boundaries are drawn and redrawn by local County Boards of Elections based on historical, political and other local circumstances unique to each county. (¢) The shapes of the congressional districts in the enacted plan, Chapter 7, reflect the shapes of the building blocks available on the legislative redistricting database, which include county, township, municipal and precinct boundaries as well as prior house, senate and congressional 18 ZZ:'d BP:91 7 66: SZ 330 £949914616: XES 1¥) W1314S 9d IN ~~ pounder lus, uld municipal ond sowashinp boundaries, and census block boundaries. Census block boundaries are established by the U.S. Censug Bureau using only visible features or township or municipal boundaries. Prior to the drawing of any districts, some sapsus plocky were divided by the U.8. conaus Bureau and the legislative staff to provide demographic data where precinct boundary lines and township lines did not coincide with census blocks. Similarly, census blocks were also divided by the legislative staff to provide demograpflf 83ata WiELE Leusus Llu did not coincide with prior house, senate and congressional district boundaries. The large nurber of preexisting jurisdictional and census block boundary lines available in the database provide a panoply of building blocks, each with its own origin, with which to create congressional districts. (d) The location and shapes of all congressional districts were affected by the strict one-person, one-vote requirements applied to congressional redistricting. With the computer tools available population deviations can be reduced to zero Or one 13 £2 4d 05:91 66:92 130 $£92991.616: XE 117 W135 “al IN person, and the boundary lines where each disctricro is "zeroed gut” are irregular. (2) The location and shapes of districts were also influenced by the General Assembly's obligation to comply with §§ 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act. (f) The location and shapes of the districts were also affected by the General Assembly's decision to create complimentary urban and rural districts. In creating a district with more than 80% of its population in urban areas, it was necessary to remove areas with low population density. Similarly, to create a district in the sparsely populated eastern i part of the state it was necessary to include large land masses, and to limit the number of people from towns with populations of more than 20,000 in order to maintain a district in which 80% of the people lived in towns of less than 20,000 people. (g) Protection of incumbents was another major factor influencing the location and shapes of the districts in the enacted congressional districting plan. Decisions on how and where to include and exclude particular areas in the different districts 20 Cd 05:91 66.5 330 £99914616: Xe 111" WH13345- 9d ON ald 16:91 6b. were based on a desire to protect i1ncumbéils. The shapes and widths of connecting areas and the direction taken in connecting other areas were also based on a desire to protect incumbents. (h) Specific political interests of individual State legislators also resulted in the inclugion or exclusion of specific areas in different districts and affected the anapas of rhe congressional diseriviy, (i) Maintaining the existing partisan balance in the State’s congressional delegation was also a major factor influencing the shape of the congressional districts. (3) Thare is ne £adexral srarntary Ar constitutional requirement that Congressional districts be compact or contiguous. (x) There is no North Carolina Statutory OF constitutional requirement that Congressional districts be compact or contiguous. (1) The criteria established by the redistricting committees of the General Assembly did not provide that Congressional digtrinra ha geographically compact. 21 SC 130 £929914616: XEA 117 "BI23d4S Sd ON (3) Defendants and defendant-intervenors contend that there is a rational basis for the districts other than race. (a) In enacting the plan the General Assembly emphasized the creation of districts containing citizens with shared interests and concerns over geographic compactness. The General Assembly was "pushed" to deemphasize geographic compactness because of the stringent population equality standards established by Baker and its progeny, because of Voting Rights Act requirements and because of a desire tc protect political interests. It was "pulled" to emphasize communities of interest because creation of communities of interest is consistent with the purpose of redistricting -- to provide fair and effective representation for voters. (b) Forming districts in which voters share common interests and concerns allows a representative better to know and represent the needs of his or her constituents and thus helps provide fair and effective representation for voters. (¢) In drawing the districts the General Assembly also emphasized the creation of a 22 9d 5:97. 66.5% 390 £99914616: XE 111 WIJ34S 9” ON distinctive urban Piedmont district (the Twelfth District) and a distinctive rural eastern district (the First District) over geographic compactness. (d) Forming distinctive districts allows for broader representation of the diverse interest of the State’s citizens by the members of the congressional delegation as a whole and thus helps provide for fair and effective representation for more citizens. (e) An analysis of the present day socio- economic and demographic characteristics of the citizens in each of the twelve districts created by the congressional redistricting plan establishes that the First District is a distinctive district which groups together citizens who have common interest and concerns in that the citizens in the district, black and white alike, are BOSrer MAE AEE YWelk-Sovsabed Shan VhbiEsnE ah any other district. That analysis also establishes that the Twelfth District is a distinctive district which groups together citizens who have common interests and concerns in that they reside in a district far more urban than any other district. 23 2%: 4 2691 66. SC: 130 £9/9914616: XE 117 IBIJ34S SY ON (f) Forming a distinctive digtrict comprised of poorer and less well-educated citizens is consistent with providing fair and effective representation because education and income influence voting behavior. Similarly, forming a distinctive district comprised of urban dwellers is congistent with providing fair and effective representation because urban dwellers have common needs and concerns that influence voting behavior. (g) A survey of the opinion of voters in the First and Twelfth Districts establishes that their common socio-economic interests produce similar opinions among black and white voters ZS on issues relevant to the responsibilities ot members of Congress. This same survey also establishes that the opinions of voters in the First and Twelfth Districts on these issues axe move similar than the opinions among voters in the Fourth District, even though the Fourth District is far more geographically compact. (h) The distinctive common interests of the citizens in the First District are a product of the district’s location within the Coastal 24 8C 'd £5:91 © 66: 5C 190 £949914616: XES 117 Wi133dS ad. ON Plain where citizens share a common history, culture and economy. (i) The distinctive common interests now possessed by citizens of the First District will continue at least through this decade. The area in which the First District is located is experiencing, and will likely continue to experience, economic stagnation and population losses. (4) The distinctive common interests of the citizens in the Twelfth District are a product of the district’s location within the Piedmont Urban Crescent where citizens share a common history, culture and economy. The Twelfth District generally traces the axis of the Piedmont Urban Crescent which extends in an arc from Raleigh thru Durham, Greensboro, Winston-Salem and Charlotte to Gastonia. The Piedmont Urban Crescent is a recognized place in North Carolina’s history, geography and demography and traces its origins to the construction of the North Carolina Railroad in the 1800's, later cemented by the construction of 1-85. Instruction regarding the Piedmont Urban Crescent is a part of the public school curriculum. 25 bl 'd £5197» 66; .92 130 £949912616: XE 117 W1034S 9d" IN (k) The distinctive common interest of citizens of the Twelfth pPistrxrict will continue at least through this decade. The Piedmont Crescent is, and likely will remain, the center of urbanization and economic growth in the State. (3) Defendants and defendant -intervenors contend that the General Assembly’s focus on creation of communities of interest, rather than on geographic compactness, was appropriate. Facts supporting the contention are summarized below: (a) There is no known, direct, empirical relationship between geographic compactness and providing fair and effective representation for voters. Geographic compactness may tend to promote fairer and more effective representation of voters because it tends to make travel and communication easier. Modern transportation and means of communications, however, make geographic compactness less important for providing fair and effective representation than in earlier times. (b) Modern transportation and communications make the First and Twelfth Districts substantially compact. Large parts of the 26 0g 'd $5:91. 66. SC 1d] £9/9914616: XS 1177 WIJ3dS 99 ON ETI © TOR ET SAAT VPA First District are connected by Interstate 40 and 95. The Twelfth District is linked . together by Interstate 40, 77 and 85. The average travel time from one end to the other . of all twelve districts is 2.6 hours. The travel time from one end of the First District to another is 4.17 hours. The travel time from one end of the Twelfth District to another is 2.9 hours. More than 30,000 citizens commute among the counties in the First District on a daily basis. More than 100,000 citizens commute among the 10 counties in the Twelfth District on a daily basis. (¢) The average district is served by three television markets. The voters in the First District are served by four television markets. The voters in the Twelfth District are served by three television markets. The total daily newspaper circulation in the First District counties for the three largest newspapers serving the district is 116,006. The total daily newspaper circulation in the Twelfth District counties for the four largest newspapers serving the district is 337,577. 27 1£°d Ga:91 | 66. SZ 130 £9.9912b16:XeS 1171 BI23d4S 59 ON (d) Geographic compactness is more important for districts served by paxt-time legislators with small budgets and small staffs, like the members of the General Assembly, than for districts served by full-time legislators with larger budgets and staffs, like the member of Congress. (2) There is no evidence that the more geographically compact a district is the more alike the opinions of voters will be. To the contrary, the opinions of voters in the First and Twelfth Districts on issues relating to the responsibilities of members of congress appear more alike than the opinions of voters in the geographically compact 4th district. (f) Similarly, there is not evidence that geographically compact districts group together citizens better than less geographically compact districts. To the contrary, an analysis comparing the gocio- economic and demographic characteristics of citizens in the twelve districts in the 1932 congressional plan and the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of citizens in the eleven district in the 1982 congressional plan establishes that the 1992 districts, 28 Zed G5:91 66: SZ £9/991.616: Xe 4 111 BIJ3d4S S56 ON though less geographically compact than the 1982 districts, group citizens with common interest and concerns better than the 1982 districts. This analysis also establishes that the 1992 districts are more BOCiO- economically distinctive than the 1982 districts. 2. Defendants and defendant-intervenors Contend that Even If Plaintiffs Prove a Racial Gerrymander the Plan is Narrowly Tailored to Serve Compelling Interests. a. Legal Contentiong as £oO Compelling Interests. (1) Defendants and defendant-intervenors contend that if plaintiffs prove a racial gerryilander, Ll Cuuil must then dctormine whather the plan is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Shaw, 113 S.. Cc. .at 2830 ("if appellants’ allegations of a racial gerrymander are not contradicted on remand, the District Court must determine whether the General Assembly’s reapportionment plan satisfies strict scrutiny.) (2) Defendants and defendant -intervenors contend that the state had a compelling interest in creating two majority-minority districts to comply with the state’s burden under Section 5 of 29 ged 95:91 “66. SZ 10 £929914616: Xe 111 "WI33dS SY ON the Voting Rights Act, as established by the Attorney General, to prove that the submitted change did not have the purposi¢ Of ailuting black voting strength. Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); 28 CFR § 51.52. (3) Defendants and defendant-intervenors contend that the state had a compelling interest in creating two majority-minority districts to comply with its burden under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to establish that the submitted change aia not violate Sevtluu 2 ul the Voting Righte Aot. 28 CFR § B1.55(a) (2). (4) Defendants and defendant-intervenors contend that plaintiffs are foreclosed from rr challenging in this Court the Attormey General's Section 5 objection to Chapter 601 as this Court has already determined because that conclusion was left undisturbed by the Supreme Court. (5) Defendants and defendant-intervenors contend that the state had a compelling interest in creating two majority-minority districts on the basis of its power to eliminate racial discrimination, to increase electoral opportunity under Section 4 (f) of the Voting Rights Act, tO achieve a broadly represeuLdilve cuuyressluual delegation and to insure substantive 30 Fed 95:91 66: SZ 130 £929914616: XE 1171 BIO3dS 99 ON representation of an historically submerged minority. (6) Defendants and defendant-intervenors contend that Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1970), provides an appropriate analytical framework for deciding the compelling interest issues. In Bakke the Court struck down a medical school admission policy which made the race of applicants the sole determinant in admissions decisions, but observed that an alternative policy under which "race or ethnic backgréutd 1B SIMPLY UNE HieueuL == LU Ue weighed fairly against other elements" -- in a process luleuded Lu aLtain a "diveroo etwudant body" whéré a "Yopust extldiye ul ideas” would occur would not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. As applied in this context, the Bakke analytical framework would require the Court to determine whether race was fairly weighed against other redistricting criteria (e.g., creation of communities of interest) to produce a redistricting plan that provided representation for North Carolina's diverse voters. (7) Defendants and defendant-intexyvenors contend that the General Assembly had a compelling interest in complying with Section 2 of the Voting 31 Sf 'd 25:91 0 66: SZ. 330 £929914616: XE 117 "IBIJ34S 99 ON JU —— p— Te REE ET RIV LT Rights Act. A compelling interest tO comply with Section 2 exists in this czes if thers Ave reasonable grounds to believe that not creating two majority-minority district may have violated Section 2. Proof that failure to create two majority-minorxity districts is not required. Voinovich vi Quilter, 113 8. Ct. 1149, 1159 (1993); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S, 267, 292 (0'Connor, Jd., concurring) ; Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.Y8. blb, bbz (i1¥Li/) (OU Culler, T., conoux®&ng) (8) Defendants and defendant-intervenors contend that whether reasonable grounds existed to believe that failure to draw two majority-minority 7 districts might have violated Section 2 ig to be assessed by examining the threshold requirements for a violation of Section 2 established in Thornburg v. Gingles, 479 11.S. 30 (1986): (1) whether the population of African-American citizens is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district; (2) whether African-Americans are politically cohesive; and (3) whether white citizens usually vote as a block to defeat the candidate of choice of African-American citizens. Defendants and defendant - incervenors contend that 32 99d 85:91. 66: SC +30 $£9991.616: XES 117 BIJ3dS 99 ON the Gingles geographic compactness requirement is to be evaluated on a functional basis. Marylanders for Fair Representation, supra; Dillard v. Baldwin County Board of Elections, 686 ®W Qupp. 148Q, 14RR-AR (MTN Al=x 1QRRAR) (9) In the redistricting context, since the goal of the state’s action is to avoid diluting the voting strength of the black community, a plan is narrowly tailored (1) if it creates only as many majority-black districts as are necessary to avoid vote dilution: (2) if the districts it creates do not pack black voters in concentrations yrealer Lau whal las reasonebly necessary to provide black voters an equal opportunity to elect a candidate of choice; and (3) if the plan also accommodates other important state interests, such as recognizing communities of interest and the Protecrion Of incumpenls. Wueller ur aul Lue districts in the plan are relatively geographically compact, according to arbitrary mathematical measures of compactness, is irralavant +n a detarmination of whether the plan is narrowly tailored to avoid a violation of § 2 uf the voulnyg Riylls Acl. (10) Defendants and defendant - intervenors rontend thar while thev have the burden of 1 8d 85:91 66: SC 30 9.991616: XE S 117 HI134S 99 ON producing evidence of a compelling interest and narrow tailoring, the burden of proving the absence of a compelling interest and narrow tailoring rests with the plaintiffs. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (*Itc is incumbent upon [the plaintiffs] to prove their case; they continue to bear the ultimate burden of persuading the court that [the defendants’) evidence did not support an inference of prior discrimination and thus a remedial purpose, or that the plan instituted on the basis of this evidence was not gufficiently narrowly tailored.") b. Factual Contentions as to Compelling Interest. (1) Defendants and defendant-intexvenors contend that the evidence described above establishes that race was fairly weighed with other legitimate redistricting criteria to create a redistricting plan that provides for fair and effective representation of North Carolina's diverse population and thus that a compelling interest hag heen estahliehad nndar Ralls, (2) Defendants and defendant-intervenors contend that there were reasonable grounds for the General Assembly to believe that the threshold elements of a Section 2 claim under Gingles could be established if it had not created two majority- 34 82d 65:91 66, .5C 1] £9.991.616: Xe 4 11371 11 AS Od ON minority districts. Specifically, defendants and defendant intervenors contend that plaintiff- intervenors’ Shaw Plan 2 provides reasonable grounds to believe that the African-American population is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a second district. Defendants and defendant- intervenors further contend that the evidence prepared by Dr. Richard Engstrom provides reasonable grounds to believe that African- Americans are politically cohesive and that sufficient numbers of white citizens vote as a block to defeat the candidate of choice of AfLicausfingr ludny, > (3) Defendants and defendant-intervenors further contend that the plan is narrowly tailored to remedy a possible Section 2 violation in that the plan will remain in effect only until 2002, in that the plan only creates two majority-minority districts, in that the plan rreatas two districts in which Afrjcan-Americans are only a bare majAariby, fa yoy dhe plon de wabvhonxidl; buwud vi legitimate non-racial redistricting criteria, in that the plan fairly and legitimately balances numerous competing legitimate criteria and in that the plan causes no harm to white voters. 35 bt “d 65:91 . 66: SZ 140 £929914616: XES 111 "WIJ34S 99 ON 3. In addition to the foregoing contentions, defendant -intervenors contend: a. Each of the three Gingles requirements are present: (1) There is compelling evidence that African-Americans are politically cohesive in North Carolina. (2) There is compelling evidence that white votcro usually vote ap a bloc to defeat ths candidate of choice of 2frigan-dmaricans. (3) The population of African-Americans is sufficiently large and geographically compact CTO constitute majorities in two congressional districts as evidenced by districting plans before the General Assembly and as developed by the parties in this litigation. b. In addition to the three Gingles criteria, the totality of the circumstances justifies the state’s actions in enacting two majority-minority districts: indeed such remedial action was required because: (1) there has been historic discrimination in the electoral process in North Carolina, luvludlyy vuuyLeasiunal Ledistcicring tho offeono of which persist; 36 ord 00°21 66. SC ¥0 £9.991/616" XP 117 WIo3dsS 9g ON (2) elections in North Carolina have been stained by racial appeals, particularly when the contest is between a white and African-American candidate, practices which have continued into the 1590s. (3) African-Americans in North Carolina continue to exist at a severe socio-economic disadvantage as compared to whites on every conceivable measure such as income, housing, AAT rSkwm; hoallll, ud su Ul. ley 48 Aus disadvantaged in their ability to participate on an equal basis in the political process. (4) Prior to the redistricting which is the subject of this case, African-Americans have met or with defeat in every instance that they contested for a Congressional seat in this century despite energetic efforts by able, experienced candidates who mounted serious campaigns. Each was able to mobilize strong cohesive support in the African- American community. Bach took his or her campaign to the white community. And each was met with an overwhelming white bloc vote which brought defeat. 27 wd 30:41 66..92 330 £9/991.616: Xe S 1171 1813345 93 IN TIX. EXHIBITS -- sole mh - ho Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Title atm ul JU LlUil VilLam 202 203 204 205 208 207 208 208 210 ZF 4d 10:47 66: SC 330 of Stephen An rrr ares dn mm. a — Timothy O'Rourke March 1984 speech to Political Scientists Mary Brodgen Affidavit David Stradley Declaration John Sanders Declaration J. HK. Froelich, Jr. Declaration Philip Godwin Declaration Walter Jones, Jr. Declaration Karen Stewart Letter Sandra Grey Herring Report 38 Objection Hearsay Hearsay Hearsay, : inadmissible opinion Hearsay, inadmissible opinion Relevance, hearsay Relevance, hearsay £99914b16b: XE 1177 BIO3dS 98 ON Exhibit 211 "White Mischief?" Relevance, hearsay it The New Republic, December 10, 1990, pp. 9-10 B. Plaintiff-Intervenors Number Title bijection 301 Notebook containing Map 11, 12, 14-16 Plaintiff Authenticity Intervenarg, Mapa 1 - 23 with attached explanations and reports. 302 Large statewide map of current congressional districts. 303 Large statewide map of Shaw III plan. 304 Large map showiiy ia outline of current District 1. 208 Largc map showing outline of current District 12. 306 U.S. Geological Survey maps showing outline of current Distrior 1. JV) U.S. La8ld8ical Survey maps showing outline of current District 12. 308 Large map showing black population concentrations in current District — 1. 39 ld ZU.24T © 85, 5 390 £9L99TLBT18. AES LIT W113d5C "JN