State Board of Public Welfare Board of Managers v Coleman Brief of Appellants

    In The

Court of Appeals of Maryland
September Term, 1960

No. 162

STATE BOARD OF PUBLIC WELFARE,
THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF MARYLAND 

TRAINING SCHOOL,
THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF MONTROSE SCHOOL, 
THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF BARRETT SCHOOL,

AND

THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF BOYS’ VILLAGE,
Appellants,

v.
ROBERT MYERS, minor, by 

MAE COLEMAN, etc.,
Appellee.

A ppeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City 
(C harles E. Moylan, Judge)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

C. Ferdinand Sybert, 
Attorney General,

Robert C. Murphy,
Assistant Attorney General, 

For Appellants.

The Daily Record Co, Baltimore 3, Md.



I N D E X

Table of Contents

page
Statement of the Case.......................................................  1

Question Presented...........................................................  2

Statement of Facts.............................................................  2

A rgument:

Sections 657 and 659-661 of Article 27 of the 
Maryland Code are constitutional.....................  10

Conclusion ............................................................................  27

Table of Citations 

Cases
Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522.........................  11, 26
Baker v. State, 205 Md. 42............................................ 15,17
Board of Trustees v. Frasier, 350 U.S. 979.................  19
Bolling, et al. v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497.........................  11,14
Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 affirmed 352

U.S. 903 ..................................................................  19
Brown, et al. v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 11,12, 21
Clark v. Maryland Institute, 87 Md. 643.....................  12
Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385........................................... 26
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1.......................................... 13
Dawson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 220

F. 2d 386 affirmed 350 U.S. 877............................. 19, 24
Durkee v. Murphy, 181 Md. 259..................................  23, 24
Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 347 U.S.

971 and 350 U.S. 413................................................. 19
Johnson v. State, 114 A. 2d 1 (N.J.)............................. 16
Jones v. House of Reformation, 176 Md. 43................ 16
Kirkwood v. Provident Savings Bank, 205 Md. 48 26



11

PAGE

Kotch v. River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552 11
Leonardo v. Comm’rs, 214 Md. 287............................... 11
Magruder v. Hall of Records Commission, 221 Md. 1 26
McBriety v. Baltimore City, 219 Md. 223 26
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 13
Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524......................................  15
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 10,11, 20, 26
Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721 appeal dismissed

361 U.S. 6................................................................  20
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 357 12,13, 23
Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266....................................  25
Roth v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329...........................  16
Shuttleworth v. Board of Education, 162 F. Supp. 372

affirmed 358 U.S. 101.............................................. 13
Siegel v. Ragan, 180 F. 2d 785 21
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535............................. 10
Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S. 137 10
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 26
Taylor v. State, 214 Md. 156 16
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312..................................  11
United States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station, 200

F. 2d 105..................................................................  21
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 11, 26
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 10

Statutes

Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 Ed.):
Article 26—-

Secs. 51-71 .......................................................  3
Secs. 72-90 .......................................................  15
Sec. 74 .............................................................. 22

Article 27—
Secs. 657 and 659-661 1, 2, 3, 4, 9,10,27



I l l

PAGE
Article 77—

Secs. 1 and 202.................................................  18
Sec. 232 ............................................................. 18

Article 88A—
Sec. 3 3 ............................................................... 3

Baltimore City Charter and Public Local Laws:
Secs. 239-257 ........................................................... 3f 4

Constitution of the United States:
5th Amendment .....................................................  13
14th Amendment ................2, 4, 5, 9, 10,11,13,19, 23, 24

Miscellaneous
31 Am. Jur., Juvenile Courts and Delinquent, De­

pendent and Neglected Children—
Secs. 2 and 19........................................................... 16

78 C.J.S., Schools and School Districts—
Sec. 1,445 ................................................................  12

Encyclopedia Brittanica—
Vol. 5—

Juvenile Courts, pages 476-479.....................  22
Vol. 13—

Juvenile Delinquency, pages 229, 231 22



In The

Court of Appeals of Maryland

September Term, 1960

No. 162

STATE BOARD OF PUBLIC WELFARE,
THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF MARYLAND 

TRAINING SCHOOL,
THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF MONTROSE SCHOOL, 
THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF BARRETT SCHOOL,

AND
THE BOARD OF MANAGERS OF BOYS’ VILLAGE,

Appellants,
v.

ROBERT MYERS, minor, by 
MAE COLEMAN, etc.,

Appellee.

A ppeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City 
(Charles E. Moylan, Judge)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a declaratory decree of the Cir­

cuit Court of Baltimore City declaring Sections 657 and 
659-661 of Article 27, Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 
Ed.), requiring separation of the Negro and white races 
in the State’s four correctional training institutions for



2

minors, to be unconstitutional as in violation of the Four­
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; and en­
joining the Appellants from denying admission of Negro 
youths, solely on account of race and color, to any of the 
said facilities. The decree appealed from also adjudged 
that the courts could not, consistent with the requirements 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, select a training school to 
which a minor is to be committed solely on the basis of 
the minor’s race or color.

QUESTION PRESENTED
Are Sections 657 and 659-661 of Article 27 of the Mary­

land Code Constitutional?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statutes in question, codified in the criminal law 

article of the Maryland Code under the designation “Places 
of Reformation and Punishment” , relate to the State’s four 
correctional training institutions for minors, namely, Boys’ 
Village, Maryland Training School, Barrett School and 
Montrose School. The statutes provide that such institu­
tions are public agencies for the care and reformation of 
minors committed thereto under the laws of this State, and 
further provide that the Maryland Training School shall 
be for white male minors, Boys’ Village for colored male 
minors, Barrett School for colored female minors, and 
Montrose School for white female minors. Specifically, the 
statutes read:

Section 657:
“There shall be established in the State an institu­

tion to be known as the Boys’ Village of Maryland. 
Said institution is hereby declared to be a public 
agency of said State for the care and reformation of 
colored male minors committed or transferred to its 
care under the laws of this State. * *



3

Section 659:
“From and after the acquisition by the State of 

Maryland from the Maryland School for Boys, a cor­
poration of this State, of the property heretofore held, 
conducted and managed by said corporation as a re­
formatory institution for the care and training of white 
male minors committed thereto under the provisions 
of the laws of this State, the same shall continue under 
the name of the Maryland Training School for Boys to 
be conducted as a public agency of this State for the 
care and reformation of white male minors now com­
mitted thereto, and who may hereafter be committed 
thereto under the laws of this State. * *
Section 660:

“From and after the acquisition by the State of Mary­
land of the property of the Maryland Industrial School 
for Girls the same shall continue as a reformatory 
under the name of the Montrose School for Girls to be 
conducted as a public agency of this State for the care 
and reformation of white female minors now com­
mitted thereto, and who may hereafter be committed 
thereto under the laws of this State. * * *.”
Section 661:

“There shall be established in this State, an institu­
tion to be known as the Barrett School for Girls. The 
said institution is hereby declared to be a public 
agency of this State for the care and reformation of 
colored female minors committed or transferred to its 
care under the laws of this State. * *

By the subtitle preceding Section 33 of Article 88A of 
the Maryland Code, these institutions are referred to under 
the designation: “Training Schools for Delinquent Chil­
dren” . Commitment of delinquent minors to the institu­
tions is authorized by the several juvenile court acts in 
force in Maryland, principal among which are the so-called 
“State-wide Act” (Sections 51-71 of Article 26 of the Code) 
and the “Baltimore City Juvenile Court Act” (Sections



4

239-257, as amended, of the Charter and Public Local Laws 
of Baltimore City, 1949 ed.).

Appellee herein, a thirteen year-old Negro boy, by his 
mother and next friend, filed a bill for a declaratory de­
cree in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City on February 
26, 1960, in which he challenged the constitutionality of 
Maryland’s racially-segregated training institutions, as pro­
vided for by said Sections 657 and 659-661 (E. 3-12). He 
alleged in his bill that on October 29, 1959, he was adjudged 
to be a delinquent child by the Circuit Court of Baltimore 
City, Division of Juvenile Causes; that the Juvenile Court 
announced its determination at that time to commit him 
to a public training school for delinquent minors; that on 
Appellee’s behalf a motion was interposed that he be com­
mitted to the Maryland Training School for white boys, 
rather than to Boys’ Village for colored boys since the 
latter, as a racially-segregated training school, could not 
provide him with rehabilitation and training equal to that 
provided by the Maryland Training School; and that the 
Juvenile Court held the motion sub curiae, in the mean­
time detaining him over his objection at Boys’ Village. 
The bill alleged that racial segregation in the public train­
ing schools pursuant to the aforesaid statutory requirement 
contravened the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution, and that the Order of court detaining him at 
Boys’ Village deprived him of his constitutional right to 
enjoy non-racially-segregated public training school facil­
ities provided by the State of Maryland for delinquent 
minors.

Named as Defendants in the bill were the State Board 
of Public Welfare and the Boards of Managers of each of 
the four training institutions. The bill alleged that De­
fendants were authorized by statute (Article 88A of the 
Code) to exercise supervision, direction and control over



5

the institutions and to provide for their general manage­
ment; and to promulgate rules with respect to the use, 
availability and admission of minors thereto; and that the 
State Board of Public Welfare was additionally vested with 
authority to establish, by rule or regulation, standards of 
care, policies of admission, transfer and discharge.

On behalf of the Defendants, a combined demurrer and 
answer was filed (E. 13-16). The demurrer, later overruled, 
alleged that the challenged statutes represented a valid ex­
ercise of the police power of the State and were constitu­
tional. The Defendants’ answer to the bill admitted that 
the training institutions were operated on a racially-segre­
gated basis pursuant to statutory requirement, and further 
admitted the statutory authority vested in them over the 
operation of the institutions.

At the trial it was stipulated between the parties that 
the physical and other tangible factors at the four institu­
tions were substantially equal (E. 34). The question thus 
raised for determination by the court was simply whether 
racial segregation in the State’s correctional training insti­
tutions for delinquent minors was, per se, a violation of the 
equal protection or due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

A statement of the educational program at Maryland 
Training School was introduced in evidence as Plaintiff’s 
Exhibit No. 3 and stipulated to be representative of the 
educational program at the other three institutions (E. 
35-42). Also introduced by stipulation of the parties were 
two opinions of the Attorney General of Maryland holding 
racial segregation in the training schools to be constitu­
tional (E. 18-28, 30-33).

Testimony adduced at the trial on behalf of the Appellee 
showed that prior to his detention at Boys’ Village, he



#

had attended integrated public schools in Baltimore City 
and Baltimore County; that at the time of his adjudication 
as a delinquent child by the Juvenile Court, his mother 
requested that he be committed to an integrated training 
institution for the reason that “I thought if he goes to an 
integrated school, he would have a better chance of re­
habilitation because he had been going to school with mixed 
groups” (E. 43).

Dr. Alvin Thalheimer, Chairman of the State Board of 
Public Welfare, testified for Appellee that the training 
schools were intended to be rehabilitative rather than 
penal institutions, and that school classes were conducted 
at the institutions in order that the children might con­
tinue their education during the period of their confine­
ment (E. 50-51).

Raymond Manella, Chief, Division of Training Schools, 
State Department of Public Welfare, testified for the Ap­
pellee that the State Department of Education provides 
the training schools with a consultant “who carries respon­
sibility for professional consultation on educational mat­
ters and educational programs” (E. 66). He further testi­
fied that it is the responsibility of the training school ad­
ministration “to organize and administer and to operate an 
educational program for all the youngsters who come into 
the State training schools, which is an important part of 
the program” (E. 67).

An official document of the State Department of Public 
Welfare, entitled “Characteristics of 860 Committed Chil­
dren in the Maryland Training Schools on January 1, I960” , 
was received in evidence as Defendants’ Exhibit No. 1 (E. 
77-78, 122-124). Table No. 12 of the Exhibit discloses the 
type of offense committed by each inmate at each institu­
tion. The offenses, as summarized in total, were as follows:

6



t

7

Type of Offense Number
Arson .........................................................  8
Assault .......................................................  33
Automobile Theft......................................  60
Breaking and Entering............................. 126
Disorderly Conduct..................................  16
Narcotics ...................................................  ...
Robbery .....................................................  23
Sex Offense ...............................................  14
Stealing .....................................................  184
Vandalism .................................................  8
Being Ungovernable ................................. 113
Runaway ...................................................  123
Trespassing ................................................ 1
Truancy .....................................................  85
Violation of Probation .............................  12
Violation of After Care Supervision......  2
Other........................................................... 52

Total Offenses.............. 860

The witness Manella, testifying on Defendants’ cross and 
direct examination, stated that the training institutions 
were obliged to take any and all delinquent minors com­
mitted by the courts, but that the purpose of the institu­
tions was to bring about the rehabilitation and training of 
the child, rather than to punish; that one of the objectives 
of the training schools was the protection of the community 
and the protection of the child while the rehabilitation 
process was being conducted; that all of the children com­
mitted to the training schools were maladjusted socially 
and that the large majority of the delinquents came from 
the lower economic strata (E. 70, 77, 79); that the training 
schools were open-custody institutions of the cottage type, 
with the inmates being in the cottages approximately two- 
thirds of the time, supervision being provided “around the 
clock” ; that not much freedom of movement was permitted



8

except for inmates ready for release (E. 79-80, 82); that in 
all the training schools there is a combination of dormitory 
sleeping accommodations and single rooms; that the in­
mates eat all meals within the cottages; that “you won’t be 
able to successfully treat children for problems in any­
thing approaching a penal or correctional type facility” 
(E. 79-80). He further testified that the cottages in which 
the inmates are housed are “meant to resemble homes, the 
family with the intimate kind of mother or father-child 
relationship which you must have in a community if you 
are going to produce healthy kids” (E. 80); that super­
vision of the inmates was provided at all times by cottage 
parents or cottage masters who are symbolic of the in­
mates’ own parents (E. 80); that the “hub” of the training 
in any cottage type training institution “is in the cottage 
and in the cottage program as such, since the youngsters 
are exposed to most of their time in the cottage with the 
cottage life program and unless this program is properly 
managed and unless the activities program is properly ar­
ranged, the rehabilitation program will probably fail” (E. 
81).

Manella further testified that the training schools at­
tempted to establish “a family setting or climate or atmos­
phere, that we want a small group atmosphere with a high 
degree of relationship so-called between the cottage parent 
as such and the youngsters in that particular cottage, which 
is a little larger than a realistic family group” (E. 83). He 
stated that in the rehabilitation process “I would not place 
prime emphasis on the education phase” (E. 81); that the 
educational program was not carried on within the cot­
tages and that only at Maryland Training School were full­
time teachers employed (E. 68, 81).

Manella also testified to having had experience with an 
integrated correctional training institution. He was asked:



9

“Q. In the integrated facility with which you have 
had experience, is there any air of tension because of 
the racial difference? A. I would say initially some 
youngsters, depending on their social and cultural form 
with reference to the neighborhood and the community 
area from which they came and they are brought into 
institutions and there is a lot of anxiety in those cases.

ijj iji ^

Q. Doesn’t this tension detract from the basic pur­
poses of the institution as you describe it? A. Unless 
the institution is properly managed and unless it op­
erates with the proper reference to philosophy, it can 
very definitely destroy the rehabilitation intention of 
the institution, and that has happened” (E. 84).

Elbert Fletcher, Superintendent of the Maryland Train- 
in School, testified for Appellants that the “main real ad­
justment” of the inmates takes place in the cottages; that 
in many cases a boy and father relationship comes about 
between the cottage parent and the delinquent boy; and 
that within his experience with integrated public training 
school facilities in New York racial fights occurred (E. 
90-91).

Other testimony at the trial indicated that the inmates 
were generally committed to the training institutions on 
indeterminate commitments but that the average period 
of confinement was actually between eight and nine months.

The trial court declared Sections 657 and 659-661 of 
Article 27 to be unconstitutional on the ground that State- 
imposed segregation of the races in the training schools 
violated both the equal protection and due process clauses 
of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The 
Court based its decision largely on the premise that the 
training schools were an integral part of the State’s public 
education system and, as such, were within the orbit of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in the School Segregation 
Cases prohibiting racial segregation in public schools.



10

Pursuant to the Court’s decree entered July 6, 1960, the 
'Order of the Juvenile Court detaining Appellee at Boys’ 
Village was rescinded, and he was committed to the Mary­
land Training School where he presently remains under 
confinement (E. 121).

ARGUMENT
SECTIONS 657 AND 659-661 OF ARTICLE 27 OF THE 

MARYLAND CODE ARE CONSTITUTIONAL.

It is fundamental that the equal protection clause of the 
14th Amendment, applicable to State action, secures to all 
citizens without distinction of race or color equality of 
rights of a civil or political kind. In other words, the 
Amendment provides equal protection and security to all 
under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their civil 
and political rights. The guarantee of equal protection of 
the law is thus a pledge of the protection of equal laws, 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356. Manifestly, however, 
the equal protection clause does not prohibit the states from 
selecting and classifying objects of legislation according to 
need, and as dictated or suggested by experience, so long 
as the classification rests upon reasonable grounds of dis­
tinction. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535; Stebbins v. 
Riley, 268 U.S. 137. In Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), 
the Supreme Court summarized the operation of the equal 
protection guarantee in these words:

“ 1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not take from the State the power 
to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits 
of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that re­
gard, and avoids what is done only when it is without 
any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does 
not offend against that clause merely because it is not 
made with mathematic nicety or because in practice 
it results in some inequality. 3. When the classifica­
tion in such a law is called in question, if any state of



11

facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain 
it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the 
law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails 
the classification in such a law must carry the burden 
of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable 
basis, but is essentially arbitrary * * *.”

In the broad sense, all classification by a state involves 
some discrimination. It is not, however, discrimination 
per se which is proscribed by the 14th Amendment; rather, 
the prohibition of the equal protection clause goes no fur­
ther than the invidious discrimination. Morey v. Doud, 
supra; Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); 
Kotch v. River Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552 
(1947). A classification, therefore, even though discrimina­
tory, is not arbitrary nor violative of the equal protection 
clause if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived 
that would sustain it. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 
522 (1959). See also Leonardo v. Commissioners, 214 Md. 
287.

The due process guarantee of the 14th Amendment de­
mands only that the particular law not be unreasonable, 
arbitrary or capricious and that the means selected shall 
have a real and substantial relation to the object sought 
to be attained. This guarantee thus tends to secure equality 
of law in the sense that it makes a required minimum of 
protection for everyone’s right of life, liberty and property 
which the State may not withhold. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 
U.S. 312.

Against this background of well-established constitu­
tional principles, the Supreme Court in 1954 decided the 
School Segregation Cases — Brown, et al. v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483, and Bolling, et al. v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497 — involving public elementary and public high 
schools, institutions which, broadly speaking, are open and



12

public to all in the locality, with the right to attend such 
facilities being a fundamental and positive civil right be­
longing to citizens as members of society. See 78 C.J.S., 
Schools and School Districts, Sec. 1, 445; Clark v. Maryland 
Institute, 87 Md. 643, at page 661. The question in each 
of the School Segregation Cases was essentially the same: 
Does segregation of children in public elementary and pub­
lic high schools solely on the basis of race, even though 
the physical and other tangible facilities may be equal, 
deprive children of the minority group of equal educational 
opportunities? This question placed squarely in issue the 
validity, as applied to public schools, of the “separate but 
equal” doctrine laid down in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
357 (1896), a case upholding the constitutionality of a 
Louisiana statute providing for racially segregated public 
transportation facilities, in which the Supreme Court said:

“The object of the (14th) amendment was undoubt­
edly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races 
before the law, but in the nature of things it could not 
have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon 
color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from po­
litical, equality, or a commingling of the two races 
upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, 
and even requiring their separation in places where 
they are liable to be brought into contact do not neces­
sarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, 
and have been generally, if not uniformly recognized 
as within the competency of state legislatures in the 
exercise of their police power * *

In the Broion case, the Supreme Court held that racially 
segregated public schools, though physically equal, had a 
detrimental psychological effect on the colored children, 
retarding their educational and mental development, and 
hence were “ inherently unequal” . This conclusion com­
pelled the Court to repudiate, as applied to public schools,



13

the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 
supra — a doctrine which depended solely for its validity 
upon the equality of the separate facilities provided the 
minority race. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 
U.S. 337. The colored children being thus deprived of equal 
educational opportunities by reason of such racially segre­
gated public schools — and there being no reasonable basis 
to support such a classification — the Court held that the 
equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment prohibits 
the states from maintaining racially segregated public 
schools.

In the Bolling case, the Court held that segregation in 
the public schools of the District of Columbia imposed a 
burden on the Negro children which constituted an arbi­
trary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the due 
process clause of the 5th Amendment. In that case, the 
Court specifically held that segregation in public education 
is not reasonably related to any proper governmental ob­
jective. This conclusion was reaffirmed in Cooper v. Aaron, 
358 U.S. 1 (1958), wherein it was held that even though 
racial segregation in the public schools may promote the 
public peace by preventing race conflicts, this aim could 
not be accomplished by laws which denied the fundamental 
and positive civil right of the individual to equal educa­
tional opportunities in the public schools. Compare, how­
ever, Shuttleworth v. Board of Education, 162 F. Supp. 372, 
affirmed 358 U.S. 101 (1958), upholding the constitution­
ality of the Alabama School Placement Law.

It is now entirely clear that the Supreme Court views 
racial segregation in the public elementary and public high 
schools to be per se an invidious discrimination, one with­
out any reason or support, and, therefore, palpably arbi­
trary. It is equally clear, however, that these cases do



14

not purport to proscribe all state-imposed segregation of 
the races as being per se in violation of the Federal Con­
stitution. On the contrary, the Supreme Court in the 
Bolling case said:

“Classifications based solely upon race must be scru­
tinized with particular care since they are contrary
to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.
*  * * >>

In effect, therefore, the Supreme Court said that there are 
some classifications based solely on race which are con­
stitutionally valid; that one is not merely substituting race 
for reasonableness in all cases when racial classifications 
are made.

THE STATE’S FOUR CORRECTIONAL TRAINING INSTITUTIONS 
FOR DELINQUENT MINORS ARE NOT PUBLIC SCHOOLS, AND 
FORM NO PART OF THE STATE’S PUBLIC EDUCATION SYSTEM 
IN THE SENSE CONTEMPLATED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN 
THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES.

Appellants concede at the outset that the content of the 
educational courses offered the inmates at the training in­
stitutions reasonably coincides with standards required in 
the public schools of the State. In itself, however, this 
fact does not transform the correctional training institu­
tions for delinquent minors into public schools, or justify 
the conclusion that they are an integral part of the State’s 
public education system, as held by the court below, any 
more than the existence of a library in a penitentiary trans­
forms the penitentiary into a reading room; or the pro­
vision of recreational facilities at a university transforms 
the university into a playground. It is the total institution, 
and not its singular parts, which is determinative of its 
basic character and purpose.



15

By express legislative declaration, the training institu­
tions are for “care and reformation” , primarily of minors 
adjudged delinquent by the juvenile courts of this State.1

In Baker v. State, 205 Md. 42, the correctional training 
institutions were held to be reformatories, escape from 
which is punishable under Maryland’s criminal escape 
staute. In accordance with the philosophy underlying 
enactment of Maryland’s juvenile court laws, however, 
minors committed to these institutions, although there 
under total restraint of their liberty for wrongs perpe­
trated against the State, are not deemed to be criminals, 
nor are the institutions looked upon as being penal in 
nature. Instead, as recognized by this Court in Moquin v. 
State, 216 Md. 524, these institutions are corrective and 
protective facilities dedicated in the main to the rehabili­
tation of the State’s erring youth by an enforced institu­
tional program intended to check and remedy, rather than 
punish, the criminal tendency in its inception. In this 
setting the State assumes a parental role, acting under the

1 The State-wide and Baltimore City Juvenile Court Acts, supra, 
page 3, define a delinquent child to be a child under the age of 
eighteen years, and sixteen years, respectively, who (1 ) violates any 
law or ordinance, or who commits any act which, if committed by 
an adult, would be a crime not punishable by death or life imprison­
ment; (2 )  who is incorrigible or ungovernable or habitually dis­
obedient or who is beyond the control of his parents, guardian, cus­
todian or other lawful authority; (3 ) who is habitually a truant; 
(4 ) who without just cause and without the consent of his parents, 
guardian or other custodian, repeatedly deserts his home or place 
of abode; (5 ) who is engaged in any occupation which is in violation 
of law, or who associates with immoral or vicious persons; or (6 ) 
who so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals of him­
self or others.

These acts provide that where a delinquent child is in need of 
“ care and treatment” , the juvenile judge shall have the right to place 
him, not beyond his minority, in the custody of a public or private 
institution. See also the Montgomery County Juvenile Court Act, 
Section 72, et seq., of Article 26 of the Code, and the special pro­
visions for Washington and Allegany Counties.



16

parens patriae doctrine as the protector, the ultimate 
guardian of the delinquent minors, so as to make good 
citizens of potentially bad ones. See 31 Am. Jur., Juvenile 
Courts and Delinquent, Dependent and Neglected Children, 
Sections 2 and 19; and Roth v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329 
(1869), recognizing the training institutions to have ref­
ormation as their objective by training the inmates to in­
dustry; imbuing their minds with principles of morality 
and religion; and, “above all, by separating them from the 
corrupting influence of improper associations” . See also 
Taylor v. State, 214 Md. 156; and Jones v. House of Ref­
ormation, 176 Md. 43.

In Johnson v. State, 114 A. 2d 1 (N.J.) (1955), the Court, 
in referring to juvenile proceedings under that State’s 
juvenile laws, and particularly to the parens patriae doc­
trine, said:

“ * * * Its exercise can be spelled out of the many 
statutory provisions relating to the settlement, incar­
ceration, care and support of such persons (minors 
under disability, such as juvenile delinquents) by the 
State. This jurisdiction and duty is called into play 
when it is found that such persons could be a danger 
to themselves or to the public if they were not taken
and held under the protective custody of the sovereign, 
* * *

“The statute, by providing that a person under the 
age of 16 is deemed incapable of committing a crime, 
does not ignore the offense but merely has the effect 
of stating a child under that age cannot commit a 
crime, but it does have the effect of placing such a 
child under a legal disability and subjects his liberty 
to the parens patriae jurisdiction of the State. It is 
the fact that the child committed the offense that is 
determinative of this restraint of liberty in aid of his 
rehabilitation through reformation and education. The 
restraint under the parens patriae doctrine is for cura-



17

live rather than punitive purposes. * * *.” (Emphasis 
supplied.)

Along similar lines, this Court in Baker v. State, supra, 
noted :

“ * * * the statute creating Boys’ Village states that 
it is a place for ‘care and reformation’. Indeed, it has 
been so described throughout its legislative history. 
* * * It has been variously called ‘The House of Ref­
ormation and Instruction’, ‘The House of Reformation’, 
‘Cheltenham School for Boys’ and ‘Boys’ Village’, but 
all along the accent has been on education and training 
rather than punishment. Changes in management, 
including the recent transfer to the supervision and 
control of the Department of Public Welfare, and 
changes in the legal concept of Juvenile Causes, have 
not changed the fundamental nature of the institu­
tion.* * (Emphasis supplied.)

The academic courses conducted within the training in­
stitutions, though part of the corrective and rehabilitative 
process, do not constitute a prime phase of the total insti­
tutional program, as testified by the witness, Manella (E. 
81). The lack of institutional requirement that inmates 
over sixteen years of age pursue any academic program 
at all during their period of confinement clearly substan­
tiates this conclusion (E. 35). That prime emphasis is not 
placed on the academic phase is wholly logical since it was 
not academic deficiency that necessitated confinement in 
the first place, nor will it be scholastic achievement, or the 
lack of it, that determines suitability for release from con­
finement.

The lower court’s opinion referred to two schools within 
the Baltimore City public school system that are main­
tained exclusively for boys formally adjudged delinquent



18

by the Juvenile Court of Baltimore City, and placed on 
probation. The court reasoned, in effect, that these schools, 
being part of the Baltimore City public school system, were 
no different from the State training institutions, concluding 
that if the former were part of the public education system, 
so were the latter. While the record does not contain any 
mention of these Baltimore City schools, and the court’s 
opinion does not cite any reference pursuant to which 
they were created, it is believed that they owe their exist­
ence directly to the Public Education article of the Mary­
land Code, specifically Section 232 of Article 77, which 
authorizes Baltimore City to establish parental schools 
for habitual truants. In accordance with Sections 1 and 
202 of Article 77, these schools are expressly provided for 
within the Baltimore City public school system and, as 
such, are under the jurisdiction and control of the Depart­
ment of Education.

Contrariwise, the State’s four correctional training insti­
tutions for delinquent minors are provided for in the 
Criminal Law article of the Code under the designation: 
“Places of Reformation and Punishment” ; they are not 
under the control of the Department of Education, but 
rather under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the 
Appellants, exercising powers granted by Article 88A of 
the Code. Unlike public schools, the training institutions 
are not open and public to all in the locality, and admission 
thereto is hardly a matter of right. Merely referring to 
the training schools as “schools” , rather than as reforma­
tories, does not change the fundamental nature of the in­
stitutions. Baker v. State, supra. Clearly, the Legislature 
did not intend that the training schools be included as a 
part of the State’s general public school or public education 
System; and Appellants submit that the constitutionality 
of racial segregation in these institutions is not controlled



19

by the Supreme Court’s decision in the school Segregation 
cases.

Nor do the decisions in Dawson v. Mayor and City Coun­
cil of Baltimore, 220 F. 2d 386, affirmed 350 U.S. 877, or 
Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, affirmed 352 U.S. 903, 
relied upon by the trial court, control the decision in the 
instant case. In the Dawson case, the Fourth Circuit held 
that segregation of the races in public recreational facili­
ties, even though such facilities were entirely equal, vio­
lated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. 
The Court held, on authority of the School Segregation 
Cases, that such segregation could not be justified as a 
means to preserve the public peace “merely because the 
tangible facilities furnished to one race are equal to those 
furnished to the other” . It rejected the “ separate but 
equal” doctrine in the field of public recreational facilities; 
and further could find no proper governmental objective 
to be served by segregating the races in such facilities, 
saying:

“ * * * if that power (State’s police power) cannot 
be invoked to sustain racial segregation in the schools, 
where attendance is compulsory and racial friction 
may be apprehended from the enforced commingling 
of the races, it cannot be sustained with respect to 
public beach and bath house facilities, the use of which 
is entirely optional.”

By like reasoning, the court in the Browder case held 
segregation of the races in public transportation facilities 
to be unconstitutional.

The “separate but equal” doctrine has, therefore, speci­
fically been repudiated in the fields of public education2, 
public recreation and public transportation, and addition­

2 Extended to cover state universities and colleges in Florida ex 
rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 347 U.S. 971, and o50 U.S. 413; 
and Board of Trustees v. Frasier, 350 U.S. 979.



20

ally, in these particular areas, each involving fundamental 
and positive civil rights belonging to citizens as members 
of society, it is clear that the courts have considered, but 
rejected, the need to preserve the public peace as being 
a sufficiently weighty justification upon which to deprive 
the individual of his basic constitutional rights.

Apart from these particular areas, however, and in other 
areas where “the separate but equal” doctrine has never 
been applied as the constitutional test for separating the 
races — as in the facilities involved in the present case — 
the inquiry must be: Does the racial classification rest 
upon some real or substantial difference pertinent to a 
valid legislative objective? In other words, the question 
in these instances must be whether the racial classification 
is justified within the rules laid down by the Supreme 
Court in Morey v. Doud, supi’a. In this connection, the 
reasonableness of state action separating the races must 
take into account the relative weights of the beneficial 
consequences which will follow from upholding the classi­
fication, as against the price which must be paid therefor 
in the form of resulting deprivation, if any, of civil rights.

The point is well illustrated by the case of Nichols v. 
McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721, appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 6 
(1959). In that case, the petitioner, an inmate of a state 
prison, contended that his constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection of the law was denied him in that he was re­
quired to join an exclusively Negro line formation when 
proceeding to his assigned cellblock for daily lockup and 
to the prison dining hall, and that he was required to eat 
in a walled-off and exclusively Negro compartment in the 
prison dining hall. He contended that such systematic 
segregation caused him a loss of self-respect, thereby mak­
ing it difficult for him to effect the same degree of rehabili­



21

tation possible for unsegregated prisoners of other races. 
He relied principally on Brown v. Board of Education, 
supra. The Court there held: “By no parity of reasoning 
can the rationale of Brown v. Board of Education be ex­
tended to state penal institutions where the inmates, and 
their control, pose difficulties not found in educational 
systems. Federal courts have long been loath to interfere 
in the administration of state prisons.” See also United 
States ex rel. Morris v. Radio Station, 209 F. 2d 105 (1953 ), 
wherein Morris, a Negro inmate of a state penitentiary, 
alleged, among other things, that he was discriminated 
against and denied equal protection of the laws solely be­
cause of his race, in that he was denied the privilege to 
audition or act as an announcer of a radio program heard 
within the prison, and using prison talent. The Court said:

“Inmates of state penitentiaries should realize that 
prison officials are vested with wide discretion in 
safeguarding prisoners committed to their custody. 
Discipline reasonably maintained in state prison is not 
under the supervisory direction of Federal Courts. 
* * * A prisoner may not approve of prison rules and 
regulations, but under all ordinary circumstances that 
is no basis for coming into a Federal Court seeking 
relief even though he may claim that the restrictions 
placed upon his activities are in violation of his con­
stitutional rights.”

To the same effect, see Siegel v. Ragan, 180 F. 2d 785.

Separation of White and Colored Children in the 
State’s Four Correctional Training Institutions for 
Delinquent Minors I s N ot A n Arbitrary Classification, 
But Rests Upon Reasonable Grounds of Distinction, 
Conducing to the Attainment of a Proper Governmental 
Objective.

Juvenile delinquency in the broad sense is a social prob­
lem, primarily rooted in social and psychological causes.



22

From the testimony at the trial, it is manifest that control 
and guidance of a parental nature, properly applied within 
minimum security facilities, is the first and most important 
essential overriding all other considerations in the State’s 
effort to successfully rehabilitate its institutionalized juve­
nile offenders. Consistent with this end, the State’s cor­
rectional training schools are open-custody institutions 
of the “cottage type” , the cottages being meant to resemble 
homes, and being staffed with “cottage parents” who are 
intended to be symbolic of the inmates’ own parents. The 
environmental setting thereby created is one as nearly as 
possible duplicating the home or family life atmosphere, 
and it is under such optimum conditions that the State, 
standing in the stead of the inmates’ own parents, under­
takes to bring about the requisite social readjustment of 
the delinquent offender prior to returning him to society.

The validity of these concepts is well recognized. See 
the Encyclopedia Brittanica, Vol. 13, Juvenile Delinquency, 
page 229-231, and Vol. 5, Juvenile Courts, page 476-479. 
See particularly the Montgomery County Juvenile Court 
Act, supra, stating (Section 74):

“The purpose of this subtitle is to secure for each 
child under its jurisdiction such care and guidance, 
preferably in his own home, as will serve the child’s 
welfare and the best interest of the State; to conserve 
and strengthen the child’s family ties whenever pos­
sible, removing him from the custody of his parents 
only when his welfare or the safety and protection of 
the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without 
such removal; and, when such child is removed from 
his own family, to secure for him custody, care, and 
discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which 
should have been given by his parents. * * * ” . (Em­
phasis supplied.)



23

The success of the rehabilitation program is thus pri­
marily dependent upon, geared to, and revolves around 
the cottage life of the inmates. It is here that they spend 
approximately two-thirds of their time, living, eating, 
sleeping and playing together, and it is under such con­
ditions — conditions most closely and realistically approxi­
mating the social environment to which the inmates must 
return upon release from confinement -—- that the basic 
reformation of the delinquents’ antisocial tendencies must 
be effected. To mix the racial cultures in this setting would 
not only subject each to a social climate as an integral part 
of his treatment which neither will experience upon dis­
charge from confinement, but it would further competely 
nullify the fundamental role played by the cottage parents 
in the rehabilitative process — for it is not to be expected 
that inmates of either race will look to the other for the 
parental attachment and guidance which lies at the very 
foundation of the institutional program. As the Supreme 
Court said in Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, the object of the 
14th Amendment was not to enforce a commingling of the 
two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.

Also to be considered in light of the foregoing is the fact 
that the institutional atmosphere — one already charged 
with natural tensions normally resulting among individuals 
compelled to live together under close restraint of their 
liberty — most conduces to attain its desired end when 
there is a minimum of extraneously caused friction or 
hostility. In Durkee v. Murphy, 181 Md. 259!, 265, this 
Court made the following factual observation with refer­
ence to segregated recreational facilities:

“ * * * And these provisions must, we conclude, be 
construed to vest in the Board the power to assign 
the golf courses to the use of the one race and the 
other in an effort to avoid any conflict which might



24

arise from racial antipathies, for that is a common 
need to be faced in regulation of public facilities in 
Maryland, and must be implied in any delegation of 
power to control and regulate. There can he no ques­
tion that, unreasonable as such antipathies may he, 
they are prominent sources of conflict, and are always 
to he reckoned with. * * * (Emphasis supplied.)

Although the Durkee case was overruled, as to its legal 
conclusions, by the decision in Dawson v. Mayor and City 
Council of Baltimore, supra, this Court’s factual observa­
tion as to racial antipathy remains a valid one of far 
greater application when applied to reformatory institu­
tions. Just as overcrowding of too many disturbed chil­
dren in cottage limits the possibilities of treatment, and 
invites the surrender of staff and program to mere custody, 
so would racial friction likely lead to such a result, and 
deprive both races of the essential treatment each requires 
independent of the other to most profitably effect their 
rehabilitation.

In view of the foregoing, to separate the races in the 
correctional training institutions for delinquent minors 
is not an arbitrary classification, but is one resting upon 
reasonable grounds of distinction, clearly serving to the 
attainment of a proper governmental objective. The classi­
fication under such circumstances is not discriminatory, 
much less would it be an invidious discrimination violative 
of the equal protection clause. Nor does separation of the 
races in these facilities constitute an arbitrary deprivation 
of the inmates’ liberty violative of the due process clause 
of the 14th Amendment, as held by the lower court.

As heretofore noted, in assessing the reasonableness of 
any law, both from the standpoint of the equal protection 
and due process guarantees, it is necessary to evaulate 
the beneficial consequences which would follow from up­



25

holding the law, as against the price which must be paid 
therefor in the form of resulting deprivation of the citizens’ 
constitutionally guaranteed rights. Appellants, though pre­
ferring to rest the constitutionality of racial segregation 
in the training schools on considerations of positive sub­
stance, cannot overlook the fact that unlike the funda­
mental, positive and pervasive civil rights of the individual 
involved in the public school, public recreation and public 
transportation cases, there is no constitutionally guaran­
teed right to be incarcerated in the training schools; nor 
does the individual enjoy any right, once there, to dictate 
to the State the terms under which he will consent to be 
rehabilitated. The individual has no civil right under the 
circumstances to consort with whom he pleases, when he 
wishes, or to be given rights and privileges without regard 
to the special and peculiar conditions existing within the 
institutions. Basically, the individual is confined in the 
training institution against his will for wrongs perpetrated 
against the State, and he will remain so confined until 
such time as his fledgling criminal and antisocial tendencies 
can be remedied by institutional treatment. As observed 
by the Supreme Court in Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266:

“ * * * Lawful incarceration brings about the neces­
sary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges or 
rights, a retraction justified by the considerations 
underlying our penal system. * *

The State’s obligation to rehabilitate its offending minors 
in such manner, and under such conditions, as it deems 
best calculated to assure their return to society as useful 
citizens is a responsibility of the highest order. The ex­
tent to which the separation of the races in these facilities 
conduces to that end, the degree of its efficiency, the close­
ness of its relation to the end sought to be accomplished, 
are matters addressed to the judgment of the Legislature.



26

It is enough if it can be seen that in any degree, or under 
any reasonably conceivable circumstances, there is an ac­
tual relation between the means and the end. Allied Stores 
v. Bowers, supra; Morey v. Doud, supra; Williamson v. 
Lee Optical, supra; Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251; 
McBriety v. Baltimore City, 219 Md. 223; and Davis v. 
State, 183 Md. 385.

This Court has many times stated and restated, empha­
sized and reemphasized, that every presumption favors 
the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, and a 
successful attack upon it must show clearly and affirma­
tively that it is arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or 
illegal. The rule, while requiring no elaboration, was re­
cently well summarized by this Court in Magruder v. Hall 
of Records Commission, 221 Md. 1, as follows:

“ * * * We have held time and time again that there 
is a presumption in favor of the validity of a statute, 
that it will not be stricken down as invalid unless it 
plainly contravenes a provision of the Constitution 
and that a reasonable doubt in its favor is enough to 
sustain it.”

And in Kirkwood v. Provident Savings Bank, 205 Md. 48, 
this Court said:

“ * * * The Court will not denounce a statute as void 
on the ground that the lawmaking power has violated 
the Constitution, except when such violation is clear 
and unmistakable. Consequently the Court will al­
ways so construe a statute as to avoid a conflict with 
the Constitution and give it full force and effect when­
ever reasonably possible * *



27

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, it is respectfully submitted that 

Sections 657 and 659-661 of Article 27, Annotated Code of 
Maryland (1957 Ed.) are constitutional. The declaratory 
decree appealed from should, therefore, be reversed, with 
costs awarded to the Appellants.

Respectfully submitted,

C. Ferdinand Sybert,
Attorney General,

Robert C. Murphy,
Assistant Attorney General,

For Appellants.