Judge Wood's Motion to Realign the Parties to Modify Intervention and Strike Notice of Action Toward Settlement

    * ®, 

PorTER & CLEMENTS 
A REGISTERED LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP 

INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS 

  

ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
MAILING ADDRESS:   

700 LOUISIANA, SUITE 3500 

EVELYN V. KEYES HOUSTON, TEXAS 77002-2730 
(713) 226-0620 

P.O. BOX 4744 

HOUSTON, TX 77210-4744 

  

TELECOPIER (713) 228-1331 

TELEPHONE (713) 226-0600 

April 2, 1993 

Mr. Gilbert Ganucheau, Clerk VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit 
100 U.S. Court of Appeals Courthouse 

600 Camp Street 

New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 

Re: No. 90-8014 and No. 90-9003; League of United Latin American Citizens, 

Council No. 4434, et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. William P. Clements, 

Governor of the State of Texas, et al., Defendants, Judge Sharolyn Wood, etc., 

Defendant-Appellant; In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 

Dear Mr. Ganucheau: 

Enclosed are the original and twenty copies of Defendant/Appellant Harris County 

District Judge Sharolyn Wood’s Motion to Realign the Parties and, If Necessary, to Modify 

Intervention of Defendant-Appellant Judge Sharolyn Wood and Strike the Attorney General's 

"Notice of Action Toward Settlement" and Brief in Support of Motion tc Realign the Parties 

and, If Necessary, to Modify Intervention of Defendant-Appellant Judge Sharolyn Wood and 
Strike the Attorney General's "Notice of Action Toward Settlement." 

Please verify filing of this document by placing your file mark in the margin of the extra 

copy provided herewith and return to me for my records. 

All parties are being served with two copies of these documents by first class United 

States mail, postage prepaid. 

Very truly yours, 

Evelyn V. Keyes 

EVK:taw 

enclosures 

 



  

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

  

NO. 90-8014 and 

NO. 90-9003 

  

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, 

COUNCIL NO. 4434, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 

Versus 

WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE 

OF TEXAS, et al., 

Defendants, 

JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD, ETC., 
Defendant-Appellant. 

  

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

Midland Division 

  

JUDGE WOOD’S MOTION TO REALIGN THE PARTIES, 
AND, IF NECESSARY, TO MODIFY INTERVENTION OF 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD AND 
STRIKE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S "NOTICE OF 

ACTION TOWARD SETTLEMENT" 

  

PORTER & CLEMENTS, L.L.P. 

J. Eugene Clements 

Evelyn V. Keyes 
700 Louisiana, Ste. 3500 

Houston, Texas 77002-2730 

(713) 226-0600 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT/INTERVENOR/ 

DEFENDANT JUDGE WOOD 

 



  

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

  

NO. 90-8014 and 

NO. 90-9003 

  

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, 

COUNCIL NO. 4434, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Respondents, 

versus 

WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE 

OF TEXAS, et al., 

Defendants-Appellants 

JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD, 

Defendant-Intervenor-Appellant. 

  

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

Midland Division 

  

JUDGE WOOD’S MOTION TO REALIGN THE PARTIES, 

AND, IF NECESSARY, TO MODIFY INTERVENTION OF 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD AND 

STRIKE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S "NOTICE OF 

ACTION TOWARD SETTLEMENT" 

  

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS: 

Defendant/Intervenor/Appellant Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood ("Judge 

Wood") files her Motion to Realign the Parties, and, if Necessary, to Modify Intervention of 

 



Defendant-Appellant Judge Sharolyn Wood and Strike the Attorney General’s “Notice of Action 

Towards Settlement," and to show the Court the following: 

lL. Judge Wood hereby joins in Judge Entz’s Motion to Realign and, If Necessary, 

to Modify Intervention of Defendant-Appellant Judge F. Harold Entz and incorporates its 

arguments and authorities by reference as though fully restated herein. 

2 First, Judge Wood requests that Attorney General Morales be aligned with the 

Plaintiffs/ Appellees for all purposes. In the alternative, she requests that he be aligned with the 

Plaintiffs/ Appellees for purposes of allocating time at oral argument and that all time permitted 

the Appellants be equally allocated between counsel for Judge Wood and counsel for Judge Entz. 

3; Second, Judge Wood requests that her constitutional and other legal arguments 

be considered for all counties under attack in this litigation and not just Harris County. 

4. In addition, Judge Wood requests that the en banc hearing be restricted solely to 

the issues as to which that review was granted and that the Court strike Attorney General 

Morales’ putative "Notice of Action Toward Resolution of Appeal.” 

5. This is a second en banc hearing of an interlocutory appeal brought by Judge 

Wood and Judge Entz pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292. This case is on remand from the United 

States Supreme Court, where it was heard under the name of Houston Lawyers Association v. 

Attorney General of Texas, 111. S.Ct. 2376 (1991). 

6. The issues before this Court have been specifically mandated by the United States 

Supreme Court, which reversed the previous en banc decision and held, 

Because the results test in § 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to claims of vote dilution 

in judicial elections... and because the concerns expressed by Judge Higginbotham in 

distinguishing elections of Texas district court judges from elections of supreme court 

justices relate to the question whether a vote dilution violation may be found or remedied 

rather than whether such a challenge may be brought, we reverse the judgment of the  



Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

111 8.Ct. at. 2381, 

7. Given the Supreme Court’s instructions in Houston Lawyers’ Association, the only 

issues before this Court are (1) the application of the standard of proof of vote dilution under 

section 2 to judicial races in general and (2) the application of that standard of proof to Texas 

state district judge elections to determine whether or not the electoral system violates section 2 

by diluting minority votes in the nine target counties. 

8. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 restricts en banc review to the necessity 

to secure and maintain the uniformity of decisions of this Court and to questions of exceptional 

importance. FED. R. APP. P. 35 and Loc. R. 35.2.2. The Supreme Court has determined the 

issues in this case which require resolution by this Court. This Court itself has determined that 

those issues are of such exceptional importance as to merit en banc review. Attorney General 

Morales should not be allowed to delay resolution of these issues or to sabotage the judicial 

process and to substitute consideration of his own political agenda, put forth as a "Settlement 

Agreement," for the en banc review he did not seek and is now trying to moot.’ 

9, What Attorney General Morales is trying to do is improper both procedurally and 

substantively. He is attempting to bring before the en banc Court, by way of a "Notice of 

Action Towards Settlement," for which there is no provision in the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, and in lieu of a brief of the issues on appeal, his and the Plaintiffs’ collusive 

  

Among the parties, only Judges Wood and Entz sought en banc review of the issues singled out 

by the Supreme Court. Attorney General Morales — who is now attempting to avert en banc review — 

sought no review once the panel ruled against the State of Texas, which opinion this Court vacated by 

granting en banc review.  



  

"Settlement Agreement." He is asking this Court to permit him to take unspecified "formal 

steps" to secure the Plaintiffs’ victory i this suit. "Notice of Action" at 1 § 3. He is 

improperly seeking to lift the stay imposed by this Court on the district court’s imposition of a 

"remedy" for violations of the Voting Rights Act without any finding of liability. The political 

taint to the "Settlement Agreement" is also confirmed by the Attorney General’s improper 

request that this Court award attorneys fees to the Plaintiffs as "prevailing parties within the 

meaning of the federal attorney’s fees statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 1973(L)," 

without making clear how this Court is to find the necessary liability determination. "Settlement 

Agreement" at 2 § 4. 

10. The Attorney General's "Notice of Action Toward Resolution of Appeal" and 

"Settlement Agreement" constitute a transparent attempt to delay resolution of the important 

legal issues scheduled for en banc review or to divest this Court of jurisdiction over those 

critical legal issues. This Court’s consideration of the Attorney General’s "Settlement 

Agreement" in lieu of argument on the issues scheduled for en banc review would disserve the 

interests of the people of Texas and the purpose of the Supreme Court remand by curtailing the 

inquiry into whether any violation of section 2 has even occurred. The Texas Attorney 

General's should not be permitted to interfere with this en banc Court’s carrying out the totality 

of its review. 

11, While neither the propriety of Attorney General Morales’ attempt to "settle" this 

case nor the merits of his "Settlement Agreement" are properly before the Court at this time, 

a brief word in regard to both is necessary to support Judge Wood’s Motions to Realign the 

Parties and to Strike the Attorney General’s "Notice of Action Toward Settlement." 

 



  

12; With respect to realignment, Attorney General Morales’ refusal to adhere to his 

oath of office, which requires him to defend the laws of the United States and Texas, and his 

attempt to surrender judgment to the Plaintiffs via a consent decree or "Settlement Agreement” 

violate Article 4, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution, from which he derives his powers, and 

Article 19, Section 1, which prescribes his oath of office. The foregoing activities also violate 

the Guaranty Clause of the United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 4, which guarantees 

to every State in the Union a republican form of government. Furthermore, these actions violate 

Section 1.06(b) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibit an 

attorney from representing conflicting interests. Therefore, the Attorney General cannot 

properly continue to represent the interests of the State of Texas in this case, since he is publicly 

championing the Plaintiffs’ cause. 

13. With respect to the propriety of Attorney General Morales’ "Notice of Action 

Toward Settlement," the Attorney General's attempt to restructure the Texas judiciary by 

"settling" this case with private parties violates fundamental legal principles, including the 

separation of powers doctrine inherent in the United States Constitution and set out in Article 

2, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution. In addition, this "settlement" attempt violates Articles 

7 and 7A of the Texas Constitution, which determine the methods for structuring and 

restructuring the Texas judiciary. The Texas Attorney General has neither the power nor the 

authority to circumvent the Texas Constitution in order to restructure state electoral procedures 

to his own preference and that of private plaintiffs to a lawsuit. 

14. Finally, the Attorney General’s "Settlement Agreement" is partisan and 

unconstitutional in its particulars. It abolishes and reconstructs the Texas judicial election system 

 



  

at the Attorney General's and the Plaintiffs’ whim. It assigns judges at their pleasure to justice 

of the peace precincts, commissioners’ districts, or state legislators’ districts, abolishes whole 

courts, reconstitutes others, postpones change for some counties in response to political deals, 

and decrees not only that some judges will run at large and some from sub-districts drawn to be 

coextensive with commissioners’ districts or state legislators’ districts, but also precisely which 

judges will be so favored. 

15. The "Settlement Agreement" is designed to create political party influence over 

judges. It makes judges the mere pawns of political patronage, many of them the pawns of state 

representatives who practice before their courts and whose retirement plans are based on the 

salaries of the state district judges they would select. At the same time, this "Settlement 

Agreement" strips voters of the ability to vote for (or against) most judges in their county, 

meaning that it divorces electoral base from jurisdiction and deprives voters of the right to elect 

almost all judges with jurisdiction over them. In Harris County, for example, voters would lose 

the right to elect 48 of the 59 judges who serve them as criminal, civil and family judges. Nor 

does this catalogue begin to exhaust the unconstitutional and otherwise illegal political 

manipulation of judicial elections which Attorney General Morales, together with the Plaintiffs 

and the Democratic state officials who have signed off on this plan, would impose on Texas on 

their own authority and in their own partisan self-interest. Significantly, the named Defendants 

in this case, except the Attorney General, are conspicuously absent from the signature page. 

16. The political manipulations of justice in Attorney General Morales’ "Settlement 

Agreement" are, among others, violative of the principle of equal protection of the law 

guaranteed by Article 1 Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to 

 



  

the United States Constitution; the principle of due process of law guaranteed by Article 1 

Section 19 of the Texas Constitution and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution; and the principle of equal voting rights guaranteed by Article 

1 Section 19 of the Texas Constitution and by the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. 

17. This Court should not entertain any plan for restructuring the judiciary of the State 

of Texas via collusive confession of judgment by a State Attorney General, much less a grossly 

unconstitutional plan such as that Attorney General Morales has set before it. If these issues are 

to be considered, they should be raised in the appropriate political context. 

18. This lawsuit is not about preserving the status quo in Texas judicial elections or 

replacing it by a different system which interested parties such as the Texas Attorney General 

and the Plaintiffs might like better. The State of Texas has constitutional provisions which 

provide the legal means to bring about such change. This lawsuit is only about whether or not 

Texas’ constitutionally required state district judge election system violates Section 2 of the 

Voting Rights Act, what is required to prove a violation of section 2 in judicial elections and, 

if there is a violation, how to remedy it. Promulgations of such a remedy should come not from 

this Court or the Texas Attorney General, but from the Texas legislature acting in accordance 

with the Texas and United States Constitutions. 

19. The Voting Rights Act is a powerful tool which has been granted by Congress to 

minorities to remedy ancient and grievous wrongs. Its luster is dimmed when it is abused by 

partisan interest groups and state officials to secure their own private advantage at the expense 

of fundamental principles of democratic government. Attorney General Morales and the 

 



  

Plaintiffs are collusively united in trying to skip over the essential legal questions before this 

Court and to obtain a partisan restructuring of the Texas judicial election system which they 

apparently believe they cannot accomplish in compliance with the Texas and United States 

Constitutions. A system in which high government officials and officers of the court are 

absolved from playing by the rules is no government of laws at all. This Court should decline 

to assist such conduct. 

20. The relevant facts, arguments and proofs in support of this motion are elaborated 

in the accompanying Brief in Support of this Motion and the exhibits thereto, which are 

incorporated herein by this reference. 

21. The legal issues properly now before this Court have been previously briefed and 

do not need further briefing except to take account of new developments in the law since the 

panel opinion issued in January of this year. To take those issues into account, Judge Wood is 

filing a Supplemental Letter Brief in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) 

and 1.0.P. following Rule 28. Judge Wood also asks the Court to consider her Suggestion for 

En Banc Review (copies of which have been provided to all members of the Court) as an 

addendum to her previous briefing. 

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Judge Wood requests that this Court realign 

Texas Attorney General Morales as a Plaintiff/ Appellee for all purposes in this case or, in the 

alternative, that it realign him as a Plaintiff/ Appellee for purposes of oral argument in the Court, 

with his time allocated to those speaking in support of the lower court ruling. She further 

requests that the Attorney General's "Notice of Action Toward Settlement" be stricken and that 

oral argument before the en banc Court be directed to the legal issues properly before the Court 

 



under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Finally, Judge Wood requests that 

the Court extend her intervention to all counties and issues in the case as necessary. 

OF COUNSEL. 

Michael J. Wood 

Attorney at Law 
440 Louisiana, Suite 200 

Houston, Texas 77002 
Telephone: (713) 228-5101 

Facsimile: (713) 223-9133 

Respectfully submitted, 

PORTER & CLEMENTS, L.L.P. 

By: = i (lends Loe 
{fips Clethents 

\ elyn V. Keyes 
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 

Houston, Texas 77002-2730 

Telephone: (713) 226-0600 

Facsimile: (713) 228-1331 

  

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT/DEFENDANT/ 

INTERVENOR HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT 

JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD 

 



  

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
  

I certify that on this 7 , day of Apel 1993, a true and correct copy of the 
  

foregoing document by first class United StatesVmail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 

William L. Garrett 

Garrett, Thompson & Chang 

8300 Douglas, Suite 800 

Dallas, Texas 75226 

Rolando Rios 

Attorney at Law 
115 E. Travis, Suite 1024 

San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Sherrilyn A. Ifill 

NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 
New York, New York 10013 

Gabrielle K. McDonald 

Walker & Satterwaite 

7800 Mopac, Suite 215 
Austin, Texas 78759 

Edward B. Cloutman, III 

Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C. 

3301 Elm Street 

Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 

Judith Sanders-Castro 

MALDEF 

140 E. Houston 

San Antonio, Texas 78205 

7630C:\DOCS\EVK\WOO027001\0626 

Robert H. Mow, Jr. 

David Godberg 

Hughes & Luce 

2800 Momentum Place 

1717 Main Street 

Dallas, Texas 75201 

Walter L. Irvin 

5787 South Hampton Road 

Suite 210, Lock Box 122 

Dallas, Texas 75232-2255 

Susan Finkelstein 

Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. 
405 N. St. Mary’s #910 

San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Renea Hicks 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

P. O. Box 12548 

Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78711-2548 

Seagal V. Wheatley 

Wheatley & Sharpe, L.L.P. 

100 West Houston 

Frost Bank Tower, Suite 1200 

San Antonio, Texas 78205 

7 ie Ul gp 
  

{rf¥. Keyé s 

 



IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

  

NO. 90-8014 and 
NO. 90-9003 

  

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, 

COUNCIL NO. 4434, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Respondents, 

versus 

WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE 

OF TEXAS, et al., 

Defendants, 

JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD, ETC., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

  

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

Midland Division 

  

JUDGE WOOD’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REALIGN 

THE PARTIES AND, IF NECESSARY, TO MODIFY INTERVENTION 

OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD AND TO STRIKE THE 

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S "NOTICE OF ACTION 

TOWARD SETTLEMENT" 

  

PORTER & CLEMENTS, L.L.P. 

J. Eugene Clements 

Evelyn V. Keyes 
700 Louisiana, Ste. 3500 

Houston, Texas 77002-2730 

(713) 226-0600 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT/INTERVENOR/ 

DEFENDANT JUDGE WOOD  



  

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

  

NO. 90-8014 and 

NO. 90-9003 

  

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, 

COUNCIL NO. 4434, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Respondents, 

Versus 

WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE 

OF TEXAS, et al., 

Defendants, 

JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD, ETC., 

Defendant- Appellant. 

  

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

Midland Division 

  

RULE 28.2.1 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS 
  

The undersigned counsel of record for Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood 

(hereinafter "Judge Wood"), certifies that the following listed persons have an interest in the 

outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the Judges of the Court may 

evaluate possible disqualifications or recusal. 

 



  

Plaintiffs: 

LULAC Local Council 4434 

LULAC Local Council 4451 

LULAC (Statewide) 

Christina Moreno 

Aquilla Watson 

Joan Ervin 

Matthew W. Plummer, Sr. 

Jim Conley 
Volma Overton 

Willard Pen Conat 

Gene Collins 

Al Price 

Theodore M. Hogrobrooks 

Emest M. Deckard 

Judge Mary Ellen Hicks 
Rev. James Thomas 

Plaintiff-Intervenors: 
  

Houston Lawyers’ Association 

Alice Bonner 

Weldon Berry 

Francis Williams 
Rev. William Lawson 

DeLoyd T. Parker 
Bennie McGinty 

Jesse Oliver 

Fred Tinsley 

Joan Winn White 

Defendants:   

Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas 

John Hannah, Jr., Secretary of State 

Texas Judicial Districts Board 
Thomas R. Phillips, Chief Justice, Texas Supreme Court 

Michael J. McCormick, Presiding Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals 

Pat McDowell, Presiding Judge, 1st Administrative Judicial Region 
Thomas J. Stoval, Jr., Presiding Judge, 2nd Administrative Judicial Region 

B. B. Schraub, Presiding Judge, 3rd Administrative Judicial Region 

Leslie Murray, Presiding Judge, 4th Administrative Judicial Region 

Darrell Hester, Presiding Judge, Sth Administrative Judicial Region 

1 

 



  

William E. Moody, Presiding Judge, 6th Administrative Judicial Region 

Weldon Kirk, Presiding Judge, 7th Administrative Judicial Region 

Roger Jeff Walker, Presiding Judge, 8th Administrative Judicial Region 
Ray D. Anderson, Presiding Judge, 9th Administrative Judicial Region 
Joe Spurlock II, President, Texas Judicial Council 

Leonard E. David 

Defendant-Intervenors 
  

Judge Sharolyn Wood 
Judge Harold Entz 

Judge Susan D. Reed 

Judge John J. Specia, Jr. 

Judge Sid L. Harle 

Judge Sharon Macrae 

Judge Michael D. Pedan 

Respectfully submitted, 

By: Y A 4 Clements fe dd 
y Eugenel/Clements 
  

Attorney of Record for Appellant/Intervenor/ 

Defendant Harris County District 

Judge Sharolyn Wood 

iil 

 



  

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

RULE 28.2.1 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS . . . . ............ i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS... ... so cin sonisie aba teilaies ns «a8 ain in wv abn nv os iv 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... . . i... ies Sininiie ns thaw dau iain ey ee Vv 

I. FACTS RELEVANT TO MOTION TO REALIGN ................. 2 

II. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . 0.0. de ev sin bis win co eas 6 

Hi. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ....... . hos 2s vias s sinew vind oie s gio 8 

A. Attorney General Morales Should Be Aligned with 

APPRHeLS, I... he cl LS eas ee Hail wi ea 8 

B. Judge Wood May Defend All Counties Under Attack. . .... .. 8 

Cc. The En Banc Hearing Should Be Restricted Solely to the 

Legal Issues As to Which Review Was Granted. . ......... 8 

D. Attorney General Morales’ Participation in the 

Purported "Settlement" of this Case Violates His 

Constitutional and Professional Duties and Require 

Realionment, . . on oh 0 a atts er a BT. 9 

E. Attorney General Morales Lacks the Authority to Settle 

ivi ly ea BEET Nr SE 1 GR lf SNe cn 10 

F. Attorney General Morales’ Proposed "Settlement 

Agreement" Is Unconstitutional and Should Not Be 

Entertainedby This Court..." i... . Lo be dds on ve 15 

IV. CONCLUSION ti, a sieiale + «oles sie nia as oe wave ae a ag fe wT 4 15 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. cies viv ie is «ve vs vaisir ns vss AE wn ain vu is 17 
  

 



      

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page 

Cases 

Houston Lawyers Association v. Attorney General of Texas, 111 S.Ct. 2376 (1990) . . . .. 5 

New. York y. United States, ®112.S.Ct. 2508 C1002) i. ou. a otis sion movin © «ins vin 5 14 

Overton v. City of Austin, 748 F.2d 941 (Sth Cir. 1981). coc iiivin cov vs av vni 12 

Terrazas v. Clements, 381 F.Supp. 13194(N.D. Tex. 1983) . ....... dvi. 10, 12 

Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.WL.2d H2ATex. 1991) . ... . «cous dive ain snliein oo % at's 4 10 

United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 440-41 (5th Cir. 1981) . ........... 13 

Federal Statutes 

2B S.C. 8 10D. ie i es aha BPE ie 2 shale ale Dw Re Siw Ye 4 

LOCA RUE 38. 2, ar. le ia. vis + Sale ere x i a TR ne Te We 7 

Texas Constitution 

TEX. CONST. OF 1876, Qft.i8 8 2d. crs + vive x wilt vis was a vininin sane bin ade os » sino 9 

TEX. CONST. OF 1876 art. 46,8 1 i .i. ov os utr ss sige iv ale #0 angie e 9 

Miscellaneous 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38... . i... 0 cele iv iininin + vin wtinms oie +s 7.13 

Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional. Conduct™1.06 . ... . .. . vv. vais vh sie vin » 9 

 



  

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 

  

NO. 90-8014 and 

NO. 90-9003 

  

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, 

COUNCIL NO. 4434, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Respondents, 

Versus 

WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE 

OF TEXAS, et al., 

Defendants-Appellants 

JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD, 

Defendant-Intervenor- Appellant. 

  

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

Midland Division 

  

JUDGE WOOD'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO REALIGN 
THE PARTIES AND, IF NECESSARY, TO MODIFY INTERVENTION 

OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD AND 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
"NOTICE OF ACTION TOWARD SETTLEMENT" 

  

 



  

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS: 

Defendant/Intervenor/Appellant Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood ("Judge 

Wood") files her Brief in Support of Motion to Realign the Parties and, if Necessary, to Modify 

Intervention of Defendant-Appellant Judge Sharolyn Wood and to Strike the Attorney General's 

"Notice of Action Toward Settlement" to show the Court the following: 

I. FACTS RELEVANT TO MOTION TO REALIGN 
  

The Texas Attorney General's office has a history of trying to confess judgment to the 

plaintiffs in this case in order to replace Texas’ constitutionally mandated state district judge 

election system with his and the plaintiffs’ political subdistricting system through a federal court 

mandate. Attorney General Mattox tried surrender in 1989. Now, Attorney General Morales 

has had legislation introduced in the Texas Senate for the purpose of mooting this case' and 

installing an unconstitutional election scheme that would give members of other branches of 

government control over Texas district judge elections by designating judicial districts 

coextensive with state legislative districts drawn for the political advantage of the Democratic 

party. A copy of Attorney General Morales’ bill for restructuring Texas judicial elections is 

attached as Exhibit 2. The bill is styled Senate Bill 379 and was introduced in the Texas Senate 

on February 17, 1993, by State Senator Rodney Ellis. A copy of Attorney General Morales’ 

  

' Attorney General Morales testified before the Texas Senate subcommittee on Senate Bills 255 and 

379 on March 2. 1993, according to the official legislative notes of that hearing, as follows: 

The status of the LULAC case. En banc hearing in late May in CA 5. Long betore that date, 

I hope that you will take action that will moot the issues presented there. The adoption of my 

proposal would make the litigation moot. 

A copy of the transcript of the March 3, 1993 subcommittee hearing’s legislative history is attached as 

Exhibit 1. 

2 

 



  

press release of March 1, 1993, adopting the subdistricting bill as his own proposal is attached 

as Exhibit 3. A copy of a second press release dated March 1, 1993, Morales’ "Judicial 

Selection Reform Announcement," is attached as Exhibit 4.2 

No copies of Attorney General Morales’ press releases were provided to Judge Wood, 

whom he claims to represent in her official capacity as a sitting state district judge. They were, 

however, attached as exhibits to a Motion for Interim Relief and Stay Pending Appeal which the 

Plaintiffs improperly filed in the district court on March 5, 1993, in defiance of the January 11, 

1990 order of this Court, which expressly stayed all proceedings in that court. A copy of the 

Plaintiffs’ Motion is attached as Exhibit 5. In their Motion the Plaintiffs quote the Attorney 

General’s comment in his press release that "it would be impossible to do worse than the current 

[district judge election] system" as proof that the system should be replaced by a judicially 

  

2 Although this Court granted en banc review of this case by order issued February 11, 1993, 

which expressly vacated the panel opinion issued in this case in January, and although it served a copy 

of that order on Attorney General Morales, both of Attorney General Morales’ press releases 

subsequently issued on March 1, 1993, falsely claim that this Court has held that Texas” system of 

electing state district judges violates the Voting Rights Act and is unfair to minorities. 

The release titled “Morales Proposes Reform ot State District Judge Selection Method..." states, 

In January, a three-judge panel of the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the at-large 

system of electing State District Judges in eight urban Texas counties was untair to minorities and 

a violation of the U.S. Voting Rights Act. The U.S. Supreme Court also has said the Voting 

Rights Act applies to judicial elections. 

Exhibit 2 at 30. The release titled "Judicial Selection Reform Announcement” states, 

As you know, a 3-judge panel of the 5th U.S. Circuit Court ruled in January that the at-large 

system of electing state district judges in eight urban Texas counties was unfair to African 

American and Hispanic voters, and thus a violation of the Voting Rights Act. 

Already, a number of useful legislative proposals have been filed to address the 5th Circuit 

Court’s ruling. 

Exhibit 3 at 1. 

 



  

imposed "remedy" (without the necessity of any judicial finding of a violation of section 2). 

Specifically, they argue that Texas’ judicial election system should be "remedied" by judicially 

imposing their own and the Attorney General's "preferred plan" on Texas. Exhibit 5 at 3 § 5. 

They have, therefore, asked the district court to "convene a hearing as soon as is practicable to 

select appropriate interim relief for the 1994 elections." Id. at 5 § 13.3 

Only Judges Wood and Entz have stood between the unconstitutional destruction of the 

Texas judiciary by the collusion of the plaintiffs in this suit and the Texas Attorney General. 

Judges Wood and Entz alone filed requests in 1990 for expedited interlocutory review of this 

case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292, after the district court found liability in all target counties. 

By contrast, the Texas Attorney General and the Plaintiffs acted then, as now, to scuttle this 

litigation. Without notice to Judges Wood and Entz and without a hearing, the Plaintiffs and 

Attorney General Mattox obtained from the district court an injunction dated January 2, 1990, 

against Texas’ holding any elections under its constitutionally required district judge election 

system in the target counties and a so-called "Interim Election Plan" imposing their subdistricting 

proposals on those counties. This Court granted Judges Wood and Entz’s requests for 

expedited interlocutory appeal and stayed all further proceedings in the district court. 

  

3 The Court should also take notice that after having improperly sought a "remedy" in the district 

court for Texas’ judicial election system, which has not been found to violate any law, the plaintiffs filed 

a second improper motion in the district court on March 11, 1993, styled "Plaintiffs Motion for Interim 

Attorney Fees." A copy is attached as Exhibit 6. In that motion the Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees ot 

$273,589.00 to cover their legislative expenses in having "to respond to the many requests made by the 

Texas Legislature, the Governors Office and the Lieutenant Governor for testimony and drafting of 

legislation," the drafting apparently referring to the Attorney General's press releases and legislative 

proposal which the Plaintiffs attached as exhibits to their motion. Exhibit 6 at 2. 

+ The district court. however, changed the Attorney General's and the Plaintitfs’ partisan election 

scheme to a non-partisan system. causing them to protest on appeal that they had not sought such relief. 

4 

 



  

Judges Wood and Entz’s every subsequent attempt to defend this critical civil rights case 

has been bitterly opposed by the Texas Attorney General, even as he has strenuously insisted 

that he and he only has the right to defend the interests of Judges Wood and Entz (and the other 

individual defendants in their official capacities) and the right to defend the State of Texas’ 

interest in maintaining its constitutionally required judicial election system. For example, the 

Special Assistant Attorney General assigned to this case, Renea Hicks, opposed allowing Judges 

Wood and Entz to argue any part of the defense of this case before the Supreme Court when it 

was reviewed sub nom Houston Lawyers Association v. Attorney General of Texas, 111 S.Ct. 

2376 (1990), and that Court did not allow divided argument. 111 S.Ct. 1385 (1991). He then 

advised the Court in oral argument that he would not defend the majority opinion of this Court 

en banc because he did not personally agree with it. A copy of the relevant pages of the 

transcript of that oral argument is attached as Exhibit 7. 

Attorney General Morales is now attempting - in advance of en banc review of this case 

and precisely in order to prevent that review - to construct another argument to remove Judge 

Wood and Judge Entz from the case, on the grounds that Texas’ judicial election system is 

"indefensible" and that they are mere "obstructionists” to his settlement, and to thwart an 

expedited hearing and prevent a resolution of this case through judicial proceedings. When 

Judge Wood - whom Attorney General Morales claims to represent in her official capacity as 

a state district judge - attempted to participate in settlement discussions, the Plaintiffs and the 

Attorney General informed her counsel that they would schedule all further meetings between 

themselves and that her counsel was not welcome. Judge Wood sent the Attorney General the 

letter attached as Exhibit 8. It was ignored; and the Attorney General and the Plaintiffs 

 



  

% » 

continued their "settlement" talks, inviting non-party minority groups, interested lawyer groups, 

and Texas’ Democratic officials to participdie. Texas’ Democratic Governor, Lieutenant 

Governor, and Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives were invited to sign the 

"Settlement Agreement,"® despite the fact that these Democratic officials are not parties. By 

contrast, the signature of Chief Justice Thomas Phillips is conspicuously absent. Meanwhile the 

Plaintiffs and the Attorney General cynically refused even to advise Judge Phillips or Judges 

Entz and Wood that they had reached a "settlement." Instead, they issued their press releases, 

held a news conference, and made cameo appearances on the 6 o’clock news. 

II. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
  

Attorney General Morales has abdicated his responsibility under the Texas Constitution 

and the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct to defend this landmark judicial 

election case on behalf of the State of Texas and the named Defendants and Defendant- 

Intervenors. Instead, he has publicly announced that Texas’ judicial election system is 

"indefensible" and the "worst possible" system and that he intends to replace it with a system 

that will be "fairer" - that is, a system that he has worked out in collusion with the plaintiffs and 

at the expense of the State of Texas. He has misrepresented the status of this case to the press, 

elected state officials, and the legislature - declaring that Texas’ judicial election system has been 

found by this court to violate the Voting Rights Act, even though he knows that any decision is 

to be made by this Court following oral argument in May. He has publicly stated that his intent 

and purpose is to moot this case in advance of en banc review or any finding of liability by this 

Court. And he has encouraged the Texas legislature to pass resolutions to further a "Settlement 

  

5 See "Settlement Agreement." a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 9. 

6 

 



  

Agreement" which is unconstitutional under many criteria and the effect of which would be the 

destruction of Texas’ judicial election system and its reconstruction by the Attorney General and 

the Plaintiffs for partisan political gain at the expense of the other parties, the Texas judiciary 

and voters, the public interest and the United States and Texas Constitutions. 

It would be a travesty of justice - and a travesty of our democratic system of government 

- for this Court to permit this case to be "defended" on appeal by a state official who has 

publicly and repeatedly announced that he will refuse to do his duty, who has repeatedly 

demonstrated his partisanship on behalf of the Democratic party (hence on behalf of the 

Plaintiffs, who represent powerful constituencies within that party), who has shown no 

compunction about putting his partisan interests ahead of his constitutionally and professionally 

mandated duties, and who has fiercely opposed every effort by Judges Wood and Entz and 

everyone else to genuinely defend this landmark case in the interests of the State of Texas, its 

voters, and its judiciary. 

The Attorney General, as a named party, should be aligned with the Plaintiffs/ Appellees 

for all purposes. In the alternative, he should be aligned with the Appellees for purposes of oral 

argument at the en banc hearing, and the time to argue for the Appellants should be evenly 

divided between Judges Wood and Entz. As necessary, the intervention of Judges Wood and 

Entz should be extended to encompass all counties and all legal issues before the court. 

Attorney General Morales’ attempt to delay and subvert en banc review of the issues as 

instructed by the United States Supreme Court is both procedurally and substantively improper 

and is prohibited by FED. R. APP. P. 35 and Local Rule 35.2.2. The Attorney General's 

"Notice of Action Towards Settlement" and "Settlement Agreement" should be stricken, and the 

 



  

time the Attorney General demands to argue for his "Settlement Agreement" at the en banc 

hearing should be denied. After realignment with the Appellees whose cause he publicly 

espouses, Attorney General Morales should be required to confine his arguments to the issues 

properly scheduled for en banc review. 

III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
  

A. Attorney General Morales Should Be Aligned with Appellees. 
  

Judge Wood hereby incorporates by reference Judge Entz’s arguments, authorities, and 

exhibits in support of the proposition that Attorney General Morales should be aligned with the 

Plaintiff/ Appellees. 

B. Judge Wood May Defend All Counties Under Attack. 
  

Judge Wood hereby incorporates by reference Judge Entz’s arguments, authorities, and 

exhibits in support of the proposition that as an intervening Defendant-Appellant she is permitted 

to defend all counties under attack and to include those counties within the scope of her 

constitutional and other legal arguments. 

C. The En Banc Hearing Should Be Restricted Solely to the Legal Issues 

As to Which Review Was Granted. 
  

  

Judge Wood hereby incorporates by reference the arguments and authorities cited in her 

accompanying Motion to Realign the Parties and, If Necessary, to Modify Intervention at {§ 4-6 

that the en banc hearing should be restricted to the legal issues for which en banc review was 

granted, and such hearing should not be delayed by the political maneuvers currently progressing 

in Austin. 

 



    

D. Attorney General Morales’ Participation in the Purported 

"Settlement" of this Case Violates His Constitutional and Professional 

Duties and Require Realignment. 

  

  

  

Realignment of the Defendant Attorney General as a Plaintiff is mandated by the express 

statements and conduct of Attorney General Morales, who has thrown in his lot with the 

plaintiffs in attacking the very laws he as Attorney General is sworn to uphold. 

Article 4, Section 22 of the Texas Constitution, requires, "The Attorney General ... shall 

represent the State in all suits and pleas in the Supreme Court of the State in which the State 

may be a party." TEX. CONST. OF 1876, art. 4 § 22 (emphasis added). Attorney General 

Morales’ actions violate that duty, as shown by the facts recited above and the exhibits attached 

hereto. Attorney General Morales’ oath of office likewise requires him to "faithfully execute 

the duties of the office of Attorney General of the State of Texas" and to "preserve , protect, 

and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this State." TEX. CONST. OF 

1876 art. 16, § 1. His actions violate that oath. 

Attorney General Morales’ continued representation of the State of Texas also violates 

Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct § 1.06, which enjoins the duty of loyalty on 

all attorneys. Section 1.06(b)(2) prohibits any lawyer from representing a person if the 

representation of that person reasonably appears to be adversely limited by the lawyer’s 

responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the lawyer’s own interests. For the 

reasons set out above and in the accompanying motion, Attorney General Morales’ insistence 

on representing the State of Texas in this case even while he capitulates to the Plaintiffs in all 

things over the objections of the defendants violates Section 1.06(b)(2). The Court should 

eliminate the Attorney General's unprofessional conflicts of interest by realigning him in his 

 



  

capacity as a named party with the Plaintiffs/ Appellees whose cause he has espoused in this 

forum, in the Texas legislature, and in the media. 

E. Attorney General Morales Lacks the Authority to Settle this 

Suit. 

  

Attorney General Morales has placed no properly framed motion before this Court which 

would allow it to entertain his "Settlement Agreement." Therefore, consideration of the 

propriety of his settling with the plaintiffs and consideration of the merits of his "Settlement 

Agreement" are premature. Nevertheless, since the Attorney General has forced this issue, 

Judge Wood will briefly address the intrinsic impropriety of the Attorney General’s attempt to 

circumvent the laws of the United States and Texas and to change the structure of this State’s 

method of electing its officials by a "consent decree" entered with private plaintiffs. 

This is not the Attorney General's first foray into this use of the courts. In 1991, 

Attorney General Morales asked a state district court to impose a reapportionment plan on 

Texas. The Texas Supreme Court, in an original mandamus action deemed that plan to be 

"based on nothing more than the agreement of the Governor, the Attorney General, and a few 

citizens." Terrazas v. Ramirez, 829 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. 1991). It held that any settlement or 

consent decree entered between the Texas Attorney General and private parties to a suit that 

affects the public interest must not only be "fair, adequate and reasonable as to the parties and 

affected third parties" but must also "not violate the United States Constitution or any other 

applicable federal or state law." Id. at 720 (quoting Terrazas v. Clements, 581 F.Supp. 1319, 

1322-23 (N.D. Tex. 1983)). 

In this case the "Settlement Agreement" proposed by the Plaintiffs and Attorney General 

Morales is not "fair, adequate and reasonable" to Judges Wood and Entz, to third parties, or to 

10 

 



  

the public interest. It is, instead, an attempt to subvert the on-going appellate process in a case 

of the highest importance under federal law, and to seal into law a collusive partisan attempt by 

the Democratic Attorney General and the Democratic Plaintiffs to restructure the Texas judicial 

election system by private agreement over the protests of the other parties and in violation of 

both the Texas Constitution and the United States Constitution. It, therefore, violates Terrazas. 

Justice Gonzales’s concurrence in Terrazas is also noteworthy, especially when, as here, 

there is no question that what Attorney General Morales is attempting to do is forbidden by 

fundamental constitutional and professional principles. Justice Gonzales concurred in the 

judgment in Terrazas, but he would have held that Attorney General Morales was attempting to 

usurp the political power of reapportionment granted the Texas legislature and that his actions 

constituted a violation of the separation of powers doctrine enshrined in the Texas Constitution. 

He wrote, 

Our Constitution and statutes confer substantial powers upon the State’s 
Attorney General to settle ordinary civil lawsuits. However, this is not an 

ordinary civil lawsuit; and the Attorney General's authority does not include the 

power to bind the state to a settlement that modifies or alters a redistricting plan 

which only the legislature or the LRB had the power to create. .. 

The Texas legislature has the primary responsibility to reapportion the 

state’s legislative districts at its first regular session following each decennial 

census. If the legislature fails to fulfill its duty, then the LRB has authority to 
act. TEX. CONST. ART. III, § 28. ... 

The Attorney General had no power or authority to enter into this consent 

judgment. The Texas Constitution explicitly provides for the separation of 
powers among three branches of government: the legislature, the executive, and 

the judiciary. TEX. CONST. ART II, § 1. And the Constitution prohibits any 

branch exercising "any power properly attached to either of the others, except in 

instances expressly permitted." Id. Here, the legislature and the LRB have the 

express power to reapportion the senate voting districts, and the Attorney General 

has no statutory or constitutional power to alter this process. Thus, he exceeded 

11 

 



    

his authority, and his unauthorized action did not bind the state. See Reagan, 186 

S.W.2d at 135. 

In representing the state in these matters, the Attorney General had no 

particular justiciable or proprietary interest upon which to settle, because, by 

virtue of the position he holds, he represents all the people of Texas. When he 

agreed to change several voting districts’ boundaries, he inevitably acted 

adversely to part of his constituency. Those adversely affected had no chance to 
intervene and voice their objections to the submitted plan. Without question, the 
substitute plan was not subjected to the kind of intense study and public scrutiny 

that is essential in these matters. 

I can well appreciate why it was done in this manner; but it sets a bad 
precedent. The drafters of the Constitution did not envision, and we should not 
countenance, relegating so important a decision to a back room deal. Public 

lawsuits that seek to remedy wrongs of "wide constitutional dimension" should 

not be privately settled. See Sheffield v. Itawamba Cty Bd. of Supervisors, 439 

F.2d 35, 36 (5th Cir. 1971). I would hold that the Attorney General exceeded 

his authority, and that under the circumstances of this case, the district court did 

not exercise its judicial power in an appropriate or well considered manner. 

Terrazas, 829 S.W.2d at 727-28, (Gonzales, J., concurring). 

The majority opinion of the Texas Supreme Court in Terrazas, and, even more so, the 

concurrence of Justice Gonzales, are directly on point and bring the authority of Texas’ highest 

court to bear on the issue whether the Texas Attorney General has the power or the authority 

to "just settle" this critical case by entering not only into a consent decree with the Plaintiffs but 

into a confession of judgment on the part of the State of Texas that would award the Plaintiffs 

not only the judicial subdistricting they seek but also their attorneys’ fees as "prevailing parties." 

See "Settlement Agreement," Exhibit 9 at 2 § 4. 

Like the Texas Supreme Court, this Court has noted the "usurpation of power" inherent 

in certain attempts by parties to a legal suit to enter consent decrees. Overton v. City of Austin, 

748 F.2d 941, 952 (5th Cir. 1981). In Overron, this Court held that in every consent decree, 

12 

 



even between private parties, the court must ascertain that the settlement is "fair, adequate and 

reasonable." Id. Where, however, the consent reaches further than a mere compromise, 

Even when it affects only the parties, the court should ... examine it carefully to 

ascertain not only that it is a fair settlement but also that it does not put the 

court’s sanction on and power behind a decree that violates Constitution, statute, 

or jurisprudence.... If the decree also affects third parties, the court must be 

satisfied that the effect on them is neither unreasonable nor proscribed. 

Id. (quoting United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 440-41 (Sth Cir. 1981)(emphasis in 

original). 

Overton is particularly pertinent, if not indeed absolutely controlling, since the parties 

in that case — the Austin City Council and plaintiffs who had claimed that the method of 

electing city council members violated the rights of blacks and Hispanics under the Voting 

Rights Act and the United States Constitution — had asked the district court to approve a consent 

decree restructuring city council elections. This Court held, 

The district court was not required to blindly accept without a hearing the ipse 

dixit of these particular Black or Mexican-American parties or the current 

members of the Austin city council respecting these matters, when such 
acceptance would permanently restructure the composition and method of election 
of the city council in a manner which is contrary to the city charter and which 
affects the rights of numerous persons, minorities and others, who are not parties 

to the settlement. Here, the rights of third parties are involved to a unique 

degree.... 

Another aspect of the proposed consent decree deserves consideration. It 
is undisputed that the City of Austin is a "homerule" city and that its charter 
provides for a city council composed of seven persons, each elected at large. It 

is likewise plain that under the Constitution and laws of Texas, a change in the 

charter of a homerule city may not be effected by the city council itself, but 
instead requires a vote of the people.... 

The court here is not being asked merely to put its sanctions behind a 

substantive result that the parties would be empowered to achieve themselves, as 

in the case of the usual consent decree: rather, it is being asked to effectuate a 

substantive result which the parties wholly lack the jurisdictional power to bring 

13  



about by themselves. Thus, more is necessarily involved than merely ascertaining 

whether the parties have consented to an ultimate result which is not of itself 

illegal, unreasonable or unfair. 

Id. at 954-57. The rule in Overton speaks for itself. It requires that this Court, likewise, not 

endorse the illegal attempt of Attorney General Morales and the private Plaintiff minority groups 

to usurp the power to restructure Texas’ judicial election system by means of a plainly 

unconstitutional "consent decree" or confession of judgment. 

In refusing to lend itself to the Attorney General's attempt to "settle" this case with the 

plaintiffs this Court would also be following the Supreme Court’s opinion in New York v. United 

States, 112 S.Ct. 2508 (1992). On behalf of the Court, Justice O’Connor wrote that an 

unconstitutional plan cannot be ratified by the "consent" of state officials. She pointed out that 

"powerful incentives" might lead both federal and state officials to view departures from law to 

be in their personal interests and that the interests of public officials may not coincide with the 

Constitution’s allocation of authority. Id. at 2432. She stated, "The Constitution does not 

protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract 

political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To the 

contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the 

protection of individuals." Id. That is the fundamental issue here. 

The Texas Attorney General should not be permitted to enter any consent decree in this 

case or to confess judgment to the Plaintiffs, and the "Notice of Action Toward Settlement” by 

which he proposes to do so should be stricken by the Court.  



  

F. Attorney General Morales’ Proposed "Settlement Agreement" Is 

Unconstitutional and Should Not Be Entertained by This Court. 
  

  

Since Attorney General Morales’ "Settlement Agreement" is not properly before this en 

banc Court, nor could it be under the circumstances of this case, Judge Wood will not brief her 

constitutional arguments regarding the merits of the proposed "Settlement Agreements" at this 

time. However, even a cursory glance at the provisions of the Texas and United States 

Constitutions cited in Judge Wood’s Motion, the facts cited in this Brief, and the proofs attached 

as exhibits shows that both the means Attorney General Morales is employing to achieve his 

political ends and the ends he would achieve are unconstitutional. 

IV. CONCLUSION 
  

For the reasons set forth above and in Judge Wood's accompanying Motion, the Court 

should realign the Defendant Attorney General with the Plaintiffs/ Appellees, subtract all time 

allotted him for oral argument from the time allotted to the parties attacking the laws of Texas, 

proceed with the scheduled en banc hearing, require all parties to argue only the issues properly 

before the Court for en banc review in accordance with the Supreme Court’s instructions and 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, extend the intervention of Judge Wood as necessary 

to all counties and all constitutional and other legal issues before this court, and evenly divide 

oral argument for the Appellants between counsel for Judge Wood and counsel for Judge Entz. 

15 

 



  

OF COUNSEL: 

Michael J. Wood 

Attorney at Law 

440 Louisiana, Suite 200 

Houston, Texas 77002 

Telephone: (713) 228-5101 

Facsimile: (713) 223-9133 

Respectfully submitted, 

PORTER & CLEMENTS, L.L.P. 

  

By: % Luge Clonante ed 
. Eugen Clements 

Evelyn V. Keyes 
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 

Houston, Texas 77002-2730 

(713) 226-0600 
(713) 228-1331 (Fax) 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT/DEFENDANT/ 

INTERVENOR HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT 

JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD 

16 

 



  

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that on misZd day of id 1993, a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing document by first class United States/mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 

William L. Garrett 

Garrett, Thompson & Chang 

8300 Douglas, Suite 800 

Dallas, Texas 75226 

Rolando Rios 

Attorney at Law 
115 E. Travis, Suite 1024 

San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Sherrilyn A. Ifill 

NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 

New York, New York 10013 

Gabrielle K. McDonald 

Walker & Satterwaite 

7800 Mopac, Suite 215 

Austin, Texas 78759 

Edward B. Cloutman, III 

Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C. 

3301 Elm Street 

Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 

Judith Sanders-Castro 

MALDEF 

140 E. Houston 

San Antonio, Texas 78205 

  

Robert H. Mow, Jr. 

David Godberg 

Hughes & Luce 
2800 Momentum Place 

1717 Main Street 

Dallas, Texas 75201 

Walter L. Irvin 

5787 South Hampton Road 

Suite 210, Lock Box 122 

Dallas, Texas 75232-2255 

Susan Finkelstein 

Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. 

405 N. St. Mary’s #910 

San Antonio, Texas 78205 

Renea Hicks 
Special Assistant Attorney General 

P. O. Box 12548 

Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78711-2548 

Seagal V. Wheatley 
Wheatley & Sharpe, L.L.P. 

100 West Houston 

Frost Bank Tower, Suite 1200 

San Antonio, Texas 78205 

vl, gar 
Evelyn V. Keyés 
  

7630C:\DOCS\EVK\W0027001\063 

17 

 



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NOTES ON MEETING OF THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SB 255, SB 
379,SJR 111 AND SCR 28 OF 

THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE 
SENATE ON REDISTRICTING, 
ELECTIONS AND ETHICS ON 

MARCH 2, 1993 

Members present and participating: 
Rbsiaomion (Won of te Diotct Comers 

Maw Cowr— Te Be | Sin Spy 
West *= Rug Spaxe >= 3 P93 
Luna *™ District Cad Judges 

Carriker 

Patterson 

Shapiro 
Sibley 

All members present at beginning. 

Chaic Jays out SB 379 by Ellis and SCR 28 by Carriker fiest. 
Ellis proposes 10 keep doth bills pending vatil next week with 
no vote to allow ail the wilnesses Lo testify. 

Dan Morales, AG of State of Texas. 

My office has put together a specific proposal which has 

been seat to all members of the Leg Oa 2-5-93 Morales said 
he would present a judicial selection package in 60 days. At 

request of Gov and Lt Gov, he shortened it to 30 days. 
We are locking for an independent judiciary which 

fairly represzals all the chizens of [eras Have talked to 
state officials in cight other states which have most cecently 
faced challenges to ther judicial selection process. We want 

 



Lo] 

8 judiciary that reflects Lhe diversity of the citizens of the 
state. We need a aew plan (or judicial selection. 

A 3-judge panel of CAS ruled in January. 1991. that 
the at-large selection system was in viofation of the Voling 
Rights Act. Most legislative proposals address only the eight 
affected counties. He recommends expanding that to every 

county having a population over 100.000, a 10tal of 28 

counties. and 10 elect judges from subdistricts within the 
counties. Subdisirias covid he commissioners districts, JP 
disiricls, or legislative representatives’ disiricls. 

Also connected to the proposal are limits on electocal 

Iinancing for judicial elections. Limits on individual and PAC 
contributions to judicial elections He will conduct public 
hearings in Dallas and Harris County in the next week. 

It would impossible to do worse than the current 
system. Any change would be {or 1he belter. 

Why elect judges rather than appoint them? Majority 
of Texans favor election. As C) Phillips said, most Texaas ace 

concerned 2bout who picks the people who pick the judges. 
[a the first 45 years of retention elections nalionwide. only 
33 judges were rejected. Those rejected seemed to have 
campagned poorly rather than performed poorly in the 
courtcoonm. 

Voting for a large number of judges in a single election 
is 8 meaningless exercise Voting for oaly two oc three 
judges will permit voters to make meaningful choices m 
judical election 

Arkansas had no black judges before changing toa 
system similar to this proposal Now they have 10 of 41 
trial judges mn affected counties. 

Fears of wholesale turnover in the judiciary are 

uvafounded. Vhat will bappea wiltbe thet qualified ATAm 
and Hispanic and viler minority lawyers will have 
increased chances to be elected 

Will these changes lake a coastitutional amendment? 
We think the clearly preferable alternative is by 
coustitutional amendment Lt Gov is of the same mind This 
is the safest surest way tu achieve the needed changes 

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The status of the LULAC case Ea banc hearing in late 

May in CAS. Long before that dite, | hope that you will take 
action that will moot the issues presented there. The 
adoption of my proposal would make the litigation moot. 

Senator Ellis’ bill {SB 379] fairly puts into operation the 

principles set out in my proposal 

Renee Hicks, in charge of LULAC litigation in CAS. 

Luna: do you foresee going further than district courts in 

making these reforms? Morales if this proposal for reform 

is successful, | foresees extension ol the principles to ell levels 

of courts in the state. But that policy choice lies with the Leg 

Luna: is it absolutely necessary to do this by constitutional 

amend meat? Morales: We cannot guarantee success if you 

do not ulllize a constitutional amendment. We feel that the 

surest and most certain way to enact these proposals is by 

coastilutional amendment But if the Leg chooses to enact 

the plan by simple legisiation, we will defend it as vigorously 

as possible. Luna: do you (avor partisan or non-partisan 

electicns. Morales: partisan association 1ells the voters. 

particularly in large counties, something about the 

philosophical! inclination of the caadidate. Valuable for that 

reason. | see no reason to reform the judicial selection 

system to eliminate partisan elections. There should be no 

Democratic justice; there should be so Repablicaa justice. 

We feel that limitations on judicial campaign (inaacing are 

most necessary in smaller districts, even limits on total 

campaign spending. 

Patterson: agrees that 1 constitutional amendment ts 

necessary. Should such an amendment be preseated to jus! 

the affected counties or ta the state as a whole. Mor ales: 

sub mitted 10 the state 1s a Whole. 

Your letter of 3-1-93 says by your subdistrict plan 

you wanl lo achieve [air representation. We made a 

Hispanic senate district and John Whitmire was elected. We 

made 2 Hispanic US rep district and Gene Green was elected. 

No guarantee that minorilies will be elected in subdistrids. 

3 

 



Morales: We thiak that judges elected from the smaller 

distcicts will feel more directly accountable to the voters in 

their distcict rather than accountable [xsi to parly bosses on 

and power brokers in elections [rom larger disiricts. : 

Morales: Seastoc Ellis, you have a good bill hece. Ellis: 

how long could tha litigation la LULAC case be dragged out? 

Macales we could keep it going for more than a decade. 1 

think it is better for us lo make policy decisions anong ovr 

state officials than allow, ance again, the federal courts 10 

impose a remedy on us. Ellis: [ believe i states rights as 

you do, but often in the past, the State of Te1as has been 

state wrong. Morales most states have taken the course o 

making policy decisions without having a solution imposed 

by federal courts. [Uinois © an example of a sate that won 

federal litigation, but then made changes in the judicial 

selection process legislatively. 

Ellis says th! if we have to go the constitutional 

amendment route thece are substantial political 

impediments. | have been told that the 2/3 vote 

requirement, 2/3 of all membecs and sot members 

present, could be used 10 prevent my bill (rem ever being 

even discussed on the floor of the Senate. § have been told 

that members of the Senate and House would act to prevent 

such a proposal from being heard on the flooc of eithec 

house of the Leg and that they have eaough votes to 

predude any such considerstion. Morales reiterates that he 

thinks a constitutional amendmext is the surest and safest 

way to g0. 

Ellis: What have been the contents of the seitiement 

discussions? Morales: | cannot imagine that the inlervenors 

would agree to any settlement of the ligation rese mbling 

my proposal 

Ellis: On a tkoray. racial issue like this issue, [ cannot 

imagine being able 10 garner 82/3 vole in either house of 

the Leg. The history of Texas has been sbysmal ia settling 

racially motivated public policy issues by legislation. All of 

the significant changes have come through court action. 

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Morales intends to make CAS formally aware that the 
leadership of the Stale favocs the changes AG has proposed 

and to ask them to resolve the litigation in a fashion that 
would achieve the terms of his proposal 

Sibley: why pick the, 100,000 population line? Horales: 
above that number, counties have three of nore district 
judges. Sibley: what about county courts at law? Morales: 

we will leave thal policy decision 10 the Legislature. Sibley: 
what about speqaity courts? Morales: we think you ought to 

decide those things as well as residency requirements. 

Hicks: Bunton said he didn't care what the state did abaut 

specialty courts. | don't know what the Voting Rights Act 
would require us io do about election of specialty courts. My 

inchnation would be to say that the VRA doesn't impaci 

specialty courts. Sibley: since the Democrats will control 
redistricting, don't you foresee (hat a large number of 

Republican judges vould be swept out of offjo=? Morales 
favors some kind of transitional procedere 10 protect 

incumbents. Sibley says there are 400,000 Republicans in 
south Dallas County. Because of Democratic redistricting, 
there is no Republican state representative from that area 

representing iheir interests. Hence, my doubts that your 
proposal for subdistrict elections will produce equity. 

Sibley: would yous be surprised 10 know that of the five 

minority district judges in Dallas County. four are 

Republicans? [ see this problem not as a thorny racial 
issues, as Ellis characterized it, but as a thoray partisan 

poltice} issue. 
Sibley: is it nol true that Louisiana, Georgia, Louisians, 

Arkansas, Mississippiace all essentially one-party states for 
judicial elections? Yes And that has made the resclution of 
those issues easier. Much more difficult in a vibrant two- 

party state like Texas. 
Sibley: you say you will vigorously defend any 

constitutional amendment that we pass. Yel you are aiso 

supposed to defend vigorously the current constitutional 
systern. Your failure to defend the current system 
vigorously led directly to ike intervention of two judges in 

5 

BE 

 



our two lacgest counties Why should we believe that you 
will vigorously defend what we pass if it doesn’t cnmply with 
Your ideas of what ought to be done? 

Shapiro: how can you say that judges will be as independent 
as they acre now when elected from larger districts when 
they are accountable to 2 much smaller constituency? 
Morales: that position was presented to the USSCt and 
rejected. The only alternatives available to us now to 
comply with the VRA as elucidated by the USSCt are non- 
electoral selection and election from subdistricts Morales 
leaves 

Chair lays out all bills and resolutions on judicial selection. 

Former State Supreme Court Justice Oscar Mauzy. We have 
been derelict ia reforming the judicial setection process. As 
a member of this bedy, | introduced bills similar to the bill 
that Ellis has flied. The time has ng passed to end this 
litigation and to deal wilh the issues legislatively. 

Ellis is there any way 10 gel the intervenors out of the 
LULAC litigation? Mauzy says ask the CAS 10 enter a 
judgment in line with settlement proposal of the State and 
plaintiffs, cutting off the rights of the intervenors. 

Mauzy wants these principles applied to ail appellate 
courts of the state, otherwise there will be further litigation 

Sharolyn Eiffel NA ACP Lega! Defense Fuad counsel from 
New York representing AfAm lavyers of the Houston 
Lawyers Assoc:ation and five AfAm voters in Harris 
County. Eiffel represents minority voting cases in judicial 
elections in many states. Texas has frustrated her in 
refusing to face up to the need to permit meaningful 
participation by minorities in the judicial branch. 
Throughout the country, the judicial branch remaias 
almost entirely white. HL A's proposa! would elect two 
district judges [rom each state representative district and 
the remaining nine judges would be elected by some 

6  



  

(& & 

a 

weighted countywide electoral system. Almost every other 

state, including many in tne traditional South. have alrexdy 

changed to permit election df minority judges 

Do you have 10 amend the Texas Constitution? In 

Arkansas, we set Up electoral subdistecls. Following the 

settlement language of Arkansas, create judicial districts 

county wide and electoral districts smaller than county. No 

violation of state constitution. 

What about incumbent judges? Incu mbent judges vill 

have to be thrown out of office 10 accom modate this pian. 

Staying in office forever is not a legitimate concern 

Legilijnate concerns for incumbent judges are retirement 

benefits. Create special provisions to permit a judge 10 Serve 

as a special judge until vesting retirement rights. 

The proposal of Ellis and the HLA is subdistricts and not 

single-me aber districts. 

Eiffel does not see & problem with the independence of 

the judiciacy. Why are the defenders of the curreat system 

not concer ned about {oss of independence When elected 

judges are reliant on contributions (rom large law firms aad 

lawyers practicing in their courts and on partisan political 

parties? 

HLA has not takena position on partisan vs nofi- 

partisan elections. Eiffet doesn't think that AIA mn voters 

vote solely on the basis of increasing repre sentation of 

AfA ms in judiciary, legislature, ele 

facchs County is the primary exancle of overtly raast 

results in judicial elections. In 1936. 19 Democratic judges 

ran for election. The sixteen white Democratic judges were 

elected. The three black Democratic incumbent judges were 

defeated. 

Eiffel thinks that inter venors would be hard-pressed 

to argue that the State has an interest in maainlainiog 

county -wije elections when the Gov, the L:. Gov. ihe Chief 

justice of the sgpreme Court and the AG all publicly s1y 

that the State has no iptcrest ia maintaining the current 

system. Therefore, il the AG settles the lawsuil, 8 court 

would be hard-pressed ta adopt the position of the 

   



intervenors that the Stale has an interest in maintaining 

the current sysiem. 

Sibley continues lo press his assertion that it is a 

partisan issue and not a racial issue. ln every county in 

Ellis’ bill the smaller sumber of judges are placed in 

Republican districts. Eiffel says thal her plan foc Harris 

County answers Sibley's concerns: equal numbers of judges 

from each subdistrict wilh any rollover elected countywide 

by some weighied election system. 

Ellis’ bill had jedges assigned tv stale rep districts by 

equal numbers. Any leftover judges vere assigned to state 

rep districts wilh highest minority voter registration in 

descending order. 

Patterson calls formec Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 

Texas, john Hill Bill was not filed as a response 10 LULAC 

litigation, but an attempl to create a fairer system of 

sejecting judges. The cutrent system rarely presents us 

with contested judicial elections with well-funded 

opposition. Most judges run unopposed: 52 percent ia their 

first election and 81 percent thereafter. 

¢] Hill The status quo is totally unacceptable; it is the worst 

of systems. We recommend a constitutional amendment as 

the means of changing the law. Article V, Section 7a,0f the 

Texas Constitution absolutely bars judical subdistricts 

without & vote of the votess in the affected county. 

Andrew Jellerscn drafted Palterson’s bill. Appointing 

com missions are mandated to have diverse populations 

Ellis: the Georgia appointed judge/reteantion election 

seitlement contains a spectic quota of AfAms ta be 

appuinted in the first round of appointments. Your hill will 

not work without specific (acial and ethnic quotas. 

Hill: 33 states in the country Us a judical selection 

process similar 10 Patterson's bill. No state that has adopted 

an appointment system has ever gone back to tn elective 

system. Pretty good endorsement. A releantion election  



  

would have kept judge John Kyles and Justice Gaynelle Jones 
in dTice. 

Waggoner Carr. Former AG of Texas and former Speaker of 
the House. For Patterson's bill rather than opposed to Ellis’ 
bill. No one has spoken in defense of the current system. 
Whatever plan we pul into effect, we must increase 
minority representation in the judiciary. The greatest evil 
about the current judicial system is the way judges are 
selected. Anyane who gives money to a judicial candidate 
cipects something in return. Your bill Senator Ellis, does 
not enhance the pover of the volecs. Your bill will take 
away my power (0 select all but 1 small portion of the judges 
who will serve in my county. Luna: that is exactly what the 
current system has done to me and my people for moce 
than 150 years. The appointment system you propose may 
give my people a Hispanic judge, but it will be a Hispanic 
judge chosen by the Anglo establishment not by the 
Hispanic com munity. [ don’t want you to pick my Hispanic. | 
wan to pick my Hispaaic. ; 

Carr agrees with Morales’ position that a constitutional 
amendment is mandatory. 

Judge Sharolyn Wood. Agrees with portions of Patterson's 
bill. Agrees with Mauzy that we need 10 address the entire 
judicial system of the state of Texas. LULAC did not make 
any case against Hacris County. Only HLA, an intervenor 
plaintiff represented by Eiffel, is the oaly party to prevail 
against Harris County. When | was appoiated in 198 1 only 
ope of the district judges in the county had reached the 
bench by an initial election. Every olher one had been 
appointed and then retained in office. Agrees with Mauzy 
that the Leg should be the source of the solution. 

The LULAC lawsuit is not about preserving the status 
quo; it is about whether the current system violates the 
federal VRA. For four years. 1 have tried to get changes 
made by the Leg to improve the system. We need to find a 

   



way Wo have all of the people of Texas think that their courts and their judiciary are fairly selected. 
| agree vith 2lmosn everything that Hill and Carr said. Carriker: isn’t your position in the LULAC suit that the current system should be mainiained? No, my position has been that the State of Texas should bave a lawyer who vigorously presents the issues ia the case My ultimate goal in the litigation is to get a judicial determination on the issue of waether the curreat system violates the VRA. She thinks that the HLA opinion by the USSCt is a great decision it interprets the word “representative” to include any elected dficial 
Wood: my lawyers have always sought 10 accelerate the process of this case. We will continue to urge expedited schedules for resolution of this litigation. J 
[ believe that 1t some point judges have been elected enough times and that they ought not to have to run in contested eleclions, reducing the pressuze of raising money I am not in favor of the commission selection proposal West. if the Leg comes up with subdistricts proposal that pleases the plaintiffs and they disauiss the lawsuit. what will you do? Wood: the lawsuit would be over. That is a settlement ia my terms. | am opposed to seitling the case in the manner that we settied the prison lawsuit with such 

disastrous results 
[ favor changing the status quo Le put more minocities on the bench. I think that the Governor ought to appoint judges. There should be retention elections thereafter. Appointed judges are a high-moriality species. P

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Harrls County, Texas 

Office of Civil District Coordinators 301 Fannin, Room S10A 
Houston, Texas 77002 
Fax No. 713-755-5779 

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Citation Rank (R) Database Mode 
1993 TX S.B. 379 (SN) R- 22 OF 76 TX-BILLS P LOCATE 

1993 Texas Senate Bill No. 379, Texas 73rd Legislative Session -- First Regular 
Session (FULL TEXT - STATE NET) 

TEXAS BILL TEXT 

Document Date: 02-17-93 

Bill Number: TX73RSB 379 Filed: 2/17/93 

Author: Ellis 
A BILL TO BE ENTITLED 

AN ACT 

VERSION: Introduced 

February 17, 1993 

Ellis 

relating to abolishing certain district courts, creating additional 
district courts, and the election of district court judges in 
certain counties. 

TEXT: 

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: 

SECTION 1. (a) This Act is a response to federal court suits relating 
to the application of the federal Voting Rights Act to state district judges 
in certain counties. 

(b) For district court elections in those counties in 1994 and 
thereafter, judges shall be elected from places composed of state 
representative districts, commissioners court precincts, or justice precincts 
as assigned by the legislature. 

(c) The legislature finds that this Act is consistent with all 
provisions of the Texas Constitution. 

SECTION 2. Subchapter A, Chapter 24, Government Code, is amended by 

adding Section 24.0015 to read as follows: 

<<+ Sec. 24.0015. RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF JUDGES. A district judge 

elected by place from an area that is less than the entire judicial district 
may, but need not, be a resident of the area from which elected. +>> 

SECTION 3. Effective January 1, 1995, Subchapter C, Chapter 24, 
Government Code, is amended by adding Sections 24.523-24.530 to read as 
follows: 

<<+ Sec. 24.523. 378TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT (HARRIS COUNTY). (a) The 

378th Judicial District is composed of Harris County. +>> 

Copyright (c) 1993 Info. for Public Affairs  



     1993 TX S.B. 379 (SN) PAGE 2 

<<+ (b) The district has 35 judges who are elected from state 
representative districts as provided by Subsection (c). For purposes of this 
section, a state representative district is composed of the area in the 
district on January 1, 1993. +>> 

<<+ (c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 
+>> 

<<+ (1) places 1 and 26 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 126; +>> 

<<+ (2) places 2 and 27 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 127; +>> 

<<+ (3) places 3 and 28 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 128; +>> 

<<+ (4) places 4 and 29 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 129; +>> 

<<+ (5) places 5 and 30 shall be elected by voters residing in 

state representative district 130; +>> 

<<+ (6) places 6 and 31 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 131; +>> 

<<+ (7) places 7 and 32 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 132; +>> 

<<+ (8) places 8 and 33 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 133; +>> 

<<+ (9) places 9 and 34 shall be elected by voters residing in 

state representative district 134; +>> 

<<+ (10) places 10 and 35 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 135; +>> 

<<+ (11) place 11 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 136; +>> 

<<+ (12) place 12 shall be elected by voters residing in state 

representative district 137; +>> 

<<+ (13) place 13 shall be elected by voters residing in state 

representative district 138; +>> 

<<+ (14) place 14 shall be elected by voters residing in state 

representative district 139; +>> 

Copyright (c) 1993 Info. for Public Affairs 

 



    5 1 

1993 TX S.B. 379 (SN) 

<<+ (15) place 15 shall 
representative district 140; +>> 

<<+ (16) place 16 shall 
representative district 141; +>> 

<<+ (17) place 17 shall 
representative district 142; +>> 

<<+ (18) place 18 shall 
representative district 143; +>> 

<<+ (19) place 19 shall 
representative district 144; +>> 

<<+ (20) place 20 shall 
representative district 145; +>> 

<<+ (21) place 21 shall 

representative district 146; +>> 

<<+ (22) place 22 shall 
representative district 147; +>> 

<<+ (23) place 23 shall 
representative district 148; +>> 

<<+ (24) place 24 shall 
representative district 149; and +>> 

<<+ (25) place 25 shall 
representative district 150. +>> 

<<+ Sec. 24.524. 

be 

be 

be 

be 

be 

be 

be 

be 

be 

be 

be 

elected 

elected 

elected 

elected 

elected 

elected 

elected 

elected 

elected 

elected 

elected 

by 

by 

by 

by 

by 

by 

by 

by 

by 

by 

by 

voters 

voters 

voters 

voters 

voters 

voters 

voters 

voters 

voters 

voters 

voters 

379TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT (DALLAS COUNTY). 
Judicial District is composed of Dallas County. +>> 

residing 

residing 

residing 

residing 

residing 

residing 

residing 

residing 

residing 

residing 

residing 

in 

in 

in 

in 

in 

in 

in 

in 

in 

in 

<<+ (b) The district has 30 judges who are elected from state 
representative districts as provided by Subsection (c). For purposes of this 

PAGE 

state 

state 

state 

state 

state 

state 

state 

state 

state 

state 

state 

section, a state representative district is composed of the area in the 
district on January 1, 1993. +>> 

<<+ (c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 
+>> 

<<+ (1) places 1 and 17 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 99; +>> 

<<+ (2) places 2 and 18 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 100; +>> 

Copyright (c) 1993 Info. for Public Affairs 

3 

(a) The 379th 

 



    v x 

1993 TX S.B. 379 (SN) 

state 

state 

state 

state 

state 

state 

state 

state 

state 

state 

state 

state 

<<+ (3) places 3 and 19 shall 
representative district 101; +>> 

<<+ (4) places 4 and 20 shall 
representative district 102; +>> 

<<+ (5) places 5 and 21 shall 
representative district 103; +>> 

<<+ (6) places 6 and 22 shall 
representative district 104; +>> 

<<+ (7) places 7 and 23 shall 
representative district 105; +>> 

<<+ (8) places 8 and 24 shall 
representative district 106; +>> 

<<+ (9) places 9 and 25 shall 
representative district 107; +>> 

be 

be 

be 

be 

be 

be 

be 

<<+ (10) places 10 and 26 shall 
representative district 108; +>> 

<<+ (11) places 11 and 27 shall 
representative district 109; +>> 

<<+ (12) places 12 and 28 shall 
representative district 110; +>> 

<<+ (13) places 13 and 29 shall 
representative district 111; +>> 

<<+ (14) places 14 and 30 shall 
representative district 112; +>> 

<<+ (15) place 15 shall be elected 
representative district 113; and +>> 

<<+ (16) place 16 shall be elected 
representative district 114. +>> 

<<+ Sec. 24.525. 380TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

380th Judicial District is composed of Tarrant 

elected 

elected 

elected 

elected 

elected 

elected 

elected 

by voters 

by voters 

by voters 

by voters 

by voters 

by voters 

by voters 

PAGE 

residing in 

residing in 

residing in 

residing in 

residing in 

residing in 

residing in 

be elected by voters residing in 

be elected by 

be elected by 

be elected by 

be elected by 

voters residing 

voters residing 

voters residing 

voters residing 

by voters residing in state 

by voters residing in state 

(TARRANT COUNTY). (a) The 
County. +>> 

<<+ (b) The district has 14 judges who are elected from state 
representative districts as provided by Subsection (c). For purposes of this 
section, a state representative district is composed of the area in the 
district on January 1, 1993. +>> 

Copyright (c) 1993 Info. for Public Affairs 

4 

 



    -. 

1993 TX S.B. 379 (SN) PAGE 

& 

<<+ (c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 
+>> 

<<+ (1) places 1 and 11 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 89; +>> 

<<+ (2) places 2 and 12 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 90; +>> 

<<+ (3) places 3 and 13 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 91; +>> 

<<+ (4) places 4 and 14 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 92; +>> 

<<+ (5) place 5 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 93; +>> 

<<+ (6) place 6 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 94; +>> 

<<+ (7) place 7 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 95; +>> 

<<+ (8) place 8 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 96; +>> 

<<+ (9) place 9 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 97; and +>> 

<<+ (10) place 10 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 98. +>> 

<<+ Sec. 24.526. 381ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT (BEXAR COUNTY). (a) The 381st 

Judicial District is composed of Bexar County. +>> 

<<+ (b) The district has 13 judges who are elected from state 
representative districts as provided by Subsection (cc). For purposes of this 
section, a state representative district is composed of the area in the 
district on January 1, 1993. +>> 

<<+ (c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 
+>> 

<<+ (1) Places 1 and 12 shall be elected by voters residing in 

state representative district 115; +>> 

<<+ (2) places 2 and 13 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 116; +>> 

Copyright (c) 1993 Info. for Public Affairs 

5 

 



Ad 

1993. TX 8.B. 379 (SN) PAGE 

<<+ (3) place 3 shall elected voters residing in state 
representative district 117; +>> 

<<+ (4) place 4 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 118; +>> 

<<+ (5) place 5 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 119; +>> 

<<+ (6) place 6 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 120; +>> 

<<+ (7) place 7 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 121; +>> 

<<+ (8) place 8 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 122; +>> 

<<+ (9) place 9 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 123; +>> 

<<+ (10) place 10 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 124; and +>> 

<<+ (11) place 11 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 125. +>> 

<<+ Sec. 24.527. 382ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT (JEFFERSON COUNTY). (a) The 

382nd Judicial District is composed of Jefferson County. +>> 

<<+ (b) The district has six judges who are elected from state 
representative districts and parts of state representative districts as 
provided by Subsection (c). For purposes of this section, a state 
representative district is composed of the area in the district on January 1, 
1993, .+>> 

<<+ (c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 

<<+ (1) places 1 and 3 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 22; and +>> 

<<+ (2) places 2, 4, 5, and 6 shall be elected by voters residing 
in state representative district 21 and the voters residing in that part of 
state representative district 19 in Jefferson County. +>> 

<<+ Sec. 24.528. 383RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT (LUBBOCK COUNTY). (a) The 

383rd Judicial District is composed of Lubbock County. +>> 

<<+ (b) The district has three judges who are elected from 
Copyright (c) 1993 Info. for Public Affairs  



     1993. TX S.B..'379 (SN) PAGE 7 

commissioners court precincts as provided by Subsection (c). For purposes of 
this section, a commissioners court precinct is composed of the area in the 
precinct on January 1, 1993. +>> 

<<+ (c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 
+>> 

<<+ (1) place 1 shall be elected by voters residing in 
Commissioners Court Precinct No. 1 of Lubbock County; +>> 

<<+ (2) place 2 shall be elected by voters residing in 
Commissioners Court Precinct No. 2 of Lubbock County; and +>> 

<<+ (3) place 3 shall be elected by voters residing in 
Commissioners Court Precinct No. 3 of Lubbock County. +>> 

<<+ Sec. 24.529. 384TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT (ECTOR COUNTY). (a) The 384th 

Judicial District is composed of Ector County. +>> 

<<+ (b) The district has two judges who are elected from commissioners 
court precincts as provided by Subsection (c). For purposes of this section, 
a commissioners court precinct is composed of the area in the precinct on 
January 1, 1993. +>> 

<<+ (c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 
+>> 

<<+ (1) place 1 shall be elected by voters residing in 
Commissioners Court Precinct No. 1 of Ector County; and +>> 

<<+ (2) place 2 shall be elected by voters residing in 
Commissioners Court Precinct No. 2 of Ector County. +>> 

<<+ Sec. 24.530. 385TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT (MIDLAND COUNTY). (a) The 

385th Judicial District is composed of Midland County. +>> 

<<+ (b) The district has two judges who are elected from commissioners 
court precincts as provided by Subsection (c). For purposes of this section, 
a commissioners court precinct is composed of the area in the precinct on 
January 1, 1993. +>> 

<<+ (c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 
+>> 

<<+ (1) place 1 shall be elected by voters residing in 
Commissioners Court Precinct No. 3 of Midland County; and +>> 

<<+ (2) place 2 shall be elected by voters residing in 
Commissioners Court Precincts Nos. 1, 2, and 4 of Midland County. +>> 

Copyright (c) 1993 Info. for Public Affairs 

 



   
« 

1993 TX S.B. 379 (SN) PAGE 8 

   

SECTION 4. Effective January 1, 1997, Sections 24.523(b) and (c), 
Government Code, as added by Section 3 of this Act, are amended to read as 
follows: 

(b) The district has <<+ 59 +>> <<= 35 =>> judges who are elected from 
state representative districts as provided by Subsection (c). For purposes of 
this section, a state representative district is composed of the area in the 
district on January 1, 1993. 

(c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 

(1) places 1 and 26 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 126; 

(2) places 2 and 27 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 127; 

(3) places 3 and 28 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 128; 

(4) places 4 and 29 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 129; 

(5) places 5 and 30 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 130; 

(6) places 6 <<+ , +>> <<= and =->> 31 <<+ , and 51 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 131; 

(7) places 7 and 32 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 132; 

(8) places 8 and 33 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 133; 

(9) places 9 and 34 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 134; 

(10) places 10 and 35 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 135; 

(11) <<+ places +>> <<- place ->> 11 <<+ and 36 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 136; 

(12) <<+ places +>> <<=- place =->> 12 <<+ and 37 +>> shall be 

elected by voters residing in state representative district 137; 

(13) <<+ places +>> <<- place =->> 13 <<+ and 38 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 138; 

Copyright (c) 1993 Info. for Public Affairs 

 



    Ld a 

1993 TX SeR. 

be elected 

be elected 

be elected 

be elected 

elected by 

be elected 

be elected 

be elected 

be elected 

elected by 

elected by voters residing in state 

SECTION 5. Effective January 1, 
Government Code, as added by Section 3 of this Act, are amended to read as 
follows: 

(b) The district has <<+ 37 +>> <<=- 30 =->> judges who are elected from 

379 (SN) 

(14) <<+ places +>> <<- place ->> 14 <<+ and 39 +>> shall 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 139; 

{15) <<+ 
by voters 

(16) <<+ 
by voters 

(17) <<+ 
by voters 

(18) <<+ 
by voters 

(19) <<+ 

(20) <<+ 
by voters 

(21) <<+ 
by voters 

(22) <<+ 
by voters 

(23) <<+ 
by voters 

(24) <<+ 

voters residing in state 

(25) <<+ 

places +>> <<- place =->> 15 <<+ , 40, and 
residing in state representative district 

places +>> <<- place ->> 16 <<+ , 41, and 
residing in state representative district 

places +>> <<- place =->> 17 <<+ , 42, and 
residing in state representative district 

places +>> <<- place ->> 18 <<+ , 43, and 
residing in state representative district 

52 +>> 

140; 

53 +>> 

141; 

54 +>> 

142; 

55 +>> 

143; 

places +>> <<- place ->> 19 <<+ and 44 +>> shall 
voters residing in state representative district 144; 

places +>> <<- place =->> 20 <<+ , 45, and 
residing in state representative district 

places +>> <<- place ->> 21 <<+ , 46, and 
residing in state representative district 

places +>> <<- place ->> 22 <<+ , 47, and 
residing in state representative district 

places +>> <<- place ->> 23 <<+ , 48, and 
residing in state representative district 

places +>> <<- place ->> 24 <<+ and 49 
representative district 

places +>> <<- place ->> 25 <<+ and 50 
representative district 

1997, 

56 +>> 

145; 

57 +>> 

146; 

58 +>> 

147; 

59 +>> 

148; 

+>> shall 

149; and 

+>> shall 

150. 

PAGE 

be 

shall 

shall 

shall 

shall 

be 

shall 

shall 

shall 

shall 

be 

be 

Sections 24.524 (b) and (c), 

9 

state representative districts as provided by Subsection (c). For purposes of 
this section, a state representative district is composed of the area 1n the 
district on January 1, 1993. 

(c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 

(1) places 1 and 17 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 99; 

for Public Affairs Copyright (c) 1993 Info. 

 



    » 

1993 TX S.B. 379 (SN) PAGE 10 

(2) places 2 <<+ , +>> <<=- and ->> 18 <<+ , and 33 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 100; 

(3) places 3 and 19 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 101; 

(4) places 4 and 20 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 102; 

(5) places 5 and 21 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 103; 

(6) places 6 <<+ , +>> <<= and =->> 22 <<+ , and 34 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 104; 

(7) places 7 and 23 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 105; 

(8) places 8 and 24 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 106; 

(9) places 9 and 25 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 107; 

(10) places 10 and 26 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 108; 

(11) places 11 <<+ , +>> <<= and =->> 27 <<+ , and 35 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 109; 

(12) places 12 <<+ , +>> <<= and ->> 28 <<+ , and 36 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 110; 

(13) places 13 <<+ , +>> <<= and ->> 29 <<+ , and 37 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 111; 

(14) places 14 and 30 shall be elected by voters residing in 
state representative district 112; 

(15) <<+ places +>> <<- place =->> 15 <<+ and 31 +>> shall be 

elected by voters residing in state representative district 113; and 

(16) <<+ places +>> <<- place ->> 16 <<+ and 32 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 114. 

SECTION 6. Effective January 1, 1997, Sections 24.525(b) and (c), 
Government Code, as added by Section 3 of this Act, are amended to read as 
follows: 

(b) The district has <<+ 25 +>> <<- 14 ->> judges who are elected from 
Copyright (c) 1993 Info. for Public Affairs 

 



     
® 

* 

1993 TX S.B. 379 (SN) PAGE 11 

» 

state representative districts as provided by Subsection (c). For purposes of 
this section, a state representative district is composed of the area in the 
district on January 1, 1993. 

(c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 

(1) places 1 <<+ , +>> <<= and ->> 11 <<+ , and 21 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 89; 

(2) places 2 <<+ , +>> <<= and =->> 12 <<+ , and 22 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 90; 

(3) places 3 and 13 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 91; 

(4) places 4 and 14 shall be elected by voters residing in state 
representative district 92; 

(5) <<+ places +>> <<- place =->> 5 <<+ , 15, and 23 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 93; 

(6) <<+ places +>> <<- place ->> 6 <<+ and 16 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 94; 

(7) <<+ places +>> <<=- place =->> 7 <<+ , 17, and 24 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 95; 

(8) <<+ places +>> <<=- place ->> 8 <<+ , 18, and 25 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 96; 

(9) <<+ places +>> <<- place =->> 9 <<+ and 19 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 97; and 

(10) <<+ places +>> <<=- place =->> 10 <<+ and 20 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 98. 

SECTION 7. Effective January 1, 1997, Sections 24.526(b) and (c), 
Government Code, as added by Section 3 of this Act, are amended to read as 

follows: 

(b) The district has <<+ 19 +>> <<- 13 =->> judges who are elected from 
state representative districts as provided by Subsection (c). For purposes of 
this section, a state representative district is composed of the area in the 
district on January 1, 1993. 

(c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 

(1) places 1 and 12 shall be elected by voters residing in state 

representative district 115; 

Copyright (c) 1993 Info. for Public Affairs 

 



1993 TX S.B. 379 (SN) PAGE 12 

» » 

(2) places 2 and 13 shall be elected by voters residing in state 

representative district 116; 

(3) <<+ places +>> <<- place =->> 3 <<+ and 14 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 117; 

(4) <<+ places +>> <<- place =->> 4 <<+ and 15 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 118; 

(5) <<+ places +>> <<=- place =->> 5 <<+ and 16 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 119; 

(6) <<+ places +>> <<- place =->> 6 <<+ and 17 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 120; 

(7) place 7 shall be elected by voters residing in state 

representative district 121; 

(8) place 8 shall be elected by voters residing in state 

representative district 122; 

(9) place 9 shall be elected by voters residing in state 

representative district 123; 

(10) <<+ places +>> <<=- place =->> 10 <<+ and 18 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 124; and 

(11) <<+ places +>> <<=- place ->> 11 <<+ and 19 +>> shall be 
elected by voters residing in state representative district 125. 

SECTION 8. Effective January 1, 1997, Sections 24.527(b) and (cc), 

Government Code, as added by Section 3 of this Act, are amended to read as 

follows: 

(b) The district has <<+ eight +>> <<- six ->> judges who are elected 
from state representative districts and parts of state representative 
districts as provided by Subsection (c). For purposes of this section, a 

state representative district is composed of the area in the district on 
January 1, 1993. 

(c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 

(1) places 1 <<+ , +>> <<= and ->> 3 <<+ , and 7 +>> shall 

elected by voters residing in state representative district 22; and 

(2) places 2, 4, 5, <<- and ->> 6 <<+ , and 8 +>> shall be 

elected by voters residing in state representative district 21 and the voters 

residing in that part of state representative district 19 in Jefferson 

County. 

Copyright (c) 1993 Info. for Public Affairs  



     
®» 

® 

1993 TX S.B. 379 (SN) PAGE 13 

» 

SECTION 9. Effective January 1, 1997, Sections 24.528(b) and (c), 
Government Code, as added by Section 3 of this Act, are amended to read as 
follows: 

(b) The district has <<+ six +>> <<- three =->> judges who are elected 
from commissioners court precincts as provided by Subsection (c). For 
purposes of this section, a commissioners court precinct is composed of the 
area in the precinct on January 1, 1993. 

(c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 

(1) place 1 shall be elected by voters residing in Commissioners 
Court Precinct No. 1 of Lubbock County: 

(2) <<+ places +>> <<- place =->> 2 <<+ and 4 +>> shall be elected 
by voters residing in Commissioners Court Precinct No. 2 of Lubbock County: 
<<- and ->> 

(3) <<+ places +>> <<- place =->> 3 <<+ and 5 +>> shall be elected 

by voters residing in Commissioners Court Precinct No. 3 of Lubbock County 
<<+ 7 and +>> 

<<+ (4) place 6 shall be elected by voters residing in 
Commissioners Court Precinct No. 4 of Lubbock County +>> . 

SECTION 10. Effective January 1, 1997, Sections 24.529(b) and (c), 
Government Code, as added by Section 3 of this Act, are amended to read as 

follows: 

(b) The district has <<+ four +>> <<- two ->> judges who are elected 
from commissioners court precincts as provided by Subsection (c). For 
purposes of this section, a commissioners court precinct is composed of the 

area in the precinct on January 1, 1993. 

(c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 

(1) place 1 shall be elected by voters residing in Commissioners 
Court Precinct No. 1 of Ector County; <<- and ->> 

(2) place 2 shall be elected by voters residing in Commissioners 
Court Precinct No. 2 of Ector County <<+ ; +>> 

<<+ (3) place 3 shall be elected by voters residing in 
Commissioners Court Precinct No. 3 of Ector County; and +>> 

<<+ (4) place 4 shall be elected by voters residing in 
Commissioners Court Precinct No. 4 of Ector County +>> . 

SECTION 11. Effective January 1, 1997, Sections 24.530(b) and (c), 
Government Code, as added by Section 3 of this Act, are amended to read as 

Copyright (c) 1993 Info. for Public Affairs 

 



    » " 

1993 TX S.B. 

follows: 

379 (SN) PAGE 14 

(b) The district has <<+ three +>> <<- two =->> judges who are elected 
from commissioners court precincts as provided by Subsection (c). For 
purposes of this section, a commissioners court precinct is composed of the 
area in the precinct on January 1, 1993. 

(c) One judge shall be elected for each of the following places: 

Court Precinct No. 

by voters residing in Commissioners Court Precincts Nos. 

(1) place 1 shall be elected by voters residing in Commissioners 
3 of Midland County; and 

(2) <<+ places +>> <<- place =->> 2 <<+ and 3 +>> shall be elected 

Midland County. 

SECTION 12. 

the Government Code are 

24.365, 
24.423, 
24.458, 
24.623; 

24.371, 
24.459, 
24.612, 

24.630, 

24.404, 

(1) 
24.368, 
24.424, 
24.472, 

(2) 
24.372, 
24.460, 
24.613, 

(3) 
24.631, 

(4) 
24.405, 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

24.157, 
24.387, 
24.425, 
24.616, 

24.146, 
34.373, 
24.468, 
24.638, 

24.352, 
24.632, 

24.147, 
24,462, 

24.160, 

24.239, 

24.421 and 24.504; 

(a) Effective January 1, 
repealed: 

24.215, 
24.388, 
24.434, 
24.617, 

24.170, 
24.382, 
24.469, 
24.901, 

24.408, 
24.633, 

24.245, 
24.465, 

24.359, 

24.414, 

24.256, 
24.406, 
24.439, 
24.618, 

24.203, 
24.383, 
24.475, 

24.273, 
24.407, 
24.440, 
24.619, 

24.218, 
24.431, 
24.508, 

and 24.905; 

24.410, 
24.910, 

24.249, 

24.466, 

24.429, 

24.41%, 
24.912, 

24.274, 

1995, 

1, 2, and 4 of 

the following sections of 

24.362, 

24.409, 

24.446, 

24.620, 

24.236, 
24.432, 
24.609, 

24.474, 

24.363, 
24.411, 
24.447, 
24.621, 

24.257, 
24.433, 
24.610, 

24.516, 
and 24.913; 

24.366, 
and 24.467; 

24.456, 

and 24.509; 

and 

24.415 and 24.626. 

24.625, 

24.402, 

24.364, 
24.422, 
24.457, 
24.622, and 

24.370, 
24.442, 
24.611, 

24.517, 

24.403, 

and 24.920; 

(b) A judicial district created by a section of the Government Code 
that is repealed by Subsection (a) of this section is abolished January 1, 
1995. 

SECTION 13. (a) Effective January 1, 
the Government Code are repealed: 

Copyright (c) 1993 Info. 

1997, the following sections of 

for Public Affairs 

 



     

’ 

» 

1993 TX S.B. 379 (SN) PAGE 15 

« 

(1) 24.112, 24.163, 24.182, 24.227, 24.229, 24.231, 24.235, 
24.250, 24.251, 24.261, 24.262, 24.267, 24.269, 24.270, 24.271, 24.272, 
24.369, 24.394, 24.479, 24.480, 24.483, 24.484, 24.485, and 24.497; 

(2) 24.115, 24.197, 24.259, 24.374, 24.902, 24.903, and 24.9504; 

(3) 24.118, 24.150, 24.169, 24.198, 24.252, 24.392, 24.488, 
24.494, 24.498, 24.639, and 24.911; 

(4) 24.139, 24.159, 24.175, 24.233, 24.263, and 24.268; 

(5) 24.162 and 24.238; 

(6) 24.201 and 24.242; 

(7) 24.172 and 24.258; and 

(8) 24.243. 

(b) A judicial district created by a section of the Government Code 
that is repealed by Subsection (a) of this section is abolished January 1, 
1997. 

SECTION 14. (a) The judicial offices created by Section 3 of this Act 
exist for purposes of the primary and general elections for state and county 
officers in 1994. 

(b) Not later than December 15, 1994, the judge of a district court 
that is abolished by Section 12 of this Act shall transfer all cases pending 
in the court to another district court in the county. The court to which the 
cases are transferred may not be a court that is abolished by Section 12 of 
this Act. 

(c) The judicial offices created by Sections 4-11 of this Act exist for 
purposes of the primary and general elections for state and county officers 
in 1996. 

(d) Not later than December 15, 1996, the judge of a district court 
that is abolished by Section 13 of this Act shall transfer all cases pending 
in the court to the district court in the county that is created by Section 3 
of this Act. 

(e) When a case is transferred from one court to another as provided by 

Subsection (b) or (d) of this section, all processes, writs, bonds, 
recognizances, or other obligations issued from the transferring court are 
returnable to the court to which the case is transferred as if originally 
issued by that court. The obligees in all bonds and recognizances taken in 
and for a court from which a case is transferred, and all witnesses summoned 
to appear in a court from which a case is transferred, are required to appear 

Copyright (c) 1993 Info. for Public Affairs 

 



     
» 

1993 TX S.B. 379 (SN) PAGE 16 

rv 

before the court to which a case is transferred as if originally required to 
appear before the court to which the transfer is made. 

SECTION 15. (a) Sections 3-11, 12(a), and 13(a) of this Act take effect 
as provided by those sections. 

(b) Sections 1, 2, 12(b), 13(b), and 14 of this Act take effect 
September 1, 1993. 

SECTION 16. The importance of this legislation and the crowded 
condition of the calendars in both houses create an emergency and an 
imperative public necessity that the constitutional rule requiring bills to 
be read on three several days in each house be suspended, and this rule is 
hereby suspended. 
1993 TX S.B. 379 (SN) 

END OF DOCUMENT 

Copyright (c) 1993 Info. for Public Affairs 

 



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EXHIBIT 
3 

 
 

 



    

State of Texas 

DAN MORALES 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: FION DUSEK @ 512-483-2082 

MONDAY, MARCH 1, 1883 PATRICIA GUILLERNO @ 512-483-2108 

MORALES PROPOSES REFORM CIF STA'E DISTRICT JUDGE 

SELECTION METHOD, CANIPAIGN FINANCING 

Texas Attorney General Dan Morales an Mon lay proposed a comprehensive 

reform of the method of selecting State District Judes that would ensure fair and 

equal representation for all citizens of Texas. 

The reform package includes the election cf State District Judges from 

subdistricts by place within counties of 100,000 population or rnore, and reform of 

campaign financing for those electiors. 

Moraies submitted his proposals io Gov. Ann Richards, Lt Gov. Bob Bullock, 

Speaker of the House Pete Laney @and members of tha Legislature. 

The Attorney General said his proposals will incrzase minority representation on 

the benches of State District Courts and eliminate the domination ky special interests in 

the election of those judges. X 

"Accordingly, | recommend that the Legislature adopt a system where District 

Judges are selected from subdistricts by place, in every Texa: county with a population 

of more than 100,000." Morales said. "It is properly the prerogative of the Legislature 

and the representatives from each atfected courty to deter nine whether the process of 

electing their judges should utilize the distncts of State Representatives, County 

Commissioners, Justices of the Peace or other districts. 

Morales also proposed eight changes to campa gn finance laws affecting State 

District Judges. The changes includ2 limiting clollar co tributions from individuals and 

political action committees to $1,000 each; limiting spencling on state district judicial 

races to $50,002 for the primary election and $50,000 fur the Jeneral election; requiring 

additional information about contributors, such as the contributors employer and 

occupation; and, requiring candidates to file all disclosure: statements with their local 

court clerks, so as to allow local and state access to the information. 

Other elements of Morales’ campaign finanze reform include prohibiting 

unopposed district judicial candidates from accepting campaign contributions; 

increasing enforcement of campaign finance laws; and requiring zdditional information 

from candidates regarding the sources of their income. velue of assets, their financial 

debts and from whom they have received gifts. 

“MOIS 

512/463-2100 P.O. BOX 12548 AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-2548 

BINION RETIN PAR AS EQUAL FMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER 

iT RE S12 dF? 2963 PAGE. NA7 MAR 

 



  MAR 

MORALES 2-22 

“We must eliminate once and for all the perceptior that justice is for sale in 

Texas," Morales said. "The taint of political faveritism aid the influence of big money 

are doing immeasurable harm to the public's faith and confidence in our judicial system. 

My package of proposals will give “exas voters a judiciary free of undue political 

influence and free of obligations to special interests. The: Legislature may want to 

consider expanding these reforms to include all judicial elections.” 

In January, a three-judge panel of the Sth U.S. Ciri:uit Court of Appeals ruled that 

the at-large system of electing State District Judges in eight urban Texas counties was 

unfair to minoritias and a violation of the U.S. Voting Flights Act The U.S. Supreme 

Court also has said the Voting Rights Act applies to judicial elections. 

On February 5, Morales announced that he wolld present 2 judicial selection 

reform package to the Legislature. He assigned his staff ‘0 research the issue. 

The Attomey General's staff visited with dozens of experts on judicial selection 

from across the state and reviewed thousands oF documen's 2xamining options which 

might yield a state judiciary more reflective of tie diversity found in Texas. Staff also 

visited with the Attorneys General of Georgia, Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana and 

llinois, states which have successfully resolved similar lit gation. 

"Today we are living with a judicial seiection method! that may have served us 

well when it was established almost 120. years ago, but now fails us in many key 

respects.’ Morales said. "We must change the system. have recommended that 

district judges be elected rather than appointed. Even though some states use a merit 

selection or a se ection and retention system, | firmly believe: this is an option which the 

vast majority of Texans oppose. 

“Two recent statewide refererdums have: shown that the majority of Texans 

share my convicion that the judicial process should remain linked to the right to vote. | 

believe that elections are particularly in keeping with the Texas tradition of autonomy 

and self governance.” 

Morales said he will conduct public hearings on his proposal this week in the two 

counties that will be most affected — Callas and Harris. 

The public hearing in Harris County will be at 2 p.rn., ‘Vednesday, March 3, 1993 

at the South Texas College of Law, 1203 San Jacinto, Houston. 

The public hearing in Dallas Ccunty will be at 2 p.n., Friday, March 5, 1993 a the 

J. Erik Johnsson Central Library, 1515 Young at Ervay Sreet, Dallas. 

~ Wem taoe S12 4F3 2883 PAGE.0QQ4 

 



EXHIBIT 
4 

 
 

 



  

Judicial Selection Ref 

Press Announcement 

Duilas and Houston 

March 1, 1993 

JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORM. ANNOUNCEMENT 

On February 5th, I announced that I would presant a judicial selection reform 
proposal to the legislature within 60 days. Governor Rictarcs and Lt. Governor Bullock 
requested that I accelerate that effort and reduce the 60 day time frame to 30 days. 

This morring, after 25 days, I was pleasad to submit :ny recommendations to 
Governor Richards, Lt. Governor Bullock, Speaker Lanzy and other members of the 
Legislature. 

We believe Texans deserve a new system of electir.g cur state district judges, one 
which will provide dtizens a judiciary free of undue political influence, free of 
obligations to spedal interests, and most importantly, a jucidary that upholds the 
principle of fair and equal representation. 

During the past 25 days, my staff has diligently r:sezrched this issue. We have 
met with, and communicated among, hundreds of leaders across the spectrum of 
interests in our state, and beyond. We have met with. state officials and examined 
selection methods in Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, Illinois and 
Oklahoma - states most recently confronted with judidal selzction challenges similar to 
ours. 

We have reviewed thousands of documents on the subject of judicial selection, 
and spent countless hours examining options which might yield a state judiciary 
more reflective of the diversity found in Texas today. 

Clearly, the formidable task of governing; diversity >écomes more manageable 
when the government itself reflects that diversity. 

Accordingly, it is my recommendation that: the legislature take action to end the 
current challenges to our state’s judicial selection: process, and repiace our antiquated 

judicial selection process with a plan suitable for the 21¢t Cenmury. 

As you know, a 3-judge panel of the 5th U.S. Circ1it ‘Court ruled in January that 
the at-large system of electing state district judges in eight urban Texas counties was 

unfair to African American and Hispanic voters, and thus a violation of the Voting 

Rights Act. 

Already, a number of useful legislative proposals have been filed to address the 

Sth Circuit Court's ruling. 

 



  

Most seek only to impact the eight counties affected by the most recent court 

ruling. I believe we should go beyond those proposals. We must seek an inclusive and 

accountable judidiary for every dtizen in our state, not just those who happen to reside 

in eight Texas counties. 

Accordingly, I recommend that the legislature adopt a system whereby district 

judges are elected from subdistricts bry place in every Texas county with a population 

of more than 100,000. 

It is properly the prerogative of the legislature ani the representatives from each 

affected county to decide whether the process o: electir.g ther judges be based on the 

districts of state representatives, county comm:ssioners, justizes of the peace or other 

districts. 

It is my hope that such a prccess will not only end current challenges to our 

judicial selection: process, but also help put qualified minority judges on the bench in the 

more populous counties where they reside. 

Coupled with this selection reform initiative, I am recommending legislative 

adoption of our eight point judicial campaign finance 1efo:m package, which imposes 

strict limitations on individual campaign contributicns, strict limitations on PAC 

campaign contributions, maximum spending limits per election, additional disclosure 

requirements for judicial candidates ind contributors, aad ougher enforcement so that 

violators will face severe sanctions. 

The taint of political favoritism and tae influwncz of big money are doing 

immeasurable harm to the public's faith and confidence 'n our judicial system. We must 

eliminate once and for all the perception that justice is for sale in Texas. 

I am going to the Legislature tomorrow to prescnt my plan to a special Senate 

subcommittee and the House Judidary Committee. Tren, on Wednesday and Friday, 

my office will conduct public hearings on this proposal in the two counties that will be 

most affected - Dallas and Harris. 

Not everyone will agree with my proposal. It is always possible for well 

intentioned people to disagree. However, the one sure path {0 failure is to do nothing. 

We can ill afford to spend precious time and energy on Tit.dsm ard bickering because, 

in my view, it would be impossible <0 do worse than tie curent system. 

Today we are living with judicial selection metho is that may have served us well 

when they were established almost 120 years ago, but ncw fails us in many key respects. 

We must act to change this. 

 



  

Uo: Ua, Bo FV ‘@o0Le LU JULY ILA ALT “® WWiVld- UVLO 

  

Now let me address why I have recommended that district judges be elected, 

rather than appointed. 

Even though some states utilize a merit selection or a selection and retention 
system, I firmly believe this is an option the vast majorits of Texans oppose. 

Perhaps the biggest problem with this approach, as Chief Justice Phillips said last 
week in his State of the Judidary address, is the problem of "who picks the pickers." 

Texans dort want government by committee. The: don’t want justice dispensed 
by a chosen few. 

Two recent statewide referenduins have shown that the najority of Texans share 
my conviction that the judicial selection process should remain linked to the right to 
vote. 

Of even greater concern to us than selection is re:eniion voting. Our research 
showed that in the first 45 years of retention elecdons, only 3 judges nationwide were 
rejected at all levels. The rate that incumbent appointed judges were defeated in 
retention elections appears to be approxdmately 1.6 percent. 

And the key factor in those defeats was poor rampaigning skills, not poor - 
courtroom skills. 

I believe that elections are particularly in keepin; with the Texas tradition of 
autonomy and self governance. The system I have recominerded will make it easier for 
the average citizen to participate in a meaningful way. 

It is time to end the fiction that voting for dozens of judges on a single ballot is 
a meaningful selection. When each voter can hirse input irto the selection of two or 

three judges - judges whose performances they can much mare effectively evaluate - 
then judicial elections become a meaningful exer=se in a xxounmability, not a charade. 

Our research shows that this system will work fo: everyone involved: citizens, 
minority voters, rainority candidates and incumtent judges. 

. Let me give you one example. Until 1989, Arkansas not only never had an African 

American judge, it never had an African American canclidate for the bénch. After a 
lawsuit was filed under the Voting Rights Act. a plan was iinplemented similar to the 

one | am recommending. 

Today, ten of the 41 judges within the challenged Arlcansas drcuits are African 
American. 

 



IU: a3 ‘odie 400 aULW 
GULLY Sid 

~ 

In conclusion, let me say that this plan is, In my vi:w, the least interruptive of all 

approaches. It requires no modification of venue or jurisdiction. It does not 

change what judges do, nor does it end the people’s right to elect them. It simpiy 

changes the selection method. We anticipate no disruption of court functioning or 

effectiveness. 

    

Generally, our incumbent judges maintain the highest ethical standards and an 

unassailable commitment to equality before the law. 

I believe that concerns about wholesale turnover anong the judiciary are 

unwarranted. 

What will happen is what should happen. 

Qualified African American, Hispanic anc other nuincrity attorneys who wish to 

serve on the bench will have improved cpportunities to do so. 

In America, when we talk abcut equality. more than anything else, we mean 

equality in the voting booth and equality in the court rcom. 

I will do everything I carr to hzlp the legislature mest its obligations to ensure 

equal voting rights and equal justice. 

Thank you very much. 

 



EXHIBIT 
5 

 
 

 



  

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
MIDLAND ODESSA DIVISION 

  

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN 

CITIZENS (LULAC), COUNCIL #4434 

et al., Plaintiffs, 

HOUSTON LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION, 

et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors 

v. 

ATTORNEY GENERAL DAN MORALES, 

et al., State Defendants 

JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD and 

JUDGE F. HAROLD ENTZ, Defendant-Intervenors. 

  

MOTION FOR INTERIM RELIEF AND STAY 
PENDING APPEAL 

  

Plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenors in the above captioned case respectfully move this 

Court to order interim relief for the forthcoming 1994 district judge elections in all counties 

involved in this litigation,' and as grounds therefore state as follows: 

1. This case was filed by African American and Mexican American voters in 1988. 

This court decided the case in favor of plaintiffs on November 8, 1989, holding that the 

countywide method of electing district judges in the counties at issue violates Section 2 of 

the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, in that it denies minority voters an equal 

  

"The counties at issue are Bexar. Dallas, Ector, Harris, Jefferson, Lubbock, Midland, Tarrant, 

and Travis. 

 



  

opportunity to participate in district judge elections and elect their candidates of choice. 

2. On May 11, 1991, a panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's 

decision on the ground that the election of trial court judges is not covered by Section 2 

of the Voting Rights Act, as amended. The panel did not address the factual evidence 

adduced at trial that the current system discriminates against African American and 

Mexican American voters. The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc, held that judicial elections are 

not covered by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. That decision was reversed by the 

Supreme Court on June 21, 1991 and remanded to the Fifth Circuit panel "for further 

proceedings consistent with [its] opinion." Houston Lawyers’ Association v. Attorney General 

of Texas, 115 L.Ed. 2d 379, 388 (1991). 

3. On January 27, 1993, the Fifth Circuit panel upheld the district court’s opinion. 

The panel held that the current countywide method of electing district judges in all but one 

of the counties at issue,’ violates the Voting Rights Act and denies African American and 

Mexican American voters an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and 

elect their candidates of choice as district judges. The panel opinion comprehensively 

reviewed the district court’s findings on a county-by-county basis. 

4. On February 11, 1993, a majority of the Fifth Circuit ordered rehearing en banc, 

on its own motion, vacating the January 27, 1993 panel opinion. Oral argument has been 

set for the week of May 24, 1993. 

5S. On March 1, 1993, the Attorney General submitted a plan to the Texas 

Legislature and the Governor of Texas, which proposes the election of district judges from 

  

*The Fifth Circuit panel reversed the district court’s opinion with regard to Travis County. 

2 

 



  

sub-districts in counties with a population of more than 100,000 persons. See Exhibit A, 

attached. The Attorney General's plan proposes that the Legislature shall determine 

whether district judges shall be elected from Legislative districts, Commissioners’ Court 

districts or Justice of the Peace districts. In the statement accompanying his plan the 

Attorney General conciuded "it would be impossible to do worse than the current [district 

judge election] system." Id. 

6. Since the initial filing of this case, three general elections for district judge 

candidates have been held. The current at-large method of electing district judges was 

found to discriminate against African American and Hispanic voters four years ago. Thus, 

district judges were elected under an election scheme that violates the Voting Rights Act 

in 1990 and 1992. In both those elections, minority voters and candidates were unable to 

participate equally in the election of district judges in eight counties in Texas. 

7. The next general election for district judges is scheduled for November, 1994 with 

a primary to be held on March 10, 1994. The filing period for the 1994 election 

commences on December 3, 1993 and ends on January 2, 1994. See Tex. Elec. Code 

Section 172.023 (a)(b). 

8. Because argument of this case will not be heard until the end of May, 1993, and 

because this court can reasonably anticipate that at least one of the losing parties will seek 

review of this case by the United States Supreme Court following the Fifth Circuit's en 

banc decision, it is unlikely that this case will be resolved finally in time for the 

commencement of the filing period for the next election. See Letter of David C. Godbey, 

Attorney for Dallas County District Judge F. Harold Entz, attached as Exhibit B. Even if 

 



  

no party seeks Supreme Court review of the Fifth Circuit's en banc ruling, this case must 

still return to the district court for a full remedial hearing. Thus, minority voters face the 

prospect that yet another district judge election will be held in violation of the Voting 

Rights Act, despite favorable rulings in the District Court, U.S. Supreme Court and now 

the Fifth Circuit, which support the plaintiffs’ claims. 

9. Moreover, because even the Attorney General -- the principal defendant in the 

litigation -- has stated publicly on numerous occasions that the current method of electing 

district judges is unacceptable, the continued election of district judges using this system 

undermines the integrity of the judiciary and seriously threatens public confidence in the 

state judicial process. Yet another district judge election under the current system will 

constitute an untenable affront to the rights of minority voters in Texas. 

10. Time is of the essence. Although the candidate filing period does not 

commence until December 3, 1993, judicial candidates, particularly African American 

judicial candidates in unusually large election districts like Harris and Dallas Counties must 

decide early on whether they will seek judicial office. Non-incumbent candidates for 

judicial office must raise large sums of money in Harris County, for example, in order to 

mount a credible campaign.’ Campaign contributions, not the qualifications of the 

candidates, often determine the outcome of judicial elections in Texas. Hill, "Taking Texas 

Judges Out of Politics: An Argument for Merit Selection." 40 Baylor Law Review 339, 341 

(1989). Minority candidates who wish to mount a credible judicial campaign will need to 

  

’In recognition of this fact, Attorney General Morales has proposed a series of campaign 
finance reforms for district judge elections. See Exhibit B. 

4 

 



  

decide whether to challenge an incumbent judge well in advance of the filing period. 

11. Moreover, even this motion once ruled upon by this court may become the 

subject of time consuming appellate litigation. 

12. The harm to minority voters that will result from the implementation of yet 

another district judge election under the current election scheme compels this court to 

grant interim relief. See Dillard v. Crenshaw, 640 F.Supp. 1347, 1362 (M.D. Ala. 1986). 

13. Plaintiffs respectfully request that this court convene a hearing as soon as is 

practicable to select appropriate interim relief for the 1994 elections. In the alternative, 

plaintiffs request that this court adopt a sub-district plan consistent with the plan proposed 

by the Attorney General, or in accordance with the plan proposed by the plaintiff- 

intervenors as set out in Exhibit C. 

14. Should this court decline the plaintiffs’ request for the imposition of an interim 

election plan, plaintiffs’ respectfully request that this court enjoin implementation of the 

1994 elections pending the final disposition of this case. 

 



  

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff-intervenors respectfully request that this court grant 

this motion for interim relief. 

ROLANDO L. RIOS, Esq. 

115 E. Travis Street 

Suite 1024 

San Antonio, TX 78205 

(512) 222-2102 

WILLIAM L. GARRETT, Esq. 

8300 Douglas 
Suite 800 

Dallas, TX 75225 

(214) 369-1952 

EDWARD B. CLOUTMAN, Esq. 
3301 Elm Street 

Dallas, TX 75226-1637 

(214) 939-9222 

March z 1993 

Respectfully submitted, 

    
"ELAINE R. JONES, ‘Esq. J 
SHERRILYN A. IFILL, Esq. 

99 Hudson Street 

16th Floor 

New York, NY 10013 

(212) 219-1900 

GABRIELLE K. MCDONALD, Esq. 

7800 N. Mopac 
Suite 215 

Austin, TX 78750 

(512) 346-6801 

 



  

EXHIBIT A 

 



  

Post-It™ brand fax transmial 

  

7671 |# of pages » 

  

  

EE in nai fan Cogog Neds 
  

Cor 

  

~ ORG oF — 
  

Dept. Framer 413-33 5       ia ane SMa RT dpi. 
    

  

Comprehensive ji    Judicial Selection {i 
Process: Reform 

     
THLE Al NG ini 
k 

  

1 
Q 
1) 
S 
T 
Ir 
QO 
DAN M PNNBES 

S12 4E3 2063 PAGE. NO



. 

THe a Judicial 
Selection 

Reform 

a In counties with a population of moire than 

100,000, this proposal calls for the election of 

state district judges from subdisiricts by place. 

‘swum: Campaign Finance 
Reform for 

District Judges 

0 Individual contributions limited to a maximum of 

$1,000. 
. 

Political action committee contributions limited 

to a maximum of $1,000. 

Additional contributor disclos:ui-e information. 

Judges required to file additional financial 

reporis. 

Prohibition on contributions to unopposed 

judicial candidates. 

Maximum spending limits of £50,000 per 

election. 

Enhanced enforcement of campaign finance 

regulations. 

Judge's supplemental inanc.al clisciosure 

required. 

S12 43 2383  FPAGE.O0Q2  



    

State of Texas 

DAN MORALES 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 

512/463-2100 P.O. BOX 12548 AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-2548 

BRINTON REUYT EY PAPER AN FAL PMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER 

MAR 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: FIONDUSEK @ 512-483-2082 

MONDAY, MARCH 1, 1983 PATRICIA GUILLERMO @ 512-483-2106 

MORALES PROPOSES REFORM CIF STA'E DISTRICT JUDGE 

SELECTION METHOD, CANIPAIGN FINANCING 

Texas Attorney General Dan Morales on Mon ay proposed a comprehensive 

reform of the method of selecting State District Judes that would ensure fair and 

equal representation for all citizens of Texas. 

The reform package includes the election c¢f tate District Judges from 

subdistricts by place within counties of 100,000 poptilation or rnore, and reform of 

campaign financing for those electiors. 

Morales submitted his proposals 10 Gov. Ann Richzrds, Lt Gov. Bob Bullock, 

Speaker of the House Pete Laney and members of the Legislature. 

The Attomey General said his proposals will incrzase minority representation on 

the benches of State District Courts and eliminate the domination ty special interests in 

the election of those judges. 

"Accordingly, | recommend that the Legislature adopt a system where District 

Judges are selected from subdistricts by place, in every Texas county with a population 

of more than 100,000." Morales said. "It is properly the prerogative of the Legislature 

and the representatives from each atfected courty to deter nine whether the process of 

electing their judges should utilize the districts of State Representatives, County 

Commissioners, Justices of the Peace or other districts. 

Morales also proposed eight changes to campa gn finance laws affecting State 

Distnct Judges. The changes includz limiting collar co tributions from individuals and 

political action committees to $1,000 each; limiting spencling on state district judicial 

races to $50,002 for the primary election and $50,000 for the general election; requiring 

additional information about contributors, such as the contributors employer and 

occupation; and, requiring candidates to file all disclosure: statements with their local 

court clerks, so as to allow local and state access to the information. 

Other elements of Morales’ campaign finance reform include prohibiting 

unopposed district judicial candidates from accepting campaign contributions; 

increasing enforcement of campaign finance laws; and requiring zdditional information 

from candidates regarding the sources of their income. velue of assets, their financial 

debts and from whom they have received gifts. 

“MOro= 

- RH es SBE WR £55 © a AE" oagT SaGE OAS 

 



  

MORALES 2-2-2 

“We must eliminate once and for all the perception that justice is for sale in 

Texas. Morales said. "The taint of political faveritism and the influence of big money 

are doing immeasurable harm to the public's faith and confidence in our judicial system. 

My package of proposals will give “'exas voters a judiciary free of undue political 

influence and free of obligations to special interests. The Legislature may want to 

consider expanding these reforms to include all judicial elections.” 

In January, a three-judge panel of the 5th LI.S. Cir:uit Court of Appeals ruled that 

the at-large system of electing State District Judges in eight urban “Texas counties was 

unfair to minoritias and a violation of the U.S. Voting Flights Act The U.S. Supreme 

Court also has said the Voting Rights Act applies to judicial elections. 

On February 5, Morales announced that he wold present a judicial selection 

reform package to the Legislature. He assigned his staff ‘0 research the issue. 

The Attomey General's staff visited with dozens of experts on judicial selection 

from across the state and reviewed thousands ot documen's :2xamining options which 

might yield a state judiciary more reflective of tie diver sity found in Texas. Staff also 

visited with the Attomeys General of Georgia, Arkans:s, Mississippi, Louisiana and 

Illinois, states which have successfully resolved similar lit gation. 

"Today we are living with a judicial selection method! that may have served us 

well when it was established almost 120 years ago, hut now fails us in many key 

respects. Morales said. "We must change the systein. have recommended that 

district judges be: elected rather than appointed. I=ven though some states use a merit 

selection or a se ection and retention system, | firmly bel eve: this is an option which the 

vast majority of Texans oppose. 

“Two recent statewide refererdums have: shown that the majority of Texans 

share my convicion that the judicial process should remain linked to the right to vote. | 

believe that elections are particularly in keeping with the Texas tradition of autonomy 

and self governance.” 

Morales said he will conduct public hearings on his proposal this week in the two 

counties that will be most affected — Callas and Harris. 

The public hearing in Harris County will be at 2 p.rn., ‘Wednesday, March 3, 1993 

at the South Texas College of Law, 1203 San Jacinto, Houston. 

The public hearing in Dallas Ccunty will be at 2 p.n,, Friday, March 5, 1993 a the 

J. Erik Johnsson Central Library, 1515 Young at Eirvay S reet, Dallas. 

far 2 LEE Ls as S12 4F? 2082 PAGE. 0NN4 

 



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HARRIS COUNTY 
STATE DISTRICT JUDGES* 

  

  

  

  

  

  

  
  

  

      
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03,02/83 10:23 ‘8512 183 20683 STX ATTY Genera     
    

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DALLAS COUNTY 
STATE DISTRICT JUDGES* 

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DALLAS 

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AFRICAN- 
AMERICAN 

HISPANIC 

TOTAL 

AFRICAN- 
AMERICAN 

HISPANIC 

TCTAL 

  

  

  

  

      
  

  

  

  

  

      
  

  

STATE DISTRICT 
POPULATION JUDGES 

19.9% 10.8% 

17% 2.7% 

36.9% 135% 

STATE DISTRICT 
POFULATION JUDGES 

192% 3.3% 

22.9% 5% 

42.1% 8.5% 

 



TEXAS COUNTIES BY 1990 POPULATION 

PCT PCT PCT 
NUMBER OF JUDGESHIPS SHARED TOTAL 

COUNTY 

HARRIS 
DALLAS 
BEXAR 

DISTRICT JUDGES WITH OTHER COUNTIES COMMENTS POPULATION 

2,818,199 
1,852,810 
1,185,394 

POPULATION 
BLACK 

POPULATION 

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MINORITY 
POPULATION 

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TARRANT 1,170,103 

EL PASO footnote 591,610 

TRAVIS £76,407 

HIDALGO 383,545 
NUECES footnote 291.145 
DENTON 273,52% 

COLLIN 264,036 
CAMERON footnote 260,120 
JEFFERSON 239,397 
FORT BEND 225,421 

LUBBOCK footnote 222,636 
GALVESTON 217,399 

BRAZORIA footnote 191,707 

BELL footnote 191,088 

MCLENNAN 
MONTGOMERY footnote 
SMITH footnote 
WILLIAMSON 
WEBB footnote 
WICHITA 
BRAZOS 
TAYLOR footnote 

ECTOR _ 
MIDLAND 
GREGG 

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114th Oistrict Court also serves Wood County. 
e 49th District Court also serves Zapata County. 

42nd District Court also serves Callahan and Coleman counties. 

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SOURCE: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS AND OAN MORALES, ATTORNEY GEHERAL  



  

- =~ = SY - vw - wea eaé : wea od ow. wn 

CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFCRNM 

For State District Court Judicial Races 

Attorney General Recommendations: 

L INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS LIMITED TO A MAXIMUM OF 

$1,000 
Individual. contributions will be limited to $500 in the ->rimary election 

and $500 in the general election, for a total of $1,00), ir. a State District 

Court race. Currently, there are no limitations on contritutiors in 

state judicial races. 

POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE CONTRIBUTIONS LIMITED TO 

A MAXIMUM OF $1,000 
PAC contributions will be limited to $500 in the pr. mary election 

and $500 in the general election. for a total of $1,00), iri a State District 

Court race. Currently, there are no limitations on I'AC contributions in 

state judicial races. 

ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTOR DISCLOSURE "NFORMATION 

For each contribution of $50 or more, a car«lidate rst obtain from the 

contributcr and disclose, in addition to all informa jon. required under 

current law, the full name and address of the contributor's employer, if 

any, together with the contributor's occupaiion ari job title. If this 

information is not provided by the contributor, the contribution must be 
returned. 

bh 

JUDGES REQUIRED TO FILE ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTS 

State District Court Judges and, or judidal candid: tes will be required to file 

a campaign finance report and Anandial disclosure report with the Texas 

Ethics Commission , the local filing authority, and with the clerk of the court 

on which the judge serves or a candidate seeks ele:tion. Currantly, 

campaign disclosure requirements are limited pririanly to filing with local 

county clerks. 

PROHIBITION ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNCPPOSED JUDICIAL 

CANDIDATES 
State District Judicial candidates would be orohibi ed from soliciting or 

accepting a political contribution after the filing deadline for an election 

and until six months after that election if tat judicial ardidate is unopposed 

for election, unless on the filing deadline the candi iat: has unpaid 

campaign debts that may be repaid by political contributions. Currently, 

there are no such restrictions or unoppose«<i candiclates. 

 



  

      ‘Q'olsd 400 =ULW SLX A..F general WiUlU- UL     

6. MAXIMUM SPENDNG LIMITS OF $50,000 PER ELECTION 
This will establish statutorily impesed or candidat 2 imposed spending limits 
of $50,000 in the primary election and $50,000 in tte g2neral election 
(dependent upon constitutional. accommodation). 

7. ENHANCED ENFORCEMENT OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
REGULATIONS 
Campaign finance regulations rust inclucie string :nt sanctions and adequate 
provisions for enforcement. Recent proposals by tae eras Ethics 
Commission regarding fines for late filings of repcrts and amendments are 
examples of much needed reforms. 

8. JUDGE'S SUPPLEMENTAL FINANCIAL DISCI OSURE REQUIRED 
Require judges and judicial candidates (arid, by thm, far their spouse and 
any dependents) to disclose the following informa ior. on a supplement to 
the financial disclosure report already required by sta ute: 

{a) for the past seven years, the name of any aw firm in which 
the person filing the report (“filer”) his beer. a member, and 
the name of any lawyer(s) with whick the filer has been 
associated as part of a partnership, professional corporation 
or other business entity formed for th: purpose of practicing 
law; and the date and duration of suc meshiv or 
association; 

b) the nature of the business of any sole Jroprictorship, 
partnership, privately held corporation, juint venture, or any 
other business entity (exclucling a pualicly held 
corporation) in which the filzr has an ownership or beneficial 
interest; the name, occupaticn, and ac dress of all other 
persons with an interest in the same tustaess entity; and, if 
the ownership or beneficial interest is solt!, te amount of 
gain or loss from the sale; 

c) the source, spectjically identified by the name, occupation, 
and address of the payor, ami amount of income ir: excess of 
$500 per source ‘rom interest, divider ds, rovalties, and rent; 

 



  

(d) 

(e) 

(f 

(2) 

the amount owed under any personal 1ote or lease 
agreement that existed at any time du “ing the year; 
disclosing the name, occupation, and ddr ess of any 
guarantor, creditor or lessor; 

the name of any trust and th: trustee ‘or cmy trust from 
which the filer rezetved incom: as ben. ficizry of the trust; 

the value of all assets and liazilities of any corporation, 
partnership, or other business entity i1 wiic’t 50% or more 
of the outstanding ownership was hel, acquired, cr sold by 
the filer; disclosing the name. occupat.on, and address of the 
person to whom un asset cr Lubility of such corporation, 
partnership, or business entiiy was sod; and 

the name of any person, association, 0" corporation 
providing gifts, nieals, transportation, or 10d Jing expenses 
on behalf of or to benefit the fiier (excest fur those conferred 
on account of kinship or a personal, professional, or business 
relationship independent of the filer’s Jfficial status); the 
amount of such expenses; ami the dates and locations of 
such expenses. 

? 

 



    

Judicial Selection Reform 

Press Announcement 

Dallas and Houston 

March 1, 1993 

JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORM. ANNOUNCEMENT 

On February 5th, I announced that I would presant a judicial selection reform 

proposal to the legislature within 60 days. Goverrior Rict arcs and Lt. Governor Bullock 

requested that I accelerate that effort and reduce the 60 day time frame to 30 days. 

This morring, after 25 days, I was pleaszd to submit :ny recommendations to 

Governor Richards, Lt. Governor Bullock, Speaker Lan2y and other members of the 

Legislature. 

We believe Texans deserve a new system of electir.g cur state district judges, one 

which will provide dtizens a judiciary free of undue political influence, free of 

obligations to special interests, and most importantly, a jucidiary that upholds the 

principle of fair and equal representation. 

During the past 25 days, my staff has diligently searched this issue. We have 

met with, and communicated among, hundreds of leiders across the spectrum of 

interests in our state, and beyond. ‘We have met witl. state officials and examined 

selection methods in Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas, Mist issipgi, Louisiana, Illinois and 

Oklahoma - states most recently confronted with judidal selzction challenges similar to 

ours. 

We have reviewed thousands of documents on tke subject of judicial selection, 

and spent countless hours examining options which might yield a state judiciary 

more reflective of the diversity found in Texas today. 

Clearly, the formidable task of governing; diversity hécomes more manageable 

when the government itself reflects that diversity. 

Accordingly, it is my recommendation that the legislature take action to end the 

current challenges to our state's judicial selection process, and repiace our antiquated 

judicial selection process with a plan suitable for the 21st Century. 

As you know, a 3-judge panel of the 5th U.S. Circiit ‘Court ruled in January that 

the at-large system of electing state district judges in eight wban Texas counties was 

unfair to Africari American and Hispanic voters, and thus a violation of the Voting 

Rights Act. 

Already, a number of useful legislative proposals have been filed to address the 

5th Circuit Court's ruling. 

 



Most seek only to impact the eight counties affected by the most recent court 

ruling. I believe we should go beyond those proposals. We must seek an inclusive and 

accountable judiciary for every citizen in our state, not just those who happen to reside 

in eight Texas counties. 

Accordingly, I recommend that the legislature adopt a system whereby district 

judges are elected from subdistricts by place in every Texas county with a population 

of more than 100,000. 

It is properly the prerogative of the legislature and the representatives from each 

affected county to decide whether the process o: electir:g their judges be based on the 

districts of state representatives, county comm:ssioners, justices of the peace or other 

districts. 

It is my hope that such a prccess will not only end current challenges to our 

judicial selection: process, but also help put qualified minority judges on the bench in the 

more populous counties where they reside. 

Coupled with this selection reform initiative, 1 am recommending legislative 

adoption of our eight point judidal campaign finance reform package, which imposes 

strict limitations on individual campaign contributicns, strict limitations on PAC 

campaign contributions, maximum spending limits pe: election, additional disclosure 

requirements for judidal candidates and contributors, aad ougher enforcement so that 

violators will face severe sanctions. 

The taint of political favoritism and the influ:nc2 of big money are doing 

immeasurable harm to the public's faith and confidence 'n our judicial system. We must 

eliminate once and for all the perception that justice is for sale in Texas. 

] am going to the Legislature tomorrow to prescnt my plan to a special Senate 

subcommittee and the House Judiciary Committee. Ten, on Wednesday and Friday, 

my office will conduct public hearings on this proposal in the two counties that will be 

most affected - Dallas and Harris. | 

Not everyone will agree with my proposal. It is always possible for well 

intentioned people to disagree. However, the one sure path to failure is to do nothing. 

We can ill afford to spend precious time and energy on Jit:cism and bickering because, 

in my view, it would be impossible -o do worse than tie current system. 

Today we are living with judicial selection metho is that may have served us well 

when they were established almost 120 years ago, but now fails us in many key respects. 

We must act to change this.  



ELE ROY ‘Q0da 1LY =ULY wi UL4- ULD     
Now let me address why I have recommended that district judges be elected, 

rather than appointed. 

Even though some states utilize a merit selection or a selection and retention 

system, I firmly believe this is an option the vast majorit’ of Texans oppose. 

Perhaps the biggest problem with this approach, as Chief Justice Phillips said last 

week in his State of the Judiciary address, is the problem of "who picks the pickers.” 

Texans dort want government by committee. The 7 don’t want justice dispensed 

by a chosen few. 

Two recent statewide referenduins have shown that the rnajority of Texans share 

my conviction that the judicial selection process should remain linked to the right to 

vote. 

Of even greater concern to us than selection is re:eniion voting. Our research 

showed that in the first 45 years of retention elections, only 3 judges nationwide were 

rejected at all levels. The rate that incumbent appointed judges were defeated in 

retention elections appears to be approximately 1.6 percent. 

And the key factor in those defeats was poor campaigning skills, not poor . 

courtroom skills. 

I believe that elections are particularly in keepin;; with the Texas tradition of 

autonomy and self governance. The system I have recominerded will make it easier for 

the average citizen to participate in a meaningful way. 

It is time to end the fiction that voting for dozens of judges on a single ballot is 

a meaningful selection. When each voter can hare input irto the selection of two or 

three judges - judges whose performances they can much mare effectively evaluate - 

then judicial elections become a meaningful exer=se in a :counability, not a charade. 

Our research shows that this system will work fo: everyone involved: citizens, 

minority voters, rainority candidates and incumtent judges. 

Let me give you one example. Until 1989, Arkansas not only never had an African 

American judge, it never had an African American canclidite for the bénch. After a 

lawsuit was filed under the Voting Rights Act. a plan wes iinplemented similar to the 

one | am recommending. 

Today, ten of the 41 judges within the challenged Arlcansas drcuits are African 

American. 

 



FEVERS." ‘Solis 400 aULY SLY A... General WWVio-VUlY 

In conclusion, let me say that this plan is, in my vi:w, the least interruptive of all 

approaches. It requires no modification of venue or jurisdiction. It does not 

change what judges do, nor does it end the people's right to elect them. It simpiy 

changes the selection method. We anticipate no disruption of court functioning or 

effectiveness. 

  

Generally, our incumbent judges maintain the highest ethical standards and an 

unassailable commitment to equality before the law. 

I believe that concerns about wholesale turnover among the judiciary are 

unwarranted. 

What will happen is what should happen. 

Qualified African American, Hispanic anc other niincrity attorneys who wish to 

serve on the bench will have improved cpportunities to do so. 

In America, when we talk abcut equality. more than anything else, we mean 

equality in the voting booth and equality in the court rcom. 

I will do everything I cam to hzlp the legislature meet its obligations to ensure 

equal voting rights and equal justice. 

Thank you very much. 

 



EXHIBIT 
6 

 
 

 



® ¢ BOPY 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION 

  

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN 

CITIZENS (LULAC), COUNCIL #4434; 

LULAC COUNCIL #4551; CHRISTINA 

MORENO; AQILLA WATSON; JOAN 

ERVIN; MATTHEW W. PLUMMER, SR., 

JIM CONLEY, VOLMA OVERTON, 

WILLARD PEN CONAT, GENE COLINS, 

AL PRICE, THEODORE M. HOGROBROOKS, 

ERNEST M. DECKARD, MARY ELLEN 

HICKS, REV. JAMES THOMAS, and 

LULAC (statewide) 
Plaintiffs, 

S 

S 

§ 

§ 

S 

S 

S 

S 

§ 

S 

S 

S 

§ 

HOUSTON LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION, § 

ALICE BONNER, WELDON BERRY, § 

FRANCIS WILLIAMS, REV. WILLIAM § 

LAWSON, DELOYD T. PARKER, BENNIE Ss 

MCGINTY, JESSE OLIVER, FRED TINSLEY, § 

JOAN WINN WHITE, And THE TEXAS § 

BLACK LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS, § 

Plaintiff-Interveners § 

vs. 
S 
S CA NO.: MO-88-CA-154 

THE STATE OF TEXAS S 

Defendants § 

SHAROLYN WOOD, and S 

F. HAROLD ENTZ, 
S 

Defendant-Interveners S 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR INTERIM ATTORNEY EEES 
  

This case was originally filed on July 11, 1988. After 

trial, ‘this Court entered judgement for the plaintiffs “on 

January 2, 1990. Since rhat time, this case has been argued 

in the Fifth Circuit three times and once before the Supreme 

Court. This case is now scheduled for reargument before the 

Fifth Circuit en banc in May of 1993. Plaintiffs counsel are 

now preparing for the May argument. 

The Fifth Circuit en banc decision may take over a year 

and, it is likely that the losing party will then appeal to 

the Supreme Court. We have been through this Process pefore; 

the Supreme Court appeal will take another year and then the 

case may be sent back to the Sth Circuit. In short, the 

appeal of this case has been protracted and placed a 

significant burden on plaintiffs’ counsel, especially the 

private practitioners. 

In this case, the plaintiffs have SO far clearly 

prevailed on the issue of whether or not the Voting Rights 

Act covered judicial elections and whether or not state 

? 1 

 



  

district judges were sole office holders exempted from the 
Voting Rights Act, Chisom v. Roemer, 111 8, Ct-.2354 (1991); 
Houston Lawyers Ass’n v. Attorney Ceneral of Texas, 111 S. 

Ct. 2376, (1931). Insofar as these issues are concerned, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress intended to cover judicial 
elections under the Voting Rights Act and that there was no 

sole office exception. Further, given the recent panel 
opinions, plaintiffs are prevailing parties on the litigation 

All other issues involved in this case are discussed in 
the recent 216 page panel opinion that ruled for the 
plaintiffs. Given the extensive issues that have been raised 
in this case, it is likely that this case will continue for 
several more years. 

Federal law allows for interim fees to private 
attorneys where they have played a key role in vindicating 
the rights of the’ plaintiffs. As a matter of public: policy, 
in order to prevent cash flow problems for plaintiffs and 
their attorneys and to prevent the danger that defendants 
“may be tempted to seek victory through an economic war of 

attrition against ‘the plaintiffs.” Bradley v. School Board 
City of ‘Richmond, 416. U.S. 696, 723 (1974); James Vv. 
Stockham Valves & Fittings co., 559 F 24. 310, 358-59 (5th 

Cir. 18727). It is now at the point where the ability of 
plaintiffs’ counsel to effectively continue this case is 
being affected by serious cash flow problems. In addition to 
preparing for the May en banc hearing, counsel has had to 
respond to the many requests made by the Texas Legislature, 
the Governors Office and the Lieutenant Governor for 
testimony and drafting of legislation. 

Plaintiffs’ private practitioners request another 
interim fee similar to the one this court granted back in 
1990 (See Attachment A). 

Accordingly, an additional 40% interim fee amount is as 
follows: $108,000 for Rolando L. Rios, $90,000 for William 
L. Garrett, $34,000 for Gabrielle K. McDonald, $28,089.00 for 

Edward B. Cloutman, and $4,500.00 for E. Brice Cunningham, 

and $9,000.00 for Brenda Hull Thompson. The total interim 

fee request is $ 273,589.00 

Respectfully Submitted, 

ROLANDO L. RIOS 

ATTORNEY AT LAW 

Milam Building 
115 E. Travis, Suite 1024 

San Antonio, Texas 78205 
Telephone: 210/222-2102 
Facsimile: 210/222-2898 

 



WILLIAM L. GARRETT 

BRENDA HULL THOMPSON 

GARRETT & THOMPSON 

ATTORNEYS AT LAW 

A Partnership of 
Professional Corporation 

8300 Douglas, Suite 800 
Dallas, Texas 75225 
Telephone: 214/369-1952 
Facsimile:214/987-0429 

Ald 
ROLANDO LY RIOS 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS 
State Bar no. 16935900 

  

I Rolando L. Rios, hereby certify that I have discussed this 

motion for interim fees with counsel for defendants and they 

have not decided whether or not to oppose this, motion. 

Y/ 70 
Rdlando L. Rios 
  

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this i iia day of March, 1993, a 

true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR 

INTERIM ATTORNEY FEES was mailed to the opposing counsel of 

record in this case by first class, as follows: 

WILL PRYOR J. EUGENE CLEMENTS 

RENEA HICKS JOHN E, O’NEIL 

DAN MORALES EVELYN V. KEYS 

JAVIER GUAJARDO PORTER & CLEMENTS 

Attorney General’s Office 700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 

P.O. Box 12548 Houston, Texas 77002-2730 

Austin, Texas 78711 

ROBERT H. MOW, Jr. 

Hughes & Luce 

2800 Momentum Place 

1717 Main Street 

Dallas, Texas 75201 Lp Ads 

ROLANDO L. RIOS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 

   



  

  

   LULAC COUNCIL #4434, et al. SEPUTY 

V, MO-88-CA-154 

JIM MATTOX, et al. 

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER ON INTERIM ATTORNEY FEES 
  

IT HAS COME TO THE COURT'S ATTENTION that its pPreviously- 

entered Order on Interim Attorney's Fees failed to specifically 

designate Bob Bullock on behalf of the State of Texas. The Court 

wishes to correct this omission and will do so by vacating its 

previous Order and entering this Supplemental Order on Interim 

Attorney Fees. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED this Court's previously-entered Order on 

Interim Attorney Fees in the above-captioned cause is hereby 

VACATED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bob Bullock, on behalf of the 

State of Texas as its Comptroller, pay an interim attorney’s fee 

of $273,589.00 to Rolando L. Rios, attorney for the Plaintiffs, 

to be distributed as follows: 

Rolando L. Rios $108,000.00 

William L. Garrett 90,000.00 

Gabrielle K. McDonald 34,000.00 

Edward B. Cloutman 28,089.00 

E. Brice Cunningham 4,500.00 

Brenda Hull Thompson 9,000.00 
  

$273,589.00 

SIGNED AND ENTERED this 20 day of March, 1990. 

A true copy of the original. | certify, 7 

ARLES W. YAGNER Te A —— 

rk, U. S. District Court 3 

/ UCIUS D. BUNTON, CHIEF JUDGE 
2 2s i ) '; 

/ Deputy 

  

  

  

  
  

  

_ Attachment A He 

  

  

 



EXHIBIT 
7 

 
 

 



  

£2 OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT 

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE 

THE SUPREME COURT 
  

      

OF THE | 

UNITED STATES 
CAPTION: HOUSTON LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION, ET AL., Petitionars 

v. ATTORKEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, ET AL.; 
and 
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, ET AL., 
Petitioners v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, ET AL. 

CASE NO: 90-813 and 90-974 

PLACE: Washington, D. C. 

DATE: April 22, 1991 

PAGES: 1-58 

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY 

Ull 14TH STREET. N.W. 

WASHINGTGN. D.C. 20005-5650 

202 259-2260 

EXHIBIT_A” 
 



  

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

HOUSTON LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION, 

ET AL., 3 

Petitioners | t 

v. : No. 90-813 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, : 

ET AL.; : 

and | 3 

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN 3 

AMERICAN CITIZENS, ET AL., 3 

Petitioners t 

Vv. : No. 30-974 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, 3 

ET AL. : 

iw wit iv i 3 li ee le X 

Washington, D.C. 

Monday, April 22, 1991 

The above-entitled matter came on for oral . 

argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 

11:04 a.m. 

APPEARANCES: 

JULIUS L. CHAMBERS, ESQ., New York, New York; on behalf 

of the Petitioners. 

RENEA HICKS, ESQ., Scectal Assistant Attorney General of 

1 

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 
1112 POURTEENTH STREET, N.W. 

SUITZ 400 
WASHINGTCMN, D.C. 2000S 

(202)289-2260 
(800) POR NFPO 

 



Texas, Austin, Texas; on behalf of the Respondents. 

2 

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1111 POURTEBENTH S™="== 

" SUITE 
#ASHINGTON, 0.C. 2000S 

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he was in -- suggesting a remand, that he was suggesting a 
remand as to reconsider coverage. 

MR. CHAMBERS: If -- you can read in the brief, 

he suggests that State interest may trump the interest of 

minorities in being able to participate in the electoral 

process. 
| 

| 7, QUESTION: Well, that may be in using the 
totality of the circumstances to decide whether there’s 

been a violation. 

MR. CHAMBERS: That's correct, Your Honor, but 

again I was suggesting that that State interest has to be 

weighed as part of the tenuousness factor in the -- in the 
cause analysis of the seven factors. 

Your Honor, I would like to reserve some time 

for rebuttal. 

Litman QUESTION: Very well, Mr. Chambers. 

Mr. Hicks, we’ll hear now from you. 

ORAL ARGUMENT OF RENEA HICXS 

ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 

MR. HICKS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please 

the Court; of 

| I wish to address both the question of coverage 

and the question of the inapplicability, not an exemption, 

but the inapplicability of vote dilution at-large 

challenges to trial judges, the solo decision makers. And 

27 

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, 11 =, 
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SUITE 400 
‘ WASHINGTON, D.C. 2000S 

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I first want to address the question of coverage. 

Much to the chagrin of much of the Toxas 

judiciary, many of the people that have intervened on zy 
case, I do not -- I anticipate Mr. Pugh -=- I do not adopt 

the theory of noncoverage that Louisiana has adopted or 
that the Pifth Circuit adopted. We argued below that the 

plain statement principle was the way to approach it. The 

problem is not that "representative® clearly excludes 

judges. It’s that the use of the word "representative® 

doesn’t clearly include them. There is ambiguity there. 

There is also some ambiguity I beileve in the 

question of whether section 2(a) of the Voting Rights Act 

covers intentional discrimination. I think it was Justice 

Scalia, but I'm not sure who pointed out, that the 

language certainly doesn’t say anything about intent. The 

language of section 2(a) only talks about results. And I 
don‘t believe there’s the slightest indication that 

Congress meant to do away with the intent standard in 

13982. But it appears that they did. Of course, there is 

the protection of the Constitution there. It's been there 

since 1870 or 1868, depending on whether You use the 

Fifteenth Amendment or ‘the Fourteenth Amendment. 

But nonetheless there may not be an intent 

standard in section 2 anymore if you read the language 

literally. If you choose not to read the -- 

28 

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 
1122 .CDURTIZZITY 833257, d.4. 

SUITZ 402 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2000S 

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MR. HICKS: Well, that would be closer. I think 

might lose that case, but they didn’t have it in mind -- 

An TE QUESTION: So you think “representative * is 

capable of covering judges (inaudible) -- 

MR. HICKS: It's capable of it. I don’t think 

common people think of judges as representatives. I don’t 

think a lot of informed scholars think of judges as 

representatives. I don‘t think judges think of themselves 

a8 representatives. I agree that under some -- 

Jeffersonian democracy theory that they’re representative 

of the people. I don’t question that at all. 

ve * 7 QuEsTION: Jacksonian democracy. 

MR. HICKS: Is it Jacksonian? Well -- 

' (Laughter. ) 

MR. HICKS: I'm talking about the idea of what a 

representative is. 

Ett aes QUESTION: Jefferson was not at all in favor of 

electing judges. Jackson was. 

(Laughter. ) 

MR. HICKS: ‘Thank you. I didn’t read my amicus 

briefs as well as I should have. : 

A mod QUESTION: Their names both begin with J, 

though. 

MR. HICXS: Yes. 

(Laughter. ) 

45 

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 
Y INUTNCENTY omewenciay W. 

GIES $3 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2000S 

(202)289-2260 

 



  

MR. HICXS: TI actually was thinking about what b ¢ said and I did mean Jeffersonian because the idea of 
anybody that’s elected is a representative in some sense -- that kind of theory. But at the normal common Parlance does not speak of Judges as Iépresentatives. rhe courts 
-- lower courts have -- have in a sense stumb]ed across 
that when they refer to Judges as not being 
representatives. And so -- 

Woil1 TY QUESTION: That's Bllime I ww YOU << 'T save its you -- then you aren‘t defending the judgment -- you're 

reasoning. Is that it? 

MR. HICKS: That’s correct. We made this 
argument that I'm making now below. I have to say I don’t think it was as sophisticated as it is now -- 
wad QUESTION: We agreed to view -- what you're 

really Saying i{s that there’s a different standard for 
judging Coverage than the pPifth Circuit used. 

MR. HICKS: Yes. 

mT QUESTION: So ve would have to remand. 
: MR. HICKS: +I don’t understand. This -- this is a legal question, not a factual question. I believe 

ultimately if you disagree with Me, YOu must remand. But 
+I don’t believe on the question of Coverage you must 
remand. I -< I think this Court is quite capable of 

46 

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. Sd STI arr TN SUITZ 400 WASHINGTON, D.C. 2000S (2021289_59¢n 
 



  

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MR. HICXS: Okay. 

STVY™> QUESTION: Or a closer 
instead of having a three-member 

changed to a single mayor -- or s 

case, what if Mobile 

commission, say, it 

ingle administrator and 

there were all sorts of good government reasons for doing 

it. It would be exempt from the 

MR. HICKS: Well, they 

the act. 

PV Ia QUESTION: Exempt from 

MR. HICKS: They would 

large vote dilution -- not they. 

~u~5 QUESTION: Yes. 

act. 

wouldn’t be exempt from 

section -=- 

be exempt from an ate 

MR. HICKS: A challenge there later would be 

would be other avenues of attack. 

scan 

MR. HICXS: Well, I don’t know if they all would 

exempt from an at-large vote dilution challenge. There 

QUESTION: But always based on intent. 

have to based on the intent. Pootnotes 10 and 12 of 

Thornburg v. Gingles -- in those footnotes, this Court 

said there are a host.of other section 2 kinds of 

challenges: 1In at-large vote dilution challenges it may 

be available. And I's not creative enough -- I’ve gotten 
into the mindset of being a defendant in this -- these 

cases now, so I’m having a hard time thinking. 

53 

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. 
1111 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W. 

SUITE 400 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2000S 

(202)289-2260 
Ff QANAN ear, labo k To 

 



EXHIBIT 
8 

 
 

 



® PORTER & crams 
A BSAMTERED LIMITED LAITY PARTNERS A / l. 

wCLVOING PAOPRASIONAL LOAPOALLONS 
- 

  

ATTORNEYS AT LAW 

. \ wn 
MAILING ADDRESS 

J, BUOZNE CLINZXTS.2 © 700 LOUISIANA. SUITE 3800 LING 
#.0.80x 4744 

SARTNRS HOUSTON. TEXAS 77003-2730 
‘T12) 226-0008 

HOUSTON. TX T7TR10-4744 

  

"ELECOPIER (713) 228-w 3! 

TELEPHONE (713} 2268:0000 

February 3, 1993 

Honorable Dan Morales 
Attorney General of Texas | 
P. O. Box 12548, Capital Station 
Austin, Texas 78711-2548 

Re: No. 90-8014 and No. 90-9003; League of United Latin American Ciilzens, 

Council No. 4434, et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. William P. Clements, 

Governor of the State of Texas, ct al., Defendants, Judge Sharolyn Wood, eic., 

Defendant-Appellant; In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 

Dear General Morales: 

This letter is a follow-up to settlement discussions held yesterday in the above-referenced 

case, which Evelyn Keyes from our office attended for Judge Wood. 

I understand from Evelyn that the plaintiffs have expressed hostility to our continuing 

participation in the settlement discussions on behalf of Judge Wood and have either scheduled 

or sought to schedule a settlement conference with you from which Judge Wood and Judge Entz, 

as named Harris County and Dallas County defendant/intervenors, are to be excluded. We also 

understand that other settlement conferences have been held to which neither we nor Judge Entz 

were invited. 

While we respect Judge Entz’ right to refuse to participate in settlement discussions, it 

is neither our intent nor our desire to be excluded from those discussions. Nor is it our desire 

to "scuttle" those discussions, as apparently at least some of the Plaintiffs believe. 

As you know, Judge Wood is a proper party to this litigation whose standing to intervene 

has been upheld. In addition, you and your office are Judge Wood's lawyers in her official 

capacity (and therefore our co-counsel), as well as being the lawyers for Chief Justice Phillips, 

Judge Entz, the administrative state district judges and the named state defendants and the judges 

affected in the eight counties under consideration - all in their official capacities. Many of those 

defendants may share the concerns we express here. 

 



  

Letter to Attorney General Morales 
February 3, 1993 Page 2 

  

As you know, it is Judge Wood's position that this case raises serious legal issues which 
have not been finally resolved and that legal proceedings should continue. She continues to 
believe that the law is not well enough resolved to safely develop a proper settlement. She is 
filing a suggestion for rehearing by the Fifth Circuit en banc, and she expects, given the 
importance of the case and the divisidns between the panel majority and the dissent, that the 
Fifth Circuit will, in fact, accept en banc review. Judge Wood solicits your support of that 
request. 

Judge Wood believes that it is premature to rush to "remedy" what may or may not 
ultimately be found to be a violation of the Voting Rights Act, and she is concerned about the 
piecemeal approach of the proposed settlement that leaves other counties and other judges in the 
affected counties to be sued in never-ending litigation and leaves the state with a crazy-quilt of 
counties electing their judges in different ways and from different electoral jurisdictions. Judge 
Wood also has serious concerns about the power of these litigants, and particularly the authority 
of the Attorney General's office, to create their own remedy for perceived vote dilution and to 
impose that remedy on the people of Texas without going through the steps required by the 
United States Constitution, the Texas Constitution, Texas statutory law and whatever federal 
order is ultimately issued (whether it is Judge King's order or that of the Court en banc or a 
subsequent panel). 

Judge Wood agrees that settlement discussions do have a place in this litigation at this 

time. The current plaintiffs’ proposal, however, is not a “compromise settlement” but a total 

surrender. The judicial redistricting plan set out in the Proposed Agreed Settlement Order sent 

to the parties on Tuesday appears to be no more than a slight reworking of the 1989 plan 

proposed by the plaintiffs and vacated by the panel opinion written by Judge King, except that 

it reinstitutes the partisan features which Judge Bunton took out of the original plan. This plan 

suffers from all the infirmities of the original plan, not the least of which is the assignment of 

judges to legislative districts (making judicial elections a tool of patronage). The plan is clearly 

unconstitutional in its assignment of two judges to each Democratic district and one judge to 

each Republican. I am not aware of any law that would support such egregious preference for 

voters of one political party. 

I understand that Sherrilyn Ifill has proposed the creation of certain districts in which 

judicial candidates would run at large as a corrective to the election of all judges from narrow 

sub-districts. This is a proposal which certainly bears study. However, it does not address 

Judge Wood's most serious concern about the remaining sub-districts, which is that under a 

subdistricting system no judge is accountable to all the voters. Also, it is possible that such a 

system would present equal protection problems. I understand that you share this concern and 

applaud your insistence on county-wide retention elections. 

PorTeER & CLEMENTS. L.L.R 

 



  

Letter to Attornev General Morales 
February 3, 1993 Page 3 

  

Judge Wood believes that if a non-judicial remedy is devised in settlement discussions, 
that remedy should be submitted to the Texas legislature and/or to the voters of Texas, as the 
Texas Constitution requires when a restructuring of the Texas judiciary is contemplated. If the 
Texas legislature refuses to adopt the proposed settlement or some other plan and the 
promulgation of a remedy devolves oh the district court, Judge Wood would envision the court 

_ responding to motions in accordance with whatever settlement terms are finally negotiated. 

Even though Judge Wood anticipates that the courts will ultimately declare that there is 
no proven violation of the Voting Rights Act, she does not believe that the status quo should 
necessarily be preserved, and she does not think that what is at stake in this litigation is an 
either/or situation. She would. in fact, like to see more minorities on the bench. She thinks it 
is important. But she is concerned that the requirements of law and the efficient administration 

of justice be respected in the process. 

While we do not expect you to poll every individual district judge or named defendant 

to seek a consensus on everything that the State does as their lawyer, we do expect the State to 

fulfill its fiduciary duty to Judge Wood and the other defendants and to respect their stated 

wishes on matters of importance to this litigation. In that regard, it is Judge Wood's desire and 

our desire that we, as her counsel, continue to be included in all settlement conferences between 

your office and the plaintiffs. 

We are prepared to continue to participate constructively in settlement discussions, and, 

to that end, we propose that the parties consider an appointment/election plan for the selection 

of judges. In that context, we should also look at how judges gain tenure and how to provide 

professionalism and independence within the judiciary through county-wide retention elections. 

The partisanship issue is also a serious issue that needs to be discussed, but that goes along with 

how judicial selection and tenure are handled. We understand that the plaintiffs are troubled 

about possible minority losses in county-wide retention elections. To address that concern, we 

further propose that information regarding existing retention election systems be solicited, I 

believe — but do not know — that current studies will show that the plaintiffs’ concems are 

unfounded and that an appointment/retention election system deserves serious consideration. If 

Texas changes its judicial selection system, it should replace it with a selection process that is 

fair to all, including minorities, and that will encourage their participation. 

PorTER & CLEMENTS. L.L.P 

 



Letter to Attorney General Morales 
February 3, 1993 Page 4 

  

  

Whatever is decided by the parties, however, I reiterate Judge Wood's belief that any 

settlement reached at this point should be submitted to the Texas Legislature for its approval and 

that the legal proceedings should not be prematurely terminated. 

a | Very truly yours, 

re os jy 

oo hh — 

. eed i, 0 

J. "Eugene Clements 

  

  

JEC.EVK/taw 

7630C:\DOCS\EVK\WOOZ7001\033 A 

 



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 9 

 
 

 



  

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN § 
AMERICAN CITIZENS, et al., § 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, § 
§ 

VS. § No. 90-8014 

8 
ATTORNEY GENERAL § 

OF TEXAS, et al., § 
§ 

Defendants-Appellants. S 

NOTICE OF ACTION TOWARD RESOLUTION OF APPEAL 

The Court-established deadline for appellants to file any supplemental briefs in this 

action is April 2, 1993. In connection with that approaching deadline, the Attorney General of 

Texas, on behalf of the State of Texas, brings to the Court's attention the following developments 

concerning efforts to resolve the issues presented in the appeal pending before the Court: 

1. The attorneys for the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors and the Attorney General 

of Texas, as attorney of record, on behalf of the State of Texas, along with the Governor of 

Texas, the Lieutenant Governor of Texas, the Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives, 

and the Secretary of State of Texas, have signed a Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") , a copy 

of which is enclosed and incorporated herein. 

2 When effectuated, the Agreement will resolve the merits issues pending before the 

Court and scheduled for oral argument sometime during the week of May 24, 1993. 

3 Consistent with provisions of the Agreement, the next step in effectuation of the 

Agreement is its presentation to both houses of the Texas Legislature for approval. When the 

process is completed, the Attorney General will promptly inform this Court in writing so that the 

formal steps toward adoption of the Agreement, and the concomitant resolution of this appeal, 

may be completed. 
Respectfully submitted, 

DAN MORALES 
Attorney General of Texas 

 



  

WILL PRYOR 
First Assistant Attorney General 

MARY F. KELLER 
Deputy Attorney General 

aa NPS el 
RENEA HICKS i 
State Solicitor J 

  

7 i: - 

. or 

AAR Ear bon 
JAVIER GUAJARDO i 7 
Special Assistant Attorney General ; 

\/ 

  

P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78711-2548 
(512) 463-2085 

ATTORNEYS FOR 
STATE OF TEXAS AND APPELLANTS 
ATTORNEY GENERAL AND SECRETARY OF 
STATE 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

[ certify that on the 26th day of March, 1993, I sent a copy of the foregoing document by 
first class United States mail, postage prepaid, to each of the following: William L. Garrett, 
Garrett, Thompson & Chang, 8300 Douglas, Suite 800, Dallas, Texas 75225; Rolando Rios, 
Milam Building, Suite 1024, 115 E. Travis Street, San Antonio, Texas 782085; Sherrilyn A. Ifill, 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor, New York, 
New York 10013; Gabrielle K. McDonald, 7800 N. Mopac, Suite 215, Austin, Texas 78750; 
Edward B. Cloutman, III, 3301 Elm Street, Dallas, Texas 75226-1637; E. Brice Cunningham, 
777 South R. L. Thornton Frwy., Suite 121, Dallas, Texas 75203; J. Eugene Clements, Porter & 
Clements, 3500 NCNB Center, P.O. Box 4744, Houston, Texas 77210-4744; Robert H. Mow, 
Jr., Hughes & Luce, 1717 Main Street, Suite 2800, Dallas, Texas 75201; Jessica Dunsay Silver, 
Department of Justice, P. O. Box 66078, Washington, D. C. 20035-6078; Tom Maness, Jefferson 
County Courthouse, Beaumont, Texas 77701; Seagal V. Wheatley, Wheatley & Sharpe, Frost 
Bank Tower, Suite 1650, 100 West Houston, San Antonio, Texas 78205; and Russell W. Miller, 
3300 Texas Commerce Tower, Houston, Texas 77002. 

oie Aid 
Renea Hicks 
  

2. 

 



FINAL 

  

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
MIDLAND ODESSA DIVISION 

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN 

AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULACQC) 

COUNCIL #4434, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

HOUSTON LAWYERS 
ASSOCIATION, et al., 

Plaintiff-Intervenors 

Civil Action No. 

§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
S 
§ 
§ 

VS. § MO-88-CA-154 
§ 

ATTORNEY GENERAL § 
§ 
§ 
§ 
S 
§ 
§ 

OF TEXAS, et al., 

Defendants 

SHAROLYN WOOD AND 
HAROLD F. ENTZ, 

Defendant-Intervenors. 

Settlement Agreement 
  

Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors and the State of Texas, by the Governor of 
Texas, the Lieutenant Governor of Texas, the Speaker of the Texas House of 
Representatives, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General of Texas, enter into the 
following Settlement Agreement. 

The case has been pending since July 11, 1988. It was tried in September of 1989, 
and since that time has been argued three times before the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, and once before the United States Supreme Court. 

The case is presently set for oral argument before the Fifth Circuit, en banc, for 
the week of May 24, 1993. 

Given the protracted litigation, the costs thereof and the importance of the issues 
to voting rights of all citizens, the parties have reached an agreement that will settle this 
litigation. 

Judicial Selection: Settlement Agreement 
Page 1 

March 24, 1993 

 



Support for judicial campaign and ethics reform is recommended by the parties 
to this Agreement. Among the proposals that should receive consideration are 
limitations on individual campaign contributions; strict limitations on PAC campaign 
contributions; maximum spending limits per election; additional disclosure 
requirements for judicial candidates and contributors; and tougher enforcement so that 
violators will face severe sanctions. 

Precondition 

1. This Agreement is conditioned upon and shall not take effect unless it receives 
majority approval of both houses of the Texas Legislature. Failure of the Texas 
Legislature to approve this Agreement renders the Agreement null and void, and in 
such event, the Agreement is inadmissible for all purposes. 

2. Upon approval by a majority of both houses of the Texas Legislature, the 
parties to this Agreement shall collectively notify the Court and move the Court for 
adoption and implementation. 

3. The Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors, through their respective counsel, agree 
to assist the State of Texas in preclearing, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. §1973c, the provisions of this Agreement with the United States Department of 
Justice. 

4. The Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors are prevailing parties within the 
meaning of the federal attorney's fees statute, 42 U.S.C. §1988 and 42 U.S.C. §1973(L). 

5. The parties to this Agreement recognize that the Texas Legislature's approval 
of the Agreement enhances the likelihood of its implementation by clarifying the public 
policy and interests of the State of Texas. The parties urge the Texas Legislature to 
promptly approve this Agreement. 

Agreements 

1. The at-large election system for the affected courts will be replaced by a 
phased-in plan in which each affected county will be divided into electoral subdistricts. 
Each county will be designated a District Number and each election unit-State 
Representative District, Justice of the Peace Precinct, or County Commissioner Precinct—- 
shall be designated a Subdistrict Place Number. The plan entails electoral subdistricts 
which are smaller than a county, except for those district courts not changed by this 
order. The plan uses existing State Representative District, Justice of the Peace Precinct, 

Judicial Selection: Settlement Agreement 

Page 2 

March 24, 1993  



  

or County Commissioner Precinct Lines. All election subdistricts used in this pian are 
based on geographic boundaries as they existed on January 1, 1993. 

2. Except for those courts not expressly covered by this Agreement, the State of 
Texas agrees to eliminate the existing at-large system of electing district judges in 
Dallas, Harris, Bexar, Tarrant, Travis, Jefferson, Midland, Ector, and Lubbock Counties, 

in the manner detailed in the Appendix to this Agreement. In Harris, Dallas, Bexar, and 
Jefferson Counties, state district judges will be elected from subdistricts comprised of 
Texas House of Representative Districts; in Tarrant and Travis Counties, state district 
judges will be elected from subdistricts comprised of Justice of the Peace Precincts; and 

in Lubbock, Midland, and Ector Counties, state district judges will be elected from 
subdistricts comprised of County Commissioner Precincts. The electoral scheme for 
some district courts, including those courts currently occupied by Defendant-Intervenor 

F. Harold Entz (the 194th District Court in Dallas County) and by Defendant-Intervenor 
Sharolyn Wood (the 127th District Court in Harris County), are not affected by this Plan 
and continue to be elected at-large. 

3. Each electoral subdistrict will elect one or more district judges as set out in the 
Appendix. Only those voters residing within their respective electoral subdistrict will 
be allowed to vote for their respective district judges. 

4. For the party primaries: elections shall be by place and by majority vote; if no 
candidate receives a majority of votes case, then the position will be filled by a run-off 
election between the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes case for that 
position, all as provided by existing state law. For the general elections, election shall 
be by plurality vote, as provided by existing state law. 

5. Consistent with the Texas Constitution, all candidates must reside in the 
county, but not necessarily the electoral subdistrict from which they seek election. All 
district judges must reside in the county from which they were elected for the entirety 
of their term. If any district judge no longer resides in his/her county, a vacancy shall 
be declared, and the post filled in accordance with state law. 

6. The electoral subdistricts created under this agreement are for the purpose of 
election of state district judges only. No change in jurisdiction or venue rules is made 
by this Agreement. Consistent with Art. 5 of the Texas Constitution, this Agreement 
will not disturb the existing district lines of the present judicial districts, except to the 
extent that it creates electoral subdistricts within the aforementioned counties for the 
purposes of electing district judges only. 

Judicial Selection: Settlement Agreement 
Page 3 

March 24, 1993 

 



  

7. In the interim before all state district judges in the affected counties are elected 
under this new sub-districting plan, state district judges now in office shall continue to 
hold their elective position until the expiration of their respective terms. 

8. In the interim before all state district judges in the affected counties are elected 
under this new sub-districting plan, state district judges elected to a court for which a 
subject-matter preference is statutorily provided, shall continue to hear cases in 
accordance with that preference until the expiration of their respective terms. 

9. There shall be no right of recusal of judges, based solely upon their election 
under this plan. 

10. The Appendix to this Agreement is part of this Agreement as if fully set forth 
at length herein. 

This Settlement Agreement is entered into among the parties listed below on 
March 24, 1993. 

Judicial Selection: Settlement Agreement 
Page 4 

March 24, 1993 

 



    

    

COUNSEL OF RECORD: APPROVED: 

0 An M. L Lr zzz 
DAN MORALES ANN W. RICHARDS 
Attorney General Governor 7 
State of Texas State of Tora 

  

2 py, 7) 

RE en AT 
    

WILLIAM L. GARRETT — BOB BULLOCK I 5 
ROLANDO L. RIOS Lieutenant Governor \ 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs State of Texas 

    

EDWARD B. CLOUTMAN, III//Z ESE. LANEY — 
E. BRICE CUNNINGHAM 47/4” Speaker 
Attorneys for Dallas County Texas House of Representatives 
Plaintiff-Intervenors State of Texas 

   
  

VA IIS 
"SHERRILYN A. IFILL 
GABRIELLE K. McDONALD Secrptary of State 
Attorneys for Harris County Stage of Texas 
Plaintiff-Intervenors 

  
Judicial Selection: Settlement Agreement 
Page 5 

March 24, 1993 

 



  

Appendix to Settlement Agreement in 
LULAC vu. Attorney General of Texas, 

Civil Action No. MO-88-CA-154 
(W.D. Tex) 

Appendix to Settlement Agreement in 
LULAC v. Attorney Generali of Texas, 
Civil Action No. MO-88-CA-154 

 



  

* 

HARRIS COUNTY 

District 378 

The 378th Judicial District is composed of Harris County. The following fifty 
district courts will be elected by subdistricts that are coterminous with the twenty- 
five House Legislative seats from Harris County: 11th, 55th, 80th, 113th, 125th, 
129th, 133rd, 151st, 152nd, 157th, 164th, 165th, 174th, 176th, 178th, 179th, 180th, 
182nd, 183rd, 184th, 185th, 189th, 190th, 208th, 209th, 215th, 228th, 232nd, 234th, 
246th, 247th, 248th, 257th, 262nd, 263rd, 269th, 270th, 280th, 281st, 295th, 308th, 
309th, 314th, 315th, 333rd, 334th, 337th, 338th, 339th, and the 351st Judicial District 
Courts. These courts shall be elected from the following places (two from each 
House Legislative district) at the time their regular term of office expires and shall 
give preference to the types of cases indicated:** 

"SUBDISTRICT A PRORE.. 2. 

PLACE PREFERENCE NUMBER ELECTION 

1 Civil *HD-126 1996 

2 Civil HD-127 1996 

3 Civil HD-128 1994 - 

4 Criminal HD-129 1996 

5 Criminal HD-130 1996 

6 Civil HD-131 1994 

7 Civil HD-132 1996 

8 Civil HD-133 1996 

9 Civil HD-134 1996 

10 Civil HD-135 1994 

11 Civil HD-136 1996 

12 Civil HD-137 1994 

13 Civil HD-138 1994 

14 Civil HD-139 1996 

15 Civil HD-140 1996 

16 Civil HD-141 1994 

17 Civil HD-142 1994 

18 Civil HD-143 1994 

19 Civil HD-144 1996 

20 Civil HD-145 1994 

21 Civil HD-146 1996 

22 Civil HD-147 1994 

“HD” indicates Texas House of Representatives Districts 

gig Throughout this Appendix, where possible, preferences designated follow 
local custom and practice. 

Table continued... 

Appendix to Settlement Agreement 1n 
LULAC v. Attorney Generai of Texas. A-1 
Civil Acuon No. MO-88-CA-154 

 



  

HARRIS COUNTY (continued) 

District 378 

SUBDISTRICT UP FOR 

PLACE PREFERENCE NUMBER ELECTION 

23 Civil HD-148 1996 

24 Civil HD-149 1996 

25 Civil HD-150 1996 

26 Criminal HD-126 1994 

27 Criminal HD-127 1994 

28 Criminal HD-128 1994 

29 Family HD-129 1994 

30 Juvenile HD-130 1994 

31 Criminal HD-131 1994 

32 Family HD-132 1994 
33 Juvenile HD-133 1994 
34 Criminal HD-134 1994 

35 Family HD-135 1994 
36 Criminal HD-136 1996 

37 Criminal HD-137 1994 

.-38 Criminal HD-138 1994 

39 Criminal HD-139 1994 

40 Criminal HD-140 1994 

41 Criminal HD-141 1996 

42 Criminal HD-142 1994 

43 Criminal HD-143 1994 

44 Criminal HD-144 1996 

45 Criminal HD-145 1996 
46 Criminal HD-146 1994 

47 Family HD-147 1994 
48 Family HD-148 1994 
49 Criminal HD-149 1996 

50 Criminal HD-150 1996 

NOTE: The following courts are not affected by this Plan and shall continue to 
be elected at-large by all voters residing in Harris County: 127th (Judge 
Sharolyn Wood) (Civil - 1996), and by seniority of non-minority 
incumbent: 177th (Criminal - 1996), 61st (Civil - 1996), 230th (Criminal 

- 1994), 245th (Family - 1994), 310th (Family - 1994), 311th (Family - 
1994), 313th (Juvenile - 1994), and the 312th (Family - 1994) Judicial 

District Courts. 

Appendix to Settiement Agreement 1n 
LULAC v. Attorney General of Texas. A-2 
Civil Action No. MO-88-CA-154 

 



  

DALLAS COUNTY 

District 379 

The 379th Judicial District is composed of Dallas County. The following thirty-two 
district courts shall be elected by subdistricts that are coterminous with the sixteen 
House Legislative seats from Dallas County: 14th, 44th, 68th, 95th, 101st, 116th, 
134th, 160th, 162nd, 191st, 192nd, 193rd, 195th, 254th, 256th, 265th, 282nd, 283rd, 
291st, 292nd, 298th, 301st, 302nd, 303rd, 304th, 305th, 363rd, CD1, CD2, CD3, CD4, 
and the CD5 Judicial District Courts. These courts shall be elected from the 
following places as their regular term of office expires and shall give preference to 
the types of cases indicated: 

SUBDISTRICT UP FOR 

1 Civil HD-99 1996 

2 Civil HD-100 1994 

3 Criminal HD-101 1994 

4 Civil HD-102 1996 

5 Civil HD-103 1996 

6 Civil HD-104 1994 
7 Civil HD-105 1994 

8 Civil HD-106 1994 

9 Civil HD-107 1994 

10 Criminal HD-108 1996 

11 Civil HD-109 1994 

12 Civil HD-110 1994 

13 Civil HD-111 1994 

14 Civil HD-112 1994 

15 Criminal HD-113 1996 

16 Civil HD-114 1994 

17 Criminal HD-99 1996 

18 Criminal HD-100 1994 

19 Juvenile HD-101 1994 

20 Criminal HD-102 1994 

21 Criminal HD-103 1994 

22 Criminal HD-104 1994 

23 Family HD-105 1994 
24 Criminal HD-106 1994 

25 Criminal HD-107 1996 

Table continued... 

Appendix to Settlement Agreement in 
LULAC v. Attorney Generai of Texas. 
Civil Action No. MO-88-CA-154 

 



  

DALLAS COUNTY (continued) 

District 379 

SUBDISTRICT UP FOR: 

26 Family HD-108 1994 
27 Family HD-109 1994 
28 Criminal HD-110 1994 
29 Juvenile HD-111 1994 
30 Family HD-112 1994 
31 Family HD-113 1994 
32 Criminal HD-114 1994 

NOTE: The following courts are not affected by this Plan and shall continue to 
be elected at-large by all voters residing in Dallas County: 194th (Judge 
F. Harold Entz) (Criminal - 1994), and by seniority of the incumbent: 
203rd (Criminal - 1994), 204th (Criminal - 1994), 255th (Family - 1994), 
and the 330th (Family - 1994) Judicial District Courts. 

Appendix to Settlement Agreement in 

LULAC v. Attorney General of Texas. A-4 
Civil Action No. MO-88-CA-154 

 



  

The 381st Judicial District is composed of Bexar County. The following nineteen 
district courts shall be elected by subdistricts that are coterminous with the eleven 
House Legislative seats from Bexar County: 37th, 45th, 57th, 73rd, 131st, 144th, 
150th, 166th, 175th, 186th, 187th, 224th, 225th, 226th, 227th, 285th, 288th, 289th, and 
the 290th Judicial District Courts. These courts shall be elected from the following 
places as their regular term of office expires and shall give preference to the types 
of cases indicated: 

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Appendix to Settlement Agreement in 

LULAC v. Auorney General of Texas, 
Civil Action No. MO-88-CA-154 

BEXAR COUNTY 

District 381 

A-S 

SUBDISTRICT UP FOR 

Civil HD-115 1994 

Civil HD-116 1996 

Criminal HD-117 1994 

Civil HD-118 1994 

Civil HD-119 1996 

Juvenile HD-120 1994 

Criminal HD-121 1994 

Civil HD-122 1996 

Criminal HD-123 1994 

Criminal HD-124 1996 
Civil HD-125 1996 

Civil HD-120 1996 

Civil HD-116 1994 

Criminal HD-115 1994 

Criminal HD-117 & HD-118 1994 

Criminal HD-119 1994 

Civil HD-121 & HD-122 1994 

Civil HD-123 1994 

Civil HD-124 & HD-125 1994 

 



  

TARRANT COUNTY 

District 380 

The 380th Judicial District is composed of Tarrant County. The following twenty- 
four district courts will be elected by subdistricts that are coterminous with the 
eight Justice of the Peace Precincts from Tarrant County: 17th, 48th, 67th, 96th, 
141st, 153rd, 213th, 231st, 233rd, 297th, 322nd, 323rd, 324th, 325th, 342nd, 348th, 
352nd, 360th, 371st, 372nd, CD1, CD2, CD3, and the CD4 Judicial District Courts. 

These courts shall be elected from the following places as their regular term of 
office expires and shall give preference to the types of cases indicated: 

JUSTICE OF THE UP FOR 

PLACE PREFERENCE PEACE PRECINCT. ELECTION . 

1 Civil *JP-1 1996 
2 Civil JP-2 1996 
3 Civil JP-3 1996 
4 Civil JP-4 1996 
5 Civil JP-5 1996 
6 Civil JP-6 1996 
7 Civil JP-7 1996 

- 8 Civil JP-8 1996 
9 Civil JP-1 1994 
10 Civil JP-2 1996 
11 Criminal JP-3 1994 

12 Family JP-4 1994 
13 Criminal JP-5 1994 

14 Criminal JP-6 1994 

15 Criminal JP-7 1996 

16 Criminal JP-8 1994 

17 Criminal JP-1 1994 

18 Criminal JP-2 1994 

19 Family JP-3 1994 
20 Family JP-4 1994 
21 Family JP-5 1994 
22 Family JP-6 1996 
23 Family JP-7 1994 
24 Family JP-8 1994 

NOTE: The following court, determined by seniority of the incumbent, is not 
affected by this Plan and shall continue to be elected at-large by all 
voters residing in Tarrant County: 236th (Civil - 1994) Judicial District 

Court. 

* “TP” indicates Justice of the Peace Precincts 

Appendix to Settiement Agreement in 
LULAC v. Attorney General of Texas. A-6 
Civil Acuion No. MO-88-CA-154 

 



  

TRAVIS COUNTY 

District 382 

The 382nd Judicial District is composed of Travis County. The following ten 
district courts will be elected by subdistricts that are coterminous with the five 
Justice of the Peace Precincts from Travis County: 98th, 126th, 147th, 167th, 200th, 
250th, 299th, 331st, 345th, and the 353rd Judicial District Courts. These courts shall 

be elected from the following places as their regular term of office expires and shall 
give preference to the types of cases indicated: 

JUSTICE OF. THE UP FOR 

PLACE PREFERENCE PEACE ELECTION 
PRECINCTS 

1 Civil | JP-1 1996 
2 Civil JP-2 1996 

3 Civil JP-3 1996 
4 Civil JP4 1994 

5 Civil JP-5 1996 

6 Criminal JP-1 1994 =~ 

7 Criminal JP-2 1994 

+8 General JP-3 1994 

9 General JP4 1994 

10 Criminal JP-5 1996 

NOTE: The following courts, determined by seniority of the incumbent, are 
not affected by this Plan and shall continue to be elected at-large by all 
voters residing in Travis County: 201st (Civil - 1994), 261st (Civil - 
1994), and 53rd (Civil - 1996) Judicial District Courts. 

Appendix to Settlement Agreement in 
LULAC v. Auorney Generai of Texas. A-7 
Civil Action No. MO-88-CA-154 

 



  

JEFFERSON COUNTY 

District 383 

The 383rd Judicial District is composed of Jefferson County. The following six 
district courts will be elected by subdistricts that are coterminous with the three 
House Legislative seats from Jefferson County: 58th, 60th, 172nd, 252nd, 279th, and 
the 317th Judicial District Courts. These courts shall be elected from the following 
places as their regular term of office expires and shall give preference to the types 
of cases indicated: 

SUBDISTRICT UP FOR. 

PLACE PREFERENCE NUMBER ELECTION 

1 Civil HD-22 1994 
2 Civil HD-19 & HD-21* 1996 
3 Criminal HD-22 1994 
4 Civil HD-19 & HD-21* 1994 
5 Family HD-22 1994 
6 Family HD-19 & HD-21* 1994 

* That part that is in Jefferson County. 

NOTE: The following courts, determined by seniority of the incumbent, are 

not affected by this Plan and shall continue to be elected at-large by all 
voters residing in Jefferson County: CD (Criminal - 1994) and the 136th 
(Civil - 1996) Judicial District Courts. 

Appendix to Settlement Agreement in 

LULAC v. Attorney General of Texas. A-8 
Civil Action No. MO-88-CA-154 

 



  

LUBBOCK COUNTY 

District 384 

The 384th Judicial District is composed of Lubbock County. The following four 
district courts will be elected by subdistricts that are coterminous with the four 
County Commissioner Precincts from Lubbock County: 99th, 140th, 237th, and the 
364th Judicial District Courts. These courts shall be elected from the following 
places as their term of office expires in the following years: Place 1 in 1998, Place 2 
in 2000, Place 3 in 1996, and Place 4 in 1998; and shall give preference to the types of 
cases indicated: 

COUNTY 

PLACE PREFERENCE COMMISSIONER UP FOR 

1 General *CC-1 1998 

2 General CC-2 2000 
3 General CC-3 1996 

4 General CC4 1998 

NOTE: The following courts are not affected by this Plan and shall continue to 
be elected at-large by all voters residing in Lubbock County: the 72nd 
(General - 2000) Judicial District Court (serving Crosby and Lubbock 

Counties) and the 137th (General - 1998) Judicial District Court. 

* “CC” indicates County Commissioners Precincts 

Appendix to Settlement Agreement in 
LULAC v. Auorney Generai of Texas. A-9 

Civil Action No. MO-88-CA-154 

 



  

ECTOR COUNTY 

District 385 

The 385th Judicial District is composed of Ector County. The following four district 
courts will be elected by subdistricts that are coterminous with the four County 
Commissioner Precincts from Ector County: 70th, 161st, 244th, and the 358th 
Judicial District Courts. These courts shall be elected from the following places as 
their term of office expires in the following years: Place 1 in 1998, Place 2 in 1998, 
Place 3 in 2000, and Place 4 in 2000; and shall give preference to the types of cases 
indicated: 

PLACE EFEREN 

1 General 
2 General 

3 General 

4 General 

Appendix to Settlement Agreement in 
LULAC v. Auorney Generai of Texas, 
Civil Action No. MO-88-CA-154 

COUNTY 
COMMISSIONER UP FOR: 

CC-1 1998 
CC-2 1998 
CC-3 2000 
CC+4 2000 

 



  

MIDLAND COUNTY 

District 386 

The 386th Judicial District is composed of Midland County. The following three 
district courts will be elected by subdistricts that are coterminous with the four 
County Commissioner Precincts from Midland County: 142nd, 238th, and the 
318th Judicial District Courts. These courts shall be elected from the following 
places as their term of office expires in the following years: Place 1 in 1998, Place 2 
in 2000, and Place 3 in 1998; and shall give preference to the types of cases 
indicated: 

COUNTY 
PLACE PREFERENCE COMMISSIONER UP FOR. 

1 General CC-1&CC-2 1998 

2 General CC-3 2000 

3 Family CC4 1998 

Appendix to Settlement Agreement 1n 
LULAC v. Auorney Generai of Texas. A-11 
Civil Action No. MO-88-CA-154