Memorandum of Lawrence County Defendants on Issue of Preliminary Injunctive Relief

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

JOHN DILLARD, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

Ve. CASE NO. 85-T-1332-N 

CRENSHAW COUNTY, ALABAMA, 

et al., 

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Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM OF LAWRENCE COUNTY DEFENDANTS ON ISSUE 
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
  

I 

Introduction 
  

On March 4, 1986, the Court will hear Plaintiffs' motion 

for preliminary injunction. While the Lawrence County 

Defendants deny that any preliminary injunctive relief is 

appropriate, they respectfully submit this memorandum setting 

forth of their position in the event that the Court determines 

that some type of preliminary relief is warranted. Nothing in 

this memorandum should be construed as an acknowledgment by 

these Defendants that their January 10, 1986 motion to dismiss 

or transfer is not well taken; indeed, they continue to believe 

that this motion, which is still under consideration, should be 

granted and that this Court should take no further action on 

the Lawrence County claims. Further, they continue to deny 

that this case should proceed as a class action, and they deny 

that the prerequisites to the issuance of preliminary 

injunctive relief exist here. 

“Yu 

 



  

II 

Argument 
  

In their motion for preliminary injunction, the Plaintiffs 

ask this Court to prohibit elections in 1986 under the existing 

at-large system for electing county commissioners in Lawrence 

County. In addition, they seek to have this Court issue a 

mandatory preliminary injunction calling for the 1986 elections 
  

to be conducted under some single-member district plan, or some 

other plan "that assures the full and equal participation and 

effective voting strength of the black citizens" of Lawrence 

County. Below, these Defendants will show that, even if some 

preliminary injunctive relief is found to be warranted, the 

Court would be in error in 1ssuing the requested mandatory 
  

injunction. 

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is, of course, to 

preserve the status quo and thus prevent irreparable harm until 

the respective rights of the parties can be ascertained during 

a trial on the merits. Collum v. Edwards, 578 F.2d 110, 113 

(5th Cir. 1978). As an important part of the law in this area, 

it is well-established that mandatory preliminary relief is 
  

disfavored, and seldom to be granted. See, e.g., Harris v. 
  

Wilters, 596 P.2d 678, 630 (5th Cir. 1979); Martinez v. 
  

Mathews, 544 F.2d 1233, 1243 (5th Cir. 1976); and Exhibitors 
  

Poster Exchange, Inc. v. Nat'l. Screen Serv. Corp., 441 F.2d 
  

  

560 (5th Cir, 1971). 

 



  

In Martinez, supra at 1243, the Court of Appeals noted 
  

that trial courts are bound by "stringent standards" in 

evaluating claims for preliminary injunctive relief. The Court 

went on to observe that: 

Mandatory preliminary relief, which goes 
well beyond simply maintaining the status 
quo pendente lite, 1s particularly 
disfavored, and should not be issued unless 
the facts and law clearly favor the moving 
party (emphasis added). 

  

    

  

Given this admonition, this Court should decline to grant 

the requested mandatory relief in this case, because the law 

and facts are not clearly in the movants' failure, and because 

mandatory relief -- in the form of 1986 elections under some 

interim plan -- goes far beyond simply preserving the status 

quo, and is not necessary to avoid irreparable harm to the 

Plaintiffs. 

The Plaintiffs have advised the Court that they intend to 

prove intentional race discrimination as the basis for their 

claim to relief, rather than relying on the result-oriented 

proof sanctioned by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 

Although there has been precious little time available to the 

Defendants to even try to comprehend the factual case 

Plaintiffs will offer, it appears that it will center largely 

on actions taken by the Alabama Legislature and various State 

officials over a long period of time, and will have little to 

do with the individual counties which are sued. 

The decision by the Plaintiffs to seek a preliminary 

injunction based on evidence of a "racially motivated pattern 

 



  

and practice [by] the state Legislature" has made it very 

difficult -- because of the accelerated pace of these 

proceedings -- for the Defendants to defend, because they are 

ill-equipped, both financially and from a "knowledge" 

standpoint, to mount a defense to these "statewide" claims. 

Since the Plaintiffs chose not to name any state official as a 

Defendant, there is no Defendant here with the knowledge and 

resources to present a thorough defense given the very limited 
  

time for preparation before the preliminary injunction 
  

hearing. 

For example, the Lawrence County Defendants might well 

have employed an expert historian to rebut the testimony and 

conclusions of Plaintiffs' expert; however, because of the 

accelerated schedule and the necessity to devote most of the 

available time and resources to responding to Plaintiffs’ 

discovery requests, it was impractical to even prepare for a 

deposition of the Plaintiffs' expert, much less to locate and 

employ their own expert who would have time to study the issues 

and prepare testimony. 

The significance of this situation to the issue of whether 

mandatory relief should be ordered should not be minimized. 
  

Given the Defendants' inability to prepare or respond on an 

accelerated schedule, the Court will largely hear only the 

Plaintiffs' version of the facts, probably without significant 

cross—-examination by the Defendants. The motion for 

preliminary injunction will be submitted to the Court on less 

 



  

than a complete record and without full benefit of the 

traditional adversary process =-- all to the detriment of the 

Defendants. Even if one concedes that Section 2 mandates 

"immediate" removal of all impediments to equal participation 

in the election process’, the Court must look carefully 

at whether mandatory preliminary injunctive relief is 
  

appropriate in this case where the under-developed record will 

not be nearly sufficient to establish that the facts and law 

clearly favor the Plaintiffs on the merits. See Martinez v. 
  

Mathews, supra, 544 F.2d at 1243. 
  

Stated differently, we respectfully suggest that if the 

Court were to find, based on the evidence presented at the 

preliminary injunction hearing, that the Plaintiffs had 

established a "likelihood of success on the merits" and the 

other three prerequisites to preliminary relief, it 

nevertheless should grant only prohibitory, and not mandatory, 
    

injunctive relief. That is, the Court should, at most, enjoin 

further elections under the existing at-large systems until a 

final decision on the merits is reached after a full and fair 

2/ opportunity for the Defendants to prepare and defend— . 

  

Yy See Harris v. Graddick, 593 F.Supp. 128, 135 (M.D. 

Ala. 1984). 
    

2/ Alternatively, the Court could allow the 1986 

elections to proceed, but make it clear that, if the Court 
rules for the Plaintiffs on the merits, those elected in 1986 
will serve only until the new elections are held. See, e.g., 
Watkins v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., CV-84-H-746-N (M.D. 
Xiz., July 19, Tosd), affirmed, No. 824-7502 (11th  Cir., 
December 17, 1984). In the case of Lawrence County, whose 
commissioners serve on staggered terms, only two commission 
posts are to be filled in 1986. 

  

  

  

-_5- 

 



If the Court ultimately decides for the Plaintiffs on the 

merits, the Defendants should be given a reasonable opportunity 

to propose a lawful election system, with special elections 
  

being conducted under the new system as soon as practicable, 

allowing the minimum reasonable time for the local officials to 

establish beats, identify voters, and the like. 

As previously discussed, one reason for not granting the 

requested mandatory preliminary relief is that the record which 

will be before the Court will necessarily be too underdeveloped 

to meet the strict standard for the granting of such relief. 

But there are other reasons as well for denying the mandatory 

relief requested. 

First, any attempt to have elections under some new 

election plan is impractical, if not impossible, given the 

short time between now and the primary elections on June 3, 

1986.37 Not only would a plan have to be developed and 

scrutinized?’, but the implementation of any new plan 

would also involve extensive work by registrars and other 

county officials who would be charged with the responsibility 

  

3/ A 1986 elections calendar is attached as Exhibit "A." 

4/ As discussed below, the Court should allow the 

Defendants a reasonable opportunity to present a plan before 
ordering its own plan, or one offered by the Plaintiffs, to be 
used. Any plan which 1s offered should be subjected to 
critical scrutiny before being used, which will require time. 
See Burton v. Hobbie, 543 F.Supp. 235, 241-42 (M.D. Ala. 1982) 

(interim plan hastily offered by plaintiffs found, after 
scrutiny, to be unconstitutional). 

   



  

of establishing new precincts, identifying and notifying voters 

by precincts, having ballot forms designed and printed, and 

doing all the other things necessary to implement a 

single-member district election plan to replace an existing 

at-large plan. Given the short time available -- for example, 

party qualifying starts in early March and closes in early 

April -- there will unquestionably be grave difficulties with 

even preparing a well-considered plan, not to mention 

implementing 1.3 In addition, the likelihood 1s that 

any plan adopted and implemented on such short notice and 

without appropriate scrutiny would prove to be 1less-than- 

satisfactory and would be a candidate for replacement in short 

  

5/ The Plaintiffs have contributed to the time problems. 

This lawsuit was not filed against Lawrence County until 
December 19, 1985 and the motion for preliminary injunction was 
not filed until about February 5, 1986. The Plaintiffs and 
their counsel -- competent and experienced attorneys with 
substantial experience in voting rights and election cases -- 
could have filed their lawsuit much earlier. By filing 
earlier, they could have insured an earlier hearing (perhaps 
even an early hearing on the merits) and, if they prevailed, 
the parties and the Court could already have started the 
process of reviewing possible interim plans, with candidates, 
party officials, election officials, and the public being aware 
prior to the commencement of the election season that a change 
was in the offing. By not filing earlier, and instead electing 
to litigate in a crisis atmosphere, the Plaintiffs have 
contributed to the exigent circumstances which now exist. 
While perhaps falling short of establishing the defense of 
laches, as the Court found present in Knox v. Milwaukee Cty. 
Bd. of Election Commissioners, 581 F.Supp 399 (E.D. Wis. 1984), 

  

  

this conduct of delay 1s not insignificant. As noted by Mr. 
Justice Douglas, concurring in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 250 
(1962), "... any relief accorded can be fashioned in the light 
of well-known principles of equity." 

 



  

order, resulting in still further expense. Even if the relative 
  

  

harms favor the Plaintiffs sufficiently to entitle them to some 
  

  

kind of preliminary injunctive relief, the Court should not 
  

require "hurry-up" elections in 1986 with all the concomitant 
  

  

problems. 
  

It is perfectly permissible -- indeed, appropriate -- for 

this Court to consider the proximity of a forthcoming election 

in deciding what relief it should order. Exigent circumstances 

such as those present in this case are exactly what the United 

States Supreme Court seemed to have in mind when, 1n Reynolds 
  

v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964), it said: 

... under certain circumstances, such as 
where an impending election is imminent and 
a State's election machinery is already in 
progress, equitable considerations might 
justify a court in withholding the granting 
of immediately effective relief in a 
legislative apportionment case, even though 
the existing apportionment scheme was found 
invalid. In awarding or withholding 
immediate relief, a court is entitled to 
and should consider the proximity of a 
forth-coming election and the mechanics and 

complexities of state election laws, and 
should act and rely upon general equitable 
principles. With respect to the timing of 
relief, a court can reasonably endeavor to 
avoid a disruption of the election process 
which might result from requiring 
precipitate changes that could make 
unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a 

State in adjusting to the requirements of 
the court's decree. 

Similarly, in Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 547, 
  

(1969), the Supreme Court struck down New York's congressional 

districting plan, but held that "Since the 1968 primary 

election was only three months away [when the district court 

 



  

approved the plan] ..., we cannot say that there was error in 

permitting the 1968 election to proceed under the plan despite 

its constitutional infirmities." See also, e.g., Ely v. Klhar, 
    

403 U.S. 108 (1971) and Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967) 
  

(District Courts properly allowed elections to go forward 

notwithstanding unconstitutional population variances in 

existing plans). 

There 1s another, 1legally-significant, aspect of this 

practicality argument. The law is clear that, where a court 

finds an existing election system unlawful, the court is to 

give the responsible public officials or body a reasonable 

opportunity to present a new, lawful election plan. The court 

is to become involved with fashioning a new plan -- or adopting 

a plaintiff's suggested plan -- only after the responsible 

official or body has had an opportunity, but failed, to act. 

As the Supreme Court stated in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 
    

U.S. at 586: 

[JJudicial relief becomes appropriate only 
when a legislature fails to reapportion 
according to federal constitutional 
requisites in a timely fashion after having 
an adequate opportunity to do so. 

See also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794 (1973); Upham 
  

Vv. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37 (1982); Burton v. Hobbie, 543 F.Supp. 

235, 238 (M.D. Ala. 1982); Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 
  

539-40 (1978). Applying this principle in Reynolds v. Sims, 
  

supra, the Supreme Court commended the District Court for 

declining to impose preliminary injunctive relief, and instead 

in deferring to the Legislature, in circumstances where 

 



  

existing Senate districts varied in population from 15,417 to 

634,864 and House districts from 6,731 to 104,767, and thus 

there was a clear violation of the one person-one vote 

principle. 

In the present case, it would be exceedingly difficult to 

allow the Defendants any reasonable opportunity to develop a 
  

lawful election plan, and still have elections in keeping with 

the 1986 election schedule calling for primaries on June 3, 

1986. However, if the 1986 elections in these counties were 

simply enjoined, and the Court later decided on the merits in 

favor of Plaintiffs, the Defendants could be allowed a 

reasonable opportunity for development of a plan to be used for 

the Court-ordered special elections to be held as soon as 

practicable. 

Again, even if the balancing of harms and interests weighs 

in favor of some preliminary relief to Plaintiffs, it does not 

justify (i) denying the Defendants a reasonable opportunity to 

present a lawful plan and (ii) subjecting the Defendants, and 

the voters, to the difficulties, disruption and confusion 

inherent in implementing a new election system on a hurried 

basis and in an atmosphere of crisis. Indeed, putting into 

effect an interim plan which may ultimately be unnecessary is a 

major intrusion into state affairs, and should not be done by 

preliminary injunction except in the clearest of cases. 

We strongly urge the Court to deny any preliminary 

injunctive relief, and to allow the 1986 elections to proceed 

-10~ 

 



  

under the existing plan’l’. If the Court concludes, 

however, that the elections should not proceed, we urge the 

Court not to order 1986 elections under some new plan. There 

is ample precedent for a decision to postpone elections until a 

final decision 1s reached and, if necessary, a new election 

system devised. See, e.g., Horry County v. United States, 449 
    

F.Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1978) (three-judge court); Herron v. Koch, 

823 P.Supp. 167, 174 (E.D.N.Y.) (three-judge court), stay 

denied, 102 S.Ct. 893 (1981), and cases cited therein. 

Postponing the 1986 elections will not have the effect of 

"rewarding" individuals for their failure to timely act, as was 

found to be the situation in Burton v. Hobbie, 561 F.Supp. 

1029, 1034-35 (1983). Here, the incumbent County Commissioners 

have in no way been guilty of delay or bad faith and, indeed, 

only if this Court ultimately decides the merits in Plaintiffs’ 

favor will the existing system even be declared unlawful. 
  

On the other hand, the less intrusive remedy of postponing 

the 1986 elections pending a final decision will best balance 

the various interests involved: it will prevent further 

  

1/ This approach was taken by Judge Hobbs, and approved 
by the Eleventh Circuit, in Watkins v. Alabama State Bd. of 
Educ. (see n. 2, supra). Because of the rapidly approaching 
elections, Judge Hobbs concluded, after a final decision on the 
merits, that the 1984 elections under the unlawful plan should 
go forward, with those elected to serve a shortened term, and 
with new elections to be held in 1986 under a new plan which 
the State would be given a chance to adopt. 

  

  

    

ee Ea 

 



elections under a plan which may be declared unlawful, yet it 

will avoid the trouble and expense inherent in the hasty 

implementation of an interim plan and, at the same time, 

properly reserve unto the elected officials the opportunity to 

fashion any new plan which might ultimately be required. 

111 

Conclusion 
  

In deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctive 

relief, and what kind of relief to grant, this Court is 

required to consider four factors: (1) whether there 1s a 

substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether 

plaintiffs have established that, without relief, they will 

suffer irreparable injury; (3) whether the threatened injury 

outweighs any threatened harm to the defendants; and (4) 

whether the public interest will be disserved by granting the 

preliminary injunctive relief. Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber & 
  

Yacht Corb., 697 P.24 1352, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 1983). The 
  

Court 1is bound by "stringent standards" and mandatory 

preliminary injunctive relief is to be ordered only in the 

clearest cases. Martinez v. Mathews, supra. 
    

In the present case, even if the Court believes the 

Plaintiffs have established all the prerequisites to 

preliminary injunctive relief, mandatory relief in the form of 
  

1986 elections under a new plan should not be ordered. First, 

even 1f the Court believes the Plaintiffs have established a 

likelihood of success on the merits, circumstances have  



precluded adequate development of the record to support the 

Court ordering the very intrusive remedy of a mandatory 
  

preliminary injunction. Second, on the "relative harms" 

inquiry, the balancing approach might dictate some relief for 

the Plaintiffs, but not mandatory relief. The disruption to 

the election system and the burden which would be imposed on 

the county officials by an order to hold 1986 elections under 

an interim plan must, on balance, be avoided. Perhaps such 

relief would be appropriate following a final order on the 

merits, but it is not appropriate at this very preliminary 

stage of these proceedings. 

This Court should deny any preliminary injunctive relief, 

and it certainly should limit such relief to an injunction 

against the 1986 elections, pending further proceedings. 

Respectfully submitted, 

* » 

D. L. Martin 
  

215 South Main Street 
Moulton, Alabama 35650 

(205) 974-9200 

i v 2. 

David R. Boyd 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Lawrence County, Alabama, 
Larry Smith and Dan Ligon 

    

BALCH & BINGHAM 

P. O. Box 178 
Montgomery, Alabama 36101 

(205) 834-6500  



  

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  

I] hereby certify that 1 have served the foregoing 

Memorandum of Lawrence County Defendants on Issue of 

Preliminary Injunctive Relief, upon all counsel of record 

listed below by placing copies of same in the United States 

Mail, properly addressed and postage paid this Fea day of 

March, 1986. 

  

Ld Live 

OF COUNSEL 

rm 

 



  

Larry T. Menefee, Esq. 
James U. Blacksher, Esq. 

wanda J. Cochran, Esq. 
Blacksher, Menefee & Stein 
405 Van Antwerp Building 
P.O. Box 1051 
Mobile, Alabama 36633 

Terry G. Davis, Esq. 
Seay & Davis 
732 Carter Hill Road 
P. OJ. Box 6125 
Montgomery, Alabama 36106 

Deborah Fins, Esq. 
Julius L. Chambers, Esq. 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
1900 Hudson Street 

l6th Floor 
New York, New York 10013 

Jack Floyd, Esq. 
Floyd, Kenner & Cusimano 

816 Chestnut Street 
Gadsden, Alabama 35999 

H. R. Burnham, Esq. 
Burnham, Klinefelter, Halsey, 
Jones & Cater 

401 SouthTrust Bank Building 

P. O. Box 1618 
Anniston, Alabama 36202 

Warren Rowe, Esq. 
Rowe & Sawyer 

P. O. Box 150 
Enterprise, Alabama 36331 

Reo Kirkland, Jr., Esq. 
P. O. Box 646 
Brewton, Alabama 36427 

James W. Webb, Esq. 

Webb, Crumpton, McGregor, 
Schmaeling & Wilson 

166 Commerce Street 
P. O. Box 238 
Montgomery, Alabama 

Lee Otts, Esq. 
Otts & Moore 
P. O. Box 467 

36101 

Brewton, Alabama 36427 

W. O. Kirk, Jr., Esq. 
Curry & Kirk 
Phoenix Avenue 
Carrollton, Alabama 

Barry D. Vaughn, Esq. 
Proctor & Vaughn 
121 N. Norton Avenue 

35447 

Sylacauga, Alabama 35150 

Alton Turner, Esq. 
Turner & Jones 

P. O Box 207 

Luverne, Alabama 36049 

D. L. Martin, Esq. 
215 S. Main Street 
Moulton, Alabama 35650 

Edward Still, Esq. 
714 South 29th Street 
Birmingham, Alabama 

We, 3 TM 

35233-2810 

 



EXHIBIT "A" 

  

April 4 Third parties certify nominees to Secretary of State 

Don Siegelman by 5:00 p.m. \1-f1-\¢) 

Independent candidates must file petitions with the Secre- 
tary of State or Probate Judge by 5:00 p.m. 7-7-1(3) 

Candidates subject to the primary election must file their 
declaration of candidacy with the state party executive 

camittee by this date. \1-\b-\\ 

April 14 State party executive camittees must certify candidates 
for the primary election to the Secretary of State. |N~\b-\\ 

County party executive committees must certify candidates 
for the primary election to the Probate Judge. \"1-lb-\l 

April 24 Secretary of State Siegelman certifies candidates for the 
primary election to the Probate Judges. \I-ib-\\( 

May 9 Candidates for nomination subject to the primary election 
submit suggested poll workers to the county party executive 
camittee no later than this date. 7-\b-11 

May 13 Probate Judge delivers absentee ballot supplies to the Absen- 
tee Election Manager no later than this date. \7-0-\Q 

May 14 First day the Appointing Board (Probate Judge, Sheriff, 

Circuit Clerk) may appoint regular and absentee poll workers. 
County Party executive Committees must have submitted their 

lists of suggested poll workers to the Appointing Board 

prior to this date. 

Probate Judge publishes the list of qualified electors no 
later than this date. \"I-Y-\:A 

‘May 19 Last day for the Appointing Board to appoint regular and 
absentee poll workers. (i~b-\; 1-6-1 

May 23 Last day for the Bdard of Registrars and Deputy Registrars 
to accept applications to register and vote. \-WU-WO; fot 4-39 

May 26 Board of Registrars are in session for ten days prior to 

elections to process the last voter registration applications 

and to prepare the list of voters who are subject to being 

purged. Y1-W-130 ; t\-3] 

 



  

May 27 

May 29 

May 31 

June 3 

June 4 

June 6 

June 15 

June 18 

April 25 

June 3 

The Probate Judge informs the Sheriff of the time and place 
for the instructional school for poll workers (machine coun- 

ties only). 17-9-19 

The Sheriff notifies poll workers of instructional school 

for poll workers (at least 48 hours before the school). \1-4-|\ 

The Probate Judge publishes the supplemental poll list, \]-\Y-{3 

Last day for the Probate Judge to hold the instructional 

school for poll workers (machine counties only). 11-\9-9 

Last day voters may apply for an absentee ballot. |7-y)-3 wo) 

The Probate Judge must begin the preparation of voting equip- 

ment no later than 9:00. \1-9-\7 

The Probate Judge delivers election supplies to the Sheriff 

by this date. 17-\b- 

PRIMARY ELECTION — YOUR VOTE MAKES A DIFFERENCE! 

The Probate Judge furnishes each polling place with an alpha- 

betical list of qualified electors in that precinct with 

the subject-to-purge notations and voter reidentification 

farms. 

The Sheriff delivers the results, tally sheets, and boxes 

or sealed envelopes to the county party executive camnittee 

by 10:00 a.m. \-\b-?0 

No later than 12:00 noon the county party executive committee 
meets and certifies the results of the primary election. \"1-ib-3S 

County party executive camittee meets to tabulate and de- 
clare the results of the primary election no later than 

12:00 noon. 17-16-35 

Secretary of State Siegelman certifies the primary runoff 
ballot to the Probate Judge by this date. \F‘%-3db 

Secretary of State Siegelman, Governor Wallace and/or At- 
tarney General Graddick will certify the results of the 
Constitutional Amendment Election. VI-W-\30; \1-\1-9 5 W1-3 

PRIMARY RUNOFF ELECTION 

First day electors may apply for an absentee ballot.(\ -10~3¢od) 

List of qualified voters must be furnished to the Absentee 

Election Manager by this date. C11-W0-RD) 

 



First day the Appointing Board may appoint absentee and 

regular poll workers. 17-10-11; \7-b-| 

Last day the Appointing Board may appoint absentee and regu- 
lar poll workers. \7-(0-1; 17-b~| 

The state party committee must certify the names of all 
primary runoff candidates running for state office to the 
Secretary of State by this date. The county party executive 
camittee must certify the names of all primary runoff candi- 

dates running for county office to the Probate Judge by 
this date. 17-b-3b 

Last day to register to vote in the primary runoff election. |1-u: 

Board of Registrars are in session for ten days prior to 
elections to process the last voter registration applications 
and to prepare the list of voters who are subject to being 

purged. \N-4-130 

The Secretary of State certifies the form and content of 
the off ballot to the Probate Jud this date. 

ghd Siete Sey 
Last day for the Probate Judge to inform the Sheriff of 
the time and place of the instructional school for poll 
workers (machine counties only). 1-9-9 

Last day to hold school of instruction for poll workers.\N-G- 

The Appointing Board in counties with a population of 50,000 

or more meets to appoint additional absentee poll workers 

if necessary. |7-1p-\\ 

The last day for the Probate Judge to deliver election sup- 
plies to the Sheriff. \N-\b- 

The Probate Judge must begin the preparation of the voting 
machines no later than 9:00 a.m. \1-9-\V] 

PRIMARY RUNOFF ELECTION — YOU ARE A VOTER ONLY IF YOU VOIE. 

. The Probate Judge must provide a poll list to the inspector 

at each polling place: I-20 

The Sheriff mast deliver the results, tally sheets,” and 
boxes or sealed envelopes to the Probate Judge: by 10:00 

a.m. 11-b-3bCd) 

The county party executive camittee must meet and receive, 
canvass and tabulate the results of the primary runoff elec- 
tion at 12:00 noon. 17-1b-%b 

The county party chairperson must certify the results of 
the primary runoff election to the state party executive 

camittee by 12:00 noon. Yi-1b-3b (4)  



June 30 The state executive committee or subcommittee thereof must 

meet by 12:00 noon to receive, canvass and tabulate the 
results of the primary runoff election. \7-b-3b(d) 

  

July 9 Secretary of State Siegelman, Governor Wallace and/or At- 

torney General Graddick must meet, canvass, tabulate and 

announce the results of the constitutional amendment elec- 

tion (if applicable). (7-14-90; \1-\1 a; (1-117-3 

GENERAL ELECTION 

June 30 Secretary of State Siegelman must certify the form and con- 
tent of the general election ballot to the Probate Judge 
by this date. \1-T-\(b) 

September 5 First day voters may apply for an absentee ballot. \1-10-3ca) 

October 14 The county party executive camnittee submits nominations 
for poll workers to the Appointing Board by this date. \A-b-b 

Last day for the Judge of Probate to furnish the list of 
qualified voters to the Absentee Election Manager. 7-0-5 

The Probate Judge must deliver the election supplies to 

the Absentee Election manager by this date. \71-\0-\R 

October 15 The first day the Appointing Board may appoint absentee 

and regular poll workers. \1-10-1\; \1-b-\ 

October 20 The last day the Appointing Board may appoint poll workers. 
The Sheriff must publish the notice of all poll workers 

during this time. \I-b=\w \1-bQ 

October 24 Last day for the Board of Registrars and Deputy Registrars 

to accept applications to register and vote. \N-W-130 

October 25 The Board of Registrars are in session for ten days prior 
to elections to process the last voter registration applica- 
tions and to prepare the list of voters who are subject 

to being purged. |1-4-130 

The last day for the Probate Judge to inform the Sheriff 

of the time and place of the instructional school for poll 
workers (machine counties only). \N-4-\9 gh 

The last day for the Sheriff to publish notice of the elec- 
tion school of instruction far poll workers. 11-94-19 

October 30 Last day for holding instructional school for poll workers 
(machine counties only). |1-9-YAca) 

as : The last day voter may apply for an absentee ballot. \N-\0-R¢a) 

 



October 31 The Appointing Board in counties with a population of 50,000 
Or more meets to appoint additional poll workers if necessary. \"-) 

  

November 1 The Probate Judge must begin the process of preparing the 
voting machines by 9:00 a.m. on this date. 17-4-11 

November 4 GENERAL ELECTION —— BE THERE, BE COUNTED! 

The Probate Judge must provide the inspectors at each polling 
location an alphabetical poll list which indicates those 
persons who are subject to being purged. A copy of each 
poll list must be certified to the Secretary of State and 
provided to the Board of Registrars. |N-\M-\; \N-14-Q 

November 19 The last day for Secretary of State Siegelman, Governor 
Wallace and/or Attorney General Graddick to canvass the 
results of the General Election for state officials and 
constitutional amendments. 1-14-8305 1N=W-1; 17-11-33