Gibbs v. Frisco City, AL Police Department Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant

    IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 79-1929

LOUISE GIBBS, et al.,
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.
THE TOWN OF FRISCO CITY, ALABAMA 
POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees

On Appeal From The United States District Court 
For The Southern District Of Alabama 

Southern Division

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

Henry Sanders
Chestnut, Sanders & Sanders 

P.O. Box 1305 
Selma, Alabama 36761

Jack Greenberg 
Charles Stephen Ralston 
Gail J. Wright 

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant



IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 79-1929

LOUISE GIBBS, et al.,
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.
THE TOWN OF FRISCO CITY, ALABAMA 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees

On Appeal From The United States District Court 
For The Southern District of Alabama

CERTIFICATE REQUIRED BY LOCAL RULE 13(a)

The undersigned, counsel of record, for plaintiff- 
appellant, certifies that the following listed parties have 
an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations 
are made in order that Judges of this Court may evaluate 
possible disqualification or recusal pursuant to Rule 13(a) 
of the Local Rules for the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit.

1



1. The named plaintiff-appellant is Louise Gibbs,
the legal representative and administratrix of
the estate of Calvin Ray Gibbs, her deceased son.

2. The defendants-appellees are:
a. The Town of Frisco City, Alabama Police 

Department;
b. Arthur Gunn, Chief of Police;
c. Claude Green and Ralph M. Tatum, police 

officers of the Frisco City Police Department;
d. Gary Talley, Mayor of the Town of Frisco City, 

Alabama; and
e. Gordon Harrison, Gilbert Norris, Harvey Martin 

and Douglas Williams, members of the City 
Council of the Town of Frisco City, Alabama.

Respectfully submitted,

1 1



IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 79-1929

LOUISE GIBBS, et al. ,
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.
THE TOWN OF FRISCO CITY, ALABAMA 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees

On Appeal From The United States District Court 
For The Southern District Of Alabama

CERTIFICATE REQUIRED BY LOCAL RULE 13(j)(2)

It is plaintiff-appellant's position that the errors 
of the lower court are clear from the record and that the 
issues raised in this appeal can be adequately decided on the 
briefs. We therefore submit the oral argument is not necessary 
and that this case may appropriately be resolved by summary 
disposition pursuant to Local Rule 18. However, this matter 
raises questions of first impression in this circuit which may 
have a substantial impact on the attorney fee awards in the 
district courts, particularly with respect to fees sought 
pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976.

i n



Accordingly, although plaintiff-appellant submits that the 
judgment of the court below is clearly erroneous and therefore 
does not require further argument, the Court may wish to hear 
oral argument on this issue.

Respectfully submitted,

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant

IV



TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Certificate Required by Rule 13 (a) ...........* . . . i
Certificate Required by Rule 13 (j) (2) . . . . . , . . ii
Table of Contents.................. « ..............  v
Table of Authorities ..................  vi
Statement of the Issue Presented . ...................  1
Statement of the C a s e ............................... 2
Summary of the Argument................   4
Argument ................  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5

The District Court Erroneous Holding That This 
Lawsuit Is Not The Type of Action for Which 
The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Act of 1976 
Was Enacted Frustrates The Statutory Purpose 
of The Act.

Conclusion ......................  . . . . . . . . . .  14
Certificate of Service..................   16

»

v



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) . . . .  9
Alyesksa Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,

421 U.S. 240 (1975)..................................... 6
Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) . . 9
Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.

La. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir.
1974)......................   9

Elrod v. Burns, 427U.S. 347 (1976)............ * • • * 7
Furtado v. Bishop, 453 F. Supp. 6 06 (D. M a . ) ..........  12
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 439 F. Supp.

393 (D. Colo. 1977)................................. 12
Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1972) . . . . .  8
Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F .2d 534 (5th

Cir. 1970)....................   5
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400

(19681 ...............................................  8
O'Conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 5631 (.1975) . . . . . . .  7
Panitch v. State of Wisconsin, 451 F. Supp. 132 (E.D.

Wise. 1978).........................................  9
Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645 (D. Mass. 1978) . . . . .  12

vx



IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 79-1929

LOUISE GIBBS, et al.,
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.
THE TOWN OF FRISCO CITY, ALABAMA 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al. ,
Defendants-Appellees

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether the District Court erred in reducing the 
amount of counsel fees awarded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 
1988, solely because this action is one for damages to redress 
the deprivation of plaintiff's intestates constitutional rights 
caused by police misconduct which resulted in death.

-1-



IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 79-1929

LOUISE GIBBS, et al.,
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.
THE TOWN OF FRISCO CITY, ALABAMA 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees

On Appeal From The United States District Court 
For The Southern District Of Alabama

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal comes to this Court from an Order of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Alabama, Southern Division, which Honorable W.B. Hand, entered 
on January 29, 1979 (R.110). The appeal presents questions of 
paramount importance concerning the awarding of attorney fees 
in civil rights actions brought pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1983. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under 
38 U.S.C. 1291.

Plaintiff-appellant Louise Gibbs instituted this law­
suit in her capacity as the legal representative and duly

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/

appointed administratrix of the estate of her deceased son, 
Calvin Ray Gibbs. The complaint which was filed on October 6 
1977 under U.S.C. Section 1983 alleges that the death of Calvin 
Ray Gibbs on November 23, 1976 caused by mortal gunshot wounds 
perpetrated by Claude Green and Ralph M. Tatum police officers 
for the Town of Frisco City, Alabama acting under color of 
state authority and local municipal ordinances, violated his 
civil rights guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, 
and Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.^

A trial by a duly impaneled and sworn jury commenced 
on October 31, 1978 and a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff 
was rendered on November 1, 1978. (R.100). Damages were
accessed against defendant Green in the amount of $8,000 and 
against defendant Tatum in the amount of $.4,000. In addition, 
the jury found that "Costs of the proceedings are hereby taxed 
against the defendants." (R.100). On November 1, 1978, a 
Judgment on Jury Verdict was entered by the Court to reflect:

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
plaintiff, LOUISE GIBBS, as Administratrix, 
etc., recover of the defendant CLAUDE GREEN, 
the sum of EIGHT THOUSAND and No/100 ($8,000.00) 
DOLLARS, and shall recover of the defendant 
RALPH M. TATUM, the sum of FOUR THOUSAND and 
No/100 ($4,000.00) DOLLARS, together with her 
costs of this action, [emphasis supplied] (R.101).
Pursuant to the Defendants' Motion to Award Judgment

filed on November 13, 1978, an Amended Judgment on Jury Verdict

 ̂ The original complaint invoked jurisdiction of the Court 
pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983, 1985 and 1986. 
A stipulation was entered into by the parties on July 31, 
1978 amending the complaint to limit the jurisdictional 
basis to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

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rendered against the defendants in the official capacity as 
police officers of the Town of Frisco City (R.104).

The District Court issued its Order of Attorney Fee 
Application on January 29, 1979 stating:

The Court is of the opinion that $8,000.00 
would be a fair and reasonable fee for the work 
turned in by counsel for the plaintiff in this 
action. However, due to the nature of the case, 
and due to the fact that the $12,000.00 recovered 
by the plaintiff was not compensation as to her 
but rather punishment against the defendants, the 
Court is satisfied that half of the fee should 
come from the plaintiff herself out of the jury 
award. Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion 
that the plaintiff is entitled to recover of the 
defendants a reasonable attorneys' fee in the sum 
of $4,000, plus expenses. (R.110).

The Court further determined that elements of cost 
including filing fees, probate filing fees, publication of 
letters, testamentary fees and administrative bond fees are 
not considered expenses of the attorney, and were to be taxed 
against the defendants. In addition, the lower court held that 
all costs of the action were to be taxed against the defendants 
upon plaintiff's presentation of a properly itemized bill. A 
judgment entered in accordance in cognition with the Order was 
entered by Judge Hand on January 29, 1979 and a timely notice 
of Appeal was filed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court mischaracterizes the instant lawsuit 

as a wrongful death suit despite the fact that the action was 
instituted, litigated and prevailed upon by the plaintiff pursuant to

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a civil rights statute and the Constitutional Amendments. 
Accordingly, this erroneous characterization of the lawsuit 
frustrates the legislative purpose of the Civil Rights 
Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976 which is intended to allow 
for awards of reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing 
party in lawsuits designed to vindicate civil rights.

The District Court also misconstrued the nature of 
attorneys' fees awards by imposing the requirement that the 
attorneys' fee awarded was contingent upon the damages recovered 
by the plaintiff. Such an imposition is contrary to the legal 
precedent governing fees in the area of civil rights law and 
defeats the purpose of the Act of 1976.

In light of the fact that the lawsuit clearly falls 
within the parameters of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award 
Act of 1976, the relief sought is a reversal of the lower 
court's ruling with directions to enter an order awarding the 
full amount of counsel fees found to be fair and reasonable, 
viz., $8,000, together with an additional reasonable compensation 
for the work necessary to prosecute this appeal. See Miller v. 
Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F. 2d 534 (5th Cir. 1970).

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred In Holding That This Lawsuit 
Is Not The Type Of Action For Which The Civil Rights 
Attorneys' Fees Act Of 1976 Was Enacted And Thereby 
Frustrates The Statutory Purpose Of The Act.

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Plaintiff moved the District Court for an award of
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Civil 
Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. Section 
1988, as amended. The fact that plaintiffs are entitled to 
an award of reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of 
$8,000 is not an issue dispute in that the lower court 
emphatically determined that such sum was an appropriate 
award. (R.114). However, the controversy before this Court 
involves whether the lower court's determination that this 
lawsuit is atypical of civil rights cases and that therefore 
fees should not be awarded as based upon the Civil Rights 
Attorneys' Fee Awards Act of 1976 is contrary to the legisla­
tive history of Act. It is plaintiff's position that the 
comprehensive legislative history of the 1976 Act explicitly 
reflects that this lawsuit which was instituted to redress the 
denial of an individual's fundamental civil rights, is the type 
of action for which the Act was promulgated.

The Civil Rights Act of 1866, revised Statutes 
Section 722, was amended in June 1976 to allow a court, in its 
discretion, to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in 
suits brought to enforce the civil rights acts which Congrees 
had passed since 1966. The purpose of the amendment was to 
remedy anomalous gaps in the civil rights laws created by the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Alyesksa Pipeline 
Service Co.v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), and to 
achieve consistency in the civil rights laws.
S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 1 (94th Cong. 2d Sess.).

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The Act provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a 
provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 
and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public 
Law 92-318, or in any civil action or pro­
ceeding, by or on behalf of the United States 
of America, to enforce, or charging a violation 
of, provision of the United States Internal 
Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party, other than the 
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as 
part of the costs.

In this regard it has been well established that counsel fees
are to be awarded in action instituted pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983. See, e.g., O'Conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 5631 (1975);
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). In enacting the statute,
the legislature fully recognized that:

If private citizens are to be able to assert 
their civil rights, and if those who violate 
the Nation's fundamental laws are not to 
proceed with impunity, then citizens must 
have the opportunity to recover what it costs 
them to vindicate these rights in court.

S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 2 (94th Cong. 2d Sess.)
During the early 1970's extensive Senate subcommittee 

hearings on legal fees were conducted and the Committee on 
the Judiciary concluded that fee awards are essential if the 
federal statutes to which the Act applies are to be full 
enforced. See, e.g. , Hearings on the Effect of Legal Fees On
the Adequacy of Representation Before the Subcommittee on 
Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary. 93 Cong., 1st Sess., pt. Ill at pp. 888-1024. 
In its Report the Committee found:

-7-



...that the effects of 
ancillary and incident 
pliance with these law 
are an integral part o 
to obtain such compliai

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 2 (94th Cc
Moreover, the legislature was acutel
seeable possibility that:

If the cost of private e 
becomes too great, there 
enforcement. If our civ 
not to become hollow pro. 
the average citizen canni
maintain the traditionally ..i.ccave remedy 
of fee shifting in these cases.

H.R. Rep. 94-1101, supra at 12.
See generally, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1011, pp. 197-298. This strong 
current of concern for the ability of the private citizen to 
have the financial resources to go to court swiftly flowed into 
the court's legal opinions reasoning. In Knight v. Auciello, 
453 F. 2d 852 (2d Cir. 1972) the court of appeals held:

The violation of an important public 
policy may involve little by way of actual 
damages, so far as a single individual is 
concerned, or little in comparison with the 
cost of vindication...If a defendant may 
feel that the cost of litigation, and 
particularly, that the financial circumstances 
of an injured party may mean that the chances 
of suit being brought, or continued in the 
face of opposition, will be small, there will 
be little brake upon deliberate wrongdoing.

The United States Supreme Court in Newman v. Piggie 
Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) succintly 
expressed the congressional objective in enacting the civil 
rights fees provisions:

-8-



...If successful plaintiffs were routinely 
forced to bear their own attorney's fees, 
few aggrieved parties would be in a posi­
tion to advance the public interest by 
invoking the injunctive powers of the fed­
eral courts. Congress therefore enacted 
the provision for counsel fees— not simply 
to penalize litigants who deliberately 
advance arguments they know to be untenable 
but, more broadly, to encourage individuals 
injured by racial discrimination to seek 
judicial relief under Title II.

390 U.S. at 402.
Although Newman was a case which arose under Title II, the courts 
consistently have held that one of the paramount purposes of 
providing attorney fees in civil rights actions is to encourage 
the private enforcement of civil rights legislation designed 
to vindicate the rights of persons injured by racial discrimina­
tion. See, e.g., Christianburg Garment' Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412 (1978); Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709,
711 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 437 F. 2d 959 (5th Cir. 
1974); Panitch v. State of Wisconsin, 451 F. Supp. 132 (E.D.
Wise. 1978). In this regard, the "private attorney general" 
rationale for awarding successful civil rights litigants 
reasonable counsel fees as part of their costs of litigation has 
been emphasized. See, e.g., Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 
U.S. 405, 415 (1975) .

The court stated that it based its conclusion on the 
premise that this lawsuit was not encompassed by the Civil 
Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act because the plaintiff's personal 
constitutional rights had not in any way been impaired and the 
sole purpose of the lawsuit was to vindicate rights by punish­
ing through a damage award. The court found:

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The instant case, which is really an Alabama 
wrongful death action hiding behind the con­
stitutional skirts of Section 1983 by virtue 
of the fact that police officers were involved, 
is clearly not the specific type of case that 
Section 1988 is addressed to.

(R.113)* The lower court's analysis reflects a total disregard 
of the legislative history of the Act. The lower court is 
clearly oblivious to the legislative background of the Act. 
which specifically directs its attention to cases involving 
police misconduct and harassment. See 122 Cong. Rec. S. 17052 
(daily ed., Sept. 29, 1976). The proponents of the statute also 
expressly discussed the dire necessity for attorneys fees in 
cases analogous to the action before this Court including those 
which require a victim's family to go to court to enforce the 
rights promised by the Congress or the Constitution. Ibid.

The District Court's contention that the case is akin to a 
wrongful death action because it involved the unlawful taking 
of a life overlooks the constitutional legal basis under which 
the claims were brought and negates the facts and circumstances 
of the case. Such a specious notion would preclude an av/ard of 
attorneys' fees in any civil rights action filed pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. 1983 which resulted in an individual's death. More­
over, the court's holding that because only one plaintiff was 
the action is not of sufficient magnitude to constitute a civil 
rights is strained and defies the purpose of the civil rights 
acts intending for individuals to act as private attorney 
generals.

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The court infiltrates its ruling with the idea that 
this is not a typical civil rights case for which fees should 
be provided according to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award 
Act of 1973 due to the fact that "white v. black idiology" [sic] 
is not involved. Clearly, it is not necessary that each and 
every lawsuit brought pursuant to a civil rights statute re­
peatedly discuss the racial ramification of the case especially 
where the lawsuit has already been argued and won on civil rights 
statutory grounds.

The District Court erred in holding that the attorney fee 
award is contingent upon the plaintiff's recovery of damages, and 
therefore wrongfully concluded that attorneys' fees should be 
paid out of the plaintiff's damage award. The lower court's 
diminution of the plaintiff's damage award in order to provide 
compensation for the attorney fee award is in direct conflict 
with the historical development of the legislative history per­
taining to the Attorneys' Fees Award Act. In a Report submitted 
by the Committee on the Judiciary prior to the passage of the 
Act it was carefully stressed that the mere recovery of damages 
should not preclude the awarding of counsel fees. [emphasis 
supplied]. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 216-17 (94th Cong. 2d Sess.). 
The legislature pointed out that similarly to- antitrust actions 
where a plaintiff is entitled to recover treble damages, the 
courts are still required to award appropriate attorney fees and

The same principle should apply here as civil 
rights plaintiffs should not be singled out for 
different and less favorable treatment. Further­
more, while damages are theoretically

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available under the statutes covered by 
H.R. 15460, it should be observed that, 
in some cases, immunity doctrines and 
special defenses, available only to public 
officials, preclude or severely limit the 
damage remedy. Consequently awarding 
counsel fees to prevailing plaintiffs in 
such litigation is particularly important 
and necessary if Federal civil and consti­
tutional rights are to be adequately pro­
tected. To be sure, in a large number of 
cases brought under the provisions covered 
by H.R. 15460, only injunctive relief is 
sought, and prevailing plaintiffs should 
ordinarily recover their counsel fees.
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 
supra; Northcross v. Memphis Board of 
Education, supra.

The application of these standards will 
ensure that reasonable fees are awarded to a 
attract competent counsel in cases involving 
civil and constitutional rights, while avoiding 
windfalls to attorneys. The effect of H.R.
15460 will be to promote the enforcement of 
the Federal civil rights acts, as Congress 
intended, and to achieve uniformity in those 
statutes and justice for all citizens.

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 9 (94 Cong. 2d Sess.).
Subsequent cases in the area of civil rights law have 

also recognized the need to provide economic incentives to the 
legal profession. See, e.g., Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F. 2d 645 
(D. Mass. 1978); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo.,
439 F. Supp. 393 (D. Colo. 1977). See also, Berger, Court 
Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"? 126 U. Pa.
L.Rev. 281, 306-15 (1977). The lower court's reduction of the 
damages award in order to provide attorney fees would certainly 
discourage private attorneys from pursuing civil rights 
actions when their ability to obtain reasonable fees would be 
uncertain even when they were successful in litigating the 
lawsuit. In Furtado v. Bishop, 453 F. Supp. 606, 607 (D. Ma. 1978) 
an action alleging brutality by prison officials, attorneys

-12-



fees were awarded subsequent to plaintiff's successful trial. 
There the court stated:

The most seemingly obvious special consideration 
that Congress had in mind was that plaintiffs 
recovery should not be reduced by having to pay 
counsel^ [emphasis supplied] .

Congress did not limit awards in Section 1983 suits to class 
actions or cases in which broad injunctive relief was sought, 
and the contention that the personal nature of the deprivation 
in the case precludes an award of attorneys' fees must be 
rejected. There is in fact an important benefit to the public 
in any meritorious action under Section 1983 where a constitu­
tional deprivation is vindicated.

It is plaintiff's reasoned opinion as determined by 
the legislative history upon which the Civil Rights Attorneys' 
Fees Award Act of 1976 and the legal developments of the Act 
that the Act was intended and designed to encompass the type 
of lawsuit now before this Court. Accordingly, the District 
Court's determination that the attorneys' fee award 
was contingent upon the plaintiff's recovery and to be paid out 
the proceeds recovered "as is generally the case in normal 
tort actions" must be reversed.

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CONCLUSION

The proper resolution of the issue in this case 
depends upon a recognition of the relationship between 
the civil rights statutes which Congress has enacted since 
1866 and the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Awards Act of 1976. 
The following was pointed out before Congress during the 
legislative hearings of 1976:

S. Report No. 94-1011, pp. 3-4 (94th Cong. 2nd Sess.)

The remedy of attorneys' fees has 
always been recognized as particularly 
appropriate in the civil rights area, . 
and civil rights and attorneys' fees 
have always been closely interwoven.
In the civil rights area, Congress has 
instructed the courts to use the 
broadest and most effective remedies 
available to achieve the goals of our 
civil rights laws.

*  *  *

These fee shifting provisions have 
been successful in enabling vigorous 
enforcement of modern civil rights 
legislation, while at the same time 
limiting the growth of the enforcement 
bureaucracy.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court 
below which directed plaintiff's counsel to recover of the 
defendants an attorneys' fee in the sum of $4,000.00 and $4,000.00 
from the proceeds of plaintiff's recovered damages must be reversed.

Respectfully submitted

Chestnut, Sanders & Sanders 
P.O. Box 1305 
Selma, Alabama 36761

JACK GREENBERG 
CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON 
GAIL J. WRIGHT



Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, N.Y. 10019

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of July, 1979

two copies of the foregoing Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant were
served upon counsel for defendants-appellees by depositing
sane in the United States nail, first class postage prepaid,
addressed to:

J. Milton Coxwell, Jr., Esq. 
Coxwell & Coxwell 
P.0. Box 625
Monroeville, Alaban.a 3 646 0
Windell C. Owens, Esq.
P .0. Box 428
Monroeville, Alabana 36460

Attorney for Plaintiff-Defendant

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