Logan v. Warren County Board of Education

    'T

urt finds that there will fu 6rrm to plaintiffs.

,iff, GHI,may recover alt 4-
,tncru,red.in tlte implemene-
oants decision of nonrcnewit
rticle XXIX and Section llgg
B-to the contract. If GHi;
flt 1t _."y assert a claim
'nited States under the Con-AcL The tcmporary I*, iI
T_ryT" injury. &e,Sane
.11! g.S. 61,90, e4 s.ct. esiq 166 (tyr4). A breach oi
: United States on account of.
contract termination would
vernment to monetary dam-
y, a-contract modification or
P.U.a by the terms of theI be a breach of contrzct
rntially entitles plaintiffs to
'ges. .See e.g. Allid ttateri-
rt C,o. Inc v. Unitd Seares,
rt.o.r9?8).

the medicare beneficiaries,
rm to them is at best specu-
the dietinct possibility ex-

'ansfer of gervices to BIue
rg improvements to the ad-
the Medicare program in

e C,ounties. Merc unfound-
an appropriate basis for a
nction and certainly not an
v.

Iv. DISSERVICE TO

. INTEREST

. The policy determination not to renew

GHI's contract was made after thoruugh

rcview of GHI's performance. The decision

a,8s an integral part of policy determina-
gons of how best to administer Part B of
the Medicare Program and allocate limited

Esounces in a manner best serving the puh'

fic as well as the beneficiaries of the Medi-

care AcL

[18, l9] The public interest lies in the

effective administration of the Medicare

Prrgram nationwide. The Secretary and

tlre Administration of HCFA are in the best

position to evaluate the most efficient ad-

ministration of the Medicare Program.
Therefore, if the injunction were to issue, it
would obstruct the administration of the
Medicare Program and deplete nesources

otherwise available for other programs con-
trary to public interest.

Therefore, having reviewed the record
and being otherwise duly advised, it is here-
by

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this
action is dismissed without prejudice.

Charlee O. IOGAN, Ptaintiff,
v.

WARREN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCA.
TION and George M. Holtiman, Individ-
ually and in hia Official Capacity ae
Superintendent l[arren County Boerd
of Education, I)efendanta.

Civ. A. No. CY 182-{67.

Unitcd Statee District Court,
S.D. Georgia,

Augusta Division.

Sept. 23, 1982.

School principal filed action alleging
that his dismissal violated various conatitu-

t45
THE PUBLIC tional rights. The county board of educa-

tion filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The District Court, Bowen, J.,
held that a school principal who was con-
victed of submitting false documents to the
Intcrnal Revenue Service could be dis-
missed frpm his position on the basis of that
conviction and, further, the statute autho-
rizing dismissal and nonrenewal of a princi-
pal's contract did not violate the teacher's
constitutional rights.

Ordered accordingly.

l. Schools 614l(l)
Under Georgia law, offense of eubmit

ting false documents to Internal Revenue
Service involves moral turpitude and was
sufficient ground for dismiss8l or nonre-
newal of principal's contract under provi-
sions of Georgia Fair Dismisssl AcL Ga.
Code, $ 32-2l0lc et seq.

2. Conetitutional Law c=278.5(3)

Schoole eDl33.l5, l4l({)
Fact that ststute authorizing dismigsal

or nonrenewal of school principal's contract
for conviction of crime may be construed to
exclude some crimes ae basis for nonrenew-
al did not rcnder ststut€ vagr.le or over-
broad, either facially or otherwise so as to
deprive principal of due prooe$ when he
was dismiEsed from his position after being
convicted of submitting false documents to
Internal Revenue Service. Ga.Code, SS 32-
2101c et seq., 82-2l0lc(a), (a[1, {, 8), (b),
82-2103c, 82-2104c; U.S.C.A. Const.
Amends. 5, 14.

3. Statutes c=47

Facial vagueness @curs when statute is
so devoid of stsndard of conduct alerting
those who are within its ambit of prccribed
conduct that it cannot be legitimatcly ap
plied to any conduct. U.S.C.A. C,onsL
Amends. 6, 14.

{. Statutee et7
If pereon of reasonable intelligence can

asoertain corc meaning, or etandard of con-

LOGAN v. IYARREN COUNTY BD. OF EDUC.
Cltc r. Or0 F.Supp. t4t (10t2)

I'ENED INJURY TOIFF OUTWEIGHS
: OF HARM TO THE DE-
{TS

hns for the transition have
)ed. Any injury to plain-
re form of money damag€E
r be apeculative. As to t,he
harm to them would be
mooth implementation of
, in that aense, more akin
est. Ttercfore, the Court
threatcned injury to de-
f the interest of the public
nrc aeriourly threatened.,

rnd Moaroe County, Floridr
rd Qucens County being the



146 549 FEDERAL SUPPI.EMENT

ll. Schoolr e-l{f(2)
Ability to discharge even tenured per-

sonnel when deemed necessary to proper
functioning of schools is essential to exer-
cise of authority over school system. Ga.
Code, SS 32-2101c et seq., 32-2t0lda),
(a)(1, 4, 8), (b), 32-2103c,32-210k"

12. Schools 6l4f(2)
It is only where school board has valid

ground for removing school personnel that
it may exerrcise authority provided under
Georgia statute to discharge teachers or
principals and, accordingly, school personnel
enjoy constitutional protections concomi-
tantly with local school board's rights to
manage school affairs. Ga.Code, SS 32-
2101c et seq., 32-2101c(a), (a[], 4, 8), (b),
32-2103c, 32-Zl04r.

13. Schools e=133.15

In rcviewing decision not to rcnew
school principal's contract, inquiry involved
whether procedures followed by school au-
thorities comported with due pnocess re-
quirements and, if so, whether action taken
was supported by substantial evidence.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.

14. Constitutional Law c=278.5(4)

Procedures employed by local and state
authorities prior to dismissal of school prin-
cipal did not violate principal's due process
rights where statutory procedures which
adequately protected principal's due process
rights were followed. Ga.C,ode, SS 32-
2l0lc, 32-2101c(aX4, 8); U.S.C3. Const.
Amends. 5, 14.

15. Schools ol4f(4)
$It was not necessary to justify dis-

charge or nonrcnewal of school principal's
contract for conviction on charge of submit
ting false documents to Internal Revenue
Senice,_ as conviction involved moral turpi-
tude. Ga.CoCe, $ 32-2101c et seq.; U.S.
C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.

16. Schools 6f4l(1)
Where decision to dismiss school princi-

pal after principal had been convicted of
submitting false documents to Internal
Revenue Service was founded solely upon

I.oGA]

@nviction of federal crimt

turpitude, it did not mattr

eraiion in decision was gl'

olitics as basis for nonre

b sz-zrot" et seq.; U.S.C

1.

1?. Congtitutional Law G

Decision to dismiss scl

was convicted of submil

ments to Internal Revl

grounds of that eonvictio

equal protection clause.

2101c et seq.; U.S.C.A.

18. Federal Civil hocedt
Action filed bY sch<

had been convictcd of sub

uments to Internal Revet

ing that his constitutiona
lated when he was dismit
tion on the basis of tht
frivolous and, thercforc, c

against principal.

J. Hue Henry, Henry &

Ga., for plaintiff.

Thomas R. Burnside,
for defendants.

ORDEI

BOWEN, District Judl

In this action, brougl
U.S.C. S 19&3, defendant
judgment on the plead

Plaintiff is estopped un,
judicata or collatcral esl
ing his dismissal from th
pal of an elementary
County. Plaintiff allegl
latcd his rights of petiti
free speech under the I
the United Ststes Coru
the rights to due proces
tion aa guaranteed t
amendment.

The standards applicr
judgment on the pleadin
a defendant's motion, th
the complaint arp talcer
gationr of the answer,

duct in law, and conduct prohibited, facial
invalidity is foreclosed. U.S.C.A. Const
Amends. 5, 14.

5. Schools 6133.15, l4l(4)
Georgia statutc allowing dismissal or

nonrenewal of teacher or principal for in-
competence, immorality and any good and
sufficient cause establishes class of people
covered and provides sufficient notice of
what conduct is prnoscribed and, therefore, is
not unconstitutionally vague. Ga.Code,

$ 32-2f0fc et seq.; U.S.C.A. Const.
Amends. 5, 14.

6. Constitutional Lsw F42.2(f)
School principal who had been dis-

missed frpm his position after having been
convicted of submitting false documents to
Internal Revenue Service could not chal-
lenge statute authorizing dismissal or non-
renewal of principal's contract on grounds
of overbreadth where his conduct fell with-
in plain terms of statut€. Ga.Code, g 32-
2l0lc et seq.; U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.

7. Conetitutional law F42(l)
Statute cannot be challenged by one to

whom law constitutionally applies when
that person is attacking constitutionality of
its application to others not before the
court.

8. Constltutlonal [.aw c=82(4)
Overbreadth challenge can prevail only

upon showing that statute envelops sub'
stantial amount of constitutionally protect-
ed conduct.

9. Constitutional l,aw F42.1(3)
Inasmuch as criminal activity does not

enjoy constitutional protection, school prin-
cipal who was discharged after he was con-
victed of submitting fals€ documents to In-
ternal Revenue Service was in no position
to challenge application of statute authoriz-
ing dismissal to him or anyone else. Ga.
Code, $ 32-2101c et seq.; U.S.C.A. Const.
Amends. 5, 14.

10. Schoolg 6U
States and local authorities have com-

pelling, legitimate interest and broad dis-
cretion in management of school affairs"

I

L

It;



r

-ul(z)
jischlSe sven t€nurcd pep-

.d*.r{ T""rrsry b p.p",
,:h* is.essential to exer.rty over school systcm. 6*
2191"^- 

-"1 
r"{., sz_erorq.i

, g2-2t0&, s2_2tw^

'lll(2)
rhere school board has valid
rovinq achool personnel thate authority provided under
e to 

-discharge teachers or
rccordingly, school per&nng;
:lonal. pmtections concomi-
al 

-school 
board'E rights to

#ffir,%ffi?,:i ilT

l:l&r5
tg decision not to rcnew
r contract, inquiry involved
ues followed by school au-
ted with due prccess re-
if so, whether action taken
by eubstantial evidence.

.mends. 5, 14.

tl lrw c-228.8(4)
mployed by local and state
t,o dismissal of school prin-
ate principal's due process
rtutory procedures which
:ted principal's due process
owed. GaCode, SS gZ_
rX4, 8); U.S.C.A. Const.

r({)
neceEs8ry to justify dis_
:wal of school prineipalt
tion on charge of submiL
rnts to Interaal Revenue
ion involved moral turpi-
8L2l0lc et seq.; U.S.

l. 6, 14.

(.)
t to dismiEs school priaci-
had been convict€d of

documents to Internal
ras founded eolely upon

J. Hue Henry, Henry & Marshall, Athens,
Gr., for Plaintiff.

Thomas R. Burnside, Jr., Augusta, Ga.,

for defendants.

OBDER

BOWEN, District Judge.

In this action, brought pursuant to 42

U.S.C. S 1983, defendants filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings asserting the
plaintiff is estopped under theories of res
judicata or collateral estoppel from attack-
ing his dismissal frcm the position of princi-
pal of an elementary school in Warren
County. Plaintiff alleges his dismissal vio-
lated his rights of petition, association and
frce speech under the firrst amendment to
the United States Constitution as well as
the rights to due process and equal prottc-
tion as guaranteed by the fourteenth
lmendment.

The,standards applicable to a motion for
irdgment on the pleadingB 8re strict. Upon
t defendant's motion, the fact allegations of
tle complaint are taken as true. The alle-
3ations of the angwer, which under Fed.R

t47

trict of Georgia on January 17, 1980.

In June of 1980, plaintiff ran for the
office of Superintendent of Schools for
Warren County, opposing the incumbent de-
fendant. George Holliman. Plaintiff was
defeated in his bid for office, but he chal-
lenged the election in superior court. He
was unguccegsful in that action as well.
Plaintiff alleges his seeking of public office
was the true rcason for his dismissal rather
than the stated conviction rcason.

After being notified that his contract was
not to be renewed, plaintiff requested and
received a ststement of the charges against
him. 

-As 
noted, the basis for the decision

was plaintiff's conviction in federal eourt.
The plaintiff was also informed the matter
was being r.efemed to the Professional
Practices Commission for a hearing. After
a full evidentiary hearing on July 16, 1981,
the Prcfessional Practices Commission rec-
ommended that the plaintiff'a contmct not
be renewed, its decision predicated upon
plaintiff's federal conviction and inability to
effectively perform his job. Eurther, the
commission found the crime for which
ptgl,ttiff EcE eonuicteil .was one involving
molal tUgpr$de.

LOGAN v. \ilARREN COUNTY BD. OF EDUC.
Cltc r' r09 F.Srryp. tas (tC82)

>\.

-s.

anviction of federal crime involving moral Civ.P. 8(d) rcquire no nespons€, ar.e taken as

Iumitude, it did not matter if eome consid- denied. Parker v. Dekalb Chrysler Plym-

iiio, in decision was given to principal's outh, 459 F.Supp. 1&1, 187 (N.D.Ga.1978).

i6ti.r as basis for nonrenewal. Ga.Code, Although consideration of mattcrs outside

i gZ-ZtOt" et seq.; U.S.C.A. C,onst.Amend. the pleadings will normally convert the mo-

l. tion to one for summary judgment, where

l?. Congtitutionet law *242.2(l) the motion is based solely on pleadings and
. __L__, _ j . ., , exhibits it is still treatcd as one for judg-

Declsron [o qlsmlss scnool pnnclpal who

,*-Jn,i.*q".**jt:i'"1,1"*9;::Iffi ';,L:lH[:1',:t,'**llffi"lf 
",JDents, ,,I.lYTl-..*,":'T, 1::::^,_:l eppear to be questions of fact to be decided.

fr:lTJili':::,H:::"'#:# TfI rhe racts surrounding this action, as tak-

ilii. i, r"q.t U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. en from plaintiff's complaint, arc as fol-
- lows: Plaintiff was a principal in the T[ar-

l& Federal 9ivl] Proce9we e2721 ren County school system, when in April,
Action filed by school principal who 1981, he was notified by defendant H;ni-

Drd been convicted of submitting false doc- man that his contract would not be renewed
lments to Internal Revenue Service alleg- for the up-coming lg8l+2 academic year.
ing that his constitutional rights were vio- The rrcason for this action was plainiiff,s
hted when he was dismiesed from his posi- conviction on charges of submitiing false
tjon on the basis of that conviction was documents to the United States govern-
frivolous and, thercfore, costs were assessed ment. He was convicted in the United
rgzinst principal. Stat€s District Court for the Southern Dis-



148 549 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

Consonant with the commission's recom-
mendation, the Warren County Board of
Education voted not to renew the plaintiff's
contract. Plaintiff appealed this decision to
the State Board of Education. The State
Board of Education affirmed the local
board's decision on December 10, 1981. The
present action was then instituted.

Plaintiff's complaint raises five causes of
action:

a) the Georgia Fair Dismissal Act is un-
constitutionally vague and overbroad
facially and as applied to plaintiff;

b) the decision of non-renewal of plain-
tiff's contract was not supported by
substantial evidence, was arbitrary
and capricious, thereby depriving him
of substantive due process of law un-
der the fourteenth amendment;

c) the decision violated his right to due
process of law because plaintiff's con-
viction is unrelated to his present abili-
ty to perform his job;

d) defendant's decision violated plain-
tiff's first amendment rights to free
speech, association, and petition; and,

e) the decision violated plaintiff's right to
equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment.

Before attending to the issues raised in
defendant's motion, one matter must be

settled. Defendants proffer the theories of
res judicata and collateral estoppel as bar-
ring plaintiff's action. Plaintiff contends
he is not barred. Specifically, defendants'
position is that the plaintiff seeks to reliti-
gate the classification of his crime as one of
moral turpitude. Although the complaint
does not seem to take this tack, it is not
necessary to determine if this is plaintiff's
position or even if he is estopped for under
the facts gleaned from the complaint and

the exhibits plaintiff claim fails, at least in
part.

tU There is no dispute as to the plain-
tiff's conviction on charges of submitting
false documents to the Internal Revenue
Service. Under the law of Georgia, of
which this Court must take judicial notice,
this offense involves moral turpitude. A

crime of this naturc is a sufficient gound
for dismisssl or non-renewal of the plain-
tiffs contrsct under the provisions of the
Georgia Fair Dismissal Act. Ga.Code Ann.
$ 32-2101c et seq. The exhibits and plead-
ing's clearly demonstrate that he was con-
victed of a crime involving moral turpitude.
In the Llatter of Nicholson, ?,43 Ga. 8/.Jl8, ?57

S.E.2d 195 (f979); Huff v. Andenon, 212
Ga. 32, 90 S.E.zd 329 (f955). This conclu-
sion effectively disposes of most of the
plaintiff's claims as will be later seen.

In as much as this action arises out of the
non-renewal of plaintiffs contract and the
subsequent administrative proceedings, it is
best to address initially plaintiff's attack of
the state statute authorizing this course of
action. The procedure for terminating or
not renewing the contracts of teacheru and
principals is established in Ga.Code Ann.

S 32-21C. In this chapter, S 3?-2101c is
the pivotal section. It provides the grounds
for which a teacher or principal can be

dismissed or not renewed for the following
year. Examples of these gmunds are in-
competence, immorality, and any good and
sufficient cause. Ga.Code Ann. S 32-
2l0l(aXl), (4), (8). If a teacher or princi-
pal has served for longer than three years

he is entitled to notice of the intBntion not
to renew a contract as well as to a written
statement of the charges against him form-
ing the foundation for a local board's ac-

tion. S 32-2108c. Under section 32-2704c
local school boards are empowered to effec'
tuate the sections of this chapter. The
chapter also makes provision for the en-
forcement of the mandates of due pocess.

For example, $ 32-210Ua) enunciates the
grounds for dismissal, while subsection (b)
provides for the gtving of notice of the
charges and the evidenoe to be presented

and the time and place of a hearing. Sec-

tion 3L2101(c), (d), and (e) prcvide for
senrice of prccess and subpoenas, right to
counsel and a hearing before the locsl board
of education or a tribunal of the Profession-
al Practices Commission. Furthermore,
subsection (0 grves the right of appeal to
the Stste Board of &lucation of a local
board's decision. Plaintiff u[ues this stat
ute is vague and overhpad both facially

IOGAN

and as aPPlied to him' t
without merit.

t2l Plaintiff was convi<

The proPosition that crimin

*nriitution"llY Protectcd r

no citation. Does the in
exclude some crimes 8s a

newal but not othen? Ttre

so construed, but that dor

itself rrnder the statute

brnad, either faciallY or ol

deprive the Plaintiff of du

til.6l Turning first to t
constitutionallY, it ia a wel

om of eonstitutional law tl
ute is unlawfullY vague ot

be impermissiblY vague in

tions. High Ol'Tims, Ir
t.% rns (llth Cir.1982)'

statute's constitutionel in
will be interPretcd, if Pos

constitutional fashion. B
ple in mind, facial vaguen

ststute is so devoid of a st

alerting those who are w
the proscribed conduct I

legitimately aPPlied to t

F.2d at 1223. If a Per
intclligence can ascertait
or standard of conduct, i
conduct prohibited facid
elosed. Id., See, Exxon C

F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.1981),
rcasonably argue that hit
the scope of $ 32-2101c
cation is unconstitutiot
clearly establishes the clt

ed and provides sufficit
conduct is pruocribed. I
that plaintiff came with
law.

tGal The fact that
conduct falls within the
ilatute defeats his ove
A rtatute cannot be cha
to whom the law cont
when that person is att
tionality of its applicr
before the court Bn
{18 U.S. 601, 610,98 S.



EI}TENT

'a tribunal of tJre
Commirgion.

and place of a hearinc.
(c), (d), and (e) prcfu
ess-and rubpoenas, rigtt
tearing befone the toctl bd

rpplied to him.

merit.

Plaintiff was convieted of a crime.
tion that criminal activity is not

ly protected condust requires

but that does not in and of
rtnder the ststute vague or over-

either facially or otherwise so as to
the plaintiff of due prrce$.

Turning first to the issue of facial
, it is a well-entrcnched axi-

IOGAN v. WABREN COUNTY BD. OF EDUC. 149
Clttulle Fslm. lat (lCe)

His argument is 87 L.Ed2d 880 ( rSZ2). *A1q- orelbregg[trr

Jltion. Does the imPugned statute
l,rn rome crimes as a basis for nonrc-

but not othen? The ststut€ could be

can
that-the_
amount of consllllioaally-pmtectad_ gln-
dluct,'l Floida Businessnen, eta v. City of
xdfua,6?s F.zd Lzrg, ,:lltz (llth cir.
1982). In as much criminal activity does
not enjoy constitutional putection, plaintiff
is in no position to challenge the gtatute's

application to him or anyone else. Brcad-
ridr, supn.

[f0-U] Does the ststute as applied to
plaintiff deprive him of his fourteenth
amendment due process rightr? Plaintiff
seems to be alleging an equal prntection
claim, rather than a due process claim. Re-
gardless of the label given the claim, how-
ever, the gubstsnce of it is without merit.
States and local authorities have a compel-
ling, legitimate intercst, Burnside v. Byarc,
863 f'.zd 7U $fh Cir.1966), and broad die-
cretion in the management of school af-
fairs. Bo8rd of Eclucation v, Pico, 

- 
U.S.

_,102 s.ct. 2799, ?8 L.Ed2d a85 (1982);

Clark v. Holmes, 474 FZI 928 (?th Cir.
1972). Moreover, teachers and principals
are, under Ga.Code Ann. $ 8?-898, con-
sidered prcfessionals whose services are af-
fected with the public intcresl It follows
that state and local authorities have a legit-
imate interest in securing the employ only
of thoee fit to sene the public intercgt.
Consequently, the ability to discharge even
tenured personnel when deemed neoessartr
to the proper functioning of the schools is
ess€ntial to the exerrcise of autlority over a
achool system. But, in applying thie au-
thority local boads may not operate arbi-
trarily. A check on this power and I reoog-
nition and implementation of due prccess
guarantees is manifested in GaC,ode Ann.
$ 82-21c. Thus, it is only when a school
boad has a valid ground for rcmoving
echool pemonnel that it may exercise the
authority granted by $ 8%-21c. Accoding-
ly, odrool pereonnel erfoy constitutional
protectionr concomitantly with the local
board's right to manage achool affairs.
Since this elntem is not capriciour or arbi-
trary, plaintiffs application argrment is
without merit.

6fconstitutional law that before a stat

I unlawfully vague on its face it muet

bprmissibly vague in all of its applica-

t HEh Ol' Tima, Ine y. Busbee, 6?8

,! 1080 (6th Cir.198l)/ Plaintiff cannot

.ronably argue that his'conduct is beyond

W [lrh Cir.f982). In reviewing a
constitutional intcgrity, a ststute

be intcrpreted, if poasible, to rcad in a
,ional fashion. Bearing this princi-

h mind, facial vagueness oocure when a
is so devoid of a gtandard of conduct
those who arc within its ambit of

plccribed conduct that it cannot be
applied to any conducl 6?8

tt 1?213. If a peraon of rcasonable
can ascertain a cone meaning,

ttrrdard of conduct, in the law and the

;;drrt pmhibited facial invalidity is fore-
.!rd. Id., See, Exxon bry.u.Busfu,W

rope of $ 8L2101c and that its appli-
is unconstitutional. The gtatute

eatablishes the class of people cover-
end provides sufficient notice of what

ie proscribed. There is no question
plaintiff came within the sweep of the

$.eJ The fact that plaintiff and his
falls within the plain terms of the
defeats his overbrerdth challenge.

cannot be challenged by a person
lbom the law constitutionally applies

tlret penon is attacking the constitu-
of its application to othera not

n tle court. Brudriclc v. Oklahoma,
Us. 6ot, 610, 9g s.ct. 2908, nt4, nt6,

3ivea tlre rigtrt of ennt
td of Education A'r bI Pleintiff Ergue! tfl.
nd overhnoad botl n



150

Plaintiffs second cause of action alleges
a deprivation of substantive due process as
secured by the fourteenth amendment.
The asserted deprivation resulted because
the decision not to renew his contract was
arbitrary and capricious and not supported
by substantial evidence. plaintiff filed
with his complaint as exhibits, which were
incorporated into the complaint by refer-
ence, a transcript and report of the hearing
before the Professional Practices Commis-
sion tribunal. The tribunal hearing was
convened after plaintiff was notified of the
grounds for the non-renewal for the pur-
pose of investigating the charges and allow-
ing plaintiff to respond accordingly. The
report of the Commission (Exhibit C, also
incorporated into the complaint) recom-
mended that the plaintiff's contract not be
renewed. Moreover, this recommendation
was adopted by the State Board of Educa-
tion (Exhibit D, also incorporated) which
affirmed the Warren County Board of Edu-
cation's decision not to renew plaintiff Lo-
gan's contract.

tl3] In reviewing the decision not to
renew plaintiff's contract, the Court is lim-
ited to a two step level of inquiry: l)
whether the procedures followed by the
school authorities comported with due proc-
ess requirements, and, if so, 2) whether the
action taken is supported by substantial evi-
dence, Viverctte v. Lurleen B. Wallae Jr.
College, 587 F.zd 191, l9g (5th Cir.t979).

tl4l Upon careful examination of the
transcript of the proceedings before the
Professional Practices Commission, it is
clear Logan was not deprived of any due
pnrcessl rights. Section B2-2l0lc proce-
dures adequately protect plaintiff's due
process rights. Furthermore, all parties
agreed at the hearing that the provisions of
$ 82-2101c were satisfied. Exhibit B, pg.
5. Therefore, the procedures employed by
the local and state authorities did not vio
late plaintiff's due prccess rights.

The second step of the two step inquiry is
a determination of whether substantial evi-
dence supported the defendant school
board's decision. The hearing tribunal,
upon whose recommendation the school

549 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

board acted, had before it substsntial, if not
conclusive, evidence of plaintiff,s conviction
of submitting false documents. Exhibit B,
pS. ll. Under Ga.Code Ann. S g2_
2101(aXa) and (8) the conviction consti-
tutes sufficient grounds for the board's de.
cision. See, Dominy v. Mays, lEO GaApp.
187, %7 S.E.2d St? (19?9). Moreover, the
hearing tribunal found that, because of the
public knowledge of his conviction and the
reaction thereto, the plaintiff was tess ef-
fective in his job and less able to s€t a
proper example for the students under his
control. The record developed by the hear-
ing tribunal supports its findings and con-
clusions and is entitled to great weight,
Ferguson v. Thomas,4i|O F.2d 852, g5g (5th
Cir.l970), inasmuch as de novo hearings by
the district court are not favored. Viver-
ette, supra, at lg3. Aecordingly, based
upon the findings and conclusions in the
record, the defendant school board,s deci-
sion and the recpmmendation of the hofes-
sional Practices Commission were substan-
tially supported by the evidence.

tlsl Closely tied to the preceding cause
of action is plaintiff's third claim. The
claim, which also asserts a deprivation of
due prccess, attacks the board's decision not
to renew his contract on the basis that his
conviction is unrelatcd to his prcsent ability
to perform his job. As not€d earlier, plain-
tiff was in a position of public tmst. Ga
Code Ann. S 3HS8. Under g B2-2101c
and the interpr"etive caselaw it is not neces-
sary to establish a nexus between convic-
tion and ability to justify discharge or non
renewal, when the conviction involves mor-
al turpitude. *e, Dominy, supra. Conse-
quently, the plaintiff's argument that he
was deprived of due process is without mer-
it.

tl6l A fourth cause of action alleged by
plaintiff is that his contract was not rrc-
newed because of his exerrise of his first
amendment rights of fiee speech, associa-
tion and petition. Specifically, plaintiff as-
serts the decision was in retaliation for his
opposing defendant Holliman in the race
for school superintendent, and for his st8te

LOGI

court challenge of the

Thus, the gist of the fr

discharge of plaintiff for
tory rcasons.

The plaintiff's fourth
by the holding in ML H

District Board of Educs
u.s. 14,97 S.Ct. 568, 50

Mt. Healthy involved t
Doyle's teaching contt
Healthy Board of Exlucr

exercising his first amenr

speech. Several groundr
board for the decision ol
with the ground entailin
ment right. The Supren
Doyle had the burden o
constitutionally Protecte
"substantial" or "motiva
board's decision not to
before he could go forv
Upon such a showing, tl
the employer who may
demonstrating that the s

have been rendered in
protected conduct. Id.
576. In other words, iI
would have been made
constitutionally permisr
presence of a constitutio
immaterial so long as tl
primary ground for the

In this case, the L
founded solely on his cor
crime involving moral
the board's decision, thr
recommendation, nor th
firmation centered on
plaintiff's conviction an
the tribunal determinet
to involve moral turpitr
6, 3, the mstt€r of log
ties and subsequent litil
of only tangential intr
sppear frpm the reeort
the State Board's affin
sideration was given to
tics as a basis for non
issue considered was tl
tion. Thus, it is abund
decision not to r€ner
would have been mad

r
I

t
t
I



LOGAN v. WARREN COUNTY BD. OF EDUC.
Cltc rt tlg F.Supp. lat (10t2)

r5l
I before it substantial, if not
rnce of plaintiff,e conviction
rlse documents. Exhibit B,rr Ga.Code Ann. S g2_
(8) the conviction consti-
frtunds for the boand,e de-

?!!y ,. Mays, tfi Ga.App.
317 (1979). Moreover, the
found that, because of the
r of his conviction and the
the plaintiff was tess ef-
b and less able to set a
br the students under his
rrd developed by the hear-
orts its findings and con-
rntitled to great weight,
us, (X) FZd B5Z, g59 (5th
,h as de novo hearings by
ane not favored. Viver_
.93. Aecordingly, based
r and conclusions in the
lant school board's deci-
rmendation of the hofes-
lmmission werc gubstan_
'the evidenee.

d to the preceding cause
tiffs third claim. The
asserts a deprivation of
r tie board's decision not
rct on the basis that his
t€d to hiE present ability
As notcd earlier, plain-

on of public trust. Ga.
}8. Under $ 8L2t0tc
caselaw it is not neces-
nexus between conyie-
uatify discharge or non
onviction involves mor-
Dominy, suprz Conse-
ffs arjument that he
proceEs is without mer-

tse of action allqed by
contract was not ne-

ic exercise of his fir8t
I free opeech, associa-
rccifically, plaintiff as-
s in retaliation for his
Holliman in the race
lent, and for his stste

court challenge of the election results.
Thus, the gist of the fourth claim is the
discharge of plaintiff for politically retalia-
tory rcasons.

The plaintiff's fourth claim is foreclosed
by the holding iffit _Hegtthy pity School
District poad of Flucation v. Doyle, 4*
u.s. 274,97 S.Cr. 568, 50 L.Ed.zd 4?t (1977).

Mt. Healthy involved the nonrenewal of
Doyle's teaching contract by the Mt.
Healthy Board of Education allegedly for
exercising his first amendment right of free
speech. Several grounds were cited by the
board for the decision of nonrenewal along
with the ground entailing the first amend-
ment right. The Supreme Courtjound that
Dofle_bcd_lhq burden of showing_llat his
comlitutienally arotected--eonduet - tvaa a

"g-bEtrgn tlal'l-qr " mgtjvali-u8f-tggloil n tLhe

board's decision not to renew his contfact
.

Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to
the employer who may auoid liability Ey

de ould
hile-E-enreffie
pro-tected conduci. -El ai-87, 9?-$.Cta at
576. In other words, if the same decision
would have been made for other extant,
constitutionally permissible reasons, the
pnesence of a constitutionally infirm basis is
immaterial so long as that basis is not the
primary ground for the decision.

In this case, the l,ogan decision was
founded solely on his conviction of a federal
crime involving moral turpitude. Neither
the board's decision, the hearing tribunal's
recommendation, nor the Sta've Boatd's af-
firmation centered on anything but the
plaintiff's conviction and its effects. Once
the tribunal determined plaintiff's offense
to involve moral turpitude, Exhibit C, pgs.

6, 3, the matter of [ogan's political activi-
ties and subsequent litigation werr matters
of only tangential interest. It does not
sppear from the rccord of the hearing, or
the State Board's affirmance that any con-
sideration was given to the plaintiff'e poli-
tics as a basis for nonrcnewal. The only
iseue considered was the plaintiff'e convic-
tion. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the
decision not to renew [ogan'8 @ntract
would have been made regardlese of his

candidacy for office or his decision to file
suit regarding that election.

tl?] Plaintiff's fifth and final claim ie

couched in terms of equal protection as

secur€d to him by the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Plaintiff alleges that other per-
sons gituated similarly to him have not been
treated in the same fashion. By this allega-
tion and claim the plaintiff must mean that
there are other tenurcd teachers who have
been convicted of crimes of moral turpitude
and have had their contracts rcnewed. I
suppose that this is a possibility but I find it
unlikely to the point of incredulity. I find
it about as rcasonable and easy to believe
the prnposition that the duly elected School

Board of TVanen County and its Superin-
tendent extend contracts to teachers con-
victed of felony crimes as I do to accept the
conceivable explanation that Mr. [ogan was

treatrd differently because his crime, being
one of falsity of statement, displays more
(or worse) moral turaitude than that of a
burglar, forger, or embezzler.

While on this motion for judgment on the
pleadings the Court is rcquircd to accept
the allegations of the complaint as true, this
standard does not mean that a Court must
abjure rcason and common s€nse. Indeed,
even if it were found that the auperintend-
ent and the board treated this convict€d
criminal and plaintiff differently than they
did other felons in their employ, would such
a ahowing justify a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff entitling him to damages or a
position in charge of the training of the
youth of America? To do so would be a
penersion of justice. Such a showing, of
courBe, would warT ant administrative, judi-
cial, and political action against the elected
officials for misfeasance of office. How-
ever, no rrcsponsible court would order yet
another felon to be employed as a school

principal.

Simply etated, I cannot accept the propo-
sition that the Superintendent of Schools

and the School Board of Wamen County are
knowingly hiring as terchers and principala
in their school syetem percono convicted of
crimes of moral turpitude any mone rcadily



152

than I will the concept of the moon being
made of green cheese.

tlSl The equal protection claim asserted
by the plaintiff is dismissed on the defend-
ant's motion for judgment on the pleadings
and because it is frivolous. Indeed, this
entire matter is ridiculous and has been
extremely wasteful of judicial and other
resourrces. The bringing of such cases
should be discouraged. Accordingly, costs
are assessed in this action against the plain-
riff.

The clerk will enter judgment in favor of
the defendants and against the plaintiff,
and tax costs against the plaintiff.

Edwin C. DOULIN, et al, Plaintiffs,

v.

Frank WHITE, Governor of the State of
Arkaneas, et al., Defendants.

No. LR{-81-{18.

United States District Court,
E.D. Arkansas, W.D.

Sept. 24, 1982.

As Corrected Oct. 19, 1982.

After district court had declared exist-
ing division of statc of Arkansas into con-
gressional districts unconstitutional and
placed into effect new arrangement and
denied plaintiffs petition for reconsidera-
tion of new plan, plaintiffs and intervenor
in action filed application for attoraey fees
and expenses. The District Court, Arnold,
Circuit Judge, held that: (1) no special cir-
cumstances justified denial of award of at-
torney fees; (2) award of fees was spprG'
priate only for that phase of litigation in
which plaintiffs prevailed, that is, for a
phase in which apportionment statute was
invalidated; (8) enhancement of award was
not justified; (a) 803.2 hours of lawyers'
time in prevailing phase of csse wa! exqes.
sive, so thercfore, court would award fees

549 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

for only 400 hourrs of attorney time; and (5)
$5,0fl) requested for time spent in connec-
tion with application for award of fees and
exp€ns€s would not be granted.

Order accordingly.

See also, D.C., 528 F.Supp. 1323, D.C.,
5.36 F.Supp.450.

l. CiYil Rlghts el3.l7
Party whose suit prcvents unconstitu-

tional law from taking effect is "prevailing
party" within meaning of statute governing
award of attoraey fees in civil rights suit.
42 U.S.C.A. S 1988.

See publication Words and Phrases
foi other judicial constructions and
definitions.

2. Civil Rights el3.l7
Where court rule that the application

for fees must be filed within 14 days of
entry of final judgment did not beeome
effeetive until after final judgment entered
in suit challenging the constitutionality of
statute demarking congressional districts in
Arkansas, rule had no effect on plaintiff's
application for attorney fees made more
than four months after final judgment that
reapportioned districts. A U.S.C.A.
S 1988; U.S.C.A.Const.Art. 1, g 2, cl. I et
seq.

3. Civil Rights ol3.l7
Where state of Arkansss suggested no

specific prejudice by reason of short delay
of some four months in plaintiffs' request
for attorney fees in suit in which they chal-
lenged constitutional composition of con-
gressional districts, and state could not
claim surprise as filing was preceded by
attempt on part of counsel for plaintiffs to
negotiate some kind of settlement with
state with respect to amount of fees and
experres to be paid, no special cireumstanc-
es justify denying awand of attoraey fees.
U.S.C.A.ConstArt" l, S 2, cl. I et s€q.;
Ark.St8ts. S :r--40f et seq.; 42 U.S.C.A. S

1988.

1. Civil Rlghts 6l&l?
Although it is often impossible, or at

least impractical, for court to separate time
spent by lawyers on prevailing issues from
time spent on nonprevailing issues becaus€
of intcrrelated nature of claims, where liti-

gation fell into two qr

both chronologicallY an

principal objective of r

declaration that Arkan
was invalid, and second

tute for invalidated lau
vailed on first phase bu

second, attorney fees wr

first phase but not v
S 1988; Ark.Stats. S &

5. Civil Rightt e:'13.1?

Wher.e party allou
action challenging Arl
act prevailed both in p
which act was invalida
litigation in which subs
claimed by court, interv
recover attorney fees
phases of litigation A
!€q.; 42 U.S.C.A. S 1988

G Civil Rights c=13.17

Although two law;
case had extensive spec
redistricting cases, wh
volved challenge to Arl
rtatute was not sufficie
sults obtsined sufficien
enhancement of atton
who pr.evailed in their
districting statute invali
fied. Ark.Stats. S S-4
c.A. $ 1988.

?. Civil Righb c-l&l,i
Although it would

ble for two lawyeru to
ride in courtrcom durinl
Arkansas' redistricting
lenged, where three or
counsel were orcsent i
hearings, in aa'aition to
nor, and some depcitior
morc than one lawver
claim of over g0ll2 iot
war excessive; thercfor
time for plaintiffs, cour
under statute allowing
ree!. {Z U.S.C.A. S f9
401 et seq.