Sheff v. Oneill Plaintiffs Brief

    STATE OF CONNECTICUT
SUPREME COURT

S.C. 15255

MILO SHEFF, ET AL.
VS.

WILLIAM A. O'NEILL, ET AL. 

PLAINTIFFS' APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT 

HONORABLE HARRY HAMMER, JUDGE 

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF

TO BE ARGUED BY:

WESLEY W. HORTON

WESLEY W. HORTON
MOLLER, HORTON & SHIELDS, P.C.
90 GILLETT STREET
HARTFORD, CT 06106
(203) 522-8338
JURIS NO. 38478

SANDRA DELVALLE 
KENNETH KIMERLING 
PUERTO RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE & 
EDUCATION FUND
99 HUDSON STREET, 14TH FLOOR 
NEW YORK, NY 10013 
(212) 219-3360

WILFRED RODRIGUEZ 
HISPANIC ADVOCACY PROJECT 
NEIGHBORHOOD LEGAL SERVICES 
1229 ALBANY AVENUE 
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06112 
(203) 297-0760

JOHN C. BRITTAIN
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT SCHOOL
OF LAW
65 ELIZABETH STREET 
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06105 
(203) 241-4664

MARTHA STONE
PHILIP D. TEGELER
CONNECTICUT CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION FOUNDATION
32 GRAND STREET
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06106
(203) 247-9823

CHRISTOPHER A. HANSEN 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION
132 WEST 43RD STREET 
NEW YORK, NY 10036 
(212) 944-9800

THEODORE M. SHAW
DENNIS D. PARKER
MARIANNE L. ENGELMAN LADO
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND
EDUCATIONAL FUND
99 HUDSON STREET, 16TH FLOOR
NEW YORK, NY 10013
(212) 219-1900



STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Did the trial court err in failing to find state action? (at

II. Did defendants violate Article First, §§ 1 and 20 and 
Article Eighth, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution by failing to 
provide public schoolchildren in the Hartford metropolitan area an 
equal educational opportunity? (at 36-44)

III. Did defendants violate Article First, §§ l and 20 and 
Article Eighth, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution by providing 
education in the Hartford metropolitan area that is segregated on the 
basis of race and ethnicity? (at 44-55)

IV. Did defendants violate Article Eighth, § l of the 
Connecticut Constitution by failing to provide Hartford schoolchildren 
a minimally adequate education? (at 55-62)

V. Did defendants fail to remedy the racial, ethnic and 
economic isolation and lack of educational resources despite their 
long-standing knowledge of the harmful effects of these conditions’ (at 63-65)

l



TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS OF CASE

A. Racial and Ethnic Segregation .............
B. Unequal and Inadequate Education

1. Disparities in Outcomes ...............
2. Educational Resources ...............

(a.) Plants and Facilities .............
(b.) Equipment and Supplies, Textbooks and

Libraries ....................
(c.) Course Offerings and Curriculum 
(d.) Teaching and Professional Staff 
(e.) Bilingual Education Programs . . . .  
(f.) Special Needs Programs .............

3. The Concentration of Poverty and the
Comparative Need for Resources .........

C. State Responsibility ..................
D . Remedy ......................

ARGUMENT .
I . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO 

FIND STATE ACTION AND FAILING TO FIND THAT DEFENDANTS' 
ACTIONS WERE CAUSALLY CONNECTED TO THE PROVISION OF 
UNEQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES, THE CONDITIONS OF 
SEGREGATION, AND THE PROVISION OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION

The Court Below Erred in Failing to Recognize the 
Existence of State Action in Dismissing Plaintiffs' 
Complaints of Unconstitutional Deprivation of a 
Fundamental Right to Education
1. Public education is a public function that 

necessarily involves state action 
2 . Cologne v. Westfarms Associates yields the same

result ....................
The Court Below Failed to Recognize Actions That 
Contributed to Existing Segregation in the Public Schools ........................
1. The court below improperly failed to address 

proof of state involvement in segregation in 
the public schools . . . . . . . .

2. Evidence of affirmative acts by the state to
increase segregation is not required to prove 
state liability ..................

1

11
13

15
18
19
20 
21
21
24
27

29

29

30

31

32

34

34

35

li

00 ̂
 GO



II. DEFENDANTS HAVE VIOLATED ARTICLE FIRST, §§ 1 AND 20 AND 
ARTICLE EIGHTH, § 1 OF THE CONNECTICUT CONSTITUTION BY 
FAILING TO PROVIDE EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES TO 
PUBLIC SCHOOLCHILDREN IN THE HARTFORD METROPOLITAN AREA

A. Article First, §§ 1 and 20 and Article Eighth, § l
of the Connecticut Constitution Confer a Right to 
Equal Educational Opportunity ...............

B. The Segregated, Economically Isolated and Unequal
Conditions in Hartford Metropolitan Area Public 
Schools Violate Plaintiffs' Right to an Equal 
Educational Opportunity ....................

III. RACIAL AND ETHNIC SEGREGATION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN 
THE HARTFORD METROPOLITAN AREA VIOLATE THE 
SCHOOLCHILDREN'S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM THE CONDITIONS OF 
SEGREGATION AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER ARTICLE FIRST §§ 1 
AND 20 AND ARTICLE EIGHTH, § 1 OF THE CONNECTICUT 
CONSTITUTION .............
A.

B .

The Connecticut Constitution Prohibits Segregation 
and Discrimination on the Basis of Race or Ethnicitv 
in the Public Schools . . . .  *

The plain language of the Connecticut
Constitution prohibits segregation .........
The history of the adoption of Article First, § 
20 supports plaintiffs' contention that it is 
the condition of segregation that is prohibited 
by the Connecticut Constitution3 .

4 .
5 .
6 .

P^ior Connecticut appellate decisions
Sibling state precedent .........
Relevant federal precedent 
Economic and sociological considerations 

The Public Schools in the Hartford Metropolitan Area 
Are Racially and Ethnically Segregated

IV. DEFENDANTS' FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE CHILDREN OF HARTFORD 
WITH BASIC EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES VIOLATES PLAINTIFFS^ 
RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE EDUCATION UNDER ARTICLE EIGHTH 5 i 
OF THE CONNECTICUT CONSTITUTION . . ' * 1
A.

B.

^ Eighth, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution
Establishes a Right to a Minimally Adequate 
Education ......................
Defendants Have Failed to Provide the Children of 
Hartford with an Adequate Education

37

41

45

45

46

47
50
51
52
53

55

56

56

58

ill



V. DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO REMEDY THE RACIAL, ETHNIC AND 
ECONOMIC ISOLATION AND LACK OF EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES 
DESPITE THEIR LONG-STANDING KNOWLEDGE OF THE HARMFUL 
EFFECTS OF SUCH CONDITIONS ..........................

CONCLUSION ......................



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

AFSCME, Council 4, Local 681, AFL-CIO v. City of
West Haven, 234 Conn. 217 (1995) .............

Abbott v. Burke,
119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990) ...........

Abingdon School District v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) ..........................

Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68 (1979) ..........................

Barksdale v. Springfield School Committee,
237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.), vacated, 348 
F .2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965) ....................

Bishop v. Kelly,
206 Conn. 608, 539 A.2d 108 (1988)

Blocker v. Board of Education,
226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) ...............

Booker v. Board of Education,
45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965) ...............

Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) ...............

Builders Service Corp. v. Planning & Zoning
Commission, 208 Conn. 267, 545 A.2d 530 (1988)

Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New 
York, No. 117 (June 15, 1995)

Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89 (1965) .................

Cologne v. Westfarms Associates,
192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984)

Daly v. DelPonte,
225 Conn. 499, 624 A.2d 876 (1993)

Danson v. Casey,
484 Pa. 415, 399 A.2d 360 (1979)

41, 57, 62 

. . .  54

. . .  40

54

50

48

50

50

53

. . . . 43

59

36

32, 33, 34

40, 48, 51

. . 57, 58

v



Doe v. State,
216 Conn. 85, 579 A.2d 37 (1990)..........................  46

Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972) ........................................ 40

Englewood Cliffs v. Englewood,
257 N.J. Super. 413, 608 A.2d 914 (1992), tiff'd
132 N.J. 327, 625 A. 2d 483 (1993), cert, denied, 114 s
Ct. 547 (1993)..................................... '. . 50, 51

Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State
746 P . 2d 1135 (Okla. 1 9 8 7 ) ..................'.............. 57

Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71 (1992).................................  36

Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) ; .....................................  36

Harper v. Hunt, CV-91-0117R, reprinted at Appendix 
to the Opinion of the Justices,
624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1 9 9 3 ) ........................  57

Harper v. Virginia Board of Education,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) ...............................  36

Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ
295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983).................. 57

Horton v. Meskill,
172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977)...................... passim

Horton v. Meskill,
195 Conn. 24, 486 A.2d 1099 (1985)...............  37, 38, 40

Jenkins v. Township of Morris School District,
58 N.J. 483, 279 A.2d 619 (1971) . . . . . . . .  50

Lockwood v. Killian,
172 Conn. 496, 375 A.2d 998 (1977).................... 32

McDaniel v. Thomas,
248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981) '/.............  57

Mizla v. Depalo,
183 Conn. 59, 438 A.2d 820 (1981) .................. 13 14

Moore v. Ganim,
233 Conn. 557, ___ A.2d ___ (1995)...............  38, 39 46

vi



Murphy v. Berlin Board of Education, 167 Conn.
368, 355 A.2d 265 (1974) ......................

NAACP v. Dearborn,
173 Mich. App. 602, 434 N.W.2d 444 (1988), 
appeal denied, 433 Mich. 904,
447 N.W.2d 751 (1989) ........................

Norton v. American Bank and Trust Co., 5 Conn Sup 
226 (1937) ...................................

Pauley v. Kelly,
162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979) .

Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896) ..........................

Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964) ..........................

Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.,
790 S .W .2d 186 (Ky. 1989) ....................

San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) ......................

Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State,
90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978)

Shofstall v. Hollins,
110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973)

State ex. rel. Huntington v. Huntington School 
Committee, 82 Conn. 563, 74 A. 882 (1909)

State National Bank v. Dick,

passim

52

12

57, 58, 59 

. . .  51

. . .  36

57, 59 

36, 37, 52 

57, 58, 59 

57, 58 

31, 56

164 Conn. 523, 325 A.2d 235 (1973) . . . . 12
State v. Ayala,

222 Conn. 331, 610 A.2d 1162 (1992) . . . 48
State v. Geisler,

222 Conn. 672, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992) . . . 59
State v. Lamme,

216 Conn. 172, 579 A.2d 484 (1990) . . . . 47
State v. Oquendo,

223 Conn. 635, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) . . .

VI1



40
State v. Rao,

171 Conn. 600, 370 A.2d 1310 (1976)
State v. Ross,

230 Conn. 183, 646 A.2d 1318 (1994)
Stolberg v. Caldwell,

175 Conn. 586, 402 A.2d 763 (1978) ...........

United States v. Yonkers Board of Education,
624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d , 837
F .2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987) ....................

West Hartford Education Association v. DeCourcy,
162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526 (1972)

CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLES AND STATUTES
Conn. Const. Article 1 § 1 .............

Conn. Const. Article 1 § 8 

Conn. Const. Article 1 § 10 

Conn. Const. Article 1 § 20 

Conn. Const. Article VIII § l

C.G.S. § 10-4a ......................

C.G.S. §§ 10-184 ......................

C.G.S. §§ 10-220 ....................

C.G.S. §§ 10-240 ....................

C.G.S. §§ 10-241 ......................

C.G.S. §§ 10-264a, et seq...................

C.G.S. §§ 10-282, et s e q . .................

Haw. Const. Article I § 9 ...........  , 4.

N.M. Const. Article XII § io

48, 53 

. . .  46

41, 42, 43 

. . .  32

. . passim  

. . 2, 56

. . 2, 56

. . passim  

. . passim  

. . passim  

31, 35

• . - 31
31, 34

• . . 31

• . . 27

• . . 35

• . . 52

• . 52

v m



MISCELLANEOUS
Conn. Agency Regs. 

Proceedings of the

§§ 10-226e-l, et seq...............

1965 Constitutional Convention .

IX



NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS OF CASE 

Hsirtfoird children attsnd schools that are ths most racially 

ethnically, and economically isolated in the state. These schools 

have the least educational resources and suffer from the worst 

academic performance. The cumulative effects of these inequities 

deprive Hartford s children of the preparation necessary to join the 

mainstream of society. The central issue before this Court is whether 

Milo Sheff and other school children have been deprived of their 

constitutional rights to equal educational opportunity and minimally 
adequate education.

Plaintiffs, black, Latino and white public schoolchildren in 

Hartford and its neighboring suburbs, brought this action for 

declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant State Board of 
Education and other education officials.1 * III

1The Complaint is in four counts:

first, that because Hartford metropolitan area schools are 
segregated on the basis of race, ethnic background, and 
socioeconomic status, and because the Hartford schools are 
educationally deficient when compared to the suburban 
schools, defendants have failed to provide plaintiffs an 
equal opportunity to a free public education as required by 
Article First, §§ 1 and 20 and Article Eighth, § 1 of the 
Connecticut Constitution, (Issue II on appeal);

second, that the sharp segregation on the basis of race and 
ethnic background in Hartford metropolitan area public 
schools, by itself, violates Article First, §§ l and 20 and 
Article Eighth, § 1 of the Connecticut.Constitution ?issSeIII on appeal) ; '

third, that the Hartford 
deficient and fail to 
schoolchildren with a 
measured by the state's 
Article First, §§ l and 
Issue IV); and

public schools are educationally 
provide a majority of Hartford 
minimally adequate education 

own standards, and this violates 
20 and Article Eighth, § i, (now

1



In 1990 the trial court denied defendants' Motion to Strike, 

ruling that plaintiffs had stated a claim upon which relief could be 

granted, and specifically that the complaint satisfied the 

requirements of state action, justiciability, and causation. (R at 

82-92). In 1992, the trial court denied defendants' Motion for 

Summary Judgment, again concluding, among other things, that the 

plaintiffs had shown state action and justiciability. (R. at 97-107)

After a six week trial ending in February 1993, and closing 

arguments on December 19, 1993 and November 30, 1994, the trial court 

issued an opinion concluding that plaintiffs' constitutional claims 

need not be addressed because plaintiffs had "failed to prove that 

'state action is a direct and sufficient cause of the conditions' 

which are the subject matter of the plaintiffs' complaint." (R. at 
179) .

At trial, plaintiffs' constitutional attack focussed on the 
layers of inequity in the schools: the harms of racial and ethnic 

isolation and the concentration of poor children, the gross 

disparities in the quality of education provided by Hartford and its 

neighboring school districts, and the inadequacies of the Hartford

public schools. Many of the facts upon which these claims were based 
were agreed to by the parties.

fourth that the defendants' failure to provide plaintiffs 
and other Hartford schoolchildren the equal educational 
opportunities to which they are entitled under Con£ect?c5t

o b l ' i J *  r 9C: f S - 5 10"4a' and “hich defendants are obliged to provide, violates the Due Process Clancy Article First, §§ 8 and 10. Clause,

The trial court addressed none of these claims. (R. at 179)

2



A - Racial— and— Ethnic Segregation. it is undisputed that the 

Hartford public schools are racially and ethnically segregated.2 

African Americans, Puerto Ricans and other Latinos alone constitute 

more than 90% (or 23,283 of the 25,716 students) in the Hartford 

public schools. (Stip. 26, 27).3 In contrast, in 1991-92 only seven 

of the 21 nearby school districts had more than 15% African American 

and Latino student populations. (Stip. 38). Thirteen of the school 

districts were less than seven percent African American and Latino. 

(Stip. 35 (1987-88 data)). The extent of Latino isolation is even

When this lawsuit began in 1989, the available 1987-88 ficmres 
for the school population and the percent minority for the 22 
districts surrounding and including Hartford were:

Total School Pop. % Minority
Hartford 25,058 90.5Bloomfield 2,555 69.0Avon 2,068 3.8Canton 1,189 3.2East Granby 666 2.3East Hartford 5,905 20.6East Windsor 1,267 8.5Ellington 1,855 2.3Farmington 2,608 7.7Glastonbury 4,463 5.4Granby 1,528 3.5Manchester 7,084 11.1Newington 3,801 6.4Rocky Hill 1,807 5.9Simsbury 4,039 6.5South Windsor 3,648 9 3Suffield 1,772 4.0Vernon 4,457 6.4West Hartford 7,424 15 7Wethersfield 2,997Windsor 4,235

J • J
30.8Windsor Locks 1,642 4.0

(Stip. 35).

3The overall minority enrollment 
(Stip. 26). in the Hartford schools is 92%.

3



more dramatic. In 1991 sixteen suburbs had less than 3% Latino 
enrollment. (Stip. 32).4

Plaintiffs also demonstrated that the racial segregation of the 

Hartford schools continues to increase, and shows no signs of 

reversing, (Finding 42; Stip. 58, 60, 61), while the vast majority of 
suburban towns remain segregated. (Pis' Ex. 126, 130).5

Significantly, defendants have admitted that "segregation is 
educationally, morally and legally wrong." (Defs' Ex. 12 5 at 1) 

Defendants have repeatedly acknowledged that racial and ethnic 

isolation is detrimental to students, particularly to minority 

students, and that integration is beneficial to all children and 

continues to have positive effects long after the children have left 

the school setting. (Stip. 150, 152; Pis' Ex. 50, 60, 494 at 11-12 

(Tirozzi Dep.)).6 The parties agree that "a multicultural 

environment is an irreplaceable component of quality education." 
(Defs' Ex. 2.29 at 1).

4The extent of segregation can perhaps be understood most readilv 
by examining an average Hartford class. In an average class of 23 4 
students, 21.6 will be members of minority groups. (Stip. 28)

The effect of this student segregation is aqqravated hv 
segregation m  the professional and teaching staff. As of I99i-92Y 
only two districts, Hartford and Bloomfield, employed more than i 
3fif1CaM AJneii;L̂ ns and Latinos on their professional staffs. (Stip° 
14 22)M St °f the dlstricts hover in the range of 2%. (Defs' Ex. 14. l-

f V
Both defendants Commissioner Vincent Ferrand-inn anH r ...

Commissioner Gerald Tirozzi acknowledged the tarns of rataa? 
segregation (Pis' Ex. 493 at 35, 138-39 (Ferrandino tan.) pi=? 
K94v,a^ 11 12 T̂irozzi Dep.)), and Commissioner Tirozzi admitted 
effects anf the St1ate B°ard °f Educaci°n had been aware of the hamfta

4



Plaintiffs presented undisputed testimony that racial and ethnic 

segregation has long-lasting adverse consequences. The state itself 

commissioned a major review which found that integrated education had 

a positive impact on achievement, school dropout rates, and college 

attendance rates, and also had positive long-term social and economic 

consequences. (Defs' Ex. 12.25).7 And in its major 1988 report on 

the need for school integration, the State Department of Education 

strongly emphasized the importance of preparing students for "living 

and working in a multicultural society." (Defs' Ex. 12.5 at 7)

These conclusions were borne out by the testimony of educators 

from both urban and suburban schools who described the development of 

racial stereotypes due to segregated experiences.8 They were 

substantiated further by detailed testimony on the long-term effects

7Janet Ward Schofield, "Review of Research on School
“SlceSI? 8°ni9S88T P a in Secondary School Students"8, 1988) In addition to the broad educational benefits of
integration tor all racial groups, Professor Schofield also found that
the impact of integration on achievement for African American students
was consistently positive. For Latinos and,whites, the results wSrl
positive or neutral. Schofield's review was cited as support for the
reconunendations of the 1989 State Department of Education report
Ex 60K Inte9rated Education: Options for Connect!™?%

8Several Hartford teachers described thp rnnt--i mi-i 
isolation that segregation inflicts on children t o S a v 5 ^  °f
Johnson II at 15-17; Dudley at 129-133° Hernandez at 42? 64)'

5



of segregated school experiences by Dr. JoMills Braddock,9 Dr. 
William Trent,10 and Dr. Robert Crain.11

Dr. Braddock cited the wealth of evidence showing that early 

segregation experiences in school leads to segregation in later life 

because of a tendency of individuals from different backgrounds to 

avoid interactions with one another unless [there is] prior contact." 

(Braddock at 18, 20-21).12 As a result, minority students are often 

excluded from the employment networks that are essential for success

*Dr. Braddock, an expert in educational and occupational equity 
has been performing and supervising educational research for fifteen 
years; He has conducted longitudinal studies to examine the 
relationship between segregated educational experiences and 
educational and occupational outcomes. (Braddock at 8).

. D r - Trent, an expert in the sociology of education, used two 
national longitudinal databases to analyze the relationships amonq 
racial and economic isolation, socioeconomic status and various life 
outcomes. (Trent at 61, 77-78).

11Dr. Crain an expert in research methods, school desegregation
“ rain rat°331Ci!' hiS StUdy °f j ect 3ConcerS(Crain I at 33, 53, 60-62). Defendants' experts explicitlv aareeri
that Dr Crain's work is of a high order of methodological clarity and
adheres to high methodological standards. (Armor I It 99; Rossell ?l3 L o 2.) .

12A s early as 1967, the United States Civil Riqhts Commission 
described the self-perpetuating nature of segregation^ Toting t h S  racial isolation m  the schools 9 cnac

fosters attitudes and behavior that perpetuate isolation in 
other important areas of American life. [Black] adults who 
attend racially isolated schools are more “ kily to hate 
developed attitudes that alienate them from whites. White 
adults with similarly isolated backgrounds tend to resist 
desegregation in many areas -- housing, jobs and schools.

(Pis' Ex 11 at 110). Statistical analysis confirms that seqreaatinn 
perpetuates itself regardless of a student's racial or ethnic qrouD 
or individual socioeconomic status. (Trent at 61 77.00. D1 ?
thitCsrhDDi EE' FF) ‘ .Indeed' defendants' witness David Armor conceded that school segregation has a generational effect. (Armor I at 146)

6



in later employment and other beneficial life outcomes. (Braddcck at 

22, 31) .13 Desegregation experiences allow minorities to break down 

these systemic barriers to equal opportunity and provide access to 
important networks. (Braddock at 22).

The results of a study of Project Concern, a small one-way 

interdistrict busing program established in Hartford in 1966, were 

entirely consistent with the findings cited by the other witnesses. 

The study found that "[African American] students from segregated 

schools were going into those kinds of jobs traditionally held by 

blacks." (Crain I at 33; see also Pis' Ex. 387 at 26).14 other harmful

long-term results of school segregation include increased likelihood 

of dropping out from high school or college and early female 

childbearing, and an increased likelihood that African American 

students will experience difficulties with their social environment 
in college. (Crain I at 53; Pis' Ex. 387 at 26-29) .15 

B - Unequal and Inadequate Education. Plaintiffs presented lay and 
expert testimony and reams of documentary evidence to prove what any 

layman visiting the public schools in Hartford and its surrounding

13For minority students, the perpetuation of early segregation 
experiences negatively affects the likelihood of finding well paid 
employment in the private sector. (Crain I at 33 ° 147; Pis' Ex. 387 at 13, 34). at 33' 58~60'’ A™ r  I at

"Segregation also adversely affects the subsequent occuDaHnn^i 
aspirations of African American students and their S)n perc2p?lois Sf their chances for promotion. frra-in t ^  cr\ ons of(Cram I at 60-62; Pis' Ex. 387 at 24-

15 ,
Significantly, the long-term effects of school segreaation 

independent of the individual socioeconomic status of f ^ c h n S r e n  
(Cram I at 44; see also Armor I at 21-22) . iidren.

7



suburbs can observe -- i.e. the gross disparities in educational

opportunities provided to students in Hartford as compared to the 

suburbs and the inadequacies of schooling in Hartford. There was no 
dispute over many of the underlying facts.

1 * Disparities in Outcomes. The Connecticut Mastery Test is 

a criterion-referenced test that is the state's own measure of the 

<3ualiby of education. An important goal of the test, as explicitly 

stated by defendant Board of Education, is to improve "assessment of

suitable equal— educational_opportunities . " (Stip. 158 (emphasis

added) ) . It is undisputed that under any of the benchmarks for 

achievement, including the state goals,16 the mastery level and the 

state remedial standard, (Stip. 170), Hartford performance levels are 

uniformly and substantially below that of the average performance

levels of students in all other districts. (Stip. 166, 168, 169, 174- 
197) ,17

H .. 16/?t^tewide 9°als represent a particular level of achievement 
defined by mastery of a particular number of objectives teJtTdiA 
math, reading and writing. (Stip. 171, 172)

■ a couft below erred by dismissing all evidence of disparities
achievement, erroneously finding that mastery test data could not 

and^hatto draw conclusions about the quality of education in Hartford 
and that the mastery tests were "not designed to be used for purposes 
of comparison." (Finding 104, 107). This conclusion is c o E S l v  
? L ? dHSt-W1^h Mhe court's finding that the districts can use mastery 

improve their programs" and to "correct deficiencies" 
? ^ L that the tests provide the basis for the state's disbursement of funds among districts. (Finding 103). uursement of

8



Enormous percentages of Hartford students have failed to meet the 

state goals. Hartford students uniformly mastered fewer math 

objectives than did the students in the surrounding districts, a 

pattern repeated for the reading and writing portions of the test 

Hartford ranked at the bottom of all twenty-one districts for all 

skills tested, with only one minor exception.19 (Stip. 174-197)

The tragic disparity in achievement becomes more apparent when 

examining the remedial scores. Large numbers of Hartford students are 

not able to meet even these minimal standards, which are used to 

indicate the need for remedial instruction. For example, in 

mathematics, 41% of 4th graders, 42% of 6th graders, and 41% of 8th 

graders in Hartford failed to perform up to even the state's remedial 

standards xn 1991-92. (Stip. 172). In reading, the results are even 

more disturbing: a majority of Hartford public schoolchildren did not 

meet even the remedial standards -- 64% in 4th grade, 62% in 6th 
grade, and 55% in 8th grade. (Stip. 172)

It is also undisputed that the disparities in achievement are 
reflected xn other indicators of educational performance. in 1991, 

Hartford students took the SAT at a lower rate than students anywhere 

else xn the state -- only 56.7% of Hartford students sat for the test, 

compared to 71.4% statewide -- and yet this more selective slice of 

Hartford students still scored lowest on the SAT when compared to

meet s t a L ^ o S ^ o r H t h e ^ e l x t A  grade ^ m a ^ ^ e e t  ^ f o r  the1^  
grade readxng test, and 97% for the writing test'. °stip. 172)

19Hartford tied for the 
eighth grade writing test. lowest score with Windsor Locks on 

(Stxp. 185; Pis' Ex. 163 at 213). the

9



students taking the test in the surrounding suburbs. (Stip. 198, 

199) . In verbal skills, seventy-six points separate the Hartford 

average from the next lowest scoring district. (Stip. 2 0 0).20 In 

math, fifty-seven points separate the average score of Hartford 

graduates from the average score of students in the next lowest 

scoring district. Id . Not surprisingly, in 1988 fewer than 30% of

Hartford students attended four year colleges in the October following 

graduation, while over 52% of students did statewide. (Stip. 201) 21 

Defendants attempted to show that the disparities in test scores 

were fully attributable to differences in the individual socioeconomic 

status of the children, (Armor I at 30-32, 94-95), advancing a theory 

that poor children in Hartford are doing as well as can be expected 

given their circumstances, and that schools cannot make a difference.

20Students can score a maximum of200) . 800 points on the SAT. (Stip.

Plaintiffs also demonstrated disparities in scores on the 
Metropolitan Achievement Test (MAT) and the Spanish Assessment of 
Basic Education (SABE) and in high school drop out rates MAT test 
scores show that Hartford students are, in the words of one witness 
"falling farther and farther behind grade level" as they progress f?om 
second to tenth grade. (Nearine at 136-37; Defs' Ex 13 9 m s "  
Ex. 163 at 124-35; Natriello I at 161). By the tenth grade the 
average Hartford student performs 2.0 grades below grade level on the 
math section of the test. (Defs- Ex. 13.9; Pis' Ex 163 In
language, average Hartford tenth grade students perform 1 7 grades 
below, (Defs' Ex. 13.9; Pis' Ex. 163 at 127), and t e n d i n g  the
w i ' ai;.H?63fI f  12sTSent Perf0rmS 2'9 Srades below. (Defs' Ex. 913 9?

The SABE is administered to all Hartford student-e? -in 
through eight in the Spanish/English bilingual program SABE results 
also show extremely poor performance. By the eighth grade stude^c
a f S ? ) thandte3Sti l  "° be!ow grade levels (Pis' Ex ^ 6 3

13ninV7 d 3-1 grades below m  reading. (Pis' Ex. 163 at 13 8)
, Perhaps most significantly, approximately one-third of the 

students m  the Hartford high schools drop out (Defs' Ex 12 20 Pis' Ex. 163 at 142-45). V V 5 *X - 12-20;

10



(Armor I at 29-31, 94-95) .22 These assertions were contradicted both 

by plaintiffs' evidence, (Orfield I at 138; Slavin at 24-27), and by 

defendants themselves. (Pis' Ex. 514 (Ferrandino statement); Pis' Ex. 

493 at 50-51 (Ferrandino Dep.) ; Williams at 31, 81-83).23 The 

parties also agree that "at-risk" children have the capacity to learn, 

(Stip. 142), and that poor and minority children have the potential 
to become well educated. (Stip. 153)

2 - Educational— Resources. Books and supplies, curriculum, 

facilities, staff and programs are the building blocks of education. 

The trial record shows gross disparities and deficiencies in these 

crucial areas with no improvement over time. (Natriello I at 131-33- 
Natriello II at 60, 62-63) ,24

In fact, from 1980 to 1992, Hartford spent approximately $2,000 

less per pupil than the state average on plant operations and 

equipment, pupil and instructional services, textbooks and

co^rt accepted this argument, at least in part. 
116, 142) . This finding is both clearly erroneous and based 
legal error. See infra at 59-62.

(Finding 
on clear

. . D r - Robert Crain, an expert in research methods 
testified that Dr Armor's data was inadequate to support his
;°??);Uf10nE an,l identified several significant methodological 
deficiencies. (Cram II at 73). Ironically, Dr. Armor's conclusions 
about the impact of student socioeconomic status (SES) inadvertentlv 
measured not only the impact of individual SES but also the 
concentration of poverty in the schools.. Dr. Armor attributed

in *chievement to individual SES despite the fact that his method did not distinguish between measures of individual SES and of 
the concentration of poor students in a community (Armor I a M 4 9  ̂
154-55, 159-60; Crain II at 60, 67). 7- ( 1 at 142'

In finding that resources were equal in Hartford to surrounri-ino 
communities (Finding 143), the trial court simply ignored this ShoJe 
body of evidence. The court's conclusion is thus clearly erroneoSj

11



instructional supplies, and library books and periodicals. (Stip. 

106) . Moreover, plaintiffs presented unrebutted evidence that, in 

category related to important programmatic resources, i.e. 

textbooks and instructional supplies, library books and periodicals, 

equipment, and plant operation, Hartford's resources were woefully 

short compared to the suburbs, and, indeed, were deficient. (Pis' Ex 
163 at 79; Natriello II at 12).

A key piece of plaintiffs' evidence at trial was a report by Dr. 

Gary Natriello, professor at Columbia University's Teachers College 

documenting resource inequalities and inadequacies, which relied 

primarily on reports by defendants and official reports of other 

governmental bodies. (Pis' Ex. 163 at 13-14; Natriello I at 51-53) 

Significantly, only one chart in this entire report was disputed by 
defendants. (Forman at 40-42).25 * S

25Documentary evidence not contradicted by the opposition has on 
occasion been treated as undisputed by this court. See e g  State 
National Bank v. D ick, 164 Conn. 523, 525-26, 325 A.2d 235 (1973) Judae 
(later Chief Justice) O'Sullivan, in deciding a Workmen's Compensation 
appeal, provided perhaps the best explained rationale for such a S e -

If the fact is uncontradicted, especially when it is of 
—  ch— g nature— that— one— would reasonably expect rtotip
contradictory--testimony to be offered whPre if -î
^Yaii^le, if there is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the witness to the fact was not to be credited if 
upon the face of the evidence it is credible, and if' the 
commissioner has not indicated that he did not credit the 
evidence, these with other considerations, furnish a
SKf5iCie^  9yide to assist one's reaching a conclusion whether the fact was or was not in dispute.

Norton v. American Bank and Trust C o ., 5 Conn. Sup. 226, 229 (1937) (citation
omitted)(emphasis added). M citation
^  ??CUmen5arY„ evidence in this case, including plaintiffs'exhibit 163, meets that test. Dr. Natriello's report compiles and 
relies upon public information readily available to the defendantSd

12



■(a •'-- Plants— and Facilities. The contrast between the glass-
strewn asphalt playground at Hartford's Clark School and the 17-acre 

outdoor classroom and $40,000 playscape at Glastonbury's Hopewell 

School, (Dudley at 124), epitomizes the gross disparity in facilities 
between Hartford and its surrounding suburbs.26

In fact, defendants conceded that there are serious deficiencies 

in buildings throughout Hartford's public school system. (Pis' Ex 

153 at 5-11; Defs' Ex. 2.24, 2.27; Calvert at 83-85). At the time of 

trial, eight of Hartford's 31 school buildings required "significant 
attention." (Stip. 101).

Hartford's schools are also severely overcrowded. Hartford 
elementary schools operate at 133% of preferred capacity, the middle 

schools at 106% and the high schools at 107%. (Pis' Ex. 163 at 75) 

There are approximately 115 portable classroom units in use in 
Hartford. (Senteio at 16; Pis' Ex. 163 at 75),27 * 63

much of which was in fact produced by defendants. The State 
Department of Education would surely be in a position to contradict 
^  lf Xtu WSre„ Untru e • There was nothing in the record to indicate 
that such evidence was not to be credited or that Judge Hammer ever
doubted it. Such documentary evidence should be considered uncontested in deciding this appeal. considered

tl0n' ■ 5hS Plafntiffs proposed numerous findings of fact reiated to disparities and inadequacies that the trial court did not 
include in its finding. Some of these proposed findings are based on 
evidence from the defendants' own files or were conceded to be true

^riala SUCh pJ°Posed findings are clearly uncontested and should be considered in deciding the appeal. Mizla v. D epalo , 183 Conn 59 6263, 438 A.2d 820 (1981). • y  conn. 59, 62-

6See also Griffin at 96-97; Neuman-Johnson at 159-62.

of classrooms have a "terrible impact" upon the deliverveducation program in part because of the "enormous expenditure
at 19T  in JUSt  p h y s i c a l l y moving." (Negron at 71; see Montanez

13



Throughout the Hartford system, rooms are being used as general- 

purpose classrooms that were not intended for such use. (Senteio at 

17; Neuman-Johnson I at 160). Hallways have been converted for use 

by language, speech, and hearing specialists. Id. One teacher

testified that she spent her first half-year teaching a third grade 

class in a hallway due to a shortage of classroom space. (Neuman- 
Johnson I at 160).

Many Hartford schools do not have cafeterias, art, or music 

classrooms. (Senteio at 17-18; Anderson at 120-21). Some schools 

have no outside playground space, (Montanez at 17; Negron I at 70), 

or playground equipment. (Cloud at 81, 85, 91) ,28 m  several 

schools gymnasiums are used for other purposes, or gym classes are 

held in classrooms, parking lots outside the building, or, in one 

school, in a basement room referred to as the "dungeon." (Cloud at 

83; Montanez at 16-17). At Hartford High, an allied health class 
meets in a storage room. (Griffin at 88).

Although many of the district's schools are in need of serious 

repair, (Senteio at 16; Cloud at 81; Pis' Ex. 153 at 5-11), Hartford 

is frequently forced for budgetary reasons to defer major maintenance

28r
qnh_ ; The nearly all concrete playground space at Hartford's Milner 
anS ?! £rammed ?lth portable classrooms and teachers' aStomobilSs 

a 1 *s any playground equipment. (Cloud at 81-85) . Even worse' 
four dumpsters filled with lunchroom garbage attract rats anH i-v.! 
smell during warm weather prevents use of part of the playground. Id

14



such as roof repair, until the problem becomes critical. (Senteio at 
14-15; LaFontaine at 134).29

---Equipment and Supplies,_Textbooks and Librari pk Gross
disparities in equipment and materials affect the entire curriculum - 

- from basic science to music. For example, a fifth grade class in 

Glastonbury enjoys an embarrassment of riches in science equipment, 

all supplied by a "central science curriculum center," while at least 

one inner-city Hartford school has virtually no science equipment. 

(Dudley at 122; see also Griffin at 95-96). Similarly, there is a

"glaring" disparity in music equipment: at trial, for example, one

teacher compared the full orchestra at West Hartford's Duffy School 

with the total of 12-15 aging instruments at Hartford's McDonough. 
(Neuman-Johnson II at 7-8) .30

From 1988-91 Hartford spent an average of $78 per pupil on 

textbooks and instructional supplies as compared to the state-wide

29 _
n a . , S°™e °f substandard physical conditions include peeling
paint, leaky roofs, antiquated bathrooms without doors on the stalls9 
broken sinks, nasty water, broken windows, and faulty electrical 
systems. (Cloud at 81, 103; Montanez at 18). One principal tesMfioa 
that the ceilings at the McDonough School have collapsed several 

at least one case nearly injuring students. (Carso at 112)
S n  ! 11119 V 1 one, teacher' s classroom at the Barnard-Brown Schooi fell down on her class. (Hernandez at 44).

30 In one Glastonbury class, fifth graders enjoy two freouentlv 
used computers with the latest in educational software and phone links
° " T T ,  COmputer networks, while in a class at Hartford's Clark School, there is only one computer with a broken kevhnsrH ana 

teacher who has not been adequately trained b  k s  at
122-123). In fact, defendants' data showed that Hartford spent 
$25 per pupil from 1988-91 on acquisitions of equipment such ^  
S97^qnpnf and microscopes; representing one-fourth of the average of 

oPfnt the twenty-one surrounding districts (Pis' Fy i fi 
183-94) . Some districts, such as Glastonbury and West Hartford “  m  excess of $100. (Pis' Ex. 163 at 164). Y Hartford, spent

15



average of $148 during the same time period. The twenty-one 

surrounding districts spent an average of $159 per pupil, over twice 
as much as spent by Hartford. (Pis' Ex. 163 at 164),31

The Hartford schools suffer from serious inadequacies in 

educational equipment, including an insufficient number of chairs in 

the libraries (Carso at 103-04), a lack of appropriate high school 

laboratories, (Davis at 79; Griffin at 89-90), too few computers 

(Wilson at 15-16),32 and inadequate art supplies, which are key for 

the kindergarten curriculum. (Cloud at 90). The high schools have 

insufficient, old, and non-functioning equipment in the life 

management, technology education, science, and business departments. 
(Griffin at 86-87, 89; Davis at 77).

Lack of resources forced Hartford to reduce textbook 
appropriations by 26-27% over the last few years. (Haig at 62)

In addition, while Hartford spent an average of $5 per pupil from 
1988-91 on library books, periodicals and newspapers, the twenty-one 
surrounding districts spent on average substantially more than three 
times as much -- $18 for the three years. (Pis' Ex 163 at 68 
Testimony from teachers bore out these dismal ffgures. While the 
iibrary at the Duffy School in West Hartford is "rich" in resources 
with new titles coming, every, every week," Hartford's McDonouqh 
library suffers from lack of space, lack of books, and broken 
equipment. (Neuman-Johnson II at 6-7; Griffin at 90, 97; Wilson Jt

There are substantial inadequacies in the availability of
iCo PU whrSi' â Well. aS teacher training in computers. (Wilson at l? 16) . While the school district's goal is to.have eight compSte?s per 
classroom the average remains less than one. (Wilson at 15- Haiq at 
60). In Hartford's elementary schools (K-6), the ratio of'students 
to computer ranges from 27.8 students per computer at the Clark school 
to more than 90 students per computer at King (Pis' Ex 163 
One Hartford teacher testified that she had received one computer for 

6 time thls past year at Betances School but had not received
any disks or software. Ultimately, the unit could n S f  be used (Anderson at 120; Griffin at 98). °  used-

16



Inadequacies exist in very basic supplies such as paper and in 

the most fundamental educational component, textbooks. (Hernandez at 
44; Carso at 101; Noel, at 28; Negron at 73; Marichal at 20-21). in 

order to fill the gap, many teachers spend hundreds of dollars of 

their own money buying basic instructional supplies and books, (Carso 

at 101-02; Anderson at 119, 122; Pitocco at 74; Neuman-Johnson at 8; 

Montanez at 20) ,33 and reuse books that were made to be used in one 

year and then discarded. (Anderson at 117). In one school there are 

entire areas of the curriculum for which there are no textbooks 

(Natriello I at 199-200). Many students have to share textbooks, 

(Montanez at 19-20) , and some bilingual students use textbooks that 
are approximately twenty years old. (Montanez at 19-20)

Hartford students attend schools that are not able to offer 

adequate library facilities. (Pis' Ex. 186 at Table 11; Pis' Ex. 163

collections that meet the minimum recommended standard. (Pis' Ex 186

at 69) .34 Only three of Hartford's thirty-one schools have library

In addition to having too few books,

34

and cai 
11 )  -

17



the library collections are extremely old. (Cloud at 84,- Pis' Ex. 163 
at 69) ,36

.(c. )---Course Offerings and Curriculum. Defendants' own data

showed that Hartford offers fewer hours of instruction than twelve 

other districts in the region at the elementary level, fewer hours 

than twenty other districts in the region at the middle school level 

and the fewest number of hours of any of the districts in the region 

at the high school level. (Defs' Ex. 14.1-14.22; Pis' Ex. 163 at 175- 

77). Cumulatively, Hartford students are receiving 5-6% less 

instruction time in the years before high school than are their 
suburban counterparts. (Pis' Ex. 163 at 67).

The curricular inadequacies in Hartford exist in a broad range 

of courses and subject areas -- from science to art to foreign 

languages.37 At one school, kindergarten children have no art, 

music, gym, or library. (Cloud at 104). At another school, some 

students have gym class for only twenty minutes per month, (Hernandez

checked out two or three books, the shelves would be emotv 
at 21-21; Davis at 75-76). * (Montanez

3 6 rTwenty-three of Hartford's thirty-one schools had librarv 
collections in which at least half of the books were over fifteen 
years old. (Pis' Ex. 163 at 69; Pis' Ex. 395 at 2).

Moreover, Hartford students are also deprived of access to an 
adequate supply of periodicals, computer materials, microform and 
microfiche, and non-print media. (Pis' Ex. 163 at 69). Libraries 

imP°rtant: media equipment, or the equipment they have is 
(Wllson at 11) . Classroom libraries are similarly deficient (Cloud at 90; Hernandez at 44). y aericient .

3 7 tF°r example, Weaver High School is not able to offer laboratorv 
in b^ol°^' chemistry, or physics. (Davis at 79) Hartford 

High has no advanced placement courses in chemistry, biology or human 
physiology (Griffin at 89). Hartford also has substandard foreign 
language laboratory facilities. (Natriello II at 19) ^

18



at 45), and students have art class only a portion of the year -- and, 
even then, only every other week. (Hernandez at 45).

---Teaching and Professional Staff. Hartford has a lower

proportion of teachers with masters' degrees than the twenty-one 

surrounding districts, and also ranks at the bottom when comparing the 

numbers of teachers trained as mentors, assessors, and cooperating 

teachers. (Defs' Ex. 14.1-14.22; Pis' Ex. 163 at 166-67). The number 

first-year teachers is twice the statewide average, (Natriello I 

at 106), leaving the most inexperienced group of teachers to confront 

"the most challenging groups of students in the Connecticut public 
school system." (Natriello I at 107).

Hartford also came up short in comparisons of expenditures for 

purchased personnel services that are not part of payroll, such as 

teaching assistants, medical doctors, curriculum consultants, 
therapists and psychologists. (Natriello II at 18),38

Moreover, because so substantial a portion of its funds must be 
devoted to staff for special needs students, there is a chronic 

shortage of staff to teach the traditional parts of the educational 

program. (Carso at 97; Shea at 131). Thus, Hartford's schools employ 

on average more special education teachers and fewer general 

elementary teachers and content-specialist teachers than do other 
districts. (Stip. 85).39

nl Hlartfl°rd. spient $39 Per pupil in this area for the 1988-91 
school years, m  contrast to an average of $101 for the twentv on? surrounding suburbs. (Pis' Ex. 163 at 164). twenty-one

In additi°n/ Hartford schools lack an adequate number of 
nurses, psychologists, speech therapists, guidance counselors and 
social workers to properly treat the many children in the district who

19



— Bilingual Education Programs. Hartford's bilingual program 
is plagued by inadequate staffing,40 texts and instructional 

materials, training, and remedial programs. (Marichal at 20-21)

Plaintiffs showed that Hartford has insufficient money to 

purchase up-to-date and appropriate texts and other instructional 

materials, forcing some Hartford bilingual students to use Spanish 

basal readers developed in the 1950s. (Marichal at 20-21) 41

Moreover, Hartford has insufficient funds for bilingual teacher 
training. (Marichal at 20) . Many principals have no training in

have social problems -- from homelessness to lack of family resources 
for food and clothing to emotional problems that interfere with 
education. (Dickens at 153-55; Negron I at 67, 71, 81; Noel at 31-32 
Cloud at 91-3; LaFontaine I at 129; Griffin at 86; Hernandefa? 46?'

Moreover, the deficiencies of the Hartford school system have 
been exacerbated by reduced state funding. (Kennelly at 63 Pis' Pv 
423K  The impact of recent cuts has been parlrcularly 'severe L  
Hartford s reading programs. Hartford lost all 31 readina 
consultants, who had been responsible for testing students and 
determining their reading level and appropriate reading instruction??

(Sentei° «  Haig at 60; Carso at 105; M?nt“ e?at 
e loss of paraprofessionals has interfered with teachers' abil-ii-v 

to individualize instruction. (shea at 124-lJ?) cuts S
administrative staff have also created difficulties in coordination 
and supervision, (Griffin at 89; Haig at 60; Shea at 121 ?2 8? ?^
cutbacks in secretarial reductions have pulled teachers awav ' from
^Sh??1?? 127)^^ ±t: m°re difficult for Parents to contact the school.

“Existing staff shortages in bilingual education have been made 
orse by layoffs, including a reduction of six English as a Second

a t ^ f  o r S

r e m e d ia t i°n

The bilingual educational program being offered in Hartford'c 
"S0marked a significant lack of rlsour??? (MaS L i  a 

35). A 1987 State task force found that while $947 in state funding
P J ill1 uas to implement state-mandated bilingual programs

the state contribution was approximately $190 per puoil -? nniv m  
B -̂rcent of the recommended level. (Marichal at 22; PI?' Ex. If)1.7 °

20



bilingual education, making it difficult to supervise adequately the 
bilingual teachers. (Marichal at 33).

Although between 30 and 35% of Hartford's bilingual students are 

currently testing at remedial levels, (Marichal at 29), there is 

currently no native-language remedial program for elementary school 

students, (Marichal at 30), and an insufficient program at the high 
school level. (Marichal at 30; Pis' Ex. 439 at 5).

If̂ -1— Special Needs Programs. Plaintiffs also demonstrated that 

although effective educational programs have proven successful in 

educating special needs students, (Slavin at 14, 22; Senteio at 14; 

Haig at 63-64; Negron 81; Wilson at 16-19), and are a critical 

component of an adequate education, (Pis' Ex. 474), they are not 

currently being provided to the many Hartford students who would 

benefit from them. (Slavin at 34). Hartford's few special needs 

programs affect only a very small proportion of the total numbers 

within the system and have not been expanded despite their success 

(Wilson at 18-19). For example, while pre-school programs are 

important for preparing poor children to succeed in elementary school, 

(Dickens at 150-51), the number of Hartford children who are actually 

enrolled in pre-school programs is woefully small compared to the 
number who are eligible for them. (Dickens at 151),42

3 ’ The Concentration of Poverty and the Comparative Need for- 
Resources. Defendants agree that progress in achieving equal 

educational opportunities can be measured by comparing resources

420nly 600 out of 2,300 
(Slavin at 36). four year olds receive preschool.

21



available to resources needed. (Pis' Ex. 163 at 233; pis' Ex. 39 . 

Natriello II at 41-42) . Students in Hartford need more, not fewer 

educational resources because of the concentration of at-risk 
children43 in their classrooms.44

Indeed, it is undisputed that Hartford schools are not only 

racially and ethnically segregated but also economically isolated. 

(Stip. 113, 114, 118, 135, 136). A full 63% of Hartford students

receive federal free and reduced-priced lunches. Participation in the 

lunch program is a measure of poverty. (Stip. 113). By comparison, 

m  fifteen of the twenty-one surrounding districts, fewer than 10% of 

the students participate in the program. (Stip. 135). Hartford's 

rate of poverty is in fact substantially greater than the rate among

students in any of the twenty-one surrounding districts. (Stip 
136) .45

In 1980 and again in 1990, Hartford was ranked last in comparison 
to the twenty-one surrounding communities for each of a number of key

43 (Stip. 140, 141).
4 4 ,. Schoolteachers testified that the concentration of at-risk 

children m  Hartford's classrooms overwhelms the normal teachina 
process. (Dudley at 126-27; Anderson at 113; Negron I aT 74; §?iff^ 
at 86 ). In comparison, the education process can be conducted with 
relative ease m  non-poverty-concentrated schools. (Pitocco at 65-66- 
Dudley at 128; Pis' Ex. 494 at 61-62 (Tirozzi Dep.) ) yVt wheA 
regular program expenditures per "need student" of Hartford akd the 
surrounding suburbs is compared, Hartford ranks at the bo?tom oi 
twenty-two districts. (Pis' Ex. 163 at 161-62; Natriello I? at

16,000 children in the city of Hartford live in
a ■ - „ the sixth highest child poverty rate amnnrrAmerica s 200 largest cities. (Pis' Ex. 456). Y among

alf° demonstrated that the economic gulf between
-SUbUrbS 1S Wldening- (Defs' Ex. 8 .1, 82- Pis' Ex 163 at 152-53; Rmdone at 121) . • , ls Ex.

45More than 
poverty, giving

22



s o c i o e c o n o m i c  indicators, such as p e r c e n t a g e  of n o n - E n g l i s h  home 

language, p e r c e n t a g e  of p a r e n t s  w i t h  a h i g h  school diploma, p e r c e n t a g e  

of p a r e n t s  wh o  are m a n a g e r s  or profess i o n a l s ,  p e r c e n t a g e  of s i n g l e ­

p a r e n t  families, and m e d i a n  f a m i l y  income. (Stip. 1 3 7 ) ,46

While each of these risk factors may increase the cost and 

challenge of educating an individual student, what makes the plight 

of Hartford's schoolchildren so difficult is the high concentration 

of these factors in any given school. Even defendants' main witness 

on the effects of individual socioeconomic status, David Armor 

conceded the harmful effect of the concentration of poverty in the 
schools. (Armor I at 148).47

Dr. Mary Kennedy testified at trial that achievement levels of 

both poor and non-poor students are lower in high poverty

. . .  In Edition, Hartford students are much more likely to enter 
kindergarten delayed one to two years in educational development, 

145 ' fitness crime and violence in their neighborhoods 
(Morris at 140), arrive at school with high levels of anxiptv' 
(Montanez at 12), and suffer from low self-esteem and poor social 
skills as a result of poverty and isolation. (Montanez at 13- Morris 
at 139; Noel at 25; Davis at 86). in one elemental school, Sere 
were three attempted suicides in the last three years. Id Manv 
children enter school at five or six years old suffering from severe
Defs^°Exent2 l8S at sPeech delays' (Montanez at 11; Negron I at 66; Dets Ex. 2.18 at 1), and some cannot form a sentence under^tanH
cognitively how to ask a question or describe items, oi articulate 
"“ h 1aPPr°prlKat,e p a b u l a r y • (Cloud at 99; Hernandez at 35) Siring 
the 1980s, between a fifth and a fourth of all of Hartford"! 
kindergarten students were held back. <Defs' Ex. 2 18 at 5) Set 
generally Stip. 113-149.

alS° agreed with plaintiffs' expert witnesses that the effect of the concentration of poverty within the schools can be 
measureci independently of the effects of individual factors such as
155-Vc ? a S  ^ ud®n^g®ocloeconomic status or student race. (Armor I at

23



concentration schools. (Kennedy at 26-28).48 In addition, children 

in economically isolated schools fall increasingly behind as they 

proceed in their education. (Kennedy at 41) . Moreover, Dr Trent 

testified that independent of individual socioeconomic status and 

race, the concentration of poor children in a student's school has 

negative consequences not only for educational attainment, (Pis' Ex 

48U, K, 0; Trent at 50, 56-59, 75-76), but also for occupational 
attainment, (Pis' Ex. 481C; Trent at 34, 36, 38, 40, 74) , future 

income, (Pis' Ex. 481g; Trent at 45, 75), and for the likelihood of 

developing positive co-worker relations across racial lines. (Pis' 
Ex. 481v).

While the impact of having a high concentration of poor students 

in a school is far-reaching, (Kennedy at 28), reductions in poverty 

concentration have been shown to have positive effects on student 
achievement. (Kennedy at 28; Orfield I at 59-60) .

c - State Responsibility. Plaintiffs introduced a series of reports 
and other documents to establish that the state has been aware at 

least since the 1960s that the use of town lines to define school 

districts has the effect of segregating students by race and ethnicity 

in the public schools. (Pis' Ex. 1-90; Pis' Ex. 16 at 2; Finding 22, 

147). These reports also document the state's awareness of the 

harmful effects of racial and economic isolation on schoolchildren and

Dr. Kennedy, an expert in educational research methodsegress-* r  sHSsS
children. (Kennedy at 6, 9 ). c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  of p o o r

24



the inequalities between the educational opportunities provided by 

Hartford and its suburbs. (Pis' Ex. 1-90; Finding 45; Defs' Ex. 2.29 
12.25, 12.5) . 49

For example, as early as 1965, a report prepared by the Harvard 

Graduate School of Education, described the growing problems of both 

racial isolation and the concentration of poverty in the Hartford 

schools. The Harvard report predicted increasing racial isolation in 

Hartford schools in future years if strong steps were not taken to 

promote integration. (Pis' Ex. I).50 a  year later the Connecticut 

Commission on Civil Rights urged defendants to respond to the 

increasing segregation in Connecticut's schools.51 See also Pis' Ex 

12a-b.52

49n
T h ? historical. s e q u e n c e  of reports, studies, and 

r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  c r e a t e d  or r e c e i v e d  b y  the s tate is i n c l u d e d  in Pis' 
Ex. 1-90 and r e p r e s e n t e d  g r a p h i c a l l y  in Pis' Ex. 488.

5°A 1966 grant proposal submitted by 28 Hartford area
superintendents and transmitted to the state recommended 
implementation of the Harvard plan. (Pis' Ex. 4) . The HarvardTepo?? 
was also relied upon in a December 1969 report of the State Department­
al Education entitled "Racial Balance and Regionalization." (Pls^ Ex / / •

[It] is the view of the Commission that the failure t-n 
^ 1^inat:e de ?acX° se9.re9ated schools not only condemns Negro children 
^ e f ^ UIleqUal educatlon also tends to. perpetuate a segregated society by presenting segregation to all children as an acceptable 
American way of life." The Commission also pointed out that "?UherI
^ e X l d ?n SS t ,̂at 1N e g r o  c h i l d r e n  s how i m p r o v e d  a c a d e m i c  p e r f o r m a n c e  in i n t e g r a t e d  school situ a t i o n s . "  (Pis' Ex. 7a, 7c)

■ «. ?^nal recommendations of the Conference included a call for
m s "  EX S  aet 8C)ati0nal ParkS and transportation

25



Recommendations for effective i n te r d i s t r ic t relief, such as

educational parks, died in the legislature in the 1960s. In 1969 the 

l^Uislsture passed the Racial Imbalance Act, an intrud istrict

desegregation law. The Connecticut legislature knowingly adopted the 

Racial Imbalance Act despite warnings about the futility of 

intradistrict approaches for urban school districts. (Pis' Ex. 23 at 

218-D (Senator Barrows)).53 Soon after the adoption of the 

regulations, the State Department of Education itself reported on the 

uselessness of the Act in large urban districts with more than 75% 

minority students. (Pis' Ex. 37 at 1-2). In a 1988 report, the 

Hartford district stated, "as long as the boundaries of the attendance 

district of the Hartford schools [are] coterminous with the boundaries 

of the city, no meaningful numerical balance can be achieved, and it 

would be an exercise in futility to develop proposals to seek racial 
balance." (Pis' Ex. 53 at 1).

In January 1988 defendants released "Report on Racial/Ethnic 
Equity and Desegregation in Connecticut's Public Schools," most often 

referred to as "Tirozzi I." (Defs' Ex. 12.5).54 in April 1989 

defendants issued "Quality and Integrated Education: Options for

53r
_  ■ 3The r̂ } a t i ° n s implementing the Racial Imbalance Act, which 
equire each school's racial balance to match the demographics of the 

district s overall population within 25%, were not finalized f o r  
eleven years. (Conn. Agency Regs. §§ l0-2^6e-l et seq. ■ Gordon II at 
49-51). Under the regulations, a 99% minority school could be in 
<(P?^1ExCe5;T) 3 49% min°rity enr°Hment would violate the law

54r

d e s e ^ e p S  and ^
the TOlU"ta^  cooperation ^ocal

26



Connecticut." (Pis' Ex. 60 ("Tirozzi II")). In December 1990 the 
Governor's Commission on Quality and Integrated Education released its 

report. (Pis' Ex. 73). Despite each report's acknowledgement of the 

harms of segregated and unequal education, sense of urgency, and 

detailed proposals, defendants have taken no significant steps to 

carry out any of these studies' recommendations.55 (Gordon II at 72- 
74, 77; Carter at 29, 41, 558; Williams, at 122-24; Pis' Ex. 494 at 

101, 107, 113, 119-120 (Tirozzi Dep.); Pis' Ex. 56, 58, 59, 69, 70 (a 

series of additional reports by defendants documenting the harms of 

racial and economic isolation and the inequities between urban and 
suburban school districts); Pis. Ex. 86).56

D. Remedy. It is clear that the harms demonstrated at trial can be 

cured. Indeed, it is undisputed that a remedy in this case could be

The few scattered programs that defendants partially subsidize 
such as Project Concern, affect few children. (Carroll at 9- n  in' 
Williams 94-97, 101, 115-16; Pis' Ex. 368; Stip. 253). ' '
261 rVrnc;ths / eiCne? cf eaSU,rne S ’ ,the state legislature, Public Act 93- 263, C.G.S. §§ 10 264a - 10-264k, An Act for Quality and Divert-i i-v
(Court Ex 1) merely describes a series of planning7 deadlines fo^ a  
process that is not binding on the towns. The new law contains no 
racial or poverty concentration goals, no guaranteed funding, and no 
mandates for local compliance. (Finding 88; Stip. 88).

Among the problems identified in plaintiffs' exhibit 86 a 
report released by the State Board of Education concern'ina 
Connecticut's Limited English Proficient (LEP) students w e r e i f  
almost 2,400 bilingual students (15%) were not even in a program’- 2 
there was no special provision in the state statutes to protect'the 
rights of LEP students,- 3) there was no state funding? to school 
districts for providing language assistance-programs to LEP students- 
4) pre-service training was not required for teachers in the bilingual' 
programs; 5) there was a failure to require i n - s l u i c e t r a i n S T o r  
■ .Work; 6) t?le cultural and linguistic wealth of LEP students was
not being recognized and was infrequently included in district-wide 
curricula; 7) LEP students often lacked access to supplemental 

°^Pjro9rfms available to English-proficient student- and 8) 
the State had failed to conduct required annual evaluations' of thi bilingual program. (Pis' Ex. 86 at 2-3, 12, 14). uacions o l the

27



ordered to address racial and ethnic isolation, the concentration of 

poverty, and the inadequacies in Hartford's public schools. Defendant 

Ferrandino stated, "We believe that by breaking down [racial] 

isolation and by eliminating concentrations of poverty we should see 

improved student achievement." (Pis' Ex. 514 (Ferrandino statement); 

Williams at 81-82) . Plaintiffs' experts Dr. Gary Orfield and Dr. 

William Gordon testified that for more than three decades, communities 

have formulated successful school desegregation plans by engaging in 

court-ordered and expert-assisted planning processes. (Orfield I at 
44-47; Gordon III at 24-29).

Any plan designed to remedy conditions of segregated and unequal 

education in the Hartford area must be metropolitan-wide to be 

effective. (Orfield at 32, 33; Willie at 41, 42, 49; Gordon II at 14; 

Pis' Ex. 82 at 8) . Indeed, defendants agree with the need for a 

multi-district solution. (Pis' Ex. 493 at 85, 151, 165 (Ferrandino 
Dep.); Pis' Ex. 494 at 144 (Tirozzi Dep.); Pis' Ex. 495 at 25, 32-33 

(Mannix Dep. ) ; Pis' Ex. 506 at 60 (Margolin Dep. ) ; Pis' Ex. 73, at 5) . 

The parties also agree that reduction of both racial segregation and

the concentration of poor students in the schools are two of the 

primary goals to be accomplished in a remedial plan. (Pis' Ex. 493 
at 139 (Ferrandino Dep.); Calvert at 62-63).57

racial Pi d e n t ^ f f aShi D r ' G o r d o n  t e s t i f i e d  that e l i m i n a t i o n  ofracial i d e n t i f l a b i l i t y  r e q u i r e s  not o n l y  s t u d e n t  a s s i g n m e n t  but also
changes in f a c u l t y  an d  staff assignment, curriculum, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
e x t r a c u r r i c u l a r  a c t i v i t i e s  an d  school facilities. (Gordon II at L g ) ’ 
Indeed, plaint i f f s '  w i t n e s s  A d n e l l y  M a r i c h a l  t e s t i f i e d  about the nee d  
to e n s u r e  the c o n t i n u e d  p r o v i s i o n  of b i l i n g u a l  e d u c a t i o n  in 
d e s e g r e g a t e d  schools g i v e n  the r e q u i r e m e n t  that t h e r e  be a critical 
mas s  of b i l i n g u a l  s t u d e n t s  for the* c r e a t i o n  of a p r o g r a m  ( S a r i c h S

28



It is also undisputed that effective schools can make a 

difference in the educational outcomes of children regardless of their 

socioeconomic background. (Orfield I at 138; Pis' Ex. 493 at 50-51, 

131, 148 (Ferrandino Dep.) ; Pis' Ex. 494 at 91 (Tirozzi Dep.); 

Williams at 31, 83; Pis' Ex. 506 at 59 (Margolin Dep.); Pis' Ex 73- 

Finding 3) . Defendants concur that any remedial plan requires 

educational enhancements. (Pis' Ex. 493 at 153 (Ferrandino Dep.); 

Pis' Ex. 506 at 63 (Margolin Dep.); see Slavin at 13-14; Gordon II at 

113; Orfield I at 51-53; Haig at 66).

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO FIND 

STATE ACTION AND FAILING TO FIND THAT DEFENDANTS' ACTIONS 
WERE CAUSALLY CONNECTED TO THE PROVISION OF UNEOUAL 
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES, THE CONDITIONS OF SEGREGATION 
AND THE PROVISION OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION.

The court misapplied the law dealing with state action in 

concluding that judgment should be entered in favor of the defendants 

(R. at 166-79). As explained below, the trial court failed to follow 

Connecticut precedent under which the question of "state action" 

relates solely to determining whether constitutionally challenged 

conduct is public or private. Instead, the court improperly conflated

the doctrine of state action with considerations of causation and 

liability and standards of proof in discrimination cases. Moreover, 

the trial court erred in failing to acknowledge uncontested evidence 

that the State of Connecticut not only instituted the state-wide
system of education, which itself is sufficient to establish "state

at 36).

29



action," but also affirmatively contributed to the unconstitutional 

conditions of which the plaintiffs complain. The Court further erred 

in its misplaced reliance on aspects of federal jurisprudence which 

inapplicable to the instant case because of the differences in the 

substantive protection afforded by the Connecticut and by the United 
States constitutions.

As a result of these errors, the plaintiffs were deprived of the 

proper threshold ruling that education is a public function and that 

the state is liable for existing constitutional deficiencies in public 

education because of its role in creating, operating, and overseeing 
the state educational system.

A- The Court Below Erred in Failing to Recognize the 
Existence of State Action in Dismissing Plaintiffs' 
Complaints of Unconstitutional Deprivation of a 
Fundamental Right to Education.

In reaching the conclusion that "the constitutional claims 

asserted by the plaintiffs need not be addressed" (R. at 179), the 

trial court relied exclusively on a discussion of federal court cases 

that dealt with questions of whether specific conduct of states and 

local governmental entities violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution. (R. at 64-72) . This reliance is 

misplaced not only because it deals with cases which speak to an issue 

separate from the one before the Court but because it wholly ignores 

Connecticut case law unequivocally supporting the right of plaintiffs 
to have their complaints heard and considered by the court

30



Public education is a oubl-ic function chat 
necessarily involves state action.

1.

The provision of elementary and secondary education in the state 

of Connecticut is undeniably a public rather than private function 

that the state has undertaken for most of its history: "Connecticut 

has for centuries recognized it as her right and duty to provide for 

the proper education of the young. » State ex. rel. Huntington v. Huntington School 

Committee, 82 Conn. 563, 566, 74 A. 882 (1909) .

The degree of state control and involvement in the operation of 

the public system of education is evidenced in the statutes that 

provide the right to an education and delegate the authority to 

implement that right: Conn. Const. Article VIII § i (providing for 

free public schools); C.G.S. § 10-4a (identifying educational 

interests of the state); C.G.S. § 10-220 (defining duties of boards 

of education); C.G.S. § 10-240 (providing for town control of public 

schools within town limits); C.G.S. § 10-241 (defining powers of 
school districts).

The fact that the day-to-day operations of the separate school 
districts occur on the local level does not alter the fact that the 

ultimate responsibility for providing education is a public function
entrusted to the state.-

The same basic educational system has continued to this
?a5®' ^  *tateL :rJc°9ni2ing that providing for education is 
a state duty and function now codified £n the constitution 
article eighth, § 1, with the obligation of overseeing 
education at the local level delegated to local school 
boards which serve as agents of the state.

31



Horton v. M eskill, 172 Conn. 615, 647, 376 A. 2d 359 (1977) (Horton I) (citing

Murphy v. Berlin Board o f  Education, 167 Conn. 368, 372, 355 A. 2d 265 (1974)); 

West Hartford Education Association v. D eCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 573, 295 A.2d 526 

(1972) . See Finding 1 .

The court below has itself recognized that the public nature of 

the state's involvement in the state system is sufficient to satisfy 
any state action requirement:

Public schools are creatures of the state, and whether the 
condition whose constitutionality is being attacked is 
®tate—created or state-assisted or merely state- 

perpetuated should be irrelevant" to the determination of 
the constitutional issue. Educational authorities on the 
state and local level are so significantly involved in the 
control, maintenance and ongoing supervision of their 
school systems as to render existing school segregation 
"state action" under a state's constitutional ecrual 
protection clause. M

(R. at 99)(citation omitted).

Plaintiffs believe that this earlier decision by the trial court 
was correctly decided and that the same factors apply. Accordingly, 
any state action requirement has been met.

2 • Cologne v. Westfarms Associates y i e l d s  thg, same t-p r u H-

In Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 469 A. 2d 1201 (1984)

this Court considered whether a political advocacy group could be 

denied access to a common area of a privately owned shopping mall. 

In deciding that the owners could not be required to provide access, 

the Court held that the Connecticut Constitution was intended to guard 

against governmental and not private interference with constitutional 

rights. Cologne, 192 Conn, at 61; see also Lockwood v. K illian, 17  2 Conn. 4 96

32



375 A. 2d 998 (1977) (private conduct abridging individual rights does 

not violate equal protection clause). The Court found that in the 

absence of state action, plaintiffs could not assert their right to 

constitutional protection. In the dissenting opinion, Justice Peters 

and Judge Sponzo disagreed on the grounds that they believed that 

Connecticut law did not require that there be expressly public 

involvement or, alternatively, that the nature of shopping malls is 

such that they have assumed "a uniquely public character" and thereby 

take on governmental characteristics. Cologne, 192 Conn, at 82 

(Peters, J., dissenting).

Application of each of the various analyses set forth in Westfarms 

to the instant case yields the same result. The facts of this case 

fit squarely within the requirements of both the majority and 

dissenting opinions in Westfarms because a constitutional right is

implicated and the nature of the interest in public education is such 

that it would satisfy both those who believe that only state action

is subject to review by the courts and those who believe that there 
is no such requirement.58

5 8 t
v, P l a i n t l ffs a g r e e  w i t h  the a r g u m e n t  that t h e r e  will n e c e s s a r i l v  
5 ^ 5 i f ’Ey e n c e = b e t w e e n  the n o t i o n  of state a c t i o n  as appUed in 
federal l a w  and an y  n o t i o n  of s tate a c t i o n  u n d e r  a s t a t e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
m  par t  b e c a u s e  of the d i f f e r i n g  n a t u r e  of the g o v e r n m e n t a l  entities':

If we are to import a state a c t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t  into the 
C o n n e c t i c u t  constitution, we m u s t  r e c o g n i z e  that its 
c o n t o u r s  will n e c e s s a r i l y  d i f f e r  f r o m  the s t a t e  a c t i o n  
conc e p t  that has d e v e l o p e d  u n d e r  the c o n s t i t u t i o n  of the 
U n i t e d  States In part, at least, the s t a t e  ac t i o n  
r e q u i r e m e n t  is d e s i g n e d  to a d d r e s s  the d e m a n d s  “  
federalism, to cr e a t e  space for s tate regula t i o n .  B e c a u s e  
t h e r e  is no "federalism" c o m p o n e n t  to s t a t e  a c t i o n  u n d e r  
state constitutions, an y  s tate s t a n d a r d  f o r  g o v e r n m e n t

33



B. The Court Below Failed to Recognize Actions That
Contributed to Existing Segregation in the Puolic 
Schools.

1 • The court below improperly failed to address
proof of state involvement in segregation in rhp 
public schools.

The court below committed a further error by finding that the 

plaintiffs failed to prove that state action is a direct and 

sufficient cause of the conditions which are the subject matter of the 

plaintiffs complaints. Although a showing of causation is not

required for the threshold determination of whether there is state 

action, the court's failure to address specific actions taken by the 

state ignores the degree of control exercised by the state in its 

public function as overseer of the education system and minimizes the 

role that the state played in creating the system of unequal 

educational opportunities that prevails in the system today.

Extensive evidence of state involvement in the public schools in 

a manner that contributed to the educational conditions complained of 

was presented at trial. In fact, the court below explicitly 

recognized this role by finding that the state-mandated requirement 

that school district lines be coterminous with town boundaries (C.G.S.

§ 10-240) along with the statutory requirement that children attend 

school in the school district within which they reside (C.G.S. § 10-

involvement should be more 
less definitive government 
federal law.

flexible, and should require 
action than is required under

Cologne, 192 Conn, at 82 (Peters, J., dissenting)(citations omitted)
34



184) contributes to the racial and ethnic segregation within the 

schools. (Finding 22, 147, 148; see also Collier at 53).

the evidence demonstrated that the state was a partner 
in the construction of new schools in a manner that reinforced 

patterns of segregation: between 1950 and 1980, defendants approved

and funded the construction of over 100 new schools in virtually all- 

white suburban communities, representing over 50% of total enrollment 

in the Hartford region. (Pis' Ex. 112, 150, 151). At the same time 

that this construction was taking place, the state took additional 

steps that had the effect of further solidifying the emerging patterns 

of racial identifiability and unequal schooling. Between 1950 and 

1980, defendants funded a major expansion of school capacity in the 

increasingly racially and ethnically isolated and poverty-concentrated 
schools in the Hartford school district. Id.

The evidence at trial showed, further, that this pattern did not 

cease in 1980. The defendants have continued to approve funding and 

oversee the construction or expansion of segregated single district 

schools since 1980. (Pis' Ex. 142, 143, 160; C.G.S. §§ 10-282, et seq.).

Taken together, the evidence demonstrated conclusively that state 

activity in the area of public education epitomizes the concept of 

state action and that the involvement of the state could not be 
considered benign or even neutral. ,

2 • E v i d e n c e  of a f f i r m a t i v e  acts h v  the g t a t e  to
increase— segregation_is not required to pr-mro
state liability. ^----

Although the evidence outlined above demonstrates that the state 

has contributed to segregation in the public schools, it is not

35



n e c e s s a r y  that p l a i n t i f f s  d e m o n s t r a t e  s u c h  acts in o r d e r  to 

p r e v a i l . 59 In a s i t u a t i o n  d i r e c t l y  a n a l o g o u s  to this, this Court has 

^ ulsd that the state was liable for i n e q u i t i e s  w h i c h  a r o s e  in school 

f u n d i n g  eve n  if those d i s p a r i t i e s  w e r e  not the d i r e c t  resu l t s  of 
acti o n s  b y  the state:

The p r e s e n t - d a y  p r o b l e m  ar i s e s  f r o m  the c i r c u m s t a n c e  that 
o v e r  the y e a r s  there has a r i s e n  a g reat d i s p a r i t y  in the 
a b i l i t y  of local c o m m u n i t i e s  to f i n a n c e  local education, 
w h i c h  has g i v e n  rise to a c o n s e q u e n t  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i s p a r i t y  
in the q u a l i t y  of e d u c a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e  to the y o u t h  of the 
state.

Horton 1, 172 Conn, at 6 4 8 . 60

59 m u  .The trial court only compounded its error by criticizing 
plaintiffs for failing to plead affirmative acts of residential or housing

' (R- at 178) • Although evidence at trial suggested that
the state was far from guiltless in the patterns of residential 
segregation that exacerbate racial isolation in the school districts 
(see, e.g., Collier at 53; R. at 44-45, 1 426), plaintiffs complain that 
it is segregation within the schools that violates the constitution.

The trial court also confused the threshold question of state 
action with the question of the standard of proof necessary to show 
?n5fLdaral constitutiona! violation. The question of demonstrating 
intent is wholly irrelevant to the issue of state involvement and if 
^q eVai -̂t the in^uiry under the state constitution. See infra at 
39-40 in addition, however, the court below misconstrues federal 
constitutional, law. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that 
a showing of intent is not required to establish a violation of the 
qual Protection Clause where unequal treatment affects a fundamental 

right. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992) (opinion of White 
Blackmun Stevens and Souter, JJ.); id . (opinion of O'Connor, J )'

383 ° S - 663' 666 n 3  <19« ) ; Reynolds v.
n o l i  r w S ' m  '■561-62 (1964) ; Carrington V. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96(1965),- Griffin v. I llin o is ,351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956 v

t f r i ' n  n 29-36 (1973) N a t i o n  is not a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution). y 1
36



II. DEFENDANTS HAVE VIOLATED ARTICLE FIRST, §§ l AND 20 AND 
ARTICLE EIGHTH, § 1 OF THE CONNECTICUT CONSTITUTION BY
FAILING TO PROVIDE EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES TO 
PUBLIC SCHOOLCHILDREN IN THE HARTFORD METROPOLITAN AREA.

A. Article First, §§ 1 and 20 and Article Eighth, § 1 of 
the Connecticut Constitution Confer a Right to Equal 
Educational Opportunity.

As a predicate to overturning the state financing system then in 

effect, in Horton I  this Court recognized constitutional guarantees 

concerning education:

We conclude that without doubt ... in Connecticut, 
elementary and secondary education is a fundamental right 
[and] that pupils in the public schools are entitled to the 
equal enjoyment of that right.

Horton 1 , 172 Conn, at 648-49; see also Horton v. M eskill, 195 Conn. 24 35

486 A. 2d 1099 (1985) [Horton III) ,61

As recently as this June, this Court has reaffirmed the vitality 

and uniqueness of this fundamental right and the obligations that it 
imposes upon the state:

The text of our constitution makes evident the fact that 
its drafters have been explicit when choosing to impose 
affirmative obligations on the state. See, e.q. Conn 
Const, art. VIII, § 1 ("[t]here shall always be free public 
elementary and secondary schools in the state. Indeed the 
history of article eighth, § 1, is particularly instructive 
in the instant case. This explicit textual provision, and 
its counterparts, article eighth, § 2 (system of hiqher 
education), and article eighth, § 4 (school fund) are the 
only constitutional provisions recognized to date that 
impose affirmative obligations on the part of the state to 
expend public funds to afford benefits to its citizens

By recognizing a fundamental constitutional right to education 
C ^ e c t i c u t  sets itself apart from federal law. s i  San Amonio T A

2^"36 <no express or implicit federal constitutional right to 
education) This very significant difference lends further support 
to plaintiffs' argument that the court below erred in relying on federal rather than state precedent. relying on

37



According to its proponents at the convention, the purpose 
of article eighth, § 1, was to give "our system of free 
Puklic education . . . the same Constitutional sanctity" as 
our bill of rights.

Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 595-96 (1995).

In Horton I the plaintiffs challenged a state system that sent

children to schools with grossly disparate financial means to educate 

children. In the present case, plaintiffs challenge the system of 

providing public elementary and secondary education, a system that 

sends children to schools that are segregated on the basis of race, 

ethnicity and economic status and are unequal. As a legal matter, 

this case falls squarely under Horton v. Meskill, and the question before

this Court is whether the undisputed condition of racial and economic 

isolation of the public schools, coupled with the undisputed and 

extreme disparities in educational resources afforded Hartford's 

schoolchildren, violate plaintiffs' constitutional right to an equal 
educational opportunity.

Article First, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution provides:
Ail men when they form a social compact, are equal in 
rights,- and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive 
public emoluments or privileges from the community.
Article First, §20 provides:

No person shall be denied the equal 
nor be subjected to segregation or 
exercise or enjoyment of his civil 
because of religion, race, color, 
origin.

protection of the law 
discrimination in the 
or political rights 

ancestry or national

Article Eighth, §1 provides:

There shall always be free public elementary and 
schools in the state. y secondary

38



Taken together, these sections prohibit the provision of unequal 

educational opportunities to Connecticut's public schoolchildren. 
Horton 1, 172 Conn, at 647-48.

As this court recently acknowledged, the right to education 

conferred by Article Eighth, § 1 constitutionalized a longstanding 

statutory tradition of free public education in this state, Moore v.

G anim , 233 Conn. 557, 596-97 n.51, _  A.2d (1995), a tradition

predicated on the belief that all children have the capacity to learn 

and should be provided the opportunity to achieve. More than two

hundred years ago, Superior Court Judge Jesse Root wrote that schools 
were founded

not only upon principles of reason and benevolence to 
^ hert'--,̂ Ut °f Justice and good will to ourselves -- for 
the children of the poor, as well as the rich, are born 
with capacities for instruction and improvement in 
knowledge and in virtue, and to acquire and enjoy the 
rights and privileges of citizens....

1 Root xix (1793)(introduction by Jesse Root).

This constitutional right to education imposes an affirmative 

obligation on the state. See Moore v. G anim , 233 Conn, at 595-96 

(distinguishing between the right to education, which is textually 

granted, and plaintiffs' claim in Moore to an unenumerated right to 

subsistence benefits). Taken together, the guarantees of Article 

First, §§ l and 20 and Article Eighth, §i impose an affirmative duty 

on the state to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity 
to every school child. Horton 1, 172 Conn, at 644-47.

The equal protection clause 

appropriate circumstances provides
of the state constitution in 

more protection than the federal
39



equal protection clause . AFSCM E, Council 4, Local 6S1, AF L-C IO  v. City of West 

Haven, 234 Conn. 217, 221, n.6 (1995) . Following the principles

established by the United States Supreme Court in construing the 

mandates of the federal equal protection clause, equal protection 

c^cilysis under the state constitution "must commence with a 

determination of whether a legislative classification . . . impinges 

upon a fundamental right," Horton 1, 172 Conn, at 640; see Dunn v.

Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335, 342 (1972). Horton I and Horton III

established that any measures potentially abridging the right to 

education is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Horton 1, 172 Conn, 

at 646; Horton II I , 195 Conn. at 35. An "action can survive 

constitutional scrutiny only if it (1) serves a compelling state 

interest and (2) is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Daly

In response to plaintiffs' demonstration of grossly unequal

v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499, 515, 624 A.2d 876, 884 (1993); see abo  State v. 

R ao, 171 Conn. 600, 602, 370 A.2d 1310 (1976); Horton 1 , 172 Conn, at
63 7.62

educational opportunities, defendants have offered no justification
for their conduct. Instead, defendants attempted to disclaim all

. In Horton 111 • this Court adopted a special standard for 
alleging unconstitutional disparate funding, under which the
U  H  ”1 7 1 * C 1 TY> /’""v T.T «%% a  «  a  1    1  J a  1  1  — 1

in Horton II I , -no such plan * 
level of disparity continues 
equality.'" Id .

j-j. ue constitutional if the remaining 
to emasculate the goal of substantial

40



worse, theresponsibility, blaming societal conditions or 

schoolchildren themselves. (R. at 294 1 10, 295 1 15; Armor I at 21, 

94-95, 117-19) . Casting the blame elsewhere is no defense for an
affirmative obligation.

B. The Segregated, Economically Isolated and Unequal 
Conditions in Hartford Metropolitan Area Public 
Schools Violate Plaintiffs' Right to an Equal 
Educational Opportunity.

Equality of educational opportunity is ascertained by comparing 

the quality of education provided in the school districts. In Horton 

I, this court identified criteria for measuring the quality of 

education, including:

(a) s-‘-ze classes,- (b) training, experience and
background of teaching staff; (c) materials, books and 
supplies; (d) school philosophy and objectives; (e) type of 
local control; (f) test scores as measured against ability
(g) degree of motivation and application of the students-
(h) course offerings and extracurricular activities.

Horton I , 172 Conn, at 634.63

Over the past decade, defendants themselves have elaborated 
further their obligation to provide equal educational opportunity.

n Q  Abh0“ V BUrke'119 N 'J ' 28?' 357~66' 575 A '2d 359, 394-4001^9° (co™Par.in9 course programs in science, foreign language music 
art and physical education, the availability of advanced academic 
offerings, facilities, teacher ratios, and the average experience and 
education of school staff); see also United States v. Yonkers Board o f Education

I I I  Fl'9«* 1 * * * S7Uw '  1276' 1 4 J ° " 31 (S-D -N 'Y - 1985 U  a ff’d , 837 F . 2d 1181 (2dCir. 1987)(comparing the racial identifiability of white and minoritv
schoois, as well as (a) school buildings and facilitiesl i n c h i n g  
analysis of size, age and condition, (b) teaching and administrative
S5a5f' _ ir̂ c.luding level of experience, turnover and expectations of 
s udent_ability, (c) the size of student enrollments and overcrowding 
as well as student mobility and disciplinary problems and (d) 
educational curriculum, including programs for advanced averaae ind 
below-average students, as measures of equal educational opportunity).

41



In Guidelines for Equal Educational Opportunity, " the State Bound of 

Education defined equal educational opportunity as "the right of every 

child to be provided with the educational experiences necessary to 

ensure that his or her intellectual ability and special talents are 

developed to the fullest." (Pis' Ex. 39). Importantly, the Board 

acknowledged that "equity ... does not mean an equal distribution of 

resources; rather, it implies that those who need more must receive more " Id 

(emphasis added).

Two years later, in 1986, the Board refined its definition of 

equal educational opportunity in its "Policy Statement of Equal 
Educational Opportunity:"

While equal educational opportunity is a dynamic concept 
certain elements emerge as critically important to schools 
and students. Access to educational opportunities, staff 
and material resources, program offerings, assessment of 
student outcomes, remedial education and funding are maior 
elements of equal educational opportunity, elements that 
must interact in systematic ways. In a broad sense 
progress in ... equal educational opportunity can be 
measured by the reduction of inter-district and inter-pupil 
disparities m  educational opportunities as defined bv these six elements. y

(Pis' Ex. 43 at 1) ,64

64,More generally, the Board stated,

"Equal educational opportunity" means student access to a 
lev? 1 5uaf1ty of programs and experiences which provide 
each child with the means to achieves commonly defined 
standard of an educated citizen.

This goal will require resource allocations based upon 
individual student needs and sufficient resources ?to 
provide each child with opportunities for developing his or
fullesttelleCtUal ablllties and special talents to the

42



The court below erroneously found that students in the Hartford 

metropolitan area are provided equal educational opportunities In 

so doing, the court ignored the criteria for measuring the quality of 

education established by Horton 1, 172 Conn, at 634, and the standards

adopted by state defendants. Instead, the court substituted its own 
method of analysis. The court found:

An equal opportunity in the educational sense of that term 
is being provided to the children of a particular school 
district if they are provided with the level of resources, 
competence in terms of instruction and an ongoinq 
systematic program that is similar to that of other 
communities in the state, and under that definition the 
educational programs and curriculum that are being offered 
in Hartford provide equal educational opportunity to its students.

(Finding 143) . The judge thus committed error by completely bypassing 

analysis of disparities in the provision of materials, books and 

supplies and course offerings, by similarly neglecting the wide 

disparity in test scores, and by disregarding the impact of racial and 

ethnic isolation and the concentration of poverty in reaching his 

conclusion. A trial court cannot "arbitrarily disregard, disbelieve 

or reject an expert's testimony in the first instance." Builders Service

Evidence of equal educational opportunity is the 
participation of each student in programs appropriate to 
his or her needs and the achievement of each of the state's 
student sub-populations (as defined by such factors as 
wealth, race, sex or residence) of educational outcomes at 
whole equa "̂ t0 that of the state's student population as a

(Pis' Ex. 43 at 1) . The Board also recognized the importance of 
overcoming racial isolation to achieving equal educttionaf 

J d - F°ur V**™ later, the Governors Commission o£ 
Q ality and Integrated Education similarly concluded that "a oualitv 
education re g ie s an integrated student body and faculty," a m c n ^ c t h ^  
things. (Pis Ex. 73 at 11)(emphasis added)

43



Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Com m ission , 208 Conn. 267, 294, 545 a .2d 530

(1988) . There is certainly no evidence in the record to show that all 
of the plaintiffs' experts were unworthy of belief.

The judge's findings also simply defy common sense. Despite 

weeks of oral testimony and hundreds of documents, many of which were 

undisputed, detailing disparities in plants and facilities, equipment 

and supplies, textbooks and libraries, course offerings and 

curriculum, and the teaching and professional staff, see supra at 11-19,

the court made not one single finding that the resources provided in 
Hartford compared poorly to those in the suburbs.65

In fact, not only are Hartford students exposed to the harmful 

effects of racial and ethnic segregation and the concentration of poor 

students in the schools, see supra at 4-7, 21-24, but they are also

subjected to unequal educational programs. See supra at 7-21. Given

the degree of segregation and economic isolation and the current level 

of resources, Hartford schools are simply unable to provide access to 

educational opportunities appropriate to their students' needs, as 

evidenced by the gross disparities in student performance. The sharp 

disparities m  both resources and student outcomes between Hartford 

and its surrounding suburbs flout any definition of "equal"

^ T So n ye r = nc r SarCe° „ * & i ^ L ™  £ £
e s s e n t i a l l y  d i s m i s s  the s i g n i f i c a n c e  of the d i s p a r i t i e s .  See e e  
F i n d i n g  116 ("Virtually all o f the differences in performance can
e x p l a i n ed....") (emphasis added); see also F i n d i n g  11 4 , 132.

44



educational opportunity. Indeed, many witnesses at trial, including 

the defendants, agreed that Hartford schoolchildren are not receiving 

an equal educational opportunity. (R. at 275, 11 481-85). The court 

below erred in not applying the factors outlined in Horton 1 and the

state's own definitions and by completely neglecting overwhelming

evidence that Hartford students are not receiving equal educational 
opportunity.

III. RACIAL AND ETHNIC SEGREGATION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE 
HARTFORD METROPOLITAN AREA VIOLATE THE SCHOOLCHILDREN'S 
RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM THE CONDITIONS OF SEGREGATION AND 
DISCRIMINATION UNDER ARTICLE FIRST, §§ 1 AND 20 AND ARTICLE 
EIGHTH, § 1 OF THE CONNECTICUT CONSTITUTION.

A. The Connecticut Constitution Prohibits Segregation and 
iscrimination on the Basis of Race or Ethnicity in the Public Schools. T

The racial and ethnic segregation currently suffered by the

p u b l i c  s c h o o l c h i l d r e n  of H a r t f o r d  b y  itself c o n s t i t u t e s  a v i o l a t i o n

of Article First, § 20 of the Connecticut Constitution, which, taken

alone or together with Article First, § 1 and Article Eighth, § i,

prohibits racial segregation in the schools. These state

constitutional provisions proscribe segregated conditions within the

public schools whether or not such segregation is the product of

intentional conduct. The claim concerning the unique language of

section twenty is separate from and in addition to the claims for
equal educational opportunity discussed above in Issue II.

This Court has developed a list of six factors to be considered 

in construing state constitutional provisions. These factors are: 

(1) analysis of the text involved; (2) holdings and dicta of the 

Connecticut appellate courts; (3) federal precedent; (4) sibling state

45



decisions; (5) the historical constitutional setting; and (6) economic 

and sociological conditions. Moore v. G an im , 233 Conn. 557, 581 (1995)-

State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684-6, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992); State v. L a m m e, 

216 Conn. 172, 579 A.2d 484 (1990) .

In Geisler this Court stated that the factors should be considered

"to the extent applicable." 222 Conn, at 685. No case explicitly 

discusses when certain factors are applicable or when one or more of 

the factors so persuasively answers the constitutional question that 

analysis of the other factors becomes unnecessary. in the present 

case, an analysis of the text of the constitutional provisions 

themselves leads inexorably to the conclusion that the educational 

segregation suffered by Hartford's schoolchildren as proven at trial 
is unconstitutional.

1 ' — le. . P laxn l a n q u a q e  of--- the C o n n e c t i c u t  Consti tut -i nnprohibits segregation. ' ■—

This Court has stated that it is "bound by the command of the

text of the constitution". Doe v. Sta te, 216 Conn. 85, 105, 579 A.2d 37

(1990) and that "effect must be given to every part of and each word 

m  the constitution." Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 597-98, 402 A.2d 
763 (1978) .

The plain language of Article First, §§ l and 20 and Article 

Eighth, § l clearly prohibits segregation in public schools without 

proviso or qualification. Article First, § 20 provides that "No 

person shall be ... subjected to segregation or discrimination in the 

exercise or enjoyment of his civil or political rights because of

46



(emphasisrace, color, ancestry or national origin. "
added).

Thus, § 20 explicitly prohibits "segregation" and treats

segregation as a distinct evil. Segregation is prohibited in addition 
to denials of equal protection and discrimination.

Moreover, the combined force of the constitutional prohibition 

against segregation and the guarantee of equal educational opportunity 

conferred by the education and equal protection clauses makes clear 

that segregation in the public schools is constitutionally impermissible

The segregation clause prohibits segregation in the enjoyment of civil 

or political rights, and the right to education is considered one of 

Connecticut's preeminent civil rights. Horton 1, 172 Conn, at 646. If

it has any meaning at all, the prohibition against segregation, thus,
must prohibit segregation in the public 

2 . The historv of the adODtion of
schools.66 

Article First.Plaintiffs' contention that it is the cnnd i t i r>n /-I-F
segregation__ that is prohibited hv th<= rnnnpph-i mi-Constitution.

This Court has also stressed the importance of the historical 

context xn which constitutional provisions are adopted in determining 

the scope of provisions contained in the Declaration of Rights. See

j ™ould violate the rule of construction that every word in a
document has meaning to argue that "segregation" and "discrimination" 
ean essentially the same thing. Cf State v. Lam m e, 216 Conn, at 177 

Moreover, even if segregation and discrimination were synonymous then 
both must apply to the condition o f segregation in the school s^no matter 

what the intent of defendants, for otherwise they wouid both be 
redundant with the equal protection language of § 20 which states 
"no person be denied the equal protection of ' the law n"r be
subjected to segregation or discrimination--- " (emphasis added).

47



State v. R oss, 230 Conn. 183, 250, 646 A . 2d 1318 (1994); State v. O quendo, 223 

Conn. 635, 650-52, 613 A . 2d 1300 (1992); State v. A ya la , 222 Conn. 331, 

349-351, 610 A . 2d 1162 (1992); Bishop v. Kelly, 206 Conn. 608, 618-20, 539 

A.2d 108 (1988) .

The framers of Article First, § 20 clearly intended to prohibit 

the condition of segregation in the public schools, whether or not it 

was caused by intentional conduct. The framers chose to insert the 

word "segregation" into the text of Connecticut's Constitution fully 

cognizant of the fact that the equal protection clause of both the 

United States and the state constitutions already prohibited facial 

and intentional discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity. 

See Brown v. Board o f  Education, 347 U.S. 4 83 (1954) ; see also Daly v. DelPonte, 225

Conn, at 513, 624 A. 2d at 883. In his remarks, Justice Baldwin 

discussed § 20 as something entirely new in Connecticut, and he also 

praised Connecticut's leadership role in civil rights. (Proceedings o f 

the 1965 Constitutional Convention at 696 (hereinafter "Proceedings")). m

referring to something entirely new, Justice Baldwin could not have 

been thinking of the equal protection clause, for Connecticut had 

already had one in Article First, § 1. It is a total perversion of 

his remarks to suggest that he would have thought § 20 protected no 

more than was already protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Certainly the Constitutional Convention did not adopt the anti- 

segregation clause only to reiterate what was already clear: the 

framers must have intended that a new and additional meaning be given 
to the segregation clause.

48



Indeed, the word "segregation," which had originally been part 

of § 20, was eliminated in subcommittee for fear that particularizing 

a specific issue might be read to limit the entire provision. 

(Proceedings at 691). It was at the insistence of Mrs. Woodhouse and

her explanation of the importance of including the term, as well as 

her and other members' declarations on the expansive interpretation 

to be given the entire provision, that it was ultimately included. 
(Proceedings at 691-696).

In discussing the inclusion of "segregation," Mrs. Woodhouse
stated,

[W]e have to realize that today the philosophy of 
segregation is something that is in the minds of all of us 
It would be regrettable if it should be in any wav 
suggested that this Constitution did not unequivocallv 
oppose the philosophy and the practice of segregation So 
I move this amendment as reading very definitely that it in 
no way limits the rights of anyone. It would not be so 
interpreted by the courts and it strengthens the wording 
that we have before us in the file. a

(Proceedings at 691) (emphasis added) .

The framers of the Constitution went on to call the provision 

"the strongest human rights principle that this convention can put 

forth to the people of Connecticut" and stated that it is a "broad 

statement of principle that is all inclusive." (Proceedings at 692).

The intended comprehensiveness of the section was remarked upon 

repeatedly. (Proceedings at 693, 695-96 (Mr. Houston and Justice 

Baldwin)). it was also clarified for the benefit of "courts and 

historians" that those civil and political rights mentioned in the

49



section include the right to education. 

Bernstein)(emphasis added)).

(Proceedings at 694 (Mr.

Furthermore, at the time of the constitutional convention, a 

number of federal and state courts were finding municipalities liable 

for school segregation without any requirement that plaintiffs 

demonstrate intent. See Barksdale v. Springfield School Committee, 23 7 F Supp

543, 546 (D. Mass.), vacated, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965); Blocker v. Board 

o f Education, 226 F. Supp. 208, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Booker v. Board o f  

Education, 45 N.J. 161, 168-71, 212 A.2d 1 (1965); see also Jenkins v. Township 

o f Morris School District, 58 N.J. 483, 279 A.2d 619 (1971); c f . Englewood Cliffs 

v. Englewood, 257 N.J. Super. 413, 608 A.2d 914 (1992), a ff’d 132 N.J.

327, 625 A.2d 483, cert, denied, 114 S. Ct . 547 (1993). Against this

background, if the framers had sought to limit the meaning of the term 

segregation to "intentional" actions, they could have done so 
explicitly.

• Prior— C o n n e c t i cut a p p e l l a t e  d e c i s i o n s  .

T h e r e  is no a p p e l l a t e  court p r e c e d e n t  d i r e c t l y  i n t e r p r e t i n g  the 

p r o h i b i t i o n  a g a i n s t  segregation. In Horton I  p l a i n t i f f  s c h o o l c h i l d r e n  

c h a l l e n g e d  the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  of a s y s t e m  of f i n a n c i n g  p u b l i c  

education, not racial segregation, a n d  t h e i r  c l a i m s  d i d  not i m p l i c a t e 

the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o h i b i t i o n  a g a i n s t  s e g r egation. Nevertheless, 

this C o u r t ' s  h o l d i n g  in Horton I  a p p l i e s  to the q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  the 

p l a i n t i f f s  m u s t  p r o v e  defendants' intent in o r d e r  to m a k e  out a 

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  v i olation. Horton 1 a n s w e r e d  that q u e s t i o n  in the

50



negative when it established that pursuant to Article First, §§ 1 and 

20 and Article Eighth, § 1, education is a fundamental right and any 

infringement of that right cannot stand absent a compelling 

governmental justification. Horton 1 , 172 Conn at 646 n.14. See also Daly 

v. D elPonte, 225 Conn, at 513, 624 A.2d at 883.

Though the state argues that it is somehow not responsible for 

the conditions of segregation, it offers no justification for 

educational segregation and, indeed, cannot. Now, nearly one hundred 

years after the United States Supreme Court upheld the separate but 

equal doctrine, in the infamous Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)

it is nearly impossible to imagine how the state could justify 

segregated schooling. The state has thus failed to meet its burden 

under the analytic framework established by Horton 1, 172 Conn, at 649 

4. Sibling state precedent.

On the subject of the "educational importance of eradicating 

segregation and discrimination in the public schools," Englewood Cliffs v. 

Englewood, supra, a New Jersey court quoted the eloquent language of 

that state's Supreme Court:

In a society such as ours, it is not enough that the 3 R's 
are being taught properly for there are other vital 
considerations. The children must learn to respect and 
live with one another in multi-racial and multi-cultural 
communities and the earlier they do so the better. it is 
during their formative school years that firm foundations 
may be laid for good citizenship and broad participation in 
the mainstream of affairs. p xri

Englewood, 257 N.J. at 453; 608 A.2d at 93 7 (quoting Booker v. B d  o f  Educ. 

o f Plainfield, 45 N.J. 161, 170-71, 212 A.2d 1 (1965)).

51



In addition, the Michigan Court of Appeals has interpreted the 

anti-discrimination clause of the Michigan constitution to prohibit 

conduct with the effect of segregating on the basis of race and 

ethnicity.67 N A A C P v. Dearborn, 173 Mich. App. 602, 615, 434 N.W.2d

444, 450 (1988), appeal denied, 433 Mich. 904, 447 N.W.2d 751

(1989)(finding unconstitutional an ordinance restricting the use of 

parks to town residents and holding that the anti-discrimination 

clause "goes beyond the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment by 

prohibiting all racial segregation, without regard to whether it was 

caused by a segregative purpose.") (quoting Berry v. School District o f  Benton 

Harbor, 467 F.Supp. 721, 730-32 (W.D. Mich. 1978)).68

5 • R e l e v a n t  federal pre c e d e n t

The U.S. Constitution contains no comparable anti-segregation 
language and no explicit right to education. See San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 

supra.™ The education desegregation case law that has developed

Article 1 § 21 of the Michigan Constitution states, in Dart 
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws • nor shall 

any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political riqhts 
or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin." because of

, . A. .numt)er ° f o t h e r  state c o n s t i t u t i o n s  c o n t a i n  p r o v i s i o n s  
^ 5 ° ^ b:L^ irig se9’r e £Tation, but n o n e  is as b r o a d  as A r t i c l e  First § 20 
of the C o n n e c t i c u t  Constitution, a n d  n o n e  hav e  y e t  b e e n  c o n s t r u e d  in
x l l T T n  T ai°K?US„t0 Che present case- See-- const. ArScle(establishing that children of Spanish descent m nnm- ho
denied admission to the public schools nor "be classed in separate
schools ); Haw Const. Article I § 9 (prohibiting segregation in military organizations). y segregation m

69The S u p r e m e  C o u r t ' s  a n a l y s i s  in San Antonio ha s  n o  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  
to the p r e s e n t  case, w h i c h  seeks relief for v i o l a t i o n  of rights 
e x p l i c i t l y  g u a r a n t e e d  b y  the C o n n e c t i c u t  C o n s t i t u t i o n .

52



under the federal law over the last thirty years, therefore, is 

distinctly inapposite to the instant case where completely different 
state constitutional provisions are involved.

6• Economic and sociological considerations.

" [C]ontemporary understandings of applicable economic and 

sociological norms," R oss, 230 Conn, at 251, compel the conclusion

that Connecticut's constitutional prohibition against segregation is 

violated by the very existence of segregation in the public schools. 

Since 1954, when the United States Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board

o f Education, 347 U.S. 483, the research has been conclusive that 

attending schools that are segregated by race and ethnicity has 

serious long-term consequences for minority and white children and 

negatively impacts on the educational opportunities available to 

African American and other minority schoolchildren. (Pis' Ex. n  at 
110; see supra at 4-7).

Defendants themselves acknowledge that racial segregation is 
harmful, (Pis' Ex. 493 at 35, 138-39 (Ferrandino Dep.); Pis' Ex. 494 

at 11-12 (Tirozzi Dep.)), and have stated that "segregation is 

educationally, morally and legally wrong." (Defs' Ex. 12.5 at 1)

As defendants thus plainly agree, and as the trial court found, 

(Finding 44) , segregation in schools is particularly corrosive because 

the adverse effects on schoolchildren are both long-term and multi­

faceted. See supra at 4-7. Conversely, and as defendants own 1988 

review concluded, integrated education impacts positively on school

Conn, at 647.

53



retention and college attendance rates and long-term economic and 

social opportunities. (Defs' Ex. 12.25; Defs' Ex. 12.5).

As a nation we have recognized the "public schools as a most 

vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system 

of government" Abingdon School District v. Schem pp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963)

and as the primary vehicle for transmitting "the values on which our 

society rests." Am bach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). By allowing

segregated schools to exist, for whatever reason, this state teaches 
its schoolchildren that separation of the races is acceptable.

Harm to children is not dependent on the intent of defendants nor 

on the ability of plaintiffs to prove the state's motive for assigning 

students to segregated school districts. (Neuman-Johnson II at 15-17. 

Dudley at 129-33). Children can see no difference between those 

systems that are intentionally segregated and those in which children 

are separated by race and ethnicity, however unintentionally. 

Children know that they go to school with others who are African 

American and Latino like them, or white like them. They also know 

that children of another race or ethnicity go to other schools, and 

minority children know the white children have opportunities of which 
they can only dream. (Hernandez at 42, 64).

T h e  e v i d e n c e  of the l o n g - t e r m  n e g a t i v e  imp a c t  of s e g r e g a t e d  

s c h o o l i n g  is u n d i s p u t e d  an d  compelling. W h i ^ e  m a n y  of o u r  re s i d e n t i a l  

n e i g h b o r h o o d s  m a y  a l s o  b e  segregated, in the s t a t e  of C o n n e c t i c u t  

e d u c a t i o n  is a f u n d a m e n t a l  right an d  it is the s t a t e ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  

to e n s u r e  that the schools are not s e g r e g a t e d  a n d  that the schools 

p r o v i d e  equal e d u c a t i o n a l  opportu n i t i e s .  S o c i o l o g i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s

54



and our concern for the future of our children, weigh mightily in

favor of construing Article First, §§ 1 and 20 and Article Eighth, §
1 as prohibiting segregation in the schools.

B. The Public Schools in the Hartford Metropolitan Area Arp 
Racially and Ethnically Segregated.

The trial court has found that " [s]tudents in Hartford schools

are racially isolated and are likely to become more isolated in the

future." (Finding 42). Additionally, the court found that this

isolation was caused by the town-school district system, which makes

school district lines coterminous with town boundaries. (Finding 22, 
147) ,70

The court's finding is well supported by the facts. (Stip. 26, 

28, 35). While Hartford's schools are composed almost completely of 

African Americans and Latinos, the minority enrollment in twenty of 

the twenty-one surrounding towns varies from a high of thirty percent 

to a low of two percent, with the majority having less than ten 

percent minority enrollment. (Stip. 35). Hartford's racial isolation 
is not only reflected by the student bodies, but also by the 

segregation of the staffs, (Stip. 36), and has been attested to by 
defendants themselves. (Finding 72, 84).

The key fact to support plaintiffs' claim is therefore clear and 

undisputed: Hartford's public schools are racial and ethnically 

segregated from surrounding suburbs. Moreover, everyone involved in 

this suit agrees that racial and ethnic segregation is harmful. These

st.te^may Snot^ve^liability1 fo^^egr^alf^d3U n e q u a l *
e d u c a t i o n . l o c a l i t i e s  the responsibility”* ^ ^

55



facts compel a finding that the present segregation of schools in the

Hartford metropolitan area violates Article First, §§ 1 and 20 and
Article Eighth, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution.

IV. DEFENDANTS' FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE CHILDREN OF HARTFORD 
WITH BASIC EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES VIOLATES PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT 
TO AN ADEQUATE EDUCATION UNDER ARTICLE EIGHTH § 1 OF THE 
CONNECTICUT CONSTITUTION.

A. Article Eighth, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution 
Establishes a Right to a Minimally Adequate Education.

Article Eighth, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution provides that

There shall always be free public elementary and 
secondary schools in the state. The general assembly 
shall implement this principle by appropriate 
legislation.

See also C.G.S. § 10-4a; Article First, §§ 8 and 10. As early as 1909, 

this Court held that the constitution created not just the right to 

education, but the right to a "proper education." State ex. rel. Huntington 

v. Huntington School Committee, 82 Conn, at 566. More recently, in Horton I,

172 Conn, at 649, this Court unanimously71 held that the state had a 

"constitutional duty to educate its children" and that the judiciary 
is responsible for determining compliance with that duty.

This holding is consistent with the holdings of the highest 
courts of other states. Most recently, the Court of Appeals in New 

York unanimously held that the New York constitution's education

In dissent, Judge Loiselle agreed with the maioritv that 
Constitution guaranteed some minimum level of education- "Free
hnVa i°?HmUSt-be interPreted in a reasonable way. A town may not 
hold children m  an open field to hear lectures by illiterates Y But 
there is no contention ... that education in Connecticut is not 
meaningful or does not measure up to standards accepted bv 
knowledgeable leaders in the field of education." Horton 1, 172 Conn

56



created a judicially enforceable right to a minimally adequate 

education. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, No. 117 (June 15
1995) . The Court held that " [s]uch an education should consist of the 

basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable 

children to eventually function productively as civic participants 
capable of voting and serving on a jury." Slip op. at 9.72

These courts have used various formulations to describe the scope 

of the right to a minimally adequate education. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke,

119 N.J. at 374, 575 A.2d at 403 (determining that a thorough and 

efficient education requires "such a level of education as will enable 

all students to function as citizens and workers in the same 

society"); Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d at 212

(recognizing that a "child's right to an adequate education is a 
fundamental one under our Constitution"); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Oklahoma,

Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d at 1149 (recognizing the guarantee to a "basic 

adequate education"); Hombeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. at 632

458 A. 2d at 776 (determining that students of the state are to be 

provided with a "basic public school education") ; McDaniel v. Thomas, 248

Other courts, interpreting their constitutions, have reached 
the same result. Abbott v. Burke. 119 N.J. at 374, 575 A.2d at 403 
v  Council fo r  Better Education, In c ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989),- Fair Sch. Fin 
C a rn a l o f  Oklahoma, Inc. v. Sta te, 746 P.2d 1135, 1J49 (okla. 1987)- Hombeck 

Somerset County Bd. o f E duc ., 295 Md. 597, 632, 458 A.2d 758, 776 (1983) ̂  
McDanielv. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 644, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1981) - L

484 £' 16J f ' Va- 6?2‘ 7°5' 255 S'E '2d 859' 877 <1978>; Dansonv.CKef 484 Pa. ' 424' 399 A 2d 36t>' 365 (1879) ; Seattle Sch. Disl. No. 1 v. S i Z  90 Wash. 2d 476, 518, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (1978); Shofslall v. Hollins 110
, 'a  4 9 0 'J 5 1 5 , P '2 d . 5 9 °' 592 <1973) -■ Harper V. H u m , C V - 9 1 - 0 1 1 7 R

reprinted in Appendix to the Opinion o f the Justices, 624 S o . 2 d  107, n o  (Ala. 1993) ’

57



although this court has ruled that subordinate factual findings will 

not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous, the appropriate standard 

for review of the trial court's conclusions is denovo. Practice Book 

§ 4061 ("The court may reverse or modify the decision of the trial 

court if ... the decision is otherwise erroneous in law."). See State 

v. Geisler, 222 Conn, at 692-94.

Moreover, the trial court erroneously ignored the stipulations 

of the parties that, at least in certain respects, the Hartford 

schools are inadequate. (Stip. 100-101; see supra at 7-24). The

court's disregard for this undisputed evidence of inadequacy was 
clearly erroneous.

Concerning the standard by which adequacy is measured, most 

sister states that have faced the issue have held that adequacy is 

measured, xn part, by student achievement. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal 

Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, No. 117 at 9; Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 
790 S . W . 2d at 212; Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d at 877-78; Seattle Sch. Dist. v. 

State, 585 P.2d at 94. A school system whose children cannot read or 

write, even if provided with significant resources, is not adequate. 

The trial court appears to have rejected this standard, erroneously 

holding that there is "no professionally accepted definition of the 
[term] 'minimally adequate education.'" (Finding 127)

Based on this conclusion of law, the court then erroneously found 

that resources provided to Hartford children were "sufficient to meet 

the basic educational needs of all its students," (Finding 125), 

implicitly holding that sufficiency is determined from inputs alone

59



Ga. at 644, 285 S.E.2d at 165 (stating that a minimum education must 

provide each child with an opportunity to obtain "the basic minimum

skills necessary for . . . full participation in the political 
process") .73

B. Defendants Have Failed to Provide the Children of 
Hartford with an Adequate Education.

The trial court agreed that the plaintiff children had a 

constitutional right to a minimally adequate education, (R. at 106), 

but failed to articulate any legal standard for determining whether 

the state had discharged its duty to provide a minimally adequate 

education. Instead, the court purported to find that plaintiffs' 

suggested measures of legal adequacy either were irrelevant or had 

been met. (Finding, 89-132, 135-142). Specifically, the court

rejected as irrelevant plaintiffs' evidence relating to whether 

Hartford children were succeeding in the goals set by the state, and 

found that the state is providing the minimal resources necessary to 

meet the needs of the students. Id. The judge's conclusions were 

mixed findings of law and fact, and they were in error. Thus

ah°  Pauley u Kelfy, 162 W.Va. at 705, 255 S.E.2d at 877

citizenship^^;
a thorough and efficient education with an "ade^ate '
pbM 1Ct e d u c a t i o n ) ,  Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State', 90 Wash.' 2d at 555

make up the minimum of the education thaf . .. Pr°cess]
required" (emphasis in original)); Shof.stall v. Hollins, n o  Ariz 1 a ^  90^ 5^5S S S H S S S S i

58



and not achievement. Indeed, after acknowledging the extensive
evidence to which the parties had stipulated that (a) students in 

Hartford have greater needs than those in other school districts 

(Stip. 113-149), and (b) Hartford students perform poorly on the state 

mastery tests and other measures of achievement such as drop-out rate, 

graduation rate, SAT scores and college attendance, (Stip. 154-202) 
the trial court found that

[v]irtually all of the differences in performance between 
Hartford students and those in other towns . . . can be 
explained by differences in socioeconomic status and the 
background factors that socioeconomic status represents

(Finding, 116) . In so finding, the trial court accepted the

extraordinary opinions of David Armor, opinions that were based on

poor methodology, (Crain II at 60), and were at odds with other

undisputed evidence. Defendants themselves have stated their belief

that achievement levels are linked to racial and economic isolation,

(Pis' Ex. 514 (Ferrandino statement); Williams at 81-82); thus, the

parties agree that scores cannot simply be the inevitable outcome of

a student's socioeconomic status. (Crain II at 72-74). Plaintiffs

strongly urge the court to reverse the trial court's finding on this 
point.

Even if this court were to accept the finding that lower 

achievement rates in the early grades were due largely or even 

entirely to the lower socioeconomic status -of the children, however, 

the court could not accept that the continuing poor levels of 

achievement, as children move through the higher grades, is due 

exclusively to that factor, unless the court also accepted the trial 

court's finding that poor and minority children were uneducable.

60



(Finding 142).74 Tnat finding, critical to the court's conclusion on 

this claim and on the claim of educational inequity, is the crux of 
the dispute between the parties.

The trial court found that "[tjhere are no educational strategies 

or initiatives that can fully deal with the complex social issues" 

that depress accomplishment in Hartford. (Finding 142). Of course 

plaintiffs do not suggest that the schools can "fully" deal with 

poverty. But the court's conclusion is not limited by that adverb. 

By permitting continued academic failures, failures that in many 

instances deepen in higher grades, the trial court is in effect 

holding that school systems cannot educate poor or minority children 

Nothing can be done by the school systems, the trial court has 

implied, to teach poor and minority children even the basic 

educational tools needed for them to participate in society.

At the simplest level, this critical finding is contrary to the 

stipulations of the parties. (Stip. 142, 153) . Defendants agree with 

plaintiffs and disagree with the court that poor children "have the 

capacity to learn" and that "poor and minority children have the

 ̂ „trial ^ourt makes the remarkable finding that despite the
JJS* that many of the students in the Hartford schools are pe?foLina 
below the remedial level, they are receiving at least a m i n i S ? ?  
adequate education in the sense that a minimally adequate education 

. °*}e that gives a child a chance of leading a successful life* »
1321’ The court fails to explain how education that leaves children without the ability to read write or ana c v,*-

T ^ t h f c o " ?  chance of leading a successful life" in today' s^orld 
To the contrary, the extraordinarily low achievement levels for 
example, the fact that a majority of Hartford fourth c-ivt-h ^ • ,_05

‘"“ I.0 meeC r Sn "he -mediaT* £ £ £ £ £ ^on then reading, (Stip. 166) -- weighs heavily against the oroDosit-i on that-
ofrth0rmaHnCiealeVelS arS S°lely attributable to the socioeconomic status of the children and are not, at least in Dart a t rS fT status
of education provided by the school system. ' f hS guallty

61



potential to become well-educated." Id. At an evidentiary level, the

facts in this case showed that there are programs that enable 

children, even those with the problems of the children in Hartford, 

to learn. (Stip. 89, 94; Finding 49; see supra at 20-21, 28-29). The

trial court failed to address evidence of the successes of these 

programs and, more importantly, failed to acknowledge the vast 

disparity between the limited number of successful programs available 

xn Hartford and the much greater number of students in need of them. 

(Carroll at 9-11, 30; Pis' Ex. 325-33, 368, 515, 516; Stip. 253; 
Williams at 101, 115, 116, 119; Forman at 44-47) ,75

The trial court's conclusion, that poor and minority children 

cannot be educated, is both morally and legally wrong. The right to 

an education, an education that succeeds in teaching children to at 

least achieve a minimal level of reading, writing and arithmetic, is

75n

Connecticut^^ COUrt COncluded with language equally applicable to

This record proves what all suspect: that if the children
of poorer districts went to school today in richer ones 
educationally they would be a lot better off. Everything 
m  this record confirms what we know: they need that
advantage much more than the other children. And what 
everyone knows is that -- as children, -- the only reason 
they do not get that advantage is that they were born in a 
poor district. For while we have underlined the impact of 
the constitutional deficiency on our state, its impact on
n o ' far raofe)!iraP°rCant- They (ace, ?hrough no fault of their own, a life of poverty and isolation that 
most of us cannot begin to understand or appreciate.

Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. at 394, 575 A.2d at 412

62



a right of all Connecticut's children, even poor children in 

Hartford.76 This court should reverse the trial court's decision and 

hold that the state is failing to provide Hartford's students an 

education sufficient to enable them to fulfill the civic 
responsibilities they will assume as adults.

V. DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO REMEDY THE RACIAL, ETHNIC AND 
ECONOMIC ISOLATION AND LACK OF EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES 
DESPITE THEIR LONG-STANDING KNOWLEDGE OF THE HARMFUL 
EFFECTS OF SUCH CONDITIONS.

The defendants' position that they have not failed to act to 

remedy the racial, ethnic, and economic isolation of Hartford's 

schoolchildren is reminiscent of their position in Horton I that they
had not failed to act to remedy vast disparities in the tax resources 

available to property poor towns such as Canton and property rich 

towns such as West Hartford. Legislation had provided for many years 

a flat grant from state funds, but that did little to lessen the 

disparities. The same could be said for state grants for exceptional 

students, for school construction, and for transportation. 172 Conn, 
at 628-34.

Before the litigation in Horton I was started, a legislatively 

established commission determined that the state was "not providing 

an equal educational opportunity for all its children." 172 Conn, at 

652-53. In 1975, after the trial court in Horton I had ruled but

767A holding by this court that the right to a minimally a d e e m s  
education is measured in part by the accomplishments of the stude£?s 
not merely by resources applied, would not be limitless. The ?iaht 
is to a minimally adequate education, not a superb one ContrarvSo

l  . C° ^ S conclusi°n ' standards do exist, set by the S a t e  Department of Education and others. See, e.g., Pis' Ex 45

63



before the appeal had been heard, the Legislature passed a statute to 

distribute certain lottery funds to the towns according to a 

guaranteed tax base formula. The impact of this legislation on the 

d_ties was found to be "minuscule and not significant " 172
Conn, at 636-37.

Similarly, in the present case, defendants have repeatedly been 
informed of the problems of racial and economic isolation and the 

overall inadequacy of Hartford's public schools, and of the 

disparities between Hartford and suburban schools. (Stip. 61, 101, 
166, 173; Pis' Ex. 1, 12a-b, 37, 50, 53, 56, 58, 59, 60, 69, 70, 73; 

supra at 24-27). Today defendants remain fully aware of the current 

racial and economic isolation and overall inadequacy of the Hartford 

schools. (See, e.g., Stip. 26-60 (racial isolation); 113-49 (economic 

isolation); 101 (inadequacy of school buildings); 51 (1991 State Board 

of Education predicts increased isolation); 173 (unsatisfactory

performance by Hartford schoolchildren); Finding 84 (Governor Weicker 

recognized the "indisputable fact" of racial and economic isolation 

m  Connecticut schools)). Year after year defendants have been 

implored to implement m/erdistrict remedies to address i n t e r d i s t r i c t  

segregation and inequality. (See, e.g., Pis' Ex. 1 (Harvard Report);

Pis' Ex. 4 (1966 grant proposal submitted by Hartford area

superintendents); R. at 59, f 53 (1966 request to Governor by Civil 

Rights Commission to adopt legislation to invest the State Board of 

Education with authority to direct full integration); Pis' Ex. 21 

(1967 proposal from Governor's Conference on Human Rights and

64



Opportunities for the creation of inter d i s t r i c t  educational parks) ; Pis'

Ex. 50 (Tirozzi I) ) . Despite the plethora of recommendations, 

defendants have adopted almost no measures to deal with the Hartford 

schools' racial and economic isolation. See supra at 25-27.

The trial court's attention to the largely inconsequential 
measures taken by the state is inexplicable, given the state's utter 

neglect of the desperate need for addressing racial, ethnic and 

economic segregation and the vast disparities between Hartford and the 
suburbs.77

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the case 

remanded with direction that a declaratory judgment be entered as 

prayed for by the plaintiffs and for further equitable relief not 
inconsistent with this Court's decision.

77 1

xrr ^  °f thJl overwhelming evidence of defendants' failure toact to address the constitutional violations and to adont 
reconmiendations made repeatedly over decades by study after studv the 
trial court s findings which, taken together, L e m  to excuse the sta?e 
from its responsibility to ensure equal and,adequate education to all 
schoolchildren, are clearly erroneous. (See Finding 46 77 ^  Find!™
t 5 ' e*fraple' credits the state with developing programs to
encourage the creation of interdistrict magnet school h wtoTl L f  
record shows that magnet schools reach an infinitesimal L o L l !  Ch? 
Hartford's schoolchildren. (Pis' Kr 325.“  5lS °£
94-97, 101, 115-116, 119; Forman at L-47) ' 4 e t r S  co %
neglec^of t S T r o b l t s ^ ^  rSC°rd °f knowledge aSdegiect of the problems of segregation, inequality and inadequacy.

65



PLAINTIFFS, MILO SHEFF, ET AL.

By_______________________
WESLEY W. HORTON 
MOLLER, HORTON & SHIELDS, P.C. 
90 GILLETT STREET 
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06106 
(203) 522-8338 
JURIS NO. 38478

>(UVjju.
SANDRA DELVALLE
KENNETH KIMERLING
PUERTO RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE &
EDUCATION FUND
99 HUDSON STREET, 14TH FLOOR
NEW YORK, NY 10013
(212) 219-3360

WILFRED RODRIGUEZ 
HISPANIC ADVOCACY PROJECT 
NEIGHBORHOOD LEGAL SERVICES 
1229 ALBANY AVENUE 
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06112 
(203) 297-0760

PHIL D. TEGELER 
CONNECTICUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION FOUNDATION 
32 GRAND STREET 
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06106 
(203) 247-9823

JOHN C. BRITTAIN
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT SCHOOL 
OF LAW
65 ELIZABETH STREET 
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06105 
(203) 241-4664

MARTHA STONE
CONNECTICUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 
UNION FOUNDATION 
32 GRAND STREET 
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06106 
(203) 247-9823

C k *  C .  / t o *

CHRISTOPHER A. HANSEN 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION
132 WEST 43RD STREET 
NEW YORK, NY 10036 
(212) 944-9800

MARIANNE L. ENGELMANN LADO 
NAACP LEGAL DEFNSE AND 
EDUCATIONAL FUND 
99 HUDSON STREET, 16TH FLOOR 
NEW YORK, NY 10013 
(212) 219-1900

Filed August 1, 1995

-65-



C ER TIFIC A TIO N

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was hand delivered to  the following 
counsel o f record on August 1, 1995.

R IC H A R D  B LU M EN TH A L 
A TT O R N E Y  G EN E R A L 
C A RO LY N  K. Q U E R IJE R O  
ASSISTANT A TT O R N E Y  G EN E R A L 
G R E G O R Y  T. D ’A U R IA  
ASSISTANT A TT O R N E Y  G EN E R A L 
55 ELM  ST R E ET 
P.O. BOX 120
H A R T FO R D  CT. 06141-0120 
(203) 566-4990

B ER N A R D  F. M C G O V ER N  
ASSISTANT A T T O R N E Y  G E N E R A L  
M A R TH A  W ATTS PR ESTLEY  
ASSISTANT A T T O R N E Y  G EN E R A L  
110 SH ERM A N  ST R E E T  
H A R T FO R D  CT. 06105 
(203) 566-7173

Wesley W. H orton