Brown v. Board of Education Supplemental Brief for the State of Kansas on Questions 4 and 5 Propounded by the Court
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1954
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Brown v. Board of Education Supplemental Brief for the State of Kansas on Questions 4 and 5 Propounded by the Court, 1954. 9e2767cf-b69a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/e721866d-207c-4ebc-9e23-fd617d35d61a/brown-v-board-of-education-supplemental-brief-for-the-state-of-kansas-on-questions-4-and-5-propounded-by-the-court. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October T erm , 1954.
Oliver B rown, Mrs. R ichard L awton,
Mrs. Sadie E m m anuel, et al.,
A ppellants,
vs.
B oard op E ducation op T opeka, Shawnee
County, Kansas, et al.,
A ppellees.
APPEAL PROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR THE STATE OF
KANSAS ON QUESTIONS 4 AND 5 PRO
POUNDED BY THE COURT.
HAROLD R. FATZER,
Attorney General,
PAUL E. WILSON,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for the State of Kansas.
KELLEY PRINTING C O ,, TOPEKA
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Page
STATEMENT ............................... 1
THE QUESTIONS ......................................................... - 2
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ...................... 3
ARGUMENT ON QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED.. . . 6
CURRENT DE-SEGREGATION TRENDS.......... 13
A tch ison ........................................................................... 14
Lawrence . . . .................................................................... 15
Leavenworth .................................................................. 16
Kansas City ....................*............................................ 19
Parsons . . • •......................................... 21
Salina ............................................................................... 22
Cities Reporting no Action..................................... 22
CONCLUSION ........................• •........... ........ .................. 23
Page
TABLE OF CASES.
Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U. S. 607, 622.............. 9
Alabama Public Service Comm. v. Southern By. Co.,
341 U. S. 341, 351................................................. . 12
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, et al., 345
U. S. 972................................................................... .. 3
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, et al., 347
U. S. 483, 4 9 5 . . . . ........................................................... 2
Chapman y. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., Inc., 338
U. S. 621, 630...............'......... ......................................... 8
Eceles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U. S. 426, 431.................. 8
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 3'21 U. S. 321, 329-330.............. 8
Henderson v. United States, 339 IT. S. 816.................. 11
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 11
Missouri, ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, Registrar, 305
U. S. 337............................... ............. ........................ .. 11
Securities Exch. Comm. v. U S R & Impl. Co., 310
U. S. 434, Syl. 7 ............................................................. 9
Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 232 U. S. 631...................... 11
United States v. Morgan, 307 IT. S. 183...................... 9
STATUTES CITED.
Section 21-2424, General Statutes of Kansas, 1949..,.. 4
Section 72-1724, General Statutes of Kansas, 1949... .4,13
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITER STATES
O ctober T erm , 1954.
No. 1
Oliver B rown, Mrs. R ichard L awton,
M rs. Sadie E m m anuel, et al.,
A ppellants,
vs.
B oard op E ducation op T opeka, S hawnee
C ounty, K ansas, et al.,
A ppellees.
APPEAL PROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OP KANSAS.
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR THE STATE OF
KANSAS ON QUESTIONS 4 AND 5 PRO
POUNDED BY THE COURT.
STATEMENT.
On May 17, 1954, this Court announced its opinion that
racial segregation in public education per se is a denial
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
2
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. At the same time the Court sought an expres
sion of the views of the parties relative to the specific
decrees to be entered in this case and other cases now
pending. More particularly, the Court’s request is as
follows:
4‘ In order that we may have the full assistance
of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will
be restored to the docket and the parties are re
quested to present further argument on Questions
4 and 5 previously propounded by the court for re-
argument this term.” (Brown v. Board of Educa
tion of Topeka, et al., 347 U. S. 483, 495)
The following is respectfully submitted in an effort
to comply with that request.
THE QUESTIONS.
Questions 4 and 5 mentioned above, were set forth in
the Court’s order of June 8, 1953, and are quoted here
after :
“ 4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in
public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment,
“ (a) would a decree necessarily follow providing
that, within the limits set by normal geographic
school districting, Negro children should forthwith
be admitted to schools of their choice, or
“ (b) may this Court,, in the exercise of its equity
powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to
be brought about from existing segregation systems
to a system not based on color distinctions?
“ 5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and
(b) are based, and assuming further that this Court
3
will exercise its equity powers to the end described
in question 4(b),
“ (a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees
in these cases;
“ (h) if so what specific issues should the decrees
reach;
“ (c) should this Court appoint a special master to
hear evidence with a view to recommending specific
terms for such decrees;
“ (d) should this Court remand to the courts of first
instance with directions to frame decrees in these
cases, and if so, what general directions should the
decrees of this Court include and what procedures
should the courts of first instance follow in arriving
at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?”
(Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, et al.,
345 IT. S. 972.)
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
We pause at the outset of these comments to empha
size that we do not approach the present questions as
an adversary. Heretofore in the arguments of Decem
ber, 1952, and upon reargument in December, 1953, we
presented as fully as we could the arguments in justifica
tion of the statute authorizing certain boards of educa
tion in Kansas to provide for the education of Negro
children in separate schools of equal facility. The argu
ments then advanced appeared consistent with the re
ported decisions of this Court, the Supreme Court of
Kansas, and Appellate Courts elsewhere. However, the
issue in this case has now been determined contra to the
position we then urged. We accept without reservation
4
or equivocation the Court’s declaration that “ in the
field of public education, the doctrine of ‘ separate but
equal’ has no place.” We assure the Court that the
resources of state government will be employed to ef
fectuate the decision in the public schools of Kansas.
Hence, the sole purpose of this brief is to supply such
information as may assist the Court in finally dispos
ing of the Kansas case.
Of the several cases at bar we suspect that the Kan
sas case may be least complex. Several considerations
point to this conclusion. In earlier arguments we have
pointed out that the practice of segregation in public
education has never been widespread among the com
munities of the state. Traditionally, Kansans abhor in
equality. Except in the case of the elementary schools
in cities of the first class, the statutes of Kansas spe
cifically prohibit school authorities from making distinc
tions based on race, color or previous condition of servi
tude. (G. S. 1949, 21-2424) Moreover, we think it is
significant that quite apart from the Courts decision
of May 17, 1954, and through the normal exercise o f
local autonomy, an accelerated adjustment from exist
ing segregated systems to a system, not based on color
distinction has been in progress throughout the state.
Indeed, it might well be argued that the instant case
is moot by reason of the action of the Topeka Board
of Education more fully described in its separate brief
filed herein.
Segregation has never existed in Kansas as a matter of
state policy. Section 72-1724, General Statutes of Kan
5
sas of 1949', which has been declared unconstitutional in
the present litigation, purported to permit rather than to
require segregated elementary schools in the areas to
which it applied. Those segregated systems that have
been maintained, have existed by virtue of action of local
boards of education. Hence we do not contemplate that
the termination of segregation in Kansas will be the oc
casion for any policy adjustment on a state level. No
provision of the Constitution of Kansas is affected by
the Court’s decision of May 17, 1954. There is no oc
casion for state legislation to provide for or implement
the process of de-segregation. The abandonment of seg
regated school systems will not require the alteration of
any policy established by the State Department of Pub
lic Instruction or any other state administrative agency.
Emphatically, de-segregation will produce no cultural
problem nor will it disrupt an established way of life.
In fact, there has been no significant amount of protest
on the part of any group of Kansas citizens to the elimi
nation of separate schools. Indeed, the prevailing atti
tude has been one of approval. Presumably, political
party platforms reflect attitudes accepted by their mem
bers. Note the statement quoted hereafter from the
1954 platform of the Republican Party of Kansas:
“ We hail the recent historic decision of the Su
preme Court of the United States as upholding the
traditional position of the Republican Party that
there can be no second class citizens under our Amer
ican form of government.” (***)
In view of the foregoing, we cannot, in candor, sug
gest that at state level there are any barriers, legal or
6
otherwise, to the immediate termination of such segre
gated public school systems as may exist in Kansas. The
problems incident to the de-segregation process will be
encountered on the local level only, and will be proced
ural rather than substantial, pragmatic rather than es
sential. At the same time, they are problems that ob
viously cannot be resolved forthwith by resolutions of
boards of education or even by decrees of this Court.
Time will be required for deliberation, for decision and
for adjustment. How much time? We do not presume
to say. We suggest only that in those cases where, as
in Kansas, responsible state and local officials are pro
ceeding in diligence and good faith to effect the adjust
ment required by the Court’s opinion herein, such ef
forts should be recognized by this Court and be per
mitted to proceed with a minimum of judicial direction.
ARGUMENT ON QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED.
The briefs submitted by the several parties and amici
curiae prior to the December 1953 arguments, reveal
little significant divergence of view relative to the prin
ciples applicable to Questions 4 and 5. Hence, we dis
cuss the questions somewhat summarily.
“ 4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in pub
lic schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment,
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing-
that, within the limits, set by normal geopraphic
school districting, Negro children should forthwith
be admitted to schools of their choice, or
(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity
powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to
7
be brought about from existing segregated systems
to a system not based on color distinctions?”
The assumption stated has now become the established
principle of law. The questions go to the power of a
court of equity.
We think that a decree providing that, within the
limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro
children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their
choice, does not necessarily follow the opinion of May
17. On the other hand, we believe that this Court, in
the exercise of its equity powers, may permit an effec
tive gradual adjudgment from existing segregated sys
tems to a system not based on color distinctions. The
very fact that these questions are now being argued,,
some seven months after the decision that segregation
violates constitutional rights, suggests that the power to
postpone compliance does exist.
The decree must seek to reconcile the personal and
present interest of the Negro citizen, whose constitutional
rights have been violated, with the public interest in
safeguarding the integrity of the school system. To il
lustrate, we call attention specifically to a statement con
tained in the separate brief of the Board of Education
of Topeka submitted prior to the December, 1953, ar
guments :
“ If this Court should enter an order to abolish
segregation in the public schools of Topeka ‘ forth
with’, as suggested in Question 4(a), the Topeka
Board would, of course, do its best to comply with
the order. We believe, however, that it would prob
ably require that the regular classes be suspended,
8
while the many administrative, changes and adjust
ments are being made, and while the necessary trans
fers of and reassignment of students and teachers
are being made. Important decisions would have to
be hurriedly made, without time for careful investi
gation of the facts nor for careful thought and re
flection. Most decisions would have to he made on
a temporary or an emergency basis. We believe the
attendant confusion and interruption of the regular
school program would be against the public interest,
and would be damaging to the children, both negro
and white alike.” (pp. 4-5) (Italics supplied)
We think it cannot be disputed that a court of equity
has power to avoid such a consequence.
The reports abound with authority for the proposition
that it is the duty of a court of equity “ to strike a
proper balance between the needs of the plaintiff and
the consequences of giving the desired relief.” (Eccles v.
Peoples Bank, 33-3 IT. S. 426, 431.)
“ . . . equity will administer such relief as the
exigencies of the case demand at the close of the
trial.” (Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co.,
Inc., 338 U. S. 621, 630.)
“ The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the
power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould
each decree to the necessities of the particular case.
Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.
The qualities of mercy and practicality have made
equity the instrument for nice adjustment and re
conciliation between the public interest and private
needs as well as between competing private claims.”
(Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329-330.)
“ It is familiar doctrine that the extent to which
a court of equity may grant or withhold its aid, and
9
the manner of moulding its remedies,, may be affected
by tbe public interest involved.” (U. S. v. Morgan,
307 U. S. 183.)
“ A court of equity has discretion, in the exercise
of jurisdiction committed to it, to grant or deny re
lief upon performance of conditions which will safe
guard the public interest.” (Securities Exch. Comm,.
v . U S R S Imp. Co., 310 U. S. 434, Syl. 7.)
“ In short, the judicial process is not without the
resources of flexibility in shaping its remedies
. . . ” (Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 TJ. S. 607,
622.)
We presume that no principle of equity jurisprudence is
more familiar than that illustrated by the foregoing
statements. It would seem that the authorities cited
would preclude further argument on Question 4. How
ever, this proposition has been discussed at some length
in the supplemental brief for the United States on re
argument filed herein prior to the arguments in Decem
ber, 1953. We call the Court’s attention specifically to
the discussion and authorities contained in that brief on
pages 152 to 167, inclusive, and suggest that we are in
substantial agreement with the views expressed therein.
Question 5 assumes that 4(b) has been answered in
the affirmative. The Court then inquires:
“ (a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in
these cases;
“ (b) if so what specific issues should the decrees
reach;
“ (c) should this Court appoint a special master to
hear evidence with a view to recommending specific
terms for such decrees;
10
“ (d) should this Court remand to the courts of first
instance with directions to frame decrees in these
cases, and if so, what general directions should the
decrees of this Court include and what procedures
should the courts of first instance follow in arriving
at the specific terms of more detailed decrees!”
This question compels our attention to the inherent
limitations on the judicial power. We doubt that the
Court contemplates the judicial development of a plan
for the de-segregation of the schools of Kansas or any
other state. If such action is contemplated, we doubt
that it is legally or practically feasible. The Court
may determine, as it has determined, that the segregated
school system heretofore maintained in Topeka, Kansas,
violates the Constitution of the United States. It may
determine whether a gradual adjustment to a system
not based on color distinctions is authorized. However,
it cannot tell the Topeka Board of Education what non-
segregated school system, will be substituted for the one
heretofore maintained, nor can it prescribe the course
to be followed in effecting the substitution. These are
determinations that must necessarily be made with refer
ence to local conditions—conditions that were not ger
mane to the question of whether segregation per se is
unconstitutional and hence are not reflected by the rec
ord now before the Court. They are determinations that
must be made by local officials who are familiar with
local conditions and who are responsible for local educa
tional policy and for the general administration of the
school system. We urge that those officials be given the
11
maximum latitude consistent witli the rights of appel
lants.
We emphasize that in the exercise of appellate juris
diction, the Court’s considerations are limited by the
record forwarded from the court of original jurisdiction.
The present questions have appeared in the case since
the trial in the court below. Hence, before any detailed
decree could be framed, additional evidence would prob
ably be required. We suggest that the District Court is
the proper forum to hear evidence and determine facts.
“ The framing of decrees should take place in the
district courts rather than in the appellate courts.”
(International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S.
392.)
A review of the precedents would indicate that this
Court, as a matter of policy, has heretofore refused to
frame detailed decrees in cases involving segregation in
education. In those cases where school facilities have
been held unequal and where administrative action has
been required to secure equality, the Court has not at
tempted to determine precise standards to be observed
by the parties in order to finally dispose of the case.
Rather, the Court has been content to remand the case
to the lower court for further proceedings consistent
with and in conformity with its opinion. (Sipuel v.
Board of Regents, 332 TJ. S. 631; Missouri ex ret. Gaines
v. Canada, Registrar, 305 IJ. S. 337, and Henderson v.
United States, 339 IJ. S. 816.)
Thus, we answer part (a) of Question 5 in the nega
tive. This answer obviously precludes comment on part
12
(b). Similarly, we answer part (c) in the negative. We
believe that the only order necessary in the present case,
indeed, the only one justified by the circumstances, is
one reversing the judgment of District Court, and re
manding the cause to said court with directions to enter
an appropriate decree. We suggest further that the Dis
trict Court be directed to retain jurisdiction of the cause
until such time as the maintenance of segregated schools
by Appellee Board of Education is finally terminated.
Implicit in such an order would be the power of the
District Court upon appropriate motion by any of the
parties to deal with special problems arising during the
transition period.
Finally, we suggest that the decrees of both this Court
and the District Court should provide for a minimum
of judicial control.
“ It is in the public interest that federal courts of
equity should exercise their discretionary power to
grant or withhold relief so as to avoid needless ob
struction of the domestic policy of the states . . . ”
(Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Southern By. Co.,
341 U. S. 341, 351.)
Wherever responsible state and local officials are pro
ceeding in good faith to make the adjustments required
by the Court’s opinion of May 17, 1954, we suggest that
their efforts be recognized and that they not be hedged
by detailed judicial orders.
13
CURRENT DE-SEGREGATION TRENDS.
In its separate brief, the Topeka Board of Education
has advised the Court o f its action to terminate its seg
regated schools. Hence, we comment on that situation
only briefly. Since September, 1953, Topeka has moved
from universal segregation in its elementary schools,
to a system consisting of 12 integrated schools, two par
tially integrated, five schools maintained exclusively for
white students and four attended only by Negroes. One
hundred and twenty-three Negro students now attend
mixed elementary schools. We deem this significant pro
gress.
In other communities of Kansas, boards of education
not parties to this suit are initiating similar policies.
Since these arguments have apparently come to tran
scend the original parties and issues, we trust it is not
improper to comment on the experience of Kansas in
areas other than Topeka.
Section 72-1724, General Statutes of Kansas, 1949, au
thorizing segregated elementary schools, applied to twelve
cities of the state. One city, Hutchinson, never exercised
the power the statute purported to confer. Two cities,
Wichita and Pittsburg, maintained separate elementary
schools for many years, but for reasons of local policy,
terminated the practice in 1952. The recent action of
Topeka is mentioned above and is detailed in the sepa
rate brief of its Board of Education. Six other cities
of the state have, during the past year, commenced or
completed the process of de-segregating their public
schools.
14
Atchison. Atchison, a city of 13',000 persons, is located
on the boundary between Kansas and Missouri. Its pop
ulation is about 10% Negro. Segregation has been
maintained in the public elementary schools of Atchison
since the establishment of the system. It may be signifi
cant that the city was founded in 1854 by persons of
pro-slavery sympathies and for years the southern tra
dition was manifest in the community. Prior to the pres
ent school year four elementary schools, each serving a
fixed geographical area, have been maintained. exclusively
for white students and one elementary school has been
maintained for Negroes. On September 12, 1953, the
Board of Education adopted the following resolution:
“ That the plan of abolition of segregation in the
public schools of Atchison heretofore established by
the Board of Education and which has been effected
in grades seven through twelve be intensified so as
to complete the plan throughout grades one through
six as soon as practicable.”
Subsequent thereto, on June 9, 1954, the policy was
implemented by the adoption of a further resolution,
the text of which is set forth hereafter:
“ Motion was made by Mr. Thorning that segrega
tion of negro pupils be discontinued as of this date
in all Atchison city school districts with the excep
tion . of the Martin-Lincoln district; thereby eliminat
ing the necessity for operation of the school bus
transporting pupils to Lincoln school; also, that be
ginning with the school term of September 1955, all
segregation be ended in the Martin-Lincoln district
under such a plan as will promote the best interests
of the students in our school system.”
15
At the present time in excess of 25% of the Negro
students of the city are attending mixed schools. The
Board o f Education anticipates that the process of de
segregation will he completed by September 1, 1955. In
addition to the integration of students as above set forth,
a Negro has been employed as an elementary class-room
teacher, teaching predominately white 6th grade classes.
School administrators anticipate that all Negro teachers
presently employed, will be assimilated into the inte
grated system.
Lawrence. Seat of the State University, Lawrence is
a city of 24,000 population. About 7% of the people
are Negro. Segregated schools had been maintained
since prior to 1869. The process of assimilating the
Negroes into white schools was apparently begun about
1916, with the result that during the past few years only
one school had been maintained exclusively for Negroes.
Subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court of
May 17, 1954, the Lawrence Board of Education ordered
the immediate termination of segregation in all its pub
lic schools. In addition a Negro teacher was employed
in the school system to teach special classes in junior
high school and to teach physical education in the ele
mentary schools, all of which classes are attended by pre
dominately white students. The seriousness with which
this community approaches the problem is indicated by
the following comment of a school official in a communi
cation addressed to the Attorney General of Kansas:
“ We recognize that some Kansas communities
have problems more grave than ours—and we have
some hurdles certainly.
16
“ Does integration mean the mixing of white and
colored pupils only! What is the status of the col
ored teacher! This year we employed one colored
teacher on the basis of qualification for the job—but
we recognize the possibility of unfavorable reaction
when a colored person is employed as a teacher of a
self contained room. Such adaptations must come
slowly but must be achieved if integration is to be
more than a term referring to mixing of colored and
white pupils.”
Leavenworth. Leavenworth, a city in excess of 20,000
inhabitants, has a Negro population of about 10%. The
segregated system of elementary schools was established
in 1858 and has been maintained consistently since that
time. At present two elementary schools are maintained
exclusively for Negro students, whereas nine are attended
only by white. The policy announced by the Leaven
worth Board of Education of August 2, 1954, indicates
the reaction of the people of this community to the de
cision of May 17. The statement of policy is set forth
hereafter:
“ Pupils who enter the kindergarten or the first
grade in the fall of 1954 will be permitted to enroll
in the school of the district in which they reside
regardless of race. Such negro pupils regardless of
residence may continue to attend Lincoln and Sum
ner schools which will be adequately staffed with cap
able Negro teachers. It will be necessary for a time
to establish attendance districts for the Lincoln and
Sumner schools in order to carry out this policy. It
is the belief of the Board of Education that the
negro people in the Leavenworth community may
desire to continue their schools as presently oper
ated for a term of years during the transition period.
17
“ The Board of Education in this statement of
policy believes it to be consistent with the Supreme
Court decision in that it is starting in an orderly
way to move away from compulsory segregation.
“ It is believed that integration, when desired by
the parents, can best be initiated at the lower grade
levels. Those colored pupils who enroll in non-negro-
staffed schools at the kindergarten or first grade
level may continue in the school through subsequent
grades.
“ It is believed that it will be best for the individ
ual if integration begins at the primary level. Also,
the existing school system has been established in
a certain pattern, and because of limited facilities,
the pattern of enrollment cannot be suddenly changed.
The Board of Education is required to provide
school facilities and to frame policies for the welfare
of all pupils.
“ The Board will continue to study the problem
and restate its policies consistent with the expressed
desires of the people within the framework of the
Supreme Court decision.
“ The Board solicits the cooperation of all citi
zens in making an orderly transition from a segre
gated to a non-segregated school system. It looks
to the State Legislature, the State Department of
Public Instruction and the Attorney General for
counsel in the continuous reframing of its policies
consistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation
regarding the constitutionality of the Kansas statute
under which Leavenworth schools have operated since
1879.
“ The Board will make an effort to follow the sug
gestions and recommendations of the Supreme Court
as promised to be made by that body subsequent to
October, 1954.”
18
The first positive step taken by the Leavenworth school
system consistent with its declared policy has been the
admission during the 1954-55 school year of kindergarten
and first-grade pupils to the school nearest their resi
dence regardless of race. Presumably nest year the
Board intends to extend this policy to the second or
higher grades, although a positive statement to this ef
fect has not been announced. The following comment of
a public school official of Leavenworth suggests one of
the problems incident to de-segregation, and the com
munity’s approach thereto :
“ It is the intention of the Leavenworth Board of
Education to be completely fair in the treatment of
its faithful and competent negro teachers. It has
been in the cities maintaining segregated schools
where the opportunity for employment has existed
for negro teachers. There will be questions raised
as to why we cannot suddenly integrate our teach
ers in these cities, and there will be a few sporadic
cases for publicity purposes to illustrate that negro
teachers can be used indiscriminately. There are
frequent cleavages between teachers and pupils at
best. Some pupils resist authority and for various
reasons have to be disciplined, restrained, or cor
rected. This often puts parents on the defensive
and causes them to question or resist the teacher’s
authority. Now, if that teacher of a white child
should be a negro, the cleavage would be magnified
fifty to a hundredfold. I am sure you are well
aware of this.
“ The Leavenworth Board believes that for a con
siderable length of time, negro teachers will be used
in schools attended almost entirely by negro pupils.
It is perfectly logical to ask, why cannot we inte
grate them in one magnanimous action! What about
19
communities like Hutchin&on who has never had seg-
gregation? Have they ever employed a negro teacher
or are they likely to start employing them now? In
my judgment, the solution will have to be carefully
and slowly introduced. You and I and most board
members will readily agree to the righteousness of
complete integration from the standpoint of our es
tablished principles of decency, Christianity and de
mocracy. However, there is a sufficient number of
biased and prejudiced persons who will make life
miserable for those in authority who attempt to move
in that direction too rapidly. As a consequence,
many of us will be accused of ‘ dragging our feet’
in the matter, not because of our personal feelings
or inclinations, but because in dealing with the pub
lic, its general approval and acceptance is indispens
able. One cannot force it, he can only coax and nur
ture it along.”
Kansas City. Kansas City has a total population of
about 130,000, 20.5 percent of which belong to the Negro
race. It is adjacent to Kansas City, Missouri. It is
perhaps significant that the proportion of Negroes in
Kansas City, Kansas, is1 greater than in such southern
cities as Dallas, Louisville, Saint Louis, Tulsa, Miami
and Oklahoma City, and only slightly less than that of
Baltimore. Kansas City is the only community in Kan
sas where by virtue of law segregated high schools have
been maintained. Prior to the present school year the
City of Kansas City has maintained seven elementary
schools, one junior high-school and one high school ex
clusively for its 6000 Negro students, while twenty-two
schools were attended by more than 23,000 white stu
dents. On August 2, 1954, the following statement of
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policy was adopted by tbe Board of Education of Kan
sas City:
“ The members of the Board of Education, meet
ing as a committee of the whole, propose the adop
tion of the following statement of policy with refer
ence to the Supreme Court decision on segregation:
“ The Board of Education of the City of Kansas
City of the State of Kansas hereby declares its in
tent to abide by the spirit as well as the letter of
the Supreme Court’s decision on segregation. Spe
cifically, the Board of Education proposes:
“ 1. To begin integration in all the public schools
at the opening of school on September 13, 1954.
“ 2. To complete the integration as rapidly as class
room space can be provided.
“ 3. To accomplish the transition from segregation
to integration in a natural and orderly manner de
signed to protect the interests of all the pupils and
to insure the support of the whole community.
“ 4. To avoid any disruption of the professional
life of career teachers.
“ With these objectives in mind, the Board of Edu
cation directs the Superintendent of Schools within
the framework of this policy declaration to be re
sponsible for developing and applying the plan of
integration. ’ ’
The plan subsequently adopted permitted Negro stu
dents in kindergarten and grades 1, 6, 7, 10, 11 and 12
to enter the school of their choice within normal geo
graphic limitations. Because the bulk of the Negro
population is concentrated in one area of the city, the
termination of compulsory segregation will not elimi
21
nate schools attended exclusively by Negroes, However,
a total of 233' Negro students are now attending mixed
schools, and approximately 1000 more live in areas where
the process of amalgamation is now in progress. A re
port to the Attorney General’s Office, dated October 12,
1954, from a school administrator indicates:
“ The announced program by the Board of Edu
cation was well received by whites and negroes alike
and it is felt that integration in our schools is ac
cepted and will be completed when classroom space
permits. We are now engaged in the completion of
a 6V2 million dollar building program which includes
the immediate problem before us.”
School officials anticipate that subsequent to the com
pletion of the amalgamation program all Negro teachers
presently employed in the system will be retained.
Parsons. Parsons is located in southeastern Kansas
some twenty miles from the Oklahoma border. It is a
city of about 15,000 population, less than 10% of whom
are Negroes. Prior to the current school year four ele
mentary schools were maintained for white students and
one for Negroes. Commencing with the current year,
the Board of Education announced a policy to the effect
that whenever possible and practical, restrictions on
school attendance are to be immediately removed and
segregation eliminated. I11 line with this policy, segre
gation was eliminated in three of four ward elementary
school areas at the beginning of the 1954-55 school year.
The remaining school area is being operated on a segre
gated basis because of crowded conditions. The sepa
rate Negro school is located in this ward. Consequently
22
every child may attend an elementary school in the ward
in which he resides.
It is the present policy of the Board to delay inte
gration of the schools o f the fourth ward until additional
school facilities will be completed. At the present time
twenty-six Negro students in Parsons are attending mixed
elementary schools, while one hundred and forty-three
are required to attend the school maintained exclusively
for Negroes.
Salina. Segregation was terminated in the City of
Salina prior to the opening of the current school term.
In view of the fact that less than 3% of the city’s 27,000
people are Negroes, the problems incident to assimila
tion were slight. Prior to the present school term, one
school was attended by all Negroes of the city. The
present policy of the Board of Education permits all
students to attend the school located nearest their homes.
Cities Reporting no Action. Only two cities, Coffey-
ville and Fort Scott, report that action by their Boards
of Education has been delayed, pending final determina
tion of this case. In these cities an aggregate of about
400 Negro students attend three segregated schools.
Both cities are located in Southern Kansas, and school
officials indicate that there has been no local sentiment
in favor of the termination of the policy of segregation.
In one city, it is reported that the only protest against
the prospect of de-segregation has come from the Negro
citizens. However, in each of these communities local
school officials stand ready to take such action as may be
consistent with the policies to be announced by this Court
and the best interests of their people.
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CONCLUSION.
We respectfully submit that all considerations ger
mane to the present issues require that the decree of
this Court do no more than reverse the judgment of the
District Court and remand the cause to said court with
directions to enter judgment consistent with the opinion
herein and to retain jurisdiction thereof until said judg
ment be complied with.
HAROLD R. FATZER,
Attorney General,
PAUL E. WILSON,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for the State of Kansas.