St. Louis City v Golden Gate Corp Brief Amici Curiae

    In the

^ujirrmr GImtrl uf Missouri
September Session, 1967 

No. 52568

T he City oe St. L ouis, a municipal corporation,

—vs.—
Appellant-Plaintiff,

Golden Gate Corporation, a corporation, et al.,
Respondents-Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OE THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MO. 
DIV. NO. 3---- HONORABLE FRANKLIN E. REAGAN, JUDGE

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

J ack Greenberg 
Leroy D. Clark 
Gabrielle A. K irk

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

Counsel for the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, 
Inc., and the National Office for 
the Rights of the Indigent

Margaret McCrory 
Of Counsel



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Points and Authorities .................................................... 1

A rg u m e n t—

I. The City of St. Louis Is Not Prohibited by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the United States Constitution from 
Enacting and Enforcing an Ordinance Author­
izing the Appointment of a Receivership to 
Rehabilitate Residential Property Which Con­
stitutes a Danger to Life, Safety, and Health 4

II. Ordinance No. 53995 Is Not an Unconstitu­
tional Delegation of Legislative Functions to
the Judiciary ........................................    11

III. Ordinance No. 53995 Is Not an Unconstitu­
tional Delegation of Legislative Function to 
Administrative Officers ....................................... 13

IV. Ordinance No. 53995 Is Not Invalid on the
Ground of Inconsistency With State Law or 
Preemption of Powers Exercised by and Re­
served to the State ............................................  15

Certificate of Service 18



I n the

^uprrmr (tort of Missouri
September Session, 1967 

Action No. 52568

T he City of St. L ouis, a municipal corporation,

Appellant-Plaintiff,
—vs.—

Golden Gate Corporation, a corporation, et al.,
Respondents-Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MO. 
DIV. NO. 3---- HONORABLE FRANKLIN E. REAGAN, JUDGE

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus accepts the jurisdictional statement and state­
ment of facts as stated in the brief of appellant.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.
THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS IS NOT PROHIBITED BY 

THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU­
TION FROM ENACTING AND ENFORCING AN ORDI­
NANCE AUTHORIZING THE APPOINTMENT OF A 
RECEIVERSHIP TO REHABILITATE RESIDENTIAL 
PROPERTY WHICH CONSTITUTES A DANGER TO 
LIFE, SAFETY, AND HEALTH.

Thomas Cusack v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 531;
Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 

(1946);



2

Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171;
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365 

(1926);
8 ampere v. New Orleans, 166 La. 775, 117 So. 

827 (1928), affirmed per curiam 279 U.S. 812 
(1929);

Rerman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954);
In the Matter of the Department of Buildings, 

14 N.Y. 2d 291, 200 N.E. 2d 432 (1964); 
Central Savings Bank v. New York, 279 N.Y. 

266, 18 N.E. 2d 151 (1938).

II.

ORDINANCE NO. 53995 IS NOT AN UNCONSTITU­
TIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS 
TO THE JUDICIARY.

State ex rel. Orr v. Kearns, 264 S.E. 775 (1924).

III.

ORDINANCE NO. 53995 IS NOT AN UNCONSTITU­
TIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION 
TO ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS.

Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495 (1935);

Panama Refining Co., et al. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 
388 (1934);

International Railway Co. v. Public Service Com­
mission, 36 N.Y.S. 2d 125 (1942), aff’d without 
opinion, 289 N.Y. 830 (1943);

New York Central Securities Corporation v. 
United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932);



3

State of Oklahoma v. Parham, 412 P.2d 142 
(1966);

State of Wisconsin v. Whitman, 220 N.W. 992 
(1928);

West Central Producers Co-operative Associa­
tion v. Commissioner of Agriculture, 20 S.E. 
2d 797 (W. Ya. 1942);

Financial Aid Corporation v. Wallace, 23 N.E. 
472 (Ind. 1939);

Dickerson, et al. v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 313, 
24 S.E. 2d 550 (1943).

IV.

ORDINANCE NO. 53995 IS NOT INVALID ON THE 
GROUND OF INCONSISTENCY WITH STATE LAW 
OR PREEMPTION OF POWERS EXERCISED BY AND 
RESERVED TO THE STATE.

Vest y . Kansas City, 194 S.W. 2d 38 (1946); 
City of Maryville v. Wood, 216 S.W. 2d 75 

(1948);
Passler v. Johnson, 304 S.W. 2d 903 (1957); 
Bushman v. Bushman, 279 S.W. 122 (1925).



4

A R G U M E N T

I.

THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS IS NOT PROHIBITED BY 
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU­
TION FROM ENACTING AND ENFORCING AN ORDI- 
NANCE AUTHORIZING THE APPOINTMENT OF A 
RECEIVERSHIP TO REHABILITATE RESIDENTIAL 
PROPERTY WHICH CONSTITUTES A DANGER TO 
LIFE, SAFETY, AND HEALTH.

The central question raised by this appeal is whether 
the City of St. Louis in utilizing a receivership ordinance, 
has unduly invaded the right of the appellee to have un­
fettered control over privately-owned residential property 
which is alleged to have extensive violations of the Mini­
mum Housing Code.

The general rule is that legislation controlling the use 
of property is a constitutional exercise of the police power 
unless “ it is plain and palpable that it has no real or 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or 
to the general welfare” . Thomas Cusack v. Chicago, 242 
U.S. 526, 531. The reasonableness of the relationship de­
pends upon a weighing of the extent of the deprivation of 
property against the importance of the governmental in­
terest sought to be protected and the degree to which the 
challenged legislation is calculated to promote that interest. 
Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946); 
Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171.

The rapid growth of American cities in the last six 
decades has been accompanied by a substantial increase 
in the number and size of slums and blighted areas, and



5

by a serious lack of adequate housing. There is also ade­
quate proof that these conditions are productive of a dis­
proportionate increase in crime, disease, fire, and difficulty 
in providing public services.1

A wide range of programs have been sustained as consti­
tutional means of abating and averting these slum condi­
tions including zoning ordinances Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Company, 272 U.S. 365 (1926); building and housing codes 
Sampere v. New Orleans, 166 La. 775, 117 So. 827 (1928), 
affirmed per curiam 279 U.S. 812 (1929) and condemnation 
under Urban Renewal programs, Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26 (1954). All of these programs involved extensive 
control over the private ownership of property but they 
were all upheld as proper exercises of the police power 
to protect the public health and safety. Receivership of 
slum housing has been adopted in six states as a supple­
ment to the above programs.2 None of these receivership 
statutes have been held unconstitutional. In New York, 
one of the states which has had the most extensive use of 
receivership, the statute has recently been upheld against 
claims that it was unconstitutional. In the Matter of the 
Department of Buildings, 14 N.Y. 2d 291, 200 N.E. 2d 432
(1964) .

Appellees’ motion to dismiss asserts that the City of 
St. Louis has other adequate remedies at law which bar 
the use of the equitable remedy of receivership. This is 
also an argument that use of the receivership ordinance

1 See generally, A  Sliorr, Slums and Social Insecurity (U.S. Depart­
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, Research Report No. 1, 1963); 
Johnstone, The Federal Urban Renewal Program, 25 University of 
Chicago Law Review 301, 304 (1958).

2 Conn. Gen. Stat. Annot. Sec. 19-3476 (1965); Laws o f Indiana, 
Chapter 243 (1967); Annot. Laws of Mass., Chapter 111, Section 127 H
(1965) ; New Jersey Laws 2A:42-80 et seq. (1966); N.Y. Multiple Dwell­
ing Law Sec. 309; 111. Rev. Stat. Chapter 24 Sec. 11-21-2 (1965).



6

is an “unreasonable” and unconstitutional deprivation of 
property, because there are alternatives which interfere 
less with ownership rights. However, it is precisely be­
cause the usual legal remedies fail to fully correct aggra­
vated housing disrepair, that many municipalities have 
had to resort to receivership.

The City of St. Louis has three legal remedies: (1) 
quasi-criminal prosecution, (2) condemnation of buildings 
unfit for human habitation with an order for all tenants 
to vacate, and (3) establishing a special tax to operate as 
a lien to recoup the expenditures for repairs made by the 
city. Studies have shown that criminal prosecution of land­
lords for violations of a Housing Code has generally proved 
unfruitful, in part because of judicial reluctance to place 
heavy penalties on landlords whose buildings vary little 
from the neighborhood norm.3

If a conviction results in a small fine, the landlord treats 
it as a cost of doing business which is less expensive than 
making the needed repairs. If the fines are large, it pre­
cludes compliance because the violator’s available capital 
is reduced. In either event, financial resources are being- 
taken by the municipality and are not being used to cor­
rect the violations. Jailing the violator is likewise an in­
efficient way of coercing the landlord, without directly 
achieving repair. The second remedy of ordering tenants 
to vacate a building, cannot be used regularly in a city 
which already has a housing shortage. Also, vacated build­
ings are themselves a serious blighting influence—vandals 
are attracted thus making repair even more difficult. More­
over, in a housing shortage this remedy is usually limited 
to buildings that are structurally unsound, where there 
is a clear need for emergency evacuation. Receivership on

3 See Lehman, Building Codes, Housing Codes and the Conservation 
of Chicago’s Homing Supply, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 180 (1963).



7

the other hand was designed to cope with the entirely 
different problem of taking structurally sound buildings 
and making them habitable by quick repairs.

Repair by the Building Department with city funds and 
recoupment through a lien places the burden on the city 
initially to have the financial resources to cope with de­
terioration created by the refusal of landlords to use in­
come from their property to maintain it in a lawful state. 
To the extent that its resources are limited, property in 
need of immediate repairs will not receive it. Only re­
ceivership provides direct access to the income from the 
property to correct the Code violation. Such a city-repair 
program may involve the Buildings Department too deeply 
in real estate management with a limited staff. Under 
the receivership program, the court could appoint private 
receivers with adequate experience in the management of 
property. Thus, neither of the legal remedies available 
to the City of St. Louis is adequate to the task of achieving 
immediate correction of Housing Code violations.

Receivership is also most appropriate in the instant case 
where the city is prepared to prove a pattern of landlord 
refusal to correct Code violations. The appellee here has 
been fully informed of the violations on the property and 
has, for at least a 60-day period thereafter, refused to 
correct those violations. The appointment of a receiver 
by the court to receive the rents and supervise the repair 
is the only adequate response to the actively recalcitrant 
landlord.

We have spoken above of the general constitutional au­
thority for a municipality to use its police power to deal 
with housing conditions which threaten the public safety 
and health. There are, however, particular constitutional 
problems under due process of law and impairment of 
contracts, which are associated with the receivership



8

remedy. The due process problems contain two elements: 
notice to all parties who have an interest in the property 
and the right to participate in a hearing on the necessity 
of the appointment of a receiver and the reasonableness 
of the expenditures for rehabilitation. The impairment 
of contract issue involves the question of whether the 
municipality can constitutionally establish a lien on the 
rents which is prior to that of the mortgagee.

The early case of Central Savings Bank v. New York> 
279 N.Y. 266, 18 NE 2d 151 (1938) raised all of these 
questions and held that the New York law was void be­
cause there was no provision for notice of the proceedings 
to the mortgagee or for affording him an opportunity to 
be heard as to the necessity for repairs or the reasonable­
ness of expenses incurred in making them. The court also 
found that the subordination of the mortgagee’s lien to 
the city’s lien for repairs, was an unconstitutional impair­
ment of contract rights because the owner could not have 
achieved such a subordination of the mortgagee’s interest 
by making the repairs himself.

In the Matter of Department of Buildings of the City, 
of New York, supra is the major case on the constitu­
tionality of a receivership statute. There the parties as­
serting the unconstitutionality of the receivership statute 
relied heavily on the Central Savings Bank case and the 
court fully responded to all of the constitutional claims 
raised in that case. The court held that the receivership 
statute which was passed after the Central Savings Bank 
case had fully remedied the procedural deficiencies cited 
there, since the mortgagee received notice and a right 
to participate in the proceedings.4 On the issue of the 
impairment of contract rights, the court stated:

4 The St. Louis Receivership ordinance has none o f these procedural 
deficiencies, for all parties with any interest in the property are given 
notice and participate in the proceedings as co-defendants. Ordinance 
No. 53995, Section 2.



9

When weighed against the vital public purposes sought 
to be achieved, the interference with the mortgagee’s 
rights resulting from the present law may not be said 
to be so unreasonable or oppressive as to preclude 
the State’s exercise of its police power. It is worth 
remarking that if the mortgagee’s lien may not be 
subordinated to the extent provided—that is by post­
poning his right to collect rents from the property or 
to effect a discharge of the receiver until the cost in­
curred by the receiver on behalf of the municipality 
in removing the dangerous conditions has been repaid 
—the result would be that the State must permit slum 
conditions to continue unabated or alternatively either 
condemn unsafe buildings and thereby aggravate the 
acute housing shortage or continue making improve­
ments with, however, a lien subordinate to previously 
recorded mortgages. To insist upon the last course, 
not only would result in a gratuitous addition to the 
security of prior encumbrances but would undoubtedly 
render the operation financially impossible.
. . . The same public interest which supports the stat­
ute when directed against the owner, even though it 
impinges on his right to deal freely with his property, 
equally justifies the legislation as a reasonable exer­
cise of the police power insofar as it affects the right 
of the mortgagee.
If the legislation before us is addressed to a legiti­
mate end, the measures taken are reasonable and ap­
propriate to that end ‘it may not be stricken as un­
constitutional even though it may interfere with rights 
established by existing’ contracts. Home Bldg. & Loan 
Assn. v. Blaisedell, 290 U.S. 398, 438, 54 S. Ct. 231, 
240, 78 L. Ed. 413.



10

The court noted that a further justification for the re­
ceivership statute lies in the current slum conditions:

It is likewise clear—turning to the second of the con­
stitutional defects noted in the earlier statute—that 
the Central Savings Bank decision may not be relied 
upon to invalidate the 1962 statute on the ground 
that it effects an unconstitutional impairment of the 
mortgagee’s contractual rights. We assess the pro­
priety and reasonableness and by that token, the valid­
ity of an exercise of the police power in light of the 
conditions confronting the legislature when it acts 
and it can hardly be questioned that the situation in 
terms of the shortage of safe and adequate dwelling 
units, which prompted the 1962 amendment (L. 1962, 
ch. 492 §1) presented a far more serious emergency 
than that existing in 1937.

The City of St. Louis, like New York City and most 
other large cities in the 1960’s, has a severe slum problem: 
Out of 262,984 housing units, approximately 20% (46,376) 
of them are classified as “deteriorating,” and another 5% 
(11,538) are in a more serious state of disrepair being 

classified as “dilapidated.” 5 In the face of such a serious 
housing blight, the receivership ordinance is clearly a valid 
measure to protect tenants from the consequent dangers 
to life, health, and safety.

5U.S. Census of Housing: 1960, Table 12, page 27. This report also 
indicates that non-whites occupy 36% (16,911) o f the housing classified 
as deteriorating and 43% (5,064) o f the housing classified as dilapidated. 
Table 38, pages 27-140.



11

II.

ORDINANCE NO. 53995 IS NOT AN UNCONSTITU­
TIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS 
TO THE JUDICIARY.

In point 8 of their motion to dismiss, Golden Gate Cor­
poration contends that Ordinance No. 53995 (hereinafter 
referred to as No. 53995) is unconstitutional and void in 
that it delegates legislative authority and power to the 
judiciary without sufficient standards given the court to 
determine: “ (1) whether or not a receiver should be ap­
pointed; (2) the purpose, if any, other than placing the 
property in the custody of the court; (3) the necessity 
of the receivership; (4) the powers, rights and duties 
of the receiver; (5) the duration of the receivership; (6) 
and the ultimate disposition of the property. (See Para­
graph IV of Golden Gate’s memorandum in support of its 
motion to dismiss.) Amicus submits that this contention 
is completely without legal or factual basis.

No. 53995 provides for the appointment of a receiver 
upon the application of the building commissioner or the 
health commissioner if it appears to either commissioner 
that the “safety, health or welfare of persons on, about 
or near said premises has been or will be endangered by 
the condition thereof.” Such a request is only made if an 
owner of a building fails to comply within sixty days with 
an order of either commissioner to correct one or more 
violations of the Revised Code of the City of St. Louis. 
The question of whether or not a receiver should be ap­
pointed is properly a judicial determination which will be 
made after a finding that endangering conditions exist, 
and that the landlord has failed to correct those conditions.

It is clear on the face of No. 53995 that the purpose of 
the receivership is “to collect all rents and profits accruing



12

from said property . . . and make any necessary repairs 
thereto.” The powers, rights and duties of the receiver 
are also made explicit by the statute. Although there is 
no specific timetable indicating the duration of the re­
ceivership, it is implicit that since the purpose of said 
receivership is to correct code violations, the necessity 
ceases when the condition is remedied and that in the 
exercise of its broad discretion the court could and would 
declare that the receivership had terminated.

Since there is no transfer of title involved, the property 
is not, in a legal sense, returned to the owner since he 
never lost it. However, after the purposes of the receiver­
ship have been accomplished, it is obvious that the owner 
would again resume complete control over the property.

This ordinance differs from the statute which was in­
validated in State ex rel. Orr v. Kearns, 264 S.W. 775 
(1924). In that case, the court was empowered to close a 
bawdy house found to be a nuisance “for a reasonable 
length of time as it seems just and wise to the court.” It 
is clear that in that instance the court was without any 
standard to guide them in a determination of the length 
of time that the bawdy house would be closed. However, 
No. 53995 has for its purpose the elimination of code vio­
lations which endanger the safety, health or welfare of per­
sons, and the appointment of a receiver is one way of ac­
complishing this result. When this result is accomplished, 
the receivership ceases.

The nature of the legislative process is to make statu­
tory declarations as to what is unlawful. It is the province 
of the judiciary to determine whether a particular factual 
situation comes within the strictures of that declaration. 
Certainly, the legislature should not be expected to foresee 
all possible circumstances involving code violations that 
might endanger the safety, health, or welfare of persons.



13

The judiciary is uniquely equipped to decide whether in a 
given factual circumstance (which will often vary) the 
existence of code violations, ignored by the owner, makes a 
building dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of 
persons, necessitating the appointment of a receiver.

III.

ORDINANCE NO. 53995 IS NOT AN UNCONSTITU- 
TIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION 
TO ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS.

Somewhat analogous to the appellee’s contention re­
ferred to in Argument II is point 18 of the motion to dis­
miss in which it is contended that No. 53995 is an uncon­
stitutional and void delegation of legislative functions to 
an administrative officer without setting up sufficient stan­
dards for his guidance. Amicus again submits that this 
contention is unfounded.

It has long been recognized that administrative officers 
or agencies should be invested with control over those 
matters for which they have peculiar expertise. When 
such control is given by the legislature, admittedly, certain 
standards must be provided so that the officers can prop­
erly carry out the legislative policy. However, the specific­
ity of such standards has been, generally, liberally con­
strued. Delegations by Congress have only been held un­
constitutional in two cases by the Supreme Court. See 
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 
(1935), and Panama Refining Co., et al. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 
388 (1934).

A number of state courts have refused to invalidate 
statutes investing administrative officers or agencies with 
authority, notwithstanding the minimal amount of stan­
dards provided by the legislature. In International Rail­



14

way Co. v. Public Service Commission, 36 N.Y.S. 2d 125 
(1942), aff’d without opinion, 289 N.Y. 830 (1943), the 
Public Service Commission was authorized to disapprove 
contracts entered by utilities if it found that they were 
“not in the public interest.” In upholding this authority 
invested by the state legislature, the court “conceded that 
a criterion of ‘public interest’ standing alone presents a 
standard of immense and varied implication.” But when 
it “construed [this term] with reference to the general 
purposes and the subject matter of the Public Service 
Law,” it found that “ ‘public interest’ is directly related 
and limited to the general purposes of such law . . . [and] 
it is a sufficient guide.” The court cited New York Central 
Securities Corporation v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932), 
in support of its position. Finally, the court held that 
“ the legislature is not required to furnish details but only 
to provide a general guide for administrative action.”

In State of Oklahoma v. Parham, 412 P.2d 142 (1966), a 
regulation enacted by the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Board which required wholesalers to keep minimum 
inventories was upheld. The court stated: “to require 
detailed and minute guidelines to the Board would be to 
destroy the flexibility and effectiveness required in dealing 
with the many and varying factual situations that arise 
in carrying out the policy set by the legislature.” State 
of Wisconsin v. Whitman, 220 N.W. 992 (1928), is another 
example of a court recognizing that the specificity of stan­
dards varies because sometimes the “ subject matter does 
not admit of the application of any except the most general 
standards.” Also, see West Central Producers Co-opera­
tive Association v. Commissioner of Agriculture, 20 S.E. 2d 
797 (W. Ya. 1942), and Financial Aid Corporation v. 
Wallace, 23 N.E. 472 (Ind. 1939), upholding a statute 
investing the Department of Financial Institutions with 
authority “to classify such small loans in general order



15

according to such system of differentiation as may rea­
sonably distinguish such classes of loans for purpose of 
regulations.” Finally, in Dickerson, et al. v. Common­
wealth, 181 Ya. 313, 24 S.E. 2d 550 (1943), the court up­
held a statute giving the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board 
authority to adopt regulations concerning transportation 
of alcohol to “fit such transportation to legitimate pur­
poses. . . .” In commenting upon the term “legitimate” the 
court saw nothing indefinite about it and said that it should 
be construed in its usual and common acceptance with 
reference to Webster’s Dictionary.

IV.

ORDINANCE NO. 53995 IS NOT INVALID ON THE 
GROUND OF INCONSISTENCY WITH STATE LAW 
OR PREEMPTION OF POWERS EXERCISED BY AND 
RESERVED TO THE STATE.

Appellee contends in its memorandum on motion to dis­
miss that No. 53995 conflicts with Missouri’s general re­
ceivership statute and consequently violates Section 71.010 
R.S. Mo. 1959 which provides that “Any municipal corpora­
tion in this state, whether under general or special charter, 
and having authority to pass ordinances regulating sub­
jects, matters and things upon which there is a general 
law of the state, unless otherwise prescribed or authorized 
by some special provision of its charter, shall confine and 
restrict its jurisdiction and the passage of its ordinances 
to and in conformity with the state law upon the same 
subject.” Section 515.240 R.S. Mo. 1959 provides that 
“ [t]he Court, or any judge thereof in vacation, shall have 
power to appoint a receiver, whenever such appointment 
shall be deemed necessary, whose duty it shall be to keep 
and preserve any money or other thing deposited in court,



16

or that may be subject of a tender, and to keep and pre­
serve all property and protect any business or business 
interest entrusted to him pending any legal or equitable 
proceeding concerning the same, subject to the order of 
the court.”

The usual rule in Missouri cases involving a possible 
conflict between state and city laws is summarized in 
Vest v. Kansas City, 194 S.W. 2d 38 (1946): “ The fact 
that a state has enacted regulations governing an occupa­
tion does not of itself prohibit a municipality from enacting 
additional requirements. So long as there is no conflict 
between the two both will stand. * * * The fact that an; 
ordinance enlarges upon the provisions of a statute by 
requiring more than the statute requires creates no con­
flict therewith, unless the statute limits the requirement 
for all cases to its own prescriptions.” (at 39). Under this 
theory courts have held city ordinances valid which require 
more frequent physical examinations for barbers than state 
statutes require (Vest) and which restrict the sale of 
liquor even beyond the requirements of “a comprehensive 
scheme for the regulation and control of [its] manufacture, 
sale, possession, transportation and distribution” enacted 
by the state. (City of Maryville v. Wood, 216 S.W. 2d 75 
(1948), at 77.) Also see Passler v. Johnson, 304 S.W. 2d 
903 (1957).

The power of a court of equity to appoint a receiver is 
inherent, existing independently of statutory sanction. 
(Bushman v. Bushman, 279 S.W. 122 (1925).) Section 
515.240 must therefore be construed broadly to include 
the full scope of the preexisting equity power and not as 
limiting all cases to a narrow interpretation of its pre­
scriptions. The receivership described in No. 53995—call­
ing for the keeping and preserving of dwellings until the 
minimum statutory requirements for such dwellings have



17

been met and a legal landlord-tenant relationship thereby 
established—is clearly consistent with a broad reading of 
Section 515.240 and with the general power of equity courts 
to appoint receivers. Indeed, the city of St. Louis has 
done no more than describe a particular use of a pre­
existing and legislatively sanctioned power, a procedure 
which is surely valid under Missouri’s liberal rulings in 
the area of preemption.

Appellee has cited City of St. Lotas v. Stenson, 333 
S.W. 2d 529 (1960), as an example of an unlawful conflict 
between state and city law. This case involved an ordi­
nance which set a maximum length for trucks using public 
highways which was more restrictive than a state statute 
to the same effect. Conflicting requirements as to the con­
dition of vehicles permitted to use public highways would 
have hampered intercity traffic and violated an interest in 
uniformity expressed by the state legislature in Section 
304.120 R.S. Mo. 1959 (which stated that city ordinances 
contrary to state traffic regulations would be invalid). 
No. 53995, on the other hand, is not in conflict with state law 
on the subject of receivership and does not involve an area 
in which uniformity is a statutory requirement or a prac­
tical necessity.

Respectfully submitted,

J ack Greenberg 
L eroy D. Clark 
Gabrielle A. K irk

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

Margaret M cCrory 
Of Counsel



18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that copies of the foregoing Brief 
Amicus Curiae was served by depositing same in the 
United States mail, air mail, postage prepaid to James J. 
Wilson, Assistant City Counselor, City of St. Louis, Room 
234, City Hall, St. Louis, Missouri 63103, Attorney for 
Plaintiff, and J. E. Sigoloff, Charles Sigoloff and Sidney 
Rubin, 722 Chestnut Street, St. Louis, Missouri, Attorneys 
for Defendants.



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