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    CV 89-03609778 

MILO SHEFF, ET AL., : SUPERIOR COURT 

: JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
Vv. HARTFORD-NEW BRITAIN 

: AT HARTFORD 

WILLIAM A. O'NEILL, ET AL. 2 JUNE 28, 1993 

DEFENDANTS' POST-TRIAL BRIEF 

Submitted by: 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL ’ 
ATTORNEY GENERAL ‘ 

BERNARD F. MCGOVERN, JR. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 

JOHN R. WHELAN 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 

MARTHA M. WATTS 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 

ALFRED A. LINDSETH, ESQ. 
SUTHERLAND, ASBILL & BRENNAN 

  

 



      

Tir. 

PAGE 
IN RO DUC ON «us estes sites + vn nis HD oir siete aie win vin vividreole ain ns oleriusa uid 1 

CONNECTICUT'S HERITAGE AND THE PLANTIFFS' PROPOSAL........ 7 

A RO IV EIN ie ve vs ov sirin sie s sien a nis nin aie winnie un mata. oy AGE TE 18 

A. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE 

DEFENDANTS HAVE VIOLATED THE EQUAL PROTECTION, 

DUE PROCESS AND EDUCATION PROVISIONS OF THE 

CONS DL DEON a ty irri vt a so vin wigs va sn sith alin tate odin als 18 

1. The Plaintiffs Have Not Established That 
The Defendants Have Violated The Constitution: 
BY ANY WronOAOLING . cc «ov ssiensisnssinin vainisie nie dine “19 

2. The Equal Protection And Due Process Clauses 
Of The State Constitution Do Not Impose An 
Affirmative Obligation On The State To Solve 
The Complex Conditions And Problems That 
Affect Population Patterns And Achievement 
Levels In The Hartford Area Schools............ 25 

3. Article Eight, Section 1 Of The Constitution 
Assigns The Power To Set Educational Standards 
And Decide How Best To Address Problems 
Associated With The Provision of Education To 
The Ceneral ASSemMDlY..... ch .u. ciaivsnssevitidnenn 37 

B. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT PROVEN THAT THE 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
  

  

CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE FREE 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS IMPOSES A 
SPECIFIC OBLIGATION ON THE STATE TO MEET CERTAIN 
LEVELS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND 
EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT... .. ois ssn nav ss dune vindadinions 46 

  
 



  
The Plaintiffs Have Not Offered Evidence From 
Which The Court Can Find A Constitutionally 
Required Course Of Action In Regard To The 
Problems Of Racial, Ethnic And Socioeconomic 
Isolation Or Urban Underachievement 

The Plaintiffs Have Failed To Establish That 
There Are Any Constitutionally Required 
Standards That Must Be Applied To This Case....51 

Racial and Ethnic Isolation 
Socioeconomic Isolation 
Achievement 
Resources 

CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION, THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY HAS TAKEN APPROPRIATE ACTION TO ADDRESS 
RACIAL, ETHNIC AND SOCIOECONOMIC ISOLATION AND TO § 
ADDRESS THE UNDERACHIEVEMENT OF CHILDREN LIVING IN 
POVERTY IN OUR CITIES 

I. The State Has Pursued A Policy Designed To 
Promote Racial, Ethnic And Socioeconomic 
Diversity In Our Schools 

The State Has Pursued A Policy Designed To 
Provide All Children With An Equal Educational 
Opportunity And To Direct State Resources To 
The Neediest Students   ..- Table 1: State Grant Analysis 

The Hartford Public Schools Offer An 
Educational Program Which Is Comparable To 
And In Some Ways Better Than That Being Offered 
In Other School Districts In The Area 

Table 2: Select Comparisons Between Hartford 
and the Combined Suburbs: 1984-85 

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Table 3: Select Comparisons Between Hartford 

and the Combined Suburbs: 1990-91..... 87B 

Table 4: Select Comparisons Between Hartford : 
and the Combined Suburbs: 1991-92..... 87C 

4. Differences Between Hartford Public Schools And 
Schools In Other Districts In The Area Are The 
Product Of Local Decision-Making... .....e...i.s 99 

5. A Proper Examination Of Student Performance 
Levels In The Hartford Area Does Not Support 
The Plaintiffs’ Contention That The 
Constitutional Rights Of Children In Hartford 

THE PROBLEMS OF RACIAL, ETHNIC AND SOCIOECONOMIC 
ISOLATION AND POOR EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN y 
HARTFORD AND OTHER URBAN AREAS ARE COMPLEX SOCIAL ) 
CONDITIONS THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED IN THE LIMITED 
CONTEXT OF A CASE SUCH AS THIS, BUT MUST BE 
ADDRESSED BY A BROAD SPECTRUM OF INITIATIVES WHICH 
CAN ONLY BE DIRECTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY........ 120 

1. Demographic Patterns In The Hartford Area...... 120   Table 5: Changes in the Racial and Ethnic 
Composition of the Hartford Public 
SChools, "1963 £0 1992... . ii isieids iin 123 

Table 6: Minority Demographic Patterns; 
: Student and Total Population......... 124A 

Table 7: African American Student Population 
Growth in the Hartford Area from | 
1980 to 1992... .. FU SEIN Sol 124 | 

Table 8: Hartford's Share of African American 

and Latino Students in the Hartford 

Area, 1980 and 1992. .c. . cd vo iid Aone divi a 125 

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VI. 

2. The Relationship Between Changes In Racial And 
Ethnic Composition And Student Performance..... 127 

3. The History Of Court Ordered School 
Desegregation In This Country Does Not Support 
The Notion That Courts Can Effectively Address 
The Complex Problems Facing Our Schools........ 139 

4. The Need For Measures Which Go Beyond The 
Field Of FAUCAt ION. «is niei ovine ss vena tisdnine vin vics 143 

E. PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED RELIEF IS UNPRECEDENTED AND 

BEYOND THE AUTHORITY OF THE COUR. viv cv ovens snnre envi 148 

CONCLUSION... ies a 0 Sten ama Bi 157 

BPPEND ICES Ji, ie ni viens ois a miminn ee te Pai nade ie a Bia 2189 

1. Index To Trial Transcripts Sra )- 

2 Selected Errors, Omissions, and Misleading Statements 
in Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief 

3. Simulation of Standard For Racial And Ethnic Balance In 
The Hartford Area Proposed By Charles Willie, Ph.D. 

4. Summary Of The Findings Of Robert Crain, et al. In 
"Finding Niches: Desegregating Students Sixteen Years 
Later - Final Report On The Educational Outcomes Of 
Project Concern, Hartford Connecticut”, Plaintiffs’ 
Exhibit 386 

5. Overall District Expenditures In Hartford Area For 
1984-85, 1990-91 and 1991-92 

5. (A and B) Summary Of The Findings Of William Trent, 
Ph.D., Plaintiffs' Exhibit 481 

7. Bibliography of Definitions: Discriminate, 
Discrimination, Segregate and Segregation 

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CV 89-0360977S 

MILO SHEFF, ET AlL., : SUPERIOR COURT 

: JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
V. : HARTFORD-NEW BRITAIN 

- AT HARTFORD 

WILLIAM A. O'NEILL, ET. AL. : JUNE 28, 1993 

DEFENDANTS ' POST-TRIAL BRIEF 
  

1. INTRODUCTION 

During the lengthy trial in this matter, the court received 

a vast amount of information and heard many hours of testimony 

from witnesses who held varied educational or social theories. 

In the course of the proceedings, the one central issue on which 

the plaintiffs’ case turns appears to have receded into the 

background: "Have the defendants violated the plaintiffs’ 

constitutional rights?” After all the educational and social 

theories have been debated, and after all the data has been 

analyzed, the answer to this question is clearly "No". 

The principal constitutional provision on which the 

plaintiffs’ claims rest is Article Eight, Section 1, of the 

Connecticut Constitution. That section provides: 

  

  
 



  

  

  

    

There shall always be free public elementary 
and secondary schools in the state. The 
general assembly shall implement this 
principle by appropriate legislation. 

In conjunction with their claims under the education clause, 

the plaintiffs also rely on the due process and equal protection 

provisions of the state constitution. Whether or not the 

defendants have violated any of these provisions turns not upon 

complex educational or social theories but upon a handful of 

undisputed facts. 

First, the constitution directs the General Assembly to 

implement the principle that "[t]here shall always be free public 

elementary and secondary schools in Ele Stans... .” Conn. ese 

Art. VIII, Section 1. Without a doubt, the General Assembly has 

done this. It has established a comprehensive system of free 

public elementary and secondary education. The General Assembly 

has continuously concerned itself with the challenges and 

obstacles of offering a first rate educational system, including 

the challenges and obstacles of racial and ethnic concentration 

in urban areas and of -the consequences which poverty has on 

education. (See Parts II and 11. C. infra). 

Second, the state has provided a fair and comprehensive 

system for funding its educational programs, which provides extra 

resources for cities like Hartford and which has passed 

  

  
 



  

  

  

    

constitutional muster. The state's system of funding provides 

} local school districts with increased state funding where local 

resources are limited and the needs of the students are greatest. 

The funding system also requires minimum expenditure levels by 

the towns that are higher for towns having students with greater 

needs. Pursuant to the state's funding system, Hartford received 

2.8 times more state aid per pupil in 1991-92 than its suburbs 

received. During the state's recent fiscal crisis, Hartford 

continued to receive increased state assistance while aid to the 

suburbs was reduced. (See Part III. C. (2) infra). 

Third, the state has helped cities like Hartford develgp and 

fund special programs specifically designed to address the 

special educational needs of Hartford students which stem from 

problems such as poverty, health care, housing, and exposure to 

drug abuse. Those include, for example, the school breakfast 

program, early childhood programs, and programs to assist 

non-English speaking students. (See Part Ill. C. (3) infra). 

There Ts na feliable evidence that most Hartford students would 

perform better in suburban schools, which lack many of these 

programs. 

Fourth, the state has never segregated any students or 

school systems by race, and there is no allegation in this case 

that the state has ever done so. Nor do the plaintiffs allege  



  

  
|| that the state has done anything to create the housing, 

| transportation, or employment patterns which have caused the 

| demographic shifts over the years and have resulted in the 

present racial, ethnic and socioeconomic complexion of the 

Hartford area. The evidence shows that these conditions are the 

product of powerful demographic forces, which the state has in 

fact endeavored to mitigate, through various social programs, 

special educational programs, grant programs, and weighted 

funding formulas. (See Part 111. D.(1) infra). 

Fifth, not only has Connecticut never advanced or supported 

segregation, the state has promoted racial. and ethnic divergity   | 

| in its schools through its Racial Imbalance Act, which mandates 

i intradistrict racial balance, and through the state's 

| interdistrict cooperative grant program, which supports and 

encourages interdistrict programs to bring together students from 

| different areas and segments of the population (See Part III. 

  C.(1) infra). In fact, even today, as evidenced by the recent 

passage of législation promoting integration in our schools, 

(P.A. 93-263), the General Assembly continues to encourage and 

support diversity in the state's educational system. 

  Plainly, the state has done all, and more, than the 

constitution requires it to do. The plaintiffs have not proven 

that the state has violated their constitutional rights.   | ; 
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The plaintiffs cannot prevail unless the court accepts the 

strained and unprecedented interpretation of the state 

constitution that the plaintiffs advance. Under their theory, 

the existence of certain conditions, such as the racial, ethnic 

and socioeconomic mW AN alleged here, even though not caused, 

and indeed combatted by the state, themselves constitute a 

violation of the constitution. The plaintiffs ask the court to 

create, out of whole cloth, a series of constitutionally required 

levels of racial and socioeconomic integration and academic 

achievement. Under this theory, rehardiess of what the state has 

done or not done, if the present conditions do not meet Chess 

judicially established standards, a constitutional violation must 

be found. Not only have the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate 

what the appropriate "constitutional" standards are or should be, 

they also seek to turn the education provision of our 

constitution -- which unequivocally mandates that decisions 

regarding educational standards be left to the General Assembly 

-- an its head by urging the court to transfer all such 

decisionmaking authority into itself. 

There is great wisdom in the decision of the framers to 

delegate the implementation of the education clause to the 

General Assembly. The evidence in this case shows that the 

problems faced by children in Hartford, like the children in 

  

  

  
 



  

  

  

      
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urban centers throughout the nation, are the product of complex 

social and economic conditions. Children bring to school the 

problems of poverty, health care, housing, crime and drugs. Only 

the General Assembly has the constitutional authority to address 

those underlying problems and the educational challenges that | 

flow from them. 

The court should respect that constitutional delegation of 

authority and should not accept the invitation of the few | 

plaintiffs in this case, who represent themselves only, and not 

any broader class of people, to make sweeping changes to our: 

  educational system, which will affect tens of thousands of 

children in towns throughout central Connecticut. The court 

should instead recognize the wisdom of the Constitution's 

delegation of these issues to the General Assembly. 

In the pages that follow, the evidence presented at trial is 

discussed in detail and presented in the context of the legal 

framework under which the court must operate. The only 

conclusion that can be drawn f -om the evidence is that there is 

no reasonable basis upon which to find that the defendants have | 

 



  

  

violated the constitution and that the court should not usurp 

{| what is properly the role of the General Assembly. l/ 

II. CONNECTICUT'S HERITAGE AND THE PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSAL 

Connecticut has always been a leader in the field of 

education. Vol. 16, . p. 23 (Coliier). 2/ Connecticut was 

[ 
recognized as having the highest literacy rate in the country as 

far back as the 17th century, and the quality of education in 

Connecticut has continuously improved over the past two hundred 

3/   years. Vol. 16, pp..9-10,:23, 56-57 (Collier). As the present 

| state historian wrote in 1983: "Things get bad in Connecticut 
) : 

    
1/ In the preparation of this brief, the defendants’ have not 

attempted to point out all of the claims in the plaintiffs’ 
post-trial brief which are erroneous or not supported by the 
evidence. In Appendix 2 to this brief, the defendants’ 
provide the court with a list some of the more significant 
errors, omissions and misleading statements in the 
plaintiffs’ brief and references to the evidence which 
refutes or explains the points the plaintiffs try to make. 

  

2/ In Appendix 1 to this brief, the defendants provide the 
court with an Index to Trial Transcripts in this case. 
References to the trial transcripts throughout this brief 
are to the volume number as designated on that list, the 
page of that volume, and the last name of the witness who 
provided the relevant testimony. 

3/ Evidence of the continuing success of our educational system 
can be seen in the change in the percentage of citizens in 
the Hartford area with a high school diploma from 1980 to 
1990. In 1980 79.4% of those living in the suburbs of 
Hartford and 55.2% of Hartford residents had completed high 
school. Def. Ex. 8.1. By 1990 85.2% of suburban residents 
and 59.4% of Hartford residents had a high school diploma. 
Def. Ex. B.2. : 

      
 



  

  
  

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from time to time, and are never as good as they should be for 

delivering quality education. But compared with most every other 

state in the United States, probably in the world, we're stars.” 

Vol. 16, Pp. 71-72 (Collier). 

One of the most important reasons we have achieved and 

maintained our position of leadership in education is because the 

people of this state have been willing to make change when change 

seemed necessary to provide quality education. Our history shows 

that even the basic structure of our educational system has been 

changed when the existing structure was not working well. For 

example, when it was important to bring education closer to fhe 

home so that more children could be educated, responsibility for 

the provision of education shifted from the towns to parishes, 

then to ecclesiastical and school societies, and then to 

districts that we would now consider attendance areas. Vol. 16, 

Pp. 19-22, 62 (Collier). And when, by 1840, the 1,600 school 

districts which evolved from this movement proved to be unwieldy 

and obstacles to educational quality and equal opportunity, we 

reversed ourselves and began the process, essentially completed 

in 1909, of consolidating our school districts at the town level. 

Vol. 16, pp. 28, 39, 66 (Collier). If and when further changes 

in the structure of our system of education are needed and 

  

 



  

  
    

appropriate, history tells us that the General Assembly will make 

those changes. 

Connecticut's history of education is marked by the state's 

endeavor to reach two key goals: (1) afford every child the 

opportunity to learn, and (2) do what can be done to ameliorate 

the burdens and handicaps that hinder children's ability to take 

advantage of that opportunity. Def. Bx. 2.36; Vol. 31, pp. 6-9 

(Calvert) . 

A series of events which occurred in 1869 shows that, even 

at this early time, the state led the nation in assuring that all 

children be afforded the same eptortuntey to learn regardless of 

their race Or national origin. "Prior to 1869, public schools 

throughout the state had always been open to children of all 

races and backgrounds; i.e., there was no de jure segregation. 

But in 1869, the Hartford City Council adopted a resolution 

requiring all African-American students to attend a particular 

school. and excluding them from other schools in the city. Within 

a few weeks, the General Assembly invalidated the city's attempt 

to segregate students, keeping the doors of every school open to 

children of all races. Vol. 16, p. 48 (Collier). This decision 

by the General Assembly foreshadowed by nearly a century the 

identical conclusion reached by the United States Supreme Court 

in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483   
 



  

  (1954). It set a tone of concern for children of all backgrounds 

4/ || which continues to this day. 

Connecticut consistently leads the nation in the pursuit of 

| the highest possible quality of education for all children. 

| Under the direction of the General Assembly, the state has 

developed a testing program (the Connecticut Mastery Test) and a 

statewide system of school evaluation (the Strategic School 

Profiles) which are models for the rest of the country. Vol. 8, 

p. 148 (Flynn). These important initiatives will provide our 

educators, state and local leaders, and the citizenry with key 

  

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| pp. 69, 138-139 (Natriello); Vol. 29, p. 83 (Rindone); Vol. 31, 

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| information from which we can continue to take cost-effective 

steps to improve the quality of education in the state. We are 

| not a state that is or ever has been satisfied with the status 

quo. We have always recognized the importance of keeping our   | 

vision just beyond reach so that we never fall into educational 
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‘Stagnation. 

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4/ The decision to invalidate Hartford's attempt to segregate 
students and other legislative initiatives led the State 
Commission on Civil Rights to report in 1961 that " [t]he i 
cumulative record of Connecticut civil rights legislation in | 
the area of race relations probably represents a maximum of | 

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progress toward equal opportunity between whites and Negroes 
achieved by one of the Northern states.” Pl. Ex. 502, pp.   
1-2. 

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  There is clear evidence in the policy positions of the State 

5/ Board of Education™’, the words of the Governors’ and the 

| various definitions of "equal educational opportunity” offered by 

| the teachers and administrators called to the stand by the 

| plaintiges?’ that the aspirations and leadership which have made 

this state a model for other states in the field of education 

will continue to keep us in the forefront. 

It is because of our great educational heritage and our 

continuing endeavors that the relief which the plaintiffs are 

seeking in this case is so startlingly inappropriate. The 
] 

plaintiffs propose that the court exercise supervision over )   
virtually every aspect of public education in the Hartford area   because the state has not, in their opinion, done enough to | 

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| reduce racial, ethnic and socioeconomic isolation in the area's   
schools. 

  

5/ P.&., Pl. Px, 32,38, 39, 40, 43,.45, 50, 56, 60, 69, 170, 

6/. See Pl. Ex. 79, 90. 

7/ The "standard" most frequently cited by the plaintiffs’ 
witnesses as their definition of equal educational 
opportunity is one which calls for every child to be | 
provided the opportunity to achieve his or her "maximum 
potential”. Vol. 1, p. 18 (Carter); Vol. 2, p. 27 (Senteio); | 
Vol. 3, p. 136 (Shea); Vol. 6, p. 28 (Montanez-Pitre); Vol. | 
6, p. 123 (Anderson). Educators should be satisfied with no | 
less than the opportunity for every child to achieve his or 
her maximum potential. This is not a practical or workable 
constitutional standard, however.   
 



  

  

    

Diversity in our schools is one of the many areas which is 

being examined by state officials for further action. Although 

state officials have often spoken of the need to do more in this 

regard, there is much evidence that Connecticut continues to set 

itself apart from the rest of the country as a leader in 

promoting diversity in its schools. Vol. 26B, pp. 39, 60 

(Rossell). The people of this state as a whole endorse the 

notion that diversity in our schools is good for our children and 

they support efforts to promote diversity. Vol. 25, pp. 158-159 

(Ferree); Def. Ex. 4.1 and 4.2; Vol. l, pp. 44-45 (Carter). The 

evidence shows that the support for promoting diversity in ot 

schools goes back at least as far as the 1960s. Vol.“ 13, pp. 8-9 

(Gordon) ; Vol. 34, p. 74 (Gordon). It is the support of the 

citizenry for efforts to promote diversity in our schools which 

is responsible for the fact that (1) Connecticut is one of only 

seven states that appropriates state dollars specifically for the 

| purpose of promoting diversity in our schools without being under 

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a court order, and (2) Connecticut is one of only three states to 

' have specific goals for racial balance in the schools. Def. Ex. 

5.2:«and 5,3; Vol. 26B, pp. 52-54, 57 (Rossell)., 

State law promotes diversity in our schools on an 

intradistrict basis by requiring that all schools in the district 

have a student population which is representative of the student 

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population of the district as a whole within certain specified 

tolerances. Conn. Gen. Stat. $§10-226a et seq., Conn. State   Agency Regs., Education, §10-226e-1 et seq. In recent years, it 

|| has become evident that, in some cases, an intradistrict approach 

to promoting diversity may not be enough. As a result, the state | 

has taken steps to encourage the development of interdistrict 

programs which bring children of different backgrounds from 

different cities and towns together. Conn. Gen. Stat. §10-74d. 

The interest in the interdistrict cooperative grant program has 

been keen and has grown significantly. Vol. 24, pp. 58-60 

(Williams). Exemplary programs that serve as models for further 
) : 

efforts in this direction have been funded over the years. Def.   
Ex. 3.1 through 3.9. The interdistrict cooperative grant program 

that began in 1988 with an appropriation of $339,000, has 

increased to $2.5 million. Vol. 24, pp. 58-60 (Williams). The 

state's financial hard times are responsible for the fact that 

more has not been done; Vol. 25, pp. 76-77 (Williams); but the 

importance attached to this initiative is evident from the fact 

that the appropriation for the interdistrict cooperative grant 

program has been maintained while cuts were being made in 

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    | vireually every other state grant program supporting education. 

| vol. 12, p. 88 (Allison).%/ 

| The course that the state has set to date in its effort to 

promote diversity across the borders of existing school districts 

is one which relies on voluntary measures. State leaders see 

voluntary measures as preferable and reasonable means by which to 

make progress in promoting diversity. Pl. Ex. 90, pp. 9-11 

(Weicker); Pl. Ex. 494, pp. 154-156, 161-163 (Tirozzi); Ex. 493, 

pp. 86-87, 117 (Ferrandino). There is strong support for the 
| 

belief that voluntary measures will, in the long run, be more 

effective in bringing about for our students the kind and ) 

quantity of multi-racial and multi-cultural exposure that we are 

trying to secure. Vol. 26B, pp. 26-28, 33 (Rossell); Vol. 27, 

P-33 (Rosgell); Def. Ex, 5.4 through 5.12. Voluntary measures i 

are preferred by parents of all races and national origins. Vol.   
27, Pp. 172-173 (Rossell); Def. Ex. 4.1, p.1l {Q38-041), p.12 

  

8/ The state promotes diversity and multiculturalism in our 
schools in many ways which go beyond directly encouraging 
changes in the composition of the student body. These 
include making multiculturalism an aspect of teacher 
training; Conn. Gen. Stat. §§10-145a(b), 10-226f, 10-226g, 
promoting diversity in the teaching profession; Conn. Gen. 
Stat. §10-155e, Vol. 12, p. 88 (Allison); establishing 
regional education service centers, such as the Capitol | 
Region Education Council (CREC), which promote and 
facilitate the kind of interdistrict cooperation that will 
give children greater exposure to children of different 
backgrounds; Conn. Gen. Stat. §10-66a et seq., Vol. 12, pp. 
88-91 (Allison); and more. 

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(047) ; Def. Ex. 42., pp. 11-12 (Q39-Q42), p.13 (Q48). To the   | extent that there is any measurable positive impact on academic 

i achievement from implementation of plans to promote diversity in 

schools, the evidence suggests that voluntary plans or programs 

work ‘better. Pl. Ex. 58, p.2.; Vol. 32. p.-121 (Armory). 

The plaintiffs criticize this voluntary approach. Without 

offering a specific alternative, let alone proving any violation 

of the constitution, they ask the court to declare the state's 

  approach invalid and inappropriate. They insist that the court 

set goals, define standards, impose timetables, and create and 

oversee groups that will design plans to be implemented in the   Hartford area for the court's consideration. Plaintiffs’ 

Post-Trial Brief at 110-120. They ask the court to supervise 

virtually every aspect of the administration of schools in the 

twenty-two towns, including student, faculty, and staff 

assignments, curriculum modifications, transportation, 

extracurricular activities, facility usage and development, staff 

training, cTeation of new programs such as bilingual education 

programs in suburban schools, and "educational enhancements’, 

which the plaintiffs construe to include "upgrading the physical 

facilities and curriculum to provide an extraordinary education 

     



  

  9/ 
in the inner city schools". Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Brief at 

114-117. In regard to all these activities, the plaintiffs seek 

10/   ii extensive monitoring by the court. Id. at 120. 

Witnesses called by the plaintiffs have also suggested that | 

the court take over issues of school finance. Dr. William Gordon | 

suggested in his testimony that the court itself should decide | 

how the costs of whatever plan might be designed should be 

allocated between the state and the municipalities. Vol. 34, p. 

24 (Gordon). Plaintiffs’ witness, Dr. Charles Willie, testified 

that he had no professional interest in how much any 

| court-ordered plan would cost the state because he viewed the. 

  

9/ Although the plaintiffs withdrew their claims relating to 
housing prior to trial and although they have never made any | 
claims relating to health care, they nonetheless appear to 
be asking that the court go beyond the realm of education 
and supervise initiatives in the areas of housing and health 
care. Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Brief at 118-119. 

10/ The specific form of relief which the plaintiffs are asking 
the court to grant in this case should be reviewed in 
contrast to the action of the Kentucky Superior Court in 
Rose Vv, Council] for Berter Education. . Inc., . Ry _..., 790 
S.W.2d. 186 (1989). In that case the court found that the 
entire system of education in Kentucky was unconstitutional. 
Despite this finding, the court ruled that the trial court 
had no authority to order the legislature or any of the 
other defendants to report to the court on efforts to 
address the problems and the court ruled that the trial 
court had no authority to appoint a "special committee” to 
advise the court on remedial measures. Id. 790 S.W.2d. at 
214-215, | 

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cost as a "penalty" that the people of this state deserved to 

pay. Vol. 15, p. 124 (Willie). 

How long do the plaintiffs expect the court to exercise the 

broad and all encompassing powers they propose for the court? 

Again, Dr. Gordon provided a telling insight regarding the answer 

to this question by testifying that he had no problem with court | 

supervision that might go.on "ad infinitium”. Vol. 34, pp. 63-64 

(Gordon) . 

  

In Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,:743:744 (1974), the 

U.S. Supreme Court aptly described the role the plaintiffs in 

this case are asking the court to play: 

[I]t is obvious from the scope of the 
interdistrict remedy itself that absent a 
complete restructuring of the laws...relating 
to school districts the....Court will become 
first, a de facto "legislative authority” to 
resolve these complex questions, and then the | 
"school superintendent” for the entire area. 
This is a task which few, if any, judges are 
qualified to perform and one which would 
deprive the people of control of schools 
-through their elected representatives. 

The plaintiffs ask the court to play this role on what is 

admittedly a "novel" and unprecedented legal theory. Brittain,   
John C., "Educational and Racial Equity: Towards the Twenty-First | 

Century - A Case Experiment in Connecticut,” Civil Rights 
  

Litigation and Attorney Fees Annual Handbook, Vol. 6, Oak 
        
 



  

  
  

Boardment, Ltd. (1990), pp. 224, 230; gee also Vol. 13, pp. 92-93 

(Gordon) ; Vol. 34, pp. 91-94 (Gordon). Our proud heritage, our 

leaders' continuing commitment to the pursuit of educational 

ii excellence for all children, and the discussion of the facts and 

law which follows make it clear that the court must reject the 

plaintiffs’ unsupportable legal theory and leave it to the 

leaders of this state to choose how best to address the 

challenges which face our educational system today. 

III. ARGUMENT 

HAVE VIOLATED THE EQUAL PROTECTION, DUE PROCESS ANp 

; | 
A. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE DEFENDANTS | 

EDUCATION PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.   
In order to find the state liable in this case, the court   

| must find that the plaintiffs have suffered injury as a result of 

conduct by the state or as a result of the state's failure to 

| noize in a specific course of conduct required by the 

constitution. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants have 

violated their rights to due process and equal protection of the 

laws and that the defendants have failed to honor the obligation 

imposed on the state by the education provision of our state 

constitution. However, the plaintiffs have not proven that state 

action caused any of the conditions about which they complain, 

and it is clear from the evidence that the state has satisfied 

-18-     
 



* » 

  

  
the specific obligation to offer the plaintiffs a system of free 

public elementary and secondary education. 

Since the plaintiffs have not proven and cannot prove that 

the state caused the conditions about which they complain and 

they cannot refute the obvious fact that a free system of 

elementary and secondary education is available to each of them, 

they attempt to push the limits of constitutional jurisprudence 

far beyond established boundaries by arguing that the mere 

existence of certain conditions (racial, ethnic and socioeconomic 

isolation and urban underachievement) is sufficient to establish 
¢ 

a constitutional violation. They argue that "conditions" viplate   
the constitution, regardless of how those conditions come about, 

and regardless of the fact that the constitution specifically | 

leaves it to the General Assembly to choose the "appropriate 

response to the conditions which affect education. 

The discussion which follows makes it clear that the 

plaintiffs’ case is based upon an unsupportable reading of the 

law so that the plaintiffs’ claims must fail. 

1. The Plaintiffs Have Not Established That The 
Defendants Have Violated The Constitution By Any 
Wrongdoing. 

Under the equal protection clause of the state and federal 

constitutions, the government may not establish a classification 
i 

| 
t 
| 

| 

| 
| 
I 

L119. i     
 



  
system which segregates children on the basis of race or national   | origin. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, (1954); 

Moss v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 350 F. Supp. 879, 881-882 (D.Conn. 
  

if 
id 

y (Newman, J.). See also Franklin v. Berger, 211 Conn. 591, 
  

595, 560 A.2d 444 (1989). Under the due process clause of the 

state and federal constitutions, the government may not impinge 

  upon the exercise of a fundamental right unless the action of the | 
hi . . 

i governments is supported by a compelling state interest. Horton 
Ii 

  

v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 639-640, 375 A.2d 359 (1977) (Horton 

1); Bruno v, Civil Service Comm’n, 192 Conn. 335, 345,:472 A.2d4 

3-28 (1984). If the government engages in either of these two 

  forms of illegal conduct ,the court may grant relief. Bolling v. 
  

Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Con. 499, 518, 
  

A.2d (1993). The plaintiffs in the present case have   
made no showing that the defendants have engaged in either of 

these two forms of wrongful conduct.     
The plaintiffs have not shown that the racial and ethnic 

composition Of the schools in the Hartford area is the product of 

any government-created system of classification based on race or 

national origin. It is clear from the evidence, and the 

plaintiffs do not contend otherwise, that children in Connecticut 

are assigned to a particular school district based on a   
completely neutral criterion; i.e., their place of residence. 

       



  

Although the plaintiffs suggest that the existence of school   
| district lines that are contiguous with municipal boundaries is 

responsible for the different racial and ethnic composition of 

| the school districts in the Hartford area, there is no evidence, 

and the plaintiffs do not contend, that those boundaries were 

established for the purpose of creating a classification based on '! 

race or national origin. Nor have the plaintiffs presented any 

evidence of a causal connection between the movement in the late 

1800s and early 1900s to consolidate districts along town lines 

and the conditions which exist today. 

The movement to consolidate school districts so that the 

boundaries of these districts became contiguous with municipal 

boundaries was, for all intents and purposes, completed in 1909. 

The purpose of this consolidation movement was to improve the 

quality of education for all children. The movement had nothing 

to do with issues Of race or national origin. Vol. 16, pp. 65-68   
(Collier). 

we - 

In 1909 and as late as 1940, no one could have predicted 

that the consolidation would cause or result in the conditions 

that exist today in terms of the racial and ethnic composition of | 

school districts in the Hartford area and elsewhere in the state. 

There was no significant Latino presence in Connecticut in the 

early part of this century and the demographics of the 

      
 



  

African-American population at that time gave no hint of future 

population patterns. The African-American population hovered 

at about 3 percent during the 19th century and even showed signs 

of a proportional decline throughout the first half of this 

century. By 1940, African-Americans represented only about 1.2 

percent of the population of the state. Vol. 16, p.41 (Collier); 

Vol. 23, pp. 78-80 (Steahr). Changes in the African-American 

population during this century show that the patterns of growth : 

and decline have been irregular and unpredictable. Vol. 23, pp. 

80-81 {(Steahr); Def. Ex. 1.14. Clearly, the 1909 demographic 

pattern, which continued for many years thereafter, was not one 

  from which the present day demographic patterns could have or 

anticipated. 

In addition to their failure to show that the defendants 

created a system of classification based on race or national 

origin, the plaintiffs have failed to show that the defendants 

have interfered with the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of the fundamental 

right to an education. All of the named plaintiffs have a 

comprehensive program of elementary and secondary education 

available to them. Furthermore, the state distributes resources 

to support the efforts of the plaintiffs’ local school districts       
 



  

in a manner which passes constitutional muster. Horton v. 

‘| Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985) (Horton 111) .11/ 

  

| Plaintiffs rely almost exclusively on the differences in 

performance between children in Hartford and children in the | 

! 

suburban districts (primarily the differences in Connecticut | 
i 

Mastery Test scores) to suggest that the defendants have somehow 
. | 

infringed upon the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to an education. 

But without separating the effect on student performance of the 

greater disadvantages children in- Hartford bring to school with 

them from the effect of the educational program being provided in 
¢ 

Hartford, something which the plaintiffs’ have not done (Vol. 11,   p. 163 (Natriello)), it is impossible to consider whether the 

defendants are responsible for the comparatively lower 

performance of Hartford children as a group. See generally Part 
  

111.C(5) infra. 

The plaintiffs’ failure to show that the racial and ethnic 

composition of the schools in the Hartford area and the 
: 

performance of Hartford children are the product of any 

  

11/ The plaintiffs do not challenge the state's system of 
financing local school districts in this case. Plaintiffs’ | 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary | 

| Judgement, p.15 (9/20/91). Furthermore, a key witness for | 
plaintiffs acknowledged that Hartford does not appear to be 

| disadvantaged in comparison to other districts in terms of ; 
the aggregate amount it spends per student. Vol. 8, p. 97 
(Natriello) . 

  
“33     
 



  

  

wrongdoing on the part of the defendants or their predecessors is 

not surprising. The plaintiffs unprecedented legal theory in 

' this case rests on the argument that "conditions" which exist in 

'i the Hartford area violate the constitution rather than anything 

12/ . the defendants have or have not done. However, the Supreme 

Court has already made it clear that "conditions" do not violate 

» of the opportunity to benefit from the system of elementary and | 

  

| 
| 

the constitution, even if those conditions affect the enjoyment 

| 

 Socahiahy education which must be available to the children of 
| . 

this state under the constitution. 

in Savade Vv. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 268, 571 A.2d 696 ).   (1990), the court declined the plaintiffs’ invitation to find 

  | that the constitution was violated even though the plaintiffs’ 

enjoyment of the opportunity to attend school, as provided under 

| Article VII, Section 1, was impaired. The plaintiffs claimed 

‘that the decision by the Department of Income Maintenance to 

reduce the number of days a family could qualify for emergency 

| housing would force them to move more often and, as a result, 
| : 

|| their children's education would be interrupted by numerous 

| changes of school. The court found no violation of the education 

  
  

| 

| 

1 12/ "[P]laintiffs are not complaining about what did or did not 
| happen in the past.” Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition 
¥ to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 10-11 
| (9/20/91). 

24 

| 

| 
i 

| 
| 
[ 
i 
| 

 



  

clause of our constitution because the impairment of the 

children's opportunity to benefit from an education was the 

result of the plaintiffs’ difficult financial circumstances, not 

any wrongful government action. A "condition” which interfered 

with the plaintiffs’ enjoyment of the right to an education 

existed, but that was not enough to establish that the 

constitution had been violated. 

The plaintiffs’ proof in the present case fails to meet the 

legal standard implicitly recognized in Savage v. Aronson for 
  

"constitutional violations. 

2. The Equal Protection And Due Process Clauses Of The 
State Constitution Do Not Impose An Affirmative 

i Obligation On The State To Solve The Complex Conditions 
| And Problems That Affect Population Patterns And 

Achievement Levels In The Hartford Area Schools. 

  
According to the plaintiffs, "conditions” in the Hartford   

area violate the constitution, and as a result, the constitution 

imposes affirmative obligations on the state to eliminate those 

conditions... The plaintiffs’ theory that a "condition" can 

violate the constitution in the absence of any wrongdoing by 

state officials is at odds with existing state due process and   equal protection precedent. "Conditions" do not violate the 

equal protection and due process clauses of our state 

constitution - only wrongful state action can to that. 

«D5.     
 



In Savage v. Aronson, supra, the Supreme Court not only 

dealt with the education clause of the state constitution, it 

also addressed the plaintiffs’ claim that the interruption of 

their childrens’ education resulting from the families' need to 

move after a short period of time was denying those children 

substantive due process. The court carefully drew the 

distinction between harm produced by state action and harm 

resulting from other circumstances: 

The financial circumstances of these 
plaintiffs, which are the root cause of their 
inability to obtain "permanent” homes, have 
not been produced by any state action, an 
essential requirement for invocation of the 
due process clause of both our federal and 
state constitutions The undoubted 
hardship imposed upon the children of these 
plaintiffs from the lack of affordable 
housing near the schools where they now are 
being educated cannot be disputed. It 
results, however, from the difficult 
financial circumstances they face, not from 
anything the state has done to deprive them 
of the right to equal educational 
opportunity. 

13/ 
  

Aronson, 214 Conn. at 284, 287   
  

In their Post-Trial Brief, the Sheff plaintiffs appear to be 
claiming that they are being denied substantive due process 
because the defendants have not complied with Conn. Gen. 
Stat. §10-4a. The defendants deny the charge that §10-4a is 
being violated. However, even if it was clear that §10-4a | 
is being violated, the plaintiffs offer no authority to 

(footnote cont'd)        



  

  
| 
| 
| 
| 

As to the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims in this case, 

| the Supreme Court has likewise made it clear that state equal 
i 
' protection violations, as with federal equal protection 
if 

| violations, must be predicated upon a showing of improper state 

{ 
| 

| 

| action, not simply upon a showing that some harmful "condition 

exists. 

Although the guaranty of equal protection in 
§20 of the Connecticut Declaration of Rights 
is stated in absolute terms...,unlike its 
federal counterpart, §1 of the fourteenth 
amendment, which is expressly directed 
against state action only, this court has 
concluded that both these provisions "are 
designed as a safeguard against acts of the 
state...." RE [B 

  

Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 192 Conn. 48, 63, 469 A.2d 120     (1984) . 

Recently the Supreme Court has again noted, in the context 

of segregation or discrimination complaints under our state 

constitution, that the constitution regulates "state action 

[that] ‘invidiously discriminates against a suspect class or 

  

(footnote cont'd from previous page) 

support the proposition that a violation of this statute, or 
any other statute, amounts to a denial of substantive due 
process. The case of Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473 
(1977), cited by the plaintiffs in support of their 
argument, is inapplicable because that case addresses an 
issue of procedural due process for individuals deprived of 
their freedom by state action, not substantive due process. 

  

«37    



| 

pA ; 

  

  

| affects a fundamental right,...." Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 

i| 499, 513, A.2d (1993). This reaffirmation of the need for 

wrongful state action to establish a violation of Article I, 

Section 20 further refutes the plaintiffs’ proposition that the 

constitution outlaws certain "conditions" that are not the 

product of state action. 

The plaintiffs appear to be claiming that Horton v. Meskill, 

177 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (Horton I) stands for the 

proposition there is no need to prove wrongful state action and 

that the constitution imposes affirmative obligations on the: 

|| General Assembly to eliminate certain conditions regardless pf 

their cause. Horton I contains no basis for this hypothesis. |     In Horton I, the court declared a specific statutory scheme which 
  

  

caused the inequitable distribution of educational opportunity 

unconstitutional. There was clear, reviewable and enjoinable 

gtate action present in Horton I. In Pellegrino v. O'Neill, 193 
  

  

  

clear that Horton I was a decision which hinged on a finding of 

wrongful state action. The Pellegrino decision also made it 
  

clear that the court saw its power to respond to this 

| 

| 
i 

Conn. 670, 480 A.2d 476 (1984), the court made it absolutely | 

| 

| 

| 
| 

unconstitutional state action as being limited to the power to 
| 

| enjoin the wrongful state action. 

In Horton I the court had before it various 
| statutory grants for public schools and it 

  

«35 -   
        
 



  

  

  

concluded that those legislative provisions 
for financing education in the state violated 
the provisions of the Connecticut 
constitution. [Citations omitted]. Rather 
than enjoin the defendants from implementing 
the existing statutory financing scheme, the 
customary remedy in such a situation as 
sought in one of the prayers for relief, the 
court chose to defer any action until the 
legislature had considered the matter 
further. [Citations omitted]. The case was 
clearly one where a judicial remedy could 
have been applied, although its scope would 
necessarily be far more limited than a 
solution which the legislature might devise. 

Pellegrino v. O'Neill, 193 Conn. at 683. 
  

Although the point seems rather obvious from a reading of 

  

Horton I and Pellegrino, any suggestion that the Horton I court 

was focusing on unconstitutional "conditions" rather than 

unconstitutional state action is fully dispelled by Chief 

  

Justice Peters’ decision in Horton III. Horton v. Meskill, 195 

Conn. 24, 486 A.2d 109° (1985). By the time Horton III came 
  

before the court, the General Assembly had enacted a new system 

of school finance. There was, however, little evidence that the 

  

"conditions! that were before the court in Horton I had changed. 

See Horton 111, 195 Conn. at 39, n. 15. Focusing on the changes 
  

  
in the state's actions, the court ruled in its favor. There is 

little doubt that the court would have reached the opposite 

result 1f, as the plaintiffs suggest, the court's focus was on 

reconditions” rather than state action. 

-29. 

  

  

  
 



+ 
i 

é § 

  

  The state constitution does not protect citizens from   conditions that are not of the government's making, such as 

private discriminatory conduct, Lockwood v. Killian, 172 Conn. 

496, '501, 375 A.24.998 (1977), on remand 179 Conn. 62, 425 A.24 

809 (1577), and private conduct that would, if taken by the 

state, infringe upon a fundamental right. Cologne v. Westfarms 
  

Assocs., 192 Conn. at 60-61. Even governmental decisions to 

withdraw from activities which might have promoted the enjoyment 

of important rights do not rise.to the level of state action that 

violates the constitution. See Sauce v. Aronson, supra 

(continuing to allow up to 180 days of emergency shelter nay: Have 

ameliorated harm to education of children of homeless families,     
but court refused to find proposed reduction in the 180-day 

allowance unconstitutional) . Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 
  

at 750 (court found no justification for imposition of 

interdistrict desegregation remedy even though state legislation   had effect of rescinding Detroit's voluntary desegregation plan); 

  

Crawford v. Board of Educ. of the City of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 

527.,.53% (1982) ("In sum, the simple repeal or modification of 

desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has 

been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial 

classification.”) 

3) | 

      
 



  

  

  
  

  

  

The due process and equal protection provisions of our 

constitution either alone or in conjunction with the education 

clause do not, as the plaintiffs suggest, create and impose upon 

the state any judicially enforceable affirmative obligation to 

address and eliminate all conditions that can adversely affect 

educational performance. Poverty, drug abuse, and other social 

problems should be addressed by our government, but the state 

plainly does not violate the constitution by failing to cure 

these problems. The plaintiffs’ invitation to the court to find 

such an affirmative obligation even though the constitution has 

never before been interpreted in this way should be considered 
) : 

with great suspicion and ultimately rejected. 

The Supreme Court in Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs. aptly 
  

cautioned against the unduly expansive reading of the 

constitution which the plaintiffs are advocating: 

This court has never viewed constitutional 
language as newly descended from the 
firmament like fresh fallen snow upon which 
-jurists may trace out their individual 
notions of public policy uninhibited by the 
history which attended the adoption of the 
particular phraseology at issue and the 
intentions of its authors. 

192 Conn. at 62. This statement reflects the way in which both 

state and federal courts have approached efforts, like those 

advanced by the plaintiffs in this case, to read affirmative 

«31 - 

  

  

 



  

  

governmental obligations into the state or federal constitutions. 

| The U.S. Supreme Court specifically eschewed looking to the 

federal constitution as a means of obtaining judicial remedies   for every social and economic evil which is present in our 

|| society. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74, 92 (1972). While   

applauding the independent vitality of our state constitution, 

'l Judge Newman of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 

likewise warned against looking to that document as a "source of 

remedies for every societal defect.” Newman, "The '0ld 

Federalism’; Protection of Individual Rights by State 

Constitution In An Era of Federal Court Passivity”, 15 Conn.:L.   Rev. 21, 28 (1982). Constitutions are intended and interpreted 

| to protect individual liberties from government infringement and |   are not usually read to create affirmative government obligations 

to protect citizens from harm. Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 192 
  

Conn. at 60-61; DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social 
  

Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195-195 (1989); Jackson v. City of 
  

  

Jollet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203. (7th Cir. 1983); Curie, "Positive and 

Negative Constitutional Rights,” 53 U.Chi. L. Rev. 864, 865-866 

(1986). 

In this case the plaintiffs urge the court to look to 

Article I, Section 20 to find an enforceable affirmative 

33   
 



  

    

obligation. As amended by Article XXI, this section of the 

constitution reads: 

No person shall be denied the equal 
protection of the law nor be subjected to 
segregation or discrimination in the exercise 
or enjoyment of his or her civil or political 
rights because of religion, race, color, 
ancestry, national origin, sex or physical or 
mental disability. 

According to the plaintiffs, the insertion of the word 

"segregation” into this section of the constitution during the 

floor debate at the 1965 Constitutional Convention was intended 

to impose an affirmative obligation on the state to ensure racial 

balance in public schools. Arguing that the state has failegd to 

live up to this claimed obligation, the plaintiffs ask the court 

to direct a "planning process to achieve racial balance.” 

Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Brief at 112. 

Neither the language nor the history of Article I, Section 

20 support the plaintiffs’ argument. The language of Article I, 

Section 20 is clearly prohibitory, not mandatory. The provision 

does not require the state to ensure racial balance. Rather, it 

prohibits state sponsored "segregation or discrimination.” 

The legislative record behind Article I, Section 20 makes it 

clear that the insertion of the word "segregation" into the   
  

 



  

I 
| 
H 
i 

i 
| 
| 

| 
| 
Hi 
| 1 

Hl 
: 
H 

| 

| 
| 

] 

| 
{ 
i 

| 

  

  

  

proposal brought to the floor was not viewed as having anywhere 

' near the significance ascribed to it by the plaintiffs. 

The debate which preceded the decision to add the word 

"segregation" shows that this addition was designed to address 

concerns by some, but not all, of those at the convention that 

the term "discrimination” might be read in a limited fashion; 

i.e. in a way that would perhaps leave it open for the state to 

separate groups of people so long as it afforded those groups 

equal treatment. Journal of the Constitutional Convention, 1965, 

pp. 691-696. The terms "discriminate” and "discrimination” imply 

action that both separates and disadvantages or harms groups of 

people. The terms "segregate" and "segregation”, on the other 

hand, imply only separation. See Appendix 7 to this brief. For 

those who were concerned that Article I, Section 20 as originally 

drafted would have prohibited government separation of groups of 

people only when one group was disadvantaged, the inclusion of 

the word "segregation” made it clear that any act of governmental 

separation wisi prohibited regardless of whether any group was 

disadvantaged. For those who did not see the word 

"discrimination" as carrying with it any burden of proving that a 

group was disadvantaged by the separation, the addition of the 

word "segregation" added nothing to the proposal. 

-34- 

  

 



  

The words of Justice Baldwin in support of this amendment to 

the proposal serve to confirm that the insertion of the word 

"segregation" was intended to clarify this point rather than 

carry with it the monumental implications which the plaintiffs 

suggest the word hae, Referring to the addition of the word 

"segregation” Justice Baldwin said: 

As a matter of fact we discussed this very 
thing in committee and we thought that 
segregation was unnecessary to put in there, 
but if it will please people, then I am 
perfectly agreeable to it being there as a 
member of this convention. 

b 

See Journal of the Constitutional Convention, 1965, p. 692. 
) 

Any suggestion that the insertion of the word "segregation"   
was known and intended to carry with it the far-reaching | 

implications the plaintiffs claim it has is further refuted by 

the words of Justice Patrick B. O'Sullivan at the conclusion of 

the debate over the addition of this word. Acting in his role as | 

convention chair, Justice O'Sullivan said: "The Chair at this | 

time will ‘rule that this amendment is not a substitutive (sic) | 

change and therefore we can act upon the entire bill today.” See 

Journal of the Constitutional Convention, 1965, p. 696. | 

That the word "segregation" was inserted only for the | 
| 

purpose of clarification and that this word is not the linchpin | 

for an unprecedented departure from traditional equal protection 

“325     
 



i 
» i 

® | 
| 

| 

i 

  

    
principles, is underscored by the testimony of plaintiffs’ 

witness the current State Historian, Professor Christopher 

Collier. Professor Collier described the 1965 Constitutional 

| Convention as a "very, very conservative body” whose members 

| nwere extremely reluctant to change anything they didn't have to 

| change.” Vol, 16, p. 79*{Collier). It stretches all reason to 

| suggest that the 1965 Constitutional Convention intended the kind 

of revolutionary changes in principles of equal protection which 
| 
| the plaintiffs are asking the court to read into Article I, 

. 

| Section 20. 

| 

If the plaintiffs’ reading of Article. I, Section 20 were   
| 
| correct then the addition of the word "segregation” during the 

| floor debates would immediately have been of monumental 

importance. It would have required immediate remedial action in |i 

the assignment of children to public schools since, as is evident   
from Pl. Ex. 19,"p.30 (Table 4.1.14), the de facto concentration |   of minorities in our inner city schools was already a reality 

when Article ‘I, Section 20 was being considered. If it had been 

the intention of the framers that the amendment have the force 

which the plaintiffs suggest it was intended to have, the 
| 

i 5 : 
| discussions relating to the amendment most certainly would have 
| 

been marked with debate over the extraordinary consequences of 

| -36     
 



% 

  

  adopting the amendment. There is no such debate in the 

legislative record. 

The plaintiffs have not presented any evidence of the kind 

of state action which must be found in order to conclude that the 

- defendants violated the plaintiffs’ rights to due process and 

equal protection. Furthermore, the plaintiffs have not shown 

that the due process and equal protection provisions of the 

constitution impose any affirmative obligation on the defendants 

to rectify conditions not of the state's making. 

3. Article Eight, Section 1 Of The Constitution Assinan 
The Power To Set Educational Standards And Decide How 
Best To Address Problems Associated With The Provision 

Of Education To The General Assembly.   Plaintiffs argue that even if a judicially-enforceable, 

affirmative obligation does not arise out of the equal protection 

ll and due process provisions of the state constitution alone, one 

can be found by reading these constitutional provisions along 

with Article VIII, Section 1, the "education clause” of the 

constitution. The education clause, taken alone or in 

conjunction with ether sections of the constitution, does not 

invest the courts with the kind of authority the plaintiffs are 

asking the courts to exercise nor does it impose any specific 

obligation on the state beyond the obligation to offer a system 

of free public elementary and secondary education. 

“3     
 



  

  
At least since the Supreme Court's decision in Pellegrino v. 

  

O'Neill, 193 Conn. 670, 480 A.2d 476 (1984), it has been clear 

that some provisions of the state constitution are directed 

exclusively to the legislature. 

Although it is widely assumed that the 
judiciary, as the ultimate arbiter of the 
meaning of constitutional provisions, must 
determine every constitutional claim 
presented and provide appropriate relief, 
some constitutional commands fall outside the 
conditions and purposes that circumscribe 
judicial action. : 

Id., 193 Conn. at 679. ' Separation of powers among the 

legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government was 

among the most significant aspects of the constitution of 1818   and must be carefully considered before the court adopts the 

approach advanced by the plaintiffs in this case. Adams v. 

14/ 

  

Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, .153, 251 A.2d4 49 (1968) As the 

Pellegrino court noted " [w]e must resist the temptation...to   

enhance our own constitutional authority by trespassing upon an 

  vv 

14/ It does the constitution no injustice for the court to find, | 
in appropriate cases, that some commands within the 
constitution fall exclusively within the province of the 
General Assembly. Some constitutional provisions are not 
self-executing and require legislative action. State v. 
Sanabria, 192 Conn. 671, 688, 474 A.24 760 (1984); State ex | 
rel. Cotter v. Leipner, 138 Conn. 153, 158, 83 A.24 169 
(1951). Furthermore, the courts should not presume that the 
legislature has any less concern for the protection of 
interests which are embodied in the constitution than the 
courts. Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 192 Conn. at 66. 

  

  

  

-38- |     
1 
i 

 



| | 

  

area clearly reserved as the prerogative of a coordinate branch 

15/ 
  
of government.” Jd., 193 Conn. at 681. 

One key factor in resolving whether the implementation of a 

particular constitutional provision is exclusively delegated to 

the legislative branch of government is whether that provision 

includes a "textually demonstrable commitment” of the matter to 

the legislative branch. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) 

(cited with approval in Pellingrino v. O'Neill, 193 Conn. at 
  

680-681). The language of Article ViIiIi, Section 1 provides 

| precisely the sort of "textually demonstrable commitment” of:   issues such as those being raised by the plaintiffs here to the 

General Assembly. The second sentence provides: "The general 

assembly shall implement this principle ["There shall always be   free public elementary and secondary schools in the state."] by 

| appropriate legislation.” Conn. Const. Art. VIII, Section 1. The 

  

15/ any alteration in the legal landscape that increases the 
types of issues or the number of cases submitted to the 
judicial branch for final resolution necessarily augments 
the power of that branch.” MacGill, H.C., "Upon a Peak in 
Darien: Discovering the Connecticut Constitution”, 15 Conn. 
L.. Rev, 7, 16 (1982).. If the plaintiffs, who are a small 
group of children and their parents, by a suit such as this, | 
can force the court to decide how complex problems relating 
to the quality of education should be addressed, the door | 
will be opened for a dramatic expansion of the number and 
kinds of cases submitted to the judiciary. Furthermore, 
despite the language of the second sentence in Article VIII, | 
Section 1, the judiciary will become the final arbiter of 
all issues relating to educational quality. 

®. “30. 

  
    
 



  

    | charge to the General Assembly in Article VIII, Section 1 to 

| develop "appropriate” means of implementing the principle that 

"[t]lhere shall always be free public elementary and secondary 

schools in” Connecticut would be virtually meaningless if the 

| judiciary's notion of what is "appropriate" prevails. The 

|| constitution expressly leaves it to the General Assembly, not the | 

judiciary, to determine what means are "appropriate” unless the 

| action taken by the General Assembly amounts to wrongful state 

| action. 16/ 

The plaintiffs in this case are, in effect, asking the court 
i 
i to ignore the second sentence of Article VIII, Section 1. They   

ask the court to find that the education clause imposes on the   
General Assembly specific affirmative obligations beyond the 

| 

| 
iobligation to offer a system of free public elementary and 

secondary education. They ask the court to read into the 

| 
| 
{ 
| 

| 

| 

i 

education clause specific educational, racial and other | 

standards, to determine that the General Assembly has not met 

| those standards, and to order implementation of those standards, 

something which will unavoidably require court involvement in 

    
16/ When the general assembly is choosing "appropriate” means by 

which to offer a free public and secondary education, it may | 
not choose means which violate other provisions of the 
constitution, such as the equal protection provisions, as 
was the case in Horton I, supra. 

«lO = 

  
 



  

  

    

every aspect of the provision of public education to children in 

Hartford and the 21 neighboring school districts. 

The history as well as the language of Article VIII, Section 

1 belies any notion that the framers of this constitutional 

provision had in mind such sweeping power and obligations for the 

judiciary when the obligation to offer free public elementary and 

secondary schools WES written into the constitution. The history 

of Article VIII, Section 1 suggests that the framers intended 

nothing more than to insure that education retain the position of 

importance which it has always maintained in this state and that 

it always be free. Connecticut Constitutional Convention > 

Proceedings, October 15-28, 1965, p. 1064. ‘pujer to 1965, the 

General Assembly had supervised the provision of education in the 

state. There is nothing in the legislative history of the 

Constitutional Convention of 1965 to suggest that this "very, 

| very conservative body” of people, who "were extremely reluctant 

to change anything they didn't have to change”, intended anything 

other than Hat the power to determine when and how problems 

affecting education and other matters relating to education 

should be addressed remain with the General Assembly, the elected 

representative of the people. Vol. 16, p. 79 (Collier). 

So long as the General Assembly provides a free public 

elementary and secondary education, Article VIII, Section 1 does 

wil = 

  
  

 



  

  

    

  

not authorize the judiciary to establish specific educational 

programs and goals or levels of educational achievement as a 

constitutional requirement. Setting such standards for education 

17/ In is and must be the responsibility of the General Assembly. 

recent years, the General Assembly has shifted its focus in the 

quest for the highest and best quality of education the state can 

provide. Of late, the state's attention has focused on 

educational outcomes, particularly the CMT results, as a means of 

assessing whether we are meeting our educational objectives. 

Ironically, the plaintiffs seize on this new legislative focus as 

evidence that the constitution requires that children reach 

certain levels of achievement. | ’ 

The new focus on test results like the CMT and other 

achievement measures is the result of a "real shift in thinking 

about how to measure the quality of education in the United 

States over the last twenty years” according to plaintiffs’ 

witness, Dr. Gary Natriello. Vol. 11, pp. 23-24  (Natriello). 

This shift in focus gets away from simply looking at educational 

inputs to measure quality of education and has a new focus, 

namely educational outputs or outcomes. Id. Dr. Natriello's 

    17/ since educators have not reached a uniform consensus as to 
what constitutes a "minimally adequate education” or a 
"substantive minimum level of education”; Vol. 14, pp. 
139-140 (LaFontaine); these concepts must be fluid and 
capable of being redesigned to fit the times. 

whi. 

 



  

  

  

  

  

  

  
observation makes it evident that the plaintiffs are wrong in 

suggesting that achievement levels are properly read into the 

constitution. 

  

  

Achievement levels were not on the minds of those who wrote 

the education clause into the state constitution in 1965, because 

educational measurement theory had not yet shifted from the then 

prevailing focus on education inputs to the more recent focus on 

educational outcomes. Reading contemporary standards of 

achievement into the constitution: would be unprecedented, 

unjustified and unwise. 

There is no support for the plaintiffs’ claim that the 

courts are responsible for setting and enforcing educational 

standards, In fact, their claim is in conflict with a recent 

decision of the Superior Court regarding Article VIII, Section 1, 

which is now under review by the Supreme Court. In this 

decision, the court correctly recognizes that it does not have 

the authority to make the kinds of decisions about educational 

policy and standards the plaintiffs are asking this court to 

make. 

The Horton cases and their progeny provide 
that the right to receive a free public 
education is a fundamental right, which must 
be provided to all eligible students on an 
equal basis and which may not lightly be 
abridged, but they do not support the 
plaintiffs! claims of constitutional 
  

  

-43- 

 



  

  
entitlement to any particular type, style, or 
method of free public education. A similar 
conclusion was reached by the New York 
courts, which, interpreting a similar 
provision in the New York Constitution 
[footnote omitted] have held that " [t]his 
general directive does not impose a duty 

! flowing directly from a local school district 
to individual pupils to ensure that each 
pupil receives a minimal level of education.” 
Bennett v. School District, 114 A.D.24 58, 67 
(1985). "[Tlhe mere fact that the child is 
not permitted to attend the school of his 
choice is not tantamount to the denial of a 
right to. an education.” Id., 6. [sic] The 
mere fact that the child is not given the 
educational program of his or her choice does 
not impinge upon that child's right to a free 
public education. 

  

  
  

  

The Connecticut Constitution expressly ‘ 
delegates the duty to implement the [] 
constitutional mandate to provide free public 
schools to the legislature. "The general 
assembly shall implement this principle [the 
provision of free public schools] by 
appropriate legislation.” Connecticut 
Constitution, article eighth, section 1. The 
complainants do not allege that the 
legislature has failed to carry out its 
constitutional mandate to provide a system of 
free public schools; in fact, the complaint 
makes clear that the plaintiffs are attending 
free public schools in their respective 

: communities. Therefore, because the : 
| Connecticut Constitution does not require the 

defendants to implement any particular type 
of educational program, and because the 
plaintiffs have not set forth any evidence to 
show that their right to a free public 
education has been abridged, the motion for 
summary judgment is granted as to count one 
of the plaintiffs’ revised complaint. 

  
  
  

  

  

  

  ~44- 
{ 

| 
| 

1 

 



  

    

(emphasis added). Broadley v. Meriden Bd. of Educ., Superior 
  

Court, J.D. of New Haven, No. 27-35-07, Memorandum of Decision, 

at 6-7 (August 14, 1992), Appendix 8 to this brief.18/ 

The constitution does not, as the plaintiffs claim, 

authorize the court to determine educational practice and policy 

and to impose its views on the other branches of government. 

Article VIII, Section 1 makes it clear that this is a legislative 

function. 

  

In a dissenting opinion in Rose v. Council for Better 
Education, Inc., Ky  , 790 8.W.2d..186, 223-229 
(1989), Justice Liebson of the Kentucky Supreme Court set 
forth well-reasoned arguments why issues like those 
presented in Broadley and those presented in this case ought 
to be recognized as non-justiciable. It is noteworthy that 
the majority in Rose did no more than express the opinion 
that Kentucky's system of education was unconstitutional. 
The court specifically held that it was beyond the power of 
the court to set up a committee to advise the court as to 
what should be done to improve the schools or to appoint a 
monitor who would report to the court on the progress being 
made by the legislature in addressing the problems with 
Kentucky's educational system. Although Justice Leibson's 
legal point that the issues before the court were not 
justiciable did not prevail, as a practical matter the 
decision of the majority produced the same result as a 
finding of non-justiciability. 

  

  

  

«45 -   
 



  

B. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT PROVEN THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE FREE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
SCHOOLS IMPOSES A SPECIFIC OBLIGATION ON THE STATE TO 
MEET CERTAIN LEVELS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
AND EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT. 

2. The Plaintiffs Have Not Offered Evidence From Which The 

Court Can Find A Constitutionally-Required Course Of 
Action In Regard To The Problems Of Racial, Ethnic And 
Socioeconomic Isolation Or Urban Underachievement. 

If the state constitution does impose some affirmative 

obligation on the defendants beyond the obligation to offer 

children in the Hartford area a system of free public elementary 

and secondary education, it was incumbent on the plaintiffs to 

establish, by principles of law or by evidence, what that 

obligation is and how it is that the defendants have failed ko 

meet that obligation. This the plaintiffs have not done. 

The plaintiffs have offered almost no evidence to establish 

what it was that the defendants should have done but failed to | 

do, and what little evidence they have presented is 

contradictory.   
In 1988 ‘and again in 1990 the Hartford Board of Education 

studied what it would take to bring about racial balance in the 

Hartford area by re-assigning children to different school 

districts, Def. Ex. 13.3 and 13.4. According to the 1990 report, | 

to achieve a 50/50 numerical balance of minority and majority 

students in Hartford and Bloomfield an exchange of 10,669 

-l 

      
 



  

students in both directions with other suburban districts would   
| be necessary, at an estimated annual cost of $10,549,000 for 

transportation alone. In order to achieve the higher goal of 

raising the minority enrollment in twenty suburban districts to 

the regional averans, 30,030 students would have to be reassigned 

to a different school district at an estimated annual cost of 

$14,815,000 for transportation alone. Def. Ex. 13.4. None of the | 

plaintiffs’ witnesses expressed support for this "solution" to 

  

the problems in the Hartford area. See especially Vol. 14, pp. 

115-120 (LaFontaine). 

Dr. William Gordon, an out-of-state expert hired by the)   plaintiffs to conduct a review of what the state has done to   promote diversity in our schools, criticized the state for not 

pursuing three avenues for promoting diversity and reducing 

isolation. First, he criticized the state for not implementing 

the recommendation in the 1965 Harvard Study that half of the 

minority students in Hartford (about 6,000 students at the time) 

be sent to School in the suburbs. 1?’ Voi. 13, p. 12 (Gordon). But 

  
later Dr. Gordon testified that this one-way plan to address the 

  

19/ In their Post-Trial Brief, the plaintiffs make the purely 
speculative and entirely unsubstantiated claim that "the 
racial and economic composition of city and suburban schools 
would have been profoundly altered, significantly 
influencing school and housing patterns for years to come if | 
the recommendation had been implemented.” Plaintiffs’ | 

| 

  
Post-Trial Brief at 66. 

-47=     
 



i } 

% 

  

  

problem in the Hartford area is not something he would recommend. 

Vol. 13, Pp. 26,'116-117 (Gordon). 

Dr. Gordon also criticized the state for not creating an   
educational park to address the demographic patterns that were 

developing in the Hartford public schools. Yet none of the 

hundred or so desegregation plans which Dr. Gordon claims to have ! 

worked on included the development of an educational park, and in 

those cases in which he recommended an educational park to the 

court, his recommendation was rejected. Vol. 13, pp. 127-128 

(Gordon). In the end, Dr. Gordon was forced to admit that he did 

not know whether an educational park was a viable option for the 

| Hartford area. Vol. 13, .p. 131 (Gordon).     Finally, Dr. Gordon criticized the state for not doing   
| enough to investigate how it might have used magnet schools to 

address the problem in the Hartford area. Coming from Dr. 

Gordon, this criticism is particularly surprising and somewhat | 

disingenuous. In 1989, Dr. Gordon published an article in which 

he maintained that, as of that time, there had never been a 

13, pp..133, 135 (Gordon). Dr. Gordon agreed that he runs "hot   

| 

| 

| 

| 

| successful school desegregation plan using magnet schools. Vol. | 

| 

| 
| 

| and cold" on magnets and that there was a time period in which he 
| 
would not have recommended magnet schools for anything. Vol. 13, 

p. 132 (Gordon). He also recognizes that there are several 

-48- 

    f 

i 

 



  

  

  

  

  

downsides to the use of magnet schools that need to be considered 

carefully. Vol. 13, pp. 138-142 (Gordon). 

The plaintiffs have failed to show that there was a 

particular course of conduct the defendants or their predecessors 

should have followed to address the demographic patterns in the 

Hartford area, and they have also failed to show that there is 

now any specific course of conduct for addressing the problems in 

the Hartford area that must be read into the constitution. Under 

cross-examination, the plaintiffs! key witnesses were asked to 

explain what had to be done in the Hartford area to address the 

problems they described. They offered no specific solutions. 

Vol. 1, PD. 36 (Carter); Vol. 3, p. 51 (Senteio)s Vol. 11, pp. 

1 148, 156, 158-161 {(Natriello); Vol. 12, pp. 75, 83 (Allison); 

Vol. 13, .p. 83 {GCordon); Vol. 34, pp.23-24- (Cordon); Vol. 14, p. 

114 (LaPFontaine); Vol, 22, pp. 93-94 (Orfield); Vol. 35, p. 95 

(Crain) . 

If, as it appears, the plaintiffs are claiming that the 

defendants have violated the constitution by not doing something 

they were required to do, proof of what it is that the defendants 

should have done, or should be doing, is something which the 

plaintiffs were obliged to offer to establish liability. An 

important inference can and should be drawn from the fact that 

some of the same individuals who testified that they did not know 

wl Oo 

| 

  

  
 



  

what the solution for the Hartford area ought to be, are   individuals the plaintiffs identified as persons who would offer 

testimony on what the remedy should be. See Plaintiffs’ Amended 

Final Identification Expert Witnesses Pursuant to Practice Book 

§220(d), September 4, 1992, p. 5 (Charles Willie), p. 6 (John | 

Allison), pp. 6-7 (Hernan LaFontaine), p. 7 (William M. Gordon), 

lp. 9 (Gary orfield) .29/ The inference that must be drawn is that 

there is no particular solution to the problems in the Hartford 

area that can be read into the constitution as a judicially- 

enforceable, affirmative obligation.?1/ 

Any consideration of how the state supposedly should have 

addressed, or should now address, the conditions in the Hartford 

area requires careful consideration of competing interests, the 

varying costs and benefits of particular approaches, changing 

conditions, the impact on school districts outside of the 

  

20/ As the court has noted, trial in this case was not | 
bifurcated into separate liability and remedy stages. Vol. | 
24, p.51 (The Court). The plaintiffs knew that it was | 
incumbent on them to prove what needed to be done as part of | 
their proof on remedy as well as liability. | 

21/ The fact that there are no particular solutions that can be 
read into the constitution is further highlighted by the 
reluctance of at least one of the plaintiffs’ key witnesses | 
to express anything more than cautious optimism that the | 
court could develop a plan that would prove successful. 
Vol. 35,%pp. 154, 165 (Orfield). 'A constitutionally- 
mandated solution ought to be based on more than cautious 
optimism. 

  

50 -     
 



    

twenty-two districts under consideration in this case, and the 

impact of whatever is to be done on the state as a whole. Vol. 

27,P0p. 58-62 (Rossell); Vol. 24, pp. 38-41, 52, 57-58 (Calvert). 

The plaintiffs’ witnesses did not even begin to address these 

considerations, and the court, in the limited context of this 

case, cannot be expected to be able to measure and deal with all 

of these considerations. 

2. The Plaintiffs Have Failed To Establish That There Are 
Any Constitutionally-Required Standards That Must Be 
Applied To This Case. 

The plaintiffs’ failure to offer any substantial evidence of 

a constitutionally-required course of conduct which the 

defendants did not follow, is reason enough for the court to find 

that the constitution has not been violated. But the plaintiffs’ 

failure of proof becomes even more evident when it is noted that 

the plaintiffs have failed to prove that there are any general 

standards for measuring the adequacy of the defendants’ conduct. 

This absence of proof is important in two respects. First, 

unless the constitution requires the defendants to meet a 

particular standard, there is no starting point for deciding 

whether the defendants have violated the constitution. Second, 

without a constitutionally-defined standard, it is impossible to 

craft a judicial remedy. Since the plaintiffs claim that   
  

 



  

  

    

"conditions" in the Hartford area violate the constitution rather 

than anything the defendants have or have not done, any 

"standard" which the court might act on in this case would 

establish a constitutionally-required "condition" that would have 

to be achieved in order to satisfy the constitution. 

The plaintiffs have not proven that there are any standards 

or specific "conditions" that must be read into the constitution, 

and it would be a serious mistake for the court to invent such 

standards. 22/ 

(a) Racial and Ethnic Isolation 

In federal school desegregation cases, the constitutional 

violation is remedied and the court must end its involvement when 

  

22/ In their Post-Trial Brief, the plaintiffs appear to suggest 

that the court countenance an "evolving" set of standards. 
Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Brief at 102. The notion that it 
might be appropriate for the court to invent and change 
constitutional standards as it learns from the experiences 
it might gain by overseeing the schools in the Hartford area 
should be categorically rejected. Any such notion would put 
the General Assembly in the position of little more than a 
body that offers recommendations for the court's 
consideration in the area of education. The General 
Assembly would never know what constitutional standards it 
should work under because the court would always be free to 
change the standards. The court would always have the final 
say as to what is "appropriate" under whatever "evolving" 
set of standards the court might be inclined to adopt at the 
time. This is directly at odds with the second sentence of 
Article VI1l, Section 1, which specifically leaves it to the 
General Assembly to choose the "appropriate” measures upon 
which to offer an elementary and secondary education. 

«53.   
  

 



» i 

p 

| 

i 

  

the schools falling under the court's jurisdiction become 

unitary; i.e., all vestiges of de jure segregation have been 

eliminated, and it does not appear that the defendants will 

  

return to unconstitutional practices. Freeman v. Pitts, 

U.s. y 112.8.CL. '1430,.118 L.EQ, 24 108 (1992). 1f the   

school system becomes "unitary", the court will release its 

control over the schools even though racial isolation may 

continue, because under the federal constitution, "[r]acial 

balance is not to be achieved for its own sake.” Freeman V. 

Pitts, 112.8.Ct. at 1447. By.contrast, the present case is about 

plaintiffs’ claim that racial, ethnic and socioeconomic balance 

must be achieved for their own sake in order to satisfy the state 

constitution.   
Since the federal standard for compliance with the U.S. 

Constitution would not provide a meaningful standard or guide for 
| 

| 
remedying the plaintiffs’ claims in this case, what should the | 

standard be? Stated differently, when would the court 

relinquish control over the schools in the Hartford area under | 
: | 

the plaintiffs’ theory in this case? Plaintiffs’ witness, Dr. 

William Gordon, could not answer this question. Vol. 34, Pp. 58 

(Gordon). He even went so far as to endorse the prospect of 

indefinite court supervision. Vol. 34, pp. 63-64 (Gordon). Dr. 

Gordon's inability to articulate a standard which the court might | 

B53       
 



  

use to decide when to relinquish control over schools in the 

Hartford area is important evidence of the plaintiffs’ failure to   
prove that there are any standards, constitutional or otherwise, 

for the court to use in defining constitutionally-required 

conditions and in deciding liability. 

It is axiomatic to the plaintiffs’ theory in this case that 

the plaintiffs must bear the burden of establishing that the 

constitution mandates a particular level of racial, ethnic and   
|| socioeconomic balance in the area. Not only have the plaintiffs 

failed to propose such a constitutional standard, virtually all 

of their witnesses who were asked the question testified they   
could not say what the racial, ethnic and socioeconomic 

composition of the schools in the Hartford area ought to be. 

Vol. 1, pp. 33=34 (Carter); Vol. 2, p. 51 (Senteio); Vol. 6, p. 

45 «(Montanez-Pitre); Vol. 7, p. 134 (Trent); Vol. 11, 'p. 144 

(Natriello); Nol, 12, pp. 72-73, 76. (Allison); Vol. 13. pp. 149, 

155 (Gordon); Vol. 14, pp. 114-120 (LaFontaine); Vol. 34, pp. 

76-77 (Gordon). Instead of suggesting that there is some 

professionally agreed upon standard for racial, ethnic and | 

|| socioeconomic balance in schools that should be applied to the 

Hartford area, key witnesses for the plaintiffs maintained that 

it was the job of the court to decide what the composition of the 

=54 -     
 



® » 

' 

i 

  

  23/ 
schools ought to be. Vol. 12, pp. 85-86 (Allison); Vol. 13,   Pp. 150-151 (Gordon); Vol. 22, pp. 44, 58 (Orfield); Vol. 34, p. 

| 70 (Gordon). Since the language and the history of the pertinent 

constitutional provisions reveal no standard for racial, ethnic 

and socioeconomic balance that must be maintained in the schools, 

and since the plaintiffs’ witnesses did not know what the racial, : 

ethnic and socioeconomic composition of the schools should be, 

the plaintiffs are asking the court to make an essentially 

arbitrary decision. Vol. 14, p. .115 (LaFontaine). 

The only witness for the plaintiffs who ventured to offer 

some specific idea of standards for racial balance in the 

Hartford area which the court might adopt was Dr. Charles 

24/ 
Willie. In Appendix 3 to this brief, Dr. Willie's proposals 

for racial and ethnic balance in the Hartford area are converted   
  

23/ Mr. Allison's testimony on this point is contradictory. At 
his deposition, Mr. Allison testified that "we have a judge | 
to try and figure out where the issues of reduction and 
balance, where that point is.” Vol. 12, pp. 85-86 (Allison). 
At trial, however, Mr. Allison testified that he was "not 
sure that it is the Judge who is in the best position to 
[set racial balance percentages because] there are others 
involved in that, the legislature, executive branches of 
government” who are in the best position to do that. Id. 

24/ pr. Gary Orfield suggested that the court allow no more than 
a ten percent deviation from the racial composition of the 
metropolitan area as a whole with exceptions made for magnet 
schools and in other unspecified situations. Vol. 22, p. 55 
(Orfield). Dr. Orfield's suggestion is quite similar to Dr. 
Willie's proposal. 

«55.       
 



  

  
into real numbers using the 1992-93 enrollment data. These   proposals have two crucial shortcomings. First, execution of Dr. 

Willie's proposals would result in massive upheaval and 

redistribution of students in this area. Second, his proposals 

| are self-contradictory because implementation of the proposals 

| would violate the "fairness" principle that Dr. Willie says 

should govern any desegregation plans. 

  | 
j Appendix 3 to this brief and Defendants’ Exhibit 7.7 reveal | 

that even the most conservative change in the racial and ethnic 

| composition of the schools in the Hartford area proposed by Dr. 

: Willie would place a disproportionate burden on Hartford children 
i   

and minority children. Because the parents of minority children   
do not favor having their children bussed unnecessarily, Dr.   Willie testified that "you have to equalize the transportation.” 

| Vol. 15, Pp. 130 (Willie). Exhibit 7.7 shows that an unusually 

| large number of Hartford children currently walk to their 

neighborhood schools. Many, if not most of these children would 

have to be bussed under Dr. Willie's proposals. Furthermore, a 

significantly greater percentage of Hartford and minority 

children would have to attend school outside of the city in which 

they live, than would be the case for suburban and white children 

under Dr. Willie's proposals. 

  -56- |   
 



The more closely Dr. Willie's proposals are considered the 

clearer it becomes that his proposals for racial and ethnic 

balance in the Hartford region are superficially conceived, 

facially impractical, and potentially harmful to public 

25/ Neither Dr. Willie nor any of the plaintiffs’ education. 

other witnesses have offered the court a meaningful standard for 

racial and ethnic balance that can or must be read into the 

constitution. 

When considering whether the plaintiffs have proven that 

there is a constitutionally required condition of racial and 

ethnic balance, it is also important to recognize that 

demographic patterns are changing constantly and that the 

patterns in the Hartford area are not static. Vol. 23, pp. 20-21 

(Steahr). A fixed standard written into the constitution by   
  

The transfer of large numbers of Hartford students to 
schools outside the city of Hartford undoubtedly will 
diminish local support for the Hartford public schools. 
Parents of Hartford children attending school outside of 
Hartford would no longer have reason to press local 
officials and their fellow citizens into supporting and 
enhancing the schools in Hartford. See Vol. 27, p.59 
(Rossell). The same would be true of parents of suburban 
children transferred to the Hartford schools. See Vol. 29, 
p.20 (Lemega). This loss of local support for the local 
public schools would be in addition to the loss of support 
for public schools in general that may result from the 
decision by some parents to withdraw their children from the 
public schools altogether to avoid having their children 
sent to school in other towns that may be far from home. 
See, e.g., Def. Exs. 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 
  

57 =      



Lie » 

  

judicial fiat is likely to become outmoded in a relatively short 

period of time. Unless the court finds that it has everlasting 

power to review and change standards to suit the needs of the 

i| times, it must find that the constitution leaves it to the | 

General Assembly to set any such standards. 

(b) Socioeconomic Isolation i 

As little as the plaintiffs have offered to suggest a 

standard for racial and ethnic balance, they have offered even 

less to establish that there is a standard of socioeconomic 

balance that must be read into the adnstitut ton, 2&/ Witnesses 

  for the plaintiffs who are intimately familiar with the 

socioeconomic composition of the Hartford student body testified | 

that they could not say how much of a reduction in the   concentration of poor children in Hartford schools was necessary 

nor could they identify a specific point at which the 

concentration of poor students crosses the line from acceptable 

to unacceptable. * Vol. 118, p. 113 (Haig); Vol. 5, p. 131 | 

(LaFontaine); Vol. 6, p. 46 (Montanez-Pitre). Similarly, Dr. 

William Trent, who, at the plaintiffs’ request and using national 

  

26/ Article I, Section 20 does not identify wealth or poverty as | 
a suspect classification so that the plaintiffs’ argument 
relating to socioeconomic isolation must be grounded 
exclusively in Article VIII, Section 1, the education 
article. i 

|     
 



  

  

  
| 
| 

| 
  

data, conducted a study of the effects of going to a school with 

i @ high concentration of disadvantaged students, testified that he 

could not identify a particular point when the concentration of 

poor and disadvantaged children became too great. Vol. 7, pp. 81, 

134 (Trent). 

Even the extent of the problem presented by concentrations 

of poor children seems uncertain. There is no doubt that poverty 

has a negative impact on educational achievement regardless of 

where and with whom the poor child goes to school. See, Parts 

IITI.B(2) (c) and III.C. (5) infra. Whether a concentration of 
  

children who are of low SES in a particular school or school 

system has an additional negative impact on performance beyond 

the negative effect of individual poverty is less certain. 

Dr. Gary Natriello, the only witness for the plaintiffs who 

reviewed the performance measures in the Hartford area in any 

depth, did not analyze those performance measures in a way which 

showed any "concentration effect” that went beyond the effect of 

individual SES differences. He, therefore, could not say whether 

Hartford's CMT scores reflected any such "concentration effect’. 

Vol. 11, pp. 25-26, 164 (Natriello). Since both Dr. Natriello 

and Dr. Mary Kennedy, a key witness for the plaintiffs on the 

"concentration effect”, agree that any "concentration effect” 

could be offset by program measures; Vol. 11, pp. 175-176 

"50 

  

 



  

'| (Natriello), Vol. 14, p. 59 (Kennedy); whether or not Hartford 

children suffer from a "concentration effect” is an important 

question which remains unanswered. 

In effect, the plaintiffs ask the court to infer that a 

| "concentration effect” is at work in the Hartford area from 

national studies of the federal Chapter 1 program conducted by 

! | 
individuals who were not offered as witnesses at trial but whose 

27/ work was overseen by Dr. Mary Kennedy. But even those 

  

27/ plaintiffs have suggested that the work of Dr. William Trent 
supports the notion that Hartford children suffer from a 

| "concentration effect”. Like the Chapter 1 studies 
presented by Dr. Mary Kennedy, Dr. Trent's work is based on 
national data and does not tell us anything about the 
Hartford area in particular. Even more important, Dr. | 

¥ Trent's work does not specifically measure the effect of 
concentrations of poor children. Dr. Trent "constructed" 
variables like "disadvantaged school context” -- variables 
that have not to date been recognized in the work of any 
other social scientist -- and then attempted to assess the 
impact of those variables. Vol. 7, pp. 26, 95, 119 (Trent). 
Even his variable "school percentage disadvantaged” is not a | 
precise measure of the concentration of poverty. Precisely | 
what it is that Dr. Trent is measuring is not clear. Since 
the data he used in the studies he conducted for the 
purposes of this case related to students whose school 
careers ended twelve or more years ago; Vol. 7, p. 105 
(Trent) ; and since "[i]n general across the country inner | 
city schools have gotten quite a bit better over the last 
twenty years”; Vol. 10, p. 70 (Crain); it is very possible 
that Dr. Trent's study measures deficiencies in inner city 
schools that may no longer be present, rather than the 
effect of a concentration of poor students. In any event, 
Dr. Trent's work, which is summarized in Appendix 6 to this 
brief, shows mixed and even sometimes bizarre results. (For | 
example, it shows that white students who attend 

    
(footnote cont'd) 

    
 



j 
| 
i 

» i 

i 

t 

  

Chapter 1 studies and the testimony of Dr. Kennedy fail to give a   clear picture of how the concentration of poor children, as 

‘distinguished from the strong impact of individual poverty, 

operates on overall achievement. The Chapter 1 studies concluded 

that individual poverty, length of time in poverty, and 

concentration of poverty each had a negative impact on overall 

performance but the studies do not clearly differentiate the i 

degree to which each of these influences affects students’ 

performance. Although Dr. Kennedy disagrees, the evidence shows 

that the individual who actually condudhed the Chapter 1 studies 

for Dr. Kennedy thought that poverty concentration by itself did 

not have a "large effect” on achievement. Vol. 14, pp. 75-786   
(Kennedy) . 

Other results of the Chapter 1 studies can be read to call 

into question the significance of the "concentration effect”. 

If, as Dr. Kennedy suggests, the concentration of poor children 

in a school has a negative impact on non-poor as well as poor 

children; Vol. 14, pp. 38-40 (Kennedy); it would seem logical to 

expect that as children in a school with a high concentration of 

poverty progress through the grades, the gap in performance 

  

(footnote cont'd from previous page) 

disadvantaged schools have higher incomes than white 
students who do not attend disadvantaged schools. Vol. 7, p. 
117 {Trent)). :       
 



  

  

{ 

| 
| 
f 

| 
| 

f 

| 

! 
| 
| 

| | between children in the high poverty concentration schools and 

children in schools in which there is no concentration of poverty 

| would grow. This does not appear to be the case. In fact, Dr. 

 vennzdl's study shows that attending a high poverty concentration 

schon does not have a statistically significant effect on the 

rate of learning when measured with appropriate controls. Vol. 

14, pp. 78-80 (Kennedy). The study also shows that, after the 

third grade, the performance of children in the high poverty 

concentration schools parallels .the performance of children in 

low poverty concentration schools. Pl. Ex. 419, p.22.28/ 

Dr. Kennedy suggests that the full impact of the 

"concentration effect” can be observed in the first grade and     | that the impact continues to manifest itself to that same degree 

i} throughout the school career. Vol. 14, p. 95 (Kennedy). But it   || seems inconceivable that the experience of attending kindergarten 

and a portion of first grade in a high poverty concentration 

school could be so damaging as to cause the enduring 

"concentration effect” which Dr. Kennedy hypothesizes. Children 

  

28/ In Fig. 29 of Pl. Ex. 163, p.132, Dr. Natriello presents a 
chart showing the percentage of children in Hartford 
performing below the 23rd percentile on the Metropolitan 
Achievement Test. This chart shows that the number of 
children in Hartford performing below the 23rd percentile 
decreases from second through sixth grade. If a 
"concentration effect” was at work in Hartford, one would 
expect just the opposite. 

  

| 
-62- | 

|       
 



  

who attend high poverty concentration schools in all likelihood 

0,
 

AA
 

  a live in high poverty concentration neighborhoods and communities. 

A more reasonable explanation for what Dr. Kennedy describes as 

the effect of attending a school with a high concentration of 

poor children is that what she is really observing is the effect 

of being and living in poverty or some other social force that | 

interferes with the achievement of children who live in poverty. 

$
d
 

How best to serve children attending our public schools who 

are afflicted by poverty is one of the most important and complex 

issues being studied, debated and dealt with by educational 

experts, teachers, cities and states throughout the country. On 

the one hand, there is reason to believe that exposing poor     children to more affluent children may dispel their mindset that   | there is no way out of poverty. On the other hand, poor children 
¥ 

| have a wider range of needs than affluent children. Those needs 

| are more likely to be addressed in an environment with greater 
| 

| 

| 

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i 

| 
| 
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sensitivity to those needs because the needs are common to a 

| 29/ 
greater number of students. 

There is no clear cut answer to the question of how best to   
equip poor children to lift themselves from poverty. There is 

  

29/ The presence of a school breakfast program in Hartford that 
is not available in the suburbs is only one example of this 

| phenomenon. 
| 
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    | 

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similarly no agreement as to when the concentration of poor 

children shifts from a concentration in which common needs can be 

fe 
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addressed efficiently and with sensitivity to a concentration 

which is more harmful than beneficial. Under these circumstances 

there is no standard of socioeconomic balance that the court can 

read into the donsticution 39 | 

(c¢) Achievement 

{ 
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The plaintiffs’ implicit, if not overt, suggestion that 

achievement standards be read into the constitution is probably 

the most specious of all their legal claims. As previously 

  noted, the state and state officials have always set high   
aspirations for our schools and our students. The state has 

never operated on the assumption that the constitution provides a 

point at which we can be satisfied that a minimum standard for 

  

30/ The plaintiffs appear to be suggesting that socioeconomic 
isolation be attacked by the indirect route of compelling 
racial and ethnic balance. Using racial and ethnic 
classification to attack a problem which stems from 
differences in socioeconomic status is, at least, legally 
suspect. It is also a methodology that may miss the mark in 
some cases. One can imagine the middle class parents of a 
minority youngster living in the city taking advantage of 
the opportunity to have their child attend school outside | 
the city and that child being replaced by a white child from 
a poor suburban family that has no option but to send their | 
child into city schools. In this situation using racial and | 
ethnic classifications to attack a problem that has its 
roots in concentrations of poor children would aggravate the 
situation in the city schools. 

® +o     
 



  

  

education has been met. A judicially circumscribed minimum 
~ 

© =     
| 
|| standard, as proposed by the plaintiffs, could well lead to 

|| mediocrity as the temptation arises to be satisfied once that 

| 
minimum has been met. 

The General Assembly has embarked on a program of student 

and school assessment through the Connecticut Mastery Test and 

the Strategic School Profiles that forces us to look at our 

$
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schools and our students on an ongoing basis. These legislative 

initiatives provide methods for us to evaluate our programs over   time and will help us carefully plan effective improvements. To 

the extent that these measures identify needs and weaknesses,   they reflect present day thinking and goals. However suitable   
this thinking and these goals might be today, these measures of 

schools and achievement might well be inadequate or inappropriate 

31/ || as time goes on. 

Nevertheless, the plaintiffs ask the court to read 

contemporary ad hoc measures of achievement into the state 

constitution - particularly the measures provided by the CMT. 

|i The plaintiffs refer the court to various policy statements of 

the State Board of Education, the Commissioner of Education, the 

  

31/ This potentiality is borne out by Dr. Natriello's testimony 
concerning changes in the way we measure educational quality 
based on inputs versus outcomes. Vol. 11, pp. 23-24 | 

| (Natriello). 

-55-       |] 
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State Department of Education, and other officials and state 

| commissions and ask the court to read these documents as setting 

constitutional standards and mandates. This suggestion should be 

rejected first and foremost because the constitution should not 

| be limited by engrafting contemporary and dynamic thinking about 

education into the constitution. The suggestion should also be 

rejected because the policy statements the plaintiffs rely on to 

find standards give the court no firm and realistic standard from 

which to determine when a violation of the constitution begins 

and when the violation has ended. 

On pages 231 to 263 of Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 163, Dr. Gary 

Natriello presents policy statements of the State Board of 

Education and the Governor's Commission on Quality and Integrated 

Education as "state standards” that presumably should be read 

into the constitution. Dr. Natriello's effort to present these 

policy statements as "standards" is flawed from the outset. Dr. 

Natriello concedes that the terms "standards" and "goals" are 

used interchangeably in the field of education. Vol. 11, p.125 

(Natriello). Clearly, when Dr. Natriello uses the term 

standard”, he is not using that term as it is used in the law to 

identify a "legal standard” or mandate. 

The policies to which Dr. Natriello looks for his conception 

of a "state standard” are, really, statements of goals and 

«66 =~ 

  

 



  

xX 
© 

  

| 

| 
i 

aspirations -- lofty and commendable goals and aspirations. 

| These goals and aspirations cannot be read into the constitution 

‘without placing the education of the children in this state 

permanently under the direction and control of the courts. 

Probably the clearest example of this is found in Dr. Natriello's 

State Board of Education Policy Statement on Equal Educational 

| Opportunities sets a "standard" for achievement. According to 

Dr. Natriello, that standard for an equal educational opportunity 

is not met unless Hartford children as a group "achieve 

educational outcomes equal to the state's student population as a 

whole.” Pl. Ex. 163, pp. 247-248. Undoubtedly, seeing that 

children in Hartford achieve outcomes equal to the state's   
student population as a whole is a goal which the State Board of 

Education has set for itself and the state as a whole. But is | 
| 

| | this a "standard" that the court ought to read into the 

| CLE Th 
| constitution? Clearly it is not. 
| 

| 
The logical extension of Dr. Natriello's interpretation of 

the State Board's 1986 Policy Statement on Equal Educational 

Opportunity, Pl. Ex. 43, is that equal educational opportunity 

can never be achieved until students in every district in the 

state perform as well as the students in the district with the 

highest level of performance. Vol. 11, pp. 140-143 (Natriello). 

“67 =     

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This is an ideal to which the state should always aspire, but a 

result that can never be realistically achieved. Making the 

goals of the 1986 policy statement a "standard” which the 

constitution imposes on the state and which the court is charged 

to enforce would only put the court in the lead, over the General 

Assembly, the Governor, the State Board of Education, and 

educators throughout the sate, of a never ending quest for the 

educational ideal. 

Dr. Natriello was forced to admit during his testimony that 

the "standards" he derives from various state policy statements 

would require the state to accomplish things that have not been 

accomplished anywhere else, including the elimination of any 

difference in performance between children of different 

socioeconomic backgrounds. Vol. 11, pp. 136-139 (Natriello). 

There is no basis in law or in fact for finding that those policy 

statements outline minimum requirements of the constitution. 

Aside from their effort to read the goals of state policy 

into the constitution, the plaintiffs have offered the court no 

basis upon which to find that there are any specific achievement 

levels that can or must be read into the constitution so as to 

«68 

 



  

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— 

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Hi
 

  

  
  

provide a basis upon which this court could determine whether the 

defendants have violated the constitution. 
32/ 

(d) Resources 

In later portions of this brief, the defendants discuss what 

the evidence shows about resources for education in the Hartford 

area and what the evidence shows about the way in which the state 

has distributed its resources in support of education in the 

area. It is a highly complex picture, but when its pieces are 

all put in place, the picture is one of fair and commendable 

state action. 

It is sufficient to note at this juncture that, even if the 

court were empowered to set some standards regarding the 

sufficiency of the resources being applied or used in the schools 

{in the Hartford area, the plaintiffs have not offered a shred of 

  

  | | 
| 
| 
i 
| 

32/ Plaintiffs’ witness, Dr. Charles Willie, suggested that the 
court concentrate on the needs of students performing in the 
bottom sixth of whatever scale of achievement is being used. 
He thought that this kind of focus was wise because focus on 
the neediest student would never be lost, i.e., there will 
always be a bottom sixth. Vol. 15, p. 33 (Willie). 
Addressing the need of the bottom sixth, like the 
"standards" which Dr. Natriello claims to have identified, 
provides a never ending goal. It is a goal which is fully 
appropriate as a matter of policy but not a standard that 
can suitably be written into the constitution. Simply said, 
since there will always be a bottom sixth there would always 
be a violation of the constitution if Dr. Willie's standard 
for achievement is read into the constitution. 

B89 - 

| 
| 

 



  

  
evidence to establish what that standard ought to be. The level 

) 
©   of funding for our schools and how these funds ought to be spent 

is not a matter for the judiciary and the plaintiffs’ failure to 

Ce. CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
HAS TAKEN APPROPRIATE ACTION TO ADDRESS RACIAL, ETHNIC 

i AND SOCIOECONOMIC ISOLATION AND TO ADDRESS THE 
UNDERACHIEVEMENT OF CHILDREN LIVING IN POVERTY IN OUR 

| 
{ 

#'
 

CITIES. 

| In accordance with the command of Article VIII, Section 1, 

'| the General Assembly has developed and implemented "appropriate" 

standards for education and it continues to re-examine and adjust 

  those standards as needs, interests and other forces throughout 

the state change. In particular, the General Assembly has taken | 

| steps to address the problems of racial and ethnic isolation and 

the special problems of our poor children and urban school 

‘districts. The actions of the General Assembly and the actions 

| of the defendants have been "appropriate" even though those 

actions have not yet eliminated the racial and ethnic isolation | 

that exists in some school districts or the problem of 

  
underachievement among our poor urban children. 

  
The plaintiffs are asking the court to apply a traditional | 

| 
| 
| 
| 

| 
| 
| 

"strict scrutiny” test to their claim that the defendants have 

| violated the state constitution. However, a "strict scrutiny” 

-70= 

    
 



  

  

  

test cannot be applied to this case for the simple reason that 

there is nothing to scrutinize. The defendants have not created 

a system of classification based on race or national origin nor 

have the plaintiffs identified any specific action by the General 

| Assembly or the defendants which interferes with the fundamental 

ll right to education. 

If the courts have any authority to measure the sufficiency 

of the General Assembly's response to "conditions" which affect 

education (a point which the defendants do not concede), the test 

| the court should apply is not a "strict scrutiny” test, but one 

drawn from Horton III. 

In Horton III the Supreme Court revisited the issues 

addressed in Horton I in light of "evidence before the trial 

'| court [which] demonstrates continued significant disparities in 

the funds that local communities spent on basic public 

33/ Despite these education.” Horton III, 195 Conn. at 39. 

continuing disparities, the court upheld the new funding formula 

which had been adopted by the General Assembly. The Court found 

that the legislative response to the disparity in spending 

"reasonably advanced a rational state policy and...did not result 

  

Footnote 15 on page 39 of the court's decision shows the 
limited extent of the progress which had been made in 
reducing the spending disparities; i.e., changing the 
"condition.   

 



| 
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| 

| 
|   
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I 
A 3 

in an unconstitutionally large disparity.” Id., 195 Conn. at 45. 

In reviewing the adequacy of the legislature's implementation of 

the education clause of the constitution, the court should do no 

more than examine whether steps being taken reasonably advance a 

| rational state policy and do not themselves create undesirable 

'' conditions. 

  
1. The State Has Pursued A Policy Designed To Promote 

Racial, Ethnic And Socioeconomic Diversity In Our 
Schools. 

The legislative response to the racial, ethnic and 

| socioeconomic isolation that exists in Hartford and other areas 

lof this state is one designed to reasonably advance a rational 

|| state policy, and the measures chosen by the General Assembly do 

not promote further racial, ethnic and socioeconomic isolation. 

The state has taken many steps to promote diversity in our 

schools. The state's Racial Imbalance Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 

i §10-226a et seg. and its implementing regulations require racial 

+ balance within each school district and set the state well ahead 

of most states in this regard. Def. Ex. 5.3. As late as 1979, 

it was believed that this intradistrict approach could address 

the isolation that then existed in Hartford and other areas of 

the state. Vol. 12, p. 12 (Allison). When the demographic 

conditions continued to change, the state responded and efforts 

| to develop programs that crossed district lines and brought  



  

iN. 
ha > 

Mo
 

  

    

children from different backgrounds together have been promoted 

and supported by state officials and the General Assembly. 

Among these interdistrict efforts are the Interdistrict 

Cooperative Grant Program, Conn. Gen. Stat. §10-74d, and several 

special acts designed to promote diversity by funding 

interdistrict magnet programs. See Def. Ex. 3.2 through 3.7 and 

3.9. Along the way, the state has taken many smaller steps to 

promote diversity and give special focus to our urban districts. 

Among other things, the state stepped in and saved Project 

Concern after the Hartford Board of Education voted to withdraw 

from the program; Vol. 14, pp. 124-125 (LaFontaine); Vol. 23, 

p.128 (Calvert); and the entire State Department of Education has 

been reorganized to sharpen the focus of the efforts of that 

department on the needs of our urban children and promoting 

diversity in our schools. Def. Ex. 3.1 and 3.8. 

The defendants do not claim that the job which state 

policymakers have set for themselves has been fully accomplished. 

State policymakers continue to look for new ways to advance the 

rational state policy of promoting greater diversity in our 

schools. See, e.g., Pl. Ex. 90 and P.A. 93-263. But neither the   

inability to fully meet our goals nor the constant consideration 

of new and different approaches to these problems are reason for 

the court to find that the constitution has been violated. On 

73 

 



  

  the contrary, the fact that more needs to be done and that debate 
XN 
© ~ 

I 
continues over new initiatives designed to promote diversity   
shows that the constitution's delegation of authority over 

education to the General Assembly is working properly and that 

| 
i 

| the constitution has not been violated. 

| 

| The plaintiffs have criticized the "voluntary and 
| 

incremental” approach toward promoting diversity which has been 

Ho
 

| pursued by the defendants. Consolidated Amended Complaint, 

Paragraph 66 (2/26/93). Without offering a clear picture of the 

"mandatory" approach they apparently advocate, the plaintiffs ask 

| the court to reject the "voluntary and incremental” approach.       
Putting aside the problem presented by the plaintiffs’ 

failure to be more specific about their "mandatory" approach, the 

court cannot dismiss the "voluntary and incremental” approach in 

favor of a philosophically different approach under the standard 

for review that can be found in Horton III since the "voluntary 

and incremental” approach reasonably advances a rational state | 

policy and does not itself interfere with the enjoyment of the 

right to an education.   
| There is good reason to believe that a voluntary approach 

will, in the long run, do more to bring diversity to our schools | 

than mandatory measures. Vol. 26B, pp. 26-28 (Rossell). After 

    
 



  

    
|| twenty years of studying school desegregation, Dr. Christine 

x. 
© 

> 

2 | Rossell reached the conclusion that "slow and steady wins the 
y 

| race” in any effort to promote diversity in the schools. Vol. 27. 

| 
ip. 62 (Rossell). (Given that there is strong, if not convincing, 
§ 

professional support for the notion that a voluntary and 

| incremental approach will work better than the vague "mandatory" 
| 

approach the plaintiffs seem to favor, the approach to promoting 

diversity in our schools chosen to date by the General Assembly A 

is beyond constitutional questian. Plaintiffs' criticisms of the 

"voluntary and incremental” approach should be directed to 

persuading the legislature to change its policies. They are not   | evidence of a constitutional violation.   
Children With An Equal Educational Opportunity And To 

| 
| 

| 2 The State Has Pursued A Policy Designed To Provide All | 
2) ‘ | 

| Direct State Resources To The Neediest Students. 

| In 1977, the Supreme Court found that the state's decision 

| to operate a system of school finance which relied on local 

| property taxes and a flat per pupil grant from state coffers was 

| Court rejected the claim that this new method of financing public 

| 
‘| schools was unconstitutional. Since that time, the GTB formula 

 



  

  > 'lhas been revised and improved in several respects and it is now 

= |called the Education Cost Sharing (ECS) formula. Conn. Gen. 
2 

‘| Stat. §810-262Ff, 10-262g, 10-262h.34/ 

ol 

Bx. 7.1, pp. 76-83,.7.21, p. 83A; 7.18, 7.19, and 7.20 that the 

It is evident from Def. 

urpose and effect of the state's principal formula for HP 
{ 

distributing state aid to local school districts has been to 

provide the most state aid to the neediest school districts in 
el 
il 
i the state. Vol. 28, pp. 37, 85, 157-162 (Brewer). As a result of L) i 

i 
3 
| 
i 

| 

| 

‘| the manner in which state dollars are distributed, Hartford 

{ received 2.4 times as much state aid per pupil as the suburbs in | 

| 
I 

Def. Bx. 7.1, p.X1; Def. Bx. 7.21, p.11A. 
{ 

{ | 
1990-91 and 2.8 times as much state aid per pupil in 1991-92. 

  

'134/ state aid under the ECS is largely controlled by the "town 
target grant”. "Town target grant” is a computation which 
takes into account the relative town wealth and the number | 
of students served by the town. Both the town wealth 
computation and the computation of the number of students : 
served are weighted so that towns which have more poor 
students and more students performing below the standard for 
remedial assistance on the CMT will get more money than ; 
similar towns having fewer poor children and fewer children | 
performing below the remedial standard. The town wealth 

| computation is further weighted to cause the formula to give 

| 
| 

| 

| 

2 
(Ag) 

| 

| 

greater benefit to towns with concentrations of poor by 
reason of the fact that a poor town's "equalized net grand 
list" is reduced to reflect the town's lower per capita 
income. As the information on pages 82-83 of Def. Ex. 7.1 
and page 83A of Def. Ex. 7.21 demonstrates, these 
adjustments in the formula by which the state supports the | 
overall activities of local school districts significantly 
increases the amount of state money being poured into the 
Hartford schools in contrast to the suburban schools which 
face less poverty and have higher success rates on the CMT. 

-76-   | 
| 

| 
| 

 



  

  Other states have had court decisions similar to the 

| decision in Horton I, but the response of the state legislatures 

| in those other states has not always been as effective as the 

| response of our General Assembly. New Jersey is a good example. 

| The most recent decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in that 

state's saga of school finance litigation provides important 

insight into some of the reasons why our General Assembly has 

- succeeded where others have failed. In Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 

287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990), the New Jersey Supreme Court was faced 

with a claim that the school finance formula which it had already 

found constitutional on its face in Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 

  449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976) (Robinson V), was still unconstitutional 

as applied. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d at 365, 373. The court       | refused to find that the school finance formula was 

| unconstitutional in relation to most school districts in the 

state, but did find the act establishing the formula | 

35/4 1 unconstitutional as it applied to poor urban school districts. 

  

| 
35/ The recent decision of the Supreme Judicial Court for the 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts in McDuffy v. Secretary of the 
Executive Office of Fduc., No. 8JC-06128, slip. op. (Mass. 
June 15, 1993) is, in most respects, a mirror of the 
decision in Abbott v. Burke, and, for that reason. is 
distinguishable from the present case. McDuffy is a school | 
funding case and Massachusetts, like New Jersey, has not | 
gone as far as Connecticut to make it possible for poorer 
school districts, like Hartford, to spend as much on their 
children as other districts. For example, Massachusetts has 

  

  

  

(footnote cont'd)     
 



  

  

    1! 

I 

| 
atl 

  

    

  

| The court criticized the formula because the spending disparities 

had actually grown since the court first declared the state's 

financing formula unconstitutional. Id. at 382, 383, 387. 

In Connecticut, and in the Hartford area in particular, the 

state, through a massive infusion of state aid, has succeeded in 

breaking the relationship between personal wealth, wealth of the 

town, and per pupil expenditures. Vol. 26B, p. 40 (Rossell). The 

poorer the children in a district, the more minority children in 

‘ila district, and the lower the achievement in a district, the more 

money the district gets from the state. State assistance 

effectively overcomes the negative relationship between local and 

  

'| (footnote cont'd from previous page) 

no requirement that municipalities contribute any particular 
amount of local funds to education and state funding for 
education in Massachusetts has been unpredictable and often 
late in coming. McDuffv v. Secretary, supra at 6. But in 
Connecticut, we have a minimum expenditure requirement, 
Conn. Gen. Stat. §10-262j, state funding has been stable, 
Def, Bx. 7.1, Pp. 4-11, Def. Ex. 7.21, p.11A, Def. Ex. 7.18 
and Def. Ex. 7.19, and Hartford's spending is comparable to 
the spending of other districts in the area. See Tables 2, 
3, and 4 on pages 86A, 86B, and 86C, infra. In the final 
analysis, the McDuffy court, like the court in Abbott v. 
Burke, recognized that choosing the means by which to 
provide an education to the children of the state is a 
legislative function. There is no reason to believe that 
the New Jersey courts or the Massachusetts courts would ever 
find it appropriate to engage in the judicial take-over of 
twenty-two school districts like that proposed by the 
plaintiffs in this case. : 

  

   



  

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| 

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federal ald and wealth. Def. Bx. 5.1; Vol. 26B, pp. 40-42 

(Rossell) . 

Contrasting the Connecticut system with New Jersey's reveals 

why we have succeeded where New Jersey failed. New Jersey's 

response to their first Supreme Court decision invalidating their 

school financing formula was limited. New Jersey changed that 

formula to equalize the distribution of money under that program 

but did little more. Up to the time of Abbott v. Burke, New 

Jersey continued to distribute categorical grants like special 

education money on a flat per pupil basis. Abbott v. Burke, 575 

A.2d at 380. The state continued to distribute transportation 

aid in a way that bore no relationship to the wealth of a 

district. Id. It operated a teacher retirement program that was 

counter-equalizing. Id. And its support for capital projects 

was, without question, insufficient. Id. at 382. 

Our General Assembly did not respond to the decision in 

Horton I in the narrow way that the New Jersey legislature   

responded to the decision invalidating New Jersey's primary 

school finance formula. Our General Assembly did more than just 

change the funding formula declared unconstitutional in Horton I. 

In Connecticut, virtually every other grant program to support 

the efforts of local school districts was modified so that by 

1988 it could be said that "[iln virtually all education grant 

TS 

 



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| % 

| 

  

  

  
programs, the state provides more state aid to poor towns to 

~ 
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! 

= | equalize their ability to promote educational opportunities.” Pl. 

"Bx. ‘59, p.1. 

Table 1 on pages 80A through 80E, provides a diagrammatic 

: summary of the way in which the General Assembly has directed 

state dollars under most of the state's grant programs to the 

neediest districts by including considerations of district 

M
o
 

wealth, student or community poverty, student achievement as   { 

| 
measured by CMT scores, and other indications of need into the | 

method or process of distributing state money. >6/ | 

In contrast to New Jersey, Connecticut's grant formula for 

student transportation favors poorer districts like Hartford. 

Def. Ex. 7.3 shows that the higher transportation reimbursement 

i rate for Hartford under the state's transportation reimbursement 

formula and the smaller percentage of Hartford students who 

require transportation, combine so as to make it possible for 

Hartford to spend a significantly smaller share of its resources 

on transportation than the suburban districts as a whole. Def. 

Ex... 3, col. £3), (6), and (8). 

  
  

36/ In the case of discretionary grants, the Department of 
Education is generally directed to consider specified 
indicators of need in deciding which districts should be 
awarded the grant money authorized by the legislature. 

-80- 

 



  

! 
@® 
oO 

T 

  

  

  

“ ya Vy 

TABLE _] 

STATE GRANT ANALYSIS 

EXHIBITS 7.1 AND 7.211 

CONSIDERATIONS 
STATUTORY DISTRICT CMT 

PAGES GRANT NAMES AUTHORITY WEALTH POVERTY SCORES OTHER 
Exhibit (pages) C.G.S. § 

7.1 (12-19) Education Evaluation and 
7.21 (197) Remedial Assistance (EERA) 10-140 X X 

Public 

7.1 (20-27) Education Evaluation AND 
Remedial Assistance (EERA) : 
Non-Public 10-140 X X 

7.1 (28-35) 
7.21 (35A) Bilingual Education 10-17qg X2 

7.1 (36-40) : 
7.21 (40A) Interdistrict Cooperation 10-744 aX x3 

1/ This table represents a condensation of the tables set forth in defendants' exhibits 
7.1 and 7.21. In some instances, several grant categories which are authorized by 
the same legislation have been, and are designated as, combined. This table does not 
reflect certain limited grant programs that were inapplicable to the 22 districts at 
issue in this case (e.g., Coalition on Literacy, Project Catch) nor does the table 
reflect project-specific grants to a single district (e.g., Primary Mental Health). 
For information on these omitted grant programs, refer directly to Exhibits 7.1 and 
7.21. 

Number of limited English proficient students from same language group per school. 

Inter alia, number of school districts benefitted. 

 



  

| 

3 
7 

  

  

CONSIDERATIONS n 
STATUTORY DISTRICT CMT 

PAGES GRANT NAMES AUTHORITY WEALTH POVERTY SCORES OTHER 
Exhibit (pages) C.G.S. § 

7.1 (42-47) Excess Cost and Agency 
7.21 (47h) Placement 10-76d(e) X x4 

7.1 (48-60) Combined Professional 
Development 10-155dd X5 

7.1 (51-75) Combined Salary Aid Public Act x6 
7.1 (169-170) 86-1 §§82,3, 

4,5,6 
(repealed) 

7.1 (76-83) 
7.21 (83A) Education Equalization 10-262f X X X 

through 
10-2621 

7.1 (84-91) Voc-Ed Equipment 10-265a i X X xX? 
7.21 (91A) through 

10-2654 

  

4/ Number of students placed outside the district; cost of educational program for those 
students at the site of the placement; district's average per pupil cost for 
preceding year. 

5/ Number of full-time equivalent staff members. 

6/ Salary levels; teacher/pupil ratios. 

1/ Inter alia, whether vocational program is interdistrict program. 

 



  

| 
(00) 
o 

© 

| » 

  

  

CONSIDERATIONS  "" 
STATUTORY DISTRICT CMT 

PAGES GRANT NAMES AUTHORITY WEALTH POVERTY SCORES OTHER Exhibit (pages) C.G.S. § 

2.1(99-106) EERA Project Concern 10-2663 x8 

7.1 (115) School Building Projects 10-282 X 
7.21 (115A) through 

10-292b 

7.1 (116-120) Telecommunication Incentive 10-4h X x9 

7.1 (121-124) Extended Day Kindergarten 10-16m X x10 

7.1 (125-130) Summer School Incentive 10-74b X x11 

7.1 (131-136) 
7.21 (136A) Young Parents Program 10-74c x12 

7.1 (142-145) Dropout Prevention Program 10-202f =X x13 

  

8/ Agreement to participate in intercommunity program for disadvantaged children. 

9/ Inter alia, demonstrated need for project. 

10/ Inter alia, relative educational need of the district. 

11 Inter alia, demonstrated need for the program in the school district. 

12, Inter alia, evidence of the need for a young parents program in the local community. 

13/ Inter alia, graduation rates; educational need. In 1989-1990, the Dropout Prevention 
Program was consolidated with the Priority School District Program. Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§10-266q(qg). 

 



CONSIDERATIONS 
STATUTORY DISTRICT CMT 

PAGES GRANT NAMES AUTHORITY WEALTH POVERTY SCORES OTHER Exhibit (pages) C.G.S. § 

  

  

7.1 (146-153) 
7.21 (153A) Child Nutrition State Match 10-215b 

7.1 (154-160) Priority School Districts 10-266p 
7.21 (160A) through 

10-266r 

7.1 (161-165) 

7.21 (165A) State School Breakfast 10-266n 

7.1 (166-168) 
7.21 (168A) Training Paraprofessionals 10-1551 

7.1 (171-173) Adult Education Action 10-69, 10-71 

7.1 (181-192) Combined Vocational 
7.21 (192A) Agriculture 10-65 

7.1 (193-200) 
7.21 (200A) Special Education 10-76g 

7.1 (201-208) 
7.21 (208A) Public Transportation 10-266m 

7.1 (209-216) 
7.21 (216A) Non-Public Transportation 10-266m 

  

14/ Inter alia, greatest demonstrated academic need to improve student achievement and 
enhance educational opportunity. 

15/ Participating districts selected by Department of Education.  



  

| 
® 
oO 

2 

  

  

v YA¥ 

CONSIDERATIONS 
STATUTORY DISTRICT CMT PAGES GRANT NAMES AUTHORITY WEALTH POVERTY SCORES OTHER Exhibit (pages) C.G.S. § 

7.1 (217-221) Contiguous Transportation 10-266m X 

7.1 (230-237) 
7.21 (237A) Health Services 10-217a X X 

 



  

Again in contrast to New Jersey, Connecticut's formula for 
3 
© . 

= assisting school districts with the cost of special education 

favors poorer districts like Hartford. Def. Ex. 7.8 shows that 

the sliding scale of reimbursement for special education costs, 

which gives districts like Hartford a higher reimbursement rate, 

makes the burden of the cost of special education on the overall 

education program in Hartford comparable to the burden which the 

£4 suburbs face even though a much larger percentage of Hartford | 

#H
 

students need and receive special education than do suburban 

students. Compare col. (3) and col. (6) and see col. (8) of Def. 

Bx: 7.8. 

Furthermore, in contrast to New Jersey, Connecticut has not 

neglected school districts' needs to build and renovate school   
facilities. Connecticut's formula for reimbursing local school 

districts for their efforts in this regard clearly evinces a 

policy that provides poorer districts more help with capital 

improvements than wealthier districts. Def. Ex. 7.1, pP- 3D and 

7.21, .p. 3A. 

Clearly Connecticut has gone further than states like New 

Jersey in recognizing and responding to the need to provide urban     
 



  

  

school districts with preferential treatment in terms of state 

37/ 

)_¥ 

LS 
~ 

& dollars. 

The plaintiffs have complained about cuts in programs in the 

Hartford public schools. The evidence shows, however, that in 

spite of changes in state grant programs and the elimination of 

some state grant programs, the state has sustained its financial 

commitment to our ping and urban school districts. Def. Ex. 

7.18; Vol. 28, p. 156 (Brewer). The evidence also shows that 

when faced with fiscal hard times; the state has sought to 

Ho
 

insulate our neediest districts, including Hartford, from fiscal 

cuts as much as possible. Vol. 28, pp. 37, 38 (Brewer). Def.   
Ex. 7.22 shows how the fiscal crisis which confronted the state 

il in 1991-92 and 1992-93 played itself out in the Hartford area. i 

In 1991-92, an additional $6,201,918 in state aid was distributed 

ll to school districts in the Hartford area under the ECS formula. 

Hartford received all of this new money and more, for a total 

increase in ECS aid:of $9,101,095. Def. Bx. 7.22, col. (3). 'The   

suburban districts as a whole received about $3 million less in 

  

37/ outside of the area of education the General Assembly has 
also given our cities, and Hartford in particular, 
preferential treatment in recognition of the special needs 
of these cities and special importance of our cities to the 
state as a whole. Def. Ex. 6.1 and 6.2. 

. “83       
 



  

38/ ECS aid that year. In 1992-93, state aid under the ECS grant 
=. 
+ 

# program to the Hartford area was decreased by $8,304,460.   
| Despite the fact that the area as a whole lost more than $8 

million in ECS aid, Hartford's ECS grant increased by $4,381,126. 

Once again, the suburban districts (with the exception of 

Ellington) absorbed all of the impact of reduced state aid to the 

area and then dome > 2/ 

Ho
 

Financial hard times are a reality. How those difficult 

times are managed is a measure of - the strength of the shares 

commitment. The evidence is clear that state policymakers and 

the General Assembly continue to recognize and act on the need to 

direct state resources to school districts which are most in   need. It is not necessary nor would it be appropriate for the   
courts to interfere with the properly directed efforts of the 1 

General Assembly to serve all of the needs and interests it must | 

| 
| 
| 

  

38/ Considering all forms of state aid, the Hartford area 
received $6,462,005 more state aid in 1991-92 than it 
received in 1990-91. Hartford, once again, received all of 
this new money and more, for a total increase in state aid 
from 1930-91 to 1991-52: of $11.527.647. Def. Ex. 2.22, Cok. 
(8). The suburban districts as a whole received more than 
$5 million less state aid. 

  

    
f.39/ The chairman of the West Hartford Board of Education 

i described the impact of these significant reductions in 
state aid on suburban districts like West Hartford. Vol. 
29, p. 11 (Lemega). 

    
 



  

serve including the commendable effort to channel more state 
| ¢ : : : 40/ |i resources to our neediest districts. 
| 

3. The Hartford Public Schools Offer An Educational 
Program Which Is Comparable To And In Some Ways Better 
Than That Being Offered In Other School Districts In 
The Area. 

¥ In their post-trial brief and at numerous points throughout 

this case, the plaintiffs have been critical of the quality of 

we | education being provided in Hartford. Most of that criticism is | 

unfounded. : i 

Hartford, like any other school system in the state, has 

  some problems. The teachers and administrators from Hartford who 

testified for the plaintiffs spoke of some of these problems. 

| Like all good teachers and administrators, they are advocates for 

hs children they serve. They are always looking for ways to | 

| make it possible to do more for their children. Given the 

| 

  

40/ Testimony from Dr. William Gordon shows how the power of the 
| courts can be and has been abused in the context of school 
| desegregation cases to leverage resources from state coffers 

and diminish legislative discretion in deciding how best to 
address the myriad concerns and interests which confront our 
society. Dr. Gordon explained why he believes some : 
districts under federal court order have not sought to free i 

: themselves from court supervision by seeking a declaration 
| that the district has reached unitary status. He explained 

that some districts take the position that: "As long as I've | 
got the state paying for something, why should I get: rid of, .| 
get rid of the courts?” Vol. 32, p. 57 (Gordon) . 

o i84- | 

J 

    
 



the Hartford Board of Education and its staff by representing 

that the plaintiffs and this case offered "the best opportunity   
for the Hartford District to obtain more resources", it is not 

surprising that the testimony of these witnesses focused on the 

problems of the Hartford schools rather than the positive 

41/ But the court attributes of the school system. Def. Ex. 37 

should not lose sight of the many positive attributes of the 

Hartford public schools which, in the final analysis, show that 

Hartford is offering a quality educational program that is 

comparable and in some cases better than what is available in the 

suburbs. 

  
The beginning point of any analysis of the quality of 

education in a particular district usually looks to the 

district's overall expenditures. The adequacy of a district's   
expenditures cannot be measured against an agreed upon standard 

of expenditures because, as discussed above, there is no such 

  

Some of the witnesses from the Hartford public schools 
called by the plaintiffs admitted that they expected this 
suit will generate more money for the Hartford public 
schoolg if the plaintiffs win. Vol. 4, p. 110 (Davis); Vol. 
6, p. 46 (Montanez-Pitre). :      



  

    standard. Expenditures can only be measured by comparison to 

42/ 

Ya
r,

 

other districts.   
Plaintiffs’ own witness on expenditures in the Hartford area 

concedes that when compared to other districts in the Hartford 

area, Hartford is not "particularly disadvantaged in terms of 

aggregate expenditure levels.” Vol. 8, p. 97 (Natriello). Figure |; 

36 on page 160 of Pl. Ex. 163 shows Hartford's Net Current 

Ho
t 

Expenditures Per Pupil (NCEP) for 1990-91 as the third highest of 

twenty-two districts in the Hartford area. Even when the student 

—A
 

count is artificially inflated by the product of one quarter of 

the number of students receiving AFDC and one quarter of the     number of students who perform below the remedial standard on the | 

{ 
CMT so as to create what Dr. Natriello describes as an 

3/ ["arblezazyd measure of student need, * seven districts in the 

  

42/ Measuring the adequacy of expenditures by comparison with 
other districts is not a particularly reliable way of 
assessing the "adequacy" of those expenditures. In any | 
array of districts with different expenditure levels, there | 
will always be districts whose spending is lower than the | 
average. Whether the spending in these districts is 
"adequate" depends on whether the average level of spending, 
something lower, or something higher is actually adequate. 

43/ This "need student” construct was developed by the General 
Assembly as a component of the state's school finance 
formula and as a means of setting the Minimum Expenditure 
Requirement (MER) higher for districts with more children 
who suffer from poverty and low achievement. Vol. 28, p. 177 
(Brewer); Conn. Gen. Stat. §10-262j. 

" -86-     
 



  

3 Hartford area spent less than Hartford in 1990-91. Pl. Ex. 163,   
iy Fig. 37,.p. 161; Vol. 11, pp. 93-94 (Natriello). 

| Tables 2, 3, and 4 on pages 87A, 87B, and 87C of this brief 
| 

| summarize a portion of the data found in exhibits presented to 

the court by the defendants. These tables show that in terms of 

| overall per pupil expenditures, Hartford ranked fourth in the 

area in 1984-85 and 1990-91 and second in the area 1991-92. In 

H
d
 

terms of Regular Program Expenditures per Resident Student in 

Regular Programs, these summary tables show that Hartford's 

spending exceeded the spending of ten other districts in the area 

jan 1990-91 and Hartford's spending exceeded the spending of 

eleven other districts in the area in 1991-92. :     
| There are many reasons why Hartford's spending is so high. 

| The federal government has helped Hartford by providing the 
| 

‘district with the lion's share of the Chapter 1 money distributed 
| 

in the area as well as other forms of federal assistance. Vol. 

5, pp. 165-166 (LaFontaine). Hartford schools also have been 

successful in attracting the concern and benevolence of numerous 

corporate and private donors. Vol. 30, pp. 14, 115-166 

(Calvert). But by far the biggest reason that Hartford has as 

much money as it does to spend on its children is that Hartford 

receives tremendous financial support from the state -- far more 

than the suburban districts in the area. Def. Ex. 7.1 and 7.21 

      
 



#
4
 

  

od 

ye
 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

® SELECT OMPARTSON BETWEEN HARTFORD AND OMBINED SSHLRBS 

TABLE 2 
SCHOOL YEAR 

DESCRIPTION 

FINANCE AND SPENDING 

  

Total State Aid Per Pupil (Def. Ex. 
7.19.5) 

Total State Aid as a Percentage of 
Overall District Budget (Def. Bx. 7.1 
p. 4) 

Education Equalization Grant Per 
Pupil: Guaranteed Tax Base Pormula 
(Def. Bx. 7.1, p. 77) 

Special Education, State Supported 
Percentages (Def. Ex. 7.1, p. 3B) 

Transportation, State Supported 
Percentages (Def. Ex. 7.1, p. 3C) 

School Construction State Supported 
Percentages (Def. Bx. 7.1, p. 3D) 

Overall Per Pupil Expenditures 
(Overall District Budget from Def. Ex. 
7.1, p. 5 divided by ADM from Def. Ex. 
7.3... p38) 

Regular Program Bxpenditures Per 
Resident Student. in Regular Program 
(Cannot be computed in a way vhich 
would permit comparison with other 
years because of formula and data 
gathering changes.) 

PROGRAM MEASURES 
Total Professional Staff Per 1000 
Students (Def. Ex. 8.5) 

Classroom Teachers Per 1000 Students (Def. Ex. 8.6) 

Support Staff Per 1000 Students (Def. 
Bx. 8.7) 

Mean Salary of Teachers and Su Staff (Def. Ex. 8.8) PPO: 

Staff Cost Per Pupil (Def. Ex. 8.4) 

Teachers Starting Salary - B.A. Ex. 8.9) 8 y A: (oer, 

Salary of Teachers at Masters Maxi (Def. Bx. 8.10) Sian 

-87A- 

1984-85 

HARTFORD 

$2,527.75 

57.47% 

1,985.82 

67.38% 

57.38% 

77.38% 

4,398.71 

N/A 

81.0 

69.2 

6.6 

25,600.00 

2,233.00 

14,430.00 

29,309.00 

704.91 

46.19% 

36.19% 

56.19% 

3,983.79 

N/A 

23,828.00 

2,188.00 

14,865.00 

27,037.00 

N/A 

1? 

17 

8T 

15 

12 

 



  

14 

15 

SELECT COMPARISON BETWEEN HARTFORD AND COMBINED SUBURBS 

TABLE 3 
SCHOOL YEAR 1990-91 

DESCRIPTION 

FINANCE AND SPENDING 

Total State Aid Per Pupil (Def. Ex. 
7+3:P. 13) 

Total State Aid as a Percentage of 
Overall District Budget (Def. Ex. 7.1, 
Pp. 11) 

Education Equalization Grant Per 
Pupil: Education Cost Sharing Formula 
Def. Bx. 7.1, p. 83) : 

Special Education, State Supported 
Percentage (Def. Ex. 7.1 p. 3B)1 

Transportation, State Supported 
Percentages (Def. Ex. 7.1, p. 3C) 

School Construction, State Supported 
Percentages (Def. Ex. 7.1, p. 3D) 
- Code Violations 
- Construction Projects 

Overall Per Pupil Expenditures 
(Overall District Budget from Def. Bx. 
7.1, p. 11, divided by ADM from Def. 
Bx. 7.1, Pp. 3A) 

Regular Program Expenditures per 
Resident Student in Regular Program 
(Def. BX. 7.2, P. 3) 

PROGRAM MEASURES 

Total Professional Staff Per 1000 

Students (Def. Ex. 8.5) 

Classroom Teachers Per 1000 Students 

(Def. Ex. 8.6) 

Support Staff Per 1000 Students (Def. 
Bx. 8.7) 

Mean Salary of Teachers and "Support 
staff (Def. Ex. 8.8) 

Staff Cost Per Pupil (Def. Bx. 8.4) 

Teachers Starting Salary - BA (Def. 
Ex. 8.9) 

Salary of Teachers at Masters Maximum 
(Def. Bx. 8.10) 

  

Handicapped on.y for 1990-91 and 1991-92. 

-87B- 

HARTFORD 

$4,514.14 

57.6% 

3,497.73 

63.21% 

54.35% 

75.48% 
73.21% 

7.837.13 

6,025.64 

89.4 

7.2 

47,587.00 

4,400.00 

27,366.00 

47,069.00 

COMBINED 
SUBURBS 

$1,878.99 

25.8% 

1,392.17 

35.71% 

31.43% 

57.14% 
45.71% 

7,281.99 

65,133.98 

88.8 

75.9 

6.4 

43,847.00 

4,045.00 

26,503.00 

46,940.00 

HARTFORD 
RANK 

12 

ST 

17 

10 

 



SELECT COMPARISON BETWEEN HARTFORD AND COMBINED SUBURBS 

  

TABLE 4 
SCHOOL YEAR 1991-92 

© COMBINED HARTFORD 

2 # DESCRIPTION HARTFORD SUBURBS RANK 

A FINANCE AND SPENDING 

1 Total State Aid Per Pupil (Def. Ex. $4,915.36 $1,758.47 1 

7.21, Pp. 131A) 

2 Total State Aid as a Percentage of 60.49% 23.99% 1 
Overall District Budget (Def. Ex. 
7.21, P. 11a) 

3 Education Equalization Grant Per Pupil 3,804.60 1,321.71 1 
Education Cost Sharing Formula (Def. 
Bx. 7.21, p. 83A) 

4 Special Education State Supported 61.79% 34.64% 1 
Percentages (Def. Ex. 7.21, p. 3A)! 

% 5 Transportation State Supported 53.15% 30.54% 1 
Percentages (Def. Ex. 7.21, p. 3A) 

6 School Construction State Supported "71.79% 44.64% 1 
Percentages (Def. Ex. 7.21, p. 3A) 

7 Overall Per Pupil Expenditures 8,126.41 7:331.13 2 
(Overall District Budget from Def. Ex. 
7.21, p. 1ll1A, divided by ADM from Def. 
Bx. 7.21, Pp. 3a) 

8 Regular Program Expenditures Per 6,263.11 6,219.88 11 
Resident Student in Regular Program 
(Def. Bx. 7.2, p. 4) 

B PROGRAM MEASURES 

9 Total Professional Staff Per 1000 86.5 85.1 8 

Students (Def. Ex. 8.5) 

10 Classroom Teachers Per 1000 Students N/A N/A N/A 

(Not available at time of trial.) 

11 Support Staff Per 1000 Students (Not N/A N/A N/A 
available at time of trial.) 

12 Mean Salary of Teachers and Support N/A N/A N/A 
(Not available at time of trial.) 

13 Staff Cost Per Pupil (Def. Ex. 8.4) S$ 4,578.00 S$ 4,161.00 20 

14 Teachers Starting Salary - BA (Def. 28,680.00 28,174.00 5 
Bx. 8.9) 

15 Salary of Teachers at Masters 49,329.00 50,057.00 14 
Maximum (Def. Bx. 8.10) 

  

i Handicapped only for 1990-91 and 1991-92. 

-87 C- 

 



  
  || demonstrate in detail that the state's support for education in 

| Hartford far exceeds its support for education in the suburbs. 

, 3, and 4 display in more concise form the preferential 

| 
i 
| 

| 
| 

| ‘treatment afforded to the Hartford public schools in three 

§ 
| representative school years. These tables also show some of the 

1 

! 

i 
\ 

| ways in which state aid made it possible for Hartford to offer 

its students at least as much as was being offered to suburban 

students on a number of measures of educational quality. The 

conclusion is inescapable that the state has recognized 

Hartford's needs and directed resources accordingly, making it 

possible for Hartford to offer a program that is at least 

comparable to the suburbs on significant measures of quality   
| education.   

The state's proper funding of the Hartford public schools 

i has caused the plaintiffs to concede and even insist that "this 

is not a funding case.” Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition of   
the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Pp. 15. (9/20/91) . 

Acknowledging that state funding and Hartford's aggregate 

expenditures do not, on their face, suggest a problem with the 

|| Hartford public schools, the plaintiffs ask the court to look 

deeper into the kind and quality of program Hartford offers to 

find problems and deficiencies.     
     



f
t
 

        

| 
1 

The plaintiffs use faulty and misleading data to raise 

questions about the quality of the professional staff hired by 

the Hartford Board of Education. The plaintiffs argue, based on 

selected data in Table 4 and Pigure 39 of Pl. Ex. 163, pp. 53, | 

166, that Hartford's professional staff is deficient because 

teachers and administrators in Hartford are not as well trained 

as teachers and administrators elsewhere. The plaintiffs also i 

suggest on the basis of 1989 figures, that the teaching staff in 

Hartford is deficient because Hartford employs a larger 

percentage of first year teachers: than most districts in the 

state. 

Table 4 of Pl. Ex. 163 shows that Hartford teachers and 

administrators are approximately the same age as teachers and 

administrators statewide and that they have about the same mean 

experience as teachers and administrators statewide. ?%/ These 

two pieces of information should have suggested to the plaintiffs | 

that there was reason to question the reliability of the other 

information in that table which suggests Chat Hartford teachers 

and administrators had less training than teachers and 

administrators statewide and the reliability of drawing the 

  

44/ Although there is some difference between the mean 
experience of Hartford teachers and teachers statewide, Dr. 
Natriello conceded that the mean experience of Hartford 
teachers was "not significantly less” than that of teachers 
statewide. Vol. 11, p. 35 (Natriello). 

«850 ~   
 



  

p_ 4 

€ 
> 

    

conclusion that Hartford teachers are inexperienced from the 1989 

data on percentage of first year teachers. If they had looked 

further into these matters, they would not have jumped to 

erroneous conclusions about Hartford's professional staff. 

The evidence at trial showed that the Teacher Retirement 

Board (TRB) data which has been relied on for information about 

the percentage of Hartford teachers with a master's degree or 

better and the percentage of Hartford administrators with a sixth 

year certificate or better is considerably out: of date. Vol. 25, 

pp. 6-8 (Keaveny); Vol. 29, pp. 86-88 (Rindone). The extent to 

which the TRB data is inaccurate had not been fully determined by 

the time of trial, but the reliable evidence which the court has   before it contradicts the plaintiffs’ claim that Hartford's 

professional staff is not as well trained as the professional 

staff in other districts. In contrast to the suggestion in Table 

4 of Pl. Ex. 163 that only 46.2% of Hartford teachers have a 

master's degree or better, Hartford's salary grid for 1991 

indicates that 89% of Hartford teachers are treated as having a 

master's degree or better for salary purposes. In contrast to 

the suggestion on Table 4 that only 5% of Hartford administrators | 

have a sixth year certificate or better, in a recent survey, 94% 

of Hartford administrators reported having thirty credits beyond 

their master's degree or better. Vol. 25, p. 14 (Keaveny). 

G0 =   
 



  

For two reasons it would be a mistake to draw the conclusion 
dae 

L 5 > 

i from the 1989 data regarding the percentage of first year 

teachers in Hartford, that Hartford's professional staff is less 

qualified than professional staff in other districts. First, 

there is testimony that the first year teachers Hartford has been 

hiring have been "excellent”. Vol. 4, p.9 (Wilson). Second, and | 

even more tellingly, in 1989 Hartford was improving its 

wb student /teacher ratio at a much faster rate than other districts #'
 

in the area. Def. Ex. 8.7; Vol. 29, pp. 143-144 (Rindone); Vol. 

11, pp. 46-50 (Natriello). The higher percentage of first year | 

teachers in Hartford in 1989 is evidence of positive steps taken | 

to reduce the student/teacher ratio in Hartford by hiring new 

| teachers, rather than a negative reflection on the quality of 

Hartford's teaching staff. 25/ 

As a number of the plaintiffs’ witnesses testified, Hartford 

teachers are no less qualified than teachers elsewhere in the 

state. Vol. 25, p. 15 (Keaveny); Vol. 14, p. 131 (LaFontaine); 

Vol. 4, pp. 28-29 (Wilson); Vol. 2, p. 7 (Negron); Vol. 6, Pp. 70 

(Pitocco) . ; 

  

45/ pl. Ex. 163, Table 5, Panel B, p. 56 reveals that Hartford ; 
continued to improve its student/teacher ratio in relation 

| to the rest of the state in 1990 as well. The figures 
| presented in Panel B show Hartford's student/teacher ratio 

improving while the student/teacher ratio for the state as a 
whole was getting worse. 

-91«     
 



  

  

  

  

  

As to the quantity of staff in the Hartford public schools, 

it 1s precisely because of increases in state aid that Hartford 

has been able to catch up to other districts. Vol. 28, p. 141 

(Brewer); Def. Ex. 7.9; see especially Def. Ex. 7.1, p. 70-72. 

Currently, Rartiord's class sizes are comparable to class sizes 

in wealthier suburban districts like West Hartford; Def. Ex. 

2.37; Vol. 30, pp. 124-125 (Calvert); and to class sizes 

throughout the state; Pl. Ex. 163, Table 6, Panel B; Vol. 11, pp. 

56-57 (Natriello). The data extracted from exhibits submitted by 

the defendants and summarized in Tables 2, 3, and 4 on pages 

87A, 87B, and 87C show that between the 1984-85 school year and 

the 1990-91, 1991-92 school years the number of professional 

staff per 1000 students, the number of classroom teachers per 

1000 students, and the number of support staff per 1000 students 

in Hartford improved to the point where the ratios in Hartford 

are now better than the ratios for the combined suburbs. 26/ 

The staff of the Hartford public schools is motivated by a 

strong vision for the children of Hartford. Def. Ex. 13.8, They 

  

  
46/ Even Dr. Natriello's presentation of various staffing 

comparisons shows that whatever difference in staffing there 
are between Hartford and the suburbs are not material. Pl. 
Ex. 163, Pig. 41, p. 169, Pig. 42, p. Y70, Fig. 43, p. 17], 
Fig. 44, Dp. 172; Fig. 45, p. 173. Dr. Natriello also 
conceded that Pl. Ex. 163, Table 3 shows that the direction 
of Hartford's staffing pattern is consistent with the needs 
of Hartford children. Vol. 11, pp. 33-34 (Natriello). 

Wa yo 0   
 



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he 

is deficient or not comparable to the educational programs being 

    

| 
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have been specially trained in strategies that are designed to be | 

effective with African-American, Latino, inner city and poor 

children. Vol. 18, p..94 (Haig); Vol. 14, p. 132. (LaFontaine); 

Vol. 4, p. 10 (Wilson). They are highly dedicated to their work 

and, as such, are clearly one of the strengths of the Hartford 

public schools. Vol. 18, pp. 113-114 (Haig); Vol. 8., p. 18 

(Neuman-Johnson). There is nothing about the professional staff 

of the Hartford public schools or the staffing patterns in those 

schools which would suggest that Hartford's educational program 

offered to students in other school districts. 

In addition to a fully qualified staff, the Hartford public 

schools also offer children a quality program. Hartford has not 

operated its schools blind to the special needs of its students. 

To the contrary, there are many programs and opportunities that 

are specifically designed to address some of the special needs 

that large numbers of Hartford children bring to school with them 

each day. 

The evidence shows that Hartford "offers a breadth and 

depth of academic programs sufficient to meet the education 

needs” of its children as well as some "unique offerings which 

are a reflection of the unique needs and also unique interests of 

children and young people attending the school system.” Vol. 30, 

“93 -   
 



    

474 The curriculum is designed to accommodate pp. 4-6 (Calvert). 

the social forces that play upon the lives of many Hartford 

! children. For example, the Hartford Board of Education has 

standardized the elementary school curriculum to soften the 

consequences of the family mobility that afflicts Hartford 

children to a much greater extent than suburban children. Vol. 

5, p. 162 (LaFontaine). Another example is the ongoing effort by 

the Hartford public schools to incorporate "state of the art” 

programs and methods for enhancing the education of poor and 

urban children, such as the fethod developed by noted Yale 

University Child Psychiatrist, Dr. James Comer. Vol. 18, p. 

(Haig); Vol. 14, pp. 134-135 (LaFontaine).   
It is generally believed that children who come from 

disadvantaged backgrounds are likely to make better progress in 

school if they begin school at an earlier age and are provided 

with a more extensive kindergarten program to ready them for 

school. Hartford has gone well beyond what is being done in most 

districts in the area and most districts throughout the state to 

reach children early and offer a more extensive kindergarten 

program. Hartford offers a sizeable pre-school program designed 

to serve children who are in need before they reach kindergarten 

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47/ For example, Hartford offers its students an "exemplary 
social studies curriculum” targeted at a multicultural 
student population. Vol. 3, p.160 (Dickens). 

  

-94 - 

   



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i 

  

2 age in many of its elementary schools. Def. Ex. 2.18, pp. 8-9; 

2 Vol. 30, pp. 9-10 (Calvert); Vol. 3, p. 151 (Dickens); Vol. 6, p. 

|| 31 (Montanez-Pitre); Vol. 17, p. 111 (Cloud). Hartford also 

offers an all-day kindergarten program in most of its elementary 

schools for children who may be at risk of poor educational 

performance. Vol. 30, pp. 10-13 (Calvert); Vol. 1, p. 68 

(Negron); Vol. 6, pp. 34, 48 (Montanez-Pitre); Vol. 17, pp. 79, 

3 88, 113 (Cloud). 

A 

Children who are hungry cannot be expected to learn 

effectively and children living in poverty in Hartford often come 

to school hungry. Hartford has responded to this problem by   offering a school breakfast program in all of Hartford's | 

elementary schools. Vol. 3, p. 50 (Senteio); Vol. 1, p. 66 

(Negron); Vol. 6, p. 42 (Montanez-Pitre); Vol. 6, DPD. 158 | 

(Morris); Vol. 8, p. 23 (Neuman-Johnson). Like most districts in 

  the state Hartford also offers a free and reduced lunch program. 

The school lunch and school breakfast programs in Hartford are 

paid for entirely by state and federal dollars. Vol. 3, p.22 

(Senteio) . 

Efforts have also been undertaken to offer some Hartford 

children a more comprehensive array of health services than is 

normally available in the schools to address the significantly 

greater health problems that affect disadvantaged children. The       
 



  

pN 

< 
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school based health clinic in Hartford Public High School 

provides "counseling for teenage parents, psychotherapeutic 

services to [the] at risk population and information to [the] 

students at large." Def. Ex. 23.14. Vol. 11, p. 107 (Griffin) .48/ 

The Family Resource Center at the Betances School in Hartford, 

funded by the State Department of Human Resources, offers an 

array of "school-based, services to families” such as adult 

education, day-care, adolescent improvement programs, and 

parenting skill training. It is one of only eight such centers 

statewide. Vol. 2, pp. 10-12 (Negron). These programs are models 

| that might be expanded to other schools serving large numbers of 

disadvantaged children as more funds for these kinds of programs 

become available. 

The higher concentration of children with limited English 

proficiency in the Hartford public schools has also been the 

impetus for changes to make Hartford's educational program better 

fit the needs of its children. Hartford offers a comprehensive 

bilingual education and English as a Second Language (ESL) 

program for students whose native language is Spanish and for 

  

48/ similarly, a health unit has been established at the Hooker 
Elementary School. Depending on the nature of the students’ 
health problems, they may be referred to community-based 
clinics, which offer the services of "physicians, ‘ 
psychologists and counselors and [a] psychiatrist . . ." 
Vol. 6, pp. 11, 42-43 (Montanez-Pitre). 

“D6 ~ 

 



  

) % 

EL = 
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students who come from homes in which languages other than 

English and Spanish are spoken as well. Vol. 5, p. 127 

(LaFontaine); Vol. 14, p. 132 (LaFontaine); Vol. 20, pp. 11-12 

(Marichal). None of the suburban districts offers a program as 

large and comprehensive as Hartford's. Vol. 20, p. 60 

(Marichal) . 

While Hartford has not been immune from the fiscal problems 

which have caused cuts in programs in virtually every school 

district in the state, Hartford continues to offer its students a 

number of special programs and services that are unique and are 

envied by other school districts in the state. The Classical 

Magnet Program which the first named plaintiff in this case 

attends is one of a number of such exemplary programs. Vol. 11, 

p. 194 (E. Sheff). The West Indian Student reception center at 

Weaver High School is another program which is unique to Hartford 

and designed with the needs of a particular group of Hartford 

students in mind. Vol. 6, pp. 88-89 (Pitocco). Hartford has 

also managed to preserve its program for gifted and talented 

children, when many other districts have been forced by budget 

constraints to eliminate their programs. Vol. 3, D.32 

{Senteio); “Vol. 29, p. 12 (Lemega). 

Which programs stay and which must go during hard times is a 

decision made by local officials in Hartford in the same way it 

> Ls   
 



  

  

    
    

is made in other districts. The important thing is that the 

particular needs and desires of the students, parents and 

citizens of the area served by the schools be considered. 

Hartford has done this. While more can always be done, there is 

no reason to peligve that the decisions which have been made in 

Hartford are unsound or put the Hartford public schools in the 

position of offering an educational program that is deficient in 

comparison to other districts in the area. 

The Hartford public schools offer children an "oasis" in the 

middle of neighborhoods that are sometimes full of nothing but 

despair. Vol. 30, p. 57 (Calvert). The Hartford public schools 

are not collapsing. Vol. 30, p. 119 (Calvert). The suburban 

school districts, like Hartford, have been forced to make cuts in 

their programs. Vol. 29, pp. 11-18 (Lemega); Vol. 6, pp. 87-88 

(Pitocco). In significant ways the suburban districts have a lot 

to learn from Hartford in terms of how to meet the needs of 

children who suffer from the debilitating poverty that afflicts 

significant numbers of Hartford children. 

Some of the plaintiffs’ witnesses simply assume that special 

programs now available to children in Hartford would 

automatically be available to Hartford students if they were sent 

to school in the suburbs; e.g., bilingual education and school 

breakfast. Vol. 11, pp. 14-15, 21 (Natriello). There was no 

~O 8 

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evidence to support this assumption, which ignores the reality of 

the state's fiscal crisis and the significant costs of 

establishing such programs in every suburban district. The 

assumption that suburban schools can do a better job than 

Hartford in meeting the needs of Hartford children is grounded on 

nothing more than unfounded speculation. 

The evidence presented to the court does not support the 

proposition that the Hartford public schools are failing to 

provide children in Hartford with. a quality education, or that 

Hartford children would be better served by attending school in 

the suburbs. 

4. Differences Between Hartford Public Schools And Schools 
In Other Districts In The Area Are The Product Of Local 
Decision-Making. 

In Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-742 (1974), the 

U.S. Supreme Court noted that "[nljo single tradition in public 

education is more deeply rooted than local control over the 

operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought 

essential both to the maintenance of community concern and 

support for public schools and quality of educational process. 

. [L]ocal control over the educational process affords citizens 

an opportunity to participate in decision-making, permits the 

structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages 

'experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for 

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educational excellence.'” Our State Supreme Court echoed this 

Although education in Connecticut is a state function, the 

nature and benefits of local control have always been recognized. 

The state has delegated most decisions about the day-to-day 

operations of schools to local boards of education. Conn. Gen. 

Stat. §10-220. The plaintiffs have not named the Hartford Board 

of Education as a party in this action. However, the plaintiffs’ 

| complaints about the Hartford public schools relate to matters 

which are the subject of local discretion. 

The evidence presented at trial shows that the state 

49/ Some of these decides how the money should best be spent. 

decisions, such as the decision to reduce the number of reading 

consultants but maintain the gifted and talented program; Vol. 3, 

pp. 31-32 (Senteio); Vol. 4, p. 28 (Wilson); are very difficult 

  

At times, the City of Hartford has diminished the impact of 
increases in money provided by the state to support the 
education of Hartford children by not passing the full 
amount of the increase on to the Hartford Board of 
Education. Vol. 14, p. 129 (LaFontaine). 

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ay decisions, and decisions which can only be judged from the local 

: perspective. The impact of these kinds of decisions, whether it 

be positive or negative, is the responsibility of Hartford 

officials. 

Aside from unsubstantiated criticism of the professional 

staff in the Hartford public schools, the plaintiffs' principal 

complaints about Hartford schools focus on Hartford's spending on |! 

#'
   textbooks, library books, instructional supplies and equipment, 

and concerns about Hartford's school facilities. A close 

examination of the evidence shows that the plaintiffs have 

| overstated the extent of these problems. In any event, the 

problems that do exist are a product of local decision-making, 

not anything the defendants have or have not done. 

There is no question that Hartford's spending in the areas 

of textbooks, library books, and instructional supplies and 

equipment in recent years has been almost the lowest of any 

50/   
district in the state. Def. Ex. 7.13 But it is evident from 

the comparison of Hartford's spending pattern over the last 

twelve years with the spending pattern of the suburban school 

districts found in Def. Ex. 7.9, that Hartford's low spending in 

  

50/ pef. Ex. 7.13 compares per pupil expenditures on textbooks, 
library books, instructional supplies and equipment over a 
five year period for every district in the state. Only West 
Haven has spent less than Hartford. 

  
$ 

-101-     
 



  

oy these areas is the product of local decisions to allocate more 

= resources to other areas, in particular, employee benefits. The 

startling fact that can be seen on page 1 of Def. Ex. 7.9 is that 

Hartford's per pupil spending on employee benefits over the last 

twelve years exceeded the per pupil spending on employee benefits 

in the suburbs by more than the amount that would have been 

necessary to equalize Hartford's per pupil spending on textbooks 

and instructional supplies, library books and periodicals, pi
 

equipment and plant operations. Vol. 28, pp. 142-143 (Brewer) .>1/ 

Hartford's low spending on textbooks and instructional 

supplies, library books and periodicals, equipment and plant 

operations and its high spending on employee benefits are 

problems which deserve attention. There is evidence that ! 

Hartford is starting to address some of these problems. Def. Ex.   7.12 shows that the Hartford Board of Education almost tripled 

  
  

51/ at trial, witnesses for the plaintiffs tried to suggest that 
Hartford's significantly higher expenditure on employee 
benefits was necessary in order to retain teachers in 
Hartford's urban system. The fact that Bridgeport and New 
Haven are staffed by teachers with a mean age and mean | 
experience level comparable to Hartford's, and that these | 
urban districts do not make similarly large expenditures on | 

| employee benefits, refutes this suggestion. Vol. 28, PD. 
i 143, 146-147 (Brewer); Pl. Ex. 427. | 

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4 -102~     
 



  

    

  

  

      

its per pupil and per school expenditures on library books from 

1989-90 to 1990-91.°2/ 

In any event, Hartford's comparatively low spending in 

particular areas does not make out a violation of the 

constitution. Plaintiffs’ witness, Dr. Mary Kennedy, testified 

that even across-the-board differences in spending between 

districts "rarely" has an effect on student outcome measures. 

Vol. 14, p. 74 (Kennedy). The evidence also shows that Hartford 

spends enough on textbooks and supplies to make the basic 

learning materials available to its students and teachers. Vol. 

31,. Pp. 94-95,'102 (Calvert); Vol. 1, p. 73 (Negron). Hartford 

lacks the kinds of supplemental materials that other districts 

have because other districts spend more, but if the standard by 

which Hartford is to be measured is some notion of "minimum 

adequacy”, Hartford's low spending on textbooks, library books, 

instructional supplies and equipment is not, on the record before 

  

52/ Hartford has not always been a low spending district in 
terms of textbooks, libraries and teaching supplies. 
Evidence presented by the plaintiffs shows Hartford's 
expenditures in these areas exceeding the statewide average 
in 1966-67; Pl. Ex. 20, p. 17; and the court heard testimony 
from the former superintendent of schools in Hartford about 
the major textbook improvement and acquisition program 
undertaken by the Hartford Board of Education in the early 
19808." Vol... 5, p. 172 *(LaFontaine) . 

=103- 

  

 



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Se this court, sufficient to conclude that Hartford is not providing 

53/ 
  
|| what is minimally adequate.   

Given the tremendous amount of state assistance already 

oing into Hartford and the consequences of Hartford's decision 

a
 

© spend far more than other districts on employee benefits, it 

lower spending on textbooks and instructional supplies, library 1 

books and periodicals, equipment and plant operations. 

  Much of the plaintiffs’ evidence that was critical of the 

quality of school buildings in Hartford, particularly the more 

  
| 

|| dramatic testimony regarding collapsing ceilings and pigeon 
(! 
| carcasses, focused on Hartford's McDonough School. According to 

I! an independent study of Hartford's school facilities, McDonough 

| is not generally representative of Hartford's school facilities. 

This independent study ranked McDonough first on the priority 

  

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53/ ‘The plaintiffs emphasize Hartford's poor showing in 

comparison to other districts in regard to the number of 
computers per student. Def. Ex. 8.19 confirms Hartford's 
overall poor showing but also shows how the distribution of 
computers in the K-6 schools in Hartford is uneven, with the 

| availability of computers in some schools being comparable 
to the availability of computers in many schools throughout 
the state. Testimony from one of the plaintiffs’ witnesses 

| that Weaver High School and Newington High School are 
3 comparably equipped; Vol. 6, p. 71 (Pitocco); indicates how 

speculative it would be to conclude that Hartford is not 
offering a program that is "minimally adequate” from the 
plaintiffs’ spending comparisons. 

  

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list of schools in need of repair or renovations, identifying 

that school as having the worst problems of any school in the 

jentire district. Pl. Ex. 153, p. 5-2.54/ 

Even Dr. Gary Natriello's attempt to present a negative 

picture of Hartford's school buildings (which actually shows few, 

if any, noteworthy differences between Hartford's schools and 

suburban schools ;« Pl. Ex. 163, Fig. 55-58, pp. 192-195), 

presented the court with a biased and potentially misleading 

picture of the quality of the school buildings in Hartford. Dr. 

‘Natriello did not compare schools in Hartford to schools 

throughout the Hartford area. Instead he compared Hartford 

school buildings to school buildings in three select districts: 

West Hartford, Glastonbury and Farmington. During his testimony 

| Dr. Natriello conceded that these three districts were "not 

necessarily representative of the entire set” of the twenty-one 

suburban districts and that they were selected in conjunction 

with the plaintiffs’ legal team for "purposes of illustration”. 

Vol. 8, p.r»174 (Natriello); Vol. 11, pp. 84, 108 (Natriello). A 

complete comparison of select categories of facilities in 

Hartford public school buildings and public school buildings in 

  

54/ Interestingly, despite its poor physical plant, McDonough 
was described by one Hartford teacher who had served in 
several schools in Hartford as "the finest of all the 
elementary schools in Hartford.” .Vol. 8, p. 18 
(Newman-Johnson) .   

 



  

  

      

all of the twenty-one suburban districts is presented in Def. Ex. 

8.13. This comparison shows that Hartford's school buildings do 

not differ significantly from school buildings in the suburbs in 

terms of key facilities. 

Other evidence presented at trial squarely conflicts with 

the plaintiffs’ effort to portray Hartford's school buildings as 

run down, inadequate and in an advanced state of decay. The 

plaintiffs make much of the fact that a good number of Hartford's 

schools are not "up to code’, but - the evidence shows that the 

schools that are not up to code fail to meet code because of. 

| issues regarding handicapped accessibility, not because of any 

health, safety or fire threat. Vol. 3, p. 44 (Senteio). 

Furthermore, the independent space utilization study commissioned 

by the Hartford Board of Education and completed in June of 1992 

||noted that the school facilities in Hartford are generally well 

‘maintained. Pl. Ex. 

There is no question that Hartford, like every other 

district in the state, has buildings in need of repair, 

renovation or replacement, but several observations by the 

authors of Hartford's space utilization study make it evident 

that Hartford's buildings are not nearly as bleak and decrepit as 

the plaintiffs have tried to present them. Among other things, 

the study noted that Hartford's stock of school buildings   
 



  

  3 includes "a number of beautiful, solid old school buildings 

x || constructed during an era when public buildings were designed to 

honor education and make a public statement about the community's 

concern for its youth”; "modern buildings that are notable for 

the wide range of facilities they provide”; "facilities beyond 

most suburban districts”; and facilities that "could serve as 

prototypes for elementary schools throughout the United States.” 

z Pl. Ex. 153, p. 5-1. 

The main problem facing Hartford is not the facilities 

themselves, but the problem of overcrowding. Overcrowding has 

made it necessary for Hartford to turn to the use of portable   
units in greater numbers than is desirable. But this problem is |   being addressed. Hartford voters recently authorized $204 

million in bonds for improvements to the Hartford school   facilities. Vol. 3, p. 37 (Senteio)." Using 1991-92 state 

reimbursement rates as a guide, Hartford can expect the state to 

cover more than seventy percent of the cost of this large school | 

improvement project. Def. Ex. 7.21, p. 3A. : 

Clearly, the problems that do exist in regard to Hartford's 

school buildings are not a basis on which to find that the state 

has violated the constitution. Whatever decisions have been made   
to postpone or delay necessary improvements or expansion of   Hartford facilities have been made by Hartford officials. Vol. 

-107~   
 



  

£ 5, p. 172 (LaFontaine). For a very long time, the state has 

# offered to reimburse Hartford for a substantial portion of the     
{| : ; ' ilcost of any necessary improvement or expansion of Hartford's 
i 
I school buildings, and Hartford's reimbursement rate has been 

|| considerably higher than the reimbursement rate for the suburban 

districts. Def. Ex. 7.1, pp. 3A-3D; Def. Bx. 7.21, p. 2A; Daf. 

IlEx. 12.27. The state has never turned down a request from 

‘Hartford for state reimbursement for a school construction or 

renovation project; Vol. 5, pp. 171-172 (LaFontaine); Vol. 28, D. 

20 (Brewer); and there is no reason to believe that the state 

will refuse to support Hartford in its newest initiative to 

  expand and improve its school buildings.     
the level of a violation of the constitution. In any event, the 

differences that do exist are the product of local decision 

making, not anything the defendants have or have not done. 

5. A Proper Examination Of Student Performance Levels In 
| The Hartford Area Does Not Support The Plaintiffs’ 

Contention That The Constitutional Rights of Children 
In Hartford Are Being Violated. 

  
The plaintiffs’ claim that children in Hartford are not   | 

| 
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| receiving a quality education relies most heavily on the raw 
i 

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differences in performance on standardized achievement tests 

between Hartford children and children attending school in the 

suburbs. On many occasions, state officials and agencies have 

decried this gap in performance and rightly encouraged the people 

of this state to support measures designed to reduce the gap. 

Reducing the performance gap between urban and suburban districts 

is an important public policy goal of the state and the 

defendants in this case. However, the constitution does not 

require any specific level of performance on achievement tests, 

nor does it require that all ghildien perform on the same level 

on such tests. 

The Supreme Court in Horton I implicitly rejected the notion 

that specific achievement measures are mandated by the 

constitution when it listed various criteria for evaluating the 

quality of education in a district. Among those criteria the 

court listed "test scores as measured against ability” and 

"degree of motivation and application of students”. Horton I, 172 

Conn. at 634. By listing these criteria, the court acknowledged 

that forces outside of the school's control influence test scores 

and other measures of achievement. Raw test scores may say 

little or nothing about the quality of education being offered. 

In his earlier writing, a key witness for the plaintiffs 

criticized the notion put forward by the plaintiffs here that 

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equality of educational opportunity might be determined by 

equality in achievement. Professor Willie wrote: "The theme of 

moving from opportunity to achievement is the rhetoric of the 

elitists who see education as a product rather than a process. 

Equal educational achievement is not what the civil rights 

movement was all about. This movement, which resulted in 

multiple federal court orders to create unitary public school 

systems, was for the purpose of eliminating inequality in the 

distribution of educational resaurces."” Vol. 15, pp. 88-89 

(Willie). 

Achievement differences may be of some assistance in 

identifying deficiencies in the educational "process", and of 

some value in defining goals to be pursued, but they are not, on 

their face, a violation of the constitution. 

The only proper question about the differences in 

performance between Hartford children and suburban children is 

whether those differences offer any reason to suspect that the 

"process" of education in Hartford is deficient in contrast to 

the suburbs. When properly analyzed, the performance of Hartford 

children does not support the proposition that children in 

Hartford are receiving an education which is inferior to that 

being provided in the suburbs. 

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Many question the inherent value of using standardized tests 

like the CMT to measure student progress. Even some Hartford 

personnel who testified for the plaintiffs questioned or 

acknowledged doubts about the reliability of the CMT scores as a 

measure of the actual achievement of Hartford students or as a 

measure of the quality of the program being provided in Hartford. 

Vol. 2, pp. 15-16 (Negron) (validity as a measure of the 

achievement of students who are still learning English 

questioned); Vol. 20, pp. 57-58 (Marichal) (Ibid.); Vol. 3, p. 

140 (Shea) (validity as a measure of the quality of Hartford's 

| program in reference to students affected by high mobility 

questioned); Vol. 14,:p. 142 .(LaFontaine) {(Ibid.); Vol. 4, pp. 

60-61 (Hernandez) (validity questioned in that Hartford students 

sare "different” in general); Vol. 24, pp. 68-70 (Nearine) 

(| (validity questioned in that Hartford students have a different 

| base Of experience); (Vol. 18, p. 95 (Haig) (validity questioned 

in that Hartford students are so hindered by poverty). 

There are many factors outside of the educational process 

| and beyond the control of the schools that have a direct impact 

on how a child performs on standardized achievement tests and 

other so called "outcome" measures. Dr. Gary Natriello 

identified some of the key non-programmatic influences which, 

according to the research, have an impact on a child's   
 



  educational performance independent of the quality of the 

| educational process. See, Pl. Ex. 163, p..38, Table 2; Vol. 8, p.   
{60 (Natriello). In Table 13 of Pl. Ex. 163, p.151, Dr. 

suburban districts, highlighting how much greater the adverse 

impact of these outside forces is likely to be on the performance | 

5/ of Hartford children as a group. > It is clear from Dr. 

Natriello's information that, everything else being equal,   
| differences in performance between Hartford children and suburban 

children are predictable because Hartford children are 

significantly more likely to suffer from social conditions which 

interfere with achievement and educational attainment. 

Of the social forces which have an impact on student       performance, social scientists generally agree that poverty, or 

individual socioeconomic status (SES), has the largest impact on 

student achievement. Although a particular child's SES does not 

necessarily determine how that child will perform, the impact of 

poverty and SES on achievement when measured for large groups of 

  

Dr. Natriello's effort to show that children in Hartford 
come to school suffering from more social conditions which 
have a negative effect on performance than suburban children 
is supported by evidence submitted by the defendants showing 
differences in infant and maternal health care; Def. Ex. 40 
and 41; differences in exposure to crime and drugs; Def. Ex. 
42; a higher rate of mobility; Def. Ex. 2.32; and a somewhat 
different rate of school attendance. Def. Ex. 8.3. 

  

-112- 

       



  

5 children is beyond question. Vol. 8, pp. 64-65 (Natriello); Vol. 

hy il 32, p. 21 (Armor); Vol. 35, p. 76 (Crain). Precisely why poor     children and more affluent children perform differently even when 

Fetes are exposed to comparable educational programs is not fully 

understood. Vol. 35, p. 77 (Crain). In all likelihood, SES is a 

measure of a host of factors relating to the child's background 

and family influences that affect a child's orientation toward 

and skill. in learning. Vol. 32, pp. 138-140 (Armor); Vol. 33, 

pp. 11-12 (Armor). But, whatever the reason may be, it is clear 

that poverty has a strong negative impact on educational 

achievement independent of what goes on in the schools. 

    Because poverty has such a strong negative impact on 

education, any attempt to assess whether deficiencies in the 

Hartford public schools are responsible for the poor performance 

of Hartford school children in relation to children in the 

suburbs must take into account the comparatively higher number of 

Hartford students who come to school from poverty. | 

Although he did not do so in his study of the Hartford area 

(Pl. Ex. 163), Dr. Gary Natriello agreed that it is important to 

separate out the effects of the disadvantages children bring to 

school with them from the effects of a particular educational 

intervention if your object is to understand the quality and/or | 

effectiveness of that intervention. Vol. 11, PP. 8, 9, 22-23 | 

® 113       
 



  

i (Natriello). Another key witness for the plaintiffs, Dr. Robert 

= Crain, acknowledged this same point. Vol. 35, pp. 79-80 (Crain). 

Since poverty is one of the disadvantages that children bring to | 

school with them, differences in performance between two groups 

of students cannot be attributed to differences in the quality of | 

education provided to those two groups without first controlling 

for differences in performance that are simply the product of 

- differences in the socioeconomic status of the children in the 

two groups. Def. Bx. 10.1; Vol. 31, pp. 151-153, 183 (Flynn); 

Vol. 32, p- 21 Armor): Vol. 10, 2 102 (Crain); Vol. 35, pp. 

78-79 (Crain) 26/ 

Accordingly, the only proper and objective way to compare   the quality of education in Hartford to the quality of education 

: : 
in the suburban schools using performance measures like the CMT | 

  

| 

56/ Studies of the CMT by the State Department of Education have | 
shown that differences in SES are the "primary factor” 
explaining differences in performance on the CMT across the 
state..Def. Ex. 12.14, -pp. v, vi; Pl. Ex..59, p. 5. For 
this and other reasons the Department has advised against 
making the kind of cross-district comparisons of raw CMT 
scores that Dr. Natriello presents in Pl. Ex. 163. See, | 
ed.,, Pl. BEx.-308, p. 20 and P1. Ex." 290, p.17; Vol. 25, p. 
93 (Williams). Dr. Natriello agrees that at least some 
portion of the difference in performance on the CMT between | 

{ 

  

Hartford and the suburbs is due to differences in SES and 
family background, rather than school factors, but makes no 
effort to determine how much. Vol. 11, p. 81 (Natriello). 
He also agrees that one would want to control for | 
differences in SES if the object of concern is the quality 
of the educational experience in isolation from student 
characteristics. Vol. 11, pp. 89, 91 (Natriello).   

-114-     
 



  

  

¥ 

is to begin by controlling for the differences in SES between 

z | Hartford children and suburban children. None of the plaintiffs’ 

witnesses did this. None of the plaintiffs’ witnesses could tell 

the court how much of the difference in performance between 

Hartford and the suburbs is explained by differences in SES and 

how much, if any, is explained by any objective defects or 

deficiencies in Hartford's educational program. Vol. 35, p. 79 

(Crain) . 

| 
; | 

Only one witness presented the kind of analysis that needed | 

‘to be done in order to know whether the differences in 

  
performance between Hartford and the suburbs indicate that | 

| Hartford might be providing the children in its schools with an   || education inferior to the education being provided to children in 

.| the suburbs. 

Using CMT test results, census data and other data available 

through the State Department of Education and well recognized | 

statistical methods for analyzing such data, Dr. David Armor 

studied the differences in CMT scores and differences in the rate 

  of attendance at four year colleges in the Hartford area. Def. | 

Ex. 11.1 - 11.19,2131.27 =:11.31. With controls for various 

non-programmatic influences on achievement, and SES differences | 

in particular, Dr. Armor's study shows that virtually all of the 

differences in performance between students in Hartford and i 

-115~   
 



  

  students. in the suburbs on the CMT, and virtually all of the 

differences in college attendance can be explained by differences 

lin SES and the background factors that SES represent. Vol. 32, 

Dr. Armor's work offers the court the only study of 

performance measures in the Hartford area that incorporates the 

kind of controls for ‘external forces that must be controlled in 

order to arrive at a meaningful and objective comparison of the 

quality of the education being provided to children in Hartford 

and the suburbs. The conclusions he reached about the quality of 

the education being provided in Hartford based on his study are 

particularly pertinent. 

[Als far as equality of opportunity is 
concerned, we find that Hartford and the 
suburbs are scoring at about what one would 
expect, given the very different, and I would 
say extremely different, levels of 
socioeconomic status; and that, therefore, I 
do not believe that the difference [in] 
Mastery score data between the suburbs and 
Hartford can be used on its face to conclude 
that there is an inequality of opportunity. 

. [Mly analysis does not show any evidence 
that Hartford is doing an inadequate or poor 
job; . . .given these very different 
students, Hartford is doing quite a good job. 

-116- 

 



    

Vol. 32, p. 95 (Armor).57/ 

When Hartford children who are afflicted by poverty come to 

school, they are already behind their suburban counterparts in 

development, with many, if not most, children entering 

kindergarten showing one and a half to two years of developmental 

delay. Vol. 5, p. 132 (lLaFontaine); Vol. 17, p. 86 (Cloud); Vol. 

6, pPP- 11, 41 (Montanez-Pitre). After they arrive at school, 

they make progress from year to year. Vol. 11, p. 80 

(Natriello); Vol. 5, p. 152 (LaFontaine) Hartford students 

continue to be behind, as they were when they started school, but 

results of the Metropolitan Achievement Test (MAT) administered 

by the Hartford school system show that annual gains are being 

made and the students are "holding their own"; i.e., they are not 

losing ground in relation to other children by virtue of being in 

the Hartford schools. Def. Ex. 13.9-13.14; Vol. 24, pp. 116-117 

! (Nearine) . 

  

Even more interesting than the fact that Hartford students 
are doing about as well as one would expect given the 
disadvantages they bring to school, is the fact, apparent 
from Def. Bx. 331.11, 11.12, 31.18, 41.19, 11.28, 11.29, 
11.30, that the suburban districts are doing no better than 
one would expect given the more limited social needs that 
suburban children bring to school with them. This draws 
into question the notion promoted by the plaintiffs that 
attending schools in the suburbs will, by itself, promote 
better achievement among Hartford children. 

  

-317~   
 



Often the performance of Hartford students has been 

presented in ways that make it seem worse than it is. For     
example, portraying group achievement scores in grade 

equivalents, as has been done in Hartford, presents a picture 

|| 
| 
I 
I 
| 1 
| 

| which does not fully convey the breadth of levels at which 

Hartford children are performing. The heavy weight of larger 

numbers of students performing at the poor end of the scale 

| diotores the picture so that the high levels at which some 

students in Hartford are performing are overlooked. Vol. 24, Pp. 

58/ A different 90-93 (Nearine); Vol. 11, pp. 73, 76 (Natriello). 

way of looking at Hartford test results, like that found in Def. 

Ex. 13.3 and 13.4, shows a significant number of Hartford 

students performing at the highest end of the performance scale   
on the Metropolitan Achievement Test. Vol. 24, p. 96 (Nearine). 

Overall, Hartford's annual testing program shows "that generally   
the school system and the majority of the schools are effective; 

they're doing what they're suppose to do." Vol. 24, PP. 116-117 

(Nearine). Test scores do not show that the Hartford public 

  

58/ The SABE test scores displayed by Dr. Natriello in Pl. Ex. 
163, Fig. 30, p. 137 are another example of how the display 
of test scores can be misleading. Def. Ex. 13.15 and the 
testimony of the Hartford administrator responsible for 
analyzing the SABE scores make it evident that it would be 
erroneous to read Figure 30 of Pl. Ex. 163 as evidence that 
the quality of Hartford's bilingual education program 
declines as students move up in the grades, although an 
uninformed reader of Figure 30 might jump to that 
conclusion. Vol. 24, pp. 161, 165-167 (Hubert). 

    

-118- 

     



    

  

    
i 
| 

| 
| | 

| 
| 
i 

| 

i 

  

schools are failing as the plaintiffs would have this court 

believe. 

There is even some reason believe that the CMT results are 

actually hiding an important positive accomplishment being made 

by the Hartford public schools. The gap in CMT performance 

between Hartford and the suburbs has not been increasing; Vol. 

8, p. 142 (Natriello); despite the fact that the gap between the 

SES of Hartford residents and the SES of suburban residents has 

been increasing. Def. Ex. 8.1, 8.2; Vol. 11, pp. 114-116 

(Natriello). Given the significant impact of SES on achievement, 

it stands to reason that Hartford and its teachers deserve credit 

for fending off some of the detrimental consequences of the 

social and economic forces operating on the area. 

In any event, from an objective point of view, Hartford 

schools are not failing. Hartford children are benefiting from 

their education by making annual gains. This does not mean, 

however, that there is reason to be satisfied with the progress 

being made. As state officials and agencies have often said, we 

need to do more than promote annual gains among our urban 

children. We need to do what we can to bring their achievement 

levels up to the levels of other students by overcoming the 

social problems which put them behind in the first place. But 

only the legislature can address the host of problems faced by   
 



  

  

  

  

| 

    

the children in our cities, and only the legislature can 

effectively address the problem of poverty, which is the real 

problem in this case. 

The performance levels of students in the Hartford area are 

evidence that we as a society need to do more to address the 

complex social conditions that interfere with the ability of some 

children to take advantage of the opportunity to learn. But they 

are not evidence of any failure on the part of the state to make 

the opportunity to learn available to children in accordance with 

"Article VIII, Section 1. 

D. THE PROBLEMS OF RACIAL, ETHNIC AND SOCIOECONOMIC 
ISOLATION AND POOR EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN HARTFORD 
AND OTHER URBAN AREAS ARE COMPLEX SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED IN THE LIMITED CONTEXT OF A 
CASE SUCH AS THIS, BUT MUST BE ADDRESSED BY A BROAD 
SPECTRUM OF INITIATIVES WHICH CAN ONLY BE DIRECTED BY 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. 

3. Demographic Patterns In the Hartford Area. 

The plaintiffs have characterized this case as a school 

desegregation case, and much of their attention has been focused 

on the racial and ethnic composition of the schools in the 

Hartford area. In Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 488, the plaintiffs 

portray the racial composition of the Hartford public schools as 

a steeply ascending line of increasing minority dominance. Based 

on this exhibit, the plaintiffs argue that the student 

=120- 

  

 



  

y demographic patterns which exist today were readily foreseeable 

= thirty or more years ago, and that racial and ethnic isolation in 

the Hartford area continues to worsen. Plaintiffs’ claims are 

based on a simplistic analysis of demographic patterns in the 

Hartford area -- an analysis that gives little or no hint of the 

extraordinarily complex social and demographic phenomena that 

have operated on the communities and schools in the Hartford i 

area. The simplicity of the plaintiffs’ analysis of student 

demographic patterns, particularly their failure to separate out 

the different patterns of the owe. LaYaess minority groups in the 

| Hartford area, leads them to conclusions that are often 

misleading and, in some instances, just plain wrong. 

  The demographic patterns that exist today did not even begin 

to appear until around 1940, and even then, only a portion of the | 

patterns which would eventually develop began to show themselves. | 

Before 1940, the African-American population in Connecticut | 

represented a very small share of the total population and even | 

showed some tendency to be in decline. Vol. 16, p. 67 (Collier).     | 
: : | 

After 1940, the African-American share of the population began to | 

grow statewide. By 1965, when the Harvard Study of Hartford's | 

schools was done, there was a significant African-American 

presence in Hartford and other urban areas. Def. Ex. 13.1 and | 

13.2 | | 

® -121- 

      
 



  

> | The authors of the Harvard Study made some predictions as to 

3 how the racial composition of the schools might change over the   
next decade. According to their projections, the rapid increase 

in the non-white student population in Hartford (almost all of 
1 
) 

whom were African-American students) which had been evident up to 

| that time would not continue. .Def. Ex. 13.2, p.2. This 

prediction has proven to be both wrong and right. In terms of 

the all "non-white" students, the prediction was wrong. But with 

respect to African-American students, who were the only 

significant minority group at the time of the Harvard study, this 

prediction, by and large, was correct. Vol. 13, pp. 98-99   
(Gordon). In 1963-64, 36.3% of the students in the Hartford | 

public schools were African-American. Pl. Ex. 19, p. 30 (Table 

4.1.14). Almost 30 years later in 1992, the percentage of 

African-American students in the Hartford public schools had 

l grown by only 6.8 percentage points to 43.1%. See Def. Ex. 2.6 

and 2.12. 

What the Harvard Study failed to predict was an entirely new |! 

phenomenon -- the massive influx of Latino students, primarily of   Puerto Rican ancestry. Vol. 13, p. 99 (Gordon). Traditionally 

| new ethnic groups have entered the state through our cities; Vol. | 

16, p. 69 (Collier); and this pattern is true of the arrival of 

| Latinos in the state. The influx of Latinos began in the 1960s, 

% wl 23 |     
 



  

but, according to a witness for the plaintiffs, the influx was 

not clearly”: felt until the 1970s. Vol. 18, pp. 29-30 

! (Morales). It is evident from Table 5 (below) that the increase 

'' in the percentage of "minority" students in the Hartford public 

schools for almost 30 years, from 1963 to 1992, is due primarily 

to the increase in the number of Latino students relative to the 

decrease in the number of white students. 

TABLE 5 
| 
| 

: 

CHANGE IN THE RACIAL AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE HARTFORD 
| PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1963 TO 1992: 

| 

| 196359/ 1992 Change | 
| Latino Students (Hartford) 599 1256460/ 411965 (+1997.5%) | 
| White Students (Hartford) 15300 176751/  -13533 (- 88.5%) | 
| African-American Students 
'| (Hartford) 9061 1120152/ + 2140 (+ 23.6%); 

| |   
Latino students now represent the largest group of students 

iin the Hartford public schools. This demographic condition, of 

‘which there was little advance notice, has had its own special 

implications for the schools. Latino students bring to school 

their own special needs, particularly in the area of language. 

The relatively recent influx of Latino students into the Hartford 

  

| 59/ Derived from Table 4.1.14 {D.-230) of Pl. Ex. 19. 
| 

1860/ ‘pef. Ex. 2.13. 

ji 61/ Derived from Def. Ex. 2.6 and 2.7. 

' 62/ ‘Def. ‘Bx. 2.13. | 

* i -123- 

 



  

  

  

    

public schools is an important educational and demographic fact 

that is overlooked when African-Americans and Latinos are treated 

as one homogenous group, having the same experiences and needs, 

as the plaintiffs have done. 

The recent influx of Latinos is, however, only one of the 

important phenomena that the plaintiffs’ simplistic portrayal of 

the demographic patterns in the Hartford area has blurred. 

Another important phenomenon is the pattern of increasing 

diversity in the suburbs of Hartford. The African-American and 

Latino populations are growing in suburban schools and in the 

suburban communities. As Table 6 on Page 124A shows, the 

African-American population in the 21 suburban communities that 

are the focus of this case increased by 141.1% from 1970 to 1980 

land by 74.4% from 1980 to 1990. The African-American student 

|| population in those suburbs grew by 39.2% from 1980 to 1990. In 

fact, Table 7 below shows that all of the growth in the 

1 African-American student population in the Hartford area over the 

last twelve years has been in the suburbs. 

TABLE 7 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDENT POPULATION GROWTH IN THE HARTFORD 
AREA, 1980 TO 1892 (SUMMARY OF DEF. EX. 2.12) 

African-American Enrollment 1980 31992 Change 
21 Suburbs 3825 6380 +2454 
Hartford 123903 11201 -1192 
Area Jo318 17581 +1262   

 



  

! 
= 

x 
T 

TABLE ¢ 
MINORITY DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS: STUDENT AND TOTAL POPULATION 

EE ET TT I TT TT TT rE Er ems nnn wm Em nw st ew oe a ee el 

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

BLACK 

1 of Total Black Population in Area 
'70 to '80' 'B0 to '90 10 '80 90 

Total Black Population (Defendants' Exhibit 1.4) 
Hartford + 4.8% +17.7% 88.3% 76.6% 68.8% 
21 Suburbs +141.1% +74 .4% 11.7% 23.4% 31.2% 

'80 to '90 
Black Pupil Population (Defendants' Exhibit 2.12) 

Hartford - 8.0% 75.9% 67.6% 
21 Suburbs +39.2% 24.1% 32.4% 

HISPANIC 

3 of Total Hispanic Population in Area 
'80 to '90 : '80 '90 

Total Hispanic Population (Defendants' Exhibit 1.5) 
Hartford + 58.2% 84.3% 78.7% 
21 Suburbs +128.8% 15.7% 21.3% 

Hispanic Pupil Population (Defendants' Exhibit 2.13) 
Hartford + 32.2% 91.1% 85.8% 
21 Suburbs +122.2% 8.9% 14.2% 

 



  

5 The demographic pattern for Hispanics in the Hartford area 

= is similar to the pattern for African-Americans except that their   numbers have increased significantly in Hartford as well as in 

the suburbs. Table 6 on page 124A shows that from 1980 to 1990 

the Hispanic population in the suburban communities grew by | 

128.8%. In that same time period, the Hispanic student 

population in the suburbs grew by 122.2%. 

Clearly, the suburbs are becoming more diverse because 

increasing numbers of African-American and Latino families are 

choosing to live and to send their children to school in the. 

suburbs. The consistency of this trend is evident from Table 8, 

which shows that Hartford's share of the African-American and   Latino population has consistently declined over the last twelve 

years. This is, undoubtedly, a very positive sign for increasing 

diversity in the Hartford area schools. 

TABLE 8 
HARTFORD'S SHARE OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND LATINO STUDENTS 
IN THE HARTFORD AREA, 1980 TO 1992 (DEF. EX. 2.12 AND 2.13) 

  

  
  

African-American 7 
Latino 9 

Not only has Hartford's share of the African-American 

students in the Hartford area declined, but in actual numbers, 

Hartford's African-American student population has declined. 

. -125-     
 



  

i Table 7 (above); Def. Ex. 2.12; Vol. 24, p.13 (Calvert). This 

y decrease is especially significant in light of the fact that 

total enrollment in Hartford has been on the increase. Def. Ex.   
2.2. The decline in the number of African-American students 

attending school in Hartford is also noteworthy because of its 

contrast to the demographic pattern in the suburbs. Most of the 

suburban school districts have seen considerable growth in the 

number of African-American students in their schools. Def. Ex. 

2.12 The significance of this growth of the African-American’ 

student population in the Subitbs Debomes even more evident when 

it is noted that total enrollment in the suburbs has declined. 

Def. Ex. 2.4. 

The demographic pattern for all African-Americans living in   
the Hartford area shows a similar trend of movement to the 

| suburbs. In raw numbers, the African-American population in 

Hartford has increased, but when the reasons for that change, 

i.e., natural growth (births over deaths) versus migration, are 

taken into account, it shows that Hartford is experiencing a 

small but significant net out-migration of African-Americans. 

Def. Bx. 1.9; Vol. 23, pp. 59-61 (Steahr). 

Demographic patterns in the Hartford area are dynamic and 

changeable. Vol. 23, pp. 20-21 (Steahr). There are very powerful 

social forces behind these patterns, including the power of 

* -126-     
 



  

individual choice; Def. Ex. 11.21 through 11.25; Vol. 32, P+:3128 
IN 
3 & 

Py (Armor) ; and the tendency of people of the same ethnic background 

to congregate in particular areas. Vol. 23, p. 67 (Steahr). 

These powerful forces are, for the most part, beyond the control 

of government -- particularly in a democratic society. Vol. 32, | 

p. 129 (Armor). There is solid demographic evidence to infer | 

that the forces now acting on the Hartford area are moving the 

area toward greater racial and ethnic diversity. Hd
 

The plaintiffs are asking the court to react to the 

demographic patterns that currently exist in the Hartford area -- 

a short sighted and simplistic approach that ignores the 

complexity and dynamic nature of the area's demographics. The 

court cannot control these demographic patterns by artificial   
means, and there is reason to be concerned that such attempts may | 

actually interfere with the positive patterns that are naturally 

emerging. 

2, The Relationship Between Changes In Racial And Ethnic 
Composition And Student Performance. 

One of the basic foundations of the plaintiffs' case is that | 

student performance will be improved by a court order which 

changes the racial and ethnic composition of the schools. The   
|| relationship between changes in the racial and ethnic composition 

  
® -127~- 

    
 



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~ 
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of the schools and student performance is not nearly as simple or 

clear as the plaintiffs would have the court believe. 

In the 1960s, when the courts began to undo de jure 

segregation that was rampant in some parts of the country, it was 

generally believed that desegregating the schools would improve 

the achievement of African-American children. Vol. 33, p. 83 

(Armor). The movement to desegregate the schools by court order 

gave social scientists the opportunity to study this proposition. 

In 1583, Dr. Robert Slavin, a witness for the plaintiffs, 

succintly summarized what the evidence then showed: "At present 

social science has reached a somewhat pessimistic consensus about 

the effect of school desegregation on student achievement and 

race relations.! Vol. 19, pp. 71-73 (Slavin). 

In 1989, the State Department of Education commissioned a 

study entitled "Review of Research on School Desegregation'’s 

Impact on Elementary and Secondary School Students," commonly 

referred to as the "Schofield Report®. Def. Ex. 12.25." The 

conclusions in the Schofield Report are not very different from 

the conclusions reached by Dr. Slavin six years earlier. 

According to the Schofield Report, "making generalizations 

about desegregation's outcomes is risky”; Def. Ex. 12.25, p. 1; 

in large part because "much of the research is flawed in one way 

-128- 

  

 



  

| or another.” Id. at 6. Not only is the research often flawed but 
pA 

< 
~ 

5 lit is almost entirely limited to studies of the effect of 
i 

. desegregation on African-American children. "There is virtually 

no empirical evidence about the impact of school desegregation on 

i the academic achievement of Hispanic students. ...Furthermore, | 

the few studies which [the author of the Schofield Report] was 

able to locate deal exclusively with Mexican-Americans."”" Def. Ex. 

12.25, p. 13.57 

H
o
 

On the basis of these caveats, the conclusion reached by the | 

author of the Schofield Report was that the measurable positive 

educational effects of school desegregation, while worthy of   consideration, are weak. Def. Ex. 12.25, pp. 35-36. The author 

notes findings of "some positive effect on reading skills" but 

that this effect does not occur in all situations and when it 

does occur " [tlhe effect is not huge.” 1d. The author finds, 

  

63/ Dr. Julio Morales, who testified for the plaintiffs, also 
noted that the impact of school desegregation on Puerto 
Rican children had not been studied sufficiently and 
suggested that he was considering undertaking one of the 
first such studies. Vol. 18, pp. 47-49 (Morales). Dr. 
Robert Crain admitted that the results of his study of 
Project Concern might not have direct carry-over to Latino 
children since there were so few Latino children in his 
sample. Vol. 10, p. 99 (Crain). Given that the largest 
group of minority students who would be affected by any 
attempt to change the racial and ethnic composition of the 
Hartford public schools would be Latino/Puerto Rican, the 
absence of any studies that tell us what impact any 
particular change might have on this group is especially 
troublesome. 

@ es 

| 
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  however, that even this tenuous relationship between 

| 

| | 

desegregation and improvements in reading skills does not carry 

‘over to improvements in mathematics skills. Id. Beyond the 
| 
| 

| | 

academic areas, the Schofield Report notes "some evidence that 

|desegregation may help to break what can be thought of as a 
| 

ilgenerational cycle of segregation and isolation”. Id.. But in 

iiof minority children to middle class children might cause those.   

| 

| 
||lregard to those who have put forth the notion that the exposure 

| 
| 
| 
| minority children to be "influenced by their middle class peers’ 

| 

|stronger orientation toward achievement”, the Schofield Report 

notes that "[r]ecent research has not lent credence to this 
1 

| 
[poELon. ht Id., p. 7. The research that has been conducted to 

| 
'|lchanging the racial and ethnic composition of schools will have 

jVol. 27, p. 63 {(Rossell). | 

As noted in a previous section of this brief, one of the 

iproblems that social scientists have when trying to measure the 

leducational achievement is that there are often a number of 

| confounding factors which must be considered. The most 

significant of these is difference in the socioeconomic status 

| 

! 

| 

| 
| 
| effect of a particular educational intervention on student 

| 
| 

| 

| 

| 
'| (SES) of students. The negative impact of individual poverty on 

| 
| 

-130- 

| 
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\lachievement is something which is widely acknowledged and i! 

a 

controlled for by competent social scientists. Vol. 35, p. 76 

| 

| 
| 
| 

  
' (Crain). A social scientist who fails to separate out the impact 

of differences in SES or poverty rates between groups of students 

|before drawing any conclusions about differences in achievement 

|!between those groups is almost certain to reach erroneous 

ilconclusions about the effect on achievement of educational 

schoocle Sl 

| 

| 
| 

| interventions like changing the racial and ethnic composition of 

| 

| 
Despite the importance of knowing whether a change in 

| performance following desegregation is due to a real improvement   in student achievement or only due to the fact that students with 
bi 

|different socioeconomic backgrounds are being tested, some who 

i 
£3 

  | 
j5/ For example, if a particular school serves a population of 
| students who are mostly poor, the average score of that ! 

school on a standardized achievement test could be improved 
| simply by taking out poor children and substituting children 

of a high SES. But is that improved score a reflection of 
the positive impact of desegregating that school? Since the 

| children of higher SES could be expected to do better than 
| the poor children they replaced under any set of 
| circumstances, any improvement in the average score of the 

students in that school after the more affluent children are 
brought in cannot be attributed to desegregation without 

| first separating out that portion of the improvement in the 
| average score attributable only to the fact that different 

students are being tested. Controls for differences in SES 
| between the former and the present student bodies are 

essential to obtain a fair comparison, as Dr. Crain, one of 
| the plaintiffs’ key witnesses readily acknowledged. Vol. 10, 
| Pp. 102-103 (Crain). 

  

£1331 ~ | 
| 
| 

| 
| 

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| 
| 

  
| 

  

  

claim that desegregation has a positive effect on achievement 

insist that there is no reason to consider whether a 

"desegregation effect” is the product of changes in the racial 

rand ethnic composition of the school or the effect of measuring 

‘land comparing the performance of different children. For 

jexample, Dr. Gary Orfield, a witness for the plaintiffs, is 

lcritical of any effort to separate the effects of individual 

|| poverty and racial isolation, claiming that racial isolation and 

poverty are always inextricably linked. 

However, the reality is that racial isolation and 

i|jconcentrations of poverty can and do exist as separate 

conditions. Vol. 27, pp. 56-68 (Rossell). Bloomfield is just one 

lexample of this phenomenon. Arguably, Bloomfield is more 

| 
‘lracially isolated than Hartford because most of its students are 

African-American. Yet Bloomfield students are not afflicted by 

poverty and their CMT scores are well above the. scores of 

Hartford children. Bloomfield demonstrates why it is important 

to know whether it is racial isolation or some other force which 

1s causing lower than expected achievement in Hartford. Most 

social scientists, including most of the plaintiffs' witnesses, 

agree that it is important to separate the effects of poverty 

from the effects of racial isolation, and that there are ways in   
 



Md
 

  

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  .lwhich the separate effects of poverty and racial isolation can be 

measured statistically. Vol. 32, p. 19 (Armor). 

Dr. Orfield's report on San Francisco; Pl. Ex. 455; shows 

their theory that desegregation will lead to significant changes 

| 
| 
| how he and other social scientists have struggled to support 

! 
3 
'|in achievement despite strong evidence that the impact is 

| minimal or nonexistent. According to Dr. Orfield's report, the 

'|Ssan Francisco school district successfully achieved its 

desegregation goals in that case. But as to student achievement, 

  Dr. Orfield reported that "the district has not reached the goals 

for academic achievement for the overwhelming majority of | 
| 
African-American and Hispanic students in the critical areas of 

| 
leducational attainment, dropouts, special education placements, 

Jif 

'jand suspension from school.” Id. p.1. He also noted; "In 

| general, ...most African-American and Hispanic high school 

‘students continue to show very low test scores and very high 
| 
| 

|| dropout rates, even in targeted Consent Decree schools.” Id. p.5. 

Finally he recognized" "The most recent data shows little or no 

progress.” ld. p.30. 

In the face of the overwhelming evidence that desegregation 

iin San Francisco did not produce improvements in student 

|performance measures, Dr. Orfield still tries to promote the 

notion that desegregation produces better performance in his 

=133-   
 



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rae ® 

report. On page 47 of the San Francisco report, the improved   
achievement levels in one school are touted as an example of a 

'nclassic desegregation effect.” However, Def. Ex. 48 and Dr. 

jOrfield’s response to that exhibit; Vol. 35, pp. 132-133, 163 

| (orfield); show that this so-called "classic desegregation 

effect" is really just the end product of a methodologically 

| .isuperficial and deficient study. 

| Neither the defendants nor any of their witnesses have 

suggested that pursuing diversity -and reducing isolation in our 

schools is not a worthy goal. Indeed, as discussed above, state 

policy is specifically and clearly directed toward that goal. 

There are benefits to offering children a diverse school 

environment that cannot be measured. However, since this court   
is being asked to direct significant changes in the basic 

structure of our educational system that almost certainly will 

require the expenditure of huge sums of money and the abandonment 

of certain advantages of the present system, the benefits to be 

gained from what the court is being asked must not be 

exaggerated. 

  Dr. Robert Crain was the only witness offered by the 

plaintiffs who studied how differences in the racial and ethnic 

| 
| composition of the schools in the Hartford area might affect 
Hl 

  | -134- 

  
 



  

  65/ 
minority children. Dr. Crain studied Project Concern, one of 

= 
©   2 the oldest programs in the country offering urban children the 

opportunity to attend school in largely white and middle class 

schools in the suburbs. The results of Dr. Crain's "Finding 

Niches" study are summarized in Appendix 4 to this brief. What 

those results show is that on most measures which Dr. Crain : 

considered with appropriate controls for differences in family 

- background, the benefits of attending school in the suburbs to fy 

children participating in Project Concern were not statistically 

significant .%6/ 

Dr. Crain did not study the effect of Project Concern on   
participants’ academic achievement. Vol. 10, p.65 (Crain). Those 

who have conducted such studies found little or no differences in 

test scores between Hartford children who attended school in the   
suburbs through Project Concern and similar Hartford students who   
  

remained in Hartford schools, Def. Ex. 13.19, pp. 26-27 {(“[nlo | 

| 

65/ The studies done by Dr. Jomills Braddock, Dr. William Trent 
and Dr. Mary Kennedy focused on national student samples. 
Dr. William Trent and Dr. Mary Kennedy did not present 
studies which focused to any significant degree on the | 
effects of changes in the racial and ethnic composition of 
schools. Vol. 7, pp. 100, 118-122 (Trent); Vol. 14, p. 74 
(Kennedy) . 

66/ Dr. Crain conceded that, in another study of Project Concern 
students, he was unable to show that Project Concern 
participation had any effect on later life income or on the 
likelihood that Project Concern children would work in 
higher status jobs. Vol. 10, pp. 75-77 (Crain). 

    

-135- i     
 



  

differences were found in student growth as measured by Woodcock 
=~ 
© > 

; 'iReading Mastery Test between the Project Concern students and the   jRartiord comparison students.”); Def. Ex. 13.20, p. 87 (no 

H 
{ 
| 
significant differences between matched groups of suburban 

| Project Concern students and Hartford students in reading or math 

MAT scores for students whose test results were monitored from 

1980-81toO 1984-85) .57/ 

Hd
 

| There is no doubt that Project Concern is a worthwhile 

|| program and that some children who participate in the program : 

appear to do better than might otherwise be expected. Vol. 32, p. 

1119 (Armor). But there is no reason to believe that the   
difference in the racial composition of the suburban schools had   anything to do with the performance of the relatively small group 

|lof children who participated in Project Concern and seemed to 

perform better than expected.     
|67/ Dr. Jomills Braddock's national study of the relationship 

between the racial composition of a student's high school 
and various outcome measures showed the same kind of limited 
effect that Dr. Crain found in Dr. Crain's Project Concern 
study. Among other things, Dr. Braddock found almost no ; 
relationship between the racial composition of a student's 
high school and whether the student secured a blue collar or 
white collar job in the North; Vol. 5, p. 66 (Braddock); no 
statistically significant relationship between the racial 
composition of the high school and perception of co-worker 
friendliness; Vol. 5, pp. 80-82 (Braddock); and no 
statistically significant relationship between the racial 
composition of the high school and the number of years of | 
college attained; Vol. 5, pp. 86-87 (Braddock). 

  

-136~   
 



  

In Def. Ex. 11.26, the results of a reanalysis of Dr. 

| 

| 

| 
| 

| 

| 

] 
[Crain's Project Concern data performed by Dr. David Armor are   presented. The tables presented in this exhibit show several 

| tportant facts about the group of students Dr. Crain studied. 

| The data show that students left Project Concern and returned to 

Hartford schools at a startling rate of almost 50%. Table 1. The |; 

jdata show that, although the difference is not statistically i 

= 
| significant, students who left Project Concern before they 
| 

| finished their education did not perform as well as students who 

never participated in Project Concern. Table 3. Most 

importantly, the data show that the amount of time students spent 

  lin Project Concern, i.e., the amount of exposure to suburban 

students, had no real bearing on the children's performance.   
{Table 4 and 5. Vol. 32, pp. 117-119 (Armor). | 

Clearly, something other than the exposure to suburban 

{ 

children or attending schools in the suburbs must explain why 

some Project Concern students seem to do better. In all 

{which Dr. Crain was not able to eliminate from his study by the 

‘methods he chose to use to control for this factor. Vel. 32, pp.   

| likelihood the explanation can be found in "self-selection bias," 

i 

| 

1117-119 (Armor). The fact that the entire difference between 
| 

| performance of Project Concern children as a whole and Hartford 

children is explained by the better performance of students who 

-137- 

 



  

finished their education in the suburbs; Def. Ex. 11.26, Table 3; 

| regardless of the amount of time they spent in the suburbs; Def. 

(Ex. 11.26, Table 5; is strong evidence that family background and 

other forces that cause self-selection bias are at play. Dr. 

| crain himself conceded that it is possible that the students who 
by 
i 

| finished their education in Project Concern might have done just 1 
| as well if those students had remained in Hartford. Vol. 35. 

HP.103. (Crain). 

Simply stated, the data which were gathered by Dr. Crain in 

‘his study of Project Concern, and the data collected by others 

who studied Project Concern, do not offer persuasive evidence 

'|that a large scale redistribution of students, like that   | envisioned by the plaintiffs in this case, will produce 

‘significant gains in student educational achievement. 

There are many costs necessarily associated with the 

| 

| 
[i 

t 

ll 

upheaval of students, faculty and staff which the plaintiffs are 

| asking the court to supervise. The object of whatever effort is 

| undertaken to enhance education in this state must be to improve 

{educational achievement. Is the kind of upheaval which the 

| plaintiffs are calling for a cost-effective way in which to 

improve educational attainment? The evidence suggests that it is 

| not. Plaintiffs' witnesses have testified that Hartford children   
| need an educational program that is different from the 

   



| ® » J 

  

  
traditional educational program offered in suburban school 

nn 
© y 

districts because of their special needs. Vol. 8, pp. 91, 95 
2 

‘(Natriello). Changing the racial and ethnic composition of the 

{schools although a laudable goal, does not hold the promise of 

ithe kind ‘of pay-off in terms of educational achievement that more 

cost effective measures, such as compensatory programs or other 

changes in the educational offerings of the Hartford public 

schools, might have. Vol. 32, pp. 122-123 (Armor). Under these 

circumstances the questions of how much of our resources should 

i 
#
 

: 

go to promoting racial and ethnic diversity, and how much should 

g 

| 

| 
| 
| 
| 

| 

re 
| 

|| improve educational performance, are questions which have no 

| 

© to compensatory programs and other initiatives designed to | 
{ 
| 
| 

| 
constitutional answer. They are questions for the General | 

| | 

Assembly alone. 

| 
Py 

i 

i 3. The History Of Court Ordered School Desegregation In 
This Country Does Not Support The Notion That Courts 

3 Can Effectively Address The Complex Problems Facing Our 
} Schools. 

The executive and legislative branches of government in 

Connecticut are pursuing policies designed to bring children of 

different racial, ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds together 

so that there is opportunity for positive exposure to children of   
3 
|different backgrounds. Similarly, these branches of government 

| 
|are pursuing policies designed to promote the highest possible 
| 
| ; 
i | 
| -139- 

  
8 
Hl 
i 
2 

 



$
d
 

  

©   
| 

  
i 

| 

  

  

    

level of achievement in all of our children. In spite of this, 

the plaintiffs ask the court to take over supervision of these 

efforts, at least in the Hartford area. The plaintiffs believe 

that the courts can do a better job of promoting diversity in our 

schools and improving student achievement. They offer the 

experience of the federal courts as evidence that the courts are 

better able to accomplish the results which state policy already 

seeks to achieve. But have the federal courts been successful in 

creating positive social conditions, such as diversity in our 

urban schools? And have they been successful in raising the 

performance of poor students in urban areas to the same levels as 

affluent suburban students? Or have the federal courts only been 

successful in stopping and undoing de jure segregation? It 

appears that this last question is the only one that can be 

answered in the affirmative. 

Professor Charles Willie cited Boston as an example of a 

court supervised desegregation plan that he deemed "successful". 

However, the Boston public schools were 64% white when the first 

of his desegregation plans was implemented in the 1970s and now 

only 20% of the students in Boston are white. Vol. 15, pp. 

108-109 (Willie); Vol. 27, pp. 13, 17-18 (Rossell). Professor 

Gary Orfield cited St. Louis as an example of a successful court 

ordered desegregation plan. But in St. Louis the transfer of 

-140- 

 



Mi
 

  

bh 

© » 

| 
| 

. » 
| 
| ! 
[] 

| 
|   113,500 African-American students from the city to the suburban 

} schools left the white enrollment in the city only one percentage 

Yooint higher than it was twelve years earlier, before the plan 

was implemented. Vol. 22, pp. 76-80 (Orfield). Clearly, the 

courts were not successful in promoting diversity in these city 

H 
| 

{ 

| 

4 
H 

i 
| 

1 68/ 
| 

|! 
| school systems. 

| 

Considered from the point of view of technical competence in 

developing plans that promote diversity and enhance educational 

performance, the experience of the federal courts demonstrates 

that the judiciary has no special ability to design and implement 

i|effective plans. Professor Willie published a book in 1984 

entitled School Desegregation Plans That Work. On the witness 

i|stand, he testified that, since the publication of this book, he 

    has been back to almost every city mentioned in the book and 

|| redesigned the plan for their schools. Vol. 15, p. 102 (Willie). 

| Clearly, the federal courts have been experimenting with 

| 
i 
\ 

| 

| 
|i 
bt 
i 
| 

| 

i 

  

68/ One witness for the plaintiffs who suggested that there were 
many examples of "successful” court ordered desegregation 
plans, also testified that white enrollment loss resulting 
from a court ordered plan was of no concern to him. Vol. 34, 
pp. . 20-21, 52, 55 (Gordon). While the loss of white 

| students may not be of any concern in a traditional school 
| desegregation case because the object of that type of case 
| is to eliminate the vestiges of de jure segregation rather 
{ 

  

than bring about racial balance, white enrollment loss must 
be considered if the policy which is being pursued is one 

: which truly seeks to bring children of different backgrounds 
| together. 

-14]1~   
 



| ® » 
! 

  

  different means to promote diversity and improve achievement, but 

it is equally clear that the courts have not found an effective 

way to eliminate racial and ethnic isolation, or to eliminate 

differences in achievement between poor and affluent students. 

ihatever justitication there might be for continuing judicial 

experimentation in cases of de jure segregation, there is no 

| basis for concluding that the state constitution requires the 

courts to engage in such social experimentation under the facts 

presented by the plaintiffs in this case. 

Probably the truest test of whether federal school 

‘'desegregation cases provide a successful model for this court to 

follow is to ask how quickly the federal courts have been able to 

turn authority over the schools back to the citizenry. It is 

| troubling to note that many, if not most, of the court ordered 

if 
| desegregation plans which the plaintiffs’ witnesses cite as 
1 

ll 

  
examples of successful plans remain under court supervision - in 

some cases as long as twenty and thirty years after those matters 

were brought before the court. Vol. 34, pp. 62-64 (Gordon). 

There is no reason to believe from the experience of federal 

courts that this court can successfully do wha the executive and 

legislative branches have not yet been able to do. 

  -142~ 

54 
Ae | 
| 

5 
] 

0 
va 

 



  
4. The Need For Measures Which Go Beyond The Field Of 

Education. 

The defendants share the plaintiffs’ desire that all 

| children perform at the highest possible level regardless of 

| their bagkground or the conditions which they bring to school 

with them. The defendants also share the plaintiffs’ desire that 
i 

all children reach the highest possible level of achievement in | 

| an environment that exposes them to the diversity of the people 
li 

iiof our state. The defendants do Poth however, share the 
I 
plaintiffs’ assumption that a court can saddess tally order these 

fod 

{ 

‘lideals into place. Not only do the courts lack the legal 

| 

| 

| 
| 
! 

Li 

I 

| 

authority to determine how to pursue these objectives because the 
| 

defendants have not violated the constitution, the courts lack 

the breadth of power needed to determine and implement effective 

| approaches to the many obstacles that interfere with educational 

achievement and the opportunity to be exposed to children of 

different backgrounds. 
4 

| This case is about education. Any relief that might be 

| granted by the courts would be limited to the field of education. 

ue the problems that interfere with children's educational 

| performance go far beyond education. While the plaintiffs have 

| presented a case that attempts to narrow the court's field of 

vision, the broader social problems that affect children and  



interfere with their educational achievement must be addressed by 

| means far beyond our schools and far beyond the capacity of the   
| courts in this education case. 

Plaintiffs imply that by restructuring our educational 

system in some fashion, by making our schools more diverse and by 

implementing certain educational enhancements, the problems which 

interfere with childven's educational achievement, particularly 

those which affect urban children, will be overcome. The 

plaintiffs’ own witnesses recognize that this is not true. The 

plaintiffs’ first witness, Dr. David Carter, acknowledged that 

"education can't.do it. all”, Vol. 1, p. 51 (Carter); and the   plaintiffs’ last witness, Dr. Gary Orfield, acknowledged that 

"it's not reasonable to expect the schools to solve everything”, 

Vol. 22, p..54 {(Orfield).     
Dr. Gary Natriello, another witness for the plaintiffs, 

(poignantly summarized some of the social problems more common to 

students in Hartford than to students in the suburbs, which have 

been shown to have a direct negative impact on student 

achievement. See Table 2 on p.38 of Pl. Ex. 163. Children with 

low birth weight, children born to mothers on drugs, children 

born to teen mothers, children living in poverty, children from   
single parent households, children of parents with limited formal 

education, children living in substandard housing, children from 

     



| * » 
| 

  

homes where little English is spoken, children exposed to crime,   =. 
© - 

and children who come from families handicapped by unemployment 

-- all suffer from social conditions which operate outside of the 

classroom and which must be addressed outside our schools in 

''order to be dealt with effectively. These social conditions must 

| be addressed by programs that focus on comprehensive health care 

including pre-natal and maternal care, drug rehabilitation, 

Hi
 

| 

| 
| programs designed to break the cycle of poverty, family 

counseling services, improved and enhanced adult education, 

programs to stimulate the development of quality low and moderate 

income housing, crime prevention and victim assistance 

lactivities, programs to strengthen and to expand the state's 

economy so that jobs are plentiful, and many other kinds of 

social programs that would be far beyond the power of any court 

to order. 

The members of the Governor's Commission on Quality and 

. Integrated Education recognized the magnitude of the task of 

meeting the needs of the children in this state in their letter 

to the Governor transmitting their recommendations for 

| improvements in our educational system: 

We now realize that no set of educational 
i strategies can fully address the myriad | 

social issues that produce inequality and 
undermine education. Substance abuse, 
hunger, parental neglect, crowded and 
substandard housing and inadequate employment 

-145~ 
i 

i | 
i 
! 

| 
i ' 
| 

i 

 



  

y opportunities disproportionately attack 
minority children in our state and divert 

= them from educational opportunity. Unless 
other elements of society and other 

i institutions actively share with education 
i the responsibility for addressing and 

remedying these conditions, not even the best 
of strategic education plans can succeed. 

  
Also gee Vol. 30, p.121 (Calvert); Vol. 31,'pp. 120-21, 141-142 

69/ 

  

(Calvert) . 

These facts present a dilemma. The resources of the state M
d
 

are plainly not unlimited. The dilemma is how to use the 

available resources in the way that will be most effective in 

pursuing our many objectives, educational and otherwise. Some 

decisions must be made as to how to allocate the limited 

resources which are available to deal with social problems inside | 

and outside of the schools in the most effective way.         The real question presented by this case is what branch of 

| government makes these decisions? The simple answer is that it 

cannot be the courts because the courts can never act on the 

  

69/ There is reason to believe that programs which make it 
possible for families in poverty to raise their 
socioeconomic status may, on balance, hold out the best hope 
for improving educational achievement. Vol. 32, plz] 
(Armor). A key witness for the plaintiffs agreed that, 
faced with a situation of limited resources, it might be 
more effective and less expensive to prevent a social 
problem from arising in the first place rather than focus 
all energy and resources on dealing with the consequences of 
that social problem when it appears in the schools. Vol. 
11, pp.6-7 (Natriello). 

-146-     
| 

 



  

broad social policy which need to be addressed. Only the General bd 

3 
oh 

ig Assembly has the broad perspective and broad power needed to     
balance the many competing considerations and direct a 

comprehensive attack on the social problems that interfere with 

the ability of children throughout the state to take full 

advantage of the educational opportunities they are being 

offered: 

f
i
 

Striking the balance between competing considerations is a 

legislative function and not one which the courts can or should 

undertake under the guise of an adjudication of constitutional 

rights.   
It is not the role of the court to strike | 
precise balances among the fluctuating 
interests of competing private groups which 
then become rigidified in the granite of 
constitutional adjudication. That function 
has traditionally been performed by the 
legislature, which has far greater competence 
and flexibility to deal with the myriad 
complications which may arise.... | 

| 
| 

Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 192 Conn. at 65. 
  

  

70/ .pef. .Ex. 38, p.43 (Table 3) shows one of the ways, outside 
of education, in which this state has gone beyond what other 
states have done to address the problem of poverty, for 
instance. According to Table 3, Connecticut's AFDC benefits 
come closer to reaching the poverty line than almost every 
other state. (Only Alaska, Vermont, and a portion of New 
York cover a larger share). 

-147- 

      
 



» 

  

= The problems in the Hartford area which have been described   
¥ in considerable detail during this trial are highly complex and 

must be attacked on many fronts, not just in the schools. 
| 

| Deciding how to address broad and complex social problems is a 

| function of the General Assembly. Unless the General Assembly 

violates the constitution in the manner in which it chooses to 
| 

address such problems, the role of the courts is limited to 

enforcement of the measures chosen by the General Assembly. 

$
d
   

| 
I ‘ 

E. PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED RELIEF IS UNPRECEDENTED AND 
BEYOND THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT. 

| 

| 
| 

| 

! ; : | 
The plaintiffs urge the court to issue a sweeping | 

"injunction" against state legislative and executive bodies.   
.|Despite their attempts to characterize their requested relief as 
il 

injunctive in nature, the plaintiffs have made it clear that they 
| 
| 

| 
are not asking the court to enjoin the defendants from engaging 
| 
| 

in some form of unconstitutional state action. Nor do the 

plaintiffs allege that the defendants are somehow acting in 

| 
|| excess of their constitutional authority. See generally Section 

| 
IT.A.(1), Supra.   

What the plaintiffs seek as relief in this case is to compel 

. some form of state action, not to enjoin or provide a remedy for 

past or present wrongful state action as in Horton I. The 

Iplaintiffs make the vague request that defendants be ordered to 

  
-148- 

 



  

=     provide "integrated education,” "equal educational opportunities" 

= 1and "minimally adequate education.” Consolidated Amended 
i 
jeenplaint, Prayers for Relief, Paragraph 2. In order to 

i effectuate such an order, the plaintiffs seek to have defendants 

compelled to develop and implement a "remedial plan” encompassing 

y21/ "housing and other components. See Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial : 

x 

|) 
| 
virtually every aspect of the educational system as well as 

| 

| 

| Brief at 108-122. Yet the plaintiffs cite no authority for the 

| proposition that state tsgigiscive and executive officials may be 

|| compelled, by means of injunction, to undertake a particular 

M
f
 

‘course of action to address issues committed to the discretion of 

such officials. It is evident that the relief the plaintiffs 

truly seek is not an injunction, but some form of sweeping 

mandamus without meeting any of the requirements for mandamus. 
A 

1 Mandamus is appropriate "to compel a public official to 
7 
perform his duty.” Bahramian v. Papandrea, 184 Conn. 1, 3, 440 
  

'A.2d 777 (1981). However, "the duty it compels must be a 

l ‘ministerial one; the writ will not lie to compel the performance 
  

  
  

| =a | 
ef 8 duty which is discretrionarv.” Beccia v. Waterbury, 185 

  

1171/ The plaintiffs clearly are not entitled to seek any remedy 
in the area of housing. Although they raised the issue of 

} housing in their original complaint, they affirmatively 
withdrew that issue from the case and deleted any : 
allegations regarding housing from the amended complaint now 

1 before the court. See Consolidated Amended Complaint 
| (February 26, 1993). 

¥ -149- 

 



  

    

Conn. 445, 453, 441 A.2d 131 (1981) (emphasis added). "Mandamus 

is an extraordinary remedy. It is designed to enforce a plain 

  

positive duty.” West Hartford Taxpavers Ass'n., Inc. Vv. 

Streeter, 190 Conn. 736, 740, 462 A.2d 379 (1983). Whether to 

issue a writ of mandamus lies within the sound discretion of the 

court and the writ will not issue "to enforce a mere abstract 

right. . . . or to accomplish a result which is not authorized by 

law.” Id., 190 Conn. at 740 {citations omitted). 

When the relief a party seeks against a public official is 

in the nature of mandamus, the strict requirements for issuing 

mandamus have been applied, whether or not the party has formally 

asked for a writ of mandamus in its complaint. Board of Educ. v. 
  

Ellington, 151 Conn. 1, 13, 193 A.2d 466 (1963) (regarding   

plaintiff's request for mandatory injunction: "[t]hat a court 

cannot compel a public official to perform an act which, under 

the law, is within his discretion requires no citation of 

authority”); Boston v. Ricci, 174 Conn. 522, 528. 391 A.24 161   

(1978) (in plaintiff's claim for mandatory injunction or mandamus, 

court notes that local board of education's decision to reduce 

teaching staff is discretionary). 

The plaintiffs ask the court to create, out of whole Cloth, 

a series of unprecedented, overarching duties based loosely on   
  

  

 



  

| 
| 
| 

| 

| 

|   i Article VIII, §1, the education clause and the equal protection 
N 
© > 

| 
jjprovisions of our constitution, then urge the court to order the 
| 
defendants to discharge these purported duties as the plaintiffs 
| 

lsee fit. No court has ever attempted to instruct the General 
| 

Assembly how to carry out its responsibilities under Article   
| VILL, §1. And application of the legal standard for mandamus to 

ithe facts of this case demonstrates unequivocally that the 

  
| 

FE have not established that they are entitled to the Md
 

sweeping relief that they seek. 

  Among other things, the plaintiffs have asked the court to 

‘usurp the authority and discretion committed to state and local   officials and to direct, implement, and administer the operations 

of an indeterminate number of school districts. See Plaintiffs’ ; 

Post-Trial Brief at 108-122. "A writ of mandamus will not lie to 
{ 
|| direct performance of an act requiring the exercise of a public 

  
ljofficer’s judgment or discretion,. . . nor will it lie to review 

a discretionary action of a public officer or board and compel a 

different course of action. . . ." Light v. Board of Educ., 170 
  

Conn. 35, 38, 364 A.2d 229 (1975). Yet the plaintiffs request   the court to substitute its judgment for that of the General 

Assembly and state educational officials and to compel the 

defendants to undertake numerous initiatives in education, 

transportation and housing, based not on a violation of any 

=151~     
 



i » 

) 
| 

  

I clearly defined legal duty; but on the plaintiffs’ particular 

i ideas on social and educational policy. 

"The word ’'ministerial’ under our law refers to a duty which 

is to be performed by an official 'in a given state of facts, in 

a prescribed manner,. . . without regard to or the exercise of 

his own judgment [or discretion] upon the propriety of the act 
| 
i 
it 

tbeing done'."” Pluhowsky v. New Haven, 151 Conn. 337, 347, 197 

1A.2d 645 (1964) (citing Blake v. Mason, 82 Conn. 324, 327, 73 A. 

782 (1909})). Only certain narrow, discrete functions have been 
| 

found to be ministerial. See, e.g., Pluhowsky v. New Haven, 151 
  

Conn. at 347 ("example of such a ministerial duty is that of a 

town clerk to record an instrument which he has accepted for 

i recordation in the land records"); Wright v. Brown, 167 Conn. 464 
  

3 

5 

| 
H 

| 

| 
| 

i 
| 

fl 

| 

| 356 A.2d 176 (1975) (duty of dog warden to quarantine a dog that | 

| has bitten a person is ministerial). All other broad functions 

in which judgment is exercised -- the field of education being a 
: | 

prime example -- are discretionary in nature. See, e.g., Light 
  

iv. Board of Edue. . 170 Conn. at 39-40, 364 A.2d 229 (1975) | 
  

| ("matters concerning the employment of teachers require the board   
1of education to exercise a broad discretion” - mandamus denied) ; 

| Simmons ¥. Budde 165 Conn. 507, 338 A.2d 479, cert. . denied, ‘416   

  

U.S. 940 (1973) (state university's board of trustees granted 
i 
'Ibroad supervisory authority regarding educational policy and must 

-152-~ 

| 
! 
Ii 
| 

{ 

i 
1 
HE 

Re i 
¥ 

2 
| 
| 

| 

 



  

  

= | exercise judgment in performance of that function - mandamus 
; rl 

li denied) .   
i 
H The right to education as guaranteed by our constitution 

cannot be secured by means of discrete ministerial acts. To be 

| sure, virtually every aspect of the development, implementation 

and administration of educational programs requires the exercise 

of judgment and discretion. The General Assembly, pursuant to 

# 

the constitutional mandate of Article VIII, §1, seeks public 

input, considers relevant information and promulgates legislation 

| governing the provision of education in this state. The 

legislative process, by definition, involves the exercise of   
judgment and discretion in formulating public policy as expressed 

by statute.   
The State Board of Education is vested with broad   

supervisory and planning responsibilities regarding the 
‘ 

E 
I 

educational interests of the state. ee Conn. Gen. Stat. §10-4. 

| 

1! 
| 

iy 
Il 
| 
The Board establishes educational goals and engages in an ongoing 

assessment of the means by which to attain those goals. This 

process requires constant attention to and consideration of the   
myriad - and changing, educational options available in an 

increasingly complex society. In carrying out these 

responsibilities, the Board must exercise judgment and 

discretion. Similarly, the Commissioner of Education must 

-153- 

 



  

o exercise judgment and discretion in directing and supervising the   < Department of Education as it implements the educational 

interests of the state. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §10-3a. The very 

nature of education requires the exercise of judgment and 

discretion on the part of those at every level who are 

responsible for providing it. 

Consequently, plaintiffs have not met and cannot meet the 

#'
 

standard for obtaining relief in the nature of mandamus, 

directing defendants to take actions proposed by plaintiffs or by 

a panel of experts convened at the plaintiffs’ request. 

  As noted in Parts III. B.{(l) and III. B. (2) of this 

brief, in requiring the state to offer a system of free public 

elementary and secondary education, the constitution imposes no   specific methods or standards that must be met, nor does it 

prescribe any particular course of conduct for dealing with the 

broad range of challenges and problems involved in educating the 

children of this state. Unless the discretion that must 

constantly be exercised by state and local officials -- from the 

General Assembly down to the classroom teacher -- violates the 

constitution and thereby makes injunctive relief appropriate, the |! 

plaintiffs may not use the court to review and change these 

decisions. They cannot use the court to circumvent the other 

avenues of participation and change that are available to them -- 

-154-     | 
A 

| H 
i 
' 
I 

i 

 



  

  # teachers, principals, state and local boards of education, their 
| 

| state representatives and senators, the General Assembly, the 

i Governor, and the electoral process. 

The court should recognize the plaintiffs' case for what it 

is -- a request by a small group of individuals?’ for a writ of 

mandamus that would dramatically intrude upon the broad 

discretion which must be exercised by the General Assembly, the 

State Board of Education, the Commissioner of Education, 

twenty-two cities, towns and school districts in the Hartford 

area, and the citizens of this state through their elected 

representatives. No court has the authority to grant the kind of 

relief the plaintiffs are seeking under the facts of this case.     
| 
| standards for obtaining relief under the circumstances of this 

| 

| In addition to the fact that the plaintiffs have not met the 

  

72/ The plaintiffs have not sought class certification under 
| Conn. P.B. §§86-90. As a result, they represent no one but | 

themselves. Those whom the plaintiffs might have 
represented if class certification had been requested and 
granted have not enjoyed the protections class certification 
provides to individuals who are not before the court but 
whose rights may be affected by what the court is being 
asked to do. Under these circumstances, the kind of 
injunctive relief the court could consider awarding in this 
case is very limited. The only kind of relief the court | 

| could consider awarding is individual relief for the named 
| plaintiffs. But even in regard to the individual 

| plaintiffs, any relief the court might grant would 

    | 
| 

| impermissibly impinge on the discretion of those responsible 
| for the plaintiffs’ education and the discretion of the 
I General Assembly. 

| 
| 

| 

  
=155- 

 



  
  

  

        
  

  

  

case, our courts have made it clear that the judiciary may not 

fashion relief that directs the activities of coordinate branches 

| of government in the unrestrained manner urged by the plaintiffs. 

| In cases in which plaintiffs have sought mandatory relief against 

governmental entities for constitutional violations, our courts 

have held that, while sovereign immunity is not a complete bar, 

the doctrine does serve as a restriction on the type of relief 

that may be granted. Mandatory relief against governmental 

entities may only be granted where the court can "fashion these 

remedies in such a manner as to wininize disruption of government 

and to afford an opportunity for voluntary compliance with the 

judoment.” Doe v. Heintz, 204 Conn. 17, 32, 526 A.2d 1318 

(1987); Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. at 264. Particularly in the   

field of education, "the court [has been] mindful of the proper 

i 1ihicarions on judicial intervention” and has refrained from 

| interfering with government functions by directing specific 

action on the part of governmental entities. Horton Tr:2172 Conn. 

at 628-629. The plaintiffs’ request for relief in this case, 

which is tantamount to a judicial assumption of legislative and 

executive functions concerning education in this state, is 

precisely the type of intrusive remedy that has been eschewed by 

our courts. The plaintiffs’ request for relief should therefore 

be dismissed.   
 



  

  

  
IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons the defendants ask that judgment 

ihe entered for the defendants. 

| 

FOR THE DEFENDANTS 

i 

| 
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL 

i ATTORNEY GENERAL 

| By: Bernard F. McGovern, Jr. 
| Assistant Attorney General 

A 
R. Whelan - Juris 085112 

Agsistant Attorney General 
| 0 Sherman Street 
i Hartford, Connecticut 06105 : 

Tel. 566-7173 
| 

    

   

  

| 

| 
| 
|: 
I 

| 

A | 
| 
| 

| 
| 

| 

| 

| 
|   

  

irtha M.2 Watts ~~ | 
| Assistant Attorfiey General 
Hy 110 Sherman Street 

Hartford, Connecticut 06105 
Tel. 566-7173 

Alfred A. Lindseth 

Sutherland, Asbill, & Brennan 
999 Peachtree Street, NE 

Atlanta, GA 30309-3996 

-157~ 

  

 



Hd
 

    

N. 
© 3 

    

CERTIFICATION 

This is to certify that on this 28th day of June, 1993 a 

copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following counsel of 

record: 

John Brittain, Esq. Wilfred Rodriguez, Esq. 
University of Connecticut Hispanic Advocacy Project 
School of Law Neighborhood Legal Services 
65 Elizabeth Street 1229 Albany Avenue 
Hartford, CT 06105 Hartford, CT 06112 

Philip Tegeler, Esq. Wesley W. Horton, Esq. 
Martha Stone, Esq. Moller, Horton & 
Connecticut Civil Fineberg, P.C. 
Liberties Union + 90 Gillett Street 
32 Grand Street Hartford, CT 06105 
Hartford, CT 06105 

Julius L. Chambers 
Marianne Engleman Lado, Esq. 

Sandra Del Valle, Esq. 
Ruben Franco, Esq. 
Jenny Rivera, Esq. : Ronald Ellis, Esq. 
Puerto Rican Legal Defense NAACP Legal Defense Fund and 
and Education Fund Education Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street 99 Hudson Street 
14th Floor New York, NY 10013 
New York, NY 10013 

John A. Powell, Esq. 

Helen Hershkoff, Esq. 

Adam S. Cohen, Esq. 
American Civil Liberties Union 

4 

132 West 43rd Street 7 
New York, NY 10036 | 4 7/7 

LLL, 
  

h KR. Whelan 
Agsistant Attorney General 

JRWO660AC 

-158- 

 





  
15 

APPENDIX 1 
INDEX TO TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS 
  

WITNESS (ES) 
  

David Carter 
Edna Negron 

Edna Negron 
Elizabeth Noel 

Donald Carso 

Charles Senteio 
Catherine Kennelly 
John Shea 
Alice Dickens 

Mary Wilson 
Gladys Hernandez 
Eddie Davis 

Jomills Braddock 

Hernan LaFontaine 

Raul Montenez-Pietre 
Robert Pitocco 
Jean Anderson 

Freddie Morris 

William Trent 

Norma Neuman Johnson 

Norma Neuman Johnson 

Gary Natriello 

Gary Natriello 

Robert Crain 

Gary Natriello 
Elizabeth Horton-Sheff 

John Allison 

William Gordon 

William Gordon 

Mary Kennedy 
Hernan LaFontaine 

Milo Sheff 

Charles Willie 

PAGES 

2-59 
60-83 

5-18 
19-78 
79-151 

5-54 
55-112 

113-147 
148-166 

5-31 
32-66 
67-111 

5-116 
120-180 

5-56 
57-106 

107-135 
136-161 

9-150 
152-163 

6-42 
43-177 

5-69 

4-170 

2-191 
192-195 

2-11} 
112-162 

3-168 

2-111 
112-148 
148-151 

2-131 

DATE 

12/16/92 

12/17/92 

12/18/92 

12/21/92 

12/22/92 

12/23/92 

12/29/32 

12/30/92 

12/31/92 

1/5/93 

1/6/93 

1/7/93 

1/8/93 

1/12/93 

1/13/93 

   



  

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26A 
- 26B 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

  

WITNESS (ES) 
  

Christopher Collier 
Yvonne Griffin 
Clara Dudley 

Mary Carroll 
Diane Brown Cloud 

Julio Morales 

T. Josiha Haig 

Robert Slavin 

Virginia Pertillar 
Adnelly Marichal 

Jeffrey Foreman 
Eugene Leach 
Badi Foster 

Gary Orfield 

Thomas Steahr 

Lloyd Calvert 

Lloyd Calvert 
Robert Nearine 
John Hubert 

John Keaveny 
Elliott Williams 
G. Donald Ferree 

G. Donald Ferree 
Christine Rossell 

Christine Rossell 

Robert Brewer 

John Lemega 
Douglas Rindone 

Lloyd Calvert 

Lloyd Calvert 
John Flynn 

David Armor 

PAGES 

2-80 
81-116 

117-147 

3:76 
79-123 

2-53 
57-135 

2-82 

3~7 
7-69 

5-97 
98-110 

111-181 

6-157 

95-113 
116-147 

2-58 
60-157 

158-175 

5-20 
21-148 

150-175 

3-70 
6-117 

5-180 

6-186 

5-55 
57-149 

2-133 

5-143 
145-184 

5=210 

DATE 

1/14/93 

1/15/93 

1/20/93 

1/21/93 

1/22/93 

1/27/93 

1/28/93 

2/2/93 

2/3/93 

2/4/93 

2/5/93 
2/5/93 

2/9/93 

2/10/93 

2/11/93 

2/17/93 

2/18/93 

2/19/93



WITNESS (ES) 
  

David Armor 

William Gordon 

Robert Crain 

Gary Orfield 

DATE 

2/23/93 

2/25/93 

2/26/93 

 



  

“ YAY, 

APPENDIX 2 
SELECTED ERRORS, OMISSIONS, AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS IN PLAINTIFFS' POST-TRIAL BRIEF 

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

1) p.9 (footnote 7) "...Professor Schofield 
also found that the achievement impact of 
integration for African American students was 
consistently positive. For Latinos and 
whites, the results were positive or neutral." 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

Pls. Ex. 58 Janet Ward Schofield, "Review of 
Research on School Desegregation's Impact on 
Elementary and Secondary School Students" 
(December 8, 1988) (Connecticut Department of 
Education). 

P.9 "In sum, any review of the literature on 
the effect of desegregation on outcomes such 
as academic achievement or intergroup 
attitudes must face the reality that much of 
the research is flawed." 

P. 53 "What have been the outcomes flowing 
from the desegregation which has been 
achieved over the past three decades? First, 
research suggests that desegregation has had 
some positive effect on the reading skills of 
black youngsters. The effect is not huge. 
Neither does it occur in all situations. 
However, a measurable effect does seem to 
occur. Such is not the case with mathematics 
skills which seem generally uneffected by 
desegregation.” 

 



PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 

  

P.19 "There is virtually no empirical 
evidence about the impact of school 
desegregation on the academic achievement of 
Hispanic students. The extent of our 
ignorance is illustrated in that several 
discussions of the impact of desegregation on 
Hispanic students cite no more than two or 
three studies (Carter, 1979; Weinberg, 1970, 
1977). Furthermore, the few studies which I 
was able to locate deal exclusively with 
Mexican-Americans. Although Mexican-Americans 
and other Hispanic groups certainly share 
certain aspects of language and culture, 
there is tremendous diversity within the 
groups which fall under the label Hispanic 
(Arias, 1986; Development Associates, Inc., 
1974; Orfield, 1986). Thus, it is a mistake 
to assume that research results coming from 
the study of one of these groups can be 
applied automatically to others." 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

2) p. 11 (footnote 9) "The State was already 
well aware of these facts through Janet 
Schofield's 1988 review (Defs. Ex. 12.25 at 
18-19). Some of the long-term benefits of 
desegregation described by Schofield included: 
(1) access to useful social networks of job 
information; (2) socialization for entrance 
into "non-traditional" career lines with 
higher income returns; and (3) development of 
interpersonal skills useful in interracial 
contexts." 

3) p. 13 "The reports prepared by Dr. Crain 
looked at the available data in different ways 
and controlled for the individual 
socioeconomic characteristics of the students. 
Dr. Crain's conclusion was that: [Slegregation 
proved to have long-term harmful effects in 
terms of encouraging students to drop out from 
high school, encouraging them to drop out of 
college, and in general discouraging them from 
having useful contacts with whites." 

-3- 

Hi 

“p ye" Vy 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

Pls. Ex. 58 Janet Ward Schofield, "Review of 
Research on School Desegregation's Impact on 
Elementary and Secondary School Students" 
(December 8, 1988) (Connecticut Department of 
Education). "Professor Schofield was citing 
Braddock, J.H., II and Dawkins, M.P. (1984). 
"Long-term effects of school desegregation on 
southern blacks." Sociological Spectrum, 4 
365-381. Professor Schofield qualifies this 
citation as follows: p. 28 "The evidence 
concerning desegregation's impact on such 
outcomes is quite sparse and virtually all of 
it concerns such outcomes for blacks, rather 
than for members of other racial or ethnic 
groups. Furthermore, almost all of these 
studies explicitly or tactily use the word 
desegregated as a synonym for racially mixed. 
Thus they are generally not studies of the 
outcomes of specific court-ordered 
desegregation programs. Yet I believe these 
studies are well worth discussing because of 
the fundamental importance of such outcomes 
-- to minority group members in particular 
and to American society in general." 

  

  

  

Vol. 10, pp. 105-108 and pp. 128-133 
Under cross-examination, Dr. Crain testified 
that removing selection bias and controlling 
background factors, Project Concern had no 
statistically significant effect on dropping 
out of high school, years attained in college 
or contact with whites. 

 



| 
& 

  

  

  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 

4) p. 22 "The disparities [between low poverty Pls. Ex. 419 "Poverty, Achievement and the concentration and high poverty concentration Distribution of Compensatory Education schools] continue to grow over time and the Services," by Mary Kennedy, Richard K. Jung, children fall increasingly behind as they go Martin E. Orland, An Interim Report from the through school (Kennedy p. 41)." National Assessment of Chapter 1 Office of 
Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. 
Department of Education, January, 1986. 
P.22 "Growth in achievement is also 
associated with concentrations of poverty in 
schools. Figure 2.3 indicates growth in 
reading achievement for students attending 
either high- or low-concentration elementary 
schools.” Students in high-concentration 
schools had lower achievement scores 
throughout their elementary school years than 
students attending other schools. The 
difference between the groups grows larger as 
students move from first to third grade, and 
then remains roughly constant through the 
remaining elementary grades." 

P. 24 "Student learning rates, however, are 
less often associated with the proportion of 
poor students in the school. We find 
concentrations of poverty to be related to 
student learning rates in only two of the 
eight relationships tested, even though it 
was related to beginning achievement in five 
of the eight tests." 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

5) p. 28 "The Hartford School District is 
compelled to use a substantial portion of its 
limited funds to hire staff to address the 
special needs of Hartford's students, rather 
than in the traditional parts of the 
educational program (Carso p. 97). Dr. 
Natriello found that Hartford's schools employ 
on average more special education teachers and 
fewer general elementary teachers and 
content-specialist teachers than other 
districts (Natriello I. p. 103)." 

6) p. 29 "The shortage of school social 
workers [in Hartford] appears to be 
particularly severe." 

STN Li A 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

Vol. 8, pp. 103 & 104 
Dr. Natriello's point was not that Hartford 
had an insufficient number of general 
elementary teachers because it was "compelled 
to use a substantial portion of limited funds 
to hire staff to address the special needs of 
Hartford's students.” Rather, his point was 
that "in order to meet some of the needs of 
the student population, they have a different 
mix of teachers. Those specialist teachers 
cost a bit more than less specialized 
teachers. 
...S0, one, one conclusion that you reach 
here is that a little bit, or at least a 
small portion, of the differences in the 
aggregate expenditure difference may be 
somewhat attributable to different, different 
staffing configurations..." : 

Hartford serves approximately 28% of the 
students in what has been defined as the 
Hartford area for the purpose of this case. 
Def. Ex. '1.1, p.3A; Def. Ex, 7.21, p.3A. 
However, Def. Ex. 8.18, p.5 shows that 
Hartford employs approximately 43% of the 
social workers serving the schools in the 
area. 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

7) p. 34 "Dr. Senteio, Hartford's assistant 
superintendent, testified that of Hartford's 
twenty-six elementary schools, only four met 
all state codes. (Senteio p. 16)." 

8) p. 35 "The Hartford School District is also 
unable to provide an adequate level of 
maintenance and repair for its schools. 
of the district's schools are in need of 
serious repair (Senteio p. 16; Cloud p. 81)." 

Many 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

Vol. 3, p. 44 (Senteio) (cross-examination) 
"If I may, there were four that we said met 
all code compliance. The others that don't 
meet the code compliance, if I may, issues 
lies in the handicapped accessibility area. 
That's what the majority -- we're not talking 
about, if 1 may, health and safety and fire. 
That is not it. It isn't a compliance issue, 
  

and I would say most of which, most of which 
is the handicapped accessibility." (emphasis 
added) . 

  

  

Pls. Ex. 153 Hartford Public Schools, "Space 
Utilization Study, 1991-2001," June 1992. 
PP. 5-10 & 5-11, Only nine of Hartford's 
twenty-six elementary schools are cited to 
have "significant architectural and code 
concerns" 

p. 5-2 "Generally, the facilities have been 
well maintained however caution should be 
exercised in further deferring maintenance 
work or in reducing maintenance staff." 

PP. 5-10 & 5-11 Only eight of Hartford's 
thirty-one schools are listed as warranting 
"significant attention." 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

9) p. 35 "Many Hartford schools do not have 
facilities that are basic to their educational 
mission. Many of the schools do not have 
cafeterias (Senteio p.17). In many schools, 
specialized art and music classrooms are 
unavailable because schools have had to place 
regular classes in them (Senteio, p.18)." 

10) p. 36 "The bilingual education program 
being offered in the Hartford Schools is not 
adequate". 

Hi 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

Def. Ex. 8.13, which is taken from the 
Strategic School Profiles, shows that 29 of 
Hartford's 31 schools have a cafeteria and 
only 6 of those schools use that room for 
other activities as well. This exhibit also 
shows that 28 Hartford schools have an art 
room (2 schools use the room for other 
purposes as well) and 26 Hartford schools 
have a music room (4 schools use the room for 
other purposes as well). (The instructions 
found in Def. Ex. 8.20, p.8 make it evident 
that any art or music room which has been 
converted into a classroom cannot be treated 
as art room or music room in the SSP). 

Pls. Ex. 439 - "Hartford Public Schools 
Bilingual Education Programs Annual 
Evaluation Report, 1990-91" 

p. 5 Principal Conclusions 
1. Students with 33 different home languages 
were served, and 92% of these students were 
Hispanic. Nearly all students (97%) were 
served in bilingual education programs. 

  

2. Students served included 8% who were in 
bilingual special education programs, and 3% 
who were not limited English proficient, but 
were placed in the bilingual education 
program at the request of their parents. 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS’ BRIEF 
  COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 

  

3. Test scores in English showed a 
consistent pattern of English language 
development toward mainstream levels of 
proficiency. As students completed the 
program and moved into mainstream, English 
skills approaching those of mainstream 
students were exhibited, except in grades 
10-12 where scores were lower. 

4. In grades 7-8, test scores in both 
languages suggest that student learning is 
still not progressing adequately in 
mathematics. This pattern is also found in 
mainstream classes at these grades, and a 
separate report has been prepared on this 
subject. 

5. Students in the program had a dropout 
rate of only 8%. 

6. Of those leaving the program who did not 
leave the school system, 68% either formally 
completed the program or graduated from high 
school. 

7. Students who were in the program longer 
than six years tended to be in grade 5-8 and 
to be remedial or bilingual special education 
students. 

8. School attendance in the bilingual 
education program was best in grades 1-6 
(93%), and significantly lower in 
kindergarten and grades 7-11. Late arrivals 
and early leavers contributed 
disproportionately to lower attendance rates 
at all grade levels. 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

11) pp. 43-44 "Large numbers of Hartford 
students are not able to meet these [CMT 
remedial] standards, which indicate a need for 
remedial instruction, and which Dr. Allison 
testified are the benchmark of whether 
students are receiving a quality education. 
(Allison p. 82)." 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

RECOMMENDATIONS 
  

1. The system should continue to look for 
ways to better address the needs of remedial 
students in the upper elementary grades." 

Vol. 2, pp. 15-16 (Negron) "When you're 
measuring mastery in mathematics from a 
student that is just learning english you're 
not measuring math; you're measuring english 
proficiency, and that's not what the mastery 
test is designed to do. So, in fact, it is 
an invalid instrument for those students. . . 
I don't think [the CMT] measures the quality 
of education that any student is receiving, 
because it -- it's measuring achievement, and 
a lot more goes into achievment than quality 
education.” 

Vol. 3, p.140 (Shea) "Q. If a student arrives 
in the fourth grade in September and takes 
the Mastery Test -- and arrives from, let's 
say, another state, and take the Mastery Test 
in November, do you consider that 
child'sscore an accurate reflection of the 
quality of instruction being provided in the 
Hartford Public Schools? A: No. Because the 
time that that student would be in the 
Hartford school system is so minimal, there 
would be no way of assessing it." 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

-10- 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

Vol. 11, pp. 22-23 (Natriello) "Q: Now, if 
we're going to measure the quality of the 
education program in Hartford in comparision 
with the suburban schools, because all these 
factors we've identified [health, economic 
status, family composition, parent 
educational attainment, housing, minority 
status, limited English proficiency, crime, 
parent labor force participation, see Pls. 
Ex. 153, p. 38] come into play, it would be 
important to control for all of these factors 
if our objective was to measure the quality 
of the Hartford educatonal program? A: It 
would certainly be important to take them 
into consideration, yes." 

1d., p. 189 "THE COURT: And are you in a 
position to form an opinion as to the extent 
to which it [CMT scores] is an indicator of 
educational attainment? THE WITNESS: Well, I 
think it's an indicator of educational 
performance of accomplishment, but it is for 
the most part a relatively narrow one. That 
is, it doesn't take in the breadth of the 
curriculum." 

'. 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

12) P. 44 "The situation [the performance of 
Hartford students on the Connecticut Mastery 
Test] is getting worse instead of better." 

-11- 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

Vol. 14, p.140 (LaFontaine) "Q: I think you 
mentioned test scores as a basis for 
measuring the adequacy of an education. Is 
it appropriate to look at my school's test 
scores and look at the test scores of the 
school down the street, and if my school's 
test scores are worse say than my school is a 
worse school than the school down the street? 
A: No it is not. Q: That would be an abuse 
of test scores, would it not? A: I think 
that would be fair to describe it that way." 

Vol. 8, p. 142 (Natriello) "...for each of 
the five years [1987-1991] at each of the 
three grade levels [4, 6, and 8)..." there 
are "some changes up and down a little bit, 
but, basically, by the time you get to the 
end of the five-year period, the gap still 
remains. It's hard to see that there's any 
evidence of the gap closing. It's also hard 
to see that there's much evidence of the gap 
increasing." 

Vol. 8, p. 143 (Natriello) "I looked briefly 
at the 1992 data that was just released, and 
-- In fact, I just saw it for Hartford in the 
last week, which is why it's not reflected 
here. And that data, in most cases, shows 
Hartford declining a little bit...In some 
cases it remains stable, but, again, what 
we'd like to see would be a closing of that 
gap..." 

r. 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

13) p. 61 "Whether one examines credits earned 
in Algebra I or English Literature, Hartford 
students consistently earn fewer credits than 
most of their suburban counterparts.” 

-12- 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

Vol. 9, p. 60 (Natriello) "Indeed, you know, 
the '92 data suggests it remains as stable as 
it has been and may in some cases, be getting 
somewhat worse." 

Figure 71 of Pl. Ex. 163, p.215 shows that 
the percentage of high school graduates who 
earned credits in Algebra I in Hartford is 
greater than the percentage of graduates who 
earned credits in Algebra I in six suburban 
communities. (East Hartford, East Windsor, 
Rocky Hill, Suffield, Windsor, and Windsor 
Locks). In regard to English Literature, Pl. 
Ex. 234 and Pl. Ex. 258 show that 100% of the 
graduates of Bulkley High and 100% of the 
graduates of Weaver High earned credits in 
English Literature. Pl. Ex. 242 suggests 
that only 62% of the graduates of Hartford 
Public earned credits in English Literature. 
The discrepancy between the Hartford Public 
figures and the Weaver and Bulkley figures 
strongly suggests that there is a problem 
with the Hartford Public data. Clearly, 
presenting a combined average for the three 
schools, as is done in Figure 72 of Pl. Ex. 
163, p.216, is misleading. The comparison 
which the plaintiffs attempt to draw in 
Figure 72 is, in all likelihood, unreliable 
because of a flaw in the data. (See Vol. 24, 
pp. 119-123 (Nearine) regarding problems 
Hartford experienced in preparing the SSPs 
from which this data was taken). 

ve. 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

14) p. 62 "Few of Hartford's graduates go on 
to college, in marked contrast to the 
achievement of their suburban peers." 

15) p.64 "For over 25 years, defendants have 
failed to respond to the growing racial and 
economic isolation of Hartford school 
children. Beginning in the mid-1960s, up to 
the present, the state has been repeatedly 
reminded of the harmful effects of racial and 
economic isolation on school children in 
Hartford and other cities, and urged to take 
strong action. Nothing was done (Gordon II 
pp. 79-81; passim)." 

-13- 

fH 

“YN, 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

Figure 82 of Pl. Ex. 163, p.230 shows that a 
larger percentage of Hartford graduates go on 
to 2 and 4 year colleges than is the case for 
graduates from East Hartford, East Windsor 
and Windsor Locks. Furthermore, plaintiffs’ 
witness Dr. Robert Crain noted in his studies 
that Hartford "does a good job of getting 
kids into college." Vol. 10, p.119 (Crain). 

See, inter alia, Vol. 25, pp. 21-148 
(Williams) passim (regarding the Priority 
School District Grant Program, Interdistrict 
Cooperative Grant Program, Racial Imbalance 
Act and enforcement thereof, Connecticut's 
Education Agenda); Vol. 28, pp. 6-186 
(Brewer) and Def. Ex. 7.1 and 7.21 (regarding 
state educational funding programs and 
preferential treatment afforded to poorer, 
needier districts such as Hartford): Conn. 
Gen. Stat. $10-266j (Project Concern) and 
Vol. 14, pp. 124-125 (LaFontaine) and Vol. 
23, p. 128 (Calvert) (regarding state's 
efforts to ensure continuation of Project 
Concern in Hartford); Vol. 26B, pp. 40-42 
(Rossell) and Def. Ex. 5.1 (regarding state 
educational funding targetted to overcome 
negative relationship between local/federal 
funding and wealth), Def. Ex. 5.2 (regarding 
voluntary desegregation funding in 
Connecticut) and Def. Ex. 5.3 (regarding 
specific legislation, regulation or policy 
requiring racial balance in Connecticut's 
schools). 

  

 



PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

16) p.66 "The Harvard Report contained a 
feasible interdistrict proposal that would 
have significantly alleviated the growing 
problem of school segregation at the time it 
was proposed (Gordon II pp. 14-15), . . . If 
the Harvard report had been implemented, the 
racial and economic composition of city and 
suburban schools would have been profoundly 
altered, significantly influencing school and 
housing patterns for years to come (See Pls. 
Ex, 1 at 14)." 

17) p. 67 (footnote) "One of the first 
examples of support for the plan is the joint 
"Proposal to Establish a Metropolitan Effort. 
Toward Regional Opportunity" (METRO) (Pls. Ex. 
4), a 1966 grant proposal subitted by 28 
Hartford area superintendents and transmitted 
to the state, recommending implementation of 
the Harvard plan." 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

Vol. , p.117 (Gordon) "Q:...I'm asking 
whether you would recommend the same thing 
that the Harvard report recommended today for 
Hartford schools, one way, half the student 
population -- minority population of Hartford 
going out to suburban schools? A: Only with 
my caveat. No, I wouldn't recommend one way, 
I'd recommend two ways." 

Pls. Ex. 4 Committee of Greater Hartford 
School Superintendents, Proposal to Establish 
a Metropolitan Effort Toward Regional 
Opportunity (METRO) (January 14, 1966). 

Part II, Section IIB 

"The preliminary study of educational needs 
in the Metropolitan Hartford Area has 
revealed that there is a need: 3. To study 
Metropolitan methods of eliminating de facto 
segregation as recommended in the Harvard 
Report (see Appendix A)." 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

18). p.70 "Acording to Dr. Gordon, 
Connecticut's unique conception of the 
educational park, as an interdistrict magnet 
school or cluster of schools attached to a 
university was a feasible proposal that would 
have made a 'significant difference in 
Hartford with respect to desegregation’ 
(Gordon II p.45)." 

-15- 

YAY 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

Vol. 13,. p.127 (Gordon) "Q: Now I think you 
testified that you worked on approximately a 
hundred school desegregation plans? A: Yes. 
Q: Isn't it true that you've never included 
an educational park in any of the plans you 
were involved in? A: It's true, but I have 
recommended educational parks on several 
occasions." 

Vol. 13, p.128 (Gordon) "I have recommended 
educational parks at times, and the court has 
not seen fit to order them, because we had 
alternatives available and the court decided 
the alternatives were a better course of 
action at that point in time." 
Vol. 13, p.131: "Q: Dr. Gordon, you haven't 
drawn any conclusions as to whether 
educational parks are a viable option for 
dealing with the problem in the Hartford area 
at this time, have you? A: I think they 
could be. But I've been careful to say I 
haven't really gotten to the point where I 
want to recommend any plan. I think it is a 
viable option, and I don't want to go beyond 
that." 

Vol. 13, p. 131 (Gordon) "Q: So you don't 
know whether eduational parks are a viable 
option for the Hartford area? A: All right. 
Fine. No, I don't." 

ve. 

 



Hoi 

# he 

YAY, 

  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

  

Vol. 13, pp. 131-132 (Gordon) "Q: How many 
magnet schools would it take in the Hartford 
area to address the problem in Hartford in 
what you would determine to be a sufficient 
fashion? A: I don't know." JS 

Vol. 13, p.132 (Gordon) "Q: Now, you are -- 
you feel that the state should have been 
creating magnet schools by now, and more 
magnet schools should have been created? A: 
I think the state should have certainly 
investigated magnet schools and should have 
at least attempted to see if magnet schools 
worked. One Montesorri school is hardly a 
magnet program. OQ: Okay. And if the state 
had come to you in the '70s and the 'B0s, and 
asked you whether magnet schools worked, you 
would have advised the state against magnet 
schools, correct? A: I run hot and cold on 
magnets." 

Vol. 13, p.132 (Gordon) "Q: Isn't it true, 
Dr. Gordon, at your deposition you testified 
-- and I quote -- there's a period of time 
when you could not have gotten me to 
recommend magnet for anything. That's at 
page 164. ‘A: That's true." 

=16= wn 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

19) pp. 73-74 "...defendants were actively 
engaged all through the 1950s, 60s, and 70s in 
a massive program of construction of 
segregated schools throughout the region... . 
During the same time period, defendants 
financed a major expansion of school capacity 
within the increasingly racially isolated 
Hartford school district. (Id.) Defendants 
had extensive approval authority over each of 
these schools (Gordon I p. 133)..." 

-17- 

fi 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

Vol. 13, p.133 (Gordon) "Q: Dr. Gordon, I'm 
going to read a statement to you and ask you 
if it's true or false. Magnet schools have 
been tried in many different school systems 
to date -- this was written in 1989. There 
has not been a successful school 
desegregation using magnet schools. A: The 
context of that sentence is a school 
desegregation meaning a total plan using 
magnet schools. I stand by that statement 
still. OQ: This is your statement, then, that 
magnet schools have been tried in many 
different school systems and to date there 
has not been a successful school 
desegregation using magnet schools? A: 
Right." 

Pls. Ex. 9, "A Brief History from 1945 to the 
Present of the Public School Building Aid 
Program in Connecticut", second page of 
4/11/80 update. 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

20) p. 78 "...the Department issued a second 
report in April of 1989, Quality and 
Integrated Education: Options for Connecticut 

  

  

(Tirozzi II) (Pls. Ex. 60), which as William 
Gordon observed, 'retreats completely from 
Tirozzi I. It goes purely to voluntary 
strategies' (Gordon II p. 73). Gone from the 
Tirozzi II report is the strong state role 
envisioned by Tirozzi I, and the concept of 
‘collective responsibility’ (Gordon II p. 
713)." 

-18- 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

"Throughout the entire building aid program, 
school building projects have had to be 
approved by the local board of education and 
the building committee of such town. From 
1945 until 1953 the Public School Building 
Commission, as well as the State Department 
of Education, approved all plans and 
specifications. Upon the abolition of the 
Public School Building Commission and the 
transfer of its functions to the State 
Department of Education in 1953, actual 
approval of plans was eliminated and the 
State Department of Education was required to 
review all final plans and specifications for 
conformity with the State Fire Safety Code 
and the State Sanitary Code. Also, a written 
report, together with the recommendations of 
the State Board of Education, has to be made 
to the town school authorities. The 
Department was further authorized to maintain 
an advisory school planning services." Also 
see testimony of Robert Brewer, Vol. 28, PP. 
7-20 (Brewer). 

Pls. Ex. 60, "Quality and Integrated 
Education: Options for Connecticut," 
Connecticut State Department of Education 
(April, 1989). 

'. 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

-19- 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

pP.ii The four recommendations contained in 
the January 1988 report, Racial/Ethnic Equity 
and Deseqgregation in Connecticut's Public 
Schools are listed including: "That the state 
promote the concept of 'collective 
responsibility’ for integrating public 
schools." 

  

  

P.34 "...The actions recommended in this 
report are voluntary and incremental. Any 
steps taken can vary in size and pace in 
different locales. Ultimately, local 
communities will have to decide what steps 
toward quality, integrated education they may 
take and when...This is not an impossible 
dream. Since last year's report calling 
attention to the problem of racially and 
economically isolated schools, the climate 
has changed. Public discussions have become 
more objective. Educators and legislators 
are talking to each other and to parents and 
students about what is possible. Some towns 
have launched interdistrict activities: this 
report cites some examples, and there are 
others. There will be trial and error, 
accomplishment and setback, but the goodwill 
of citizens should move the schools toward 
greater equity and equality. No town is an 
island; even those that are not contiguous to 
a city where the majority of the students are 
from poor minority populations should have a 
responsibility and a concern for the 
future... 

BL 

 



PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

21) p. 104 "The Common Core of Learning forms 
the basis for the mastery testing program 
(Pls. Ex. 493 at 38)." 

22) p. 104 "The Connecticut Mastery Test goes 
further -- it 'not only represents what 
students ought to know, but represents a 
testing measurement by which you can ascertain 
the extent to which they know that' (Pls. Ex. 
494 at 83). The mastery tests can be used to 
evaluate whether a school or district is 
providing a minimally adequate education (Pls. 
Ex. 494 at 86)." 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

Pls. Ex. 290, State of Connecticut Department 
of Education, Connecticut Education 
Evaluation and Remedial Assistance -- Grade 4 
Mastery Test Results: Summary and 
Interpretations, 1985-1986. 

Foreword "The grade 4 Connecticut Mastery 
Test given for the first time in the fall of 
1985..." [Emphasis added]. 
  

Pls. Ex. 45 "Connecticut's Common Core of 
Learning", State Board of Education, January, 
1987. 
Foreword "It is with great pleasure that the 
Connecticut State Board of Education presents 
Connecticut's Common Core of Learning, 
adopted by the Board on January 7, 1987..." 
[Emphasis added]. 
  

Pls. Ex. 493 Deposition of Vincent Ferrandino 
P. 37 Q. You indicated that the mastery tests 
were a good indicator of student achievement. 
Do you agree with that? A. Yes. I believe the 
mastery tests are a good indicator. I need 
to also say that the mastery testing program 
measures a relatively narrow piece of 
students' achievement, and I quess I wouldn't 
say that it is the only thng that is 
important with regard to student 
achievement... 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

23) p. 113 (footnote) "Even one of the key 
defendants, John Mannix, the former chairman 
of the State Board of Education (until January 
1993) supported the plaintiffs' position, 
favoring a metropolitan remedial planning 
approach ordered by the court to counter the 
detrimental effects of racial and economic 
isolation (Pls. Ex. 495 at 18, 26, 30 and 37) 
(Deposition of John Mannix)." 

-21- 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

Pls. Ex. 495, Deposition of John Mannix. 
P.20 Q. Well, what do you think should be 
done about this problem? A. I have very, very 
strong ideas. First of all, I think -- let 
me tell you what should not be done. I think 
busing is a mistake... 

PP. 21 & 22 I'm also against bigness as sort 
of something bad... ...I think it should be 
relatively small. 1 also feel what is 
positive in education and in the town is to 
keep the town or to keep the city. ...What 
happens to a community when you pull 
together, this is our school, rather than 
this is some big regional school where you 
have all various towns involved. 

P. 22 & 23 You have to break up the ghettos 
in the cities...move the families out into 
the suburbs...At the same time, just as 
important, we are going to have to, at the 
same time we have to turn around the schools 
in the cities, make those attractive places 
to send, safe places to send your children to 
school if you happen to move into the city, 
which I think is important. I think we have 
to bring back the white population, 
principally young people, get lower priced 
housing, bring them back into the cities, and 
if they can send their children to a safe, 
integrated school system, and gentrify the 
cities... 

ve. 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

-22- 

“ ye v 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

PP. 24 & 25 Q. Now, you said you are against 
busing. Maybe you could define your term. 
A. Busing has developed as a term that means 
taking a group from either one section of a 
town or from one region, say people of color, 
and move them out into some other town or 
some other section, and then take white 
people and move those children into the 
schools that the people of color, children of 
color have been moved out of... ...I'm 
talking about an end, the purpose of which is 
for integrating the students. That has 
gotten such a bad name, and in the minds of 
many, many people, principally the public, 
that -- and I don't think it's a good idea 
because it breaks up my idea of community. 

I think in Wilton what we ought to do is 
invite into our town, make it -- maybe that's 
the wrong term, but make it attractive in our 
town to have people of color, children of 
color move into our town into nice housing 
scattered throughout our town, become 
integrated into the town, become part of the 
high school and the elementary school 
life-style... 

‘vn 

 



  

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
  

-23- 

/ {i ye! Vv 

COUNTER EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY 
  

PP 25 & 26 Q. But that leads to my next point 
which is: Do you see school district 
boundary lines as being sacrosanct? A. I 
don't think they are sacrosanct or -- or town 
lines... ...I would prefer not to change the 
boundary lines of the town or the school 
district unless it became absolutely 
necessary under some conditions I can't 
envision at this point. 

P. 26 Q. Are you in favor of any regional 
approach to education? A. Yes, I think in 
certain circumstances, the magnet schools, 
first of all, I think every school ought to 
be a magnet school in its broad sense... 

P. 28 ...But the serious problems rest in 
those three cities, and magnet schools, 1I 
mean, you are not going to solve the problems 
with magnet schools... 

'. 

 





APPENDIX 3 
SIMULATION OF STANDARD FOR RACIAL AND 
ETHNIC BALANCE IN THE HARTFORD AREA 

PROPOSED BY CHARLES WILLIE 

  

= 

3 
> 

2 In his testimony at trial, Professor Charles Willie cites 

three "components" to desegregation: 

1. "...the proportion of students in each school should be 

the same as the proportion of the students in the whole 

1/ 
system..." "Or whatever that district is, whether 

it's a city or whether it's county or whether it's 

  

: state. One can choose which parameter one wishes to 

use. "?’/ 

...all schools ought to be the same as the racial 

portion for the district or the metropolitan or the y 

state district..."3/ 

2. "I have found that a school district has to have a 

minimum of twenty percent, one-fifth, of the students 

unlike the prevailing population. And if one 

population group cannot provide that twenty percent 

then a combination of minority population groups ought 

to be added together to achieve that twenty percent." 4’ 

3. "My third component is an ideal. And I would consider 

an ideal desegregated learning environment as one in 

  

¥/ pr, ¥ol.'15, p. 19 

2/ i: 7r.:vol.315, p. 17 

% 3/ vr. vol. 15.,'py 22 

2/ Tr. Vol, 15,.p. 18 

 



-~ 

    

which the prevailing population - and here I'm not 

dealing with white/black/Latino, I'm saying whatever's 

the prevailing population in number - the ideal 

desegregated learning environment would be one in which 

the prevailing population varies anywhere from fifty 

percent to two-thirds. Fifty percent to sixty-six 

percent. And in which the minority population, that 

is, the numerical minority -- that can be a numerical 

minority of white, black, Latino or other -- in which 

the numerical minority population varies anywhere from 

fifty percent to one-third. ">/ 

In addition, Professor Willie sets forth his principle of 

fairness; namely, that the definition of desegregation "should be 

fair to the numerical majority, and the definition should be fair 

to the numerical minority. "®/ 

Table I shows the number of student exchanges that would 

have to be made in Hartford and each of the 21 suburban districts 

cited in Sheff to realize Professor Willie's first component of 

desegregation; namely, that the percentage of students in the 

numerical minority in each district should be the same as the 

percentage of students in the numerical minority in the 22 

district region. ’’ 

  

8/. Tr. vol. 15, pp. 21 & 23, 

6/y: Pr. Vol. 15, p. D¢. 

i It is not clear from his testimony whether Professor Willie meant that the proportion of non white students in the 
region should be the standard for non white students in 

Footnote continued on next page. 
-2-



  

Referring to Table I, among the 21 suburban districts, East 

© Hartford has a 38.1% non white enrollment (column 5) and, 

therefore, would not be affected. Bloomfield would have to 

“exchange with the other 19 suburbs 521 non white students (column 

9) for an equal number of white students. This would leave a net 

of 14,718 white students - 15,239 (column 8) minus 521 - that the 

19 suburbs would have to exchange for non white students with 

Hartford. 

Reducing Hartford's non white enrollment by 14,718 students 

and increasing its white enrollment by the same number of 

students, its non white student percentage would be 34.9% and its 

white student percentage would be 65.1% - very close to the 

proportion of non white to white that would exist in the 19 r 

suburban districts. 

If these goals were attained, 58.1% of total enrollment in 

Hartford would be affected, i.e., transferred. The percentage of 

non white students that would be affected (the group that would 

bear all of the burden) would be even higher - 62.4%. 

In the suburban districts (East Hartford excluded because 

none of its students would be involved), 24.7% of total 

  

Footnote continued from previous page. 

districts that are predominantly non white as well as those 
that are predominantly white. His fairness principle would 
suggest that he does not mean this, but rather that the 
proportion of non white students in the region should be the 
standard for whatever racial/ethnic group or groups 
(black/Hispanic/ Asian combined or white) was numerically in % the minority. The latter is the way we have interpreted his 
"standard" for this simulation of his first component of 
desegregation. 

-3- 

 



enrollment would have to transfer. The percentage of non white 

® = students (all in Bloomfield) that would be affected would be 

5.38. The percentage of white students (all in the other 19 

“suburban districts) that would be affected would be 28.3%. 

Percentagewise, the heaviest burden would fall on Hartford 
  

students. Fifty-eight point one percent (58.1%) of its students 
  

(all non white) would be transferred compared with 24.7% of 
  

  

suburban students (mostly white).8/ 

Table II shows the number of student exchanges necessary if 

the numerical minority in Hartford and in each of the 21 suburban 

districts were to be at least twenty percent of total enrollment. 

This twenty percent minimum was chosen based on Professor 

Willie's belief that the numerical minority ought to have "a 

critical mass" of no-less-than twenty percent.’ 

To begin with, East Hartford, Manchester and Windsor would 

not be affected because the numerical minority (black/Hispanic/ 

Asian combined) in each is twenty percent or more (column 5). 

Bloomfield, whose numerical minority is white and under 

twenty percent (column 3), would have to exchange 86 non white 

students (column 9) for 86 white students in the 17 other 

suburban districts each of which has a numerical minority 

(black/Hispanic/Asian combined) under twenty percent (column 5). 

  

Also, none of the 20 suburbs that would have to transfer 
students would individually bear the amount of burden 
Hartford would bear. 

Tr. Vol, 15, p22  



  

In 

© 
> 

  

This would leave a net of 5091 white students - 5177 (column 

8) minus 86 - that the 17 suburbs would have to exchange for non 

white students with Hartford. 

Reducing Hartford's non white enrollment by 5091 students 

and increasing its white enrollment by the same number of 

students, its non white student percentage would be 72.9% and its 

white student percentage would be 27.1%. 

If these goals were attained, 20.1% of total enrollment in 

Hartford would be transferred. The percentage of non white 

students that would be affected would be 21.6%. 

In the suburban districts (excluding the three districts 

that would not be affected - East Hartford, Manchester and ! 

Windsor), 10.1% of total enrollment would have to transfer. The 

percentage of non white students (Bloomfield) that would be 

affected would be 1.3%. The percentage of white students (the 

other 17 suburban districts) that would be affected would be 

11.4%. 

In this simulation as in the previous one, the heaviest   

burden would be born by Hartford students. In terms of   

percentage of students affected, 20.1% would be affected in   

  

Hartford (all non white); while only 10.1% would be affected in   

the suburbs (mostly white). 107 
  

  

10/ Also in this simulation, none of the 18 suburbs that would have to transfer students would individually bear the amount of burden Hartford would bear. 
—ty



The previous simulation presented in Table I would affect 

  

  

  

% -- 30,478 pupils (32% of total enrollment in the 22-district 
  

region). The simulation presented in Table II would affect   

  

~10,354 pupils (11% of total enrollment in the 22-district 
  

region). 

Both simulations assume and omit certain things that would 

have to be considered in an actual desegregation plan; such as, 

1. Should the percentage standard (regional average or 

: minimum twenty percent) be weight-allocated among the three non 

white groups (black, Hispanic, Asian) rather than applied to the 

three groups combined (as in these two simulations)? 

2. Should enrollments be based on projections or current r 

numbers (as in these two simulations)? 

3. Students who were exchanged would come from and go to 

11/ individual schools as well as grade levels. How would these 

conditions be factored in to maintain appropriate balance? 

4, How would it be determined which students were required 

to transfer and which were not? 

  

11/ professor Willie testified that "the proportion of the 
students in each school should be the same as the proportion 
of the students in the whole system." (Tr. vol. 15, p.19). 

-6- 

 



H 

  

APPENDIX 3, TABLE 1 
NUMBER OF STUDENT EXCHANGES THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE IN HARTFORD 

D EACH OF THE 21 SUBURBAN DISTRICTS CITED IN SHEFF TO REALIZE 
PROFESSOR CHARLES WILLIE'S 1ST COMPONENT OF DESEGREGATION 

(Based on 1992-93 enrollment with Project Concern students in suburban districts) 

  

  

  

    

  

Actual Actual Actual Projected Enrollment Transfers Required i Total White Enrollment Non White Enrollment Under lebih] Sabie To Attain 37,6:62.4 Ratio District Enrollment _ { $0 Total ma 8 of Top Numerical Numerical whites Out Non Whites Out (Col. 1) eT Col. i) Col.5 filly Yalonany Non Whites In Whites In 
Col. 6 Col. 7 (Col. 8) (Col. 9) 

Avon 2,142 2028 94.7 114 5.3 805 1337 691 Bloomfield 2,467 407 16.5 2060 83.5 928 1539 521 *#*Canton 1,277 1234 96.6 43 3.4 480 797 437 Bast Granby 707 © 679 96.0 28 4.0 266 441 238 Bast Windsor 1,313 1178 89.7 135 10.3 494 819 359 Ellington 1,939 1885 97.2 54 2.8 729 1210 675 **Farmington 3,226 2898 89.8 328 10.2 1213 2013 885 **Glastonbury 4,837 4389 90.7 448 9.3 1819 3018 1371 *¢Granby 1,569 1505 95.9 64 4.1 590 979 526 **Manchester 7,372 5890 79.9 1482 20.1 2772 4600 1290 **Newington 3,848 3499 90.9 349 9.1 1447 2401 1098 Rocky Hill 2,076 1904 91.7 172 8.3 781 1295 609 **Simsbury 3,983 3726 93.5 257 6.5 1498 2485 1241 **So. Windsor 3,981 3617 90.9 364 9.1 1497 2484 1133 **Suffield 1,871 179% 95.9 76 4.1 703 1168 627 Vernon 4,238 3746 88.4 492 11.6 1593 2645 1101 **W. Hartford 7,960 6460 81.2 1500 18.8 2993 4967 1493 Wethersfield 3,051 2846 93.3 205 6.7 1147 1904 942 Windsor 4,322 2728 63.1 1594 36.9 1625 2697 31 Windsor Locks 1,642 1517 92.4 125 7.6 617 1025 492 — 63,821 53931 9890 15,239 521 

Bast Hartford 6,095 3771 61.9 2324 38.1 Fulfills the first component 

Hartford 25,337 1767 7.0 23,570 93.0 9527 15810 7760%%# 
  

® 
. / The proportion of students in the numerical minority in each district should be the same as the proportion of students in the numerical minority in the region. In 1992-93, the proportion of students in the region that is in the numerical minority is 37.6% and the proportion of students that is in the numerical majority is 62.4%. 

**/ Districts with Project Concern students. 

*%%*/ The 19 suburbs would have to exchange with Hartford 14,718 white students (see 3) for an equal numbé¢ 
; 

’ . r of non vhite students in order for each suburb to attain the numerical minority Pe conrad for the Ton, This would mean that Hartford would have to transfer to the 19 suburbs 6958 more non white students than the 7760 necessary 
Us | 

RL AA 

 



  
i 

APPENDIX 3, TABLE II 
NUMBER OF STUDENT EXCHANGES THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE IN BARTFORD 

AND EACH OF THE 21 SUBURBAN DISTRICTS CITED IN SHEFF TO REALIZE 
A MINIMUM 20:80 RATIO OF NUMERICAL MINORITY TO NUMERICAL MAJORITY 

(Based on 1992-93 enrollment with Project Concern students in suburban districts) 

      

        
  

Actual Actual Actual Projected Enrollment Transfers Required 
Total White Enrollment Non White Enrollment Under 20:;80 Ratio To Attain 20:80 

District Enrollment i } of Total S$ of Total Numerical Numerical Whites Out Non Whites Out 
(Col. 1) (col. Col.3) (Col.d Col.5) Minorit mil Non Whites In Whites In 

(Col. 3 Col. 7 (Col. 8) (Col. 9) 
Avon 2,142 2028 94.7 114 5.3 428 1714 314 
Bloomfield 2,467 407 16.5 2060 83.5 493 1974 86 
*Canton 1,277 1234 96.6 43 3.4 255 1022 212 
Bast Granby 707 679 96.0 28 4.0 141 566 113 
Bast Windsor 1,313 1178 89.7 135 10.3 263 1050 128 
Bllington 1,939 - 1885 97.2 54 2.8 3ee 1551 334 
*PFarmington 3,226 28986 89.8 328 10.2 645 2581 312 
*Glastonbury 4,837 4389 90.7 448 9.3 967 3870 519 
*Granby 1,569 1505 95.9 64 4.1 314 1255 250 
*Nevington 3,848 3499 90.9 349 9.1 770 3078 421 
Rocky Hill 2,076 1904 91.7 172 8.3 415 1661 243 
*Simsbury 3,983 3726 93.5 257 6.5 797 3186, 540 
*So. Windsor 3,981 3617 90.9 364 9.1 796 3185 432 
*Suffield 1,871 1795 95.9 76 4.1 374 1497 296 
Vernon 4,238 3746 88.4 492 11.6 848 3390 356 
*W. Hartford 7,960 6460 81.2 1500 18.8 1592 6368 92 
Wethersfield 3,051 2846 93.3 205 6.7 610 2441 303 
Windsor Locks 1,642 1517 92.4 12 7.6 328 1314 03 

52,127 15313 14 5.177 “86 

‘Bast Hartford 6,095 3771 61.9 2334 38.1 
*Manchester 7,372 5890 79.9 1482 20.1 Pulfill minimum 20:80 ratio 
Windsor 4,322 2728 63.1 1594 36.9 

Hartford 25,337 1767 7.0 23570 93.0 5067 20270 3300** 

  

* Districts vith Project Concern Students 

*¢ The 17 suburbs would have to exchange vith Hartford 5091 white students (see p. 5) for an equal number of non white 
students in order for each suburb to attain the minimum 20:80 ratio (nbn white to white). This would mean that Hartford 
would have to transfer to the 17 suburbs 1791 more non vhite students than the 3300 necessary for it to attain the 
minimum 20:80 ratio (white to non white). 

 





  

APPENDIX 4 
- SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF ROBERT CRAIN, ET AL. IN FINDING 
< NICHES: DESEGREGATED STUDENTS SIXTEEN YEARS LATER - FINAL REPORT 
-ON THE EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES OF PROJECT CONCERN, HARTFORD, 

- CONNECTICUT, APPENDIX B: "ANALYSIS OF SELF-SELECTION AND RESPONSE 
BIAS", JUNE 1992, PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 386. 

  

  

  

In his direct testimony, Dr. Crain relied on Table 2 of his 

"Finding Niches" study of Project Concern (see Plaintiffs’ 

Exhibit 386). However, Table 2 compared Project Concern 

participants with the control groups who were educated in 

Hartford's schools without controlling for individual family 

background differences between the two groups of students.’ 

Dr. Crain also admitted that children who volunteered for 

  

Project Concern and who stuck with the program until the very end IEEE 
v 

vr 

were "certain" to be different.?’ 

Under cross-examination, Dr. Crain admitted that it would be 

unfair to compare the groups without controlling for their family 

background and self-selection bias differences. >’ 

Dr. Crain sought to take this self-selection bias, as well 

as family background differences, into account in Appendix B of 

exhibit 386. Since Appendix B presents the "fairer" comparisons, 

we have analyzed it and its results in further detail below. 

  

1/ Tr. VYol.U10, pp. 10% & 105. 

2/" Tr, Vol M10, pps 103 5.104. 

pe 3/ Tr. Vol. 10, p.103. 

 



  

In Appendix B, Dr. Crain sought to remove the effects of 

self selection bias with the application of two different 

techniques of analysis - the "experiment entrants method" and the 

"experimental assignment method." 

Experiment Entrants Method 
  

The "experiment entrants method" compares "all students who 

ever attended Project Concern schools (even if they later 

5 withdrew from the program) with students who never entered the 

program (even if they found some other route to a desegregated 

education)." Dr. Crain reasoned that if the higher attainment of 

Project Concern alumni is due to "the self-selection of more able 

students remaining in the program while weaker students dropped : 

out, then we should find the high attainment of Project Concern 

alumni is entirely offset by the correspondingly low attainment 

of the Project Concern students who transferred back to city 

schools...". As a consequence, the attainment of Project Concern 

"'stayers' and 'leavers' combined should be the same as the 

attainment of the control group. "?’/ 

  

4/ Appendix B, pp. 64 & 65. 
-2- 

 



  

% = The results of applying the experiment entrants method to 
pT 

€determine the educational attainment of Project Concern entrants 

relative to control entrants (with multiple regression to control 

8/4 are shown in Table B.l. of Appendix B.%/ background factors 

This table displays by gender the percent of Project Concern 

entrants and control entrants at varying levels of educational 

attainment. 

The interpretive narrative concerning Table 8.17% and Dr. 

8/ 

Ho
 

Crain's testimony state that the difference in percent of 

Project Concern entrants and of control entrants at each level of 

educational attainment is not statistically significant.’ Table 

B.1l can be summarized as follows: y 

  

S/ The background factors controlled for were age, second grade 
test scores, presence of two parents in the home, mother's 
educational attainment, number of siblings, home ownership, 
and presence of a typewriter, encyclopedia and daily 
newspaper in the home. 

6/ Appendix B, p. 67. 

v Appendix B, p. 65 (last two paragraphs) and p. 66 (first 
four lines). 

B/. “iTr. vol. 10. pp. 105-108 

S/ The results were not only not statistically significant, but 
were not even in the same direction that Dr. Crain 
predicted. For example, a smaller percentage of females in 
Project Concern (29%) attended one or more years of college » Fhaj females in the Hartford schools in the control group 
34%). 

-3- 

 



H
H
 

  

p 

© 
- 

Applying the experiment entrants method 
to remove selection bias and controlling 

    

for background factors, is the effect 
Levels of of Project Concern on educational 
Educational Attainment attainment statistically significant? 

Male Female 
college graduate no no 
2+ years of college no no 
l year of college no no 
high school graduate no no 
drop out no no 

In addition, Dr. Crain analyzed seven other later-life 

outcomes and choices using the experiment entrants method. His 

results appear in Table B.5 of Appendix pio/, This table shows 

the differences between Project Concern entrants and control 

entrants for each outcome with and without background controls. 

Based on the interpretive narrativell’ 

12/ 

and Dr. Crain's 
r 

testimony, the data in Table B.5 showing the effect of Project 

Concern, after controlling for family background, age, and test 

scores, reveals the following: 

Applying the experiment 
entrants method to remove 
selection bias and controlling 
for background factors, is the 
effect of Project Concern on 
other outcomes statistically 

  

  

Other Outcomes significant? 
Male Female 

perceived college discrimination no no 
perceived discrimination generally no no 
police/violence no no 
contact with whites no no 
moved into white residential area no yes 
had few friends in college no no 
bore child before age 18 n/a no 
  

10/ Appendix B, p. 76. 

11/ appendix B, p. 79 ("Selection Bias in Effects on Other 
Outcomes") - p. 82 (line 6). 

12/ rr. vol. 10, pp. 128-133 
-4- 

 



  

_statistically significant effect on twelve of the thirteen 

In summary, Dr. Crain found that Project Concern had no 

a
,
 

outcomes he analyzed using the experiment entrants method. 

Experimental Assignment Method 
  

The experimental assignment method consists of three 

substudies: 1) comparing every student selected in 1966 with 

every student in the control group; 2) comparing every student 

randomly selected to participate in 1968 and 1969 with every 

student in the randomly selected control group; and 3) comparing 

every student who entered the program voluntarily with every 

child a family attempted to enroll in the program. 13’ vu
 

Table B.4 of Appendix 1a shows the differences in 

educational attainment between Project Concern and control group 

males and between Project Concern and control group females in 

each of the three substudies with and without control of 

background factors. Table B.4 also shows for males and for 

females the overall difference between students assigned to 

Project Concern and those assigned to the control group with 

controls for background factors. 

  

13/ Appendix B, Pp. 71. 

14/ Appendix B, p. 72. 

 



  

» i As noted in Table B-4, the result of the overall effect 

© analysis is statistically significant for males but not for 

* temales 19/ 

Based on the overall results of the experimental assignment 

method to remove selection bias and controlling for background 

factors, the effect of Project Concern on educational attainment 

can be summarized as follows: 

Is the effect of Project Concern on 
educational attainment statistically 
significant? 

Male Female 

yes no 

  

The results of analyzing, under the experimental assignment 
3 v 

method, the same later-life outcomes and choices analyzed using 

the experiment entrance method are shown in Appendix B. Table 

16/ for males and Table 8.71% for females. Both tables show B.6 

the difference between the Project Concern group and the control 

group for each outcome in each of the three substudies with and 

without control of background factors. Both tables also show the 

overall difference between students in the Project Concern group 

and those in the control group for each outcome with control of 

background factors. 

  

15/ see also, Appendix B, p. 73 final paragraph, first sentence. 
No information is provided concerning the statistical 
significance of the data reported in each of the three 
substudies for males and females with control of background 
factors. 

16/ Appendix B, p. 77. 

% 17/7 Appendix B, p. 78. 

 



  

The overall analysis of childbearing before age 18 is the 

conly data for which information is provided concerning 

"statistical significancel8’, It is reported to be statistically 

significant:?’, Without the same information for all of the 

other outcomes it is not possible to come to any conclusions 

about the significance of the effect Project Concern had on these 

outcomes based on the overall results of the experimental 

assignment method with proper controls for difference in 

c background factors. 

OVERALL FINDINGS 
  

The following is a summary of what Appendix B shows (with 

confirmation and clarification through Dr. Crain's testimony) 

concerning whether Project Concern had a statistically 

significant impact on the outcome measures Dr. Crain chose to 

consider. This summary portrays the results of Dr. Crain's study 

after application of the two methods of removing selection bias 

and after applying controls for the individual student background 

factors which Dr. Crain thought it important to take into 

account. 

  

18/ During cross-examination Dr. Crain stated as follows: "I 
think when I constructed tables B.7 and B.8 [the context 
suggests he meant B.6 and B.7], I did not put significance 
footnotes on them." (See Tr. Vol. 10, p. 135). Dr. Crain 
does not provide this information in either the narratives 
of Appendix B or in his testimony. 

% 13/ Appendix B, p. 81 (3rd paragraph, 2nd sentence). 
-7- 

 



Experimental Experimental 
Entrants _ Assignment 

| (overall results) 
Outcome Male Female Male Female 
"overall educational attainment yes no 
levels of educational attainment 
college graduate no no 
2+ years no no 
l year no no 
high school graduate no no 
drop out no no 

other variables 
perceived college discrimination no no 
perceived discrimination generally no no 
police/violence no no 
contact with whites no no 
moved into white area no yes 
had few friends in college no no 
bore child before age 18 n/a no yes 

  

  

  

  

In the final two paragraphs of Appendix B, Dr. Crain 

suggests that the impact of Project Concern on each of the 

following shows "one or more statistically significant effects 

after self-selection bias is removed, and therefore cannot be 

explained as the results of selection bias": 

Male high school drop-out rates 
Male college retention rates 
Male perception of college discrimination 
Male contact with whites 
Female childbearing before age 18 
Female househunting in predominately white neighborhoods 
Female complaints of few friends in college? 

However, Dr. Crain does not state whether the "one or more 

statistically significant effects" to which he refers were with 

or without control of background differences as well as removal 

of self-selection bias. His language "one or more statistically 
  

significant effects" suggests that for some it was with controls, 

  

20/ Appendix B, p.82  



  

% = for others without controls, and there were those for which it 

cwas both. 

Proof that he included statistically significant results 

without controlling for family background is apparent from Dr. 

Crain's inclusion of male high school drop out rates in his 

summary conclusion. As previously noted (see p.3 above), Dr. 

Crain concluded that after removing selection bias and 

controlling for background factors, the difference in percent of 

Project Concern entrants and of control entrants that dropped out 

of school (males and females) was not statistically significant. 

 



  

. ii Therefore, it is apparent that some of his conclusions were 

based on comparisons which did not control for family background. 

“Under the circumstances, very little weight can be given to the 

conclusions drawn by Dr. Crain in the final two paragraphs of 

Appendix 8,21 

#H 

  

21/ puring his testimony (Tr. Vol. 10, pp. 102 -103) Dr. Crain 
agreed that it was necessary to control for difference in 
background factors. 

"Q: So wouldn't you agree with me that to really get an 
accurate picture or a more accurate picture of the effects 
of desegregation or the effect of going to a suburban 
school, that you have to control for these differences in 
family background, right? 

A: That's right. 

Q: That's important in any comparison of student achievement 
or any other outcome you're looking at, isn't it? 

A: That's right. 

Q: Okay. It wouldn't be fair to just compare Hartford 
students with suburban students and not take that into 
account, wouldn't it? 

* A: That's right. You're right. You do have to do that." 

-10- 

 





; 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 

10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 

t
d
 

ft
 

V
N
.
 

N
N
N
 

nN
 
=
O
 

1984-85 
DISTRICT 

Bloomfield 

West Hartford 
Wethersfield 
HARTFORD 

Farmington 
Rocky Hill 
Canton 

East Granby 
East Hartford 
Newington 
Suffield 
East Windsor 
Windsor Locks 
Windsor 
Avon 

Simsbury 
South Windsor 
Granby 
Ellington 

~ Manchester 
Glastonbury 
Vernon 

APPPNDIX 5 
OVERALL DISTRICT EXPENDITURES 
  

PER PUPIL* 

4834.92 
4731.90 
4439.49 
4398.71 
4331.99 
4318.27 
4304.65 
4261.27 
4252.54 
4224.15 
4128.68 
4058.80 
3852.51 
3837.03 
3782.13 
3709.37 
3695.86 
3607.56 
3584.58 
3500.12 
3330.70 
3325.61 

1990-91 
DISTRICT 

Bloomfield 
Wethersfield 
East Hartford 
HARTFORD 

East Granby 
Rocky Hill 
West Hartford 
Canton 

Avon 
Newington 
Granby 
Vernon 
Farmington 
Glastonbury 
South Windsor 
Ellington 
Suffield 
Manchester 
Simsbury 
Windsor Locks 
East Windsor 
Windsor 

PER PUPIL* 

9053.52 
8109.42 
7870.70 
7837.13 
7829.61 
7795.76 
7619.92 
7435.29 
7402.40 
7303.93 
7228.05 
7171.80 
7108.80 
7099. 24 
6998.80 
6924.02 
6908.38 
6886.41 
6882.12 
6833.68 
6563.68 
6236.97 

1991-92 
DISTRICT 

Bloomfield 
HARTFORD 

Rocky Hill 
East Granby 
Wethersfield 
West Hartford 
Vernon 

Avon 

East Hartford 
Canton 

Newington 
Glastonbury 
Granby 
South Windsor 
Farmington 
Manchester 
East Windsor 
Suffield 
Windsor Locks 
Ellington 
Simsbury 
Windsor 

PER PUPIL* 

9116.63 
8126.41 
7886.15 
7812.27 
7810.97 
7615.28 
7591.21 
7567.47 
1532.82 
7356.99 
7307.53 
7258.36 
7243.71 
7219.04 
7181.38 
7141.71 
7129.82 
7086.34 
7082.92 
6912.71 
6814.66 
6039.91 

Total expenditures (excluding school construction and adult education) reported by districts to State Department of Education on end of year report (ED001) divided by ~ average daily membership (as defined in C.G.S., 10-261(a)(2)) for the same year. 

 



  

Hi 

  

  
  

  

  

2/ 

3/ 

£4 

APPENDIX 6A 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF WILLIAM T. TRENT, PLAINTIFFS' EX. 481 

Summary of Dr. William T. Trent's findings 1/ re: 
Does attending schools with the following conditions existing (independent of other 
variables 2/) have a statistically significant impact on the following outcomes and 
racial/ethnic groups at the .05 level or less? 

Is Impact 
Statistically Exhibit School Racial/Ethnic Significant At 

i Condition Outcome Group .05 Level or Less? 

481M high % of educational Latino No 
disadvantaged students 3/ attainment 

~ 481N " h Black No 
4810 ’ ’ White Yes 

(county Black) 
481P i 4 White Yes 

(county Latino) 

1/ Based on PARNES Youth Cohort data, which in general explained a much higher 
percentage of the variance found than the regressions based on the High School and Beyond data (on which the findings in Appendix 6B are based). 

Region, sex, age in 1979, mother's education, father's education, mother's 
occupation, father's occupation, county unemployment rate, and county racial 
composition, 

Dr. Trent's variable of "school percentage disadvantaged" is not a direct measure of the concentration of poverty in the school as the plaintiffs have suggested. Instead 
the variable reflects the "percentage of students who qualified and were 
participating in Title I programs." Vol. 7, p. 56 (Trent). Because of the great 
latitude school districts have in deciding where to spend Title 1I money and because, 
once a school has been designated to receive Title I money, the children who are 
served by that Title I program need not be poor, there are many forces which affect 
the computation of "school percentage disadvantaged" in a way which makes it an 
imprecise measure of the concentration of poverty. 

 



  

Exhibit 

4810 

481R 
481S 

481T 

481U 

481V 
481W 

481X 

481Y 

4812 
481AA 

481BB 

481CC 

481DD 
481EE 

4B1FF 

School 
Condition 
increasing diversity 4/ 
  

high % of 
disadvantaged students 

high % of 
disadvantaged students 

increasing diversity?/ 

  

4/ Attended schools with a higher percentage of non-white students - if white, and a 
higher percentage of white students - if nonwhite. 

Outcome 
co-worker 

friendliness 

co-worker 

friendliness 

$ of other 

race co-workers 
n 

$ of other 

race co-workers 
" 

Racial/Ethnic 

Group 
  

Latino 

Black 
White 

(county Black) 
White 

(county Latino) 

Latino 

Black 
White 

(county Latino) 
White 

(county Black) 

Latino 

Black 
White 

(county Black) 
White 

(county Latino) 

Latino 

Black 
White 

(county Black) 
White 

(county Latino) 

: ( ' ye Ie 

Is Impact 
Statistically 
Significant At 
.05 Level or Less? 
  

No 

No 
No 

No 

No 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

 



  

Exhibit’ 

ee 

481GG 

481HH 
48111 

481JJ 

School 

Condition 
  

increasing diversity 
school and work place ° 

”n 

  

Outcome 

income 

Racial/Ethnic 
Group 
  

Latino 

Black 
White 

(county Latino) 
White 

(county Black) 

BEET SR 

Is Impact 
Statistically 
Significant At 
.05 Level or Less? 
  

Yes 

Yes 

No 

No 

5/ same condition defined in footnote 4 in the workplace as well as in schools attended. 
vy 

 



Does 

APPENDIX 6B 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF WILLIAM T. TRENT, PLAINTIFFS' EX. 481 
  

Summary of Dr. William T. Trent's findingsl/ re: 
attending a disadvantaged school2/ (independent of region, sex, and socioeconomic 

status) have a statistically significant impact on the following outcomes and 
racial/ethnic groups, at the .05 level or less? 

Is Impact Statistically 
Exhibit Racial/Ethnic Significant At .05 

481A 
481B 
481C 
481D 

Outcome Group Level or Less? 
occupational attainments Puerto Rican No 

’ Latino No 
n Black Yes 
Ly White Yes 

  
  

Based on High School and Beyond data (high school seniors in 1980 resurveyed in 
1986). 

Dr. Trent defines his disadvantaged school variable as follows: 
Disadvantaged School Context is a constructed variable created by combining 
three measures from the school survey: 

School Dropout Rate 
DSC = Title I + 

College Attendance Rate 

"Title I"; "Does the school participate in Title I programs for disadvantaged 
students?" The measure is coded 1 = yes, 0 = no. 

  

Dropout; This is a school reported measure of the percentage of dropouts from 
school based on sophomore enrollments. 

College Attendance Rate; This is a school reported measure of the percentage of 
students who enrolled in college following graduation in 1978-79. 

| . wy 

   



Outcome 

income 

educational attainment 
" 

Lu 

Racial/Ethnic 
Group 
  

Puerto Rican 
Latino 
Black 
White 

Puerto Rican 
Latino 
Black 

White 

Is Impact Statistically 
Significant At .05 
Level or Less? 
  

No 

No 
Yes 
No 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

 



Hd
 

  

AN 
© y 

{ 

  

  

  

  

APPENDIX 7 

Bibliography of Definitions of “discriminate”, 
*discrimination®, "segregate® and “segregation”. 

Webster, Noah, by William G. Webster and William A. Wheeler. 
A Common-School Dictionary of the English Language. New 
York: Ivison, Blakeman, Taylor & Co. 1867. 

Discriminate. v. t. To distinguish; to separate. 
Discrimination, n. Act of discriminating. 
  

  

~ Segregate. v: t. To separate; to set apart. 
  

Segregation. n. Separation from others. 
  

Webster's Collegiate Dictionary. Third Edition. 1922 

Discriminate. a. [L. discriminatus, p.p. of discriminare 
to divide, deriv. of discernere to discern.] 1. 
Distinguished by certain tokens; distinct. 2. Marked by or 
showing discrimination. 
--(-nat), v.t.;-nat'ed-(-nat'ed);-nat'ing. 1. To mark as 
different;differentiate. 2. To separate by discerning 
differences;distinguish.--Syn. See distinguish.--v.i. 1. 
To make a difference or distinction; distinguish. 2. 
To make a difference in treatment or favor (of one as 
compared with others). 

  

Discrimination. n. 1. Act of discriminating; a state of 
being discriminated. 2.A distinction, as in treatment; esp. 
an unfair or injurious distinction. 3.Quality of being 
discriminating; acute discernment. 4.That which 
discriminates; mark of distinction. --Syn. Penetration, 
clearness, acuteness, acumen, judgment, discernment, 
distinction. 

  

segregate a. [L.segregatus, p.p. of segregare to separate; 
se-aside + grex, gregis, flock, herd.] Set apart; separate; 
  

    
 



Hi
 

    

a 
© 
= 

| 

    

select.--(-gat), v.t.;--gat'ed(-gat'ed);-gat'ing. To 
separate or cut off from others or from the main body; 
set apart. v.i. Chem., Geol., etc. To separate from 
the general mass and collect together, as in 
crystalization or solidification. 

segregation n. Act of segregating, or state of being 
segregated; also, a segregated portion or mass. 
  

Universal Dictionary of the English Language. George 
Routledge & Sons, Ltd. 1932 ; 

discriminate vb. intrans. & trans. [l. diskri-minat; 
2. diskrimineit], fr. Lat. discrimin-at(um), P.P. type of 
discriminare, ‘'to divide, separate'; fig. 'to distinguish; 
to distribute, apportion’, fr. discrimen, 'an intervening 
space, interval; distinction,difference; critical moment, 
turning point,crisis; danger,hazard', fr. dis- & *cri-men, 
fr. Aryan base *(s)krei-, *(s)kri-, 'to divide, separate’. 
Cp. Gk. krino, 'to separate, distinguish' (see critic); Lat. 
cernere, 'to divide, separate; to recognize, perceive 
(see concern, certain); Lat. cribrum, 'sieve' (see 
cribriform, riddle(III.)). The base *(s)k(e)rei-&c. is an 
expansion of the base*(s)ker-, 'to cut'. See cortex, carnal, 
scribe. A. intrans. 1. To perceive differences, distinguish 
(between): to discriminate between A and B. 2. To 
distinguish by different treatment; mark out, select, for 
special treatment; make distinctions, treat differently: to 
discriminate in favour of A, against B. B. trans. 1. To 
distinguish carefully, mark differences in: to discriminate 
A from B. 2. To serve as a distinction, distinguish: his 
great stature discriminated him from his followers. 

  

discrimination, n.[1l. diskriminashun; 2. diskrimineifen]. 
discriminate &-ion. 1. The act of discriminating. 
2. Capacity for discriminating; ability to perceive subtle 
distinctions; perception. : 

  

segregate (I), vb. trans. & intrans. 1. segregat; 2. 
segrigeit]; pedantically [1l. segregat; 2. sigrigeit] on 
account of Lat. se-; fr. Lat. segregat-(um), P.P. type of 
segregare, 'to set apart, separate from others', fr. se- & 
greg-, stem of grex, 'a flock'. See gre-garious. 1. trans. 
To cut off, separate from others or the main body or mass; 
to set apart, isolate. 2. intrans. To become separated from 

  

Jw 

—
 

e
a
 

ee
 
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
 
—
—
—
—
—
e
 

 



Hd
 

  

N 
x > 

    

a 
 
—
 
S
—
—
—
 
 
—
—
 

——
——

——
—;

 
—
—
 

——
—t

 
5 —
—
_
 

io 
3 
oH
 

    

a main body or mass, specif. (of crystals &c.) to separate 
and collect round a nucleus or line of fracture. 

segregation [l. segregashun; 2. segrigeifen], fr. Lat. 
segregation-(em). See prec. & -ion. a Act, process, of 
segregating; b state of being segregated; c segregated group 
of persons or objects &c. 

  

New Practical Dictionary of the English Language, 
Britannica World Language Dictionary. Funk & Wagnalls Co. 
1956. 

discriminate: 1. to note the differences between; observe 
a difference. 2. to set apart as different; differentiate; 
distinguish. 3. To make a distinction; treat unequally 
or unfairly. 

  

discrimination, n.l. The act or power of discriminating; 
the discernment of distinctions. 2. Differential treatment. 
3. The state or condition of being discriminated; 
distinction; sometimes, unjust distinction. 

  

segregate: 1. To place apart from others or the rest; 
isolate or make into an isolated group. 2. To separate from 
a mass and gather about nuclei or along lines of fracture, 
as in crystallization or solidification. 3. To undergo 
segregation. adj. separated or set apart from others; 
select. 

  

segregation, n.1. The act or process of segregating; esp. 
in genetics the separation and distribution of inherited 
characters in the off-spring of cross-bred parents. 

  

Webster's New International Dictionary of the English 
Language. Second Edition. From Volumes II and IV. 1957 

discriminate, adj. [L. discriminatus, 
past part of discriminare to divide, separate, fr. 
discrimen division, distinction, decision, fr. discernere. 

See Discern; cf. criminate.] 1. Having the difference 
marked; distinguished by certain tokens; distinct. 
2. Marked by discrimination; carefully distinguishing. 
--discriminately, adv.--discriminateness, n. 

  

discriminate(-nat), v.;-nated (-nated); -id; 119); 

-3- 

  
 



  

x 
L3 

    

    

-nating(-nat'ing). Transitive: 1. To serve to distinguish; 
to mark as different; to differentiate. Now rare. 2. To 
separate (like things) one from another in comprehension 
or use by discerning the minute differences. 
--,Intransitive:1. To make a distinction; to distinguish 

accurately; as, to discriminate between fact and fancy; 
also, to use discernment. 2. To make a difference in 
treatment or favor (of one as compared with others); as, 
to discriminate in favor of one's friends; to discriminate 
against a special class. Syn. --See distinguish. 

discrimination, n. (LL. discriminatio 
the contrasting of opposite thoughts.] 1. Act of 
discriminating, or state of being discriminated. 

To make an anxious discrimination between the miracle 
absolute and providential. Trench. 

2. That which discriminates; a mark of distinction. 
3. The quality of being discriminating; faculty 
of nicely distinguishing; acute discernment. 4. A [ 
distinction, as in treatment; esp., an unfair or injurious 
distinction. Specif., arbitrary imposition of unequal 
tariffs for substantially the same service; a difference in 
treatment made between persons, localities, or classes of 
traffic, in respect of substantially the same service. 

A difference in rates, not based upon any corresponding 
difference in cost, constitutes a case of 
discrimination. A.T. Hadley. 

5. The perception of a difference. 
Syn.--Discernment, penetration, distinction, acumen. 

  

segregate, adj. [L.segregatus, past part. of segregare to 
separate, fr. se- aside & grex, gregis, a flock or herd. 
See Gregarious.] Apart, or separated, from others of the 
same kind; set apart; separate; select. 

  

segregate, n. That which has segregated; specif.: a.Biol. 
An individual of a class resulting from the separation 
of characters during segregation (sense 4). b. Bot. & Zool. 
A species separated from an aggregate species. 

  

segregate, v.: seg're-gat’'ed (-gat'ed; -id;119); 
  

segregating (-gating). Transitive: 1. To separate or cut 
off from others or from the general mass or main body; to 
set apart; to isolate; to seclude. 2. To cause to 
segregate. 

  

    

 



  

    

--=-=,Intransitive: 1. To separate from the general mass, and 
collect together or become concentrated at a particular 
place or in a certain region, as in the process of 
crystallization or solidification; hence, to separate or 
withdraw as a group from a main body, as from a nation. 
2. Biol. To separate, as alleomorphic genes or characters, 
during meiosis. 

segregation, n. [LL. segregatio.] 1. Act of segregating, or 
state of being segregated; separation from others or from 
the general mass or main body. 2. Specif.: a Obs. Secession 
from an ecclesiastical body; schism. b. Obs. Dispersion. 
Shak. c Isolation or seclusion of a particular class of 
persons, as of foreign or defective school children or of 
the colored or Oriental population of a city. 3. A 
segregated portion; formerly, a schismatic group. 4. Biol. 
The separation of allelomorphic genes or characters, 
typically during meiosis. See Mendel's Law. 5. Ceramics. The 
condition of a surface having more than four spots, _f 
blisters, or pinholes in any pottery square. 

  

Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English 
Language. Second Edition. The World Publishing Company. 
1964 

discriminate, v.t.; discriminated, pt., pp.; discriminating, 
ppr. [L. discriminatus, pp. of discriminare, to divide, 
distinguish, from discrimen, a division, distinction, 
interval, from dis-, apart, and crimen, verdict, judgment.) 
1. To distinguish; to observe the difference between; to 
select from others. 

When a prisoner first leaves his cell he is unable to 
discriminate colors or recognize faces. - Macaulay. 

2. to constitute a difference between; to differentiate. 
In outward fashion. . . discriminated from all the 
nations of the earth. - Hammond. 

  

discriminate, v.i. 1. to see the difference (between 
things); distinguish. 2. to make distinctions in treatment: 
show partiality (in favor of) or prejudice (against). 

  

discriminate, a. 1. distinguished; distinct. 2. involving 
discrimination; distinguishing carefully. 
  

  

discrimination, n. 1. the act of distinguishing; the act 

“Ba    



Ho
 

    

5 
3 
= 

| 

  

of making or observing a difference; distinction; as, the 
discrimination between right and wrong. 2. the ability 
to make or perceive distinctions; penetration: judgment; 
perception; discernment. 

Their own desire of glory would . . . baffle their 
discrimination. - Milman. 

3. the state of being discriminated, distinguished, or 
set apart; a showing of difference or favoritism in 
treatment. 

There is a reverence to be showed them on the account 
of their discrimination from other places. 
Stillingfleet. 

4. that which discriminates; mark of distinction. 
Take heed of abetting any factions, or applying any 
public discriminations in matters of religion. Gauden. 

Syn.--discernment, penetration, clearness, acuteness, 
acumen, judgment, distinction. 

segregate, a. [L.segregatus, pp. or segregare, to set part, 
lit., to set apart from the flock; se-, apart, and grex, 
gregis, flock.) set apart from others; separate; segregated. 

segregate polygamy; in botany, a mode of inflorescence, 
when several florets included within an anthodium or a 
common calyx are furnished also with proper perianths. 

  

segregate, v.t.;segregated, pt.,pp.; segregating, ppr. 
to set apart from others or from the main mass or group; 
to isolate. 

  

segregate, v.i. 1. to separate from the main mass and 
  

    

collect together in a new body; said of crystals. 2. to 
separate from others; to be segregated. 3. in biology, 
to separate in accordance with Mendel's law; to undergo 
segregation. 

segregation, n. 1. a segregating or being segregated. 
2. a segregated part, group, number, etc. 3. in biology, 
the separation of allelmorphic genes or characters, as in 
meiosis. 

  

Random House Dictionary of the English Language. 1966. 

discriminate (v. diskrim e nat; adj di skrim e nit) 
v., -nated, -nating, adj. =--v.i. 1. to make a distinction 
in favor of or against a person or thing on the basis of 

  

“6a  



#4
 

    

Ll) 
© s 

{i 

  
  

    

the group, class, or category to which the person or thing 
belongs, rather than according to acutal merit: He 
discriminates against foreigners. He discriminates in 
favor of his relatives. 2. to note or observe a difference; 
distinguish accurately: to discriminate between things. 
--v.t. 3. to make or constitute a distinction in or between; 
differentiate: a mark that discriminates the original from 
the copy. 4. to note or distinguish as different: He can 
discriminate minute variaions in tone. --adj. 5. marked 
by discrimination; making nice distinctions: Discriminate 
people choose carefully. [L discriminat(us) separated, ptp. 
of discriminare. See Discriminant, -ate] 

discrimination, n. 1. the act or an instance of 
discriminating. 2. the resulting state. 3. treatment or 
consideration of, or making a distinction in favor of or 
against, a person or thing based on the group, class, or 
category to which that person or thing belongs rather than 
on individual merit; racial and religious intolerance-and 
discrimination. 4. the power of making fine distinctions; 
discriminating judgment: She chose her colors with great 
discrimination. 5. Archaic. something that serves to 
differentiate. [L discrimina-tion-(s. of discriminatio) 
a distinguishing. 

  

segregate (v. segregat;' n. segregit, -gat). v.,-gated, 
-gating, n. -v.t. 1. to separate or set apart from others 
or from the main body or group; isolate: to segregate 
exceptional children; to segregate hardened criminals. 
2. to require, often with force, the separation of (a 
specific racial, religious, or other group) from the 
general body of society. --vi.i. 3. to separate, 
withdraw, go apart; separate from the main body and 
collect in one place; become segregated. 4. to practice, 
require, or enforce segregation, esp. racial segregation. 
5. Genetics. (of allelic genes) to separate during 
meiosis. --n. 6. a segregated thing, person, or group. 
[ME segregat / L segregat(us) (ptp. of segregare to part 
from the flock), equiv. to se- se- + greg- (base of grex 
flock) + -atus -ate; see gregarious]. 

  

segregation, n. 1. the act or practice of segregating. 
2. the state or condition of being segregated: Segregation 
was most evident in the wealthier parts of the town. 
3. something segregated. 4. Genetics. the separation of 

  

ig JP  



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[ 

  

  

  

  

allelic genes in different gametes during meiosis, resulting 
in the separation of their characters in the progeny. 
[/ LL segregation- (s. of segregatio), equiv. to 
segregat (us) (see segregate) +-ion- -ion]) 

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. 
William Norris, Editor. Published by American Heritage 
Publishing Co., Inc. & Houghton/Mifflin Co. 1969. 

discriminate: To make a clear distinction; distinguish; 
differentiate. 2. To act on the basis of prejudice. 
-tr. 1. to perceive the distinguishing features of; 
recognize as distinct. 2. To serve to mark; differentiate. 
Adj. Discriminating. [Latin discriminaire), to’'divide, 

distinguish, from discrimen, distinction. 

  

discrimination: 1. The act of discriminating, 2. The ability 
or power to see or make fine distinctions; discernment. 
3. An act based on prejudice. _f 

  

segregate: -tr.1l. To separate or isolate from others or from 
a main body or group. 2. To impose the separation of (a 
race or class) from the rest of society. -intr. 1. To become 
separated from a main body or mass. 2. To practice a 
policy of racial segregation. 

  

segregation: n. 1. The act or process of segregating or the 
condition of being segregated. 2. The policy and practice 
of imposing the social separation of races, as in schools, 

housing and industry; especially, discriminatory practices 
against nonwhites in a predominantly white society. 
3. Genetics: The separation of paired alleles in meiosis. 

  

World Book Dictionary - A-K. Edited by Clarence L. Barnhart, 
Robert K. Barnhart. Published by Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1986. 

discriminate: 1. To see or note a difference between. 
2. To constitute a difference between; differentiate. 

adj. 1. having discrimination; making careful distinctions. 
Archaic: distinguish; distinct. 

  

discrimination: 1. The act of making or recognizing 
differences and distinctions. 2. The ability to discriminate 
accurately between things that are very much alike; good 
judgment. 3. Making a difference in favor of or against. 

  

5 

  
 



fH
 

  

x 

La > 

    

8b. 

4. Obsolete. 

World Book Dictionary - L-Z. 

segregate: 1. to separate from others; set apart; isolate. 
2. to separate or keep apart (one racial group) from another 
or from the rest of society by maintaining separate schools, 
separate public facilities, etc. 
v.i. 1. to separate from the rest and collect in one place. 
2. Genetics: to undergo segregation. 

  

segregation: A separation from others; setting apart; 
isolation. 2. the separation of one racial group from 
another or from the rest of society, especially in schools, 
theaters, restaurants, and other public places and public 
places of meetings, especially social gatherings. 3. a thing 
separated or set apart, isolated part, group, etc. 

  

Webster's Third New International Dictionary. f 
(Merriam-Webster). 1986. 

discriminate. adj. Archaic: having the difference marked: 
distinguished by certain tokens: distinct. 2. marked by 
discrimination: carefully distinguishing. 

  

discriminate. [L discriminatus, past part of discriminare 
to divide, distinguish, fr. discrimin-, discrimen 
division, distinction, decision, fr. discernere to 
separate, distinguish between -- more at discern) 
vt la : to mark or perceive the distinguishing 
or peculiar features of: recognize as being different from 
others: distinguish between or among. b: to serve to 
distinguish: distinguish, differentiate. c: to make out; 
analyze, discern, demarcate. 2: to distinguish (as objects, 
ideas, or qualities) by discerning or exposing their 
differences; esp: to distinguish (one like object) from 
another by discerning or exposing the minute differences. 
vi la: to make a distinction: distinguish accurately. b: to 
use discernment or good judgment. 2: to make a difference 
in treatment or favor on a class or categorical basis in 
disregard of individual merit. syn see distinguish. 

  

discrimination: n -s [LL discrimination-, discriminatio act 
of contrasting opposite thoughts, separation, distribution, 
fr. L discriminatus + -ion, -io, -ion] la: the act or an 

  

  
 



tH
 

    

5 
© x 

    

instance of discriminating: as (1): the making or perceiving 
of a distinction or difference (2): recognition, perception, 
or identification esp. of differences: critical evaluation 
or judgment b: psychol: the process by which two stimuli 
differing in some aspect are responded to differently: 
differentiation. 2 archaic: something that discriminates: a 
distinguishing mark. 3: the quality of being discriminating: 
the power of finely distinguishing (as in respect to 
quality): good or refined taste: discernment. 4: the act, 
practice, or an instance of discriminating categorically 
rather than individually: as a: the according of 
differential treatment to persons of an alien race or 
religion (as by formal or informal restrictions imposed 
in regard to housing, employment, or use of public 
community facilities) b: the act or practice on the part of 
a common carrier of discriminating (as in the imposition of 
tariffs) between persons, localities, or commodities in 
respect to substantially the same service. ¢ 

segregate. adj [ME, fr. L segregatus, past part, of 
segregare to segregate]: Segregated. 
  

segregate/"/ n -s 1: an individual or class of individuals 
differing in one or more genetic characters from the 
parental line usu. because of segregation of genes 2: a 
taxonomic unit separated out from another of the same rank. 

  

segregate. vb -ed/-ing/-s[L segregatus, past part, of 
segregare to set apart, segregate, fr. se-apart (fr. 
sed, se without) + greg-, grex flock, herd -more at 
idiot, gregarious] vt 1: to separate or set apart from 
others or from the general mass or main body :isolate. 
2: to cause or force the separation of (as races or social 
classes) from the rest of society or from a larger group. 
3: to remove nondrying components from (a fatty oil) by 
winterizing or other methods * vi 1: to separate or 
withdraw (as from others or from a main body) 2: to practice 
or enforce a policy of segregation. 3: to separate during 
meiosis - used esp. of allelic genes. 

  

segregation. n. -s often attrib [LL segregation-, 
segregatio,fr.L. segregatus (past part of segregare to 
segregate) + -ion-, -io -ion)] 1 a: the act or process cf 
segregating or the state of being segregated. b obs: 
Dispersion. 2: the separation or isolation of individuals 

  

-10=  



  
  

    

or groups from a larger group or from society: as a: the 
separation or isolation of a race, class, or ethnic 
group by enforced or voluntary residence in a restricted 
area, barriers to social intercourse, divided educational 
facilities or other discriminatory means. 
-- see Apartheid b: the separation for special treatment 
or observation of individuals or items from a larger 
group. c: the separate confinement of individuals or 
groups. 3: the tendency of individuals or units to 
separate from a larger group or society and associate 
together on a basis of similar characteristics. 4: a 
special cell or cellblock for the confinement of persons 
separated from the rest of the inmate population in an 
institution. 5: the separation of allelic genes that 
occurs typically during meiosis -- see Mendel's Law. 
6: a nonuniform distribution of particles or aggregate 
throughout a quantity of concrete, mortar, or plaster 
7: the concentration of alloying elements in specific 
parts of a metallic alloy. 'Y 

7. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language. 
Second Edition, Unabridged. 1987. 

discriminate: v.i. 1. To make a distinction in favor of or 
against a person or thing on the basis of the group, class 
or category to which the person or thing belongs rather than 
according to actual merit; show partiality. 2. To note or 
observe a difference; distinguish accurately. 

  

v.t. To make or constitute a distinction in or between: 
differentiate. To note or distinguish as different. 

discrimination: n. 1. An act or instance of discriminating. 
2. Treatment or consideration of, or making a distinction 
in favor of or against, a person or thing based on the 
groups, class, or category to which that person or thing 
belongs rather than on individual merit. 3. The power of 
making fine distinctions; discriminating judgment. 

  

segregate: to separate or set apart from others or from the 
main body or group; isolate. 2. To require, often with 
force, the separation of (a specific racial, religious, or 
other group) from the general body of society. -v.i. 3. To 
separate, withdraw, or go apart; separate from the main body 
and collect in one place; become segregated. 4. to practice, 

  

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segregation: n. 
  

segregated. 

Laraine Z. Baker 

‘|! Paralegal Specialist 

  

  

Bibliography prepared by: 

require, or enforce segregation, esp. racial segregation. 

The act or practice of segregating. 2. 
The state or condition of being segregated. 3. Something 

=13- 

  

 



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3 4 

    

APPENDIX 8 

NO. 27 35 07 : SUPERIOR COURT 

NEIL BROADLY, ET AL. : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF NEW HAVEN 

V. : AT NEW HAVEN 

MERIDEN BOARD OF 
EDUCATION, ET AL. : AUGUST 14, 1992 

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
  

In a three count revised complaint, two minor school 

children, Neil Broadly, Timothy Croce ("the plaintiffs"), and 

their parents bring this action against the Meriden Board of 

Education, the Waterbury Board of Education, the Connecticut 

State Board of Education and its commissioner, Gerald Tirozzi, 

and the Connecticut Association of Boards of Education. The 

plaintiffs allege that they are "exceptional children" as defined 

in C.GCeSe §10-76a(c)?! and "children requiring special education” 

as defined in C.G.S. §10-76a(e)?, that they have been so 

identified by their respective school districts, and that they 

have been denied access to special educational programs by the 

defendant school districts. 

"JDICIAL DISTRICT OF NEW HAVEN 
SUPERIOR COURT 

FILED 

Come. enon ores 3 [1g <4 AUG 18 1332 

Bh (1 Care |THiop Arar i Bis 

ond copy to Carl 
oF Lio A ATs ING 1 - ; os 

  

   



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Each of the three counts are directed at all of the 

defendants. In the first count , the plaintiffs allege that the 

failure of the defendant boards of education to provide special 

educational services is a violation of article eighth, section 1 

of the Connecticut Constitution, which guarantees free public 

elementary and secondary schools: in the state. The second count 

incorporates the allegations of the first count, and alleges a 

violation ‘of article 1, section 1 of the Connecticut 

Constitution, whic} luarantees equality of rights for all 

persons. The third count incorporates the allegations of the 

first, and alleges a violation of the equal protection clause of 

the Connecticut Constitution, article first, section 20. 

In their prayer for relief, the plaintiffs request an order 

requiring the defendant boards of education to provide special 

educational services for the plaintiffs and all other children 

entitled to special educational services under state law, and a 

judgment declaring C.G.S. §10-76d(b)> unconstitutional under the 

aforementioned provisions of the Connecticut Constitution. 

Each of the defendants have filed answers and special 

defenses. In their answer, the defendant boards of education 

admit that th plaintiffs are "exceptional” children as defined in 

C.GC.85.:.§10~-76a{c), that they are "children requiring special 

education” in that they have "extraordinary learning ability" as 

. Diet 

 



  

LN 
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those terms are defined in C.G.S. §10-76a(e), and that they have 

been so identified by their respective school districts. The 

defendants have asserted as special defenses lack of standing, 

non-justiciability, sovereign immunity, and separation of powers. 

The plaintiffs have replied to the special defenses of each 

defendant. After the closing of the pleadings, each of the 

defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In their 

memoranda in support of the motion, the defendants set forth 

four grounds: 1) that the Connecticut educational system 

satisfies the state's constitutional obligation to provide free 

public elementary schools; 2) that there is no right in 

Connecticut to an individualized education; 3) that Connecticut's 

educational plan does not impinge upon the plaintiff's rights and 

does meet an important state interest; and 4) that the 

Connecticut. Constitution specifically leaves decisions regarding 

education up to the general assembly. The defendants' motion is 

accompanied by the plaintiffs' report cards, attached as exhibits 

A and B. 

The plaintiffs have opposed the motion, and have filed a 

memorandum of law. The motion and memorandum are accompanied by 

a bibliography of articles on the subject of gifted education. 

"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when 

pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that 

there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving 

- 3 - 

 



party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wilson v. New 
  

Haven, 213. Conn. 277, :279,%67:A.24 829% (1989); Connecticut   

  

National Bank v. Great Neck Development Co., 215 Conn. 143, 148, 
  

574 A.24:.1298 (1990). "The moving party has the burden of 

showing the absence of any genuine issues as to all material 

facts, which under principles of applicable law entitle him to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 
  

445, 476 A.2d 582 (1984). "The test is whether a party would be 

entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts." Cohne ll Ve 
  

Colwell, 214 Conn. 242, 246-47, 571 A.24 116 (1990), citing   

    
Batick v. Seymour, 186 Conn. 632, 647, 443 A.2d 471 (1982).   

There are no factual issues in dispute. The parties’ 

arguments focus primarily upon the issue of whether the 

defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

A. The First Count: The Right To A Free Public Education 
  

In the first count of their complaint, the plaintiffs allege 

that their right to a free public education is being abridged by 

the defendant boards of educations' failure to provide them with 

"special education.” The plaintiffs argue that the right to a 

free public education requires the sciool districts within the 

state to provide "real educational benefit" to all students, 

including gifted ones. The defendants argue that a program that 

is designed to advance students from. grade to grade is 

constitutionally sufficient.  



# 

  

4 
© 

Article eighth, §1 states in its entirety that 

There shall always be free public 

elementary and secondary schools 
in the state. The general 
assembly shall implement this 
principle by appropriate 
legislation. 

Under the Connecticut Constitution, the right to education is 

fundamental, and infringements upon this right are subject to 

strict judicial review. Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 35, 486 
  

A.2d 1099 (1985) ("Horton III")' Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 
  

615, :648-49, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) ("Horton 1"). Elemedtary and 
  

secondary education is a fundamental right, and pupils in the 

public schools are entitled to the equal enjoyment of that right. 

Campbell v. Board of Education, 193 Conn. 93, 105, 475 A.24 289 
  

(1984), citing Horton I, supra, 648-49. Although rcognizing that 
  

infringements upon the fundamental right to education are subject 

to strict judicial review, the Horton cases do not require that 

strict scrutiny be applied to _all governmental regulations 

affecting education, but only to those that impinge upon the 

plaintiff's right, to "'a substantially equal educational 
  

opportunity’ for Connecticut students in the state's 'free public 
  

elementary and secondary schools.'" (Emphasis added.) _Campbell 
  

Ve. Board of Education, supra, quoting Horton 1, supra, 649. 
        

Thus, a school board policy that is "neither disciplinary nor an 

infringement of equal educational opportunity does not infringe 

any fundamental rights under our constitution.” Campbell v. 
  

sg 

 



  

#'
 

  

x 
© x 

    

Board of Education, supra, 105. 
  

The Horton cases and their progency provide that the right 

to receive a free public education is a fundamental right, which 

must be provided to all aliginle students on an equal basis and 

which may not lightly be abridged, but they do not support the 

plaintiffs’ claims of constitutional entitlement to any 

particular type, style, or method of free public education. A 

similar conclusion was reached by the New York courts, which, 

interpreting a similar provision in the New York Constitution’ 

have held that "[tlhis general directive does not impose a duty 

flowing directly from a local school district to individual 

pupils to ensure that each pupil receives a minimal level of 

education.” Bennett v. School District. 114 .A.D.24d 58, 67 
  

(1985). "[Tlhe mere fact that the child is not permitted to 

attend the school of his choice is not tantamount to the denial 

of a right to an education." 1Id., 6. The mere fact that a child 

is not given the educational program of his or her choice does 

not impinge upon tHat child's right to a free public education. 

The Connecticut Constitution expressly delegates the duty to 

implement the constitutional mandate to provide free public 

schools to the legislature. "The general assembly shall 

implement this principle [the provision of free public schools] 

by appropriate legislation.” Connecticut Constitution, article 

first, section 1. The complainants do not allege that the 

- A



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XN. 
© s 

legislature has failed to carry out its constitutional mandate to 

provide a system of free public schools; in fact, the complaint 

makes clear that the plaintiffs are attending free public schools 

in their respective communities. Therefore, because the 

Connecticut Constitution does not require the defendants to 

implement any particular type of educational program, and because 

the plaintiffs have not set forth any evidence to show that their 

right to a free public education has been abridged, the motion 

for summary judgment is granted as to count onef of the 

plaintiffs' revised complaint. 

B. Counts Two and Three: Equal Protection 
  

In count two the plaintiffs allege a violation of article 1, 

section 1 of the Connecticut Constitution, which guarantees 

equality of rights for all persons; count three incorporates the 

allegations of the first count, and alleges a violation of the 

equal protection clause of the Connecticut Constitution, article 

first, section 20, Both of these provisions have been 

interpreted as providing rights similar to those set forth in the 

equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the 

federal constitution. See Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 542 
  

A.24;: 700 (1988) ("equality of rights" provision of state 

constitution has meaning equivalent to equal protection clause 

contained in fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution); 

Brunswick Corp. v. Liquor Control Commission, 184 Conn. 75, 440 
      - 

 



  

2 
© r 

A.2d 792 (1981) have the same meanings and the same limits). 

Because these constitutional provisions proceed under the Sale 

method of analysis, they will be analyzed together. 

"'The concept of equal protestion under both the federal and 

state constitutions has been traditionally viewed as requiring 

the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to 

the governmental action questioned or challenged.'"™ Franklin v. 
  

Berger, 211 Conn. 591, 594, 560 A.2d 444 (1989), quoting Reynolds 
  

  

Y. Sims, 377.0.8. 533, 84 83.Ct, 1362, 12 L.Ed.24 506f (1964); 

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 105 S.Ct. 
  

    
3249, 87 L.Ed. 313 (1985); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 
  

Conn. 562, 578, 512°A.2d 3893 (1986). "The equal protection 

clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal 

advantages. Rather, a state may mmake classifications when 

enacting or carrying out legislation, but in order to satisfy the 

equal protection clause the classifications made must be based on 

some reasonable ground." Franklin v. Berger, supra, 595. Where 
  

a classification impinges upon a fundamental right or impacts 

upon an "inherently suspect” group, it will be subjected to 

strict scrutiny and will be set aside unless it is justified by a 

compelling state interest. Id. On the other hand, where a 

classification neither impinges upon a fundamental right nor 

affects a suspect group it will withstand constitutional attack 

if the distinction is founded on a rational basis. 1d. 

- 8 - 

 



  

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"To implicate the equal protection clauses undr the state .and 

federal constitutions, therefore, it is necessary that the 

statute in question, either on its fact or in practice, treat 

persons standing in the same relation to it differently." Id., 

596. The plaintiffs argue that their right to the equal 

protection of the law is being abridged because C.G.S. §l10-76a(e) 

creates two classes of "children requiring special education,,” 

namely children with disabilities, C.G.S. §l10-76a(e)(l), and 

"gifted" children, C.G.S. §10-76a(e)(2), while C.G.S. §f0-76d(b) 

mandates special education only for the latter class of students. 

It has been submitted that the classification complained of 

does not impinge upon a fundamental right. That "gifted" or 

"exceptional" children are not the sort of "discrete and insular" 

minority for whom strict judicial scrutiny is required. See 

Ryskiewicz v. New Britain, 193 Conn. 589, 596-99, 479 A.2d 793 
  

    
(1984); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 s.Ct. 1848, 
  

29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971). Therefore, since the statute is "neither 

disciplinary nor. an infringement of equal educational 

opportunity, does not infringe any fundamental rights under our 

constitution;" Campbell v. Board of Education, supra, 105; and 
  

does not create a suspect class, the classification need only be 

rationally related to some legitimate government purpose. Id. 

C.G.S. §10-76d(b), insofar as it mandates special education 

for children with disabilities but not for children with 

- 0 =



  

pW 

LL 
> 

  

    

exceptional ability, is not violative of the equal protection 

clauses because it does not "treat persons standing in the same 

relation toi lt differently.” ‘Franklin v. Beger, supra, 596. The 
  

plaintiffs argue that C.G.S. §l0-76a(e) creates a single class of 

persons, consisting of the disabled and the gifted, and that they 

are therefore entitled to the same educational benefits as 

children with disabilities. For equal protection purposes, the 

children with disabilities and gifted children are not "similarly 

situated," and the two classes are not made a single clags by the 

fact of their inclusion within a single section of the statutes 

As the defendants point out in their memorandum in support of the 

motion for summary judgment, the handicapped require special 

education because they may have special problems which deny them 

access to a. normal education. (Memorandum in Support of 

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 18). The plaintiffs, on 

the other hand, "gifted" students, do not share these obstacles 

and are not being denied a "normal" education; instead, the 

plaintiffs are extraordinarily able, not extraordinarily unable, 

and thus dissinilarly situated from the class of children defined 

in C.G.S. $10-76a(e)(l). Therefore, the plaintiffs' argument 

that they are similarly situated to the children with physical 

handicaps and other learning disabilities is unavailing, and that 

in the absence of a showing that the plaintiffs have been treated 

differently from those similarly situated, the plaintiffs cannot 
  

- 10 i



  

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set forth a violation of their constitutional right to equal 

protection. 

Second, in order to succeed under the rational basis test, 

the plainitffs bear the heavy burden of proving that the 

challenged law bears no rational relationship to any legitimate 

state purpose. Campbell v. Board of Education, supra, 105. 
  

"[Tlhe focus of the rational relationship test is not whether the 

state has superior means available to accomplish its objectives, 

but whether the means it has chosen is a reasonable onef" Tyler 

v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1102 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 426 
  

U.S. 940 (1976). "Under the rational basis test, '[t]lhe court's 

function . . . is to decide whether the purpose of the 

legislation is a legitimate one, and whether the particular 

enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and 

reasonable way.' Pierce v. Albanese, 144, Conn. 241, 249, 129 
  

A.24 606, appeal dismissed, 355 U.S.: 15, 78 8S. Ct. 36, 2 L.Ed. 2d 

21 (1957); see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 
  

2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 520, 
  

425, 81 Ss. Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Caldor's Inc. v. 
  

Bedding Barn, Inc, 177 Conn. 304, 315, 417 A.2d4 343 (1979)" 
      Ryskiewicz v. New Britain, supra, 596-99. 
  

The defendants argue that the legislature's distinction 

between gifted and handicapped children is a legitimate one 

because handicapped children, unlike gifted children, may require 

iw 1]



  

x 
© 
> 

    

special educational services to obtain even rudimentary skills, 

which may enable the handicapped student to become SLA 

sufficient. The defendants argue that gifted students are] 

capable of acquiring most Basic skills without special education, 

and that the special education the gifted students seek is 

required primarily to maximize their extraordinary potential. 

This distinction between handicapped and gifted children is | 

"rational" under the rational basis test, and that the challenged 

statute therefore does not violate the equal protection clause of 

the state constitution. 

Because C.G.S. §1l0-76a(e) does not treat dissimilarly 

classes of persons similarly situated, and because the statute 

passes muster under the rational basis test, the motion for 

summary judgment is granted as to counts two and three. 

Based on the foregoing, the defendants' motions for summary 

judgment is granted as to all three counts of the plaintiffs’ 

  revised omplaint. —---- 

  

  

  
 



  

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FOOTNOTES 
  

l General Statutes §10-76a(c) states that 

an 'exceptional child' means a child 
who deviates either intellectually, 
physically, socially or emotionally 
so markedly from normally expected 

= growth and development patterns that 
he or she is or will be unable to 
progress effectively in a regular 
school program and needs a special 
class, special instruction or 
special services. 

2 General Statutes §20-76a(e) states that: [ 

'Children requiring special 

education’ includes any exceptional 
child who (1) is mentally retarded, 
physically handicapped, socially and 
emotionally maladjusted, 
neurologically impaired, or 
suffering an identifiable learning 
disability which impedes such 
child's rate of development . . . or 
(2) has extraoridinary learning 
ability or outstanding talent in the 
creative arts, the development of 
which requires programs or services 
beyond the level of those ordinarily 
provided in regular school programs 
but which may be provided through 
special education as part of the 
public School program. 

3 General Statutes §10-76d(b) provides, in 

pertinent part, that 

each local and regional board of 

education shall: (1) provide 
special education for school aged 
children who are described in 

. subdivision (1) of subsection (e) of 

s section 10-76a. 

4 The New York constitution states 
-13 =     
 



  

rf
, 

  

    

that "[t] he legislature shall 
provide for the maintenance and 
support of a system of free common 

schools, wherein all the children of 

the state may be educated." N.Y. 
Const., Art. XI, Sl.