Jackson v. Georgia Brief for Respondent

    IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
1971 TERM

NO. 69-5030

LUCIOUS JACKSON, JR.,

V.
Petitioner,

GEORGIA,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF GEORGIA

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

P. O. ADDRESS:

132 State Judicial Bldg. 
40 Capitol Square, S.W. 
Atlanta, Georgia 30334

Arthur K. Bolton 
Attorney General
Harold N. Hill, Jr., 
Executive Assistant 
Attorney General
Courtney Wilder Stanton 
Assistant Attorney General
Dorothy T. Beasley 
Assistant Attorney General

p. O. ADDRESS: Andrew J. Ryan, Jr .
Chatham County Courthouse J?istrict Attorney 
Savannah, Georgia E aste rn  JudlCial C ircuit

Andrew J. Ryan, III 
Assistant District Attorney



1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

HOW THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 
WAS PRESENTED AND DECIDED BELOW . .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............

ARGUMENT:

Page

. 1

19

The imposition and car­
rying out of the death 
penalty imposed by the 
jury in this case does 
not constitute a vio­
lation of the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause 
of the Eighth Amendment 
and the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment...................... 20

I. No evidence of racial 
discrimination is 
present, and thus it 
does not constitute a 
factor which might 
render the death 
penalty for rape in 
this case a constitu­
tionally prohibited 
cruel and unusual 
punishment................ 20



11

II. The cruel and unu­
sual punishment 
clause does not 
forbid the imposi­
tion of a penalty 
of death for rape. . .

CONCLUSION .....................

APPENDICES:

APPENDIX A:

Statutory Provisions and 
Rules Involved . . . . . .

APPENDIX B:

Comparative Punishments 
for sexual offenses in 
Georgia ....................

APPENDIX C:

Crime rate for rape—  
chart . . . . . . . . . . .

. . 37 

. . 56

. . la

. . lb 

. . 1c



1 X 1

Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216
(1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51

Aikens v. California, 1971 Term,
No. 68-5027 ............. 20, 28, 30

Arkwright v. State, 223 Ga. 763

TABLE OF CASES
page
No.

(1967) .......................... 51

Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942) .  ...................... 18

Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954) . . . . . . . .  27

Butler v. State, 285 Ala. 387,
232 S.E.2d 631 (1970) . . . . . .  42

Craig v. State, 179 So.2d 202 
(Fla. 1965) Cert. Den. 383
U.S. 959 . . . . . . . . . . . .  42

Fogg v. Com., 208 Va. 541, 159
S .E .2d 616 (1968) . . . . . . . .  42

Furman v. Georgia, 1971 Term, No.
69-5003 . . . . . . .  21, 34, 37, 53

Gunter v. State, 223 Ga. 290
(1967) ...............  . . . . .  51

Jackman v. Rosenbaum Company,
260 U.S. 22 (1922) 57



IV

Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39
(1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55

Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 553
(1969)   . 51

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184
(1964)     38

Johnson v. State, 215 Ga. 448
(1959)   51

Kemp v. State, 226 Ga. 506 (1970) . 51

Louisiana ex rel, Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) . . . 38

McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183 (1971)   15, 36

Massey v. State, 227 Ga. 257
(1971)   5, 51

Mathis v. State, 224 Ga. 816 (1968) 51

Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138
(8th Cir. 1 9 6 8 ) ............. 22, 53

Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325
(8th Cir. 1 9 6 5 ) ................  42

TABLE OF CASES-Cont.

Page
No.



V

Miller v. State, 224 Ga. 627 (1968) 4, 5, 6 

Miller v. State, 226 Ga. 730 (1970) 51

Mitchell v. State, 225 Ga. 656
(1969) ..........................  51

*
Qyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) 22, 30

Paige v. State, 219 Ga. 569 (1963) 51

palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937)   18

Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354
(1939) ..........................  9, 11

Rjqgins v. State, 226 Ga. 381
(1970)   51

Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889
(1963) ................... .. . . 43

Simmons v. State 226 Ga. 110
(1970) ........................ . 35

Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7 (1964) . 4, 44

Siros v. State, 399 S.W.2d 547
(Tex. Cr. 1 9 6 6 ) ................. 42

TABLE OF CASES-Cont.

Page
No.



vi

TABLE OF CASES-Cont.

Page
No.

State v. crook, 253 La. 961, 221
So.2d 473 (1969) ................ 42

State v. Williams, 255 La. 79, 229
So.2d 706 (1969) . . . . . . . .  42

State ex rel, Barksdale v. Dees,
252 La. 434, 211 So.2d 318 (1968) 42

State v. Goes, 271 N.C. 616, 157
S.E.2d 386 (1967)..............  42

State v. Rogers, 275 N.C. 411, 168
S .E . 2d 345 (1969)..............  42

State v. Gamble, 249 S.C. 605, 155
S . E . 2d 916 (1967)..............  42

Stragder v. West Virginia, 100 u.S.
303 (1880)   7, 11

Swink v. State, 225 Ga. 717 (1969) 51

Tarrance v, Florida, 188 U.S. 519
(1903)    9, 11

*Moorer v. MacDouqall, 245 S.C. 633,
142 S.E. 46 (1965) 42



Page
No.

vii

TABLE OF CASES-Cont.

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1968)   37,38,52

Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346
(1970)   34

yanleeward v. State, 220 Ga. 135
(1964) . . . . .  .............  51

Watt v. State, 217 Ga. 83 (1961) 51

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910) ...................  38, 42

Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545
(1967)    11

Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235
(1970) . . . . .  .............  22,52

Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949) . ......................  52

Williams v. State, 226 Ga. 140,
173 S .E . 2d 182 (1970)............  42

Willis v. Smith, 227 Ga. 589
(1970) . . . . . . . . . . . .  50



STATUTORY PROVISIONS
PAGE NO.

Const, of Ga. of 1945, Art. I,
Sec. II, par. I (Ga. code Ann.
§ 2-201)............. 32, App.A, 2a

Criminal code of Ga., §§
26—2001 to —2020 ...............49, App.B

pp.lb-2b
Ga. code Ann. § 26-1302 (Ga.

Laws 1960, p. 2 6 6 ) ...........3
Ga. code of 1933, § 27-2301 . . . 32,App.A 3a
Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2506 ........ App.B, 2b-4b
Ga. code Ann. § 27-2534 (Ga. Laws 

1970, pp. 949, 951, as amended Ga.
Laws 1971, pp. 902-903 . . . .  4

Ga. code Ann. § 59-106 (Ga. Laws
1968, p. 533).................  34 , App.A, 6a-7a

Ga. Code Ann. § 59—709 (Code of
1 9 3 3 ) ........................ 35

Ga. code Ann. § 70-301 ........  32, App.A, 8a
Ga. Laws 1967, p. 251 . . . . . .  34,App.A,4-5a
Ga. Laws 1970, p. 949, as amended 

Ga. Laws 1971, p. 902 (Ga. Code
Ann. § 2 7 - 2 5 3 4 ) .............4

United States Supreme Court Rules,
Rules 19 and 40 . . . . . . .  16

viii



IX

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Barzun, Jacques "In Favor of 
Capital Punishment," 31 The 
American Scholar 181, Spring,
1962     41

City of Atlanta, Department of 
police, 91st Annual Report,
Dec. 31, 1970 ................ 25

Crime in the United States, Uniform 
Crime Report 1970, pp. 12-14 54

Massie, "Death by Degrees," 75
Esquire, pp. 179-80, April, 1971 41

New York Times, July 6, 1968,
p. 42, col. 1 ..........   52

New York Times, August 30, 1971,
p. 3 2 ........................ 53

Sophocles, Ajax . . . . . . . .  55

Page
No.



IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

1971 Term 
No. 69-5030

LUCIOUS JACKSON, JR.,

Petitioner,

v .

GEORGIA,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF GEORGIA

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

HOW THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 
WAS PRESENTED AND DECIDED BELOW

A careful analysis of the 
development of the constitutional ques­
tion which this Court has agreed to re­
view, will show that Petitioner has



2

departed from the Supreme Court of 
Georgia ruling of which he complains.
It will also provide the proper context 
for this Court's consideration.

The actual presentment of the ques­
tion which is currently to be decided 
occurred as follows: In the amended
motion for new trial and to set aside 
the verdict, its filing on April 11,
1969 (R. 35) following the trial by 
some four months, one of the grounds 
was that:

"18. The Court is required 
to set aside the verdict and 
judgment because the penalty 
of death as was imposed upon 
defendant is cruel and unusual 
in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United 
States." (R. 29, 31, 32).

Petitioner asserts this as the under­
lying foundation for the question now 
extant (Petitioner's Brief, pp. 10- 
11). The motion was subsequently heard 
and a new trial denied by the trial 
court on July 11, 1969 (R. 36), three 
months after the amended motion had 
been filed.



3

Then on appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Georgia, Petitioner enumerated as 
error the following, among others:

"6. The court erred in permitting 
the death penalty to be imposed 
upon defendant in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment to the Constitu­
tion of the United States.'1 (Enum­
eration of Errors, Supreme Court 
of Georgia, filed August 22, 1969, 
p.1, unnumbered in Record).

This, Petitioner says, is how the question 
was presented below (Petitioner's Brief, 
pp. 10-11).

The Supreme Court of Georgia, in 
its customary fashion, provided head- 
notes as part of its opinion. In the 
headnote summary referring to appel­
lant's challenge to punishment, the 
court stated:

"4. Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Ga. L.
1960, p. 266) is not subject to 
the constitutional attacks made 
on it." (A . 112) .

Section 4 of the opinion reveals that 
several enumerated errors were embraced 
in the summary. As to the first, 
Enumeration No. 5 (Enumeration of Errors, 
Supreme Court of Georgia, p. 1,



4

unnumbered in Record), the court held 
that the penalty statute was not subject 
to the attack that constitutional vio­
lation occurred by simultaneously sub­
mitting the issues of guilt and punish­
ment to the same jury (A. 114). 1 /
In this connection it cited Miller v. 
State, 224 Ga. 627, 630 (1968), which 
held that the alleged error referred 
to as point "(c)" in that opinion and 
concerning the constitutionality of 
unitary trial, was not meritorious.
Id. at 631.

As to Enumeration No. 6, which 
Petitioner asserts as providing the 
question sub judice (Petitioner's 
Brief, pp. 10-11), the court held 
that the penalty statute was not subject 
to the attack that the Constitution was 
violated by "imposing the death penalty 
on one convicted for rape"(A. 114).
Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7(2) (1964),
is one of the cases cited as the basis 
for the court's conclusion. That case 
held, in the portion cited by the court, 
that the penalty of death for rape is 
not "cruel and unusual punishment, such 1

1 / Georgia now has a bifurcated trial. 
Ga. Laws 1970, pp. 949, 951, as 
amended Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 902-903 
(Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2534).



5

as is inhibited by the Federal or State 
Constitution." (Id. at 7, 10-12).
Miller v. State, supra, was also cited 
for the principle therein enunciated, 
that the death penalty did not amount 
to cruel and unusual punishment forbid­
den by the federal Constitution. Supra, 
224 Ga. at 631. Likewise, the case of 
Massey v. Smith, 224 Ga. 721, 723 (1969) 
was cited. 2 / Relevant to the point 
below was Enumeration of Error No. 4 in 
that case, which complaint was that the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments made 
illegal Massey's sentence of death for 
a crime in which life was not taken or 
threatened. The court dismissed Mas­
sey's contention on the basis of earlier 
controlling decisions.

Enumeration No. 7 (Enumeration of 
Errors, Supreme Court of Georgia, page 
2, unnumbered in Record), which alleged 
unequal application of the death penalty

2/ Cert. den. 392 U.S. 912 Massey 
v. State, 227 Ga. 257 (1971), 
petition for certiorari pending in 
U. S. Supreme Court, No. 6985 Misc. 
Previous appearances of same case: 
220 Ga. 883 (1965); 222 Ga. 143 
(1966), cert. den. 385 U.S. 36.



6

to Petitioner because of his race, is 
not pressed in this Court (Petitioner's 
Brief, pp. 10-11; Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, p. 6). With respect to it, 
the Court held:

"As in Miller v. State, supra,at 
p. 631, there was no evidence to 
support the contention that 'there 
exists a discriminatory pattern 
whereby the death penalty is con­
sistently imposed upon Negro de­
fendants convicted of raping 
white women.'" (A. 114). 3 /

Thus, the question here is limited 
to a review of the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Georgia as it pertains 
to Enumeration No. 6. Enumeration 
No. 7 is in no way involved or

_3_/ Interestingly, the contention was 
made in Massey., supra, 224 Ga. at 
723, that under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, the punish­
ment for Massey, a white man, was 
cruel because only 3 of 66 persons 
sentenced to death in Georgia for 
rape since 1924 were white. The 
Court did not even consider the Eighth 
Amendment argument worthy of comment, 
but instead ruled that no denial of 
due process or equal protection was 
shown.



7

subject to review here. Petitioner does 
not cite it as a basis for the question 
at this juncture and,of greater significance, 
he does not challenge the court's ruling 
that there was no evidence to support a 
pattern of discrimination.

Nor could he. The court's ruling 
was correct. Illustrative are the analo­
gous "systematic exclusion” cases which 
similarly claimed denial of equal protec­
tion of the laws.

To begin with, the underlying con­
cept in those cases is that:

"The very idea of a jury is a 
body of men composed of the peers 
or equals of the person whose rights 
it is selected or summoned to deter­
mine ; that is, of his neighbors, 
fellows, associates, persons 
having the same legal status in 
society as that which he holds." 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 308 (1880).

A reason for this fundamental pro­
vision was stated by the Court in that 
case:

"It is well known that prejudices 
often exist against particular 
classes in the community, which 
sway the judgment of jurors, and



8

which, therefore, operate in 
some cases to deny to persons of 
those classes the full enjoyment 
of that protection which others 
enjoy."

* * *

"Without the apprehended existence 
of prejudice that [equal protection] 
portion of the [Fourteenth] amend­
ment would have been unnecessary, 
and it might have been left to the 
States to extend equality of pro­
tection. " Id. at 309.

The Court concluded that the State 
statute in effect discriminated against 
Negroes in the selection of jurors and 
therefore amounted to a denial of equal 
protection of the laws to a Negro per­
son when he was tried. _!/ There, of 
course, the statute was invalid on its 
face because of what it did. It was 
thus a discrimination made by law.

_4_/ The statute provided that only
white males were liable to serve 
as jurors. id. at 305.



9

In Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S.
519 (1903), the plaintiffs in error 
contended that they were denied equal 
protection by reason of an actual dis­
crimination against their race in the 
selection of jurors. They did not chal­
lenge the law itself, but rather its 
application. This Court recognized that 
equal protection could be denied as 
well by actual discrimination as by that 
created by law:

"But such an actual discrimi­
nation is not presumed. It must 
be proved or admitted." _Id. at 
520.

No evidence was submitted in the trial 
court in support of the allegations, ex­
cept an affidavit stating that the facts 
contained in the motion to quash the 
indictment were true "to their best 
knowledge, information, and belief."
Id. at 521. This was deemed insufficient.

In Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S.
354 (1939), jury discrimination was 
again complained of. Petitioner did 
not contend that Louisiana laws require 
an unconstitutional exclusion of the 
Negroes from the grand jury but rather 
that his evidence showed that the State, 
acting through its administrative officers, 
had deliberately and systematically 
excluded Negroes from jury service because



10

of race, contrary to the equal protec­
tion of the laws guaranteed by the 
Constitution. The State appellate 
court held that the evidence presented 
to the trial court on the motion to 
quash did not establish that members 
of the Negro race were systematically 
excluded. Since petitioner asserted 
that his evidence did show such ex­
clusion, the question before this Court 
was made to turn upon the disputed 
questions of fact. The Court said:

"In our consideration of the 
facts, the conclusions reached 
by the Supreme Court of Louisi­
ana are entitled to great 
respect. Yet, when a claim is 
properly asserted - as in this 
case - that a citizen whose 
life is at stake has been de­
nied the equal protection of 
his country's laws on account 
of his race, it becomes our 
solemn duty to make independent 
inquiry and determination of 
the disputed facts - for equal 
protection to all is a basic 
principle upon which justice 
under laws rests." id. at 
358.

The Court examined at length the 
evidence which had been presented to the 
trial court on the motion and concluded



11

that there was a strong prima facie 
showing that Negroes had been systemat­
ically excluded because of race, and 
that it was not overcome by contrary 
evidence. The Court held that the 
Petitioner had proved his case and that 
the indictment against him should have 
been quashed.

The Court in considering the ques­
tion of systematic exclusion in Whitus 
v. Georgia. 385 U.S. 545 (1967), said:

"'The burden is, of course, on 
the Petitioners to prove the 
existence of purposeful dis­
crimination' Tarrance v.
Florida [citation omitted].
However, once a prima facie 
case is made out the burden 
shifts to the prosecution."
Id. at 550.

The "prima facie" case in Whitus 
consisted of evidence adduced in the 
trial court at the hearing on the chal­
lenge to the array of petit jurors.
Whitus, supra, 385 U.S. at 547; see 222 
Ga. at 112, 114. This Court concluded 
that the concrete evidence presented 
concerning the method of obtaining prospec­
tive jurors, the racial makeup of the commun­
ity, and the racial percentages of jurors drawn



12

constituted a prima facie case of pur­
poseful discrimination. Further, it 
concluded that the State failed to offer 
evidence meeting the burden of rebutting 
that case. id. at 552.

Thus, in Strauder, an examination 
of the statute itself was sufficient to 
make out a case of unequal protection.

Tar ranee, Pierre, and Whi tus, proof 
was required to show actual discrimina­
tion, because operational rather than 
simply facial violation by the state 
laws was asserted.

Turn now to the instant case. 
Petitioner had alleged below that 
the death portion of the penalty statute 
had been unequally applied to him because 
of his race. His was not an attack on 
the statute as it was written, in which 
event the statute itself would evidence 
discrimination. His attack was instead 
aimed at the implementation or applica- 
tion of the statute, and thus proof of 
actual discrimination was called for.

The record does not reveal any 
evidence in this respect presented to 
the trial court. Apparently there was 
none, because on appeal new factual al­
legations were made in the Brief of 
Appellant which were not shown to exist 
anywhere in the record. The argument 
offered to the Supreme Court of Georgia



13

on the question of discrimination, which 
was embodied in Enumeration of Error No. 
7, was as follows:

"f. The Death Penalty was 
Unequally applied. Petitioner 
further urges that the death 
penalty as to him, a Black, is 
violative of the equal protec­
tion clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States.

"In the State of Georgia, since 
1924, 63 Negroes have served the 
death penalty for rape; since 
1924, 3 whites have served the 
death penalty for rape; none 
for raping Negro women; since 
1945, 26 Negroes have served 
the death penalty for rape, and 
during the same period no whites 
have served the death penalty 
for rape." Appellant’s Brief 
in Supreme Court of Georgia, 
p. 8.

The brief, of course, is not a part 
of the record before this Court. The 
record, moreover, is devoid of any judi­
cial proof of the statistics asserted. 
Even if the facts asserted in this docu­
ment, which is outside the record, had 
been admitted, they do not prove that



14

Petitioner was discriminated against 
because of his color insofar as his 
penalty is concerned. The mere number 
of Negroes executed for rape, as compared 
with the number of whites executed for 
the same crime, has no relevancy, exist­
ing alone, to a claim of discrimination. 
Numerous factors, such as the comparative 
ratio of Negroes in the community, the 
ratio of convictions of rape by Negroes, 
the comparative circumstances of the 
crimes themselves, and the selection of 
the jury, to name just a few factors, 
would be necessary to support a conclu­
sion of discrimination.

Therefore, the court below was 
eminently correct in finding that no 
evidence supported the bald claim of 
racial discrimination and that it 
therefore had no merit. Consequently, 
its decision offers no ground upon which 
to build a complaint cognizable by this 
Court. What is more, Petitioner con­
ceded the correctness of the Georgia 
Supreme Court's ruling in this regard, 
by not pursuing it.

His effort now seems to be directed 
towards bringing the claim in through 
the back door. That is to say, since 
he cannot, and does not, dispute the 
finding of "no evidence", he attempts 
now to maintain instead that he does



15

not need evidence of actual discrimination 
in a "cruel and unusual punishment” 
context. He asserts in effect that he 
is entitled to a presumption of discrimi­
nation because of the history of the 
Georgia statute setting punishment for 
rape, because of the position of most 
of the world and a majority of the states 
outside of the South _JL/ on the ques­
tion, and because of the racial imbalance 
in executions for rape since 1930.

Such an attempt must surely fail 
at the outset because of the fallacy 
of the premise. As this Court made 
plain in McGautha v. California, 402 
U.S. 183 (1971):

"[I]t requires a strong show­
ing to offset this settled 
practice of the nation on 
constitutional grounds."
Id. at 203.

5/ Which he loosely and inartfully lists 
as the "Segregation States", Peti­
tioner's Brief, p. 14, as though 
such a characterization would lend 
some element of proof to the claim.



16

Looking back, it is noted that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibition against 
unequal application of the law, which 
Petitioner invoked in Enumeration No.
7 in the court below and expressly
abandoned here §_/ has somehow been
transformed into an Eighth Amendment 
"cruel and unusual punishment' claim.
The ease with which this assertion slips 
into Eighth Amendment garb highlights its 
shallowness. At this stage, the sub­
stance of the question may not be so 
changed. Rules of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, Rule 40(d)(2). Nor 
could it be said that the State court's 
decision in this regard was "not in 
accord with applicable decisions of 
this court." Rules, supra. Rule 19(1)
(a) •

The real scope of the question 
before the Court must therefore be out­
lined so that the argument can be con­
sidered in the proper perspective. 
Paraphrasing the query as put by the 
Court, and particularizing it to Peti­
tioner's case, the question is whether 
the imposition and carrying out of the 
death penalty in the case of Lucious 
Jackson, who forcibly raped a young

Petitioner's Brief, p. 16.



17

mother by breaking into her home and 
threatening her with a dagger he made 
by dismantling her scissors, consti­
tutes cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment clause 
prohibiting such an infliction, and of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

Petitioner says that the penalty 
in his case is invalid because the penal 
law itself is unconstitutional, on its 
face as compared with the rape penalties 
in other countries and states, and in 
operation due to its historical origin, 
the geography of its existence, and the 
number of Negroes executed. He does not 
contend that the penalty is excessive 
under the circumstances of his case but 
rather solely that it is excessive in 
all rape cases. That is, he makes no 
complaint that if the Court finds the 
statutory penalty itself is not contrary 
to the Constitution, it was unconsti­
tutionally applied to him. He attacks 
the statute per se.

Thus, the question as developed 
by Petitioner embraces only whether 
the statutory maximum of death for rape 
is unconstitutional because, as he alleges, 
it is not universally accepted, its purpose 
as contrived by the legislature and as



18

served in operation, is racial discrim­
ination, and it allows a penalty which 
would be excessive in any case, even 
the worst.

In the broad constitutional con­
text, the question is whether the dis­
cretionary penalty of death for rape 
is forbidden the States as cruel and 
unusual punishment because it is a de­
nial of a right "implicit in the con­
cept of ordered liberty," Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S.319, 325 (193 7 ) 
or "a denial of fundamental fairness 
shocking to the univ ersal sense of 
justice." Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455, 462 (1942 ).



19

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The sentence in this case for the 
crime of rape bears no unconstitutional 
mark of being cruel and unusual. The 
basis upon which Petitioner bottoms his 
specific attack is an allegation of 
racial discrimination. The facts offered 
do not support the allegation to any de­
gree of certainty, much less to the 
degree judicially required to establish 
unconstitutionality. Contrary indications 
affirmatively point to there being no 
racial discrimination in the imposition 
of the death penalty as a sentence for 
rape. In addition, the application of 
the tests heretofore utilized in cases 
involving the Eighth Amendment, to the 
present inquiry, leads to the conclusion 
that the penalty is not beyond the 
accepted bounds of decency, is not im­
permissibly severe in comparison to the 
crime perpetrated, and is a viable tool 
rationally related to the protection of 
the public and the control of crime, 
which aims the State is obligated to 
achieve.



20

ARGUMENT

THE IMPOSITION AND CARRY­
ING OUT OP THE DEATH PENALTY 
IMPOSED BY THE JURY IN THIS 
CASE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A 
VIOLATION OP THE CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSE OF 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE 
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.

I. NO EVIDENCE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINA­
TION IS PRESENT, AND THUS IT DOES 
NOT CONSTITUTE A FACTOR WHICH 
MIGHT RENDER THE DEATH PENALTY 
FOR RAPE IN THIS CASE A CONSTI­
TUTIONALLY PROHIBITED CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.

Petitioner's primary argument in con­
tending that the penalty of death for the 
rape committed in this case is cruel and 
unusual punishment, is that it was racially 
inspired. In addition to the general ar­
guments advanced in the Aikens brief 7 /, 
Petitioner claims that the death penalty 
for rape is unconstitutional because 
only 16 states and the federal govern­
ment still provide for it, and because its

_Ly Aikens v. California, Supreme Court of
the United States, 1971 Term, No. 68-5027.



21

only purpose must be the implementation 
of racial discrimination. These addi­
tional factors, he asserts, prove that 
it violates contemporary standards of 
decency and is excessive.

Respondent relies herein on the 
argument it submitted in response to the 
brief of Petitioner in Furman v, Georgia, 
United States Supreme Court, 1971 Term,
No. 69-5003. In addition, and with re­
spect specifically to the instant case, 
Respondent shows that Petitioner Jackson 
cannot prevail in his claim.

In the first place, the red flag of 
racial discrimination is illusory. Peti­
tioner does not prove his serious charge 
that racial discrimination is a factor, 
and the controlling factor, which resulted 
in the infliction of the death penalty 
upon him. He does not allege that there 
was any discrimination in his case, nor is 
there any proof even remotely connected to 
such a theory. Rather, he alleges that 
the death penalty for rape in Georgia only 
exists because of discriminatory racial 
considerations; that it would not survive 
if the props of discrimination against the 
Negro race were removed. Thus, as pointed 
out previously, his charge is that the law 
operates discriminatorily, that the pur­
pose and effect of the penalty provision 
is the achievement of an impermissible ob­
jective .



22

This contention must, of course, 
be supported if it is to prevail in 
this case. As has been shown, it should 
be required to meet the same degree of 
proof as a similar charge does when 
couched in due process and equal pro­
tection terms. See also, Maxwell v . 
Bishop, 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968).
The fact that the allegation is removed 
to a cruel and unusual punishment con­
text should not remove it from the 
requirements of proof. It is obvious 
that a man cannot be punished more 
harshly due solely to his race, whether 
such be called a denial of equal pro­
tection of the laws, or cruel and unu­
sual punishment, but the conclusion 
that such a case exists must be based 
on more than mere allegation and 
inference. In this case, the proof 
fails to make the case.

(A) Look first at the allegation 
concerning the number of executions.
It does not prove discrimination. This 
Court observed in Williams v. Illinois, 
399 U.S. 235 (1970), that identical 
punishment treatment among convicted 
defendants is not constitutionally 
required.

This was also the subject of Oyler 
v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962). The 
recidivists there complained that 
other inmates had not been similarly



23

proceeded against, with respect to 
receiving harsher penalties for prior 
convictions. They invoked the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Court found that no 
ground of violation was alleged, since 
although there appeared an unexplained 
selectivity, Petitioner did not state 
or show what the basis for the selec­
tion was. The Court pointed out reasons 
other than arbitrary discrimination that 
might explain such selection. The Court 
went further and suggested that even 
conscious selectivity was not unconsti­
tutional so long as it was not based 
on an unjustifiable standard such as 
race. Id. at 454-456.

Similarly, in the present case, the 
mere fact that more Negroes than whites 
were executed for rape in Georgia 
between 1930 and 1968 does not prove 
that the reason for Petitioner's death 
penalty is racial discrimination in his 
sentencing. There is evidence showing 
instead that of the persons convicted 
of rape, a proportionately greater number 
are Negro than are white. According to 
the records of the Georgia Department 
of Corrections, the following numbers 
of persons were received into its 
authority due to rape convictions in 
the years just prior to and including



24

the year in which Petitioner was sen­
tenced: 8/

1965 - 31 Negro
1966 - 49 Negro
1967 - 43 Negro
1968 - 59 Negro
1969 - 52 Negro

- 10 white
- 26 white
- 22 white
- 15 white
- 34 white

Of these, 13 Negro and 5 white persons 
received the death penalty. This is 
substantially proportionate to the 
total number of persons received by the 
Department, which is 234 Negro and 107 
white.

Also, a higher proportion of persons 
arrested for this violent crime against 
the person are Negro. For example, in 
Atlanta, Georgia, in 1970, 18 white

8/ These numbers were derived from the 
ledger books of the State Department 
of Corrections, Atlanta, Georgia.
They reflect the year in which those 
persons included in the total were 
received into the Department's author­
ity, rather than the year of sentenc­
ing. A delay would occur in cases 
where motions for new trial or appeals 
carried over to a succeeding year.



25
males and 88 Negro males were booked 
for rape. 9/

Also, there are too many variables 
which may explain the numbers shown by 
Petitioner. The type of crime committed, 
how aggravated it was in each case, com­
mutations or reduced sentences following 
reversals in other cases where the death 
penalty was initially imposed by the jury, 
all indicate that the number of Negroes 
executed as compared with the number of 
whites, cannot be taken to lead directly 
to the assumption that such a statistic 
results from racial discrimination. It 
must be kept in mind also that juries are 
imposing the sentences, not some official

9 / Atlanta Police Department, 1970
Annual Report, p. 41. Petitioner's 
county, Chatham, is also a large 
metropolitan area; and the sta­
tistics are likely comparable.



26

state organ such as a judge or prosecu­
tor or executive authority, or the legis­
lature by a mandated death penalty. The 
choice is the jury's.

Moreover, the great majority of the 
executions between the years of 1930 and 
1968, when petitioner received his sentence, 
are too far removed to indicate any dis­
crimination as to the penalty in Peti­
tioner's case. In the eleven years prior 
to Petitioner's December trial, that is, 
including back through 1958, only four 
persons were executed for rape in 
Georgia.1^ Whatever attitude prevailed 
during the '30's and '40's and whatever 
lack of safeguards existed up to the period 
in which Petitioner was sentenced, cannot 
be presumed prevalent during the time in 
question here. changes in jury selection 
methods, provision for counsel, non-death- 
qualified juries, and the movement towards 
greater recognition of Negro equality and 
away from the attitudes engendered by 
slavery, all palpably affected Petitioner's 
trial in ways non-existent in 1930. In 
addition, the present attitude of other

ID/ Edward Samuel Smith on January 17,
1958; Leroy Dobbs on November 7, 1958; 
Nathaniel Johnson on July 1, 1960; and 
George Watt on August 11, 1961. Records 
of the State Board of Corrections, 
Atlanta, Georgia.



27

states and countries, concerning appro­
priate penalties for rape, cannot fairly 
be compared to whatever situation pre­
vailed in Georgia prior to the '601s.
The distinction would obviously be magni­
fied.

(B) Petitioner additionally offers 
the history of Georgia's rape statute as 
an indication of racial discrimination. 
Suffice it to say that even if discrimina­
tion were a motive in 1866, there is nothing 
to link such a motive to Petitioner's 1968 
jury, which represented the standards and 
conscience of the community of 1968, not 
whatever existed in 1866. The flexibility 
which the Georgia penalty statute provides 
through its wide range of possible penal­
ties removes any rigidness from a legisla­
tively imposed penalty and indicates that 
today's community believed the death 
penalty was justified in this case.
Such flexibility demonstrates in addi­
tion that the attitudes of a century 
ago, whatever they were, are not imposed 
on today's criminal by an unwilling public.

(C) Thirdly, Petitioner insinuates 
that the existence of segregation in 
Georgia's schools evidences discrimination 
in sentencing. Such a connection is to­
tally absent, it is obvious. Any segrega­
tion maintained until 1954^bears no
UJ See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 

U.S. 483 (1954).



28

relation to what petitioner1s jury con­
cluded was a fit penalty for his crime 
fourteen years later.

(D) In answer to Petitioner's 
"indicator" that death as a maximum 
penalty for rape is retained primarily 
in the South, discrimination is not there­
by shown. Rape is a crime against the per­
son which does not result in death. The 
fact that only 16 states and the federal 
jurisdiction retain this ultimate penalty 
for such a crime should not be taken as 
any indication of discrimination or, more 
broadly, cruel and unusual punishment.
Other crimes which do not amount to the 
taking of life also bear the death penalty 
in states which do not retain such a 
penalty for rape. According to the list 
contained in Petitioner Aiken's Brief .13. /  > 
fifteen states provide the death penalty 
for kidnapping if the victim is harmed,for 
kidnapping for ransom, or both-lj/ Five 
states provide the death penalty for armed

12/ Aikens v. California, 1971 Term,
No. 68-5027, Appendix G, pp. lg-13g. 

13/ Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Montana, 
Negraska, New Jersey, Ohio, South 
Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.



29

assault by a life term prisoner.!§/ Two 
states provide the death penalty for rob­
bery if the victim is harmed. 15/ The death 
penalty is also provided for such other 
civilian, non-life-taking crimes as train 
robbery^/ train wrecking!^ boarding a train 
with intent to commit a felonyisj child 
stealing 19/ and attempt or conspirary to 
assault a chief of state.2 o/ Thus it cannot 
be said that since only seventeen juris­
dictions provide the death penalty for 
rape, which in the present case was a life- 
threatening and life-endangering crime, the 
death penalty is so out of order that it 
offends the standards of decency in the 
community. Compared to kidnapping, it is 
often a much more repugnant crime in terms 
of the victim's experience, the probable 
long-lasting effects on the victim, and 
the motive of the attacker.

The death-for-rape states also pro­
vide death as a maximum for other non-life- * 1

14 / Arizona, California (or by means likely 
to cause great bodily injury), Colorado 
(if prisoner is escaped), Pennsylvania 
(assault with intent to kill), Utah.1 c / California, Wyoming.

16/ Arizona
17 /  California
18 /  Wyoming
1 9 / Wyoming
20/ New Jersey



30

taking crimes in addition to rape,2l/so 
death for rape is an integral part of the 
systems of penal laws of those states and 
is not a disproportionate sentence.

The conclusion to be drawn from the 
statistics regarding the types of non-life- 
taking crimes which call for the death 
penalty around the country is that some 
states consider certain crimes more serious 
than other states do, or that they regard 
life imprisonment as insufficient to secure 
the state's objectives for criminal punish­
ment. At any rate, the conclusion is not 
authorized that the states which retain the 
death penalty for rape do so because of 
aberrant discrimination against Negro 
rapists.

Thus, as in Oyler, supra, petition­
er's evidence does not show that the penal­
ty statute effects a deliberate policy of 
discrimination against Negroes insofar as 
the death penalty for rape is concerned.

2l/ Of the 16 death-for-rape states, 10 
have death-for-robbery of some type, 
usually armed, and two have death- 
for-burglary: Alabama for robbery; 
Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, Mis­
souri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas 
for armed robbery; North Carolina for 
burglary; and Virginia for burglary, 
armed bank robbery, and aggravated 
robbery. Aikens Brief, supra, App. G.



31

The discrimination alleged is just as 
hypothetical in the present context as 
it would be if Petitioner had pursued 
the equal protection claim he advanced 
below as Enumeration of Error No. 7.

Why should Petitioner's burden to 
prove the racial discrimination which 
he claims as an "objective indicator" 
of cruel and unusual punishment, be 
any less than if he were claiming jury 
discrimination due to a systematic ex­
clusion of Negroes from the jury selec­
tion process? In the cases reviewed 
earlier, a prima facie case was required.
Here, in the analogous situation where 
racial discrimination is claimed in 
sentencing as opposed to its being an 
infection of the "jury of his peers" 
which is the claim in the typical dis­
crimination case, comparable proof should 
be a requisite.

That is, in order for this Petitioner 
to prevail in asserting his entitlement 
to a penalty which is not cruel and un­
usual, his charge of discrimination should re­
quire proof that the penalty was used 
exclusively for Negroes in the time per­
iod when he was sentenced, that Negroes 
consistently received the death penalty 
for rape during that period, that the 
death penalty was given to Negroes re­
gardless of the heinousness of the crime, 
that for the same degree of crime white



32

persons consistently received lesser 
punishment, and that compared with punish­
ments for other crimes, the maximum 
punishment for the crime of rape is sub­
stantially out of line.

Petitioner instead offers only 
superficial proof which amounts to no more 
than a cloud of innuendo. It does not 
provide a basis for regarding the death 
penalty as cruel and unusual punishment 
on that account.

An opportunity for revealing any 
racial discrimination believed to exist 
was available to Petitioner on voir dire 
at the outset. If he believed that such 
discrimination became evident only after 
return of the verdict and imposition of 
the sentence, he could have pursued it 
in the hearing on the amended motion for 
new trial. 22/

Moreover, at least three factors 
point in the other direction and indicate 
that racial discrimination would not be 
found.

See the applicable constitutional 
and statutory provisions, App. A, 
pp. 2a, 3a, 8a-9a.



33

(1) Statistics:

In Georgia, during the period in 
which Jackson was tried and sentenced, 
from 1965 through 1969, 13 Negroes have 
received the death penalty for rape, and 
5 white men have been so sentenced. 33/  

Although the total is higher for members 
of Jackson's race, the initial cases 
and ultimate convictions are also sub­
stantially higher so that the higher 
number of Negro death penalties may be 
explained in part by the base from which 
these penalties arise. 33/

(2) The jury selection method in 
Georgia at the time of Petitioner's trial 
operated to avert discrimination. The 
legislature had, in 1967, adopted a new 
method based on the voter's lists of the 
county, and discarded the previous method

23/ Supra, p. 24.

24/ Supra, pp. 24 and 25.



34

of selecting jurors from the tax lists. 25/ 
Detailed evidence concerning the method 
of selecting prospective jurors in Chatham 
County in the year previous to Petitioner's 
trial was submitted in Eddie Simmons' 
trial in June, 1957. 26/ ^ ruling by the

25/ Ga. Laws 1967, p. 251, App. A, 
pp,4a-5a. That statute was subse­
quently superceded by the present 
law, Ga. Laws 1968, p. 533 (Ga. Code 
Ann. § 59-106), which is the same in 
the provisions here pertinent.
App. A ,pp6ar-7a. This Court discussed 
the new scheme in Turner v. Fouche, 
396 U.S. 346 (1970).

26/ The transcript of that evidence was 
submitted in the trial of William 
Henry Furman and is therefore part 
of the record before this Court in 
that case. Furman v. Georgia, 1971 
Term, No. 69-5003, Transcript of 
Trial, beginning after page 11 EE 
and continuing to page 3.



35
Supreme Court of Georgia, that systematic 
exclusion of Negroes was not shown, is 
supported by the evidence described in the 
opinion. Simmons v. State. 226 Ga. 110 
(1970) .

(3) Jury oath and charge:

The oath which is administered to 
juries in criminal cases is provided by 
law. Ga. Code § 59-709 (Code of 1933) 
provides:

"In all criminal cases, the fol­
lowing oath shall be adminis­
tered to the petit jury, to wit:
'You shall well and truly try 
the issue formed upon this bill 
of indictment between the State 
of Georgia and A.B., who is 
charged [here state the crime 
or offense], and a true verdict 
give according to evidence. So 
help you God.'"

The court instructed the jury that the 
punishment was to be fixed "in the exer­
cise of the discretion which is left with 
you by law. . . ."(A. 109). The solemnity
imposed on such proceedings, in which a 
man's fate hangs in balance, is manifest.



36

The faith that a jury will perform its 
obligations honorably and fairly is 
historically a bulwark of our system of 
criminal justice, as recognized most re­
cently in McGautha v. California, 402 
U.S. 183 (1971). There is not an allega­
tion or a shred of fact in this case 
which could even raise an inference that 
the jury departed from its duties and dis­
criminated against Petitioner in setting 
his penalty at death rather than recom­
mending mercy. Nor does the case rise 
any higher in regard to the imposition 
of the death penalty for rape generally.



37

II. THE CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
CLAUSE DOES NOT FORBID 
THE IMPOSITION OF A 
PENALTY OF DEATH FOR 
RAPE.

It has been shown that Petitioner 
cannot prevail in this case because 
he has not properly raised the question 
he seeks litigated, and further, because 
he does not make out his case. But the 
matter need not end there. An examina­
tion of the relevant factors will sup­
port the affirmative conclusion that 
the death penalty for rape in this case 
does not exceed the constitutional 
limitations on punishment.

In addition to the argument of 
Respondent advanced in its brief in 
Furman v. Georgia, 1971 Term, No. 69- 
5003, Respondent maintains that the 
imposition and carrying out of the 
death penalty for the rape in this 
case meets the tests which determine 
whether a punishment is constitutional­
ly barred.

(A) The penalty in this case does 
not violate "evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society." Trop v. Dulles,



38

356 U.S. at 86. Nor is it contrary 
to "standards of decency more or less 
universally accepted." Louisiana ex 
rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
459, 469 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter con­
curring) . See Weems v. United States, 
217 U.S. 349, 373.

In this case, the facts show that 
the victim was brutally and violently 
assaulted by Petitioner, who broke 
into her home and repeatedly endan­
gered her life and her freedom from 
harm with a scissor blade which he 
kept pressed against her neck. it 
is indisputable that her life was 
endangered by the vicious attack.

Petitioner urges a world-wide 
standard, but it is submitted that 
the national standard is more 
appropriate to the question, both 
because the attitudes and experience 
of other contries with the crime of 
rape may be far different than that 
prevailing in the United States, and 
also because the penalty for rape is 
not peculiarly an international 
subject matter as was the penalty in 
Trop v. Dulles, supra.

In construing the meaning of 
"contemporary community standards" in 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), 
the Court explained that this meant the



39

society at large, the public, or 
people in general so that the concept 
under review had a varying meaning 
from time to time rather than from 
geographical location to geographical 
location. 2/ it was stated that:

" . . .  the constitutional 
status of an allegedly ob­
scene work must be deter­
mined on the basis of a 
national standard. It is, 
after all, a national Consti­
tution we are expounding."
Id. at 195.

Thus it would appear appropriate to 
apply a national standard of decency 
to the question of whether our national 
constitutional prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment is infringed 
by the penalty in this case.

Most states provide for the 
death penalty for some crimes at 
least and thus it becomes a matter 
of degree, a matter of which crimes 
may draw the death penalty without 
crossing the barrier of universally 
accepted standards of decency. As

27 / Id. at 193.



40

has been shown, -^^in addition to 
crimes of homicide, the majority of 
states provide the death penalty for 
some civilian, peace-time crimes which 
do not involve the taking of human 
life. The greatest incidence of 
such non-life-taking crimes is kid­
napping. The nature of that crime 
cannot be said to be more vicious, 
or more violent, or more serious, or 
more damaging to the victim's mental 
and physical health than is the crime 
of rape, which is an infinitely 
greater invasion and disruption of 
intimate privacy. Rape, moreover, 
generally leaves irreversible scars.

The standard of decency involves 
"broad and idealistic concepts of 
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, 
. . ." Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F„2d 
571 (8th Cir. 1968), p. 579. In terms 
of the criminal and his punishment, it 
cannot be taken as settled that life 
imprisonment rather than capital 
punishment affords a man a greater 
degree of basic dignity or is so 
substantially greater a civilized 
precept that the alternative punish­
ment of death must be cast aside as 
barbaric. Reflection on the prospect 
of even a long prison sentence fol­
lowed by a dismal freedom also leaves 
doubt that the death penalty is by

28/ Supra, pp. 28-29.



41

comparison unconstitutionally inhuman 
and without dignity. 29/ At the least, 
whether life imprisonment in terms of 
today's prisons, or the life which a 
long-incarcerated man faces upon 
release by parole, is so much more 
civilized than the death penalty 
by comparison that the latter must 
be regarded as indecent, is not a 
foreclosed question.

With further respect to the 
examination of accepted standards of 
decency, account must be taken of 
the fact that the many jurymen and 
appellate court justices and others 
who have brought about and affirmed 
the sentence of death for rape, are 
themselves reflectors of the

29/ See Jacques Barzun "In Favor 
of Capital Punishment," 31 
The American Scholar, 181- 
191, Spring, 1962, reprinted, 
Bedeau, The Death Penalty in 
America, p. 154. See also 
Robert L. Massie, "Death by 
Degrees", 75 Esquire, pp. 
179-180. April 1971.



42

acceptable standard of decency. 30/

30 / Representative cases in which it 
was held that the death penalty 
for rape is not cruel and unu­
sual punishment are as follows: 
Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 

325 (8th Cir. 1965);
Butler v. State, 285 Ala. 387, 

232 S.E .2d 631 (1970);
Craig v. State, 179 So.2d 202 

(Fla. 1965), cert, denied 
383 U.S. 959;

State v. Crook,253 La. 961, 221 
So.2d 473 (1969);

State v. Williams, 255 La. 79, 
229 So.2d 706 (1969);

State ex rel. Barksdale v. Dees, 
252 La. 434, 211 So.2d 318 
(1968);

Gordon v. State, 160 So.2d 73 
(Miss. 1964);

State v. Yoes, 271 N.C. 616,
157 S.E.2d 386 (1967);

State v. Rogers, 275 N.C. 411, 
168 S .E.2d 345 (1969);

State v. Gamble, 249 S.C. 605, 
155 S.E .2d 916 (1967), cert, 
denied 390 U.S. 927; 

(continued on next page)



43
Is it to be said that the death penalty 
for rape is a violation of universally 
accepted standards of decency, when 
even this Court declined to review the 
question in even narrower terms in 
Rudolph v. Alabama? 31/

Georgia follows a tough line in 
providing the ultimate penalty for rape. 
That such a penalty is not used uni­
versally for this crime should not 
render it unconstitutional since the 
Constitution does not require a uniform 
system of maximum penalties throughout 
the States.

(B) The imposition and carrying 
out of the death penalty to protect a 
value other than life itself is not

Moorer v.MacDougall, 245 S.C. 633, 
142 S.E .2d 46 (1965);

Siros v. State, 399 S.W.2d 547 
(Tex. Cr. 1966);

Fogg v. Com., 208 Va. 541, 159 
S.E .2d 616 (1968);

Williams v. State, 226 Ga. 140,
173 S.E.2d 182 (1970).

31 / 375 U.S. 889 (1963).



44

inconsistent with the constitutional 
proscription against "punishments 
which by their excessive . . . 
severity are greatly disproportioned 
to the offenses charged." Weems v. 
United States, supra, 217 U.S. at 371. 
The crime in this case was heinous. 
Petitioner deliberately invaded his 
victim's home and stalked her with a 
dagger fashioned from a pair of 
scissors. He invaded her baby’s 
nursery and secreted himself in the 
closet and then overpowered her. He 
repeatedly overcame her struggles and 
pleas and, fighting her, brutally 
forced her subjection to a violent 
intrusion of her body, all the while 
threatening her life and seriously 
endangering it with the scissor blade 
he held to her neck.

The values to be protected by the 
imposition of capital punishment for 
such an act are cogently described in 
Sims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7 (1964): 32 /

"No determination of this 
question [of whether death 
for rape is cruel and unu­
sual punishment] is either

JL2/ Reversed on other grounds.



45

wise or humane if it fails 
to take full account of the 
major place in civilized 
society of woman. She is 
the mother of the human race, 
the bedrock of civilization; 
her purity and virtue are the 
most priceless attributes of 
human kind. The infinite 
instances where she has 
resisted even unto death 
the bestial assaults of 
brutes who are trying to 
rape her are eloquent and 
undisputable proof of the 
inhuman agonies she endures 
when raped. She has chosen 
death instead of rape. How 
can a mere mortal man say 
the crime of rape upon her 
was less than death? Man 
is the only member of the 
animal family of which we 
have any knowledge that is 
bestial enough to forcibly 
rape a female. Even a dog 
is too humane to do such 
an outrageous injury to the 
female.

"We are not dealing 
with the wisdom of capital 
punishment in any case.



46

That must be left by the 
judiciary to the legisla­
tive department. But any 
man, who can never know 
the haunting torment of a 
pure woman after a brutal 
man has forcible raped her, 
who would arbitrarily clas­
sify that crime below murder, 
would reveal a callous 
appraisal of the true value 
of woman's virtue.

"We reject this attack 
upon the sentence in full 
competence that in so doing 
we permit the sovereign 
State, which is actually 
all the people thereof, to 
guard and protect the mothers 
of mankind, the cornerstone 
of civilized society, and the 
zenith of God's creation, 
against a crime more horrible 
than death, which is the 
forcible sexual invasion of 
her body, the temple of her 
soul, thereby soiling for 
life her purity, the most 
precious attribute of all 
mankind. . . . there can 
be no more reprehensible



47

crime [than forcible rape].

k k k

"We would regret to see 
the day when this freedom 
loving country would lower 
its respect for womanhood 
or lessen her legal protec­
tion for no better reason 
than that many or all other 
countries have done so. She 
is entitled to every legal 
protection of her body, her 
decency, her purity and her 
good name. Anyone so depraved 
as to rape her deserves the 
most extreme penalty that the 
law provides for crime." Id. 
at pp. 10-12.

Rape is an absolutely aggravated 
bodily attack on one who is incapable 
of meeting force with force. It is 
a crime of flagrant and serious magni­
tude. It is never unpremeditated. It 
is never accidental. It is perhaps 
the most atrocious indecent act a 
man can perform on another human.
To say that it is so much less serious 
than murder that it never justifies 
the same penalty, is to place the 
values which rape destroys so far



48

below the value of human life that the 
latter must be said to stand undisput- 
ably as humanity's highest value. This 
is at the least debatable, and such 
being the case, an unconstitutional 
disproportion between punishment and 
crime in this case cannot be made out.

The retention of the death penalty 
as the maximum punishment for rape in 
seventeen American jurisdictions itself 
indicates how serious the crime is 
considered. Taking away the death 
penalty only reduces the seriousness 
of the crime and cheapens the values 
it seeks to protect.

The crime of rape should in fact 
be regarded as more and more heinous 
as civilized precepts increase. The 
greater the progress of our maturing 
society, and the more wide-spread the 
enlightenment of its people becomes, 
so greater becomes the gap between 
what society may legitimately expect 
of its members and a crime such as 
rape. The nature of the crime is not 
static in terms of the deviation of 
the criminal from accepted norms.
Thus, the punishment, to accurately 
reflect the greater departure from 
civilized norms which attends the 
rapist's act, should itself be 
increased rather than the converse.



49

Not only is the death penalty not 
disproportionate to the crime in this 
case, but it also is not disproportionate 
to other punishments. The comparison 
with life imprisonment as an alterna­
tive has already been discussed. In 
terms of the broad constitutional 
principles enforceable here, it would 
not appear that the alternative of life 
imprisonment is so far superior in its 
decency and humaneness that death, but 
not life imprisonment, constitutes 
punishment forbidden as cruel and 
unusual. The broad thrust of the Eighth 
Amendment's intendment is not meant to 
draw so fine a line when opposition to 
the death penalty is not universally 
felt to be devoid of decency.

Nor is the death penalty for rape 
disproportionate as compared with 
punishments for other sexual crimes.
The death penalty for rape in Georgia 
is part of a scheme which indicates the 
high revulsion of such offenses in this 
State leading to the utter condemnation of rape 
as the most reprehensible crime. The 
new Criminal Code of Georgia, effec­
tive July 1, 1969, lists nineteen 
sexual offenses subject to punishment 
ranging from misdemeanor to death. 33/

33 / Appendix B, pp. lb - 4b.



50

The sex crime next to rape in degree 
of severity is aggravated sodomy, 
which bears a maximum punishment of 
life imprisonment. 34 /

As to the proportionate relation­
ship between the crime and the punish­
ment, it should be noted also that the 
crime affects not only the victim, but 
also her family and society which must 
live in fear of such brutality. In 
this case, the young mother had a four- 
month -old baby daughter, and a physi­
cian husband. Both had to suffer the 
consequences of the mother and wife's 
ordeal, not only on the day of its 
occurrence, but also thereafter.

Since Petitioner does not simply 
single out his own case, but contends 
that the death penalty is excessive 
for every rape, the Court's attention 
is drawn to the type of crime which 
Petitioner would have the Court rule 
could never warrant the penalty of

34J  See Willis v. Smith, 227 Ga.
589 (1970), a case which involves 
the imposition by a jury of a 
life sentence for sodomy.



51

death. See in this connection 
Riggins v. State, 226 Ga. 381 (1970); 
Kemp v. State, 226 Ga. 506 (1970); 
Miller v. State, 226 Ga. 730 (1970); 
Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39 (1969) 
and Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 553 
(1969); Mitchell v. State, 225 Ga.
656 (1969) ; Swink v. State,
225 Ga. 717 (1969); Mathis v . State
224 Ga. 816 (1968); Abrams v. State,
223 Ga. 216 (1967) ; Gunter v. S tel t0 f
223 Ga. 290 (1967); Arkwright v.
State, 223 Ga. 768 (1967); Vanleeward 
v. State, 220 Ga. 135 (1964);
Paige v. State, 219 Ga. 569 (1963); 
Watt v. State, 217 Ga. 83 (1961); 
Johnson v. State, 215 Ga. 448 (1959). 
The facts in these cases themselves 
speak convincingly of the appropriate­
ness of the penalty here attacked.



52

(C) The death penalty in this 
case is rationally related to the 
permissible aims of punishment.
Williams v. New York. 337 U.S. 241 
(1949); Trop v. Dulles, supra.

The question of the State's sta- 
utory provision of the death penalty 
for the crime of rape, in the context 
of the Court's consideration, is neces­
sarily narrow. it is not whether the 
punishment is good or bad, or more or 
less effective than any other punish­
ment, but rather whether it is consti­
tutionally prohibited by the principles 
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
As this Court pointed out in Williams v. 
Illinois, supra, 399 U.S. at 241:

"A state has wide latitude in 
fixing the punishment for State 
crimes. " 35_/

35 / Former Chief Justice Warren pointed 
this out in an interview in which he 
stated his opposition to capital 
punishment. The New York Times 
reported: "However, he said, capital 
punishment should be left to the 
states. They are in a position to 
experiment with its effects, he said." 
New York Times, July 6, 1968, p. 42, 
column 1.



53

See also Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 P.2d 
138, 154 (8th Cir. 1968).

The distinction between legisla­
tive desirability and constitutionality 
must be maintained. With that perimeter, 
the pertinent question is whether the 
death penalty statute for rape trenches 
on the constitutionally protected free­
dom from cruel and unusual punishment.

To lay to rest any qualms in this 
regard, Respondent wishes to add the 
following points to the argument already 
advanced in its brief in Furman v. 
Georgia, 1971 Term, No. 69-5003. The 
primary purpose of the State's system 
of criminal justice is the protection 
of the public. This was pointed out 
by Lord Oaksley, president of the 
international war crimes tribunal at 
Nuremberg, who said:

"The prime and immediate 
object of punishment is the 
protection of the public.
It is possible to think too 
much of the reform of the 
criminal." 36 /

36/ New York Times, Monday, August 30, 
1971, p. 30M.



What he said at the war trial is pertinent 
here:

"I have the greatest horror of 
the capital sentence, but a 
greater horror of the crimes 
which have been perpetrated."
Ibid.

This puts the death penalty for rape, 
and the State's interests in retaining 
it, in proper context before this Court.
The State's obligation to its citizens 
is to make every effort to prevent the 
type of crime which the instant case 
portrays and to afford freedom from fear of 
similar attacks. This overriding obli­
gation warrants the threat and imposition 
of the death penalty as a device in the 
battle. it is particularly true since 
the incidence of the crime is measurably 
increasing, 21/ and there is no evidence 
that another penalty or method is a more 
effective deterrent:^That the threat of

37 / "Crime in the United States," issued 
by John Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, 
Uniform Crime Reports, 1970, pp.
12-14. Chart. 7 is reproduced as App.C 

38/ No guidance is offered by the States 
which do not retain the death penalty 
for rape, and in some of them, the 
rate of rape is substantially higher 
than it is in Georgia, where the rate 
in 1970 was 16.1 per 100,000 inhabi­
tants. Alaska's rate was 26.1, Ari­
zona's 27.0, California's 35.1, Colo­
rado's 36.0. "Crime in The United 
States",supra, pp. 72-73.



55
death is no deterrent has not been proved, 
while on the other hand common sense 
teaches that leniency would lead to the 
belief that rape, after all, is not 
such a despicable crime. This is what 
advances the breakdown of law and 
order. The idea is an ancient one:

"For in a state that hath no 
dread of law / The laws can 
never prosper and prevail./
Where dread prevails and 
reverence withal / Believe me, 
there is safety, but the state/
Where arrogance hath license and 
self-will / Though for a while, 
she run before the gale / Will 
in the end make shipwreck and 
be sunk." Sophocles, in Ajax.

The utter disregard shown by rapists 
for values which society holds at least 
as high as the value of life, and in some 
cases higher, as demonstrated by those 
who have died trying to avoid rape, 
warrants death as a commensurate penalty. 
These values are honor and virtue, 
personal peace and integrity. As com­
pared with other serious crimes, rape 
is more strenuously to be prevented, 
since a bank robber or a burglar wants 
only property, whereas a rapist desires 
the unwilling submission of another 
person's will and body. Another dis­
tinguishing factor is that the victim 
in a rape, be it woman or child, can 
never escape the memory, can never



56

avoid the indelibility of the tarnishing 
experience, whereas in theft, burglary, 
larceny, or robbery there is not such a 
lasting element of personal anguish.

The lack of knowledge to eliminate 
crimes such as this one make the reten­
tion of harsh penalties mandatory. The 
lack of knowledge has been brought about 
in part by the long delays in recent 
years, and indeed the cessation, of the 
carrying out of death penalties imposed 
by duly constituted juries. The effec­
tiveness of swiftly carried out execu­
tions, surrounded by all of the legal 
requisites of due process, and including 
all of the procedural and substantive 
safeguards afforded in recent years, 
would afford a more intelligent analysis 
of current effectiveness. The consti­
tutional mandate does not forbid the 
use or resumption of use of this penalty.

CONCLUSION

The death penalty for rape in this 
case is not constitutionally infirm.
In the first place, the death penalty 
for rape has not been shown to be a 
departure from the fundamental standards 
of decency which are required of the 
State. And as Mr. Justice Holmes stated 
nearly fifty years ago:



57

"[I]f a thing has been practised 
for two hundred years by common 
consent, it will need a strong 
case for the 14th Amendment to 
affect it, . . . "  Jackman v. 
Rosenbaum Company, 260 U.S. 22,
31 (1922).

The punishment which Georgia has 
held consistent for over one hundred 
years should not now be constitutionally 
abrogated because of any of the reasons 
advanced by Petitioner, as it has not 
been shown that it must be counted among 
the ranks of forbidden "cruel and unus­
ual punishments".

Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR K. BOLTON
Attorney General
HAROLD N. HILL, JR.
Executive Assistant
Attorney General
COURTNEY WILDER STANTON
Assistant Attorney General
DOROTHY T. BEASLEY
Assistant Attorney General
ANDREW J. RYAN, JR.
District Attorney
ANDREW J. RYAN, III
Assistant District Attorney



58

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Dorothy T. Beasley, Attorney of 
Record for the Respondent herein, and a 
member of the Bar of the Supreme Court 
of the United States, hereby certify that 
in accordance with the Rules of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, I 
served the foregoing Brief for Respondent 
on the Petitioner by depositing copies 
of the same in a United States mailbox, 
with first class postage prepaid, addressed 
to counsel of record at their post office 
addresses:

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, III 
JACK HIMMELSTEIN 
ELIZABETH B. DuBOIS 
JEFFRY A. MINTS 
ELAINE R. JONES 
10 Columbus Circle 
Suite 2030
New York, New York 10019

BOBBY L. HILL
208 East 34th Street
Savannah, Georgia 31401

MICHAEL MELTSNER
Columbia University Law School
435 West 116th Street
New York, New York 10027



ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM 
Stanford University Law School 
Stanford, California 94305

This ______  day of __________ , 1971.

DOROTHY T. BEASLEY



APPENDICES



la

APPENDIX A

STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES INVOLVED
Constitution of the State of Georgia 

of 1945, Article I, Section I, Paragraph 
IX (Ga. Code Ann. § 2-109, 1948 Revision) 
Bail; fine; punishment; arrest; abuse 
of prisoners. - Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflict 
ed; nor shall any person be abused in 
being arrested, while under arrest, or 
in prison.

Constitution of the State of Georgia 
of 1877, Article I, Section I, Paragraph 
IX (Ga. Code Ann. § 2-109, 1948 Revision) 
Bail; fines; punishment; arrest; abuse 
of prisoners. - Excessive bail shall 
not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish­
ments inflicted; nor shall any person 
be abused in being arrested, while 
under arrest, or in prison.



2a
Constitution of the State of Georgia 

of 1945, Article I, Section II, Paragraph 
I (Ga. Code Ann. § 2-201, 1970 Cummula- 
tive Supplement). (6382) Paragraph I. 
Libel; jury in criminal cases; new trials 
restrictions as to property near certain 
Federal highways. - In all prosecutions 
or indictments for libel the truth may­
be given in evidence; and the jury in 
all criminal cases shall be the judges 
of the law and the facts. The power of 
the judges to grant new trials, in case 
of conviction, is preserved. . . .



Ga. Code § 27-2301 (Ga. Code Ann. 
1953 Revision). (1059 P.C.) Jury judges 
of law and facts; general verdict; form 
and construction of verdicts. - On the 
trial of all criminal cases the jury 
shall be the judges of the law and the 
facts, and shall give a general verdict 
of "guilty" or "not guilty." Verdicts 
are to have a reasonable intendment, and 
are to receive a reasonable construction, 
and are not to be avoided unless from 
necessity. (Const., Art. I, Sec. II,
Par. I (§ 2-201). (Cobb, 835)

3 a



4a
Ga. Laws 1967, pp. 251-252:

§"59-106— Immediately upon the passage 
of this Act and thereafter at least 
biennially, or, if the judge of the 
superior court shall direct, at least 
annually, on the first Monday in August, 
or within sixty (60) days thereafter, 
the board of jury commissioners shall 
compile and maintain and revise a jury 
list of upright and intelligent citizens 
of the county to serve as jurors. in 
composing such list they shall select a 
fairly representative cross-section of 
the upright and intelligent citizens of 
the county from the official registered 
voters' list which was used in the last 
preceding general election. If at any 
time it appears to the jury commission­
ers that the jury list, so composed, is 
not a fairly representative cross-sec­
tion of the upright and intelligent 
citizens of the county, they shall 
supplement such list by going out into 
the county and personally acquainting 
themselves with other citizens of the 
county, including upright and intelli­
gent citizens of any significantly 
identifiable group in the county which 
may not be fairly represented thereon.

After selecting the citizens to serve 
as jurors, the jury commissioners shall 
select from the jury list a sufficient 
number, not exceeding two-fifths of the 
whole number, to serve as grand jurors. 
The entire number first selected, in­
cluding those afterwards selected as



grand jurors, shall constitute the body 
of traverse j urors for the county, to 
be drawn for service as provided by law 
except when a name which has already 
been drawn for the same term as a grand 
juror shall also be drawn as a traverse 
juror, such name shall be returned to 
the box and another drawn in its stead.

Section 2. All laws and parts of 
laws in conflict with this Act are 
hereby repealed.

Approved March 30, 1967."



Ga , Laws 1968, pp. 533—534:

§"59-106. At least biennially, or, 
if the judge of the superior court shall 
direct, at least annually, on the first 
Monday in August, or within 60 days 
thereafter, the board of jury commis­
sioners shall compile and maintain and 
revise a jury list of intelligent and 
upright citizens of the county to serve 
as jurors. In composing such list the 
commissioners shall select a fairly 
representative cross-section of the 
intelligent and upright citizens of the 
county from the official registered 
voters' list which was used in the last 
preceding general election. If at any 
time it appears to the jury commission­
ers that the jury list, so composed, 
is not a fairly representative cross- 
section of the intelligent and upright 
citizens of the county, they shall 
supplement such list by going out into 
the county and personally acquainting 
themselves with other citizens of the 
county, including intelligent and up­
right citizens of any significantly 
identifiable group in the county which 
may not be fairly representative there­
on .

After selecting the citizens to serve 
as jurors, the jury commissioners shall 
select from the jury list a sufficient 
number of the most experienced, intel­
ligent and upright citizens, not ex­
ceeding two-fifth of the whole number,



to serve as grand jurors. The entire 
number first selected, including those 
afterwards selected as grand jurors, 
shall constitute the body of traverse 
jurors for the county, except as other­
wise provided herein, and no new names 
shall be added until those names orig­
inally selected have been completely 
exhausted, except when a name which has 
already been drawn for the same term as 
a grand juror shall also be drawn as a 
traverse juror, such name shall be re­
turned to the box and another drawn in 
its stead. "

Section 2. All laws and parts of 
laws in conflict with this Act are 
hereby repealed.

7a

Approved April 1, 1968."



8a

Ga. Code Ann. (1970 Cummulative 
Pocket Part) § 70-301. Time for motion 
for new trial; amendment; procedure where 
transcript of evidence required; hearing 
on motion; grant of new trial on motion 
of court. - All applications for new 
trial, except in extraordinary cases, 
shall be made within 30 days of the entry 
of the judgment on the verdict, or entry 
of the judgment where the case was tried 
without a jury. The motion may be amend­
ed any time on or before the ruling 
thereon, and where the grounds thereof 
require consideration of the transcript 
of evidence or proceedings, the court 
may in its discretion grant an extension 
of time for the preparation and filing 
of the transcript, which may be done any 
time on or before the hearing, or the 
court may in its discretion hear and 
determine the motion before the tran­
script of evidence and proceedings is 
prepared and filed. The grounds of the 
motion need not be approved by the court. 
The motion may be heard in vacation or 
term time, but where not heard at the time 
named in the order, whether in term time 
or vacation, it shall stand for hearing 
at the next term or at such other time 
in term or vacation as the court by order 
at any time may prescribe, unless sooner 
disposed of. On appeal, a party shall 
not be limited to the grounds urged in 
the motion, or any amendment thereof.



The court also shall be empowered 
to grant a new trial on its own motion 
within 30 days from entry of the judg­
ment, except in criminal cases where the 
defendant was acquitted. (Acts 1965, 
pp. 18, 30).



lb
APPENDIX B

COMPARATIVE PUNISHMENTS FOR SEXUAL 
OFFENSES IN GEORGIA (Criminal Code of 
Georgia, effective July 1, 1969)

§ 26-2001 

§ 26-2002

§ 26-2003

§ 26-2004 

§ 26-2005 

§ 26-2006 

§ 26-2007 

§ 26-2008

§ 26-2009 

§ 26-2010 

§ 26-2011

Rape— death, life imprisonment, 
1 to 20 years.

Sodomy--aggravated: life 
imprisonment, 1 to 20 years; 
sodomy: 1 to 20 years.

Solicitation of sodomy--
" kmisdemeanor .

Bestiality— 1 to 5 years.

Seduction--l to 5 years.

Incest— 1 to 20 years.

Bigamy— 1 to 10 years.

Marrying a bigamist— 1 to 
10 years.

Adultery— misdemeanor. 

Fornication— misdemeanor.

Public indecency-misdemeanor.

Footnote describing terms of 
misdemeanor punishment begins 
on next page.



2b
§ 26-2012 Prostitution--misdemeanor

(punishment provided for in 
§ 26-2015).

§ 26-2013 Pimping— misdemeanor of a high 
and aggravated nature (punish­
ment provided for in § 26-2015)*

§ 26-2014 Keeping a place of prostitu­
tion— same as above.

§ 26-2016 Pandering-same as above.

§ 26-2017 Pandering by compulsion— - 
1 to 10 years.

§ 26-2018 Statutory rape (victim under 
age 14)--1 to 20 years.

§ 26-2019 Child molestation (victim
under age 14)— 1 to 20 years.

§ 26-2020 Enticing a child for indecent 
purposes (victim under age 
14)-- 1 to 20 years.

* Punishments for a misdemeanor and for 
misdemeanors of a high and aggravated 
nature are as follows:

Ga. Code Ann. (1970 Cumulative Pocket 
Part) § 27-2506:

"(1065 P.C.) Misdemeanors, how 
punished.— Except where otherwise 
(Continued on next page)



3b

provided, every crime declared 
to be a misdemeanor shall be 
punished either:

(a) By a fine not to exceed 
$1,000 or by confinement in the 
county or other jail, county 
public works camp or such other 
places as counties may provide 
for maintenance of county pris­
oners for a total term not to 
exceed 12 months, either a fine 
or confinement or both; or,

(b) By confinement under the 
jurisdiction of the State Board 
of Corrections in the State 
penitentiary, in a public works 
camp or such other institutions 
as the Director of Corrections 
may direct, for a determinate 
term of months which shall be 
more than six months but shall 
not exceed a total term of 12 
months.

Either the punishment pro­
vided in (a) or (b), but not 
both, may be imposed in the 
discretion of the sentencing 
judge: Provided, however, that 
misdemeanor punishment imposed 
under (a) or (b) may be subject 
to suspension or probation but 
the punishment provided in (b) 
shall not be subject to suspen­
sion or probation wholly or 
partially upon the payment of 
a fine either directly or indir- 
(continued on next page)



4b
ectly: and Provided, further, 
that the sentencing courts 
shall retain jurisdiction to 
amend, modify, alter, suspend 
or probate sentences imposed 
under (a) at any time but in 
no instance shall any sentence 
under (a) be modified in a 
manner to place a county pris­
oner under the jurisdiction 
of the State Board of Correc­
tions .
A person convicted of a 

misdemeanor of a high and 
aggravated nature shall be 
punished by a fine not to 
exceed $5,000 or by confine­
ment for a specific term not 
to exceed 12 months or by 
both.

(Acts 1865-6, p. 233; 1878-9, 
p. 54; 1895, p. 64; 1908, p. 
1119; 1956, pp. 161, 168; 1957, 
pp• 477, 482; 1964, p. 485; 
1970, pp. 236, 241.)"



lc

APPENDIX C
Chart 7

FORCIBLE RAPE
I960 - 1970

PERCENT C H AN G E OVER 1 9 6 0
NUMBER OF OFFENSES UP 121 PERCENT

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970

FBI CHART

Crime in the United States, issued by 
John Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI,
Uniform Crime Reports - 1970.



♦