Legal Defense Fund Takes New Orleans School Case to Court of Appeals

    IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
NO. 77-1502

WESLEY P. BERNARD, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.
GULF OIL COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States District Court 
For The Eastern District of Texas

REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

STELLA M. MORRISON1015 East Gulfway Drive 
Port Arthur, Texas 77640

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
One Lakeside Plaza, 7th Floor 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70601

CHARLES E. COTTONSuite 500 - 348 Baronne Street 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70601

BARRY L. GOLDSTEIN806 15th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006

JACK GREENBERG
PATRICK O. PATTERSON 

10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants



IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
No. 77-1502

WESLEY P. BERNARD, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

GULF OIL COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from The United States District Court 
for The Eastern District of Texas

CERTIFICATE REQUIRED BY LOCAL RULE 13(a)

The undersigned, counsel of record for the plain­
tiff s-appellants , certifies that the following listed par­
ties have an interest in the outcome of this case. These 
representations are made in order that Judges of this Court 
may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal pursuant 
to Local Rule 13 (a).

1. Wesley P. Bernard, Elton Hayes, Sr., Rodney 
Tizeno, Hence Brown, Jr., Willie Whitley, and Willie

i



Johnson, plaintiffs.

2. The class of all black employees now employed 
or formerly employed by defendant, Gulf Oil Company, in Port 
Arthur, Texas, and all black applicants for employment at 
Gulf Oil Company who have been rejected for employment at 
said company.

3. Gulf Oil Corporation, defendant, and its 
affiliates listed at pp. ii-v, Brief of Appellees.

4. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International 
Union, and Local Union No. 4-23, Oil, Chemical and Atomic 
Workers International Union, defendants.

5. International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers, Port Arthur Lodge No. 823; International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 390; 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO;
United Transportation Local Union; International United 
Transportation Union; Bricklayers, Masons, and Plasterers 
International Union, Local 13; and International Bricklayers, 
Masons, and Plasterers Union: prospective defendants named in 
plaintiffs' motion to join additional defendants and for leave 
to amend the complaint. This motion was pending when the dis­
trict court granted summary judgment for the existing defendants.

Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants

- n -



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
Introductory Statement ...........................  1

1. The Title VII jurisdictional prerequisites 
do not apply to actions under 42 U.S.C.§ 1981, and they need not be satisfied 
by each named plaintiff in class actions
under Title VII ..............................  2

2. The amended complaint was properly filed 
within ninety days of notification by the 
EEOC of the termination of administrative
action ......................................  3

3. Plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
are not barred by the statute of limita­
tions .......................................  6

4. The district court violated the First and 
Fifth Amendments and exceeded its regulatory 
authority in restricting communications by 
plaintiffs and their counsel with class
members, and its errors were not harmless .... 7

Conclusion .......................................  11

-iii-



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

CASES
Page

Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Construction Corp.,
437 F .2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971) ............. .... 3

Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d
711 (7th Cir. 1969) ...........................  2

Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc., 556 F.2d 1219
(5th Cir. 1977) ...............................  7

Coles v. Marsh, ____ F.2d , 14 EPD 3 7774,
No. 77-1235 (3rd Cir., July 28, 1977) .........  9, 10

Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc.,525 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1976) ..................  10
East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332

(5th Cir 1975) ...............................  3
EEOC v. Griffin Wheel Co., 511 F.2d 456

(5th Cir. 1975) ...............................  7
Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108

(D.C. Cir. 1975)   2
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,

421 U.S. 454 (1975) ...........................  2, 3
Local 179 United Textile Workers v. Federal 

Paper Stock Co., 461 F.2d 849(8th Cir. 1972) ...............................  2, 3
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973)   3
Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d

283 (5th Cir. 1969) ........................... - 2, 3
Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d

496 (5th Cir. 1968)   2
Page v U.S. Industries, Inc., 556 F.2d

346 (5th Cir. 1977) ...........................  5, 6
Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp..,.

508 F .2d 152 (3rd Cir.), cert, denied,
420 U.S. 969 (1975) ...........................  9, 10

-iv-



Page

Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Carp., 517 F.2d 
1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert, denied,
423 U.S. 1052 (1976) ..........................  5

Turner v. Texas instruments, Inc.,
556 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1977) ..................  5

United States v. Georgia Power Co.,
474 F .2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973) ..................  7

Zambuto v. American Telephone and Telegraph
Co., 544 F .2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1977) ............  4, 5, 6

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
AND RULES

United States Constitution, First Amendment ......  7, 9, 11
United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment ......  7, 9
42 U.S.C. § 1981, Civil Rights Act of 1866 .......  passim
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 .......................  passim

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), § 706(f)(1) of
Title VII .....................................  5

Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P ...........................  2, 10
Rule 61, Fed. R. Civ. P...........................  10, 11
Rule 83, Fed. R. Civ. P........................... 10

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Manual for Complex Litigation. 1 J. Moore,

Federal Practice (2d ed. 1976) ................  9, 10
7 J. Moore, Federal Practice 1 61.11

(2d ed. 1975) ..................................  11

-v-



IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
NO. 77-1502

WESLEY P. BERNARD, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

vs.
GULF OIL COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal From The United States District Court 
For The Eastern District of Texas

REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS
Plaintiffs-appellants submit this brief in reply

to the brief of the defendants-appellees. In our view, many
of defendants' arguments do not warrant a response, and
with respect to those arguments we rest on our principal
brief. Our response to the remainder of the defendants'

1/contentions is set forth below.

1/ On pages 3-11 of the Brief for Appellants, we set forth 
a statement of the facts with which the defendants have ex­
pressed their substantial agreement (Brief of Appellees, 
p. xv). However, as indicated hereafter in this reply brief, 
the defendants' statement of facts (Brief of Appellees, 
pp. xv-xxi) contains significant errors and inaccuracies 
which plaintiffs wish to correct.



1. The Title VII jurisdictional prerequisites do not 
apply to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and they need not 
be satisfied by each named plaintiff in class actions under 
Title VII. The district court clearly erred in holding 
that, since plaintiffs Hayes and Tizeno had not filed charges 
with the EEOC, they could not "maintain suit in their own 
right, . . . and therefore could not adequately represent 
a class" (A. 182). Their failure to file EEOC charges 
provides no basis for the dismissal of their claims under 
42 U.S.C. § 1981: "The filing of a Title VII charge and 
resort to Title VII's administrative machinery are not pre­
requisites for the institution of a § 1981 action." Johnson 
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.. 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).

As the court below recognized, persons who have 
not filed EEOC charges or have not received or acted upon 
notices of their right to sue are nevertheless proper named 
plaintiffs and Rule 23 class representatives even with 
respect to Title VII claims, so long as other named plain­
tiffs have satisfied these prerequisites (A. 182). "[I]t is
not necessary that members of the class bring a charge with 
the EEOC as a prerequisite to joining as co-plaintiffs in 
the litigation. It is sufficient that they are in a class
and assert the same or some of the issues." Oatis v. Crown2/
Zellerbach Corp.. 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968) . The

2_/ See also Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 
283, 285 (5th Cir. 1969); Hackley v.. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 
108, 152 n. 177 (D.C. Cir._ 1975).;. .Local 179, United Textile 
Workers v. Federal Paper Stock Co.-,. .461 F_2d 849, 850-51 (8th Cir. 1972); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 
711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969). In support of their argument, defendants cite the following cases (Brief of Appellees,

- 2 -



same principle applies to plaintiff Johnson, who never 
received a notice of his right to sue, and to plaintiff 
Whitley, who did not act upon his notice within ninety 
days of its receipt. Since plaintiffs Bernard and Brown 
fully satisfied the Title VII jurisdictional prerequisites, 
the district court erred in dismissing not only the § 1981 
claims but also the Title VII claims of plaintiffs Hayes,

3/Tizeno, Johnson, and Whitley.
2. The amended complaint was properly filed within 

ninety davs of notification by the EEOC of the termination
5/of administrative action. Defendants argue that, under

2 / continued
pp. 1-2): East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1975), 
and Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Construction Corp., 437 F.2d 
1136 (5th Cir. 1971), neither of which makes any reference 
to this issue; and inexplicably, Miller and Local 179, supra, 
both of which specifically reject defendants 1 contention. As 
this court held in Miller, "no procedural purpose could be 
served by requiring scores of substantially identical griev­
ances to be processed through the EEOC when a single charge would be sufficient to effectuate both the letter and the 
spirit of Title VII." 408 F.2d at 285.
3/ The record shows that plaintiff Bernard filed an amended 
charge with the EEOC in 1976 against the International Union 
(R. 361-366; Supp. App. 21A) . Defendants argue that plaintiff 
Bernard "attempted to file" this charge (Brief of Appellees, 
p. xvii) and that, because the charge was dismissed by the EEOC 
as untimely, the International Union should be dismissed as a 
party to this action (Brief of Appellees, p. 2 n.l). This argu­
ment is frivolous. The filing of a charge with the EEOC is not 
a prerequisite for an action under § 1981, Johnson v. Railway 
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975), and the disposi­
tion of that charge by the EEOC cannot bar an action under Title 
VII, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
4/ Defendants incorrectly state that the EEOC's reasonable cause 
decision was issued on August 15, 1967 and that the EEOC "Notices 
of Right To Sue Within 90 Days" were issued to plaintiffs Bernard 
and Brown on April 11, 1976 (Brief of Appellees, p. xviii). The record shows that the decision was issued on August 15, 1968 
(A. 94, 98, 102), and that the notices were issued on June 11,
1976 (A. 73; Supp. App. LA - 2A).

-3-



this court's decision in Zambuto v. American Telephone and
Telegraph Co.. 544 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1977), the letter 
which plaintiffs Bernard, Brown, and Johnson received from 
the EEOC on February 26, 1975 (A. 84, 87, 90), was sufficient 
to start the statutory ninety-day period for filing a civil 
action under Title VII (Brief of Appellees, pp. 2-9). De­
fendants are wrong. The February 1975 letter, the text of

5/which is quoted in its entirety below, notified plaintiffs 
that the defendants did not wish to entertain conciliation 
discussions; advised plaintiffs that they could request a 
"Notice of Right to Sue”; and stated that "you will have 
ninety (90) days from the date of its receipt fi.e., receipt 
of the "Notice of Right to Sue"] to file suit in Federal 
District Court." This is precisely the kind of letter which 
this court held insufficient in Zambuto:

5/ Defendants have incorrectly asserted that the February 
1975 EEOC letters to plaintiffs Bernard, Brown, and Johnson 
stated "in essence that no further action was contemplated 
by the Commission" (Brief of Appellees, p. xviii). In fact, 
the text of each of these letters stated in its entirety as 
follows:

On February 19, 1975, the Equal Employment Oppor­tunity Commission's Houston District Office received 
notice from Gulf Oil Company - U.S. and Oil, Chemical 
and Atomic Workers, International Union Local 4-23, 
the Respondents in the above captioned matter, that they 
do not wish to entertain conciliation discussions to 
resolve those issues set out under the Commission's 
Decision as issued on August 15, 1968. You are hereby 
notified that you may request a "Notice of Right to Sue" 
from this office at any time. If you so request, the 
notice will be issued, and you will have ninety (90) days 
from the date of its receipt to file suit in Federal 
District Court.

It is advisable that, if you wish to pursue this 
matter further, you have an attorney ready to proceed with the case prior to issuance of the Notice of Right to Sue. If you do not have an attorney and you wish

-4-



This language [of 42 D.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1)] has been read to require communication of 
both the failure of conciliation and the 
EEOC's decision not to sue in order to 
indicate clearly that the administrative 
process has been completed. . . .A notice 
which merely informs the aggrieved party 
that conciliation has failed, may not mean 
that no suit will be brought [by the EEOC]
. . .  .A letter only announcing "no con­
ciliation" would not fulfill the statute's 
requirement for notice of both inability 
to conciliate and a determination not to 
sue by EEOC. 544 F.2d at 1335 (emphasis in 
original).
This court has subsequently reaffirmed its Zambuto

holding in Page v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 556 F.2d 346 (5th
6/Cir. 1977), and in Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 556

1/F .2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1977). These decisions put to rest any

5/ continued
to proceed in Federal District Court with your 
case, then call this office for assistance in 
securing private legal counsel.

If you have any questions, please feel 
free to call upon me. (A. 84, 87, 90).

6/ " [T]o be adequate as statutory notice of right-to-sue,the notice must not only state that conciliation efforts have 
failed but also that the EEOC has decided not to sue. In 
essence, the notice must indicate that the administrative 
process has terminated." 556 F.2d at 349 n. 1.
7/ "In Zambuto we recognized that in order to give proper 
statutory notice the EEOC must communicate both the failure 
of conciliation and its decision not to sue." 556 F.2d at 
1351. "We also endorsed the Eighth Circuit's view [in Tuft v. 
McDonnell Douglas Coro.. 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976)] that an individual must bring 
suit within 90 days only after he has received notice that the 
administrative process is terminated." 556 F.2d at 1352. The 
district court in the instant case expressly rejected the 
Eighth Circuit's decision in Tuft and relied heavily on the 
decision which this court reversed in Turner (A. 183).

-5-



contention that the February 1975 letter constituted adequate 
statutory notice to commence the right-to-sue period. They 
also hold that, where the notice is so "patently misleading" 
in assuring the prospective plaintiff that his ninety-day 
suit period will not begin to run until he subsequently 
requests and receives the "Notice of Right to Sue," the 
plaintiff is not required to make any further showing that 
he was misled. Zambuto, supra, 544 F.2d at 1336; Page, supra.
556 F.2d at 351, 355. The district court clearly erred in 
dismissing the Title VII claims on this ground.

3. Plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. S 1981 are not
8/barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants have 

characterized the § 1981 statute of limitations issue as 
a question of "tolling" (Brief of Appellees, pp. 17-24).
However, plaintiffs do not contend that the statute of limita­
tions has been tolled or suspended with respect to old claims, 
but rather that the statute does not bar plaintiffs from obtaining

8/ Defendants have also argued that "the trial court was 
correct in finding that the Appellants' claims were barred 
by the Equitable Doctrine of Laches" (Brief of Appellees, 
pp. 27-28). The district court made no such finding, but 
stated only that it believed defendants' argument in this 
regard to be "most compelling" (A. 184). For the reasons 
previously set forth, the district court clearly erred to the extent that it held this action to be barred by laches. 
Brief for Appellants, pp. 28-38; Brief of the EEOC as Amicus 
Curiae, pp. 20-36.

- 6-



a remedy for present and ongoing violations of § 1981 (see
Brief for Appellants, pp. 21-23). As this court has held,
state statutes of limitations do not bar claims of present
and continuing employment discrimination:

Georgia Power [474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir.
1973)] teaches that employment discri­mination may as readily be a continu­
ing course of conduct as a single event 
(474 F.2d at 922); that the court must 
determine the most recent date on which 
the discriminatee's cause of action accrued;
[and] that for the purpose of the statute 
of limitations a cause of action accrues 
whenever an individual is directly and 
adversely affected by that discriminatory 
practice . . . .  EEOC v. Griffin Wheel 
Co.. 511 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1975).

Since the allegations of the complaint bring this action within
"the accepted doctrine of continuing violations," the plaintiffs'
claims are not time-barred. Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc.. 556
F .2d 1219, 1221-22 (5th Cir. 1977).

4. The district court violated the First and Fifth Amend­
ments and exceeded its regulatory authority in restricting com­
munications by plaintiffs and their counsel with class members, 
and its errors were not harmless. The court below entered 
orders on May 28 .and June 22, 1976 (A. 30-31, 56-61) , 
restricting communications with the class members. Contrary 
to defendants' suggestion, the first order did not merely 
prohibit "unauthorized and unethical communications" (Brief 
of Appellees, p. xix); instead, it flatly prohibited all 
communications concerning the action with any actual or 
potential class member who was not a formal party to the 
action, without regard either to authorization or to ethics 
(A. 30-31). Similarlyr defendants have incorrectly stated

-7-



that the June 22 order prohibited "only those communications 
that had the purpose of solicitation and that tended to mis­
represent the status, purposes and effects of the cause of 
action and that impeded the orderly administration of 
justice . . . "  (Brief of Appellees, p. xix) . The order 
in fact prohibits all communications concerning the action 
with any actual or potential class member unless the court 
has specifically approved both the proposed communication 
and the proposed addressees (A. 56). The order then lists 
only three exceptions to its blanket prohibition (A. 57).
It expressly states that the communications which are forbidden 
are not limited to those involving solicitation and misrepre­
sentation (A. 56-57, 5 2), and it provides that all communica­
tions not specifically authorized in the order are strictly

1/forbidden (A. 58, I 8).

9/ Defendants are also incorrect in stating that plaintiffs' 
July 6, 1976, motion to communicate with members of the proposed 
class (A. 62-65) "was denied as Appellants' communication tended 
to misrepresent the status, purposes and effects of the cause 
of action" (Brief of Appellees, p. xx). The district court 
made no such finding; instead, it issued a one—sentence order 
denying the motion without any explanation or statement of 
reasons (A. 157) .

Defendants have further misstated the facts in claiming 
that there is "no evidence in the record concerning any fee 
agreement between this local counsel [for plaintiffs] and 
Appellants" (Brief, p. 50). In fact, all attorneys for the 
plaintiffs in this action are either employed by the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., or associated with 
the Legal Defense Fund for the purposes of this litigation; 
and the record contains an affidavit of local counsel stating 
that "neither I nor any of the attorneys representing the 
plaintiffs accepted or expect any compensation from them, nor 
do we expect to receive any compensation from any additional 
named plaintiffs who may hereafter be added, or from any member 
of the plaintiff class." (Affidavit of Stella M. Morrison,
A. 54) .

- 8-



As plaintiffs have shown, the district court's 
orders violated the First and Fifth Amendments (Brief for 
Appellants, pp. 39-59), and they exceeded the authority of 
the district court (Brief for Appellants, pp. 60-63). With 
respect to the latter point, defendants have sought to dis­
tinguish Rodcrers v. United States Steel Corp.. 508 F.2d 152 
(3rd Cir.), cert, denied. 420 U.S. 969 (1975), on the grounds 
that the Rodgers case involved a local rule rather than an 
order, and that the rule in Rodgers did not include the 
exceptions which are suggested in the Manual for Complex 
Litigation. 1 J. Moore, Federal Practice 1.41, at 188-90 
(2d ed. 1976), and which appear in the June 22 order in the 
instant case (Brief of Appellees, pp. 45-47). The Third 
Circuit rejected these arguments in its recent decision in
Coles v. Marsh. ____ F.2d ____, 14 EPD 5 7774, No. 77-1235
(3rd Cir., July 28, 1977).

The district court in Coles. like the district
court here, had entered an order restricting communications
in a case which had been brought as a class action under
Title VII. As in the instant case, the substance of the
order had been taken almost verbatim from "Sample Pretrial
Order No. 15" in the Manual for Complex Litigation, and it
contained the same three general exceptions as the June 22
order here, including the provision which purported to permit
constitutionally protected communications. Coles v. Marsh.
supra, slip op. at 3-5. Once again, as in Rodgers, the court
found that these restrictions on communications improperly
interfered with the plaintiff’s activities which "were directed
toward-e£fectuatXng-the purposes of Rule 23 by encouraging

-9-



common participation in the litigation of her sex/race
discrimination claim." Coles v. Marsh, slip op. at 5-6.
The fact that these restrictions were embodied in an order 
rather than a local rule, and the fact that the order con­
tained the exceptions suggested in the Manual for Complex 
Litigation, did not change the result. The court held, as 
in Rodgers. that the district court lacked the power, under 
either Rule 23(d) or Rule 83, Fed. R. Civ. P., "to impose 
any restraint on communication for the purpose of preventing 
the recruitment of additional parties plaintiff or the solicit­
ation of financial or other support to maintain the action."
Coles v. Marsh, slip op. at 6. The district court in the 
instant case also lacked this power, and its orders should 
therefore be reversed.

Defendants, citing Rule 61, Fed. R. Civ. P., argue 
that in imposing unauthorized and unconstitutional prior 
restraints on the rights of expression and association, the 
district court committed mere harmless error (Brief of Appellees, 
pp. 55-56). However, the record shows that these orders blocked 
plaintiffs' counsel from fully investigating the defendants' 
racially discriminatory acts and practices, and that the orders 
deprived the class members of information regarding their civil 
rights at a time when the defendant company was soliciting 
waivers of those rights (A. 49r 51-52, 54). Thus, the errors 
substantially prejudiced the rights of the plaintiffs and class 
members. See Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 525 
F . 2d 927, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1976). Moreover, assuming that, this

- 10-



case is remanded for further proceedings on other grounds, 
the order of June 22, 1976, presumably would remain in 
effect; unless it is reversed, it will continue to deprive 
plaintiffs and their counsel of a full opportunity to 
develop the facts and present the case, and it will con­
tinue the unauthorized and unconstitutional interference 
with communications by plaintiffs and their counsel with 
class members. Finally, the purpose of Rule 61 and of the 
"harmless error" doctrine is to insure that decisions will 
not turn upon "procedural errors which do no real harm."
7 J. Moore, Federal Practice 1 61.11, at 61-43 (2d ed. 
1975) . Violations of the First Amendment, and actions by 
the district court in excess of its authority, simply do 
not fall into this category.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in the Brief 

for Appellants, the orders of the district court should

- 11-



be reversed, and the judgment should be vacated and the 
case remanded for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

m  v;V/llv -------
STELLA M. MORRISON

1015 East Gulfway Drive 
Port Arthur, Texas 77640

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUXOne Lakeside Plaza, 7th Floor 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70601

CHARLES E. COTTONSuite 500 - 348 Baronne Street 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70601

BARRY L. GOLDSTEIN806 15th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006

JACK GREENBERG
PATRICK O. PATTERSON 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants

- 12-



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 15th day of September,
1977, copies of the foregoing Reply Brief for Appellants
were served on the following attorneys by United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:

William G. Duck, Esq.
P.0. Box 3725 
Houston, Texas 77001
Carl Parker, Esq.
440 Stadium Road
Port Arthur, Texas 77640
William H. Ng, Esq.
Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission 
2401 E Street, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20506

Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants