Research Memorandum on Bozeman and Wilder v. State 2
Working File
January 1, 1981 - January 1, 1981
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Case Files, Bozeman & Wilder Working Files. Research Memorandum on Bozeman and Wilder v. State 2, 1981. 242af400-f092-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/ebd1c753-3c8c-42ad-921a-434f4b6d7937/research-memorandum-on-bozeman-and-wilder-v-state-2. Accessed October 27, 2025.
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RESEARCH:
BOZEMAN V. STATE OF ALABAMA
WILDER V. STATE OF ALABAMA
1. What standards govern relief ln federal and Alabama State
Post-Conviction Procedures ?
Alabama 1aw requires a contemporaneous objection to jury
instructions and also required a party to reguest instructions
ln wrlting ln order to preserve potential error for appelJ-ate
revlew. A1a. Code Sl-2-l-6-13 (1965); ARCP 5l-. Failure ro objecr
or except to oral instructions acts as a waiver of any defect
thereln, Cole v. Southern Rallway Co., 286 A1a. 478, 242
So.2d 383 (1970), and failure to court to glve a charge not
requested or requested but not reduced to writing is harmless error.
See Northcot L Sl3ls, 43 Ala. 330 (1899); Lurde4 v. Srare, Z0
A1a. App. 387, L02 So. 464 (L924). Consequenrly, rrial errors
are usually not reviewabl-e where couns el_ has f aiLed to conply
wlth the relevant st,ate procedural- rul-e. Errors or def ects whlch
affect substantlal rlghts of the accused may be notlced altough
not brought to the attention of the court,. A1a.R. C.p. 45; Fed.R.
CrLm.P. 52(b). Both the Federal ruLe and Alabama rule permit
crlmlnal convlctions to be overturned on dlrect appeal for ttplaln
error" ln jury lnstructions even though counsel failed to object
at trlal- as requlred by ALA.R.C.P. 51 and Fed.R.Crim.P. 30.
In Unlted States v. Frlday, _U.S._ 71 L.Ed. 816 (1982),
the Supreme Court held the ttcause and actual prejudice"
standard enunclated in walnwrighr v. sykes, 433 u.s. 7z (L977)
governs relief on collateral attack following procedural- de-
fault at trial. In drawing thls conclusj.on the Court noted
that where counsel- has had an opportunity to object to instruct-
ions at tri-al and on direct appeal, but failed to do sor a
collateral challenge may not do service for an appeal-." Frady,
supra; E,e.g., I{111 v. U.S., 368 U.S. 424, 428-429 (L962).
Thus, the "p1ain errortt standard only governs relief on dj-rect
appeal from errors not objected to at trial.
To obtain federalcollateral relief, the petitioner must
demonstrate: (1) cause excusing the procedural default and;
(2) actual prejudice resulting from conplained errors. Frady.
The Federal Habeas Corpus Manual for Capital Cases llsts arguments
for showing cause and prejudice (pg. 4O7). In the case of
Wllder and Bozeman cause for fallure to request special instruct-
lons as required by S12-16-13 Ala. Code L975 may be established
(e1-aborate)
by asserting ineffective assistance of counseL.l To establish
aetual prejudice the complained error by ltself must have so
infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates
due process. Henderson v. Kibbe, 43L U.S. L45, L54, 52 L.Ed.2d
203 (L977). Several arguments establishing actual prejudice may
apply to the factual clrcumstances in the Wilder and Bozeman cases.
The arguments set out in the Federal Habeas Corpus Manual (p. 42L-
425) are as follows: (1) under the circumstances there was a
"reasonable possibil-1ty" that the error lnfluenced the verdict
of the trier of fact. See Chapman v. Callfornia, 386 U.S. 18,
24, 25-26 (L967) where prosecutorlal comment on peti-tioner
not taking the stand was not harmless error; (2) when the tainted
evidence is excluded, the evidence of guil-t at trial rras not
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t'overwhelming" so that the error cannot with certainty be said
to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., chapman v.
California, supra at 24 (L977); (3) but for the rainted evidence,
a "rational juror" could not have found the petitioner guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt. E.g., collins v. Auger, 557 F.2d l-107,
1110 (5rh cir. L97B) , cerr. denied, 439 u. s. 1133 (1979) . These
arguments will be discussed inthe sections regarding circumstantial
evidence and impeachment Eestimony.
In Frady the Court did not consider error in the instruction
concerning the elements of the crime, prejudice per se. The
particular circumstances of each case must be considered and the
instruction must be vi-ewed in the context of the overall charge.
cupp v. Naughren, 4L4 u.s. L4L, L46-L47 (1973). Frady did nor
present any affirmative evidence of mitigating circumstances which
would tend to Prove lack of malice and thereby a killing from murder
to manslaughter. A1so, the evidence for the State was substantial
on the question of malice. A jury properly instructed would have
probably reached the same conclusion. In light of these considera-
tions the Court found the instruction resulted in no actual preju-
dice. rn Alabama the l{rit of Error coram Nobis provides post-
convicti.on relief i.n the state courts . A. R. c. p. 60. Generally the
motion is made in the court which rendered the judgment. rf the
motion is denied petitioner appeals to the next court. ',st.ate law
must be consulted to determine what types of claims attacking the
conviction and sentence may be raised in the post-conviction
proceedings available in a state. rn general, all matters that
might possibly warrant federal habeas corpus relief in the
case that were not clearly and exhaustively raised on appeal
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from the conviction and sentence in the State courts must be
raised in some State post-conviction proceeding to assure that
the Federal exhaustion requirement has been met.t' Federal Habeas
Corpus Manual for Capital Cases, James Liebman, Vo1. 1, 1981 2d.
Edition, pC. 62. See, Johnson v. liilliams, 244 Ala. 391' 72 So.2d
683 (l-943) (adopts Writ of Error Coram Nobis into Alabama Procedure);
Grole v. State, 48 A1a. App. 709 (L972) (whether issues raised by
appellant are within purview of error coram nobis proceedings).
Initially, the writ !{as available to question procedural issues
other than the merits of the case, and to raise errors concerning
facts not known to court at the time of trial. Johnsgn, supra' at
394, 395. Alabarna case law since 1943 has narrowed the scoPe
of the wirt to correct rr*** an error of acts, one not appearing on
the face of the record, unknown to the Court or party affected, and,
which if known in time, would have prevented the judgment challenged,
and served as a motion for new trial on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence." T111is v. State, 349 So.2d 95, 97 (A1a. App.
Le77).
Where a collateral attack in federal procedure will not do
service for failure to raise issues on direct aPpeal, Frady,
-Urg, the Writ of Error Coram Nobis will not provide rellef
where a petitioner had the opportunity to bring to the attentlon
of the Court the matter complained of but failed to do so.
Srrang v. United States,53 F.2d 820 (1931). In Lewis v. State,
367 So.2d 542 (A1a.Cr.App. 1978), writ. denied, Ala. 367 So.2d 547'
defense counsel pettitioned the trial court by Wirt of Error
Coram Nobis, asserting newly discovered evidence and ineffective
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assistance of counsel as grounds for a new trlal. The writ was
denied for several reasons. First, the defendant I s failure
to remember the name of an alibi witness of the first trial and
his recollection of the name during second trial was considered
newly diselosed evidenee but not newly discovered evidence.
The writ was not intended to relieve a party of his own negligence.
Thornburg v. State, 42 A1a. App. 70, L52 So.2d 442 (1963).
Second, the alibi witness provided testimony that was only im-
peachi-ng in nature in that 1t cast doubt on part of testimony
of prosecutionfs witness placing the defendant near the scene
of the murder. with impeachment testirnony the jury can either
accePt or rej ect the new witness I s testimony and still convict
the defendanE. This fal1s short of the requirement that the newly
discovered evidence must be such as will probably change the
result if a ner,f trial is granted. Tucker v. state , 57 Ala. App. 15,
325 So.2d 531 (L975) , cert. denied, 295 Ala. 430, 325 So.2d 539
(L976). Probably means having more evidence for the defendant
than against. Lewis, supra at 545. other requireuents for the
newly discovered evidence include: 1) tfrat it has been diseovered
since the l'riaLi 2) that it could not have been dj-scovered before
trial; 3) that it is material to the issue. Finally, counsel was
not dound to be inadequate. Even though it can be shown that an
attorney has made a mistake i"n the trial of a case that result,s
in an unfavorable judgrnent, this alone is not sufficient to
demonstrate that his client has been deprived of his constitutional
right to adequate and effective representation by counsel. Lee
v. srare, 349 so.2d L34 (Ala.cr.App., Lg77). Even rhe failure of
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counsel to make a closing argument has been held insufficient
to demonstrate inadequate representatlon because thj-s can be a
tactical m ve by counsel. Robinson v. State, 361 So.2d LL72
(Ala.Cr.App.; Behl v. State, 405 So.2d 51 (A1a.Cr.App. 1981)
An adequate defense in the context of a constitutional report
to counsel does not mean that counsel wil-1 not commit tactlcal
errors. Summer v. State, 366 So.2d 336, 341 (A1a. Cr. App. 1978).
Alabama case law on the l,rrrit of Error Coran Nobis embodies a stand-
ard governlng relief whereby the petltioner has a duty to establish
his right to reli-ef by "c1ear, ful1 and satisfactory proof."
Vincent v. State, 284 Ala. 242, 224 So.2d 60 (1969): "Clear"
is highl-y exactlng as to proof of facts and always means more than
"reasonably satisfying." Burden v. St,ate, 52 A1a. App. 348, 292
So.2d 463 (L974). The application of this standard seems com-
parable to the "cause and actual prejudice" standard set forth
ln Waj-nwright, supra. See, e.9., Summers v. State, 366 So.2d 336
(A1a. Cr. App.,1978); Hlshtower v. State,410 So.2d 442 (A1a.Cr.
App. 1981); Behl v. State, 405 So.2d 51 (A1a.Cr.App. 1981).
Consequently, any issues ralsed in the Writ of Error Coram Nobis
should be supported by a showing of cause and actual prejudice.
This memorandum will set out to establlsh those issues whlch will
most llkely survive the cause of actual prejudice test.
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