Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie Application for Injunction Pending Disposition

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YRIAi.GLE IMPROVEMENT COUNCIL, et al. ,
Pc-titi oners 

v .WILLIAM S. RITCHIE, COMMISSIONER, 
STATE ROAD COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, jet al.

APPLICATION FOR AN INJUNCTION PENDING 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE PENDING ON A 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UNITED STATE' COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT GRANTED
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JEFFRY A. MINTZ
3O co3umbus Circle
M ov.T Y c NY 10019

JOHN L« BGETTNER, JR.
13. j 6 -1 • Kan awh a Be ■'leva rd, E. 
Charleston, W. Vo. 25301

A. ANDREW MACQUEEN III 
1026 Quarrier Street 
Charleston, VI. Va. 2 5301

Attorneys for Petitioners
TIIOMA S J . O'HULL IVAN 14 Wall'Street 
Nev: York, NY 10005
Of Counsel

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-IN- Till', —  •
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER TERM, 1970 
NO. 712

TRIANGLE IMPROVEMENT COUNCIL, et al.,
Petitioners,

v.
WILLIAM S. RITCHIE, COMMISSIONER, 

STATE ROAD COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, et al.

APPLICATION FOR AN INJUNCTION PENDING 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE PENDING ON A 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT GRANTED 
DECEMBER 21, 1970

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND ASSOCIATE 
JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

In light of this Court's granting of certiorari in 
this case on December 21, 1970, and for the other reasons stated 
herein, petitioners move the Court to reconsider its order of 
October 26, 1970, denying an injunction pending the disposition 
of the petition for a writ of certiorari, and to enter an order 
enjoining respondent William S. Ritchie, Commissioner of the

» VWest Virginia Department of Highways and his agents or 
contractors: (1) from evicting or otherwise seeking or ordering

/
1 /During the pendency of this litigation, the name of the State 
Road Commission of West Virginia was changed to the West Virginia 
Department of Highways.



the; removal of any persons now residing or operating busines
loc-at-cd—on the proposed right oiLway . of X P t erst a tej? i ghwa y
I- 7 7 in the area- of Charleston, West Virginia, known as the 

2 /"Triangle"'- ; (7) from demolishing any structures located m
said area; and (1) from failing to maintain all inhabited 
structures in said area now owned by said Department of 
Highways in habitable condition, for the following reasons:

1. Hie individual petitioners are residents of the 
"Triangle" district and specifically live on the proposed

ses

3/right of way of Route 1-77. They brought the action originally 
for the purpose of diverting the proposed road primarily, 
insofar as relevant now, on the ground that the defendants, the 
federal and state officials responsible for building the 
highway, had failed to comply with the requirements of

4/ .federal law regarding the providing of relocation housing to 
persons displaced by the highway. Quite reluctantly, they 
have now, in the words of the dissenting judge in the court 
below, "abandoned their futile efforts to halt or divert the 
road. Their sole objective at this point is to assure that 
when displaced they will be able to obtain adequate replacement 
housing, as guaranteed by federal law." Triangle Improvement 
Council v. Ritchie, 429 F. 2d 423 (4 Cir. 1970), Sobeloff and
Winter, JJ. , dissenting.

2/By way'of delimiting the area, petitioners accept the boundaries 
of the "Triangle" district as set out by respondent Ritchie at 
the time of trial, namely, the area in Charleston, West Virginia, 
bounded by Washington Street, Capitol Street, Piedmont Road, and 
the Elk River. (Defendant Ritchie's Exhibit No. 1.)
3/The Triangle Improvement Council is a community organization 
composed of approximately 200 residents of the district. 
Petitioners sue both individually and on behalf of all persons 
similarly situated. At least one of the named petitioners has 
ocen recently compelled to move outside of the corridor. See 
paragraph 5, infra, and Exhibits C and D attached. For reasons 
outlined herein, and to be argued fully in the brief on the merits 
which will be filed shortly, petitioners contend that persons v/ho 
Jived on the right of way at the time the suit was filed may be 
entitled to relief even if they have since been compelled to 
vacate their homes.
---/in particular, the relocation provisions of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 2 3 U.S.C. §§50.1 et seq.

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2. Having boon denied relief below, petitioners filed 
o petition lor a writ of certiorari in this Court on September 
17, 1970. Simultaneously with the petition, an application
for an injunction pending its disposition was filed with the 
Chief Justice, as Circuit Justice for the Fourth Circuit. The

yfederal respondents filed an opposition to the application.
On October 26, 1970, the Court, to which the application had
been referred by the Chief Justice, entered an order denying

6/it, Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting. Following the filing of 
the brief of the Federal Respondents in Opposition and a 
response of petitioners to it., the petition for certiorari 
was granted on December 21, 1970.

3. At the time the previous application was submitted
and denied, construction of the subject highway in Charleston
had been halted by order of Secretary John A. Volpe of the
United States Department of Transportation, issued on July

2/10, 1970, to permit reconsideration of the route. On or 
about November 12, 1970, the Department of Transportation 
reaffirmed the prior route and authorized construction to

yproceed. On December 15, 1970, the State Department of 
Highways approved bids for various phases of the construction, 
including the demolition of 60 structures aldng the path of

5 /— That application, like the present one, seeks relief only as 
against the state officials, who filed neither a response to 
it nor to the petition for certiorari itself.
y  The present application is addressed to the Court, rather than 
to the Chief Justice, in view of the fact that it may be said 
to seek reconsideration of the previous order, which was con­
sidered by the whole Court.
-̂ New York Times, July 13, 1970, p. 62, Col. 1.
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—'' Charleston (W. Va.) Gazette, November 13, 1970, p. 1.

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"l~7 V  In'"t7Te"~Triancjle Dlst r ic t. On December 21, 1970, this
Court granted certiorari. Petitioners are informed that the 
-dem-o-H-t-ion wor-V-wi 11—commence shortly, and may be completed 
before tins case can be decided, if a stay is not granted.

4. On December 30, petitioners' counsel requested of 
respondents, through their counsel, that further demolitions 
and evictions be stopped pending the decision of this case, in 
light of the grant of certiorari. (Exhibit "A" attached.)
On January 4, 1971, respondent's counsel denied that request 
(Exhibit "B").

9/

5. Although actual constrLction of the highway
v/as halted from July through November by Secretary Volpe's order,
the State Department of Highways continued to compel the removal
of persons living on the right of way then under review by

9a/
the federal officials. Petitioners' concern for the adequacy
of relocation housing, the thrust of the litigation from its
inception, was shown to be justified in most of these circum-

12/stances. By way of example, Mrs. Lillian Day, one of the 
named petitioners, was ordered to leave her home by October 1, 
1970. (Exhibit "C"). Mrs. Day, who lives with her two disabled 
sons, was not provided with relocation assistance by the 
state, and eventually, she was able to find a house to which
she moved on November 4, 1970. As the rent was beyond her
means, she sought assistance under the rent supplement provisions:
of the i.968 relocation amendments, 23 U.S.C. §506. By letter
of December 9, 1970, the State Department of Highways advised

--'charleston (W. Va. ) Gazette, December 16, 1970, p. 17.
9a /~ A survey taken by petitioners on December 22, 1970, indicated 
that at that time 65 persons and 14 businesses remained on the 
right of way. Respondents question the accuracy of that figure, | 
although they do not dispute that a substantial number of persons; remain. See Exhibit "B".
10/Mrs. Day is a white woman, and represents the interests of 
low income white persons living in the Triangle area.

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_oi a.pot it ion for writ of certiorari. 20 U.S.C. §1651 (a);
Rule 51(1) Revised Rules of the Court (19o7). See Federal 
Trade Commission v. Dean Foods Co.., 284 U.S. 507. (Mr. Justice
Clark issued a preliminary injunction, after consulting other 
members of the Court, to restrain respondents from making 
material changes in the corporate structure of Bowman Dairy 
Co. pending review, after the Court of Appeals had dissolved 
its temporary restraining order.) See also, Arrow Transportation 
Company v . Southern Railway Co., 9 L.jEd. 2d 36, 83 S.Ct. 1, 
an opinion of Mr. Justice Black in chambers extending a 
restraining order pending the disposition of a petition for 
certiorari, to review a decision of the court of appeals denying 
an injunction pending appeal. liie stay injunction in Arrow 
Transportation, supra, preserved the status quo pending 
clarification of an Act of Congress. See also, Robertson &
Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Unitedm,2».States §430 (2nd ed. Wolfson & Kurland, 1951) and cases cited.

(b) Novel Questions
The issuance of an injunction is particularly 

warranted where it will operate to preserve novel federal 
questions for determination by this Court. See, e.g., Interna-_
t i ona 1 Boxing_Club of New York, Inc. , v. United States—of
America, 2 L.Ed. 2d 15 (opinion in Chambers) (Mr. Justice 
Harlan, 'as.Circuit Justice, in the first Government anti-trust 
case involving professional sports). See also, Arrow Trans­
porta tion Co._v._Southern Railway Co., supra.

Petitioners here contend that their displacement 
from their hones for the purpose of constructing*a federally- 
aided interstate highway without any provision for relocating 
them in replacement housing is a violation of the Equal Protec­
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fair Housing Act 
of 1960, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et scg., and the relocation

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provision-, of the Federal-Aid Housing Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C.
__§501---e't sog.--'jTiis Court .has never, previously considexed__the~-

question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires the pro­
vision of relocation housing where black persons are displaced 
by state action and required to secure new housing in a dis­
criminatory private market. The decision below is in conflict 

! wjth a decision on the same question in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Arrington v. City _of 
Fairfield, 414 F. 2d 687 (5th Cir. 1969). It is also contendedI ~~
that the conduct of the Department of Transportation in this
regard constitutes a failure to comply with the requirement of
the Fair Housing Act that all federal agencies conduct their
activities affecting housing in a manner so as to promote
the national goal of fair housing. 42 U.S.C. §3608 (c). This
Court previously has not considered tnis provision of the

12/  . .Fair Housing Act. However, the serious constitutional
question can be avoided by an application of the recently
enacted provisions of the Federal—Aid Highway Act which relate
to relocation. Petitioners contend that this statute obliges
the state highway department of prepa?:e and submit for approval
by the Department of Transportation a relocation plan which
demonstrates that replacement housing of substantially equal
quality is available before displacement can take place.
This statute has not been construed previously by this Court.

* The district court denied relief by relying on a
then-existing regulation which purported to deny the benefits
of the new statute to persons in petitioners' situation.
During the pendency of the appeal, the Department of Transportat:

H/cf.' Shannon v. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
F. 2d . , (3 Cir. No. 18397, filed December 30, 1970.)

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issUod now xcyublious. which reversed its previous position 
end effectively adopted petitioners' interpretation of the 
statute. Despite this change in the lav;, cf. Tligrpjs v. IIoû j_nq 
Authority, 393 U.G. 268, 281 (1969), the Court of Appeals 
affirmed "on the opinion of the district court." As Judge 
Sobeloff pointed out in his dissent from the denial of 
rehearing en banc-, this occurred despite the fact that the 
court agreed that petitioners' "position on the applicability 
of the 1968 amendments has now become the law and that 
comprehensive relocation plans are required before construction 
can be approved" (41a), and that consequently the opinion of 
the district court cannot "logically" serve as the basis for 
the appellate court's decision (41a), Judge Sobeloff inter­
preted the majority's affirmance as based on an unarticulated 
belief that the claim was effectively mooted by the change 
in regulations, since the Department of Transportation had 
apparently recognized their obligations under the statute. 
However, since both federal and state highway officials have 
remained steadfast in their position that they would not 
require the preparation of a relocation plan in the Triangle, 
the claim is, in the words of the dissent, "anything but moot" 
(42a). Petitioners are now in the position, having been 
advised that their legal position is correct, of being yet 
told that.they will get no relief from the courts. Thus the 
petition additionally requests this Court to correct what has 
the appearance of being an irrational functioning of the 
judicial process.

(c) Irreparable Injury to Petitioners •
/ . . .i The record below reveals, and petitioners

application lor a writ of certiorari details, the serious 
injury which will follow as a result of their displacement

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Petitioners and their classfor the construction of 1-77. 
drej for' lhe~mosT part, poor” and black. They are being 
threatened with imminent eviction from their homes, which 
will be destroyed in order to construct a facility which will 
bring them no benefit. Having reluctantly in this 
litigation accepted tine location of the highway and the fact 
that it will effectively demolish their community as a 
viable entity, they ctsk only that those who would displace 
them be required to provide decent, , seife and sanitary 
replacement housing in accordance with the requirements of 
federal law.

If this Court denies a stay, many of those living
on the right-of-way may have been evicted before the full Court
can consider the case on the merits. They will have moved
into housing which is likely substandard, although perhaps
more expensive, and from which they will likely soon be evicted
again for a planned urban renewal project. In some cases, they
will be forced to move out of the city of Charleston, causing
them to lose jobs, and break family and community ties. No
relief this Court can grant will give them back their homes,
which will have been demolished. Even if the Court were to
compel the respondents to provide new homes for those who were
displaced, as the statute requires, it would be impossible to i
find all-those who were displaced and provide them with the 
housing which should have been made available initially.

(d) Lack of Irreparable Injury to Respondents 
The construction of this highway has been 

planned for many years. The final route was approved on 
August 31, 1964, following a public hearing. /uithorization to 
acquire various parcels on the right-of-way was received betweer

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19G7. Only 18 of 65 parcels had beenApril, 1966, and May, 
acquired or optioned by the time of the district court hearing 
in April, 1969. Construction of a major bridge section of the 
highway which must be completed before the section here in 
issue can be opened has only just begun. If a stay is granted 
the additional delay will likely be no more than a few 
months, even if respondents ultimately prevail. Respondents 
cannot now place themselves in a more advantageous legal posi­
tion by limiting the range of possible remedies merely by 
continuing with evictions and emolition, and an injunction 
should issue no prevent this from occurring.

(e) An Injunction is Necessary to Prevent a 
Change in Facts from Making the Devising 
of an Effective Remedy Difficult After a 
Decision on the Merits.
As outlined above, the continuation of the 

presently planned evictions and demolition will cause 
irreparable injury to the petitioners and very likely make the 
fashioning of a remedy far more difficult than it presently

13/is. in a very closely analogous case, Nashville 1-40 Steerinc-
Committee v. Ellington, O.T. 1967 No. 995 (cert., denied, 390
U.S. 921 (1968)), petitioners challenged the route of an 
interstate highway which was planned through the black 
community of Nashville, Tennessee, and which would cause injury 
to numerous individuals, businesses, educational institutions,
13/—  Petitioners do not suggest, however, that their claims will 
become moot if an injunction is denied. In the brief on the 
merits to be filed, petitioners will argue that if their 
legal position is correct, respondents should be ordered to 
locate those persons who have been forced from their homes in 
violation of their rights and to offer them replacement housing 
in conformity with the statute if they have not yet obtained sue)') on their own.i

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on the grounds that the public hearing requirements of the 
Federal-Aid Highway Act, 2 3 U.s'.C. '§101 ct seq.„ had not been 
met and that the planners had not taken into account the 
disruption to the community which the route would cause, as 
required by statute. Petitioners sought a stay of con­
struction pending the consideration by this Court of a 
petition for certiorari. Although certiorari was eventually 
denied, Mr. Justice Stewart granted a stay, enjoining further 
construction until the Court could consider the petition.

In another closely analogous case, Federal Trade 
Commission v. Dean Foods Co., supra, the Court held that 28 
U.S.C. §1651 (a) empowered the federal courts to enjoin a 
merger of the Bowman Dairy Company with the Dean Foods 
Company pending a determination of the legality of the merger 
by the Federal Trade Commission. If the merger were not 
enjoined, "consummation of the agreement would 'prevent the 
Commission from devising, or render it extremely difficult for 
the Commission to devise, any effective remedy after its.de­
cision on the merits.'" (384 U.S. at 805.) The proposed merger 
would have resulted in a split of Bowman and virtual disap­
pearance of the company as an entity. The Court of Appeals 
had issued a temporary restraining order but dissolved it 
and Mr. Justice Clark issued a preliminary injunction to res­
train respondents from making any material changes pending 
review.

Federal Trade Commission, supra, parallels decisions 
by the Court in similar cases involving the issuance of stay 
injunctions to prevent the claims raised from bpcoming moot. 
Johnson v. Stevenson, 335 U.S. 801; 7 L.Ed. 2d 767; Ohio River 
Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244 U.S. 68; Natural Gas Co. of West 
Virginia v. Public Service Co. of West Virginia, et al.,

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2 94 U. S. 090. In Johnson v. Stevenson, suEi* c±̂ £b-' ^ 1J s
Court stayed a lower court judgment in order to avoid the 
mooting of the issues. In In rc Bart, supra, Mr. Justice 
Warren stayed petitioner's commitment pending final action on 
his appeal by the Court of Appeals because of "the likelihood 
that the normal course of appellate review might otherwise 
cause the case to be moot." These cases recognize the 
power of federal courts under the All Writs Act to preserve 
the status of litigants pending ultimate appellate
determination of their claims.

The State cannot male the claim, after years of delay
in starting construction of 1-77 for which it alone is 
responsible, that it would be injured by the comparatively 
slight delay which will be caused during review by this Court. 
Certainly, the injury which may be avoided to petitioners, on 
balance, strongly supports petitioners' claim for issuance of 
the injunction.

1 WHEREFORE, petitioners respectfully pray that an 
injunction be issued enjoining respondent Ritchie (1) from 
evicting or otherwise seeking or ordering the removal of any 
persons now residing or operating businesses located on the 
proposed right of way of Interstate Highway 1—77 in the 
area of Charleston, West Virginia, known as the "Triangle";
(2) from demolishing any structures located in said area; 
and (3) from failing to maintain all inhabited structures in 
said area now owned by the Department of Highways in habitable

14/conditions pending the decision on the merits of this case.

-^■Petitioners do not seek to prevent any other aspects of the; 
construction of this cr related highways beyond those which 
relate to the provision of ade note relocation housing for 
petitioners;. See Exhibit "A".

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A proposed form of Order, modeled in part after that issued 
by Mr. Justice Stewart in Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee 
v, Ellington, No. 995, O.T. 1967, is attached for the 
assistance of the Court. (Exhibit "E".)

'Respectfully ‘submitted,
/\.

;iJACK GREENBERG
JAMES M. NABRIT III 
JEFFRY A. MINTZ

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, NY 10019

JOHN L. BOETTNER, JR.1116-B Kanawha Boulevard, E. 
Charleston, W.Va. 25301

A. ANDREW MACQUEEN III 
1026 Quarrier Street- 
Charleston, W. Va. 25301

Attorneys for Petitioners

THOMAS J. O’SULLIVAN 
14 Wall Street 
New York, NY 10005
Of Counsel

$

//

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Al’J'AKACJIIAN Iii;sj:Ai;or a n d D e i e x s e F u n d , In c .
KANAWHA BLVD.. E. 
:CTON. W. VA. 23301 

0 0 4 )  i 4 4 f 0 0 7

TO COL.LEGE LANE 
PRESTONSDURG. KY. 4 1GS3 

(GOO 6SC-27GI

P. O. BOX 378 
BARBOURVILLE. KY.

December 30, 1970

Mr. Stanley E. Preiser 
Heck's Building 
Charleston, WV 25301

Re: Triangle Improvement Council, et al
v. Ritchie, et al.
Supreme Court, October Term,_19 70 fl712

Dear Mr. Preiser:
In light of the grant of certiorari by the Supreme 

Court of the United States in the above captioned case, on 
behalf of petitioners, we hereby request that the West 
Virginia Department of Highways take no further action to 
evict residents or demolish structures along the present 
right of way of Interstate Route 1-77 in the "Triangle" area 
of Charleston pending the Court's decision of this case in 
order to protect the rights of those individuals and busi­nesses remaining in the highway corridor.

Specifically, we request the following: (1) that no
persons or businesses presently remaining in the corridor 
be evicted from or ordered to vacate their homes or busi­
nesses, (2) that no structures in the corridor be demolished, 
and (3) that all buildings owned by the Department of High­
ways be maintained in habitable condition. A survey taken 
on behalf of petitioners on December 22, 1970, indicates that 
sixty-five (65) persons and fourteen -(14) bysinesses remain 
in the corridor. In the context of the present scope of 
the litigatibn, we have no objection to the Department of 
Highways proceeding with any other phases of construction 
related to this or other highway projects, except as to the three aspects just mentioned.

We request that you notify us of your response to this 
request no later than January 5, 1971. If your clients are 
unwilling to agree to this, we will make application to the 
Supreme Court for reconsideration of its previous order 
denying an injunction pending consideration of the petition

i

(EXHIBIT "A")



V >

Mr. Stanley E. Preiser 
December 30, 19/0 
Page Two

Cor certiora 
(1 ) the dec! 
in November, 
way and the December 19, structures r 
of ccrtiorar 
adequacy of 
by the highw

ri in light 0f£°“ ansporSSon? SotaTjolpe'sion by Secretary t routing of the high
1970, to retain the rtment of Highways onsubsequent action of th P the demolition of
1970, letting ^ 7 7  corridor, and (2) the grant ■emaining in the I . ., Question of thei by the Court to review the quest di laced
relocation housing provided to per^o 
ay

i-o the request should be communi- 
^  >■ »*>•

Attorneys for Triangle Improvement 
Council/ et,al.

JLB:JAM/mfd
cc: Hon. Erwin Griswold Solicitor General of the 

Department of Justice 
Washington, DC

United States

(EXHIBIT "A")
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P A U L  Z A K A l O ,  J R .  

J O H N  H . f O W L t «

p. O. IIOX 2T.OO 1012 KANAWHA UOULEVAWO, E. 
C H A R L E S T O N ,  W .  V A . 2 b 3 2 ©  

T E L E P H O N E  30 - 4  3 A A - 6 C 5 I

January 4, 1971

John L. Docttner, Jr., Esquire 
Jeffrey A.Mintz, Esquire 
1116 B Kanawha Boulevard, East 
Charleston, West Virginia 25301

TRIANGLE IMPROVEMENT COUNCIL, ET AL 
V.
RITCHIE, ET AL
SUPREME COURT, OCTOBER TERM, 17 0,' #712 
Gentlemen:
Replying to your letter of December 30, pursuant to your request 
for response prior to January 5, 1971, you may consider this 
as the written response.
Please be advised that the West Virginia Department of Highways 
has not evicted any residents in the Triangle area, and that 
the West Virginia Department of Highways has complied with all 
requirements of law, whether it be by statute, regulation, 
directive or memorandum, and it intends to continue doing so.
You may further be advised that the factual statement contained 
in the second paragraph of your letter, which you indicate was 
derived from a survey taken on behalf of the petitioners, is 
inaccurate.
You should further be advised that, ■ as stated before, the West 
Virginia Department of Highways has and will continue to comply 
with all requirements of law relative to the matter here involved.
Very truly yours

SEPjgmc
cc : Honorable Erwin Griswold

Solicitor General of the United States
Department of Justice, Washington, D. C

(EXHIBIT "B")



n.r.T'vr-lATJON OP LEASH AGREEMENTNOTICE Oi;

RE: project 1-77-3 (67) 93
Parcel No. 469 
Lease No* 211-012°

TO: L i l l i a n  Day
, , ,,ith thc provisions o£ Paragraph two (2)In accordance witn vnt

■ „l Of that certain lease agreement dated and Paragraph sir (0) or that
the 25th day of hugest. 1969, between you and the West 
Virginia Department of highways, you are h e r e b y  notified that

• i tr-ill rccuire possession of thethe Department of Highways will icgu P
on or before the 1st day of October, 1970, leased premises on or doloi

„ „ „„ said lease will cease and terminate onand that the terra Oi said.ieas

that date.
Given , ; c- o u t  day of August, 1970,under my hand this 3isr uay

.. •/
, 9:S \ L. c. McCann

[
strict Right of Way AgentDl:

(EXHIBIT "C")



I

a »>c k  a M o o n t ,  j h . 
covi *>.o*

in''’'"'' r " ' f - f M  CV £ V.'l_>i V. . .C-.Uw. ' .  ...I.v — Vt V*.
Office of t::: Dimmer cMGiKCea rieor t;;v;:;cvOwL iloo, V!f'j!nl»iOOJ 1

December 9 , 1970

W IL L IA M  E. n i T C H I C .  JR coMMisoiofiea

Mrs. Lillian Day ..
S02 Eagan Street 
Charleston, West Virginia

RE: REPLACEMENT HOUSING PAY ■’.'ENT
Project 1-77 - 3 ( 67 ) 98 
Parcel No, 469

Dear Mrs. Day:

As a result of the inspection of your replacement property, 
the Department cannot approve your application for a replacement 
hosuing payment. Attached are the minimum requirements for a decent, 
safe and sanitary property as set forth in the Federal Highway Act 
of 1968. The structure you are now occupying does not meet the stan­
dards that are checked on the enclosed form.

In the event you should move to another property within one 
year after you moved from the above captioned parcel, and the new 
property meets the attached requirements or if you change your 
present dwelling to meet this standard, the Department will reconsider 
your application.

Sincerely yours,

0, N.-Rinehart
* ' Distirct Right of Way Agent

OHR/da ’ ’ ‘ " ' ...... '
Attachment

/
(EXHIBIT "D")

*'H**T<



—r-Q-v 7XJI ; n -0
"lTA!<V ! .'.'US1 i .u

j . P a r a [j .‘ii]‘>ii

a. A decent, safe, one! sanitary owe
v.nich‘meets 'all of the following minim

• * ...... -) •
.i i  1 v. . . i C  i » . ’ „ fr„ c-• cting structures that have been

< * * « »  electrical, housing.and occupancy code
to the property in Cation. . . ; /

. .. • , r,-i ir'ofin. p suonlv of potable safe water.(;■) boo a conv’nuir.g ana nesqua<,e -û pj-y t
’ ., .”0- kitchen use which contains a sin.< in qg?-j

(3) Jiao a kitchen or an area ; c. j *o k ^   ̂g c disposal system. A stc-'
wiring condition and cor.nects^o o-. ^  bJ. provided when required by local coder,,
-.h i refrigerator in good opera cing -naxt_ ~ J reouired by local codes, ordinances;
ordinances or custom. When -.eca ouch use [shall have utility serviced cor.-

ntJ t*n»* 4 f .i . ......

______ .«> on adequate
W n o t  bo " h o s e W a p h i c a l  area where. such »  not. nor,,U.,

included’:.n new housing. ' ’

an adequate -.supply of hot and cold ru.ming v.̂ ccr, ana v ^ u  ’ . ... .. . > %  .
working c -dor and properly connected to a sewage disposal -ystom. . ..- ' -  ■ .\/,yk .

(a) Has provision for artificial, lighting ao.<. e°dh room.

/(y) Is structurally sound, in good repair and adequately maintained.

(a) r-,ch building used for dwelling purposes shall have two safe unobscructG-»r.-<..i. - 
l i ^ s S  o enkpace at ground level. Bach dwelling unit ‘ y

building must hove access either direct y or through a c ^ o n  co.rido ^“ S  nc b V a  or moro,_the-c«son corr.de. 
each story must have at least *cwo means of cyp ĉ o.

• (9) Has 150 square feet of habitable floor space for the- firsu occupan. i.yO^^r 
'Ti^rinlt ar.a at least 100 square feet of habitable floor c  ̂ ;;t 
The floor space is to be subdivided into sufficient rooms to be w e  qua.e.The floor space is to be subdivided into sufficient rooms t o n s  -  ■
rooms :r.us+ be adequate!- ventilated. Habitable floor space as defined as that ?«c 
; ;;;ino. living,‘cookihg, or dining purposes, and excludes such enclosed places ^  clo.

■piinm~.. re-vice rooms, connecting corridors, .laundries, -no u,w....sleeping, living, cooking, or dining purposes, and excludes .<ucn ^ndries and unfi •
pantoios bath, or toilet.rooms, service rooms, connecting corridors. , ^ d r i e s ,  
attics,..foyers, storage spaces, cellars, utility rc.or.is and similar space,.

v. r a -00-S. The standards for decent, save and sanitary housing oB
lied*to the knial of sleeping' roans shall include the minim.™ requirements oonoarnod M. 
subparagraphs a (1), (A),(6), (7), or.d (S) of this paragraph and .ho fo.Uo.nng.

(3) At least ICO square feet of'habitable_floor space for the first occupant and a 
square feet of habitable floor space for each additional occupan • ■

(2 ) Lavatory and toilet facilities that provide privacy including a door that con S 
locked if ouch facilities are separate from the rocm. . .

i:„ exceptions can be made to these standards without prior approval of the Federal Agon, 
involved. " ' • • • ■ • . •  -



EXHIBIT "E"

PROPOSED FORM OF ORDER.

UPON CONSIDERATION of the application for an 
injunction by counsel for petitioners in the above entitled 
cause,

IT IS ORDERED that an injunction is granted pending 
disposition by this Court of the c^se now pending on 
petition for certiorari granted December 21, 1970,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pending disposition 
of the case, William S. Ritchie, Commissioner of the 
West Virginia Department of Highways, and all persons or 
agencies in active concert or participation with him, 
and his contractors, shall not proceed with or further 
implement the construction of a certain link of Interstate 
Highway 1-7 7 in tire area of Charleston, West Virginia, 
bounded by Washington Street, Capitol Street, Piedmont Road 
and the Elk River and specifically shall refrain (1) from 
evicting or otherwise seeking or ordering the removal of any 
persons now residing or operating businesses located in 
said area; (2) from demolishing any structures now located in 
said lirea and (3) from failing to maintain all inhabited 
structures in said area now owned by said Department of 
Highways in habitable condition. All other phases of 
construction of this or related highways may proceed.
If the judgment below is affirmed, this injunction is to 
terminate automatically. In the event the judgment isi
reversed, -this injunction will be in effect under such terms 
as may be contained in the final judgment of this Court.

(EXHIBIT "E")