Kelley v. Board of Education of Nashville and Davidson County, TN Appendix to Appellants' Brief
Public Court Documents
September 23, 1955 - September 17, 1958
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Kelley v. Board of Education of Nashville and Davidson County, TN Appendix to Appellants' Brief, 1955. f39290c8-b99a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/eeca4485-1cb4-4353-8efc-18ebfbc56e43/kelley-v-board-of-education-of-nashville-and-davidson-county-tn-appendix-to-appellants-brief. Accessed November 18, 2025.
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MnlUh Bintm ( to r t rtf Appeals
F oe t h e S ix t h C ir c u it
No. 13,748
I u t h e
R obert W . K e l l e y , et al.,
Plaintiff s-Appellants,
B oard oe E d u cation of t h e C it y of N a sh v il l e ,
D avidson C o u n t y , T e n n e s s e e , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, NASHVILLE DIVISION
APPENDIX TO APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
Z. A lexander L ooby
A von N. W il l ia m s , J r.
327 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville 3, Tennessee
T hurgood M a rshall
Suite 1790
10 Columbus Circle
New York 19, N. Y.
Counsel for Appellants
W il l ia m L . T aylor
Of Counsel
TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX
Docket Entries ..................................... la
Complaint....................... 4a
Answer ........... 14a
Supplemental Answer ...... 32a
Transcript of Proceedings on November 13, 14, 1956 38a
P l a in t if f s ’ W it n e s s e s :
V. T. Thayer—
Direct .................................................... 39a
0. B. Iiofstetter—
Direct .................................................... 44a
Memorandum Opinion of the Court.......................... 46a
Findings and Conclusions........................................... 57a
Judgment .................................................................... 65a
The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench .... 67a
O rder.......................................................................... - 81a
Transcript of Testimony on January 28, 1958 ....... 82a
D e fe n d a n t s’ W it n e s s :
William H. Oliver—
Direct ................................................... 82a
Cross ..................................................... 84a
PAGE
Opinion ....................................................... ................ 88a
Order ........................................................................... 103a
Transcript of Proceedings on April 14, 1958 ............ 105a
D e p e n d a n t s ’ W it n e s s e s :
William H. Oliver—
Direct ................................. 107a
Cross ...................................... 117a
Recalled by the C ourt.......................... 228a
Elmer Lee Pettit—
Direct .................................................... 129a
Cross ............................................ 134a
Redirect ............................ 148a
Mary Brent—
Direct .................................................... 150a
Cross ..................................................... 156a
W. A. B a ss-
Direct .................................................... 159a
Cross ..................................................... 163a
P l a in t if f s ’ W it n e s s e s :
Herman H. Long—
Direct .................................................... 171a
Cross ..................................................... 184a
Dr. Preston Valien—
Direct ..................................... 195a
Cross ..................................................... 201a
Mrs. Preston Valien—
Direct .................................... 208a
Cross ........... 215a
11
PAGE
I l l
Coyness L. Ennix—
Direct .................................................... 222a
Cross ..................................................... 224a
Redirect ................................................ 225a
Memorandum Opinion................................................ 236a
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law................ 241a
Judgment .................................................................... 246a
PAGE
In t h e
Intfrfc itBtrirt CErntrl
fo e t h e M iddle D istr ic t of T e n n e s s e e
N a sh v ille D iv isio n
.Robert W . K ell e y , et al.,
—v.-
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
B oard of E ducation of t h e C ity of N a sh v il l e ,
D avidson C o u n t y , T e n n e s s e e , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
a ppea l from t h e d istrict court of t h e u n it e d states for
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, NASHVILLE DIVISION
Docket Entries
1. Complaint, filed September 23, 1955.
2. Answer filed jointly by all named Defendants, filed
November 16, 1955.
3. Amended Complaint, and Order allowing same, filed
November 30, 1955,
4. Answer of New Co-Defendants, Isaiah Suggs and
W. E. Turner, Jr., filed December 15, 1955.
5. Three-Judge Opinion and Order remanding this
action to be heard by a District Judge, entered
March 28, 1956.
6. Order entered allowing defendants to file Supple
mental Answer, entered November 13, 1956.
7. Supplemental Answer filed by Defendants, filed No
vember 13, 1956.
8. Transcript of Proceedings on November 13, 14, 1956.
2a
Docket Entries
9. Memorandum Opinion of the Court, entered Janu
ary 21, 1957.
10. Findings and Conclusions of Law, entered Febru
ary 20, 1957.
11. Judgment Order, entered February 20, 1957.
12. Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Answer and
Counter-Claim, filed by Defendants, filed August 30,
1957.
13. Transcript of the Court’s Statement from the bench
on hearing of Defendants’ Motion to file Supple
mental Answer and Counter-Claim on September
6, 1957.
14. Order Denying the Motion for Leave to File Sup
plemental Answer and Counterclaim heretofore filed
by defendants, entered September 23, 1957.
15. Report of Nashville Board of Education, filed De
cember 6, 1957.
16. Specification of Objections to Report of Nashville
Board of Education, filed by the Plaintiffs, filed De
cember 23, 1957.
17. Motion to Dismiss filed by the Defendants, filed
January 20,1958.
18. Transcript of Testimony, January 28, 1958.
19. Opinion of the Court, entered February 18, 1958.
20. Order entered Ordering that : (1) Motion to Dis
miss Denied. (2) Plan for desegregation filed by
School Board is disapproved. (3) Injunction should
be withheld pending the submission by the Board
of another Plan. (4) That Defendant shall file with
the Court, not later than April 7, 1958, another Plan.
(5) That a hearing on said last mentioned Plan be
3a
Docket Entries
held for approval or disapproval on the 14th day
of April, 1958, entered March 19,1958.
21. Report of Nashville Board of Education, filed April
7, 1958.
22. Specification of Objections to Report of Nashville
Board of Education filed by the Plaintiffs, filed April
14, 1958.
23. Transcript of Proceedings on April 14, 1958.
24. Memorandum Opinion of the Court, entered June
19, 1958.
25. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered
July 17, 1958.
26. Order of Judgment entered Ordering that: (1) That
the original plan of Board of Education of City of
Nashville approved as amended by the judgment of
this Court entered on February 20, 1957, and as
further amended by the amended plan filed April
7, 1958—be approved, and that the prayer of the
plaintiffs for injunctive relief be and is denied. (2)
That jurisdiction of the action is retained during
the period of transition, entered July 17, 1958.
27. Notice of Appeal to the Circuit Court—filed by
Plaintiffs, August 15, 1958.
28. Bond for Costs on Appeal—filed by the Plaintiffs,
August 15, 1958.
29. Notice of Cross-Appeal—filed by the Board of Edu
cation of the City of Nashville, Davidson County,
Tennessee, Deft., August 15,1958.
30. Bond for Costs on Appeal filed by the Defendant,
Board of Education of City of Nashville.
31. Order extending time to file Record on Appeal to
Nov. 13,1958, filed September 17,1958.
4a
(Filed September 23, 1955)
1. (a) The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under
Title 28, United States Code, section 1331. This action
arises under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu
tion of the United States, section 1, and the Act of May
31, 1870, Chapter 114, section 16, 16 Stat. 144, (Title 42
United States Code, section 1981), as hereinafter more
fully appears.
The matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest
and costs, the sum or value of Three Thousand ($3,000.00)
Dollars.
(b) The jurisdiction of this Court is also invoked under
Title 28, United States Code, section 1343. This action is
authorized by the Act of April 20, 1871, Chapter 22, section
1, 17 Stat. 13, (Title 42, United States Code, section 1983),
to be commenced by any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to redress the
deprivation, under color of a state law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of rights, privileges and im
munities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, sec. 1, and by the Act
of May 31, 1870, Chapter 114, section 16, 16 Stat. 144,
(Title 42, United States Code, section 1981), providing
for the equal rights of citizens and of all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States, as hereinafter more
fully appears.
(c) The jurisdiction of this Court is also invoked under
Title 28, United States Code, section 2281. This is an
action for a permanent injunction restraining, upon the
ground of unconstitutionality, the enforcement, operation
and execution of provisions of the Constitution and stat
Complaint
5a
utes of the State of Tennessee by restraining the action of
defendants, officers of such State, in the enforcement and
execution of such Constitutional provisions and statutes,
as hereinafter more fully appears.
2. This action is a proceeding under Title 28, United
States Code, sections 2201 and 2202, for a judgment de
claring the rights and other legal relations of plaintiffs
and all other Negro children eligible to attend elementary,
junior high and high schools owned, maintained and oper
ated by the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennes
see and demanding an injunction, for the purpose of deter
mining and redressing questions and matters of actual con
troversy between the parties, to-wit:
Whether Sections 11395, 11396, and 11397, Code of
Tennessee and that portion of Section 12 of Article 11 of
the Tennessee Constitution which makes it unlawful for
white and colored persons to attend the same school vio
late the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con
stitution, and whether the exclusion of plaintiffs and other
persons, similarly situated, from elementary, junior high
and senior high schools owned, maintained and operated
by the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee,
pursuant to these statutes and constitutional provisions
and any other law, custom, practice or usage violates the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
3. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23 (a)
(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for themselves
and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, who
are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them
all before the Court and who seek a common relief based
upon common questions of law and fact.
Complaint
6a
4. Plaintiffs are Negroes and are citizens of the United
States, State of Tennessee, and are residents of and domi
ciled in the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Middle
Division of the State of Tennessee. All of the infant plain
tiffs can satisfy all requirements for admission to the
public elementary, junior high and senior high schools
maintained and operated by the defendants Board of Edu
cation of the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennes
see in and for said City of Nashville, Davidson County,
Tennessee. Adult plaintiffs not applicants, are either par
ents or guardians of the infant plaintiffs who are applicants.
5. (a) The defendant, Board of Education of the City
of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, is composed of
the following board members, the defendants, Mrs. W. 0.
Benson, Mrs. Tom A. Bland, Coyness L. Ennix, A. B. Gib
son, 0. B. Hofstetter Sr., Henry Kantor, Elmer Lee Pettit,
William H. Underhill and Neil H. Wright, who together
constitute the Board of Education of the City of Nashville,
Davidson County, Tennessee, and who are hereinafter re
ferred to as defendant Board of Education.
(b) Said defendant Board of Education exists pursuant
to the Constitution and laws of the State of Tennessee as
an administrative department of the State of Tennessee,
discharging governmental functions, and is by law a body
corporate or a continuous body or entity.
(c) All of said defendants, above named as board mem
bers of defendant Board of Education, are citizens and
residents of the State of Tennessee, and are being sued
herein in their official capacities as such board members.
(d) Defendant W. A. Bass is Superintendent of Schools
of the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, and
Complaint
7a
holds office pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the
State of Tennessee as an administrative officer of the free
public school system of Tennessee.
(e) Defendant William H. Oliver is Principal of East
Nashville Senior High School and East Nashville Junior
High School; defendant Jack Stanfill is Principal of Kirk
patrick Elementary School; and defendant Miss Mary
Brent is Principal of Glenn Elementary School; all of said
Schools being public schools maintained and operated by
defendant Board of Education in and for the City of
Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee.
(f) Defendants W. A. Bass, William H. Oliver, Jack
Stanfill and Miss Mary Brent are citizens and residents of
the State of Tennessee, and are made defendants herein
and sued, in their official capacities as stated hereinabove.
6. The State of Tennessee has declared public educa
tion a State function. The Constitution of Tennessee,
Article XI, Section 12, provides:
“Knowledge, learning and virtue, being essential to the
preservation of republican institutions, and the dif
fusion of the opportunities and advantages of educa
tion throughout the different portions of the State
being highly conducive to the promotion of this end, it
shall be the duty of the General Assembly, in all future
periods of this Government to cherish literature and
science.”
Pursuant to this mandate the Legislature of Tennessee
has established a uniform system of free public education
in the State of Tennessee according to a plan set out in the
Code of Tennessee of 1932, Sections 2306-2540.3, and sup
Complaint
8a
plements and amendments thereto. The establishment,
maintenance and administration of the public school system
of Tennessee is vested in a Commissioner of Education,
a State Board of Education, County Superintendents of
Public Schools, and County and City Boards of Education.
7. The public schools of the City of Nashville, Davidson
County, Tennessee are under the control and supervision
of defendant Board of Education and defendant W. A.
Bass, acting as an administrative department or division,
and as an agent of the State of Tennessee. Said Board of
Education is under a duty to enforce the school laws of
the State of Tennessee; to maintain an efficient system
of public schools in the City of Nashville, Davidson County,
Tennessee; to determine the studies to be pursued, the
methods of teaching, and to establish such Schools as may
be necessary to the completeness and efficiency of the
school system. Defendant, W. A. Bass, as Superintendent,
has the immediate control of the operation of the public
schools of said City and is the administrative agent of the
defendant Board of Education.
8. Defendant Board of Education maintains and oper
ates in and for the said City of Nashville a number of public
elementary, junior high and senior high schools, including
those designated as Kirkpatrick Elementary, Glenn Ele
mentary, East Nashville Junior High and East Nashville
Senior High Schools, exclusively for the education, con
venience and use of white school children residing in the
City of Nashville. All of these schools afford adequate
facilities to provide elementary and secondary instruction
on a modern basis by grades. These schools are readily
accessible to, and are used by, white school children re
siding in the areas proximately surrounding the respective
Complaint
9a
schools; but the facilities afforded by these schools are
denied by defendants to the infant plaintiffs and other
Negro children, similarly situated, who reside in the areas
proximately surrounding said schools, solely because of
their race or color.
9. At the beginning of the Fall Term, 1955, eight of the
infant plaintiffs presented themselves and made application
for admission to Kirkpatrick Elementary School, four of
the infant plaintiffs presented themselves and made ap
plication for admission to Glenn Elementary School, two of
the infant plaintiffs presented themselves and made ap
plication for admission to East Nashville Junior High
School, and seven of the infant plaintiffs presented them
selves and made application for admission to East Nash
ville Senior High School. Said infant plaintiffs reside in
the areas served by said respective schools, and if they
were white children they would have been admitted to
said schools; but all of said plaintiffs were refused admis
sion by defendants, to said respective schools, solely on
account of their race or color. Defendants require Negro
applicants to attend schools designated exclusively for
Negro children.
10. The defendants rely on the following provisions of
the Tennessee Constitution and Statutes, which read as
follows:
Constitution of 1870, Art. 11, Sec. 12:
“ . . . No school established or aided under this section
shall allow white and negro children to be received as
scholars together in the same school. . . . ”
Complaint
10a
Code of Tennessee, 1932, Sections:
“11395 6888a37. Unlawful for white and colored per
sons to attend same school,—It shall be unlawful for
any school, academy, college or other place of learning
to allow white and colored persons to attend the same
school, academy, college, or other place of learning.
(1901, ch. 7, sec. 1.)
“11396 6888a38. Unlawful for teacher to allow such
mixed attendance or to teach them in same class.—
It shall be unlawful for any teacher, professor, or
educator in any college, academy, or school of learning
to allow the white and colored races to attend the same
school, or for any teacher or educator, or other per
son to instruct or teach both the white and colored
races in the same class, school, or college building, or
in any other place or places of learning, or allow or
permit the same to be done with their knowledge, con
sent or procurement. (Ib., sec. 2)
“11397 6888a39. Violation is a misdemeanor; fine and
imprisonment.—Any person violating any of the pro
visions of this article, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
and, upon conviction, shall be fined for each offense
fifty dollars, and imprisonment not less than thirty days
nor more than six months. (Ib., sec. 4, Modified.)”
11. The infant plaintiffs and all other Negro school
children in the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Ten
nessee, are thereby deprived of their rights guaranteed by
the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Plaintiffs aver that the said constitutional and statutory
provisions and all other laws of the State of Tennessee
permitting or requiring segregation of the races in public
Complaint
11a
education fall within the prohibited group which the Su
preme Court of the United States holds must yield to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. But if, as defendant Board of Education appar
ently insists, said constitutional and statutory provisions
and laws of the State of Tennessee are valid until specif
ically declared invalid in a judicial proceeding, the plain
tiffs here and now aver that the said constitutional and
statutory provisions and all other laws, customs, practices
and usages of the State of Tennessee requiring or permit
ting segregation of the Negro and white races in public
education are in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore
unconstitutional and void.
12. Plaintiffs and those similarly situated and affected,
on whose behalf this suit is brought, are suffering irrepa
rable injury and are threatened with irreparable injury in
the future by reason of the acts herein complained of. They
have no plain, adequate or complete remedy to redress the
wrongs and illegal acts herein complained of other than
this suit for a declaration of rights and an injunction. Any
other remedy to which plaintiffs and those similarly situated
could be remitted would be attended by such uncertainties
and delays as to deny substantial relief, would involve
multiplicity of suits, cause further irreparable injury and
occasion damage, vexation and inconvenience, not only
to the plaintiffs and those similarly situated, but to defen
dants as governmental agencies.
13. There is between the parties an actual controversy
as hereinbefore set forth.
W h e r e fo r e , Plaintiffs respectfully pray the Court that
upon the filing of this complaint, the Court convene a Three-
Complaint
12a
Judge District Court as required by Title 28, United States
Code, Sections 2281 and 2284; the Court advance this cause
on the docket and order a speedy hearing of this action
according to law, and that upon such hearing:
The Court adjudge, decree and declare the rights and
legal relations of the parties to the subject matter here in
controversy in order that such declaration shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
The Court enter a judgment or decree declaring that
the above quoted portion of Article 11, Section 12 of the
Constitution of Tennessee, Sections 11395, 11396 and 11397
of the Code of Tennessee, 1932, and any other laws, cus
toms, practices and usages pursuant to which plaintiffs
and other persons, similarly situated, are excluded from
Kirkpatrick Elementary School, Glenn Elementary School,
East Nashville Junior High School, and East Nashville
Senior High School, or any other public elementary, junior
high and senior high schools maintained and operated by
defendant Board of Education in and for the City of Nash
ville, Davidson County, Tennessee, solely because of race,
violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
This Court issue a permanent injunction forever re
straining and enjoining defendants and each of them from
refusing to admit plaintiffs, and other persons similarly
situated, to Kirkpatrick Elementary School, Glenn Ele
mentary School, East Nashville Junior High School, East
Nashville Senior High School, or any other public elemen
tary, junior high or senior high schools maintained and
operated by defendant Board of Education in and for the
City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, solely be
cause of their race.
Complaint
13a
Plaintiffs further pray that the Court will allow them
their costs herein and such further, other or additional
relief as may appear to the Court to be equitable and just.
Z. A lexander L ooby and
A von N. W illiams, J r.
327 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville 3, Tennessee
T hurgood Marshall
107 West 40th Street
New York 36, New York
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Complaint
14a
Answer
(Filed November 16,1955)
Answer of Mrs. W. 0. Benson, Mrs. Tom A. Bland, Coyness
L. Ennix, A. B. Gibson, 0. B. Hofstetter, Sr., Henry
Kantor, Elmer Lee Pettit, William 11. Underhill and
Neil 11. Wright, Members of the Board of Education of
the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee:
W. A. Bass, Superintendent of Schools of the City of
Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, William H.
Oliver, Principal of East Nashville Senior High School,
Jack Stanfill, Principal of Kirkpatrick Elementary
School and Miss Mary Brent, Principal of Glenn Ele
mentary School
These defendants, for answer to the complaint filed
against them in the above styled cause, say:
1, 2 and 3
Defendants admit the averments of Section 1, 2 and 3 of
the complaint.
4
Defendants assume and, therefore, admit that plaintiffs
are Negroes and are citizens of the United States and of
the State of Tennessee and are residents of and domiciled in
the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee. Defen
dants also assume and, therefore, admit that the adult
plaintiffs are either parents or guardians of the infant
plaintiffs. Defendants are without information sufficient, to
form a belief as to the truth of the averments that all of
the infant plaintiffs can satisfy all requirements for admis
sion to the public schools maintained and operated by the
City of Nashville.
15a
5
Defendants admit the averments of Section 5 of the com
plaint, except as hereinafter stated in this paragraph. Said
Section 5 of the complaint avers that defendant William
H. Oliver is Principal of East Nashville Senior High School
and also of East Nashville Junior High School. Defendants
admit that William H. Oliver is Principal of East Nash
ville Senior High School. Defendants deny that William
H. Oliver is Principal of East Nashville Junior High
School. The Principal of said East Nashville Junior High
School is H. B. McDonough.
6 and 7
Defendants admit the averments of Sections 6 and 7 of
the complaint.
8
Defendants admit the averments of Section 8 of the com
plaint subject to the explanation and qualification herein
after stated in Section 14 hereof.
9
Defendants are without information sufficient to form
a belief as to the averments of Section 9 of the complaint.
The facts in respect to the matters stated in Section 9 of
the complaint in so far as known to the defendants are as
follows:
At the beginning of the school term 1955-56, certain
Negro children, accompanied by persons who were appar
ently their guardians or parents, sought admission to Kirk
patrick Elementary School, Glenn Elementary School and
East Nashville Senior High School. All of such applicants
Answer
16a
were then refused admission, as more fully appears in Sec
tion 14 hereof. Admission was then denied to all of such
applicants in the particular schools they sought to attend,
other schools of the City of Nashville being available to
them, because they were Negro children and for the reasons
fully set forth in Section 14 hereof. The schools to which
such Negro applicants sought admission had been estab
lished as schools for white children. Admission for the
school term 1955-56 was refused to the plaintiff applicants
for the reasons set forth in Section 14 hereof upon the
assumption that they resided in the areas in which they
now claim to reside and upon the assumption that they
met the scholastic requirements, other than race, then a
prerequisite for admission, and no evidence in this respect
was demanded from applicants nor any investigation of
their residence or scholastic qualifications made by defen
dants. Defendants have no reason to question the substan
tial accuracy of the averments that those applicants who
were denied admission to Kirkpatrick, Glenn and East
Nashville High School are plaintiffs herein, but for lack
of sufficient information, defendants cannot admit that such
applicants reside in the areas proximately surrounding
said schools or that they are of an age and with requisite
scholastic qualifications justifying their admission into said
schools.
Defendants deny that any applicants for admission to
East Nashville Junior High School presented themselves
to the Principal of such school. Defendants assume that
those whom the complaint refers to as seeking admission
to such school presented themselves to East Nashville
Senior High School, William H. Oliver, Principal, and were
denied admission by him upon the belief that they were
seeking admission to the Senior High School.
Answer
17a
10
Defendants admit the averments of Section 10 of the com
plaint.
11
Defendants deny that they have deprived plaintiffs or
others of their rights guaranteed by the Constitution and
laws of the United States. Defendants admit that the con
stitutional and statutory provisions of the State of Ten
nessee must yield to the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States. Defendants deny
that it is now their insistence or has ever been their in
sistence, as the complaint supposes, that laws of Tennessee
requiring racial segregation in the public schools are valid
until specifically declared invalid. As more fully appears
in Section 14 hereof, defendants are aware that the Su
preme Court of the United States has said that all provi
sions of Federal, State or local laws requiring or permit
ting racial discrimination in public education are uncon
stitutional. Defendants are also aware that the Constitution
of the United States provides that such Constitution shall
be the supreme law of the land and that such Constitution
is binding, anything in the constitutions or laws of any state
to the contrary notwithstanding.
12 and 13
Defendants deny the averments of Sections 12 and 13 of
the complaint, as is more fully explained in Section 14
hereof.
14
Defendants aver that they are proceeding in good faith
and with all reasonable promptness to implement the con
Answer
18a
stitutional principle announced by the Supreme Court of
the United States on May 31, 1955 in the case of Brown vs.
Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas. Such decision
recognized as a fact what these defendants as school admin
istrators and school board members know, that there are
complexities and obstacles which demand that the situation
be studied and an intelligent plan formulated, consistent
with the various public and private interests involved.
Defendants aver that their predecessors in office have
created and established, and these defendants propose to
operate and maintain, a public school system of high quality
and with high standards and that the administration of
such school system has been, and will be, without preju
dice and without racial discrimination as the Constitution
of the United States and the laws of the land are inter
preted and applied in good faith.
For many decades the school system of Nashville, Ten
nessee has been developed, built and operated in compliance
with the principle of segregation, expressly written into
the Constitution of Tennessee (1870), Article XI, Section
12, by that provision forbidding that schools receiving
State aid shall allow white and Negro children to be re
ceived as scholars together in the same school and in com
pliance with statutory provisions of Tennessee enacted pur
suant to and consistent with said constitutional provision.
Said principle of segregation having received the express
approval of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Plessy vs. Ferguson in 1896 and the implied ap
proval of such Court in many other cases, it was not merely
the right and privilege but it was also the solemn legal duty
of these defendants and their predecessors in office to
adhere to the policy of racial segregation and to build a
public school system based thereon. The Supreme Court
of the United States does not have the power nor claim the
Answer
19a
power by overruling its prior decisions thereby to erase
a century of history built upon prior constitutional doc
trines.
As a consequence of the rule of segregation, schools have
been located and built and they have been equipped and
staffed to provide for these separate needs. If such opera
tion is abruptly and totally abandoned without survey,
without planning, without school census and without school
districts established in the light of the constitutional doc
trine, newly discovered as inherent in the Fourteenth
Amendment, then the result will be very damaging to the
quality of Nashville’s public school system, destructive to
amicable association of the races and harmful to the pupils
and the teachers.
Defendants aver that, fully conscious of their duties and
obligations to plaintiffs, they are also aware of their duties
and obligations to all the pupils and teachers of the Nash
ville School system. Defendants propose to formulate
their plans and to administer the schools of Nashville with
a recognition of both duties and obligations.
Defendants aver that they, and their immediate prede
cessors in office, have administered the affairs of the Nash
ville school system without discrimination against the
colored race. As evidence of this they point to the fact
that during the past decade, capital expenditures for Negro
schools have been a greater proportion of total capital
expenditures than average daily attendance of Negro stu
dents has been of total average daily attendance. Attached
to this Answer and made a part hereof as Exhibit A is a
statement showing average daily attendance and also show
ing capital expenditures during each of the past ten years
for schools for white pupils and for schools for colored
pupils, and total expenditures.
Defendants further aver as evidence of a school admin
istration in good faith and without racial prejudice, that
Answer
20a
there are presently employed in the schools of the City of
Nashville 1003 class room teachers, of whom 324 class room
teachers are members of the colored race, and that there
are presently employed in the schools of the City of Nash
ville a total of 1085 principals, supervisors, class room
teachers and assistants, of whom 343 are Negroes. As
further evidence of school administration in good faith
and without racial prejudice, defendants aver that the
Negro teachers in Nashville are paid on the same salary
scale as are the white teachers, that such salary scale is
the best in the State of Tennessee and that such salary
scale compares favorably with those in other cities of the
United States of similar population.
Defendants aver that the above mentioned decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States of May 31, 1955 was
brought to the attention of the defendant City Board of
Education by the Defendant School Superintendent on
June 9, 1955. On motion duly made and with one member,
to-wit Coyness L. Ennix, voting in the negative, the matter
was then referred to the Instruction Committee for study
and report to said Board of Education. On July 14, 1955
the Instruction Committee made a progress report to the
Board, copy of which is attached to this Answer and made
a part hereof as Exhibit B. Said progress report was
approved by said Board of Education.
Said progress report advised the Board that the Instruc
tion Committee had sent questionnaires to forty cities in
the southern region in order that Nashville might make use
of the experience of the other school systems, that replies
had been received from approximately one-half of these
and that the Committee was studying the data received.
Said progress report informed the Board that to act in
telligently, an accurate, up to date school census was neces
sary and that permission had been asked of the State
Answer
21a
Board of Education to take such a census six months in
advance of the normal date. The State Board of Education
denied as impractical such request for an advanced date
of the next school census, which Section 2474.1 of the Sup
plement to the Code of Tennessee (1950) provides shall he
taken between February 15th and May 31st, 1956. Said
progress report also advised the Board that the Committee
proposed to hold meetings of ail school principals to ask
their advice and assistance in formulating a policy and
suggested that interested citizens, including Parent Teach
ers Association groups and other parents should be given
an opportunity to meet and discuss the appropriate pro
cedure.
On August 11, 1955 said Instruction Committee made
another progress report, copy of which is attached to this
Answer and made a part hereof as Exhibit C. Said second
progress report was also approved by the City Board of
Education, with one member, Coyness L. Ennix, voting in
the negative. In this progress report the Instruction Com
mittee suggested to the Board that it was considering the
problem in its many aspects, that the Board must deal
with the matter positively and yet unhurried. Such prog
ress report pointed out that the school system of Nashville
had operated for approximately one hundred years and
that during all of this period, pursuant to the constitutional
and statutory provisions of Tennessee, and having the
approval of the Supreme Court of the United States, sepa
rate facilities and separate schools had been maintained
for white and Negro children. Said progress report pointed
out that in view of the many problems inherent in the
matter, many of which were enumerated in the report, it
was not in the interest of the schools to undertake imple
mentation of the decision of the Supreme Court of the
Answer
22a
United States of May 31, 1955 during the school year 1955-
56.
Defendants aver that by approving the second progress
report of its Instruction Committee, the City Board of
Education determined, with member Coyness L. Ennix
voting in the negative, that implementation of the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States on May 31, 1955
would not be attempted during the school year 1955-56,
but that the problem should have extensive study. Defen
dants further aver that such is the specific status of the
matter at this time. The Instruction Committee is working
intensively on the matter and it has been directed by defen
dant City Board of Education to make a further report as
soon as may be practicable following the completion of the
school census in 1956 provided for by Section 2474.1 of the
Supplement to the Code of Tennessee (1950).
Defendants further aver that when Defendant Board of
Education has formulated a plan for implementing said
decision of May 31, 1955, defendants will seek the permis
sion of this Court to file a supplemental answer which sets
forth the then status of the matter and any plan then
formulated. Defendants, therefore, say that all proceed
ings in this case should be stayed until the City Board of
Education has had a reasonable opportunity to receive and
act upon the report of its Committee now studying the
problem and reasonable opportunity to formulate an appro
priate plan.
Laying aside their personal views and preferences, these
defendants intend in their official capacities to comply with,
and to be bound by, the decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States with respect to public education. In so
doing, defendants do not intend to abdicate the adminis
trative responsibilities committed to them by the govern
Answer
23a
mental system inherent in the Constitution of the United
States, and they do not intend to permit any association
for any racial group, majority or minority, to administer
the affairs of the schools submitted as a sacred trust to
these defendants. Defendants do not propose to ask the
Federal Courts to assume the functions and responsibilities
of school administration; and in view of the separation of
powers required by the Constitution and inherent in our
system of government, defendants are confident that the
Courts will not yield to the pressures and insistences that
they do so.
Defendants aver the Supreme Court of the United States
has not decided that the Federal Courts are to take over
or regulate the public schools of the states. It has not
decided that the states must mix persons of different races
in the schools or must require them to attend schools or
must deprive them of the right of choosing the schools
they attend. What it has decided, and all that it has de
cided, is that a state may not deny any person on account
of race the right to attend any school that it maintains.
This, under the decision of the Supreme Court, the state
may not do directly or indirectly, but, if the schools which
it maintains are open to children of all races, no violation
of the Constitution is involved even though the children of
different races voluntarily attend different schools, as they
attend different churches. Nothing in the Constitution or
in the decision of the Supreme Court takes away from the
people freedom to choose the schools they attend. It does
not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of
voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental
power to enforce segregation. The Fourteenth Amendment
is a limitation upon the exercise of power by the state or
state agencies, not a limitation upon the freedom of in
dividuals.
Answer
24a
And now having fully answered, these defendants pray
to be hence dismissed.
Answer
R eber B oult
E d w in F. H u n t
Attorneys for Defendants
H oward, D avis, B o ult & H u n t
Of Counsel
I hereby certify that a copy of this Answer has been
mailed to Z. Alexander Looby, Esq., 327 Charlotte Avenue,
Nashville, Tennessee, one of the counsel for plaintiffs.
E d w in F. H u n t
25a
EX H IBIT A ANNEXED TO ANSWER
N a sh v ille C it y S chools
Average Daily Attendance 1946-55
Year White Negro Total
1945-46 ..... 15,059 6,458 21,517
1946-47 ..... 14,885 6,664 21,549
1947-48 ..... 15,132 6,913 22,045
1948-49 ..... 14,999 6,846 21,845
1949-50 ..... 14,826 6,977 21,803
1950-51 ..... 14,814 6,957 21,771
1951-52 ..... 14,467 7,030 21,497
1952-53 ..... 15,029 7,128 22,157
1953-54 ..... 15,807 7,461 23,268
1954-55 ..... 16,080 8,089 24,169
Capital Expenditures 1946-55
Year White Negro Total
1945-46 ..... .... $ 16,566.00 $ 84,664.86 $ 101,230.86
1946-47 ..... 28,840.00 28,840.00
1947-48 ..... 90,474.31 30,837.88 121,312.19
1948-49 ..... 633,729.45 262,629.04 896,358.49
1949-50 ...... 2,368,343.65 572,058.29 2,940,401.94
1950-51 ..... 517,608.14 98,729.16 616,337.30
1951-52 .... 206,475.72 201,044.43 407,520.15
1952-53 .... 432,517.95 473,518.45 906,036.40
1953-54 .... 1,102,901.82 1,110,775.17 2,213,676.99
1954-55 .... 278,777.70 909,095.38 1,187,873.08
Total ...... ..... $5,647,394.74 $3,772,192.66 $9,419,587.40
26a
July 14,1955
Nashville Board of Education
Nashville, Tennessee
Ladies and Gentlemen:
I . P rogress R epo rt of t h e I n st r u c t io n C o m m it t e e
of t h e B oard of E ducation on t h e Q u e st io n of
D esegregation in t h e P u b lic S chools
The Board of Education has referred to this Committee
for consideration the decree of the United States Supreme
Court with regard to desegregation in our schools.
The Committee has given careful, thoughtful study to
this problem, and we are aware of the necessity of action
that will carry out the purpose of the Board and at the same
time assure such procedures as will contribute to better
understanding and harmonious cooperation of all our
citizens in support of drastic changes that affect the lives
of us all. We are presenting the Board with this progress
report.
1. In order that we might profit by the experiences of
other school systems, we have sent questionnaires to forty
cities in the Southern region. Replies have been received
from approximately half of these, and we are studying the
data received. We believe that completion of this study
will give us valuable help.
2. In order to act intelligently, we must have an accu
rate, up-to-date school census. The problems of utilizing
present buildings which have been built, equipped, and
staffed by the Board of Education and the citizens of Nash
ville must be decided when we know where the children
are, grade placements, etc. The State Board of Education
EX H IB IT B ANNEXED TO ANSWER
27a
requires that this census he taken every four years, hut our
Superintendent has asked permission to take the census
six months in advance to facilitate our program.
3. We propose to hold meetings of all our School prin
cipals for discussion of the problems, to ask their assistance
and advice in formulating our policy. Furthermore, we
believe that interested citizens, including parent-teacher
association groups and other parents in each community
who will be affected by decisions, should be given oppor
tunity to meet and discuss in each school area the pro
cedures that will be most appropriate in complying with
the Board’s policy.
4. In view of the far reaching adjustments involved, we
ask that the committee be given time to work out details, so
that we may proceed with caution and guarantee the con
tinued progress of a peaceful, harmonious cooperation for
better relationships and the advancement of the best inter
ests of all our children.
We ask approval of the Board of this progress report,
and assure you that any changes or further developments
will be brought to you for approval.
Bespectfully submitted,
I n stb u c tio h C o m m ittee
Neil H. Wright, Chairman
Mrs. Tom A. Bland
Henry Kantor
Elmer Lee Pettit
Exhibit B Annexed to Answer
28a
August 11,1955
Nashville Board of Education
Nashville, Tennessee
Ladies and Gentlemen:
P rogress R epo rt of t h e I n st r u c t io n C o m m it t e e
on D esegregation
The Board of Education by official action has referred
to the Instruction Committee of the Board the matter of
studying the question of desegregation in the public schools
and other matters arising since the Supreme Court’s deci
sion on this issue.
Your Committee has gathered information from other
cities and school districts affected by the Supreme Court’s
decision and considered the problem in its many aspects,
keeping in mind at all times that the Board must deal,
justly with all concerned; that its course of action must
be unhurried, yet positive.
For approximately one hundred years successive Boards
of Education in the City of Nashville have operated a
system of public schools for all the children of the City.
This program was interrupted during the period of the
War Between the States but immediately thereafter the
operation of the schools again got under way. During this
period of time it has been the policy of the Nashville Board
of Education to operate a system of public schools for the
city in keeping with the provisions of the Constitution of
the State of Tennessee, of the Statutes of the State of Ten
nessee, and in harmony with the provisions of the Charter
of the City of Nashville, and with the laws of the City. From
the time of the establishment of the Schools in the City of
EX H IBIT C ANNEXED TO ANSWER
29a
Nashville until the present separate facilities and separate
schools were provided for White and Negro children. This
course of action was amply supported by the Constitution
of the State of Tennessee and by the Statutes of the State
of Tennessee. Furthermore, this position was supported
by opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Plessy vs.
Ferguson in 1896.
Now, on May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court of the United
States announced that the court had reached a unanimous
decision holding that the protection clause, the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits the states from maintaining racially
segregated public schools.
On May 31, 1955, the Supreme Court issued its imple
mentation decision. In this decision the court said: “Full
implementation of these constitutional principles may re
quire solution of varied local school problems. School au
thorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating,
assessing, and solving these principles; courts will have to
consider whether the action of the school authorities con
stitutes good faith implementation of the governing con
stitutional principles.”
It is manifestly clear that it would not be in the interest
of the schools to undertake implementation of the court’s
decision during the school year 1955-56. There are too many
unresolved problems for this course of action to be initiated
now. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the Su
preme Court itself directed the various Boards of Education
to examine their individual local situations before making
final decisions. The following problems are suggestive:
1—Determination of school boundaries
This problem requires that a complete census of the city
be taken and that existing school facilities be studied
Exhibit C Annexed to Answer
30a
to determine accessibility and adequacy for a rezoned
school system of the City.
2— Age-grade distribution of pupils
A careful study of the age-grade distribution of pupils
will be required. That is to say, in a sixth grade school
it will be necessary to determine how many children of
a given age-grade category can be adequately taken care
of and what demands will be made on each school.
3— The Selection and assignment of principals and teachers
The selection and assignment of principals and teachers,
under a policy of desegregation, constitutes a significant
problem within itself. The solution of this problem will
require extensive study.
4— Athletic policy
Another problem on which policy will have to be deter
mined is that of operation of an athletic program in
the public high schools and junior high schools after
desegregation.
5— Adaptation of the school curriculum so as to meet the
needs of all the children, particularly in the high schools
This problem will require extensive study.
6— Orientation of principals and teachers with respect to
the issues involved in a change in policy from a segre
gated to a desegregated school system
Manifestly serious errors in judgment and practice on
the part of principals and teachers might ensue without
adequate preparation for such a significant change.
Exhibit C Annexed to Answer
31a
7—Determination of the scope and the timing of action for
the initial step to be taken in desegregating the schools
This matter will require careful study on the part of all
concerned, including teachers, principals and parents.
The question of taking a small segment of the overall
problem and learning by doing how to handle the overall
problem is involved here.
Respectfully submitted,
I n steu c tio 'n C o m m ittee
Neil H. Wright, Chairman
Mrs. Tom A. Bland
Henry Kantor
Elmer Lee Pettit
Exhibit C Annexed to Answer
32a
Filed November 13,1956
Supplemental Answer to Amended Complaint of Mrs. W. 0.
Benson, Mrs. Tom A. Bland, Coyness L. Ennix, A. B.
Gibson, 0. B. Hofstetter, Sr., Maurice Pilsk, Elmer Lee
Pettit, William H. Underhill and Neil H. Wright, Mem
bers of the Board of Education of the City of Nashville,
Davidson County, Tennessee; W. A. Bass, Superinten
dent of Schools of the City of Nashville, Davidson
County, Tennessee, William H. Oliver, Principal of East
Nashville Senior High School, Jack Stanfill, Principal of
Kirkpatrick Elementary School, W. E. Turner, Jr.,
Principal of Pearl Elementary School and Isaiah Suggs,
Principal of Washington Junior High School
These defendants for Supplemental Answer to the
Amended Complaint filed against them in the above styled
cause, say:
In their Answer heretofore filed, defendants stated that
when the Nashville Board of Education formulated a plan
for implementing the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States of May 31, 1955, they would file, with the per
mission of the Court, a Supplemental Answer setting forth
the then status of the matter and any plan then formulated.
Defendants now aver that said Board of Education, on
October 29, 1956, adopted a plan, as set forth in a report
of its Instruction Committee. Copy of said report and plan
are attached to this Answer as an exhibit. In view of the
fact that Exhibits designated A, B and C were attached to
the original Answer, said exhibit attached hereto is desig
nated Exhibit D.
Defendants aver that said plan constitutes good faith
implementation of the governing constitutional principles
Supplemental Answer
33a
and is a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance
with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Defendants, therefore, aver that the injunc
tion sought should not issue.
And now having fully answered, these defendants pray
to be hence dismissed.
R eber B oult
E d w in F . H u n t
Attorneys for Defendants
H oward, D avis, B oult & H u n t
Of Counsel
I hereby certify that copies of this Supplemental Answer
have been delivered to Z. Alexander Looby, Esq., 327
Charlotte Avenue, Nashville, Tennessee, one of the counsel
for plaintiffs.
E d w in F. H u n t
EXHIBIT D
October 29, 1956
Nashville Board of Education
Nashville
Tennessee
Re: Report of Instruction Committee on Abolishing
Compulsory Segregation in the Public Schools
Ladies and Gentlemen:
On June 9, 1955, the Board of Education after being ad
vised of the Opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States of May 31, 1955, referred the subject of “racial dis
Supplemental Answer
34a
crimination in public education” and all matters relating
thereto to the Instruction Committee of the Board of Educa
tion, with the request that said Committee make an inten
sive study of the problem in all of its various aspects and
make subsequent reports on its findings.
Pursuant to the direction of the Board the Committee has
heretofore made two written reports reflecting its findings,
It is unnecessary now to summarize such reports, which are
part of the records of the Board.
In the Committee Report filed with this Board on August
11, 1955, Item 7 dealt with the subject “Determination of the
Scope and the Timing of Action for the Initial Step to be
Taken in Desegregating the Schools”. In connection with
Item 7, the Committee said:
“This matter will require careful study on the part of
all concerned, including teachers, principals and par
ents. The question of taking a small segment of the
overall problem and learning by doing how to handle the
overall problem is involved here”.
Subsequent to the filing of Report No. 2 on August 11,
1955, your Committee has continued to study the problem.
A number of meetings has been held by the Committee. In
vestigation of progress or programs of other cities in the
matter of desegregation has been made. Books and periodi
cals relating to the matter have been examined. The Chair
man of the Committee, the Superintendent and Supervisor
of Secondary Education of the Nashville City Schools
sought and obtained an extended conference with repre
sentatives of two large cities which have executed plans for
desegregation in public schools. Representatives of the
Instruction Committee have attended work shop and other
Supplemental Answer
35a
group meetings to observe or to participate in discussions
of the issues involved in desegregation.
The further studies of the Committee have convinced its
members as to the soundness of the suggestion made in Item
7 of its report on August 11, 1955, that a portion of the
problem should be handled first and, based upon the results
obtained and within the limits of facilities available, fur
ther plans should be made. The segment selected for han
dling should not be so large as to endanger the orderly ad
ministration of public schools in a system that has been
wholly segregated for many years. At the same time such
segment should be sufficiently large to be a significant and
worthwhile first step. After careful consideration, the
Committee has concluded that the initial step should involve
the first grade rather than older students who have here
tofore been in segregated schools. This abolishing of com
pulsory segregation in the first grade will involve an esti
mated 3200 students.
As a consequence of its studies and investigation, and
the exchange of views between its members and other in
vited to meet with the Committee, your Instruction Com
mittee now feels it is ready to submit a report and recom
mendation to the Nashville Board of Education dealing with
the initial step to be taken. Your Committee recommends
the adoption by the Board of Education of the following
resolution:
B e it resolved by the Nashville Board of Education
that the Board approve the report of its Instruction
Committee on abolishing compulsory segregation in the
public schools.
B e it f u r t h e r resolved that the Board of Education
now determine and announce the following plan as the
Supplemental Ansiver
36a
initial step to comply with the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Brown vs.
Board of Education, said step to be taken as of Septem
ber 1, 1957:
Supplemental Answer
P la n
1. Compulsory segregation based upon race is abol
ished in Grade One of the elementary schools of the
City of Nashville for the scholastic year beginning
in September, 1957.
2. A plan of school zoning or districting based upon
location of school buildings and the latest scholastic
census without reference to race will be established
for the administration of the first grade and of
other grades as hereafter desegregated.
3. Every student entering the first grade will be per
mitted to attend the school designated for the zone
in which he or she resides, subject to regulations
that may be necessary in particular instances.
4. Applications for transfer of first grade students
from the school of their zone to another school will
be given careful consideration and will be granted
when made in writing by parents or guardians when
good cause therefor is shown and when transfer is
practicable, consistent with sound school administra
tion.
5. The following will be regarded as some of the valid
conditions to support application for transfer:
(a) When a white student would otherwise be re
quired to attend a school previously serving
colored students only.
37a
(b) When a colored student would otherwise be re
quired to attend a school previously serving
white students only.
(c) When a student would otherwise be required to
attend a school where the majority of students
in that school or in his or her grade are of a
different race.
6. The Instruction Committee is directed to continue
its study of the problem and to recommend by De
cember 31, 1957, the time of and the number of
grades to be included in the next step to be taken
in further abolishing compulsory segregation.
Respectfully submitted,
I n stb u c tio n C o m m it t e e
Supplemental Answer
Neil H. Wright,
Chairman
Mrs. Tom A. Bland
Elmer Lee Pettit
Maurice H. Pilsk
38a
Transcript of Testimony of November 13-14, 1956
* * # * #
E dwabd F. H u n t , Esq.
Counsel for Defendants
-V. -V. «J£. -V-TP W TP W TV*
[13] “This is a class action brought by infant plaintiffs,
by and through their parents or next of friends. The
defendants are prepared to stipulate and now admit
that those plaintiffs are residents of the City of Nash
ville; that they are attending schools in the City of
Nashville; that they sought admission in 1955 to schools
other than those that they were attending; that the
Negro plaintiffs sought admission to schools then
operated for white children only and were denied such
admission; that the white plaintiffs sought admission to
schools operated for Negro children only and were de
nied admission.
“That the plaintiffs in seeking that admission sought
to go to the school most proximate to them in point of
space. They were denied that admission for the reason
that the Board of Education had not then formulated
a plan for abolishing compulsory segregation in the
schools of Nashville. We are prepared to admit and
will stipulate those facts. So there is no occasion to
bring in these twenty-one plaintiffs to prove, or to say
that they have applied for admission. We [14] have in
vestigated and have determined that they are residents
of the City of Nashville, and some one sought admission
to these schools and we think the inference perfectly
clear that these are the ones who did it. For that reason
we admit those facts.”
# # # # #
39a
D r. Y. T. T hayer, the nex t w itness called in behalf of
the p lain tiffs, hav ing been firs t duly sworn, testified as fo l
lows :
Direct Examination by Mr. Looby:
[137] Q. Will you state your name, please, sir? A.
My name is V. T. Thayer.
Q. Dr. Thayer, you are listed in Who’s Who as an educa
tor and editor. Is that your profession? A. That’s cor
rect, educator, and I have been editor of a number of educa
tional magazines.
Q. I ’m sorry, I didn’t understand you. A. I say I am
primarily an educator. I have been editor of one or two
educational magazines.
Q. And you also received your Bachelor of Arts, Master
of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy Degrees from the Uni
versity of [138] Wisconsin. Is that correct? A. That is
correct.
Q. And your Phi Beta Key as an under-graduate? A.
Yes.
Q. You served as Instructor of Philosophy and Psy
chology in the University of Wisconsin from 1919 to 1922.
Is that correct? A. That’s correct.
Q. And you were principal of the Ethical Culture High
School in New York City? A. Yes, I was principal of the
Ethical Culture High School from 1922 to 1924. Then I went
to the Ohio State University as professor of secondary edu
cation, and then returned to the Ethical Culture School in
1928 as Educational Director.
Q. You were also editor of the American Review?' A.
That’s true.
Q. 1923 to ’27, and were associate editor of the Journal
of Educational Research 1929 to 1931? A. That’s correct.
Dr. V. T. Thayer-—for Plaintiffs—Direct
40a
Q. And yon were Educational Director of the Ethical
Culture Schools in New York City from 1928 to 1948? A.
That’s right.
Q. When were you professor at the University of Hawaii?
A. Following my retirement from the Ethical Culture
Schools [139] in 1948, I became visiting professor at the
University of Hawaii in 1949 and ’50.
Q. From 1952 to 1956 what did you do? A. After return
ing from Hawaii I was also visiting professor at Johns Hop
kins University and the University of Maryland for a year.
And in the past four years I have been visiting professor
at the University of Virginia until, of course, this Fall.
Q. You have also written a number of articles for educa
tional journals. Will you tell the Court just a few of those
and on what subjects? A. Well, I ’ve written a number of
books as well as articles. The first book that I wrote was a
book called “The Passing of Recitation”, which had to do
with educational methods. Then I was the joint author
with Professor Alberty, of Ohio State University, “Super
vision in the Secondary School”. Then, between 1931-2 and
1940 I was chairman of the Commission on the secondary
school curriculum, and joint author of the book called “Re
organizing Secondary Education”, in addition, of course, to
supervising the publication of the reports of other com
mittees dealing with the work in science, mathematics,
English, social studies and the like. And then in my own
right, in addition, I have written a book called “Religion
in Public Education”, “American Education Under [140]
Fire”, “Public Education and its Critics”, and the “Attack
upon the American Secular Schools”.
Q. In your work, Doctor, have you had any opportunities
to investigate segregation in the schools? A. For the last
four years, of course, at the University of Virginia, teach
Dr. V. T. Thayer—for Plaintiffs—Direct
41a
ing in a Southern State, I considered that to be one of our
most important problems to study and so as an integral part
of my courses for the past four years, I have made a study
of the problem of segregation, not carrying on research
myself, but rather keeping informed regarding the research
work that is going on, the problems that are involved and
the like, so that I have attempted to study the problem
from the standpoint of its administrative difficulties, the
problems that it raises with reference to teaching in an
organizational school and the like.
Q. I believe prior to that you were Superintendent of Sec
ondary Education? A. Well, years ago I was Superinten
dent of Schools in Ashland, Wisconsin, and also on the staff
of the Superior Public Schools.
Q. From your training and your experience, especially
in the last four years in the University of Virginia, when
you studied and had your classes and work on segregation
in the schools, I show you a copy of the plan submitted by
the Nashville [141] Board of Education in compliance
with the Supreme Court’s decision to desegregate, have you
read that plan? A. I have. Yes.
Q. Will you give your opinion as to the plan? A. Yes, I
will be very happy to. I think you are asking me to give my
opinion, now?
Q. Yes. A. I wasn’t quite sure I heard you properly. I
think the plan runs counter to the whole trend of research
with reference to successful compliance with the Supreme
Court’s decision for a number of reasons. The plan to
abolish compulsory segregation as outlined by the Nashville
Board indicates a rather timid and hesitant attitude toward
the problem which confronts the City, and the experience
with reference to desegregation has been that success turns
quite largely upon the attitude, the initial attitude of the
Dr. V. T. Thayer—for Plaintiffs—Direct
42a
Board of Education. If it takes a forthright and courageous
attitude with reference to compliance with the law and then
seeks the cooperation of community agencies and organiza
tions, success is more likely to follow. But where the Board
takes, as I say, a timid and hesitant attitude and studies
only a segment of the problem, thus encouraging unruly
groups in opposition to develop, the tendency is then for
pressure to be exerted upon the Board to backwater, to side
step, or to modify its plan and [142] the like, so that that’s
my first criticism,—namely, that this does not give evidence
of any forthright intention on the part of the Board to
realize what is inevitable, ultimate compliance with the law.
Then, secondly, a further objection that I have, we also
find from experience that success in eliminating compulsory
segregation depends upon careful preparation for a change
in each of the school communities affected. Now, this co
operation on the part of the school community is best se
cured when the community is dealt with as a whole. I mean
a community of a school, an elementary school community,
or a high school community, because all of the parents are
involved when the school as a whole is taken into considera
tion, the community as a whole is involved, but when you
only take a fraction of the pupils in a school, such as the
Nashville plan proposes to do in the first grade only, then
it’s difficult to enlist the interest and support of the entire
parent body through the Parent-Teachers Association, the
community organizations that might be enlisted to support
the plan to generate a favorable attitude and so on, are only
partially involved. And so the weakness of this plan is that
it does not make possible the Board of Education working
with community groups to bring about wholehearted sup
port of the plan on the part of the community and the
school community as a [143] whole.
Dr. V. T. Thayer—for Plaintiffs—Direct
43a
On the other hand, it does make possible, almost invites
opposition because only a portion of the community is in
volved and it leaves open the question, What are we going
to do next year, and the like? So, in a sense, it invites
people who are opposed to compliance with the law to make
their objections manifest and to create conditions that will
cause the Board to be more hesitant the following year.
It is said that this plan is designed to study the situa
tion and to learn from the situation, but it’s not a normal
situation. I t’s only a partial approach to the problem in
each school, and as I say encouraging conditions of opposi
tion and the like to be taken into consideration later, so that
you do not have an opportunity on the part of the Board
to draw conclusions from what I say is a normal school
situation.
Then, furthermore, within the school itself grades are
going to be contrasted with each other. You have the
younger children involved, but if we assume they go on
grade by grade in subsequent years, you have within one
and the same building children who are in segregated
classes and children who are in non-segregated classes.
They become easy agents for groups outside to create op
position, so bullying tactics and the like may well be en
couraged within the school, and [144] you are not utilizing
the school staff and the student body as a whole to meet
whatever problems arise. The very partial aspect, as I say,
tends to create problems rather than to eliminate them.
Those are my basic objections to it. I might add that
where there are administrative problems involved, as we
know, where the school as a whole is involved it is possible
to start preparation in the Summer or in the Spring and
run through the Summer to bring about the cooperation and
ask for the cooperation of community groups and so on,
Dr. V. T. Thayer—for Plaintiffs—Direct
44a
and by instituting early registrations and the like, a good
many of the administrative problems can be pretty well
solved in advance by the school as a whole, as easily as
handling with one or two grades.
Q. Now, yon haven’t said anything about the interests
of the children involved. You are saying that it creates an
administrative problem by desegregating part of a school
and not the other part? A. One part of the school is
segregated and another part of the school is not segregated,
I say that is to open opposition for unruly groups outside
the school, to initiate, to stimulate, to encourage pupils
to compare each other and introduce bullying tactics and
create problems that would not be present at all if you were
dealing with a school as a whole [145] and attempting to
promote a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding.
# * # # *
0. B. Hofstetter—for Plaintiffs—Direct
Mr. 0. B. H o fstetter , being called as a witness on behalf
of the plaintiffs, having been first duly sworn, testified as
follows:
Direct Examination by Mr. Looby.
# * * * #
[186] Q. I believe you are a member of the Roman
Catholic faith, are you, Mr. Hofstetter? A. I am.
Q. And have been all your life? A. Yes, ever since I was
a year old, or somewhere in that neighborhood.
Q. Do you live in Nashville, Tennessee? A. I ’ve lived
in Nashville since 1910, and in the suburbs and in Nashville
ever since I was born.
Q. Are you a member of the School Board? A. Yes.
45a
Q. And a defendant in this action? A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Hofstetter, have the Roman Catholic Schools in
Nashville desegregated their entire system? A. Yes, they
have, as to the high school and possibly one or two of the
other schools, the Cathedral School, and I don’t know
whether any of the others have any integration or not.
Q. How long has the Roman Catholic Church been de
segregating its school system in Nashville? A. Since the
beginning of the term in 1955, or possibly shortly after the
beginning of the session, I ’m not certain.
Q. And that system has operated successfully since that
time, [187] hasn’t it? A. So far as I know, it has. I
haven’t attended the school, and I haven’t had occasion to
be in the schools to notice how successful it is, but so far
as I know, it has been. I might say this, that about the
time school started the only colored Catholic High School
in the City had been discontinued. It was out here where
the Sears-Roebuck Building is now and the Bishop was con
fronted with the problem of what to do with those high
school students, and I think that was his reason for de
segregating.
Q. And the School at St. Vincent’s on Highland Street,
that has been closed and the children sent to the white
school? A. If there are any white children going there, I
don’t know it. I never heard that they were.
Q. There are no colored children going there, are there?
A. St. Vincent’s?
Q. Yes. A. Yes, it’s filled up with colored children.
Q. The children go to the Cathedral School now, don’t
they? A. Yes, I understand there are some colored chil
dren in the Cathedral School.
0. B. Hofstetter—for Plaintiffs—Direct
46a
Entered January 21, 1957
On May 31, 1955, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board
of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 99 L. Ed. 1083, enunciated the
principles which should govern the district courts in for
mulating decrees to implement its prior ruling in the same
case that racial discrimination in public education is un
constitutional.
Immediately thereafter, the Board of Education of the
City of Nashville began an intensive study to determine
the methods to be followed in the City school system to
effectuate the constitutional principles declared by the Su
preme Court. These studies included investigation of the
programs of other cities in the matter of desegregation, an
analysis and review of pertinent books and periodicals, at
tendance by its representatives at work shops and other
group meetings, and the exchange of views between its
members and others invited to meet with its committee.
From the outset the Board of Education frankly and
openly recognized its obligation to maintain the school
system upon a racially non-discriminatory basis. It has
endeavored by its careful investigation and study of the
question to find a solution which would accomplish the
transition as soon as reasonably practicable consistent with
the public interest and the efficient operation of the schools.
The problem confronting the Board of Education was
not one which was concerned with a single school but with
an entire school system which had been maintained for
practically a hundred years—always on a segregated basis
—and having an aggregate school population of 27,000
students, of whom 10,000 were negro students. In this situa
tion the Board concluded that it would need more time to
formulate a workable plan of integration.
Memorandum Opinion of the Court
47a
In recognition of the reasonableness of this request for
further time, a three-judge court, at the March 1956 term,
granted the Board’s motion for a continuance of the case
to the October 1956 term. In granting the continuance the
Court specifically found that the Board of Education at an
early date had announced that it would comply with the
ruling of the Supreme Court in integrating the public
schools of Nashville, and that it “has proceeded promptly
to take steps toward that end, and is now acting in good
faith and with appropriate dispatch in awaiting the tak
ing of the school census and giving careful consideration
to all factors involved, so as to arrive at a workable plan
of integration, which appears to be a reasonable start
toward full compliance with the May 17, 1954 ruling of the
Supreme Court.”
At the October 1956 term the case was called and set
for trial November 13, 1956. At the hearing which was be
gun on that date, the Board of Education submitted its
plan, adopted on October 29, 1956. The primary question
presently before the Court is whether the plan so adopted
is adequate to meet constitutional requirements.
The pertinent provisions of the plan are as follows:
1. Compulsory segregation based upon race is abolished
in Grade One of the elementary schools of the City of
Nashville for the scholastic year beginning in Septem
ber, 1957.
2. A plan of school zoning or districting based upon loca
tion of school buildings and the latest scholastic census
without reference to race will be established for the
administration of the first grade and of other grades
as hereafter desegregated.
3. Every student entering the first grade will be permit
ted to attend the school designated for the zone in
Memorandum Opinion of the Court
48a
which he or she resides, subject to regulations that
may be necessary in particular instances.
4. Applications for transfer of first grade students from
the school of their zone to another school will be given
careful consideration and will be granted when made
in writing by parents or guardians when good cause
therefor is shown and when transfer is practicable,
consistent with sound school administration.
5. The following will be regarded as some of the valid
conditions to support application for transfer:
(a) When a white student would otherwise be re
quired to attend a school previously serving
colored students only.
(b) When a colored student would otherwise be re
quired to attend a school previously serving white
students only.
(c) When a student would otherwise be required to
attend a school where the majority of students in
that school or in his or her grade are of a different
race.
6. The Instruction Committee is directed to continue
its study of the problem and to recommend by De
cember 31, 1957, the time of and the number of grades
to be included in the next step to be taken in further
abolishing compulsory segregation.
It is the considered opinion of the school authorities, after
mature deliberation, that the change from a system of
segregated schools should be upon a gradual or step-by-step
basis. They have concluded that an abrupt change in all of
the city schools would be inconsistent with the public inter
Memorandum Opinion of the Court
49a
est and with the efficient functioning of the school system
itself. They believe that the soundest approach to the prob
lem is to begin with desegregation in the first grade and to
make plans for the future based upon the experience thus
gained.
Whether the solution proposed by the Board is the best
one which could be devised is a matter of dispute in the
evidence. The views of the school authorities are supported
by the testimony of expert witnesses. Other experts, testi
fying for the plaintiffs, have expressed contrary opinions.
They insist that if a plan of partial desegregation is
adopted, each step should include not less than a normal
functioning unit, i.e., elementary schools, junior high
schools, or high schools. They further insist that any plan
adopted should be a “total plan” in that it should set forth
all steps to be taken to accomplish complete desegregation
together with the time for taking each step in order that all
interested parties will know definitely what to expect for
the future.
In passing upon the adequacy of the plan submitted, this
Court must give effect to the implementing opinion in the
second Brown case, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S.
294, 99 L. Ed. 1083, wherein the Supreme Court stated, inter
alia, as follows:
“Full implementation of these constitutional princi
ples may require solution of varied local school prob
lems. School authorities have the primary respon
sibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these
problems; courts will have to consider whether the
action of school authorities constitutes good faith im
plementation of the governing constitutional principles.
Because of their proximity to local conditions and the
possible need for further hearings, the courts which
originally heard these cases can best perform this
Memorandum Opinion of the Court
50a
jud ic ia l ap p ra isa l. A ccordingly, we believe it ap p ro
p r ia te to rem and the cases to those courts.
“In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally,
equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility
in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting
and reconciling public and private needs. These cases
call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of
equity power. At stake is the personal interest of the
plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as
practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectu
ate this interest may call for elimination of a variety
of obstacles in making the transition to school systems
operated in accordance with the constitutional princi
ples set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of
equity may properly take into account the public inter
est in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic
and effective manner. But it should go without saying
that the vitality of these constitutional principles can
not be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement
with them.
“While giving weight to these public and private con
siderations, the courts will require that the defendants
make a prompt and reasonable start toward full com
pliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a
start has been made, the courts may find that additional
time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective
manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to estab
lish that such time is necessary in the public interest and
is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest
practicable date. To that end, the courts may consider
problems related to administration, arising from the
physical condition of the school plant, the school trans
Memorandum Opinion of the Court
51a
portation system, personnel, revision of school dis
tricts and attendance areas into compact units to
achieve a system of determining admission to the public
schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws
and regulations which may be necessary in solving the
foregoing problems. They will also consider the ade
quacy of any plans the defendants may propose to meet
these problems and to effectuate a transition to a ra
cially nondiscriminatory school system. During this
period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction
of these cases.”
From the foregoing language it is thus clear that the
district courts in fashioning decrees in cases of this nature
are to be guided by equitable principles and that they are
required, therefore, to give due weight to considerations of
public interest. While it is recognized that the plaintiffs
have a personal interest in admission to public schools as
soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis, the dis
trict courts, as courts of equity, may take into account the
necessity for time to eliminate a variety of obstacles in a
systematic and effective manner. Primary responsibility
for assessing the problems involved rests upon the local
school authorities and the function of the courts is strictly
judicial in character, i.e., to determine first, whether the
action of school authorities constitutes good faith imple
mentation of governing constitutional principles, secondly,
whether the school authorities have made a prompt and rea
sonable start toward full compliance, and third, whether the
school authorities have carried the burden to establish that
more time is necessary in the public interest, consistent with
good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date, to
carry out the ruling in an effective manner. It is not the
duty of the Court to devise a plan of desegregation nor to
Memorandum Opinion of the Court
52a
substitute its judgment in matters of school administration
for that of the constituted school authorities.
In the instant case, as already indicated, there is a dif
ference of expert opinion as to whether desegregation of
the first grade throughout the entire system, effective with
the beginning of the September, 1957 school term, con
stitutes a prompt and reasonable start toward full compli
ance with the May 17, 1954 ruling of the Supreme Court.
But viewing the question as a relative one which addresses
itself to the local conditions obtaining in the City of Nash
ville, the Court is of the opinion that the proposed first
step is both prompt and reasonable. It involves 3400
students and 115 teachers of whom 1400 students and 42
teachers are negroes. It will abolish compulsory segregation
for 12 per cent of the City’s aggregate school population,
which is only 2 per cent less than the aggregate school
population of the senior high schools.
The evidence justifies the conclusion that desegregation
will confront the Board with numerous administrative
problems, including increased difficulty in procuring and re
taining teachers, teaching adjustments required because of
differences in achievement levels of students among negro
and white children, problems arising from a liberalized
student transfer system supplanting a strict transfer sys
tem, as well as other problems inherent in accomplishing
a change so profound and far-reaching in its effects. While
it is possible to argue that the first step towards desegrega
tion should include a greater number of grades or at least a
normal functioning unit, the Court is not able to find from
the evidence that the conclusion reached by the Board is an
unreasonable one.
But although the Court is of this view, and although it
finds that the school authorities are acting in good faith
Memorandum Opinion of the Court
53a
and have carried the burden of showing that more time is
necessary to comply with the decision of the Supreme Court,
it cannot find that they have carried the burden of support
ing the indefinite time to accomplish full compliance pro
vided for in paragraph 6 of the plan. Paragraph 6 merely
provides that the Instruction Committee of the Board shall
continue its study of the problem and recommend by De
cember 31, 1957, the time and number of grades to be in
cluded in the next step to be taken in further abolishing
compulsory segregation.
There is no indication from the plan itself or from the
evidence what the Instruction Committee would recommend
to the Board or whether, in fact, it would recommend any
thing more than further delay. Nor is there any indication,
if the Instruction Committee made a recommendation for
a substantial further step, whether the recommendation
would be approved or disapproved by the Board itself. Nor
does the plan require the Board to take action upon any
recommendation by the Committee at any particular time.
Also, according to the proposal, after the Committee once
made a recommendation for another step to be taken, its
function would have been completely exhausted with no
obligation to make recommendations for further steps
toward desegregation. It is manifest, therefore, that para
graph 6 makes the plan submitted partial and incomplete,
and that it is in effect simply a proposal for indefinite post
ponement of further desegregation, directly contrary to the
mandate of the Supreme Court that full compliance with its
ruling shall be accomplished with all deliberate speed.
The provisions of the plan for transfers of students
from the school of their zone to another school were ap
parently adopted upon the basis of the interpretation of
the Supreme Court’s decisions set forth in Briggs v. Elliott,
Memorandum Opinion of the Court
54a
132 F. Supp. 777. In that case a three-judge court, presided
over by Circuit Judge Parker, construed the Brown deci
sions of the Supreme Court as not requiring integration but
as merely forbidding discrimination, and as not forbidding
such segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary action.
If this is a correct interpretation, and the Court believes
that it is, provisions which merely confer upon white and
negro students a nondiscriminatory right to transfer would
not appear to violate the Constitution. If the provisions
should be applied on a discriminatory basis, any aggrieved
party would have an appropriate remedy.
The Court has examined the recent opinion of the Court
of Appeals in Booker v. State of Tennessee Board of Edu
cation, in which a gradual plan for desegregating Memphis
State College was disapproved. But because of material
factual differences the decision in that case is not deemed
to be in conflict with the conclusions herein reached. The
Court found in that case that the plan was discriminatory
in that it postponed the “qualified plaintiffs for five years in
their admission to the freshman class, and expressly con
templates that white students who have registered later
than these plaintiffs shall be admitted earlier”. Further dis
crimination was found in the fact that “plaintiffs may be
compelled to seek education elsewhere in order to avoid dis
crimination and to secure a college education now without
being deferred for several years”. Manifestly the Nashville
plan does not contemplate or involve such discrimination
between the races. It merely postpones complete desegrega
tion to provide time for the solution of varied administrative
problems without impairment or denial of adequate educa
tional opportunities to both races during the period of
transition.
Memorandum Opinion of the Court
55a
Accordingly, the judgment to be entered pursuant to
this memorandum will provide as follows:
(a) That Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the proposed
plan are approved;
(b) That Paragraph 6 of the proposed plan is dis
approved;
(c) That the Board of Education shall submit to the
Court not later than December 31, 1957, a report set
ting forth a complete plan to abolish segregation in all
of the remaining grades of the City school system, in
cluding a time schedule therefor;
(d) That upon the filing of such report the plaintiffs
shall have a period of twenty days thereafter within
which to file objections thereto;
(e) That if objections are not filed to the report with
in said period the report shall be automatically ap
proved ;
(f) That if objections are filed to the report within
said period a hearing shall be held thereon before the
Court upon five days’ written notice by the plaintiffs
to the defendants, with the burden resting upon the de
fendants to establish that the plan is adequate to meet
the constitutional principles declared in the two Brown
opinions;
(g) That the rights of the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated to attend the public schools of the
City of Nashville without discrimination on account of
race are recognized and declared, but that the issuance
of an injunction is withheld pending the filing of the
report provided for in Paragraph (c) above and the
Memorandum Opinion of the Court
56a
action of the Court upon any objections which may be
made thereto; and
(h) That jurisdiction of the action is retained during
the period of transition.
In addition to a form of judgment the parties will also
submit to the Court proposed findings of fact and conclu
sions of law to implement this memorandum.
W m . E. M iller
United States District Judge
Memorandum Opinion of the Court
57a
Findings and Conclusions
Entered February 20, 1957
F in d in g s op F act
1. Plaintiffs, except as specified in Paragraph 3 hereof,
are Negroes who are citizens of the United States and are
residents of and domiciled in the City of Nashville, Ten
nessee.
2. Adult plaintiffs are either parents or guardians of
infant plaintiffs; and all infant plaintiffs (except Willie
Dean Coleman who graduated from high school in June
1956) are presently attending public schools operated by the
City of Nashville.
3. Plaintiffs Robert W. Rempfer and Mrs. Gertrude
Fleming Rempfer, are white persons and are the parents of
Jean Rempfer and Richard F. Rempfer, who are infants
presently attending public schools operated by the City of
Nashville.
4. Defendants include the members of the Board of Edu
cation of the City of Nashville and the Superintendent of
Schools of the City of Nashville, said defendants being the
administrative officers having general supervision and con
trol of the public schools of Nashville.
5. Defendants, other than those specified in Paragraph 4,
are principals of particular public schools of Nashville.
6. At the beginning of the school year 1955-56, in late
August or early September 1955, infant plaintiffs sought
admission to particular public schools maintained and
operated by the City of Nashville.
58a
7. Infant plaintiffs satisfied academic requirements for
admission to the public schools in which they sought to en
roll and said schools were most proximate in distance to the
residences of the respective plaintiffs seeking admission
thereto.
8. The schools to which infant plaintiffs who are Negroes
sought admission were schools which were then and are still
operated on a segregated basis for white students; and the
schools to which infant plaintiffs who are white children
sought admission were schools which were then operated on
a segregated basis for Negro students.
9. Infant plaintiffs were refused admission to the schools
of their choice; and they were required, if they chose to
attend public schools, which they did choose to do, to attend
different public schools which were operated on a segregated
basis for students of their own race.
10. The school system of Nashville has been developed,
built and operated for almost one hundred years in com
pliance with the principle of segregation, expressly written
into the Constitution of Tennessee in 1870, and subsequently
embodied in statutory provisions.
11. The school system of Nashville consists of forty-six
schools, with a total enrollment of 27,595 students, of whom
10,322 are Negro students and 17,273 are white students.
12. The Nashville school system employs a total of 1,057
principals and teachers, of whom 702 are white persons and
355 are Negroes.
13. The enrollment in the first grade of the Nashville
school system is approximately 3,400 students, of whom ap
Findings and Conclusions
59a
proximately 2,000 are white students and 1,400 Negro
students.
14. Teachers employed for the first grade of the Nash
ville school system number 115, of whom 73 are white per
sons and 42 Negroes.
15. The enrollment in the first grade of the Nashville
school system is twelve percent of the aggregate school
population and is only two percent less than the aggregate
school population of the senior high schools—grades ten to
twelve, inclusive.
16. In so far as physical facilities are concerned, the
public schools of Nashville operated for Negro students are
substantially equal to the public schools of Nashville
operated for white students.
17. In the public schools of Nashville there is no differ
ence in the salary schedule of Negro teachers and white
teachers.
18. During the past decade, capital expenditures for
Negro schools in Nashville have been a greater proportion
of total capital expenditures than average daily attendance
of Negro students has been of total average daily attend
ance.
19. Immediately after the decision of the Supreme Court
in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, on May
31, 1955, the Board of Education of the City of Nashville
began an intensive study to determine the methods to be
followed in the City school system to effectuate the con
stitutional principles declared by the Supreme Court.
Findings and Conclusions
60a
20. Such study by the Board included investigation of
the program of other cities in the matter of desegregation,
an analysis and review of pertinent books and periodicals,
attendance by its representatives at work shops and other
group meetings, and the exchange of views between its
members and others invited to meet with its committee.
21. From the outset the Board of Education frankly and
openly recognized its obligation to maintain the school
system of Nashville upon a racially non-discriminatory
basis.
22. Said Board of Education has endeavored by its care
ful investigation and study of the question to find a solution
which would accomplish the transition of an entire school
system as soon as reasonably practicable consistent with the
public interest and the efficient operation of the schools.
23. The public schools of Nashville are operated on the
basis of an entire school year as the unit of operations, as
distinguished from the semester or term basis.
24. Desegregation will confront the Board of Education
of Nashville with numerous administrative problems, in
cluding increased difficulty in procuring and retaining
teachers, teaching adjustments required because of differ
ences in achievement levels of students among Negro and
white children, problems arising from a liberalized student
transfer system supplanting a strict transfer system, as
well as other problems inherent in accomplishing a change
so profound and far-reaching in its effects.
25. The school authorities are acting in good faith and
have carried the burden of showing that more time is neces-
Findings and Conclusions
61a
sary to comply with the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Brown case.
26. It is the considered opinion of the school authorities,
after mature deliberation, that the change from a system of
segregated schools should be upon a gradual or step-by-step
basis; that an abrupt change in all the city schools would
be inconsistent with the public interest and with the efficient
functioning of the school system itself; and that the soundest
approach to the problem is to begin with desegregation in
the first grade and to make plans for the future based upon
the experience thus gained.
27. At the hearing, the Board of Education submitted its
plan, adopted on October 29, 1956, which is as follows:
1. Compulsory segregation based upon race is abolished
in Grade One of the elementary schools of the City of
Nashville for the scholastic year beginning in Septem
ber, 1957.
2. A plan of school zoning or districting based upon loca
tion of school buildings and the latest scholastic cen
sus without reference to race will be established for
the administration of the first grade and of other
grades as hereafter desegregated.
3. Every student entering the first grade will be per
mitted to attend the school designated for the zone in
which he or she resides, subject to regulations that
may be necessary in particular instances.
4. Applications for transfer of first grade students from
the school of their zone to another school will be given
careful consideration and will be granted when made
in writing by parents or guardians or those acting in
Findings and Conclusions
62a
the position of parents, when good cause therefor is
shown and when transfer is practicable, consistent
with sound school administration.
5. The following will be regarded as some of the valid
conditions to support application for transfer:
(a) When a white student would otherwise be re
quired to attend a school previously serving
colored students only.
(b) When a colored student would otherwise be re
quired to attend a school previously serving
white students only.
(c) When a student would otherwise be required to
attend a school where the majority of students in
that school or in his or her grade are of a differ
ent race.
6. The Instruction Committee is directed to continue its
study of the problem and to recommend by Decem
ber 31, 1957, the time of and the number of grades
to be included in the next step to be taken in fur
ther abolishing compulsory segregation.
28. Whether the plan proposed by the Board is the best
one which could be devised is a matter of dispute in the
testimony; the views of the school authorities being sup
ported by the testimony of expert witnesses and the op
posing views on behalf of plaintiffs being supported by
other experts.
Findings and Conclusions
Conclusions of L aw
1. The Court has jurisdiction of the parties and the sub
ject matter of this action. Title 28 U.S.C.A., Sections
2201 and 1343.
63a
2. This suit arises under the Constitution and laws of
the United States and seeks redress for the deprivation of
civil rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Title 42 U.S.C.A., Sections 1983 and 1985.
3. This action is properly brought as a class action under
Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Title
28 U.S.C.A.
4. In passing upon the adequacy of the plan submitted
by the Nashville Board of Education for abolishing segre
gation in its public schools, the Court must give effect to
the implementing opinion in the second Brown case, Brown
v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 99 L. Ed. 1083, and
is to be guided by equitable principles.
5. Primary responsibility for assessing the problems
involved rests upon the local school authorities and the func
tion of the courts is strictly judicial in character, i.e., to
determine first, whether the action of school authorities
constitutes good faith implementation of governing con
stitutional principles, secondly, whether the school authori
ties have made a prompt and reasonable start toward full
compliance, and third, whether the school authorities have
carried the burden to establish that more time is neces
sary in the public interest, consistent with good faith com
pliance at the earliest practicable date, to carry out the rul
ing in an effective manner.
6. It is not the duty of the Court to devise a plan of
desegregation nor to substitute its judgment in matters of
school administration for that of the constituted school au
thorities.
Findings and Conclusions
Findings and Conclusions
1. The provisions of the plan proposed by the Nashville
Board of Education, except Paragraph 6 thereof, constitute
a prompt and reasonable first step and are not violative of
any constitutional provisions.
8. Paragraph 6 of the proposed plan is contrary to the
mandate of the Supreme Court in the Brown case that com
pulsory segregation shall be abolished with all deliberate
speed.
Judge
65a
Judgment
(Entered February 20,1957)
This cause came on to be heard on November 13 and 14,
1956 upon the entire record, upon oral testimony without
the intervention of a jury, and upon briefs and argument
of counsel, pursuant to which the Court, on January 21,
1957, filed its Memorandum and has this day filed Findings
of Facts and Conclusions of Law, all of which are herein
incorporated by reference.
It is, therefore, Obdebed, A djudged and D ecreed as fol
lows:
1. That Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the proposed
plan are approved;
2. That Paragraph 6 of the proposed plan is disap
proved ;
3. That the Board of Education shall submit to the
Court not later than December 31, 1957, a report setting
forth a complete plan to abolish segregation in all of the
remaining grades of the City school system, including a
time schedule therefor;
4. That upon the filing of such report the plaintiffs shall
have a period of twenty days thereafter within which to
file objections thereto;
5. That if objections are not filed to the report within
said period the report shall be automatically approved;
6. That if objections are filed to the report within said
period a hearing shall be held thereon before the Court
upon five days’ written notice by the plaintiffs to the defen-
66a
Judgment
dants, with the burden resting upon the defendants to estab
lish that the plan is adequate to meet the constitutional
principles declared in the two Brown opinions;
7. That the rights of the plaintiffs and others similarly
situated to attend the public schools of the City of Nash
ville without discrimination on account of race are recog
nized and declared, but that the issuance of an injunction
is withheld pending the filing of the report provided for
in Paragraph 3 above and the action of the Court upon any
objections which may be made thereto; and
8. That jurisdiction of the action is retained during the
period of transition.
W il l ia m E . M iller
Judge
Approved as to Form:
Z. A lexander L ooby
A von N. W il l ia m s , J b .
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
B eber B oult
E d w in P . H u n t
Attorneys for Defendants
February 20, 1957.
67a
M il l e r , District Judge.
As the Court intimated a moment ago, it feels strongly
that the question which has been presented here should be
passed upon with all possible dispatch since the school year
is about to begin and since the school board is under an
order from this Court to carry out a plan of integration in
compliance with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States. The timing of the plan is an essential part
of it.
The question presented by the motion to file the supple
mental answer and counterclaim is not new to the Court,
as it has been considered by the Court since the motion
was filed a week ago. Knowing that this hearing was to
arise, the Court asked for the file in the case, and read the
proposed supplemental answer and counterclaim, and im
mediately began an investigation of the legal questions
involved, taking that course because of the public interest
in the matter and because of the importance of the time
element. I feel that I am as ready to pass upon the ques
tions presented today as I will ever be.
I have been greatly assisted by the able arguments which
have been made here on behalf of the various parties, the
movants who seek to file this supplemental answer, the
attorneys for the original plaintiffs, the attorneys for the
School Preference Committee, and the attorneys for the
State of Tennessee. The arguments have been sincerely
and capably made and presented, and have brought to the
attention of the Court the issues in a forcible and thorough
manner.
The pleading in this case, as already stated, is a motion
by which the School Board of Nashville, being the defen
The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench,
September 6, 1957
68a
dants in the action, asks the permission of the Court to
file a supplemental answer and counterclaim which, in turn,
would ask the Court to declare the rights of the school
board under a certain act of the 1957 Legislature of Ten
nessee, being Chapter 11 of the Public Acts of 1957, known
as the School Preference Law.
The supplemental answer and counterclaim would call
upon the Court to determine in effect and substance (a) the
validity of the statute, (b) whether or not it is in conflict
with the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, (c) whether or not it is in conflict with the orders
of the Court heretofore entered in this cause, and (d) just
what rights and privileges the school board possesses under
the statute. In other words, the pleading is in the nature of
a request for a declaratory judgment, declaring the rights
of the parties, as indeed is the nature of the entire suit
itself, the original complaint having been filed in this action
as a declaratory judgment action.
A brief word ought to be said, it seems to me, about the
history of this litigation. The action wTas filed, as already
pointed out, by certain parents of colored children and
later by parents of certain white children of the City of
Nashville, to have their rights declared under the decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States enunciating the
doctrine that racial segregation in public education is
unconstitutional and disapproving the “separate but equal”
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson which was decided, I believe,
in 1896 or thereabouts.
The school board filed an answer to the complaint in
which it in effect, if not in so many words, conceded the
unconstitutionality of the segregation laws of the State of
Tennessee.
The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench,
September 6, 1957
69a
The matter first came before a three-judge court, con
vened in view of the nature of the relief sought by the
original complaint. At that time the defendants made a
motion for a continuance of the case on the ground that
they had not had sufficient time to formulate a plan to carry
out the decisions of the Supreme Court. That application
for a continuance was extensively argued before the three-
judge court and resulted in an order being entered to the
effect that the school board had taken prompt steps in an
effort to formulate a plan, that it needed more time to
complete the formulation of the plan, and granting a con
tinuance of the case as requested by the school board.
Thereafter, the three-judge court was dissolved, since it
appeared that no constitutional question was involved in
the case in view of the concession made by the school board
that the segregation laws of Tennessee must necessarily
yield to the principles declared by the Supreme Court,
that is, to the paramount authority of federal law.
The case was called on the docket when the court regu
larly convened at the October 1956 term, and at that time
a motion was made by the school board to further postpone
the case until after the meeting of the 1957 legislature of
Tennessee on the assumption that the legislature would
presumably pass some kind of legislation which might enter
into the matter and have a bearing upon the kind of plan
which the school board would submit to the Court.
That application was denied by the Court, and the case
was set for hearing in November of 1956. It was heard at
the time set. Testimony was taken from witnesses on both
sides of the controversy, extensive arguments were made,
and elaborate briefs were filed by both parties, the Court
taking the case under advisement and holding it for some
The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench,
September 6, 1957
70a
several weeks in order to give the issues mature and de
liberate consideration.
The crucial question at that time was whether or not a
gradual plan of integration would meet the constitutional
tests laid down by the Supreme Court, more specifically
whether or not a gradual plan of integration would be con
stitutional which contemplated as a first step desegregation
only in the first grade, and thereafter desegregation of the
remaining grades as might in the future be recommended
by the instruction committee of the school board.
After giving the case what the Court believed was its
very best effort, it was able to conclude that the plan was
valid insofar as it proceeded on the basic principle that
gradual desegregation was permissible and insofar as it
contemplated desegregating the first grade in 1957. The
Court believed that that was a substantial step, that the
issue must be looked upon as presenting a local problem
peculiar to the City of Nashville, about which the school
board would have more knowledge than any other agency,
certainly more knowledge than the Court itself could pos
sibly have. Viewed in that light, the Court felt that the de
cision of the school board to desegregate the first grade as
the first step should be respected and that the plan to
that extent should be approved. However, the Court was
unable to see that the plan was valid or constitutional
insofar as it deferred all action with respect to remaining
grades and only provided for further study to be made by
the instruction committee with no particular obligation to
submit any particular plan at any particular time; and
consequently, that portion of the plan was disapproved,
and the school board was requested to submit by December
31,1957, a plan which would abolish compulsory segregation
The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench,
September 6, 1957
71a
in. the remaining grades of the school system together with
a time schedule therefor.
The result so reached by the Court was strenuously re
sisted by the plaintiffs in the case, the plaintiffs taking the
position that the plan presented was no plan at all, that
it wTas not substantial, that it was not a prompt and reason
able start as required by the Supreme Court, and that
since the school board had had ample time to study the
matter and had not presented a substantial plan, the entire
plan should be disapproved and all of the schools of Nash
ville required to desegregate simultaneously and immedi
ately. That was the position of the plaintiffs in the case,
but (as stated) the Court believed that the school board of
Nashville from the very outset had acted in the utmost good
faith to meet a very serious problem and to solve a problem
having obviously many complications.
Now, after the Court so decided, the legislature of Ten
nessee in 1957 passed the law which is before us here today,
the pertinent part of which reads as follows, omitting the
caption of the act:
“Section 1. Be it Enacted by the General Assembly
of the State of Tennessee, That boards of education of
counties, cities and special school districts in this state
are authorized to provide separate schools for white
and negro children whose parents, legal custodians or
guardians voluntarily elect that such children attend
school with members of their own race.”
That act was passed in January of 1957, and the mo
tion in this case to be permitted to file the supplemental
answer and counterclaim to have rights declared under the
act, was not filed until just recently, many months after
the passage of the act.
The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench,
September 6, 1957
72a
In the meantime, however, the school board was met with
a petition signed by thousands of citizens and parents of
Nashville, requesting that the school board invoke the pro
visions of the School Preference Act of Tennessee, or at
least take steps to have the act brought to the attention of
the Court in order that it could be passed upon, and the
rights of the school board declared.
It is in response to that petition, as I understand it, that
this motion is filed by the school board to ask for instruc
tions from the Court.
At the outset, I want to make it clear that I think that
the School Preference Committee has acted in a perfectly
normal and legal manner and in the true American way to
bring the question to the Court’s attention. It has not
sought to resort to any kind of violence or to defy the au
thority of the law but rather to petition, as it has a legal
right to do, under our constitution, the school board, and
to make its wishes known; and the Court feels that the
School Preference Committee is to be commended for the
manner in which it has handled the cause which it repre
sents. Also, the Court does not feel that it would be possible
to say that the school board was negligent or did not act
with due diligence or that the school board did not act in
good faith in not bringing this matter to the attention of
the Court, sooner that it did, because I am confident that
the members of the school board felt and probably their
attorneys felt that the matter had already been passed
upon by the Court, its judgment had been entered, and that
the School Preference Law could not enter into the picture
at all, but that the order of the Court would have to be car
ried out; and therefore no action was taken until the peti
tion was filed by the interested citizens. So I do not find in
The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench,
September 6, 1957
73a
the case that the school board has acted in bad faith. On the
contrary, I think it has acted in good faith from the very
outset.
I fully appreciate the fact that the school board is met
with a very serious problem, one that has many complica
tions, and no doubt involving many pressures; and the
Court is gratified to see the firm way that it has gone about
the discharge of its duties under the difficult circumstances
which sometimes have prevailed. But the school board,
just like this Court, is met with the duty to comply with the
law of the land.
As already stated, the motion necessarily presents to
the Court the question of whether or not this act of the
Tennessee Legislature, Chapter 11 of the Acts of 1957, is a
constitutional enactment. If it is on its face in conflict with
the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in the two
Brown opinions, necessarily it must give way because of
the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution.
Various arguments have been presented here to the Court
in an effort to sustain the validity of the act. It is argued
by the school board and their attorneys, first, that the act
should be sustained because it involves a principle of
voluntary action which was in effect approved by a three-
judge court in the case of Briggs v. Elliott, cited by this
Court in its prior memorandum. It is further argued that
the act is one which simply allows the parents of both races
a choice or an alternative to send their children to schools
of their own race or to schools of a mixed race, and that
it does not involve enforced or compulsory segregation.
Furthermore, it is argued that the act applies only to
school systems and not to individual schools, presumably
that argument meaning that it would be possible under the
The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench,
September 6, 1957
74a
act to set up one or more segregated schools so long as the
entire system itself did not discriminate on account of race.
Another argument is that the principles declared by the
Supreme Court of the United States apply only to units of
government and not to individual citizens, and that the act
of the Tennessee Legislature now under consideration
confers upon the citizens themselves the right of preference
or choice.
The arguments of the School Preference Committee are
somewhat the same but with particular stress upon the right
of freedom of choice, the right to be free from compulsion
or restraint, it being argued generally that such freedom
is a fundamental part of our law or a fundamental concept
in our system of government, that this act seeks to give
effect to that principle and, therefore, should be sustained.
The State of Tennessee makes the argument that the con
stitutionality of the statute is not presented to the Court
at this time and will not arise until the school board actu
ally presents a plan which would set forth in what way the
school board intends to use the School Preference Law;
in other words, that the constitutionality of the act at this
time is premature and should not be passed upon or deter
mined by the Court until such time as the school board does
present a plan which contemplates the use of the School
Preference Law in some way or another. Furthermore,
the State says that in any event this Court should not
declare the act unconstitutional but, on the contrary, is
required to convene a three-judge court before the act
could be so declared.
After careful consideration of the arguments, all of which
(I might say) the Court itself anticipated before they were
presented here today, the Court is of the opinion that the
The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench,
September 6, 1957
75a
Tennessee Public Act of 1957, Chapter 11, is on its face
antagonistic to the principles declared by the Supreme
Court in the two Brown cases and is, therefore, unconstitu
tional.
Referring to the two Brown cases and reading from the
headnotes, we find in the first Brown case the following:
“Segregation of white and Negro children in the
public schools of a state solely on the basis of race,
pursuant to state laws permitting or requiring such
segregation, denies to Negro children the equal pro
tection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment—even though the physical facilities and
other ‘tangible’ factors of white and Negro schools may
be equal.”
In the second Brown opinion, the following appears in
the headnote:
“Racial discrimination in public education is uncon
stitutional,” citing the first Brown case, “and all pro
visions of federal, state, or local law requiring or per
mitting such discrimination must yield to this prin
ciple.”
Taking the Act of 1957, Chapter 11, and laying it along
side those declarations by the Supreme Court of the United
States, it is manifest that the state statute is unconstitu
tional, for it says in so many words that boards of educa
tion of counties, cities, and school districts in this state are
authorized (which is another way of saying are per
mitted”) to provide separate schools for white and Negro
children whose parents, legal custodians, or guardians
voluntarily elect that such children attend schools with
The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench,
September 6, 1957
76a
members of their own race. In other words, the act would
directly authorize the school board of the City of Nashville
to take a census and then to set up separate white schools
and separate schools for colored children, whose parents so
elected.
After those schools were so set up, they would not only
be separate schools, but they would be separated because
of race and for no other reason. In addition, the separation,
once made, would be compulsory. In other words, no col
ored student thereafter would have a right to attend a
school so designated as a white school regardless of the
inconvenience involved or any other factor. The colored
student would be denied the right to attend that school for
white children solely because of his race, and the same
thing, of course, would apply the other way. So the Court
sees no alternative but to say that the act does not comply
with the constitutional test that discrimination in public
education because of race is abolished.
The arguments made to the contrary, to the effect that
the act contemplates voluntary action cannot prevail. The
transfer system which the Court approved in its memo
randum opinion heretofore rendered, giving the colored
students and the white students an equal right to transfer
from one school to another, was a limited right, and the
Court felt that it wras reasonable under the circumstances
and could be sustained. There was no compulsion connected
with it, but the present act is a compulsory act in that it
authorizes separate schools for the races from which mem
bers of the other race are excluded by law.
To the argument that it applies only to school systems
and not to individual schools there are two answers. In
the first place, I see no basis for saying that the doctrine
declared by the Supreme Court applies only to school sys-
The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench,
September 6, 1957
77a
terns and not to individual schools. I think, on the con
trary, that the Supreme Court principle applies to all
schools, in other words, that discrimination in public edu
cation on account of race is prohibited.
In the second place, the argument is not sound because
the act of the Tennessee Legislature applies to school
systems as a whole. It does not say anything about in
dividual schools. It applies to the entire system and gives
the school board a right to take a census or a vote and
determine the preference of all parents in the entire system,
and then to set up segregated schools and thereafter to
maintain them in that way.
The argument that the act applies to individual citizens
and not to units of government is clearly unsound for the
act specifically confers upon state agencies the authority to
set up and maintain schools on a segregated basis. The
school authorities are to determine the wishes of indi
viduals only to the extent necessary to decide whether there
shall be separate schools and, if so, how many, etc.
The further argument that the act is merely one which
involves the principle of voluntary choice is, of course, an
oversimplification of the act and of the problem presented.
It does have a voluntary element in it in that it permits
or contemplates as a preliminary step that the preferences
of the parents will be ascertained. But after preferences
are once ascertained and the schools established, then this
act says, in effect and in substance, that those schools shall
be compulsorily maintained thereafter as separate and
segregated schools. That is the way the Court construes the
act.
Of course, it is carrying the argument too far to say that
no restraint can be placed upon citizens in connection with
education and other matters. We all know that compulsion
The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench,
September 6, 1957
78a
is an essential part of government. There are many laws
that we do not like that we have to comply with. There
are many people who do not like the ruling of the Supreme
Court, but nevertheless it is the law of the land, and the
duty of this Court to apply that law is clear and unrnis-
takeable.
The argument that a three-judge court should be con
vened: As I see it, the requirement of a three-judge court
does not apply to this case for two reasons: First, this act
is patently and manifestly unconstitutional on its face. It
so clearly conflicts with the Supreme Court decisions that
it does not present a substantial federal question, and this
Court therefore under the decisions has the right as a
single court or judge to refuse to enforce rights under it
without convening a three-judge court. Secondly, the stat
ute requiring a three-judge court does not apply to a situa
tion of this kind where the board of education in a case
which has already been tried by a single judge is applying
to that judge for instructions in carrying out its duties and
as to what it shall do to comply with an order which the
Court has already entered. In other words, what this Court
is doing is merely enforcing its own order which it has
already decided as a single judge and (by admission of the
defendants) rightly decided as a single judge and not as
a three-judge court. The application to this Court is not
for an injunction to enjoin state action but a request for
the Court to modify its order already entered. So, for that
further reason, I do not believe that the requirement of a
three-judge court applies in this instance.
As a practical matter, if a three-judge court should be
convened in this case, it would be possible for the Court
to refuse to vacate its order as to the first grade and to
The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench,
September 6, 1957
79a
allow integration in tire first grade to proceed, and we will,
therefore, assume that it would cause no delay mso ar as
the first grade is concerned to convene a three-judge cour_
But it must he remembered that the prior order of this
Court also required the hoard of education o su mi
plan hy December 31, 1957, for abolishing compulsory seg
regation in all of the remaining grades of the system. _
Clearly, the board of education, if this state statute i
not passed upon and a three-judge court 18 ^
not be expected to take any steps to formulate a plan for
the other grades until the three-judge «onr does meet a d
does decide the case. All lawyers know the difficulty
convening a three-judge court, that is, the time which is
required in doing so, having the court appointed and[ get
ting it together. As a practical matter, if this Court shou
undertake to convene a three-judge court, it would probably
be long after December 31, 1957, before the court could
act which would mean that the order of the Court here
tofore entered, requiring the submission of a further plan
would have to be vacated. Even if the Court could convene
a three-judge court within a month from now or six weeks
f c l BOW, there would be that much time wasted m the
formulation of this further plan by the school board, tim
which it needs to study this serious problem.
The position of the State’s attorneys, as friends of the
Court that the constitutional question is premature has
been considered, but as I view the case a decision on the
validity of the state law is directly presented and should be
decided without delay. To overrule the motion for pie-
maturity would leave the school board at sea to decide t
“ estion for itself and would probably result m the submis
sion of a plan geared to the School Preference Law. This m
The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench,
September 6, 1957
80a
turn would require its disapproval by the Court and hence
further unnecessary delay in accomplishing desegregation
in Nashville and compliance with the Supreme Court’s
ruling.
Therefore, the Court directs that an order be entered in
this case, denying the motion to be permitted to file the
supplemental answer and counterclaim.
The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench,
September 6, 1957
81a
Order
(Entered September 23,1957)
This cause came on to be heard on September 6, 1957
before the Honorable William E. Miller, Judge, upon mo
tion by defendants for leave to file Supplemental Answer
and Counter-Claim and to set the same for hearing, and
upon arguments in open Court by attorneys for defendants
(movants), attorney for plaintiffs, attorneys for the State
of Tennessee appearing as amicus curiae in support of the
constitutionality of Chapter 11 of the Public Acts of Ten
nessee for 1957, and attorneys for the Parents Preference
Committee as amicus curiae, the Court is of the opinion
for reasons set forth in oral opinion which has been tran
scribed as “Statement from the Bench” and which is hereby
ordered filed and made a part of the record, that said
motion is not well taken.
It is accordingly Ordered, A djudged and D ecreed that
the motion for leave to file Supplemental Answer and
Counter-Claim be and the same is hereby denied.
To the action of the Court defendants escepted on their
own behalf, and, at the request of the Attorney General
of the State of Tennessee, also on behalf of said State
appearing as amicus curiae, and by request on behalf of the
Parents Preference Committee appearing as amicus curiae.
Enter :
(s ) W m . E. M iller
United States District Judge
Attest: A True Copy
J o h n 0. A nderson , Clerk
U. S. District Court
Middle District of Tennessee
By P ra n k W illia m s D.C.
(Seal)
82a
Transcript of Testimony of January 28, 1958
w *vr w *Jv "Tr
W illia m H . Oliv er , Superintendent of Schools, called
as a witness in behalf of defendants, first duly sworn,
testified as follows:
Direct Examination by Mr. Hunt:
̂ ^ ̂ ^
[5] Q. That plan contemplated a liberal transfer policy,
did it not! A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who administered that transfer policy under the
supervision of the Board! A. I administered the transfer
problem. The—The [6] superintendent assigned to me
that duty, to administer the transfers.
Q. How many pupils, either exactly or approximately,
enrolled in the first grade in September 1957! A. All to
gether!
Q. The total number, yes. A. 3367, I believe was the
number on roll as of October 4th. And that is approxi
mately correct.
Q. Of those 3367, how many or approximately how many
were Negroes and how many were white students! A.
There were 1400 first-grade students, approximately 1400.
Q. 1400 that were what! I mean what race! A. Negro
students.
Q. And the balance then would be white students! A.
That is correct.
Q. Mr. Oliver, in formulating your zoning plans, how
many white students or white pupils eligible for the first
grade were there in a zone where the elementary school
was a school that had previously been segregated as an
all-white school! A. About 55.
Q. And those 55 were eligible to attend the school in
83a
their zone or they were eligible to seek transfers? [7] A.
(Interrupting) That is correct.
Q. Were they not? A. That is correct. They had a
choice.
Q. How many of those 55 did seek transfers? A. All 55
of them.
Q. Were those transfers granted or denied? A. They
were all granted.
Q. They were all granted? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Then, how many Negro pupils were there who lived
in zones and were eligible to attend a previously segregated
white school? A. Well, so far as I could say, 115. We
had estimated that there would be about 127 on the basis
of census figures, but when they enrolled in school, there
were only 115 who enrolled, and I—I assumed that was
the number. About 115, I ’d say.
Q. Approximately 115. Of the 115 Negroes who were
eligible to attend a previously segregated white school, how
many of those sought transfers back to other schools? A.
One hundred and five, I believe.
Q. One hundred and five? A. Yes sir.
Q. Were those transfers granted or denied? [8] A. They
were all granted.
Q. They were all granted? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did any of the 105 who transferred seek to be re
transferred back to the school of their zone? A. Yes, sir.
Three or four of them did. Yes, sir.
Q. Were those transfers requested by parents or by
other persons or by them jointly? Tell something of those
re-transfer requests. A. Well, as I recall, I didn’t have a
written request from any parent, but some of the parents
came to see me with their children and some other adults
who were more or less counseling the parents. One parent
called me by telephone. I don’t believe he came to see
William H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct
84a
me. But the requests for re-transfer were made, I would
say, by the parents in consultation with some of their
friends or counselors.
Q. Were the requests for re-transfer granted or were
they denied? A. They were denied.
Q. In summary, you granted all original transfer re
quests and denied re-transfer requests. Is that a correct
statement? A. That is correct. Yes, sir.
* # # # #
Cross Examination by Mr. Looby:
[16] Q. Mr. Oliver, I think I understood you to have
said that there were some students on the first-grade level
that have asked to be transferred or re-transferred to
integrated schools and were refused? A. I said that some
of the students who had requested and been given transfers
to (we will say the Negro schools) the schools in which
the other students were Negroes asked for re-transfer, and
those requests for re-transfer were denied. That is what I
said.
Q. The requests for transfer were to the so-called inte
grated schools? A. That is correct.
[17] Q. And they were refused by you? A. That is
correct.
Q. Why? A. Well, because I didn’t think they had suffi
cient reasons for asking for the transfers. Furthermore,
I felt in some cases they were—they really didn’t want the
transfers, that they were influenced by somebody else.
I talked with the parents. I talked with their advocates,
shall we say? I talked with one or two of the children
The children didn’t want to be transferred. The parents
were a little uncertain, some of them, and—I—I just didn’t
think they had sufficient reasons.
William H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross
85a
Q. But they were living sufficiently close to the requested
school so as to justify a transfer on grounds of nearness.
Isn’t that true! A. I presume that they were. However,
they hadn’t moved. They—They hadn’t gotten any closer
to the school they wanted to get into. They were still living
at the same place.
Q. But they were living closer to the school to which
they asked for a transfer than they were to the school in
which they were! A. Well, I wouldn’t say they were liv
ing closer to it, hut they were living in that zone.
[18] Q. I see. A. And, generally speaking, I would
assume they did live closer to it.
Q. In a number of cases, the white students who wanted
to transfer were granted without exception their requests
for transfer! A. All the white and all the Negro were
granted without exception.
Q. Well, those you were just talking about, they were
the exceptions, weren’t they! A. They were—No. They
had asked for transfers and had been given transfers.
Then, when they asked for re-transfers, those were denied.
There is nothing particularly unusual about that. We have
many requests for transfer which we don’t grant.
Q. You say these cases in which re-transfers were re
quested, that you talked to the children! A. In some cases,
yes, and the children were with the parent.
Q. And your decision was predicated upon the statement
of the first-grade students! A. Not altogether.
Q. Well, at least in part! A. Well, I was possibly
influenced somewhat by the [19] feelings of the child.
Q. Were you influenced by your own feeling that you
prefer that they not be re-transferred to these integrated
schools! A. Well, I had a feeling that if the child didn’t
want to be re-transferred, I ought to sort of consider that.
But the parent was there. I ’ll tell you. The parent was
William H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross
86a
there, and the child was there, and some other folks were
there; and sometimes the parents impressed me as not
really wanting what they were asking for. I think they
were influenced by somebody else, and I figured I couldn’t
afford to just change a student in and out and in and out
every time somebody changed his mind. I did everything
I could to give the parents a good opportunity to decide
whether they wanted to leave the student in this zone or
transfer him without any intimidation, without any pres
sure from anybody. As far as I could I tried to let each
parent decide what he thought was best for his own student.
Then when they made their decision, I thought it was best
for them to stick to it unless they had better reasons than
any of them had for asking for a re-transfer.
Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. Oliver, you were influenced
by your own preference that they not transfer to these
integrated schools'? A. I don’t think so, Mr. Looby. I
really tried to give the parent an opportunity to make his
own decision, but after he had made it, I—I thought he
ought to stick to it.
# # # * *
[25] Q. You are familiar then with the geographical
living [26] conditions with respect to the races? You know
that the races are somewhat segregated in their residential
areas? A. Somewhat, yes.
Q. And the school zoning is predicated upon residential
location? A. Primarily, yes.
Q. So that in a school zone, even if you had complete
desegregation predicated upon residential areas, you would
have little or no problem, would you? A. Well, I wouldn’t
say I wouldn’t have any problem, but I would say that the
figures in the first grade are—give a pretty good picture of
what the whole situation would be. Fourteen hundred—
William H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross
87a
1400 Negro first-grade students are enrolled, and of those
1400, only about 115 live in the zones where they would
have gone to school with the white students. Do I make
myself clear!
Q. Yes, I think you do. Now, following that same pat
tern, if all complete desegregation is ordered or adopted
by the Board, you would have little or no administrative
problem because of your residential zoning. Isn’t that
true! A. Well, I would say that there wouldn’t be large
numbers where they would be mixed, not large numbers.
There would be—I don’t know whether you would call them
administrative problems, but I think there would be a lot
of problems.
[27] There were last fall with these first graders. I
think we would have the same problems we had last fall
greatly magnified. That is my opinion.
Q. And those problems you had last fall were controlled
by the Police Department and law-enforcement agencies,
weren’t they! A. That’s correct.
# # # *
William H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross
*
88a
(Entered February 18, 1958)
[842] The complaint was tiled September 23, 1955, as a
class action, by negro children eligible to attend the public
schools of Nashville, Tennessee, by their parents as next
friends, to have declared their rights to attend the public
schools without discrimination on account of race and for
an injunction restraining such discrimination. Named as
defendants were the members of the Board of Education
and the Superintendent of Schools of the City, in addition
to principals of particular public schools. Additional par
ties were added by amendment to the complaint but with
out changing the nature of the cause of action or of the
relief sought.
[843] By their answer to the complaint the defendants
conceded, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court,
the unenforceability of the school segregation law's of
Tennessee and acknowledged their eventual obligation to
operate the schools of the City of Nashville in compliance
with the constitutional principles therein declared. How
ever, the position was taken that the defendants should be
allowed time to solve various administrative problems and
that the transition to a racially non-discriminatory system
should not be accomplished immediately but on a gradual
basis.
Pursuant to the prayer of the complaint, a three-judge
District Court was convened and upon a hearing at the
March 1956 term, that Court granted the defendants’ mo
tion for a continuance of the case to the October 1956
term. In granting the continuance the Court specifically
noted that the Board of Education at an early date had
announced that it would comply with the ruling of the
Supreme Court in integrating the public schools of Nash-
Opinion
89a
ville, that it had proceeded promptly to take steps toward
that end, and that it was acting in good faith and with
appropriate dispatch in awaiting the taking of the school
census and giving careful consideration to all factors in
volved, so as to arrive at a workable plan of integration,
“which appears to be a reasonable start toward full com
pliance with the May 17, 1954 ruling of the Supreme
Court.” In view of the defendants’ concession that Tennes
see’s school segregation laws were invalid, the three-judge
court was dissolved and the case remanded to a single
judge court. 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 519 (1956).
[844] At the October 1956 term the Board of Education
submitted a plan of desegregation, providing for the elimi
nation of compulsory segregation in the first grade begin
ning with the 1957-1958 school year, for a voluntary right
of transfer on the basis of the racial composition of the
school attended, and directing its Instruction Committee
to make further studies and to recommend by December
31, 1957, “the time of and the number of grades to be
included in the next step to be taken in the further abolish
ing of compulsory segregation.” After a full hearing upon
the plan the Court on January 21, 1957, by a memorandum
opinion, approved the plan in part as constituting a
prompt and reasonable start toward complete desegrega
tion but directed the Board to submit not later than De
cember 31, 1957, “a report setting forth a complete plan
to abolish segregation in all of the remaining grades of
the city school system, including a time schedule therefor.”
2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 21 (1957).
On January 9, 1957, the Governor of Tennessee ap
peared before a joint session of the General Assembly to
propose five bills permitting local authorities to act with
respect to questions of racial integration in the public
schools. On January 25, 1957, the bills were finally ap-
Opinion
90a
proved by the General Assembly and, as enacted, included:
(1) legislation authorizing the establishment of separate
schools for pupils whose parents or guardians voluntarily
elect that they attend schools only with members of their
own race, generally referred to as [845] the School Pref
erence Law, (2) a Pupil Assignment Act to provide for
the assignment of pupils to public schools by county or
city boards of education, (3) an amendment to the present
law authorizing the transfer of pupils between school
systems, (4) authorization for the joint operation of school
facilities, and (5) an amendatory bill dealing with trans
portation of pupils. 2 Race. Eel. L. Rep. 215 (1957).
Shortly before the beginning of the 1957-1958 school
year, the Board of Education, acting in response to a peti
tion which had been filed with it by a citizens committee,
filed a motion with the Court requesting permission to file
a supplemental answer and counterclaim to ascertain its
authority under and the validity of the School Preference
LawT, Chapter 11 of the Public Acts of 1957, authorizing
Boards of Education of cities and counties to provide
separate schools for white and negro children, whose
parents, legal custodians or guardians voluntarily elect
that such children attend school with members of their
own race. On September 6, 1957, after a hearing, the
Court held that the School Preference Law was on its face
antagonistic to the principles declared by the Supreme
Court in the two Brown cases and, therefore, unconsti
tutional. 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 970 (1957). Accordingly,
an order was entered denying the motion for leave to file
the supplemental answer and counterclaim.
The Board of Education on December 6, 1957, filed its
report, setting forth what is described as “a complete plan
to [846] abolish segregation in all grades of the City
Opinion
91a
School System,” in compliance with the prior order of the
Court requiring it to submit such a plan not later than
December 31, 1957. The plaintiffs have filed objections to
the plan, principally upon the ground that it does not
comply with constitutional requirements, and one question
presently before the Court is whether the plan should be
approved.
Before discussing that question, however, it is necessary
to consider a motion of the defendants, filed on January
20, 1958, to dismiss the action, such motion, the objections
to the School Board’s plan for desegregation, and all re
lated questions having been heard by the Court on January
28, 1958. The issues have been fully briefed and orally
argued by the parties to the action, and in addition the
Court has had the benefit of elaborate briefs submitted as
amicus curiae by attorneys for the School Preference Com
mittee, a local group sponsoring and supporting the pro
posed plan, and on behalf of the Attorney General of the
State as amicus curiae.
The motion to dismiss the action is based upon the pro
visions of the Pupil Assignment Act, referred to above,
Chapter 13 of the Tennessee Public Acts of 1957. It is
argued on behalf of the Board of Education that the Act
provides the plaintiffs with an adequate administrative
remedy to obtain admission or transfer to particular
schools and that they should be required to exhaust such
remedy before resorting to a court for relief, particularly
before resorting to a Federal Court [847] for an injunction.
In support of this argument, it is insisted that this Court
has already declared the rights of the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated to attend the public schools of Nashville
without discrimination on account of race and that it is,
therefore, not necessary for the Court longer to retain
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92a
jurisdiction since the only remaining problem is the assign
ment of individual students to particular schools, a matter
now governed by the Pupil Assignment Act. To support
its contention as to the validity of the Pupil Assignment
Act, the Board of Education relies upon Carson v. Board
of Education of McDowell County, 4 Cir., 227 P. 2d 789,
and Carson v. War lick, 4 Cir., 238 F. 2d 724, certiorari
denied 353 U. S. 910, in which the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the North Carolina Pupil Enrollment
Act was not unconstitutional on its face, and that negro
children denied admission to schools would first be required
to exhaust the administrative remedies provided for by
the Act before being entitled to declaratory or injunctive
relief in a Federal Court with respect to their right to
attend school. The standards provided for in the North
Carolina Act required that the enrollment be made “so as
to provide for the orderly and efficient administration of
such public schools, the effective instruction of the pupils
therein enrolled, and the health, safety, and general wel
fare of such pupils.” The Act further provided for appli
cation to and prompt hearing by the Board in the case of
any child whose admission to any public school within
the county or city had been denied, with right of appeal
from an adverse ruling to the courts.
[848] However, notwithstanding the apparent scope and
generality of the rulings of the Fourth Circuit in the two
cases just cited, the Court is unable to reach the conclusion
on the facts of the instant ease that the action should be
dismissed and the plaintiffs remitted to a so-called adminis
trative remedy, with the implied invitation to return to the
Federal Court if that remedy is exhausted without obtain
ing satisfactory results. This is true because the Court is
of the opinion that the administrative remedy under the
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93a
Act in question would not be an adequate remedy. In this
connection, it must be recalled that the relief sought by the
complaint is not merely to obtain assignment to particular
schools but in addition to have a system of compulsory
segregation declared unconstitutional and an injunction
granted restraining the Board of Education and other
school authorities from continuing the practice and custom
of maintaining and operating the schools of the city upon
a racially discriminatory basis. While it is true that by
its order entered pursuant to its memorandum of January
21, 1957, this Court “recognized and declared” the rights
of the plaintiffs and others similarly situated to attend the
public schools of the City of Nashville without discrimina
tion on account of race, it was specifically provided that
“the issuance of an injunction is withheld pending the
filing of a report” with respect to complete desegregation
and the action of the Court upon any objections thereto.
By the same order jurisdiction of the action was retained
“during the period of transition.” The effect of the order
was therefore not to direct the immediate discontinuance
of the [849] practice of compulsory segregation in the
public schools, but on the contrary, to permit its continu
ance during a gradual period of transition in keeping with
what the Court believed was the true meaning of the second
Brown opinion of the Supreme Court. Brown v. Board of
Education, 349 U. S. 294, 99 L. Ed. 1083. Thus the argu
ment of defendants that the case is now moot is not sup
ported by the record, for the primary purpose of the
complaint to end racial discrimination in the public school
system has not been accomplished.
Clearly the principal reason why the administrative
remedy under the Act is inadequate is that the administra
tive agency would be in the instant case, the Board of Edu
Opinion
94a
cation of the City of Nashville. That agency, according
to the record in this case, has never abandoned a policy
of compulsory segregation in the public schools, other
than the first grade as provided for by its plan which was
heretofore approved in part by the Court. To require
the plaintiffs to go before a board committed in advance
to a continuance of compulsory segregation would be to
require them to perform a futile act or to pursue a remedy
which would have no reasonable prospect of success.
That the Board of Education is in fact committed to
such a policy is the inescapable conclusion from the posi
tion which it has consistently taken from the outset of the
litigation. In its first application to the Court for a con
tinuance, the Board insisted that it should be allowed to
effect a transition [850] to a racially non-discriminatory
system on a gradual basis, and it therefore requested a
continuance of the case to permit it to make a further
study and to formulate a workable plan of integration.
The first plan submitted proposed to abolish compulsory
segregation in the first grade only and to refer the prob
lem of further integration to its Instruction Committee for
additional study and a later recommendation. Its next
appeal to the Court was to have its rights declared under
the Tennessee School Preference Law which would have
allowed the Board to establish and maintain segregated
schools in accordance with the wishes of school parents.
And finally, the Board has presently before the Court a
plan similar to the provisions of the School Preference
Law authorizing it to maintain and operate both segre
gated and integrated schools dependent upon the prefer
ences of school patrons. Notwithstanding the good faith
of the Board of Education in its efforts to meet a grave
problem, the Court would indeed be “closing its eyes to
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95a
the obvious” if it should not conclude that the Board is
presently committed to compulsory segregation in the
public schools other than in grade one. Nor has the Court
been given any assurance that this fixed practice and
policy of the Board will be discontinued in the future.
The inadequacy of the administrative remedy proposed
by the defendants is emphasized when the present segre
gation policy of the Board of Education is considered in
the light of the criteria and factors prescribed by the Pupil
Assignment Act to determine pupil assignments. Thus by
Section 2 of the Act [851] it is provided that the Board of
Education may consider and base its decision on any one
or more of a large number of factors, including “the effect
of the enrolment on the welfare and best interests of such
pupil and all other pupils in said school as w7ell as the
effect on the efficiency of the operation of said school” ;
. . . “the psychological qualifications of the pupil for the
type of teaching and associations involved” ; . . . “the effect
of admission of the pupil upon the academic program of
other students in a particular school or facility thereof” ;
. . . “the psychological effect upon the pupil of attendance
at a particular school” ; . . . “the effect of any disparity
between the physical and mental ages of any pupil to be
enrolled, especially when contrasted with the average
physical and mental ages of the group with which the
pupil may be placed” ; . . . “the sociological, psychological,
and like intangible social scientific factors as will prevent,
as nearly as possible, a condition of socioeconomic class
consciousness among the pupils” ; . . . “the possibility or
threat of friction or disorder among pupils or others” ;
. . . “the possibility of breaches of the peace or ill will or
economic retaliation within the community” ; . . . “the home
environment of the pupil” ; . . . “the maintenance or sever
Opinion
96a
ance of established social and psychological relationships
with other pupils and with teachers” ; . . . “the choice and
interests of the pupil” ; . . . “the request or consent of
parents or guardians and the reasons assigned therefor” ;
. . . and “any and all other factors which the Board may
consider pertinent, relevant [852] or material in their
effect upon the welfare and best interest of the applicant,
other pupils of the county, city, or special school district
as a whole and the inhabitants of the county, city or special
school district.”
Whether or not the Pupil Assignment Act is constitu
tional (a question which is not decided), at least there can
be no doubt that there is nothing in the language of the
Act which would preclude a Board of Education from
taking into account racial distinctions in making pupil as
signments. Nor is there anything in the Act which is in
any manner inconsistent with a continued policy of com
pulsory racial segregation, with the result that the admin
istrative remedy itself would not afford the plaintiffs in
the instant case any opportunity or ground upon which to
resist the fixed policy of the Board to operate the city’s
schools on a compulsorily segregated basis.
It is recognized by the authorities that the necessity of
pursuing an administrative remedy provided by state law
before seeking injunctive relief in a Federal Court does
not apply unless the administrative remedy is “adequate.”
School Board of City of Newport News, Va. v. Adkins, 4
Cir., 246 F. 2d 325; Gibson v. Board of Public Instruction
of Dade County, Florida, 5 Cir., 246 F. 2d 913. In the
Adkins case the Virginia Pupil Placement Act was de
clared unconstitutional but the Court further found that
the statute did not furnish an adequate remedy to the
plaintiffs because “of the fixed [853] and definite policy
of the school authorities with respect to segregation . . . ”
Opinion
97a
And in the Gibson case the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in holding that the plaintiffs were not required
to pursue administrative remedies under the Florida Pupil
Assignment law, stated:
“Neither that nor any other law can justify a viola
tion of the Constitution of the United States by the
requirement of racial segregation in the public schools.
So long as that requirement continues throughout the
public school system of Dade County, it would be pre
mature to consider the effect of the Florida laws as
to the assignment of pupils to particular schools.”
Being of the opinion upon the facts here presented that
the suggested administrative remedy is inadequate, and
that the case is not moot, the motion of defendants to dis
miss the action cannot prevail.
If the action is not dismissed, the Board then requests
approval by the Court of its plan for desegregation filed
with its report to the Court on December 6, 1957. The
proposed plan is as follows:
P lan
1. No compulsory integration or segregation shall be
required in any grade of the Nashville Public School
System.
2. There shall be conducted annually a parents prefer
ence census to determine which parents desire their
children to attend school with members of their own
race exclusively and which parents desire that their
children attend school with the members of another
race. Such preference shall be stated by parents or
those standing in the position of parents, and if no
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98a
preference is indicated the child shall be assigned
by the Board under rules in conformity with this plan.
[854] 3. Three groups of schools of equal standards,
opportunity and facilities in accordance with the
preferences indicated above shall be established in
as nearly accessible and convenient locations as
practicable:
a. Schools for Negro students whose parents prefer
that their children attend school with members of
their own race exclusively;
b. Schools for White students whose parents prefer
that their children attend school with members
of their own race exclusively;
c. Integrated schools for those students whose
parents prefer that their children attend schools
available to both Negro and White children.
4. Requests by parents for transfer of their children
from one school to another shall be acted upon by the
Board in accordance with existing laws.
5. All administrative details and procedures for the
operation of this plan within the framewTork thereof
shall be determined by the Superintendent of Nash
ville City Schools under the direction of this Board.
The arguments advanced to support the constitutionality
of the plan are practically the same as those advanced and
considered by the Court in passing upon the School Prefer
ence Law above referred to, inasmuch as there is no real
or substantial difference between the plan and the pro
visions of the Law which the Court found to be unconstitu
tional on its face at the hearing on September 6, 1957. It
Opinion
99a
is true that the plan, unlike the School Preference Law,
specifically provides that an annual census be taken to de
termine the preferences of school parents, and that the
Board is authorized, in addition to separate white and
negro schools, to maintain integrated schools for children
whose parents desire that their children attend such schools.
[855] However, these provisions were clearly implicit in
the School Preference Law itself.
Upon further consideration, the Court finds no reason
to alter its view that such a plan wholly fails to meet the
test of constitutionality. It would sanction by law, if ap
proved, the separation of schools in accordance with racial
distinctions and once the schools were separated, negro
children because of their race alone would be excluded by
operation of law from schools designated for white chil
dren only. The discrimination would not be removed simply
by providing a third school or group of schools which
could be attended by members of both the white and colored
races. It is a mistaken interpretation of the segregation
decisions of the Supreme Court to argue that the doctrine
of those cases applies only to an entire school system and
not to individual schools. The fundamental basis of the
decisions is that members of the negro or minority race are
denied the equal protection of the law if they are denied
admission to public schools which they are otherwise
qualified to attend solely upon grounds of their race. The
discrimination is clearly not eliminated by maintaining and
operating some schools in the system on a racially segre
gated basis and others with the discrimination removed.
Another objectionable feature to the plan is that it does
not offer in any realistic sense an alternative or choice to
the members of the minority race. To hold out to them the
[856] right to attend schools with members of the white
Opinion
100a
Opinion
race if the members of that race consent is plainly such a
dilution of the right itself as to rob it of meaning or sub
stance. The right of negroes to attend the public schools
without discrimination upon the ground of race cannot be
made to depend upon the consent of the members of the
majority race. That the proposal to establish a group of
integrated schools is, as a practical matter, illusory and
meaningless is clearly shown byr the testimony of the Super
intendent of Schools. He stated, in substance, that if the
census provided for in the plan should be taken, it would
be doubtful that any substantial number of white parents
would consent to have their children attend school with
members of the colored race. In such circumstances, to
approve the plan would be in effect to deny to the members
of the colored race the protection of the Fourteenth Amend
ment as construed by the Supreme Court, for they would
be remitted solely to schools of their own race.
The case of Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 cannot
by any reasonable interpretation be construed as authority
for the plan presently proposed. The most that the Elliott
case decided was that the Supreme Court decision in the
Brown cases did not require integration but merely pro
hibited segregation on account of race. On any fair ap
praisal of the plan now under consideration it must be
concluded that it would in fact require and give the sanction
of the law to a continuation of compulsory segregation in
public education.
[857] Despite the sincere and earnest arguments which
have been advanced in support of the plan both by attorneys
representing the school Board and attorneys representing
the School Preference Committee, the Court is unable to
find either that it is constitutional or that it is practically
101a
Opinion
feasible and workable. The plan must, therefore, be dis
approved.
In this posture of the ease, the question remains whether
an injunction should issue requiring desegregation in all
of the remaining grades of the school system beginning
with the next school term, or whether an injunction should
be withheld pending the submission by the Board of an
other plan which would offer a workable and legal solution
to the problem of accomplishing a transition to a system
having no racial discrimination. The first alternative is
strongly urged upon the Court by the plaintiffs, with the
Board of Education requesting further time to submit an
other plan.
The Court is mindful of the fact that it has been approxi
mately four years since the Supreme Court first declared
invalid racial discrimination in public education, and that
the plaintiffs are entitled to have their constitutional rights
enforced without undue delay. Nevertheless, the record is
replete with evidence that the problem with which the
School Board is confronted is one of a grave and complex
nature, the solution of which requires not only time but
also patience and understanding on the part of the school
authorities and on the part [858] of the members of both
the white and colored races. The conditions in Nashville
must be appraised and assessed primarily by the constituted
school authorities. They are certain in their belief that
the best interests of the entire school system require that
integration not be accomplished in all grades simultaneously
but rather in accordance with a gradual step-by-step plan.
The Superintendent of Schools so testified at the last hear
ing and there was similar evidence upon the hearing of the
first plan. The Federal Courts cannot operate the public
schools and should refrain from any interference with their
102a
Opinion
operation by the regular school authorities unless it is
plainly necessary to intervene to protect constitutional
rights. Notwithstanding the failure of the Board thus far
to submit an acceptable plan, the Court is of the opinion
that it should be accorded a further opportunity to study
the problem and to present a plan for desegregating the
remaining grades of the school system together with a time
schedule therefor. However, in view of the history of the
litigation as set forth in this opinion, and the delay since
the applicable constitutional principles were first announced,
it should be apparent that the School Board must adopt a
substantial plan and one which contemplates elimination of
racial discrimination throughout the school system with all
deliberate speed.
An order will be passed to the Court carrying out the
terms of this opinion, allowing the School Board until the
7th day of April 1958 to file with the Court another plan,
and [859] directing that a hearing be held thereon before
this Court for approval or disapproval on the 14th day
of April 1958.
/s / W il l ia m E. M illeb
United States District Judge
103a
[979]
Order
(entered March 19,1958)
This cause came on to be heard on January 28, 1958
before the Honorable William E. Miller, Judge, upon the
entire record and especially upon the Plan filed by the
defendants, Board of Education, on December 6, 1957, the
Objections to said Plan filed by the plaintiffs, the Motion
to Dismiss filed by said defendants on January 20, 1958,
and Application for Injunction requiring desegregation in
all of the remaining grades of the school system beginning
with the next school term, the evidence heard in open
Court, oral arguments and written briefs submitted by
attorneys for the parties, attorneys for the State of Ten
nessee as amicus curiae, and attorneys for the Parents
Preference Committee as amicus curiae, from all of which
the Court makes the findings of fact and conclusions of
law contained in its Opinion filed on February 18, 1958,
which Opinion is hereby made a part of the record and
incorporated herein by reference as a part of this Order;
and for the reasons stated in said Opinion, the Court finds
and holds that the Motion to Dismiss should be denied, that
the said Plan submitted should be disapproved, that is
suance of an injunction should be withheld pending the
submission by the Board of Education of another Plan
in accordance with said Opinion of the Court, that the
defendants, Board of [980] Education, should be allowed
until April 7, 1958 to file another Plan and that there
should be a hearing thereon on April 14, 1958.
It is accordingly Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed as
follows:
1. That the Motion to Dismiss filed herein by defen
dants, Board of Education, on January 20, 1958, be and
the same is hereby denied.
104a
Order
2. That the Plan for desegregation filed herein by said
defendants, Board of Education, with its report to the
Court on December 6, 1957, be and the same is hereby
disapproved.
3. That an injunction should be withheld pending the
submission by the Board of Education of another Plan.
4. That said defendants, Board of Education, shall file
with the Court, not later than the 7th day of April, 1958,
another Plan for desegregating the remaining grades of
the school system together with a time schedule therefor.
5. That a hearing on said last mentioned Plan be held
before this Court for approval or disapproval on the 14th
day of April 1958.
To the action of the Court in denying the Motion to
Dismiss and in disapproving the Plan submitted, defen
dants excepted. To the extent they are permitted by law
to do so, the State of Tennessee and the Parents Prefer
ence Committee, as amici curiae and not as parties to the
action, also except.
A pproved as to F orm :
, / s / Z. A lexander L ooby
/ s / A von W illia m s
Attorneys f or Plaintiffs
W m . E. M iller
Judge
105a
Transcript of Testimony
(April 14,1958)
I n t h e D istrict C ourt of t h e U n ited S tates
for t h e M iddle D istrict of T e n n e sse e
N a sh v ille D iv isio n
Civil Action No. 2094
R obert W . K ell e y , e t a l.
B oard of E ducation of t h e C ity of
N ashvil l e , T e n n e s s e e , e t a l.
B e f o r e :
T h e H onorable W il l ia m E. M il l e r , Judge of said Court,
on the “Plan of the Board of Education” on April 14,
1958, at Nashville, Tennessee.
A p p e a r a n c e s :
For the Plaintiffs:
Z. A lexander L ooby, Esq.
A von W illia m s , Esq.
Attorneys at Law
327 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville, Tennessee
For the Defendants:
R eber B o u lt , Esq.
E d w in F. H u n t , Esq.
Attorneys at Law
American Trust Building
Nashville, Tennessee
106a
Colloquy
T r a n sc r ipt op t h e P roceedings
[3] (All parties announced ready.)
The Court: The matter is before the Court (as I under
stand it) on the plan contained in a report which was
filed on April 7, 1958, the plan of the Board of Education.
I am ready at this time to hear any matters which the
Board has to present in support of this plan.
Mr. Hunt: May it please the Court, in thinking about
this matter, we concluded that we definitely would not go
over the things that have heretofore been presented. How
ever, in support of this plan, we will offer as witnesses the
Superintendent of Schools, the acting Chairman of the
School Board, the Principal of one of the schools. It will
then be our hope that we will offer the former Superin
tendent of Schools who indicated that he would be here
as a witness if his health permitted. We will offer them
and ask a few questions about the plan, and then turn
them over for examination by adversary counsel.
The Court: That will be satisfactory.
Mr. Hunt: Their presentation, I might add, we antici
pate will be brief. We are not going into any great detail.
The Court: All right.
[4] Mr. Hunt: The first witness will be Mr. Oliver, the
Superintendent of Schools. He has not been sworn at this
hearing. Of course, he was sworn at a former hearing.
The Court: Does any party request the rule on the
witnesses?
Mr. Looby: We do not, if Your Honor please. We have
filed objections to the plan.
The Court: You have filed objections? I have not seen
those.
Mr. Looby: They were filed this morning.
Mr. Hunt: Do you want to present any matter in con
nection with your objections?
107a
Mr. Looby: No more: than to say that if it becomes
necessary after the witnesses for the defendant will we
be heard?
The Court: Oh, yes.
Mr. Looby: We will ask the privilege to call witnesses.
The Court: All right.
(The witnesses were sworn.)
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct
Mb . W. H. Oliv er , c a lle d a s a w itn e s s in b e h a lf o f th e
d e fe n d a n ts , b e in g f i r s t d u ly sw o rn , te s tif ie d a s f o l lo w s :
[5] Direct Examination by Mr. Hunt:
Q. Is this Mr. W. H. Oliver? A. Yes, sir; William
Henry Oliver.
Q. Mr. Oliver, you are at present the Superintendent
of Schools of the City of Nashville? A. Yes, sir; I am.
Q. And you were a witness in this case, I believe at
the hearing in January. Is that correct? A. That’s cor
rect.
Q. Since you have been Superintendent and Assistant
Superintendent, have you met with the Board in its meet
ings where the matter of complying with the Court order
has been the subject of discussion? A. Yes, sir. I have
met regularly with the Board since I became Assistant
Superintendent last July the first.
Q. Now, I believe this matter that we are now con
cerned with was the subject of discussion before one of
the committees of the Board. What committee was that?
A. The instruction committee.
Q. And did you meet with that committee in its de
liberations considering this question? A. Yes, sir. I have
met regularly with that committee also.
108a
[6] Q. You are familiar, Mr. Oliver, with the plan that
has been filed with the Court? A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hunt: I assume, if Your Honor please, that
there is no technical need to identify and tender it
to him as the plan. We will do that if the Court
desires that he examine it and say that that is the
plan adopted.
The Court: I think that is all right.
By Mr. Hunt:
Q. Just read the plan, not the preliminary things that
do not concern you, and tell whether or not that is the
plan. A. (After reading from document handed witness
by counsel) Yes, s ir; this is the plan.
Q. That is the plan that was adopted— A. (Interrupt
ing) By the Board.
Q. (Continuing) —by the Board. Now, Mr. Oliver,
state the substance of that plan. What does it provide
for? A. Well, there are three essential provisions. One
is that the abolishing of segregation by race in the public
schools of Nashville will proceed one grade each year, the
second grade in September 1958, the third grade in Sep
tember of 1959, and so on until we have gone through
the 12th.
The second provision is that the policies followed [7]
with regard to the first grade with respect to zoning and
matters of that kind will be continued.
And the third is that as the job of desegregation pro
gresses it will be subject to review by the Court, direction
from the Court, submission to the Court of any informa
tion which circumstances may justify as we go along.
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct
109a
Q. Mr. Oliver, state whether or not before formulating
that plan the Board sought the recommendation of the
principals in the schools of Nashville! A. I don’t know
that the— Well, yes, through the Superintendent the Board
did.
Q. You sought the recommendation! A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, tell how that was done. A. Well, I called all
the principals together and told them that we had the job
of making a plan for desegregating the remaining eleven
grades, that I had a great deal of respect for their judg
ment in the matter, that they were close to the matter,
they were interested in the childern, and that I would like
to know—I would like to have suggestions from them as
to how—as to what would be the best plan.
Q. How were their suggestions received! Were they
received orally! Were they received in response to a
questionnaire! [8] Were they received by letters from
them! How did the principals respond in giving their
recommendations! A. Well, as I recall, it was this way:
The principals themselves appointed a committee of them
selves to draw up a sort of questionnaire which all of the
principals were invited to answer but without signing. It
was thought that a principal might come a little nearer
to saying exactly what he thought if he were not asked
to sign the statement. Also, it was desired that no princi
pal be embarrassed in the matter. Of course, we had
principals of both races. So the principals filled out these
questionnaires.
Mr. Looby: If Your Honor please, I want to
raise an objection to this line of testimony as to
what the principals did and about being a coward
enough not to sign their name or do anything but
simply draw up the questionnaire; and, if Your
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct
110a
Honor please, it is totally irrelevant to the issues
before the Court.
The Court: I think it would be pertinent to in
quire into any procedure that the Board followed
in adopting the plan. I think that is to be con
sidered. Your objection goes to the weight of it
and the value it might have rather than to the
admissibility of it as I see it. I will allow him to
answer it.
[9] By Mr. Hunt:
Q. All right. A. I am just trying to tell how it was
done. Then these answered questionnaires were collected
and submitted to the Superintendent that he might study
them and use the information which they gave in advising
the Instruction Committee.
Q. Did any or all of those recommendations propose a
gradual handling of the problem? A. Yes, sir; practically
all of them did. Not quite all of them. I believe there was
one that advocated total and immediate desegregation,
but the vast majority of them advocated a gradual plan,
and several of them suggested the year-by-year plan.
Mr. Williams: May it please Your Honor, with
reference to the objection which was made pre
viously and Your Honor’s ruling on it, we submit
that even if this evidence is heard as a matter of
determining the way that the Board reached the
conclusion, that still the testimony of the Superin
tendent as to what was contained in the question
naires is incompetent under the best evidence rule,
that the questionnaires themselves would be the
best evidence of that.
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct
111a
The Court: All right.
Mr. Hunt: May it please the Court, we are not
[10] offering this to prove as such the contents.
We are offering it to prove how the Board acted
and how it proceeded in the information that it
sought to assemble with respect to the matter.
As a matter of fact, we have sent for those ques
tionnaires so that if they wanted them filed in the
record, they could be. We have sent for them, and
at the appropriate time they will be produced.
Mr. Oliver was talking with me this morning, and
I said, “Well, bring those things in.”
Actually, I think that is to clutter up the record
with these recommendations.
The Court: When I overruled the objection a
moment ago, what I had in mind was that you were
offering evidence to show just what the Board did
as a matter of fact as bearing on the question of
good faith for one thing.
Mr. Hunt: Exactly.
The Court: To show that it acted deliberately
and in an effort to obtain information from relevant
sources. That is the reason I admitted it, not as
evidence to prove whether this plan should be ap
proved by the Court or disapproved, and it will
not be considered in that way.
[11] Mr. Williams: I see.
The Court: If you have the questionnaires,
though, you might file them.
Mr. Hunt: I will do that. It may be in the
interest of expedition that we will want to proceed
with other witnesses because that information is
being brought. Mr. Oliver has asked for it.
The Court: All right.
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct
112a
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct
By Mr. Hunt:
Q. Now, Mr. Oliver, I believe you stated that among
these unsigned recommendations of the principals, all
except one recommended a gradual handling of the prob
lem and one recommended immediate and total desegrega
tion next fall. Am I correct there in what you said! A.
Yes, sir. As I recall there was one, only one, which sug
gested total and immediate desegregation. By immediate
I mean in September 1958.
Q. Mr. Oliver, as the Superintendent of Schools, is it
your opinion that the plan recommended is the best plan
available? A. Yes, sir. It very definitely is.
Q. Will you state to the Court your reasons for hold
ing that opinion? A. Well, I can’t do that in just a
word or two. If I [12] talk too long, somebody can say
so. That’s been a big question with me for a long time,
one which I have asked and tried very much to answer
and which I have answered in my own mind.
When you ask me why I think this plan is the best
plan there is, I would say—I don’t know just how much
to say or not to say. But right to the question, I ’d say
in the first place I think this is the best plan because it
would incur the least opposition, the smallest number
and size of difficulties to deal with. Judging from past
experience, there are difficulties encountered in this pro
cess of desegregation.
And I would like to make this clear, too, if I may, that
in speaking of this plan and in using such terms as
“desegregation” I am speaking only of the attendance of
students in the public schools of Nashville, Tennessee. I
am not saying that this is the best plan for everywhere,
but I am saying that in my opinion it is the best plan
for us here in Nashville.
113a
Now, if I may say this, it’s a matter of record in this
court, that we had considerable difficulty and confusion
and disorder last fall in spite of the fact that we did every
thing that we knew to do to avoid it. "VVe held advance
registrations so that when the little first-graders regis
tered, there wouldn’t be any upperclassmen or their parents
[13] there. We arranged so that the little Negro children
and their parents would not have to go to a school where
the majority of the folk were white to get their transfers.
We made the same arrangement with regard to the white
children who had to get transfers, and we— We did
everything we knew to do, and in spite of everything we
could do we lost above $70,000 worth of the Hattie Cotton
building, and a great many little children whose first ex
perience in school should have been one of security and
harmony and joy found themselves faced with a situation
where they were subjected to dread and fright and in
many cases actual danger. I think that the effect of that
sort of thing on a child is something that should be
avoided.
We begged the reactionaries to stay away from the
schools last fall, but they didn’t do it. And I think that
the year-by-year plan (if I may call it that) will involve
less of this damage to the children than any other plan
which we could propose.
Another reason (I hope it’s a good reason) why I think
that this is the best plan is that it gives a maximum of
consideration for the will or the wishes of the majority
of the citizens, the taxpayers, the parents; and I— I can’t
help thinking that under a government such as ours, which
is of and by and for the people, it’s in order.
[14] Of course, I know we must carry out the law, and I
think this plan is perfectly in accord with every ruling the
Supreme Court has made, otherwise I wouldn’t consider it
W. //. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct
114a
a proper plan; but still I think that it is in order to give
as much consideration to the wishes of the people as is
practical under the law, and our Board has tried very hard
to respect the wishes of the people whom it represents and
whom it serves.
There are a great many people in our community who are
opposed to desegregation according to any plan. We can
not go by their wishes but I think it’s practical and I think
it’s wise to give some consideration to their wishes. I
think they are entitled to consideration, and I believe that
this year-by-year plan will come nearer being acceptable
to the majority of the parents, the citizens, the taxpayers
in Nashville, Tennessee, than any other plan would be.
Another reason why I think this is the best plan is that
it doesn’t—it doesn’t rush an adjustment which at best is
going to be a difficult adjustment in our community among
the people and among the students.
Segregation by race in the public schools of Nashville
(right or wrong) is a practice of long standing, and to
change it goes counter to the feelings of a great many
people. There are a lot of adjustments that must be made
[15] on the part of the Negro children (It’s something
they’re not accustomed to), on the part of the white chil
dren (It’s something they’re not accustomed to), on the part
of parents, and on the part of teachers. I t’s something none
of us are accustomed to.
It involves more difficulty in adjustment than someone
just looking on from the sidelines would recognize or rea
lize, and I firmly believe that this adjustment can be made
with less friction, it can be made with less disadvantage
to everybody concerned, it can be made more smoothly, it
can be made with less difficulty psychologically, educa
tionally, socially, and otherwise, if it is done slowly. This
plan, of course, proposes that it be done slowly.
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct
115a
I think that to undertake to do it all at once would be a
most unwise thing to do. I t’s not going to be easy if we do
it a year at a time. If it can be accomplished peacefully
in the twelve years, it will be a noteworthy accomplishment.
I think that this plan is the best plan for making the ad
justments in the school, in the community, among the
teachers, among the students, that could be proposed.
And another reason is that it will give us a more
homogeneous grouping of students. At least, it will make
possible a more homogeneous grouping of students. And I
[16] think that most educators feel that homogeneous group
ing is wise as far as it is practical to practice it. We cannot
always have students of just the same aptitude. We cannot
always have students of just the same social background.
We cannot always have students of just the same chrono
logical age. We cannot always have students of just the
same achievement level. But we’ll be further from having
that if we desegregate fast, in my opinion. Now, the princi
pal person whose welfare is to be considered in the matter
of homogeneous grouping is the student.
Now, it may be that if we said, “We’ll desegregate the
whole school system all at once,” it may be that not a
large number of students would be involved, but you can’t
assume that. There might be a large number of them in
volved. And if there were, then you’d have students put
into classes together who had a very different background
in the community, in the home, in social life, and in the
school; and you would have a situation—- If they all came
in together, you would have a situation where there would
be a group of students or (we will say) individual students
competing with others at a disadvantage, and you’d have
students who would have to be held back because of others
who were not on the same achievement plane with them.
W. U. Oliver-—for Defendants—Direct
116a
I—I hope I make myself clear there. If homogeneous
[17] grouping has any value, then we can get the greatest
value out of it by a gradual plan.
Now, I ’d like to give one other reason if I may. I think
that it’s very important that we do all we can to preserve
good relationships between the two races. We have the two
races. There is— There’s no way around that. We have
the two races. They— They are two races. I don’t suppose
either race wants to be merged with the other. I assume that
the white race wants to remain a white race and the Negro
race wants to remain a Negro race as far as race is con
cerned. The two races live together and work together in the
same city and the same community. I t’s very important that
there be between the two races and between individuals
representing the two races a relationship of friendliness, co
operation, and respect such as I think we have had in the
past to a great degree and which I think has improved a
great deal during the past twenty or thirty years.
Frankly, I think that the desegregation issue has
threatened that relationship, made it in some cases a little
more difficult to maintain, but we must maintain it some
how ; and I believe that the gradual plan of putting students
together in school will do more toward preserving proper
relationship between the two races in our community than
would any other kind of plan.
[18] Now, Mr. Attorney, those are my principal reasons,
I would say, for thinking that this is the best plan. I have
left out a good bit. I hope I haven’t taken too much time in
answering. I will be glad to answer any specific questions
about it.
Q. I think you have covered my direct questions, Mr.
Oliver.
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct
117a
Cross examination by Mr. Looby:
Q. Mr. Oliver, will you tell the Court your experience in
desegregating schools in any community other than Nash
ville1? A. Well, I don’t suppose I have had any experience
in desegregating schools in any community other than Nash
ville. I have made some observations elsewhere, but I
haven’t had any experience except in Nashville.
Q. To what extent have you made any observations ? A.
Well, I ’ve visited schools in Washington, D. C. I ’ve visited
in Evanston, Illinois. I have made observations in Chicago
and Indianapolis. Not to a very extensive degree, but I have
made observations in all those places.
Q. Then, you also said that the majority of taxpayers
in Nashville are opposed to this ruling. How many tax
payers are there in Nashville? [19] A. I don’t know.
Q. How do you know then what is a majority? A. Well,
if I—I would say that it’s not necessary to know the num
ber in a group to know whether—what is a majority.
Q. How did you arrive at your conclusion that there was a
majority of the taxpayers that were opposed? A. By read
ing, by listening, by talking, by hearing a great deal.
Q. By reading what? A. By reading newspapers, by—
Q. (Interrupting) What newspapers? A. Well, the
Nashville Tennessean and the Nashville Banner in particu
lar.
Q. Can you tell me whereabouts in the Nashville Tennes
sean have you found that and what issue? A. No, I don’t
think I could. They have been many issues. I have talked
with many, many people. I don’t think it matters how I came
to my conclusion. That’s my opinion, Mr. Looby, and it may
be open to be contested.
Q. We want to know whether your opinion is based upon
the facts or if it’s wishful thinking. A. I wouldn’t say it
W. II. Oliver-—for Defendants—Cross
118a
was wishful thinking. I t’s based upon— I have had many
contacts with many people in Nashville, [20] and my opin
ion is that the majority of the taxpayers and parents of
Nashville do not favor desegregation at all as a matter of
fact, but I think also that this plan would be more ac
ceptable to them than any other plan.
Q. But in your opinion, no plan at all (that is, no de
segregation) would be preferable? A. I think that the
majority of the people in Nashville would prefer that white
children and Negro children attend school separately. I
think that.
Q. And that is your opinion? A. That is my opinion?
Q. Yes. A. Well, frankly, I don’t think we are gaining
anything educationally by putting them together. No, sir.
Q. So that it is— A. (Interrupting) But my opinion
is not— Of course, I think that we must respect the Supreme
Court’s decision. I don’t advocate ignoring that, of course.
Q. But regardless of what you think about that, you are
giving your opinion as to desegregation under the question
by Mr. Hunt, weren’t you? A. I don’t quite understand
you.
Q. Under the question by Mr. Hunt you were giving your
opinion of desegregation? [21] A. In Nashville, Tennes
see?
Q. Yes. A. That’s right. I— Under Mr. Hunt’s ques
tion I was giving my—I was not giving my opinion about
desegregation in Nashville, Tennessee. I was giving my
opinion about this plan. Mr. Hunt did not ask me anything
about what I thought of desegregation, generally speaking,
in Nashville. I was talking about this plan which I think is
the best plan.
Q. Enumerating the basis upon which you arrived at your
ultimate decision, you spoke about the homogeneity of
W. E. Oliver-—for Defendants—Cross
119a
students. Are yon saying now that the difference in students
is based on race! A. No, not exactly.
Q. So that homogeneity or lack of homogeneity has noth
ing whatsoever to do with the races, has it! A. Well, I
would say that race and the conditions under which the races
live may have something to do with causing the differences.
I wouldn’t—
Q. (Interrupting) Are you saying conditions under which
the races live or conditions under which the people live!
A. Well, the races are people.
Q. And people are races, aren’t they! A. People are
divided into races.
[22] Q. Now, when you talk, say, about economic condi
tions, economic conditions affect people regardless of their
race, don’t they! A. Economic conditions affect people
regardless of their race!
Q. Yes. A. I suppose that is true.
Q. And so the sociological effect upon people does not
—is not affected by race but is affected by the sociological
environment and the like. That’s true, isn’t it! A. I ’m not
sure.
Q. You are not sure? A. In the first place, I ’m not sure
that I quite understand your question.
Q. All right. You talked about sociological reasons. I
am asking you whether those sociological reasons don’t
result the same without regard to race? A. Well, I ’d say
there are certain sociological conditions which are appar
ently more pronounced with one race than with another.
Q. And it is upon that basis and with that philosophy
that you are performing your functions as Superintendent
of Schools? A. I don’t see that that has much to do with
my performing [23] my function as the Superintendent of
Schools. As the Superintendent of Schools I must try to
provide the best possible educational opportunities for all
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross
120a
the children regardless of race, regardless of economic or
sociological situation.
Q. Now, let’s get back to that meeting with your prin
cipals. You called the principals together, you said? A.
That’s right.
Q. And that’s all the principals, colored and white? A.
All the elementary principals, I believe. I don’t think I had
the high-school principals in the meeting.
Q. You had all the principals of the elementary schools,
both colored and white, meet together? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you explained to them what you wanted? A.
Well— Yes. I ’ll say it this way: I said about this to them:
“You are close to the problem. You are interested in the
children. We want to make the best plan. We respect your
opinions in the matter, and we would like to know what you
think would be the best plan for us to submit to the Court.”
I was asking for help from them because I thought they
were in pretty good position to have opinions as to what
would be the best plan.
Q. Did you take into consideration then that their indi
vidual interests may conflict with what you were seeking to
[24] obtain? A. Well, not especially. I—-
Q. (Interrupting) Didn’t take that into consideration?
A. (Continuing) —hardly think it did. It was not a matter
of individual preference. It was a matter of professional
judgment.
Q. Well, each had to exercise his individual judgment,
didn’t he? A. That’s right, and I pooled—
Q. (Interrupting) And his economic interests would in
fluence his judgment, wouldn’t they? A. I don’t think there
would be so much difference in the economic interests of
the elementary-school principals.
Q. I see. Was there any special reason why you re
quested them not to sign their name to each individual
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross
121a
ballot? A. Yes. I— I thought that perhaps if a man were
asked to sign it, he might not be quite so free to say exactly
what he thought because there might be a possibility of his
being different from someone else in opinion, and that might
make him fear some embarrassment in the matter.
Q. You have individual reports from every principal in
your office, haven’t you? A. I— You mean on that matter?
Q. On any matter. From the schools? [25] A. I wouldn’t
say I have individual reports from the principals on every
matter or any matter.
Q. You don’t have it? A. Well, I don’t know what you
mean.
Q. Do you have anything in writing from the principals
in your office? A. Regarding what?
Q. Regarding anything? A. Yes, regarding some things.
There are routine reports which principals turn in and
sign, such as fire-drill reports, attendance reports, and
things of that sort; but this was an entirely different matter.
Q. I know that, but— How often are those reports made,
any reports from the elementary principals to your office?
A. Well, some of them are made every semester, some of
them are made once a year, and some of them are made once
a month.
Q. And those are part of your records? A. That is
correct.
Q. So that it would be most easy to determine the sig
nature of a—the writing of a principal in any of those
blanks which you asked them to turn in? A. No, I don’t
think so. It wasn’t required that they be written. They
might have been typed. Probably some of [26] them were.
Q. And that— A. (Interrupting) I ’ll say— Excuse me.
Q. Go ahead. Finish your answer. A. No, there wasn’t.
No, I couldn’t go through them all and say this belonged
to this man, this belonged to this man, this belonged to
this man, and so on; no. I can’t do that.
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross
122a
Q. Was the answer required of the principal to be turned
in at the same time or at some later time! A, You mean—
You mean was he supposed to fill out that questionnaire
right then and there and turn it in or at a later time?
Q. Yes, sir. A. At a later time.
Q. I see. Now, was their reaction to that submitted to the
Board? A. As I recall, it was submitted to the Instruction
Committee but not to the Board because the Instruction
Committee was charged with—with the job of proposing the
plan or recommending a plan to the Board. Now, I don’t—
I ’m not sure that I presented all the questionnaires to the
Instruction Committee. Possibly I didn’t, but I carried to
the Instruction Committee the impressions which I received,
[27] the expressions of the elementary principals—of the
elementary principals as something which we thought might
help us in formulating a plan.
Q. What do you mean by “expressions?” A. I mean—
I mean indication as to what they thought just as I stated
a while ago, that the majority of them favored a gradual
plan, that a very small number preferred an immediate
plan. I believe there was one—I think there was only one
who favored an immediate and complete plan. The majority
of them wanted a gradual plan and I reported that to the
Instruction Committee. By that— That’s what I mean by
an expression from this—from the elementary principals.
There was a sort of pooling of their opinions.
Q. And your Instruction Committee reported one plan
to the Board, didn’t it? A. The Instruction Committee rec
ommended a plan to the Board.
Q. And but one plan, and that’s the plan that was sub
mitted to the Court? A. Well— Of course, you know
that—
Q. (Interrupting) Answer that yes or no, Mr. Oliver, and
then you can explain anything you want. A. No, I can’t
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—-Cross
123a
answer that yes or no because I don’t know—I ’ll answer it,
but if you will—if you will say [28] when, then I can answer
it yes or no.
Q. I believe you say that you attended all of the meetings
of the Instruction Committee as well as all of the meetings
of the Board! A. Let me see if I can get this clear. You
mean that since the last direction we had from the Court—•
Q. (Interrupting) Yes. A. (Continuing) —the Board
submitted one plan. That’s what you mean, isn’t it?
Q. Yes. A. Then the answer is yes.
Q. Yes. A. I ’m sorry. I didn’t quite understand you.
Q. So that the Board had no other plan to consider ex
cept this one that was submitted to the Court? A. Well,
I wouldn’t say that. Members of the Board were sometimes
invited to meet with the Instruction Committee while the
Instruction Committee was considering plans. No, I
wouldn’t say that the Board had no opportunity to consider
another plan.
Q. I didn’t say that. A. The Board knew. Of course,
the members of the Instruction Committee are members of
the Board and on certain occasions, other members of the
Board were invited to meet [29] with the Instruction Com
mittee, and the Instruction Committee did consider other
plans and the Board of Education was aware of that but
the Instruction Committee finally recommended the plan
which the Board is now presenting to the Court. That is
the only plan which the Instruction Committee submitted
finally to the Board.
Q. And the Board never considered any plan up until
the Instruction Committee reported this plan? A. I would
say officially—officially the Board was not in position to con
sider a plan until the Instruction Committee presented a
plan or recommended a plan, and the Instruction Commit
tee recommended only one plan. So officially that, I suppose,
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross
124a
is the only plan which the Board considered because it is
the only plan which was officially recommended to them.
Q. Mr. Oliver, prior to this question being brought before
the Court did the Board consider homogeneity in placing
its students where it had separate schools! A. Will you
ask that question again please!
Q. Prior to this question being raised relative to segrega
tion, did homogeneity constitute one of the bases upon
which the Board placed students in the schools! A. Mr.
Looby, I wouldn’t be in a position to say what the Board
discussed officially really prior to the bringing up [30] of
the question of desegregation because the question of de
segregation before the Board is older than I am as Superin
tendent, but I will say that the matter of homogeneous
grouping is something which we have been dealing with in
Nashville for a good many years. I t’s— It’s not a new
matter at all. We have been dealing with it for a long time
and wrestling with it, and we don’t know-— We don’t know
what is the best thing to do. We have tried various plans
of homogeneous grouping, and some schools do it more
successfully than others. But if you are trying to find out
now whether that is a new question which has arisen, it is
not.
Q. It is not! A. That’s right.
Q. So that that question was with you before and is with
you now and will be with you long after this question that
we are talking about is settled! A. Yes. I would say that
is true. The question of homogeneous grouping will—is
one which will continue with us.
Q. And from your knowledge of the problems in the field
of education, that remains in all school systems, whether
integrated or not, doesn’t it? A. The question of homo
geneous grouping is one with [31] which I would say—
Well, I— I— Maybe I ’m about to cover too much territory.
W. //. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross
125a
I would say in a public-school system such as Nashville.
Of course, they have school systems in which there are ad
mitted homogeneous groupings in the country, but in a
public school system such as Nashville, the problem of
homogeneous grouping, taking into consideration several
factors, several factors other than race— In fact, I wouldn’t
consider that as the principal factor that I had in mind.
It is a matter of—of background, a matter of aptitudes.
I t’s a matter of achievement. But let me answer your
question a little more directly and apologize for not being
more direct.
Yes, in a school system such as that of Nashville, the
matter of homogeneous grouping is a—is a question which
will remain with us.
Q. Yes. Now, let’s get back to a question or two relative
to disturbances which you emphasize occurred last fall.
Do you contemplate a similar occurrence each year? A.
Mr. Looby, it’s pretty difficult to know what to contemplate.
We try to assume that there won’t be anything that the law-
enforcement agencies available to us cannot handle. They
handled it last fall, handled it pretty well, but in spite of
their handling of it, a great many students were, I think,
damaged by the disturbances which we had.
[32] Q. And do you think an annual disturbance of that
nature for the next 12 years will be profitable? More so
than to have it all over at once? A. Ask that again please,
if you please.
Q. Do you think an annual disturbance that you say—
You say that was a disturbance of the students, a psycho
logical disturbance or whatever disturbance you call it.
Do you think going through that every year for twelve
years will be more profitable to students than getting it
all over at one time? A. Well, I will say this, that if I
thought that it would be the same every year, I think it
W. II. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross
126a
would be better to have it one time rather than eleven,
but that is not the case. I think there is a certain amount,
we might say, of reaction which we may expect, and the
more people that are involved, the more of that we shall
encounter. I t’s pretty difficult to cope with, and I think
it would be better to scatter it out over a period of years.
I think I can make myself clear by saying this:
One time I came in contact with a rabid dog, and I had
to take rabies shots. It would have been possible to give
me the whole dose at one time, but the reaction to the rabies
vaccine is something, so it was given to me in fourteen
instalments. And I think that this is somewhat the [33]
same situation.
Q. You mean it’s just like rabies shots, ehf A. If I may
explain it this way, I think there is a great deal of violent
reaction and opposition we are going to encounter from the
people in our community, and I think that if it is distributed
over a period of years, we can take it better.
Q. Then your primary objection, if you perchance pro
pose to interpret the action of the Board, is that there may
be public disturbances, is one of your reasons for your
objection to total desegregation1? A. If I understand you
correctly, Mr. Looby, and I think I do, one reason why—
In answering your question, yes. One reason why I think
the year-by-year plan is best is that I think that there will
be a good bit of reaction against it and opposition to it
and that that reaction will be easier to deal with and will
be less violent if it is distributed over a period of years.
And the principal person I am pleading for there is the
child himself.
I think that the material loss which we suffered last fall
is small compared with the dread and fright and the dis
turbance which was caused to our children and to the
W. II. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross
127a
principals and to the teachers. It was difficult to work, and
a good many students stayed out for a week or two or
[34] three, and there are probably a few still out today in
so-called private schools of maybe questionable quality.
It is the impact of it all on education which I am trying
to distribute because it will be less harmful in my opinion
if it is distributed over a period of years than if it all
comes at one time.
Is that a clear answer?
Q. My question was directed towards your opinion or
rather how the public acceptance or public rejection af
fected your plan? A. Well, I think that one reason for
favoring this plan is that it will be less objectionable to
the people.
Q. That is one of your primary objections? A. I may
have been a little too brief in answering that. Of course,
what I ’m thinking about is not so much the objection of
the people but the results of that objection on the work of
the schools.
Q. Have you any of those children or the record of any
of those children to show its effect upon the children or
just your opinion? A. Well, I don’t know what kind of
record you could make. Of course, we have attendance
records to show how they were kept out of school.
Q. And that was during the first few days? [35] A. I
beg your pardon?
Q. That was during the first few days? A. It was a
little more than a few days. Some of it extended out over
three or four weeks. Some of them— Some of them never
came back but went to private schools, a small number of
them.
Q. And there’s a number of them go to private schools all
the time, aren’t there? A. Well, these wouldn’t have.
W. II, Oliver—for Defendants—Cross
128a
Q. What private schools are you referring to! A. Well,
let’s see if I can name them. There are two. One of them
was—• I ’m afraid I can’t give the names of them. They
were schools— They were not regularly established private
schools. I wouldn’t have objected to those, but they were
private schools so-called set up just for the specific pur
pose of taking care of children who didn’t want to go to
the mixed schools.
Q. Did they meet the requirements of the public-school
law! A. I assume that they did, some question maybe.
Q. You have no objection to children going to schools
that meet the public-school requirement, do you! A. I
have no objection to students going to a private school.
I think that the private schools to which we are [36] gen
erally accustomed provide good educational opportunities
for children, but I have some doubt as to whether these
did because in one of them, for instance, they had one
teacher and they had students of about seven different
grades. It was somewhat like the old one-room eight-grade
school house which I think has generally been considered
not as good as what we have now.
Q. What have you or the Board of Education done with
respect to those children that are not attending public
schools and not attending schools approved by the Board
of Education or some accrediting agency! A. The Board
of Education doesn’t approve the private schools in the
city.
Q. I said “or some accrediting agency.” A. There is an
accrediting agency which approves high schools.
Q. Mr. Oliver, let’s get right down to the meat of the
question I ’m asking you. Has anything been done about
those children not attending adequate public schooling!
A. Well, we have got a list of their names and their ages
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants-—Cross
129a
and their addresses and their grades. We were not in posi
tion to do anything about them except to leave them alone.
Q. I see. Well, isn’t it true that children who are not
[37] attending public-—who are of public-school age and
not attending public school, that their parents may be
prosecuted? A. No. The law states that they must attend
a school which meets in the daytime, and it is pretty indefi
nite as to the requirements of that school. It is hard to
say from the state requirements just what constitutes a
school really.
Q. Those children weren’t denied admission to any school,
were they? A. No. No. They were not denied admission
to the public schools.
Q. And the public schools are now open to them? A.
That is correct.
Mr. Looby: I believe that is all.
Mr. Hunt: That is all, Mr. Oliver, unless the Court
has some question.
The Court: No, I don’t think of any at this time.
I might later on.
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Direct
E l m e r L ee P e t t it , c a lle d a s a w itn e s s in b e h a lf o f th e
d e fe n d a n t, b e in g f i r s t d u ly sw o rn , te s tif ie d a s f o l lo w s :
Direct Examination by Mr. Boult:
[38] Q. Mr. Pettit, will you please state your age and
residence? A. 49 years of age; Nashville, Tennessee; 1915
Tenth Avenue, North.
Q. I believe it can be stated that you are the acting
Chairman of the School Board of the City of Nashville. Is
that correct? A. That’s correct.
130a
Q. Will you state for the record why the Chairman is not
here and really why you are acting as acting Chairman?
A. Well, the Chairman is convalescing from a heart attack
and for that reason I was elected Chairman pro tern.
Q. How long have you been a member of the School
Board? A. Six years.
Q. How long have you been a member of the Instruc
tion Committee? A. Six years.
Q. Are you at the present time Chairman of the Instruc
tion Committee? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Pettit, referring to the matters which have de
veloped under the authority of the Instruction Committee
since the last hearing in this court in January, will you
state whether or not the Instruction Committee has con
tinued [39] its discussion and investigation of the problem
of furnishing an additional and supplemental report to this
Court upon the question of desegregation? A. The In
struction Committee has met numerous times, and also we
have invited—insisted that each Board member be at those
meetings and especially when we knew that we would dis
cuss the desegregation. Most members have attended those
meetings and taken part in the discussion of those—of the
plan.
Q. As a result of those discussions did the Instruction
Committee prepare and submit to the Board a report
recommending a plan of desegregation? A. Yes.
Q. Was that plan adopted by the Board? A. Yes.
Q. Can you identify the plan which has been filed here
with the Court and which was identified by Mr. Oliver as
being the plan submitted by the Instruction Committee with
its recommendation and subsequently officially adopted by
the Board? A. Yes.
Q. You have heard Mr. Oliver testify and he testified to
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants■—Direct
131a
the essential components of that plan. They are correct,
are they not? [40] A. Yes, sir.
Q. Of course, the plan speaks for itself as filed with the
records of the Court. Mr. Pettit, do you have any children
in the public schools of Nashville? A. Yes.
Q. How many do you have in the public schools of Nash
ville and in what grades are they during the present school
year? A. I have one daughter, a senior in high school,
North High. I have a boy eight years in the second grade
at Jones, and I have a boy, Jimmy, that’s in the first grade
at Jones.
Q. Was Jones School one of the schools which was in
volved in certain disturbances which are described as a
part of the record in this case which occurred last August
and September 1957 ? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have your two boys continued to go to Jones School
since that time? A. Yes, sir.
Q. You are then familiar with the occurrences which
occurred last September and you had a personal interest
in those occurrences because your two little boys were in
that school? A. Yes.
[41] Q. Mr. Pettit, you then have been acting not only as
a member of the School Board but your interests include
those of a concerned parent, do they not? A. Yes.
Q. State to the Court, Mr. Pettit, why you individually
and as acting - Chairman of the School Board feel that the
plan which has been filed with this Court is the best plan
for the City of Nashville in its public schools. A. Well,
first after we had—- 1 might say that at all times we never
refused any groux) of people or anyone that came to our
Board meetings to offer anything on the subject. We didn’t
turn down any x>erson.. We also never turned down anyone
that came to the Instruction Committee to talk with us
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Direct
132a
about it. We did not go out and invite special groups to
come in, but we did— We listened to all, and we studied it.
The— We came up with two different views. We had one
view that—people that were very strong towards desegre
gation. The other group were very bitterly opposed to
desegregation. Those two groups of people made up—-
They were the majority of the people that appeared before
the Board. We had one group, only one group of parents
that really represented the parents of the school children.
Most of the others were organizations that were either
sponsored, I ’d say, or more or less had outside interests
that came into Nashville to try to [42] give us advice and
professional and expert assistance, as they might call it,
but each side claimed that they were experts, but they
were so far apart that the Board decided the thing that we
were concerned about was to—to obey the Court order and
at the same time try to do what was best for the schools of
Nashville with the main thing in mind was that our children
who everybody had been forgetting are the ones that should
be educated; and that’s the thing that we are concerned
about, educating the children, and also we are concerned
about obeying the laws of the land. And for that reason
we, after talking with our supervisors and superintendent,
that we thought the wisest plan was the gradual plan to
go up one year at a time.
Q. Now, Mr. Pettit, state your opinion or reason, your
judgment, why you feel that a one-year-at-a-time plan, the
year-by-year plan as Mr. Oliver has referred to it, is pref
erable to any other type of block plan or total desegre
gation. A. Well, I think the— When we resolve one prob
lem, it creates so many other problems that by doing it
in the first grade— We— We had to— We didn’t have too
much trouble in the class room. Of course, the teachers
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Direct
133a
were—did have tension, I mean, but they were— The
classes, most of them, had probably one colored in the class
along with the white, [43] and the teacher was able to cope
with it, and for that reason, the problems—our main prob
lems were on the outside in this; but had we started at the
other end, our problems would have been on the inside and
outside, and then our educational system would have suf
fered as far as the children were concerned. This way, I
think we were able to still give our first-graders the—
the education they deserved, maybe not as good as we
should have, but it—the trouble was at a minimum inside
the school.
Q. Can you state whether or not there is still— You have
stated, I believe, that there is still some tension! A. There
is. Naturally, the—the teacher in a new experience, she’s
concerned. She doesn’t want to hurt the—the minority,
the little colored boy in the class, and still she’s tense,
afraid— She doesn’t want all the white parents jumping on
her neck, and— So far, though, the teachers have been
able to handle the—as far as I know, handle the situa
tions, and we’ve had no trouble with that.
Q. In spite of the existence of tension, the size of the
problem has been such that the teachers have been able to
handle it! A. That’s right,
Q. Under the present one year. Is the fact that, you
have in effect learned by doing on this one year going to
be [44] of assistance in the year-by-year plan, step up year
by year in your opinion! A. I think so. I think from the
inside, in the school room, if they move up, they are already
in the class and part of the class, and your problem won’t—
won’t exist there as far as the educational— And, then,
too, if their adjustment, their level, their achievement level,
if there is a difference there, then the child— We still—
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Direct
134a
Here in Nashville, if they don’t pass the grade, we still
leave them; and for that reason, they—things will be ad
justed that way regardless, and they will keep their level,
achievement level as they go through school.
Q. They will have gone through the same educational
experiences themselves, all from the first grade on up
through the 12th grade year by year? A. That’s right.
Q. Now, Mr. Pettit, in order to make the record perfectly
clear, is it or not true that the plan which was adopted
by the Board was adopted with the Chairman absent on
account of her health and one negative vote cast by a mem
ber, Coyness L. Ennix? A. That’s right.
Q. Is that or not correct? A. Yes.
[45] Q. And all of the other votes of the Board were in
favor of the plan which was filed with the Court? A. Yes.
Q. Is there anything else that you would like to say to
the Court, Mr. Pettit, in connection with the present hear
ing and the present plan? A. No, I don’t think there is
anything else.
Mr. Boult: You may ask him.
Cross Examination by Mr. Williams:
Q. Mr. Pettit? That is correct, isn’t it? A. Yes, that’s
right.
Q. You testified that you had a personal interest in this—
A. That’s right.
Q. —because of your children having been involved in
the desegregation situation last September? A. That’s
right.
Q. Your children didn’t have any rocks or bricks thrown
at them, did they? A. No, sir.
Q. They weren’t spit on? A. No, sir.
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross
135a
Q. I believe that occurred purely with regard to the
[46] Negro children last September. The children who
were members of the class here seeking the desegregation of
the schools, they were the ones who were spit on and had
rocks thrown at them. Is that correct, sir? A. Well, the
only way I know was reading it in the paper. I didn’t see
it.
Q. You weren’t there on the scene? A. I was— I was
at one school, yes, on the scene. I made it a point to stay
there those days.
Q. Yes. I believe you testified that in the vote on this
plan that you had one dissenting— The Chairman was
absent, and you had one dissenting vote? A. Yes.
Q. Which was the vote of the Negro member, Mr. Ennix?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there any plan, Mr. Pettit, wThich was considered
which would have desegregated more slowly than the plan
which you now propose to the Court? A. You mean did
we discuss plans like that?
Q. Was there considered by the Instruction Committee
or the Board any plan which would have— A. (Interrupt
ing) We talked— Yes. We talked of several different ap
proaches to it.
Q. Well, sir, what I am asking is if there was any plan
[47] which was considered which would have extended the
period of desegregation out over a longer period than the
12 years which the Board now proposes to the Court? A.
Over a longer, no. No, there were none.
Q. Then, in point of gradualism, this was the most ex
treme plan which was considered by the Board. Is that cor
rect, sir? A. That’s right. We—
Q. What other plans have been considered by the Board
at times in the past, Mr. Pettit? A. We— We considered
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross
136a
starting at the high-school level, probably the 12th—11th
and 12th, but we—
Q. That was prior to the January hearing in this case?
A. That was a couple of years ago.
Q. A couple of years ago, you had considered starting at
the high-school level? A. We didn’t really consider it.
I mean it was brought up to debate the question. We didn’t
consider it seriously.
Q. I don’t know whether I ’m in order in asking this ques
tion, but was the plan for beginning at the high-school
level proposed by your Negro member, your minority mem
ber? A. No, sir.
Q. What position did he take? A. On that particular—
[48] Q. (Interrupting) What position has he taken with
regard to the plan which the Board should submit? A.
Well, I don’t— As— As Chairman, when we all discussed
it, I don’t know that—
Q. You are not familiar with that position? A. Not
familiar enough to say what— I think he would be the one
to answer that.
Q. This plan in which you stated the Board considered
two years ago to begin at the high-school level, would you
state that plan in greater detail to the Court, if you please,
sir? A. Well, we thought we would start wuth the 12th
grade one year, and the 11th, but after we— We didn’t
discuss it too long because the Superintendent said educa
tionally it wasn’t sound. And I might— I might add that
(and I think that probably the purpose was that) in that
plan that probably there wouldn’t be any that would trans
fer in the 12th grade, and maybe there wouldn’t be any in
the 11th; and then, if they did, why then, we’d have a lot
of trouble, but we—we just discarded that plan because
we—we— We thought it would be trying to get around
the Court order, and we were not trying to do that. We
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross
137a
were trying to abide by the Court ruling, and not try to
get around it. So we switched ends there and started to
try to work it out the [49] best we could from an educa
tional standpoint.
Q. Mr. Pettit, did the Board at any time consider a three-
stage plan of taking a normal functioning unit each year :
this year the first six grades, this year the junior-high
grades, and the following year the senior-high grades!
Did the Board at any time consider such a plan? A. We—
We had discussed it.
Q. And that was over two years ago also, was it not?
A. Oh, no. No. I wouldn’t say. I mean any member is free
to bring up any plan, and we would— We’d pick it apart
and then we—
Q. (Interrupting) Was such a plan also considered by
the Instruction Committee? A. You mean in our unit?
Q. Yes, sir. A. Not as— I don’t recall any specific plan
where it would take the different units, primary, elemen
tary, junior high, and high school.
Q. Then the Board hasn’t even considered that plan,
the plan of desegregating a normal functioning unit at a
time? A. We—We had— We had discussed the fact where
the elementary and high schools, and then we discussed the
two or three, and it’s hard to say. In our school, we don’t—
We don’t have the three-grade division really as a func
tional [50] separation there in the operation of them like
the three grades and next three grades.
Q. Mr. Pettit, assuming that the high schools of the City
of Nashville were to be desegregated this coming Septem
ber, on the racial zones which were provided in the plan
which was partially approved by this Court on January 21,
1957, can you state how many—approximately how many
Negroes there would be in integrated situations in high
schools? A. No, I couldn’t.
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross
138a
Q. Has the Instruction Committee considered such fig
ures'? A. No.
Q. Then, the Instruction Committee has not taken the
school population and the respective geographical loca
tions of the schools according to the zones which the Board
has set up and determined how many Negro students would
he integrated in white schools in hypothetical situations?
A. We had that. I think at first we had the number.
Q. Tou had it as to the first grade? A. No. When we
first started discussing it, I—we had the—the— In our
census we had it broken down then. That’s been probably
two years ago since we had that number.
Q. Then, in submitting the plan which is now proposed
[51] to the Court, the Instruction Committee and the Board
of Education as a matter of fact do not know exactly how
large an integrated situation you would have if the entire
school system was desegregated in September, do they?
A. I don’t right now. I couldn’t give you that figure.
Q. And if the high schools were to be integrated in Sep
tember, they wouldn’t know how many? A. Well, it’s—
It’s hard to— It— It would be hard to tell. We had those
figures, but we can’t— When we built a new school, accord
ing to the census and the Bureau of Statistics, we figured
that we needed a hundred—we had a hundred first-graders.
When school opened, there were 160 first-graders. And you
can’t— And the way the population shifts and moves, it’s
hard to know.
Q. Well, as a matter of fact, it was in evidence before the
Court on January 21, 1957, that there were approximately
3,000 children involved in the integration situation for this
past September in the first grade. As a matter of fact,
there are actually only eight or nine Negro children in inte
grated situations. Is that correct, Mr. Pettit? A. At the
present time?
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross
139a
Q. Yes. And how many schools does that situation in
volve! A. Six—seven. I might say there’s only your nine
[52] Negro students involved, but you have your white.
I think you should— Your white students are involved in
that, too. We’re not just— Our problem is not just the nine
colored children.
Q. Oh, we understand that, sir. A. They’re all involved.
The only difference is the hundred or so that out of that
total that chose to go to the—to remain or go to the colored
school.
Q. Yes, s ir; but how many first-grade schools do you have
here in the City of Nashville? A. Elementary?
Q. How many schools, that is, that include the first grade,
sir? A. That include the first grade?
Q. Yes, sir. A. Let’s see. About—I don’t know the exact
number. Thirty-some-odd.
Q. Approximately 30? A. Something.
Q. And of the first-grade integration, which occurred
under your present zoning system which you adopted last
January (that is, January ’57) or thereafter pursuant to
the plan approved on that date, only six out of 30 schools
were involved in integrated situations? [53] A. Six or
seven. I believe it’s six.
Q. Yes, sir. Is that entire number of six presently in
volved or was that the number originally involved? A.
They’re the ones involved now.
Q. Now, Mr. Pettit, you say that—- You testified, I be
lieve, that the people—that the Board invited people—
Bid the Board actually extend a formal invitation to people
from the Community to render whatever assistance they
could on the desegregation problem? A. I can’t say. The
only thing, I think we announced in our meeting, but we
never— We had so many people there we didn’t have
room to invite anybody else.
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross
140a
Q. Well, sir, has that been true at every meeting that
the Board has had! A. Not every meeting, just when some
one heard that we were going to discuss this problem. Then
it filled up fast.
Q. People have attended the Board meetings! A. Yes,
they have.
Q. I believe that was true even before this suit was filed,
was it not, sir! A, Well, not to the extent that they did
after the—- Yes. Before— Not before the suit was filed.
Q. Well, isn’t it true as a matter of fact that before
the suit was filed, that a number of Negro parents attended
[54] your Board meetings and asked the—both Negro
and some white parents! A. Some white, yes. We had the
white ones first.
Q. And asked the Board to desegregate the schools! A.
That’s right.
Q. And the people who have been meeting with you re
cently are primarily white, some white people. Is that cor
rect! A. No. We— It’s about half. We’ve had more
representing the colored, or—
Q. You had— Pardon me. A. Yes, we had recently—
We had two groups the last meeting, one wanting to— Well,
like they always— They don’t want to desegregate. The
other group, bringing in some petitions signed by lots of—•
some religious organization. Of course, they were all
colored, and they were probably sponsored by this CORE
outfit.
Q. Well, sir, I ’m not asking you what— I ’m not asking
you to speculate now. A. O.K.
Q. If you please, Mr. Pettit, if you will just testify what
happened. I don’t want your speculation. A. I ’m just tell
ing you the groups that came and who—
[55] Q. (Interrupting) This remark, “probably was
sponsored.” May I ask you this, sir: Will you name some
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross
141a
of the organizations whose names appeared on that petition
asking the Board to desegregate? A. The names on the
petition?
Q. Yes, sir. I believe you stated that there were some
names of some organizations on the petition asking the
Board to desegregate. A. Well, they were mostly churches,
a group of Methodist churches and Baptist churches and one
labor union, but mostly they were all organizations—
Q. (Interrupting) A labor union? A. Yes.
Q. What labor union was that, sir? A. Some— Well, I
don’t recall the name. It was some local.
Q. Were there any Jewish organizations listed on that?
A. On that particular one, I don’t recall.
Q. Well, have you had petitions from Jewish organiza
tions, sir, with regard to the desegregation question? A.
Yes, we have.
Q. What has been the tenor of their— A. I couldn’t tell
you exactly what they— They weren’t—
[56] Q. In general, has it been favorable toward deseg
regation? A. Yes, I think so.
Q. Where were these churches located that you indicated
were listed on these petitions that were recently brought?
A. They were all located around—
Q. Here in Nashville? A. Here in Nashville. I think all
of them were Nashville churches.
Q. How many were there, sir, all together? A. Well, I
got a supplement to that with probably 10 or 15 more, and I
don’t know the exact number.
Q. Well, on the original, could you approximate it please,
sir? A. I—I just couldn’t. There was a big stack of them,
but I don’t—I didn’t count the exact number.
Q. I call your attention to the newspaper report that
there were 26 organizations on the original. Would that—
A. That would be about—
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross
142a
Q. That would be approximately correct, wouldn’t it?
A. That would be probably correct, I would say.
Q. Then you didn’t intend to say— You didn’t intend
the Court to understand you as saying a while ago as I did
—as I understood you to say, that these people who were
[57] petitioning the Board, represented outside—to de
segregate the schools, represented outside interests that
merely came into Nashville and tried to tell you what to
do? A. What I— What I mean, I think the extremes on
both sides are probably pressured from the outside.
Q. Yes, sir. Oh, you— A. (Interrupting) Except the—
Q. (Interrupting) Are you taking the position, Mr. Pettit,
that the Nashville Board of Education cannot find anything
of value to assist it in desegregating that comes from out
side the State of Tennessee? A. No, sir.
Q. Are you taking the position that all textbooks are
written in the State of Tennessee, sir? A. No, sir. I
know—-
Q. (Interrupting) You use textbooks in your schools that
are written outside the State of Tennessee? A. Yes, sir.
I—I am aware of that.
Q. Yes, sir. I gather from what you have stated that
the Board of Education then is taking the position that in
approaching desegregation that outside help should be
shunned insofar as devising any technique, insofar as de
termining techniques and methods of desegregating the
schools? A. No. We didn’t— We didn’t take that at
titude.
[58] Q. On what facts did you base your statement, sir,
that you thought that— Well, let me withdraw that ques
tion. You stated that there were two extremes, that there
was a group which wanted to—that was bitterly opposed to
desegregation, and that there was a group which was very—
ah, bitterly opposed to desegregation, and that there was a
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross
143a
group which, was very strong for desegregation. Mr. Pettit,
hasn’t the Board taken the position that it would comply
with the law as declared by the Supreme Court? A. We
have. We have.
Q. Then, Mr. Pettit, isn’t the Board strong for desegrega
tion? A. That— That’s— It’s according to— We intend
(and have always) to follow the order of the Court, but at
the same time, the Supreme Court didn’t say, “You’ve got to
do that September 1st, 1956,” or “’7,” and in good conscience,
we’re trying to work out something that’s been given us as
a school board to work out with the idea of educating the
children and complying with the law, but—but for some
thing that’s gone on for 70 years, and then expect us to
remedy it over night— Our main purpose is education.
Q. Yes, sir. A. And we’re— We’ve tried to (and to the
best that we know how)—to work it out where we can and
not have any [59] trouble like we had last fall.
Q. Yes, sir. And I agree with you, Mr. Pettit, on the
side— If I may just make that remark on the side, I agree
with you that your main problem is education. I would like
to ask you this: Doesn’t the efficiency of your education
depend to some extent in this desegregation situation on the
extent to which you educate the public? A. Sure. I think
the public must be educated, yes.
Q. What steps has the Board taken since the desegrega
tion decision in 1954 to attempt to educate the public? A.
We had— Our Superintendent at that time did go to all
the schools. He didn’t get to all of them because of his
health. And—and they had meetings and we tried to ex
plain it, and that— As far as the school, that’s as far as
we went with it because primarily we—we’re supposed to
run the school inside, to educate the children, and as far
as— It’s not really our problem to educate the parents. I
mean we try to, but it’s just more than we can—we can do.
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross
144a
Q. Well, Mr. Pettit, isn’t it the policy of the Board to
try to educate the public insofar as safety matters are con
cerned, insofar as school safety of children going to and
from school is concerned? A. School safety, yes.
Q. And safety of children in school insofar as the [60]
conduct of their parents may affect that? A. We— We
teach safety in school, but as far as trying to teach the
parents outside, I mean after school or things like that,
we don’t go into that.
Q. Sir, aren’t your parent-teacher associations designed
to obtain a close liaison between the school officials and
teachers and the public? A. I—I think that’s what the
Parent Teacher Association tries to do.
Q. Was any effort made by the Board of Education after
the first or second desegregation—segregation decision in
the Brown case, or at any time, to attempt to educate the
parents and the general public to the idea that the Board
was going to comply with the law and that it was inevitable ?
Was that at any time done through the PTA’s or through
any other method? A. We have a PTA panel at our Board
representing two groups, and they at first said they would
—they would help the Board. And, also, there has always
been cooperation between us and the PTA, and I think
they have—they have worked hard to—to help in this.
Q. Mr. Pettit, has the Board ever made any firm, un
equivocal statement through its PTA’s, or to the community
through any other organization, that “We intend to comply
[61] with the law and we intend to do it soon and we expect
the cooperation of the community”? A. We made that
statement not long after the Supreme Court made—that we
were going to abide by the law, that we were going to
follow the Supreme Court, but as far as telling the PTA
that we were going to do it and expected them to cooperate,
I don’t recall ever doing it—the Board ever doing it.
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross
145a
Q. And as a matter of fact, the Board has been lukewarm
about its attempt to comply with the Supreme Court’s deci
sion throughout the time since the decision? A. No, sir;
I can’t agree with you.
Q. Well, sir, I think you testified—or did you testify
that you thought the majority of the community was in
favor—was against desegregation? A. I didn’t say that.
I think it’s— It’s probably generally believed that most of
the white people are against it, and I can’t speak for other
people.
Q. Is that why you thought:—you testified that you
thought the wisest plan was a gradual plan to go up one
year at a time, that the Board thought that? A. That is
one reason. Surely.
Q. That is the main reason, isn’t it? A. Not— No. I
don’t know as it is the main. I t’s [62] one of the main. I t’s
one. I t’s a main reason. I t’s a strong reason.
Q. Now, Mr. Pettit, last September when the schools
desegregated— The first grade has been desegregated now
insofar as situations, which you mentioned, since last Sep
tember. That involves six principals, does it not? A. Yes.
Q. Has there ever been a meeting of those principals
among themselves on the desegregation question? A. I
know we had one the first day.
Q. Have you had one since the first day, Mr. Pettit? A.
That— The Superintendent probably has.. I wouldn’t know.
The Board hasn’t.
Q. Insofar as he has reported to the Board, you have no
knowledge of any such meeting? A. The Board did not
call them in.
Q. You testified, I believe, that you thought that you
could handle the situation as long as it was in that context,
in the context of one grade at a time and in small situations.
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross
146a
What do you base that statement on, Mr. Pettit, what factual
basis ? A. Facts ?
Q. Yes, sir. A. Just the nine members on the Board get
ting together [63] and trying to reason out what would
be the best, and after we tried one grade this fall, if we had
had twice that many schools, you wouldn’t have had the
police to take care of them because we used every one they
had, and it was still pretty rough because I was— I went
through the crowd to take my child to school, and if I hadn’t
been on the Board, he wouldn’t have gone back the next day
because it wasn’t the right condition for a child to go to
school.
Q. Yes, sir; and then the Board— And that is another
reason why the Board has reached the conclusion that the
12-year plan is best because, based on your reasoning among
yourselves from the September incident, you think that if
that situation were magnified that it would be a problem
that the police couldn’t handle. Is that correct, sir? A.
That— That’s not the— That’s one reason. That’s one
reason only. The main— The main reason is education,
and after our Superintendent and supervisors, and they
believed to the best of their knowledge that they could
handle the situation, that they could educate the children,
and it would work out and not be too hard to administer, the
School Board— We took their advice and judgment on it.
Q. The Board has not at any time considered a compro
mise on the question of this time? A. We— We— We’ve
discussed all different angles.
[64] Q. Has the Board considered, Mr. Pettit, in its
assumption that the incident difficulties in September
would be magnified if integration were begun at once ? Has
the Board considered that it would be considerably more
magnified if it occurred a year at a time for the next 12
years? A. I don’t—don’t get all your question just like—
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross
147a
Q. Well, sir, you stated that one of the reasons why the
Board favored the 12-year plan was that based on the diffi
culty, reasoning among the nine members-—that based on the
difficulty which occurred last September, the Board felt that
if all the schools had been desegregated at the same time,
the police would not have been able to handle them, that
that was one of the main reasons. A. That—
Q. (Interrupting) Now, I ’m asking you, sir, has the
Board considered the great difficulty which would be in
volved should that situation re-occur every September for
the next 11 years? A. We—- We believe that on the
gradual plan that it will get smaller each year, the opposi
tion to it, and that’s—
Q. (Interrupting) Then, sir, the Board does not believe
that you will have that problem for any number of years.
Is that true, sir ? A. I don’t think it will be as great as we
had.
[65] Q. Well, sir, if— Assuming your first pos
tulate, that desegregation was to occur all at once, if it had
been ordered all at once in September, are you taking the
position that the difficulties which you are assuming would
have occurred then would continue to exist? A. I don’t
know.
Q. Then, sir, you— Well, what is your belief in that
regard, sir? A. You mean whether—if we desegregated
the whole thing, what would have happened then?
Q. Do you believe that any difficulties that you might
have would just continue indefinitely or do you believe
that that would subside just as you think it will subside
before the end of this 12 years? A. That’s something that
I can’t answer, and I don’t believe anybody else can.
Q. You can’t answer this, but you would attempt to an
swer the other? A. Well, I think—I think any gradual, as
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross
148a
people become accustomed to it, there will be less opposition
to it.
Q. Thank you, sir.
Redirect Examination by Mr. Boult:
Q. Mr. Pettit, I want to ask you if the PTA organization
[66] as such is organized by or responsible to the Board
of Education? A. No, sir.
Q. State whether or not it is a purely voluntary organiza
tion at each separate school? A. It is a voluntary organiza
tion, and I know nothing else about it, only I pay my dues.
Q. It has its own city-wide and state-wide organization,
but the Board of Education has nothing to do with that?
A. It has nothing to do with it.
Q. Mr. Pettit, I believe you testified in connection with
your own child at the school. I will ask you if you remained
at the school with your child? A. Yes, I did.
Q. For how many days? A. Two whole— Two days
and then the next day there wasn’t anybody there but about
one or two boys, mine and another boy and a little colored
boy. That’s just about all they had the rest of the week so
I didn’t see any use staying there.
Q. You mean there were only three children in the grade?
A. There might—might have been—
Q. Three or four children? A. There was one or two,
just two in his class, I think, [67] but they got up as high
as 15 or 20, I guess, during the week. I ’m not sure.
Q. With reference to the attendance, I will ask you if
that did not only occasion—the incidents of last September
did not only occasion the physical damage to the Hattie
Cotton School, but was there or not a loss in the daily
attendance average figures? A. There was quite a loss
in the—as far as our state revenue—
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Redirect
149a
Q. State funds? A. State funds on average daily at
tendance.
Q. And that was in a substantial amount? A. Yes.
Q. Now, in connection with the high-school situation and
the abatement of the impact of admittance of a large group
to more than one grade, and simply for the record, I want
to ask you if there are not colored students in more than
one grade admitted in Little Rock, Arkansas, according to
the reports?
Mr. Looby: If Your Honor please, I object to what
happened in Little Rock, Arkansas, unless he can
testify of his own knowledge.
The Court: Yes. He would have to know of his
own knowledge.
[68] By the Court :
Q. Ho you know that of your own knowledge? A. No,
sir.
By Mr. Boult:
Q. That is all, only what public information has been
reported. Now, Mr. Pettit, in your opinion would the mul
tiplying of the problem by two, six, or twelve times result
in making it easier to handle or more difficult to handle?
A. You mean if we take more than the—
Q. (Interrupting) One grade year by year. A. I think
so.
Q. You think it would be more difficult? A. It would be
more difficult.
Q. Also, in that connection, state whether or not you and
the Instruction Committee and the Board have tried to
relate the problem to the city limits of Nashville, Tennessee?
A. Yes.
Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Redirect
150a
Q. And its educational system? A. We have.
Q. And your testimony is that the plan submitted is in
your judgment the best for Nashville, Tennessee, public
schools? [69] A. That’s right.
Mr. Boult: Come down, Mr. Pettit.
Further this witness saith not.
The Court: We will take a 10-minute recess.
(A brief recess was taken at 11:00 A.M.)
Mary Brent—for Defendants—Direct
Miss Mary B rent, called as a witness in behalf of the
defendant, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:
Direct Examination by Mr. Boult:
Q. This is Miss Mary Brent? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Miss Brent, I am not going to ask you how old you
are, but I am going to ask you how long you have been a
teacher or a principal in the system of the Nashville Board
of Education, the City Schools? A. I have been a teacher
in the Nashville Schools for 24 years. Nineteen years of
those I have been principal.
Q. Where are you now principal and how long have you
been principal? A. I am now at Glenn School in East
Nashville, and this [70] is my 16th year there.
Q. Glenn School is located, I believe, at 322 Cleveland
Street, East Nashville, Tennessee? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Miss Brent, were you the principal and on duty as
such at Glenn School during the days of August and Sep
tember 1957 during which time disturbances and violence
occurred in connection with the enrollment and attendance
of certain Negro children in the first grade at Glenn
School? A. Yes, sir; in August and September.
151a
Q. There appears in the record in this case an affidavit
signed by you in connection with the hearing for an in
junction in connection with such disturbances. I will ask
you if you have recently re-read that affidavit and if it
accurately states your recollection of the occurrences at
and around your school during that time? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Without going further into it at this time, it can
be referred to as your testimony in that connection as a
part of the record upon this hearing? A. That is true.
Q. Miss Brent, how many Negro children, first-graders,
are in your school, Glenn School, at the present time? A.
We have two students—two Negro students enrolled.
[71] Q. Are they presently in attendance at Glenn School?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And have they been since last fall when they enrolled?
A. Since the very beginning.
Q. Are they in the same section of the first grade, or are
they in separate sections? A. No, sir. They are in sepa
rate sections, and I would like to make an explanation of
that. In— When beginning first grades come in, they are
not all of exactly the same age. Of course, they may come
in just any time within their sixth year. We divide the
children chronologically. We put the children of the first—
born in the first four months in one group, the second four
months in another, the last four months in another. We
have three groups of the first grade. When these two
Negro children were enrolled, one of them fell in the group
of the oldest children, the other fell in the group of the
youngest.
Q. That was a natural— A. (Interrupting) That was a
natural.
Q. (Continuing) —and historical classification? A.
That’s right. They were enrolled, in other words, and
divided just as the rest of the children.
Mary Brent—for Defendants—Direct
152a
Q. Miss Brent, since September 1957, state whether or
[72] not there has continued to exist a tension in your school
and in your school constituency? A. Yes, sir; there has.
We have managed, since there are only the two children.
We have fairly well managed to keep it down within the
school itself, but it’s mostly on the outside that we have
felt it. The two Negro children are brought to school each
day and are taken home by one or other of the parents.
That’s one thing.
There have been two or three incidents within the school
that older children had brought about. As far as the
children with their own first-grade group, they are well
accepted. Things have gone on fairly smoothly, but with
the older children we have had some trouble.
I myself have been the brunt of several pretty bad
things. I mean such as anonymous telephone calls and call
ing me different names that a lady doesn’t appreciate. And
for the first— I ’d say the first six weeks, there was a con
stant stream of parents in and out of the school putting up
the arguments to me that I had listened to most of the
summer; and sometimes they would go away satisfied, some
times they would not. Some of them have never come back
into the school since that time.
Q. And has there been dissension or tension in the Parent-
Teacher organization itself? [73] A. Well, as far as the
organization itself, the president—most of the officers have
been determined that they were going to make it hold to
gether, and they have done so; but I would say maybe 20
parents, maybe more (between 20 and 30), have failed to
join the Parent-Teacher Association for the first time, and
they gave that reason, not to me but to other people, that
that was why they did not join.
Q. In connection with these abusive telephone calls that
you have received, state whether or not they have occurred
Mary Brent—for Defendants—Direct
153a
as late as within the last several weeks of 19581 A. Yes,
sir. The last one I had was the Saturday night, or rather
early Sunday morning following the bombing of the Jewish
Temple. That’s about three weeks ago.
Q. I am not going to ask you to repeat the language which
was used, but ask you the hour of the night that you were
called? A. It was about 1:30 in the morning.
Q. And did the -caller identify who it wras calling? A.
Not at all. And on that occasion, I tried to get the person
to repeat. It was a lady—a woman (let’s put it that way)
at that time, and I tried to. get her to repeat what she said
so that I might be able to get the voice. I couldn’t do it.
[74] Q. Miss Brent, in connection with education and the
education of children, that I believe you would regard as
your primary responsibility? A. That’s right.
Q. Do you. actually teach at the present time? A. No.
I am not a teacher.
Q. Do you feel that the education of the two Negro chil
dren in the first grade has progressed satisfactorily? A.
Yes, sir; I do. In the case of one child, it has been excep
tionally good. In the case of the other child, she is im
mature, she is young, and the work has been hard for her.
Q. In connection with the other children in the grade,
the white children, have they also seemed to progress satis
factorily, meaning compared to other years educationally?
A. I can’t see that this has made any difference in their
progress. The only thing is: We almost had to discount
the first month of school because of the pulling and pushing,
pulling children out of school and bringing them back;
and deciding that they’d go to the county, and bringing
them back again. Until about the second week in October,
we did not have our roll set up to where we honestly knew
which children belonged to us and which were going to stay.
Now, that is the only thing which has held us back.
Mary Brent—for Defendants—Direct
154a
[75] Q. Have your teachers, particularly the first-grade
teachers, undertaken to perform their duties under these
difficult circumstances? A. They certainly have, and they
have done a beautiful job.
Q. Has it been difficult? A. It has been very difficult.
Q. Are you familiar with (meaning have you read) the
plan which is proposed at this time by the Nashville Board
of Education and which has been filed with this court and
which is the subject matter of this hearing? A. I have
only read it in the paper.
Q. I believe it wTas accurately copied and reported—
quoted in the newspaper. You are familiar with the fact
that it is a year-by-year plan as it has been called in the
courtroom this morning? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And it retains the transfer provisions and also con
tains a provision providing for subsequent report to this
court if deemed necessary. Now, that refreshes your mind
about it, does it not? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Miss Brent, based upon your experience as a teacher
and as a principal, as one who has had the experiences at
[76] Glenn School which you have described, give us your
opinion and judgment about the advisability of the new
proposed year-by-year plan.
Mr. Looby: If Your Honor please, we want to
object to that question, this witness’s opinion. The
opinion of the defendant may be admissible, but I
doubt if the opinion of this lady would be admissible.
The Court: Well, she has had 24 years of school
experience. I think she qualifies as an expert on
school matters.
Mr. Looby: Your Honor allows it?
The Court: Yes. I will allow her to answer. I
think she clearly qualifies to express an opinion.
Mary Brent—for Defendants—Direct
155a
Mary Brent—for Defendants—Direct
By Mr. Boult:
Q. Miss Brent, answer the question please. Do you think
it advisable? And if so, why? A. I think it’s the only
plan that we in Nashville can accept right nowr and make
work. If people had been at Glenn School as I was during
the last of August and most all of September last year—in
1957, they would realize that it was not an easy thing to do.
Any radical change is bound to bring chaos, and this was
certainly a radical change.
Now, in an educational institution, teachers cannot
[77] do their best in the midst of excitement and turmoil
and upheaval. I feel that if we can do this and get it over
in people’s minds that it is the law of the land, that we
are trying to do our best to accomplish the purpose that
the Supreme Court—the thing that the Supreme Court has
set up for us to do, if we do it gradually, let them get ac
customed to it gradually, I believe we will have a much
better chance of succeeding in the end.
To me, integration and desegregation are not the same
thing, and we would like very much at the end of 11 years,
or however many years it takes, to feel that the schools
are truly integrated, that it’s not just a question of their
being desegregated. That feeling will have to come from
the hearts of people. It cannot be forced, and it certainly
cannot be thrust upon them in a hurry. In the second
place, I feel that little children, for instance, these children
in the first grade, now are absolutely accustomed to having
the Negro and the white child right there together. They
play together. They eat together. Everything goes along
just the same. There’s no difference whatsoever made.
Well, if that group moves on next year to the second
grade, they will still be accustomed to that. The children
that are coming in in the first grade naturally expect their
156a
group to be desegregated. If you jump and begin to take
[78] children in higher grades, you are going to double
your trouble. I firmly believe that it is the only plan.
Q. Thank you, Ma’am.
Mr. Boult: You may ask her.
Cross Examination by Mr. Looby:
Q. Miss Brent, I understand that your opinion is predi
cated upon the community resistance, as to how the com
munity accepted. Am I correct in that assumption? A.
Well, after all, Mr. Looby, the only situation with which
I am very familiar is the situation right there at Glenn
School.
Q. And your opinion is based upon the fact that people
resented this desegregation? A. That is part of it, yes.
Q. Well, what is the other part? A. Well, the other part
is this, Mr. Looby: Those children have come in— We
firmly believe now that they have a foundation that will pre
pare them to go along into the second grade with the white
children. They will the next year be able to progress. There
will be no differences in their (shall we say) background.
We feel that educationally it mil be the best thing for
the child, and after all, that is what we are concerned with.
We leave the outside trouble [79] to the policemen.
Q. The outside trouble (since you mentioned that), after
the police got busy, you had no further trouble, did you?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. What trouble did you have after the policemen—
A. (Interrupting) Well, we did not have any—oh, I mean
any screaming and things like that. The police were on
duty (I would say) for possibly three weeks over there,
Mary Brent—for Defendants—Cross
157a
but that is not the only trouble. There has been a— As
I said before, there has been a constant stream of parents
from one thing and another coming in. They will come in.
We have had, oh, such things as rock fights involving chil
dren of the two races which we had never had before.
Q. Have you had any trouble involving children of the
same race? A. Oh, yes. We still have child problems.
Q. And that exists regardless of the race, doesn’t it?
A. That’s true.
Q. All right. Now, let’s get back to this question: Chil
dren themselves have no prejudice, have they? A. Small
children do not.
Q. Do not. And insofar as the children are concerned,
we could have desegregation at any time, couldn’t we ?
A. No. Now, I would wonder about that. The few times
[80] that we have had trouble within the school when I
would consider it really a race problem, every time older
children have been involved.
Q. And you also have that same kind of trouble between
older and younger children of the same race? A. No. Not
the same type problems.
Q. What type are they? A. Well, now, for instance, at
one time one of the little Negro girls had not finished her
lunch on time, and as we do with most first-graders, the
teacher left her at the table. She was still there when the
class came in that was supposed to take the place of the
first grade at that section of the lunch room. A boy came
and sat at the table, a fifth-grade—a fourth-grade boy sat
at the table, and when he saw the little Negro girl there,
he slammed his tray down on the table and took his chair
and shoved it out, and said, “I won’t eat at the table with a
nigger.” So I was able to handle that problem because it
Mary Brent—for Defendants—Cross
was one.
158a
Q. And it was a disciplinary problem that any principal
may encounter! A. If you don’t have too many of them,
yes.
Q. All right. Now, other than community objection,
what problems have you had! A. Well, now, the mother
of one of the little Negro [81] girls has come to the
teacher. She did not come to me. But she has come to
the teacher saying that some of the older children were
making fun of her little girl in the rest room; and when
we got down to find out how to overcome that, the only
(thing we could do was to see that the teacher went to
the rest room when this child goes.
Q. And from that time on, the teacher has to go with
one of them every time she goes to the rest room! A. With
the little Negro girl, yes.
Q. Insofar as the aptitude is concerned, there is no dif
ference between the races, is there! A. With these two
children— Now, that’s the only—of course, the only ex
perience that I have had.
Q. I see. A. But, no, sir; I cannot see any difference
with those two.
Q. Now, those children have been in the school from
since last September! A. That’s right.
Q. And they are making satisfactory progress! A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Now, as to the older child, he was in a different
grade, wasn’t he! A. Yes, sir. He was in the fourth
grade. You mean the [82] one in the lunch-room incident!
Q. Yes. A. Yes, he was in the fourth grade.
Q. And so the difficulty arose because only one grade
was desegregated and the other grades were not! A. No.
Now, that’s not the way that I meant to imply. I meant
that the younger children realize less difference of any
Mary Brent—for Defendants—Cross
159a
sort. They are not conscious of racial differences, relig
ious differences, or any other kind, but older children are.
Q. What difference in grade were these two children
involved? A. One, of course the little Negro girl, was in
the first. The other boy was—I think he was either fourth
or fifth., I am not. sure which.
Q. So then you would not recommend that the fourth or
fifth grade be desegregated? A. Not right at this time;
no, sir.
Q. Now, these calls that you have been getting, when did
you say was the last one? A. Sunday morning after the
Jewish Temple was bombed.
Q. You didn’t get one last Saturday morning? A. Didn’t
get one last Sunday morning?
Q. Well, I did. [83] A. You did?
Q. Yes.
Mr. Looby: I guess that is all.
The Court: Is that all of this witness?
Mr. Boult: That is all. Thank you, Miss Brent.
Further this witness saith not.
W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Direct
W. A. B ass, c a lle d a s a w itn e s s in b e h a lf o f th e d e fe n
d a n t , b e in g f i r s t d u ly sw o rn , te s t if ie d a s f o l lo w s :
Direct Examination by Mr. Hunt:
Q. Is this Mr. W. A. Bass? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Bass, I believe you were one of the defendants in
this case, being Superintendent of Schools at the time this
lawsuit began. Is that a fact? A- That’s correct.
Q. How long were you Superintendent of Schools in Nash
ville? A. Twenty years.
160a
Q. And have you now retired? A. I have.
[84] Q. As of what date? A. As of January 1st last.
Q. I believe you were a witness in the hearing at which
the plan was proposed under which the first grade was
desegregated, were you not? A. I was.
Q. Are you familiar, Mr. Bass, with the plan which the
Board has adopted for further desegregation in Nashville?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You have read that plan? A. Yes, sir.
Q. State whether or not that is in substance the plan
which you as Superintendent prior to your retirement
recommended to the Board? A. It is. In fact, I made the
written recommendation, one of the last recommendations
I made to the Board before retirement. It was that the
Board continue desegregation in the first grade and add to
it the second grade coming September next, it being under
stood that the original plan regarding maintenance of
recognition of school zones and transfer features adopted
by the Board and approved by the Court would be in
continuation.
Q. If it is the plan you recommended, I assume— I will
ask you, Mr. Bass, if it is not in your opinion the best plan
[85] that is available for Nashville? A. I wouldn’t have
recommended it if I hadn’t thought it was the best thing
to do for the City of Nashville.
Q. Now, Mr. Bass, endeavoring to be concise, will you
state to the Court the reasons why you think this is the
best plan available? A. I think I have two reasons I should
like to state: Number one is the—is the distinct recogni
tion of the fact that the children grow from what they
are to what they subsequently become. They don’t become
what they do become immediately and at once. And so I
based my recommendation on that fact, that adjustment
W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Direct
161a
to an entirely new community problem, such as is involved
in the change of attitude, the change of practice, the change
in tradition that this plan or that the desegregation in
volves, I figured that— I reached the conclusion that bas
ing any decision upon the natural growth and development
of children would be the only safe and sound approach to
the problem.
Another problem: Schools are not—not just school build
ings and just school children. They have teachers there.
I took into account the teacher problem and experience I
had had with teachers.
When I came to Nashville as Superintendent of Schools
(and this fact can be established in the mouths of many
[86] witnesses), I called a meeting of the English teachers
in the junior- and senior-high-school groups. It had not
occurred— It never occurred to me that I would have any
difficulty because as State Supervisor of High Schools I
had held conferences all over the state involving both white
and Negro teachers primarily in the county schools.
Well, the day came for the meeting I had personally
called. I was in my office gathering up some material I was
taking to the meeting. At that time, our Negro schools
were opened ten minutes earlier than the white, and as a
consequence they dismissed ten minutes earlier. Our Negro
teachers arrived on the scene ten minutes ahead of the
white teachers. They went in the room and in a normal
manner took their seats in the room.
Just before I started from my offi.ce down to the meet
ing place, the Principal of Hume-Fogg High School, C. T.
Kirkpatrick then (He is dead now), came down all excited.
He said: “The white teachers won’t go in. The Negro
teachers have taken their places about over the room, and
they won’t go in and sit by them.” That was the coldest,
W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Direct
162a
most unsatisfactory educational meeting I ever presided
over.
Now, I never forgot that. I didn’t know what to do. I
was confronted with a hard problem, and yet I knew—
Any Superintendent would have known that the efficacy
of his [87] administration in the last analysis depended
upon what he could do through the teachers, and it was
highly necessary that we establish a way of work that
brought about mutual respect and mutual confidence.
And so I had to change my tactics, and I started with
the principals and supervisors. We had mixed meetings
and we finally got common understanding, but it took 10
years to get that done where the teachers and—ah, princi
pals and supervisors would sit down and talk in confidence.
Now, when you consider adults having that sort of diffi
culty, you must remember that you can’t force desegrega
tion upon children and the adults and maintain that favor
able attitude for learning. If you don’t have that favorable
attitude, you just as well close the door and have a holiday
that day because children will not learn where they are
under stress and strife.
I stood at Glenn School and engaged a group of people
who were there, a big delegation of them, and one man
stoutly maintained that he would not send his child to any
city school (not just Glenn) if a single school permitted
Negro children to attend with the whites, that he wouldn’t
patronize the public schools. And so we had a lively dis
cussion.
I saw the Negro parent who brought his child up to
Glenn School. He went in and came around through the
[88] auditorium and registered—enrolled his child, and
came out the front door. He couldn’t get that little girl
through the crowd without the intervention of a policeman.
W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Direct
163a
Now, that little six-year-old girl was getting her first im
pression of a school.
I don’t want to see this community throw the baby out
with the wash. We’ve got too good a school system (both
white and colored) to permit anything that will tear down
what some of us have worked hard to maintain. That’s
why I made that recommendation.
Q. And this plan is the one that you recommended? A.
Yes, sir.
Cross Examination by Mr. Looby:
Q. Mr. Bass, it is your considered opinion that a segre
gated system is more desirable, isn’t it? A. I beg your
pardon?
Q. It is your considered opinion that a segregated sys
tem is more desirable? A. Mr. Looby, I don’t want to go
into my personal views. I think, since the Supreme Court
has spoken, what I think is not the material question. The
question, it seems to me, is one of law, what is the best
way to comply with the law of the United States as ex
pressed through the Supreme Court. [89] And—
Q. (Interrupting) Do you know what it is? A. (Con
tinuing) —I ’m in favor of the Board of Education carry
ing it out. I know what it is. Sure I do. I have read it
over and over, every word of it, and I gave considerable
thought to that question of “all deliberate speed.” Now,
we deliberated (and I think we were entitled under the
Supreme Court’s decision to be deliberate) about this mat
ter. We are not just trying to stand in the way. We are
trying to determine the scope that we can take and do the
job effectively. I told this Court the first time— I said:
“This is a new problem with us. We’ve never desegregated
a school system, and we want to learn by doing.” I main
W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross
164a
tain that we still have a lot to learn. We will build on what
we have achieved and do thoroughly and well not just for
the white children but for the Negroes as well.
I have— Time after time in talking with our groups
(principals, supervisors, and teachers), I have made the
statement that we don’t want a single child, white or colored,
to be injured as a result of the attempt of the Board of
Education to comply with the Supreme Court’s decision.
I ’m not so concerned about a bunch of adults, but I am
concerned about these children.
And this plan is in the interest of the children who [90]
will be affected, either white or colored, and I think our
colored people who know me know that I am sincere in that
remark.
Q. Well, Mr. Bass, I am going to ask you a question now.
I have no objection to your making a speech, but just an
swer this question please: Isn’t your opinion as to whether
this system is best predicated upon your considered opin
ion that segregation is not desirable? A. Not at all.
Q. That desegregation is not desirable? A. Not at all.
If we had been in the formative stages here proposing an
interpretation, we would have argued that question on its
merits. Your question should apply not now but at the
time the Supreme Court made its decision. I have tried as
the Superintendent of the schools, through the principals
and teachers at my disposal, to teach people to respect the
law, and that I maintain today.
Q. In your entire administration of the City School Sys
tem of Nashville, you have maintained a segregated system
throughout, haven’t you? A. I have.
Q. And even in payment of teachers, jmu had a system
where you had one salary scale for white teachers and one
salary scale for Negro teachers, and maintained that sys
W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross
165a
tem [91] until you were forced by the court to change it?
A. That-— I aired that problem, and we maintained it until
the Board of Education, through acts of the court (federal
court), was required to make a change in it. And I want
to say in following that up that we have been assiduous
and as faithful in trying to meet every requirement of
that court decision as we knew how.
I want to say another thing since you have raised that
question.
Q. Yes, sir. A. I was Commissioner of Education of
Tennessee one time, and at that time I— I used whatever
influence I had with the legislature and with the governor
to write a plan of equalization of educational opportunity
in Tennessee, and one plank we insisted upon was that equal
service (as indicated by training and experience) carried
with it equal salary. And I think that ought to be stated
in connection with this record as much as the answer I
have made to your question.
Q. Now, you say it took you ten years to get the teachers
to meet together? A. Not to get them to meet together.
I could have— I could have called them together, and did,
but I didn’t get the morale. I didn’t get at the bottom of
the problem of [92] teaching. This business of teaching
and working through teachers is not just a legal matter.
I t’s a spiritual matter at base, and unless we can develop
that rapport which a teaching group must have to touch
the lives of children, we are not a successful school system,
however good our buildings may be or whatever other
physical features we may have.
Q. Is that one of the elements you take into considera
tion in saying that this plan is the best plan? A. I said
this. I say that this is the best plan for the reason that
it enables us to consolidate the gains we make from year
W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross
166a
to year and not to create a lot of confusion and haranguing
and threats and counterthreats around a school building.
Q. Did those confusion and threats and counterthreats
to which you refer result from community objection? A.
Basically, yes; and misunderstanding.
Q. So your plan is predicated primarily upon community
objection to this—to desegregation? A. I am going to
state the answer a little different from that. I am going to
say that we take into account the community in which we
are trying to operate, and if we know that community is
going to be split in many splinters, we know right away
that we have got a different instructional program from
what we would have had had we had a community [93]
that would have community of interest.
Q. I see. So that your plan for this one year—12-year
plan is based upon what you consider would be the com
munity objection? A. I think there are two answers to that
question. I think the teachers can’t absorb too big a piece
of this problem at one time, and I think the community will
gradually see that their first impressions were erroneous
and that this problem can be handled systematically with
mutual benefit.
Q. Did you determine how many schools would be af
fected if a rule for total desegregation were adopted? A.
The answer to that question is that we asked— We called
our principals all in to work on the question of determin
ing school zones without reference or regard to race, and
then we called—we laid this matter—we consolidated those
whole reports. We had had a census taken. We had con
solidated that whole business and made a map that we saw
all the way across the board room. Every board member
could see the zones of the separate schools proposed. Only
one of those school zones was changed, and that was to
extend one block further than their—than the original plan
W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross
167a
called for. It didn’t make much difference one way or the
other. There weren’t very many children, either white or
colored, in that block. That was the only change that was
made, in that zone [94] block.
Q. I still ask you how many schools in Nashville would
be affected if you had not based upon zones, your residen
tial zones? How many schools would be affected if an
order for total desegregation went down? A. I suspect
every school in the city practically now. See, Mr. Looby,
any day you answer that question, your answer may be
based on facts that you had when you prepared the an
swer, but due to the shifting in population, we could have—
Take— I’ll illustrate what I ’m trying to say. Over at Lock-
land School when we opened there, we didn’t have a single
Negro child residing in the Lockland School territory.
Today there may be one. I would guess that practically
every school in the city.
Q. Based upon the census which you took? A. Based
upon the zones which the Board adopted.
Q. All right, based upon the zones, you are saying there
would be Negro children in every school in Nashville? Are
you saying that? A. I ’m saying that might be true now.
Of course, we had a group of schools last fall—
Q. (Interrupting) I ’m not talking about possibility. I ’m
talking about the actuality, not the possibility of what may
happen a hundred years from now. But based upon the
[95] zoning which you made last year, how many schools
would be affected? A. I don’t recall. The record is over
there. It will speak for itself.
Q. Do you know? A. No. I say I don’t recall the num
ber. I think there were eight or ten maybe that didn’t have
a single Negro child in them.
Q. How many schools in Nashville? A. Well, they
W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross
168a
opened the new school out on Twelfth Avenue after I
retired.
Q. Well, at the time that the— A. (Interrupting) There
were thirty— I guess there are 36 or 37 elementary schools
today.
Q. Assuming then that there are 37, you are saying that
37 schools would be affected in a desegregation order! A.
Assuming what!
Q. Assuming that there was an order for total desegrega
tion, you are saying that 37 elementary schools of Nashville
would be affected! A. They might be. I said a moment
ago Lockland School last September did not have a single
Negro child residing in it.
Q, And there are several others in the same category!
[96] A. There were eight or ten as I recall, but I won’t
make a positive statement on the exact number because I
don’t recall it.
Q. Well, Mr. Bass— A. (Interrupting) I ’ve been sick
since last—the 20th of last May.
Q. You had to form an opinion! A. Yes, I did.
Q. To submit to the district court, and you had all that
information available to you! A. Yes, sir.
Q. And why didn’t you use that information! A. We
did use it.
Q. Well, can you give me the results of that now! A.
We used it in preparing the original first-grade proposi
tion. And we are asking that that plan be continued, and
add the second grade to it.
Q. You say you used it in preparing the plan for the
first grade! How many schools were affected by that!
A. All of them except eight or ten. The exact number I
don’t recall.
Q. Can you explain to the Court why there are only nine
W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross
169a
colored students in the desegregated— A. (Interrupting)
I would like to ask you a question: [97] Why did those
who didn’t go ask that they not be sent there, made request
for transfer?
Q. Well, the schools were not affected then, were they?
A. (The witness did not reply.)
Q. How many schools now are there in which there are
first-grade Negro students? A. I didn’t get your question.
Q. How many schools in which there are first-grade
Negro students? How many schools there were at the
time you retired? A. We had— When I retired from the
City Schools, there had been six schools that had a child
for one or more days.
Q. And that is six of the thirty-seven. A. One of those
schools had one child for one day, and that night (I be
lieve it was that night) somebody bombed the building.
That left five existing schools at that time who had one or
more Negro children.
Q. But there were six schools that were affected of the
thirty-seven? A. That’s right.
Q. I see. And that ratio would hold the same in all the
grades, wouldn’t it? A. Had those children not asked for
transfers, there would have been a lot more schools that
had one or more Negro [98] children in them.
Q. I thought you said there were seven, and one asked
for a transfer. How many schools in which there were
Negro students eligible based upon the zoning system? A.
You will have to ask that question of Mr. Oliver because
he has handled that problem. I don’t know it,
Q. You don’t know. So that didn’t enter into your opin
ion? A. My opinion— My— My judgment— It’s more than
an opinion. My judgment regarding the proposed scope of
this next step was based on our experience plus what I
knew about the City Schools of Nashville.
IF. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross
170a
Q. And it was not based upon the number of schools that
would be affected? A. Not at all. I— I assumed in making
that recommendation that every one of them would have
one or more Negro children in it.
Q. And knowing the housing situation in Nashville and
with the zoning that was made—the zoning which was re
ported, you still say that that’s true, that all 37 schools
would be affected? A. Potentially they could all be af
fected.
Q. What do you mean by potentially? A. Well, I mean
that there—there could be Negro [99] children in every
one of the elementary school zones in the city.
Q. Would that statement be true today? A. Today?
Q. Yes, sir. A. I say I ’m assuming it would be.
Q. Is that so? A. You take in this—this growth out here
towards Ward-Belmont—Ward College—what I mean,
Belmont College. There’s been such a change in the popu
lation out there that it’s hard to tell what school zone
they would be in.
Mr. Looby: That’s all.
Mr. Hunt: That is all, Mr. Bass.
Further this witness saith not.
Mr. Hunt: That concludes the defendant’s testi
mony.
The Court: All right. Any proof?
Mr. Looby: (Reply was inaudible.)
The Court: How is that?
Mr. Looby: We have some proof reflecting on this
plan.
The Court: All right. Call any proof you have.
W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross
171a
[100] H er m a n H. L ong , c a lle d a s a w itn e s s in b e h a lf o f
th e p la in t i f f s , b e in g f i r s t d u ly sw o rn , te s t if ie d a s f o l lo w s :
Direct Examination by Mr. Williams:
Q. This is Dr. Herman H. Long! Is that your name, sir?
A. Yes, sir; that’s right.
Q. Dr. Long, where do you live? A. I live in Nashville
on Phillips Street, 1611.
Q. How long have you lived here, sir? A. About 15
years.
Q. What is your occupation? A. I work in the field of
race relations for the Board of Home Missions for the
Congregational Churches. We have offices at Fisk Uni
versity. I am a psychologist by training.
Q. I see. Since you have mentioned your training, will
you state your professional qualifications please or educa
tional background and qualifications? A. Bachelor’s degree
from Talladega College in Alabama and master’s degree
from Hartford Seminary Foundation and the doctorate
degree in Psychology from the University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, Michigan.
Q. Did you accept the job with the American Missionary
Association immediately after acquisition of your doctorate
or have you engaged in other occupations? [101] A. Well,
I taught for a while before accepting the work in race
relations. I taught in Miles College in Birmingham, and
I was Dean of Instruction at Miles for a year before I
entered—followed up my graduate work and then came
back in the field of race relations.
Q. How long in all did you teach at Miles College? A.
Four years.
Q. Four years. Is that a junior college or— A. It was
a regular four-year college.
Herman II. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct
172a
Q. All right, sir. I believe the agency in which yon work
is known as the Department of Race Relations at Fisk
University. Is that correct! A. Yes, it is.
Q. That is located here in Nashville! A. That’s right.
Q. How long has it been here in Nashville! A. For 16
years.
Q. Sixteen years. Dr. Long, what are the functions of
the Department of Race Relations! A. Well, we are a
research and consultative agency in the field of race rela
tions. Our services are made available to communities and
to organizations in the community who wish to use our
services in the field.
Q. Do your services relate to the furnishing of [102]
scientific data and so forth with reference to various prob
lems which may be related to interaction of Negro and
white people and integration and desegregation of Negro
and white people in various areas of life! A. Only on the
occasion that we may be called into some consultative role
with the community where we are dealing with a concrete
set of problems that may relate to such relationships.
Q. Have you had any experience with the desegregation
problem in the city or county public schools in the United
States! A. Not directly except through indirect roles we
have had in some community situations like Baltimore,
Maryland. We were there at the invitation of the Gov
ernor’s Interracial Commission and the Mayor’s Interracial
Commission.
Q. Will you just tell the Court what you did in Balti
more! A. Well, this was essentially an effort the year
before the schools were desegregated in that community to
lay a basis of fact for the community in terms of what the
problems were in the community that needed to be solved
in order for all citizens to have an equal opportunity.
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct
173a
Q. Did you conduct a survey there! A. We conducted a
survey and—
[103] Q. What was that called! A. Well, it was called
the Baltimore Community Self Service.
Q. I believe it obtained some national recognition, did
it not! A. It was featured over the CBS Television Sys
tem.
Q. You might tell us what you did in that survey. A.
Well, we essentially took an inventory of what the practices
were in Baltimore in the field of education, in the field of
housing, in the field of employment, in the field of social-
welfare services, hospital services, what the practices were
in these fields that affected the status of minorities, espe
cially the Negro group in the community in terms of whether
or not these practices were providing for them equal op
portunity along with other citizens in the community.
Q. Did you— In connection with that and in connection
with the education part of it, did your survey include an
evaluation—an ascertainment and evaluation of the atti
tudes of school teachers, for example! A. Yes. One phase
of it dealt with— At that time, Baltimore had separate
Negro and white schools, and we were concerned— I might
say that the Superintendent of Schools was a member of
the Commission-—of the Committee of the [104] Survey
which dealt with these problems as was the one of the
Commissioners of Education for the state at large.
We attempted to see whether or not, for example, the
physical facilities under the school system were equal. We
found some differentials especially as between Negro and
white schools where the age of—age of buildings was con
cerned, equipment, and so on.
We did also ask the teachers in these schools whether
or not they believed they would have any difficulties in
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct
174a
teaching Negro and white students in the same class, as
suming that the school board were to—were to integrate
the school system.
Q. What were your findings with particular regard to
the teachers? A. We— We were, I suppose, surprised to
learn in a way that the teachers felt that—that there
would be some difficulties, that they wouldn’t—they wouldn’t
be able successfully to—to teach Negro and white children
in the same classes.
Q. Did all of the teachers feel that way? A. Well, I
would say about the largest percentage. About 30 per cent
of them felt that way. You had a distribution of—of re
sponses.
Q. Of varying shades of attitudes? [105] A. Yes. And
yet the—the—the following term the school was success
fully desegregated, and Negro students were integrated in
classes and the teachers did teach them fairly successfully
according to reports from the board.
Q. Did Baltimore have the aspects of a southern com
munity with regard to racial segregation or a northern
community? A. Well, I think Baltimore in some respects
wms more southern than Nashville if you mean—if you
mean the extremes to which the practice of segregation
can be taken. It certainly had segregated schools just as
Nashville has. It had— In the downtown department stores,
it had separate Negro and white facilities.
Q. Does that exist in Nashville? A. It exists— It exists
in Nashville, and even some of the department stores in
Baltimore don’t extend credit accounts to Negro clients.
This does not obtain in Nashville to my—to my opinion.
Q. Is there a custom in Baltimore against allowing
Negroes to try on clothes in some of the department stores?
A. And hats especially.
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct
175a
Q. Does that exist in Nashville? A. I don’t believe it
does to any large scale. Maybe there are some small ex
ceptions, minor practices.
[106] Q. Have you also— Have you been called upon
by any agency in Nashville (that is, in an official role as
head of the Department of Eace Relations) to render any
technical assistance to any agency in Nashville? A. Not
in an official capacity. I have had the good fortune to be
invited to serve as a consultant at one of the workshop
sessions of the Nashville School System a year ago last
September when they—•
Q. (Interrupting) Was that when— A. (Interrupting)
These were integrated— These were integrated Negro-and-
white-teacher orientation sessions. I was present at one
of the workshop sessions at the invitation of the board.
Q. Were you advised that the board had been having
these sessions previously, or was this a new thing? A. It
was my impression that—that this was an innovation of
the School Board.
Q. And this was July of—the summer of 1957? A. This
was September 1956. I believe this was probably the second
year. I think they have had three years nowT of integrated
teacher-orientation workshops at the beginning of the school
term.
Q. In your capacity as consultant at that workshop, were
you able to draw any conclusions with regard to the
[107] attitudes of the teachers in Nashville with regard
to desegregation? A. I— I couldn’t say that I had any
reliable impressions. The— As much of an exchange as
there was in these sessions, the only recurring comment
that—that I remember was one of concern on the part of
the teachers and the principals who w7ere there (I assume
there were principals in the audience) that they would re
ceive help themselves in dealing with the difficult problems
Herman II. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct
176a
of integration, that they needed help from somewhere, from
somebody to help them in dealing with the protests, the—
the attitude of—of—of complete unconcern on the part of
some element of the public, people who were responsible
for the anonymous telephone calls and so forth.
Q. I see. Then it was with regard to matters outside of
the school room that the teachers indicated that they needed
help? Is that correct? A. I had the impression that they—
that they felt that they could deal with the educational
problems in the classroom and in the school situation if—
if they had adequate support and assistance in dealing
with these irritations which come from the extreme ele
ments outside the classroom situation, those who were op
posed to integration, desegregation.
[108] Q. Dr. Long, who asked you to appear as a con
sultant at that workshop? A. The invitation came, I be
lieve, from the school superintendent. I believe I received
a letter from Mr. Bass to that effect.
Q. Who was superintendent at that time? A. Who was
superintendent at that time.
Q. And that was one workshop. How long did that last?,
A. I think it was a one-day workshop.
Q. A one-day workshop. A. Although some phases of
it extended over two days or more.
Q. But your services were required for only—asked for
only that one day? And you appeared merely as a lecturer?
Is that correct? A. As a discussant on a panel.
Q. As a discussant on a panel. All right. But ever since
the first decision of the Supreme Court and down to the
present date your agency is and has been available to the
Nashville Board of Education, has it not? A. Yes.
Q. And that’s the only occasion you’ve been called on?
A. To my knowledge, yes.
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct
177a
Q. You have been called all over—in other areas of
[109] the country but not here in Nashville? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Dr. Long, based on your experience in race relations,
could you give an opinion as to the desirability, as to the
feasibility and desirability of the plan which has been pro
posed by the Board of Education here today to extend
desegregation over an additional 11-year period? That is,
in terms of race relations? A. I— I think I can. I am
afraid that a large number of people tend to believe that
a special kind of plan used by a school board to desegregate
the schools is the final test of whether or not you will have
effective desegregation, and the assumption seems to be
that if the plan protracts the process of change over a
long period of years (I think this is—is basic to the
Nashville proposal) that you will have a smoother plan
of operation and you will have less difficulty. I believe that
this assumption isn’t entirely sound in looking at the ex
perience of other school systems and the experience I have
had generally in the field of race relations for several
reasons:
One reason is that any proposed change in this field as
well as in others takes place within a climate of opinion
and a climate of expectation that is created by the kind of
policies which a Board of Education or which any other
board, [110] whether it is a board of—of an industry,
creates in the public mind. I think it has been fairly well
shown that when policies enacted by such boards are vacil
lating policies (that is, they do not proceed with clear
pronunciation of purpose and without qualification) that
when the processes of change in the school system are at
tempted, you get resistance because the public does not
expect that the board means what it says in many of these
instances.
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct
178a
Q. Can yon give an illustration of that! A. Well, I
think one of the best examples is—is—is the case of the
action of the school board in Delaware, one of the first
school systems that was desegregated. There, you had a
board deciding to—to desegregate the schools and, because
of pressure, withdrawing its decision and referring it to
the State Board of Education, and the State Board of
Education refusing to grant the local board the authority
to move forth, and you had— At the opening of school, you
had actual difficulty in the community because the com
munity didn’t know what to expect on the part of its obliga
tions in the—in the field of education. I think there are
some other examples.
Q. What is the positive side of that! Can you give an
illustration of the positive side of that! A. I think the
positive side on the policy matter is—[111] is fairly well
represented in the successful efforts of school integration
in St. Louis, Missouri, in Washington, D. C., and in Louis
ville, Kentucky, recently, in which cases the boards
adopted—
Mr. Hunt: Just a moment. May it please the
Court, I think this witness should be qualified as
to what he knows about Washington and St. Louis
before he expresses an opinion on it. He has qualified
himself, I believe, to express an opinion on Balti
more. I don’t believe he has been qualified to ex
press—
The Court: He might briefly go into that.
Mr. Williams: I believe Counsel is correct, if
Tour Honor please.
By Mr. Williams:
Q. Are you familiar with those situations, Dr. Long!
A. I visited St. Louis, and I talked with members of the
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct
179a
supervisory staff in St. Louis, Missouri. I know— I’ve been
in direct contact with the school authorities in Baltimore.
I can’t say that’s true with Louisville. I haven’t been in
the Louisville situation, and I can’t—only know it except
as I have studied the reports which have come from the
superintendent’s office.
Q. All right, sir. Do you have any further reasons that
[112] you wish to point out to the Court, the reasons under
lying your opinion of this Nashville plan! A. The second
■—the second reason is I believe that—that one of the
assumptions is—is that if you minimize the change, you
reduce the resistance. I believe that the character—- We
need to analyze the character of the resistance, and if one
looks—if we look at our experience in Nashville last year,
the people who constituted the protesters and the mobs,
the people who were arrested and fined, either fined in
court or put under injunction in the court, expressed an
attitude which was completely unreasoning as to any kind
of change. I think the pattern that is expressing itself is
one in which any kind of change toward desegregating
schools or any other institutions will meet resistance on
the part of this element of the population. And I see—
I see— I see that the merits of whether or not the change
is done in 12 years or whether it’s, done in one year
doesn’t enter into this—this kind of resistance effort be
cause it is fairly completely unreasoning and inconsiderate
effort. I t’s not an effort to meet the issues in terms of any
kind of statesmanship.
Q. Is it your conclusion then that the protraction of
the period during which desegregation is attempted will
not alleviate the conditions created by the people who are
[113] bitterly opposed to desegregation as a matter of
principle? A. I— I see nothing to—to leave the conclusion
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct
180a
that a 12-year plan will reduce the actual resistance on the
part of the extremist elements in this community to de
segregating the schools.
Q. Can you explain that"? A. Well, last year we only
desegregated the first-grade level. There were only nine
Negro children involved in six schools, and yet we had a
demonstration which approached tremendous extremes in
this community. There wasn’t even a commitment as I
understand the proposal to continue desegregation the
second year. This was a minimal amount of change, and
yet you had in effect a maximum kind of resistance.
In other words, it wasn’t a resistance which was predi
cated on the assumption that this was—this was complete
desegregation. In other words, it was protest against even
the most minor kind of change.
Q. All right, Dr. Long. Now, I want to ask you this:
What are some of the community resources which are or
dinarily mobilized in an attempt to solve a race-relations
problem? A. Well, I— This varies with—with the com
munity.
Q. Well, with particular application to the education
problem, what in your opinion would be some of the re
sources? A. Well, of course, parent and parent-teacher
groups [114] are a logical and necessary community re
source. Chambers of Commerce— Although this isn’t a
direct function, they have a very important indirect func
tion in setting the climate of leadership in the community.
The organizations that are representative of minority
groups in the community are important to have—
Q. (Interrupting) With reference to that, may I ask you
this, Dr. Long: Based on your experience as a race-
relations expert, is it in your opinion possible to arrive
at a plan which will approach a solution of the race-
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct
181a
relations problem in education without close consultation
with the minority group itself in the community? A. Well,
I— I wouldn’t think that it would be—be possible to have
a meeting of minds on an issue of this sort if—if the
persons involved most directly aren’t—aren’t consulted
and involved in the consultationskip.
Q. Is it your opinion, carrying that further, that the
opinions and ideas and desires of the minority group should
be considered if one is to reach a peaceful solution of a
race-relations problem? A. I think so as long as they
represent responsible leadership groups in the community.
Q. You have lived here in the community before and
during the desegregation problem in the City Schools here?
[115] A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know whether or not the Nashville Board
of Education has made any attempt to mobilize those com
munity resources? A. My knowledge is very sketchy
there. I couldn’t say that I—that I did. I— I know that
the—from his own report that the school superintendent
has spoken to a lot of groups, parent—parent groups at—
at local schools. Now, I had— My impression was that this
was primarily in the white schools and not among the
Negro parent-teacher groups.
Q. Dr. Long, do you know whether or not certain agencies
in the community itself have voluntarily come forward and
sponsored community workshops to try to attack the prob
lem of community sentiment at any period of time since
the Supreme Court decision? A. Yes. The Nashville Com
munity Relations Conference has held two community-wide
workshops for— I think for the purpose of helping to build
some constructive opinion in this community.
Q. When and where were those held, sir? A. I— The
first workshop was held at the Jewish Community Center,
Herman II. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct
182a
I believe two years ago or three years ago now. I am not
quite certain. In the following year a second workshop
was held at the Belmont Methodist Church.
[116] Q. Do you know how many participating groups
there were in the first workshop? A. I don’t know the
actual number of groups that were involved. I would say
that in attendance at the general session there were some
six hundred people present that evening.
Q. This was at the Jewish Community Center? A.
Jewish Community Center. And about the same number
the following year at the meeting at the Belmont Methodist
Church. That’s a slightly larger group.
Q. Did you attend those workshops? A. I participated
in the workshops.
Q. Did any member of the Board of Education appear or
speak or take part in either of those workshops ? A. I don’t
remember, and I couldn’t say that there was or was not.
Q. At the Belmont Methodist Church Workshop, were
any experts other than—any race experts in the school—
desegregation situation called in from outside the state?
A. Yes. There were representatives from both the Balti
more Public Schools and the St. Louis Public Schools who
were present at these workshops mainly giving and evaluat
ing their own experience in the field of school desegregation.
[117] Q. Were these workshops conducted by Negroes al
together or were there other races? A. These were inter
racial groups.
Q. What would you say with regard to the respective
proportions of the audiences at these workshops racially?
A. I—I would guess that racially Negroes were about 20%
of the group—of the total group. I t’s a very rough guess.
Q. Do you know of your own knowledge whether find
ings were promulgated as a result of either of these work
shops ? A. I believe the second workshop— The first was
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct
183a
not an attempt to reach any kind of consensus on the part
of the people who participated. As a matter of fact, the
second was not organized for the purpose of passing resolu
tions, but there were conclusions out of the individual dis
cussion groups reached by—by these discussion groups,
and the— If there was any consensus as I remember it, it
was a fairly common consensus, and it was later expressed
to the School Board, that the School Board begin some effec
tive desegregation as of September 1957 or ’56. I ’ve for
gotten which year it was now.
Q. I see. Can you name a few of the organizations who
sponsored that second workshop ? A. I believe the—among
the original sponsors was the [118] United Church Women,
the Jewish—
Q. Is that a white organization? A. White. Well, it’s
interracial.
Q. Interracial! A. Yes. The Jewish— Federation of
Jewish Women, I believe was another sponsor. The Nash
ville Council of Churches I believe was another sponsor.
Q. Are all these interracial organizations ? A. Those are
interracial. The Parent-Teachers— I ’m not sure about the
Parent-Teacher Association, but I believe the Negro ad
junct of the Parent-Teacher Association was one of the spon
sors of it. I think you can get better—you can get better evi
dence than I can give you on that because I don’t quite re
member the details.
Q. It was a large number of organizations ? A. Quite a
large number. I believe the second workshop had some 26
organizations as sponsors.
Q. In your opinion, the community forces which were
mobilized and waiting to be used in those two workshops,
have they been utilized by the Board of Education in the
City of Nashville in trying to approach a solution to this
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct
184a
problem! A. I don’t know that—that they have. I can’t
say that they have.
[119] Q. Does the plan which the Board is proposing
here today— Does that seem to indicate that those re
sources have been utilized! A. Would the plan itself in
dicate that these sources-—
Q. (Interrupting) Well, let me re-phrase that. Would
the evidence which the Board has offered here today seem to
indicate that those resources have been utilized! You have
heard the evidence. A. I— I don’t— I don’t believe that—
that the plan reflects (It may. This is merely an opinion.)—
reflects an assessment of the—of the attitudes and opinions
of this segment of the community that have been involved
in these workshops.
Q. That is exactly what I am getting at. Thank you.
Cross Examination by Mr. Hunt:
Q. Dr. Long, it was not clear to me, your exact relation
ship to Fisk University. Are you part of Fisk! Are you
employed by Fisk as a professor or otherwise! What is your
relationship to Fisk! A. I am Director of the Race Rela
tions Department of the Board of Home Missions (This is a
long one), the Congregational Christian Churches, which
has offices at Fisk University. Fisk is church-related. It is
Congregationally [120] related so that explains it.
Q. Your relationship is that you have offices there, but
you are not part of the university as such. A. Not as an
operating unit of the university.
Q. You are reasonably familiar with the university! A.
Yes. I—I should say that at one stage of our relationship,
we were actually a unit of the university when Dr. Johnson
was both director of the Social Science Department and of
our race-relations program.
Herman II. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross
185a
Q. Is Fisk University a segregated school? A. No, sir.
It is not.
Q. What is the proportion then of white and Negro
students in Fisk if it is not segregated! A. It is— If you
mean by segregated, by policy, it is not segregated by
policy.
Q. It is not segregated by policy. It is segregated in fact
in practice ? A. It is not segregated in practice. It accepts
white students.
Q. How many white students are there now! A. I think
there must be about three or four there now. I ’m not sure
exactly.
Q. What is the enrollment of the university, the total
enrollment approximately! [121] A. I think around 750 is
the—
Q. And you think there are three or four white students ?
A. Three or four white students.
Q. Now, I gathered the impression that you were testi
fying as an expert in race relations and not as an expert in
education. Am I correct? A. Ah, I—I would think— You
embarrass me to try to—try to declare myself as an expert
in one or the other field.
Q. Well, I think that is:— A. (Interrupting) I think I
could qualify as an expert in either field because of the
nature of my training and experience.
Q. Then you were testifying in both. Then, as an expert
in education, are you familiar with a book quite recently
published by the Macmillan Company by Dr, Henry H. Hill
of Nashville, Changing Options in American Educationf
A. No, sir; I am not.
Q. It is quite new. I wondered. Now, I wanted to see
to what extent as an educator your views and his disagree,
and I wanted to ask you a few questions about opinions ex
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross
186a
pressed by Dr. Hill and see wherein you may agree or dis
agree with him. A. I wish you hadn’t mentioned the name
of the man. You [122] put me in the position of differing
with a man whose—ah, whom—whose reputation I know and
whom I know in the community.
Q. Now, I am reading from this book, and I would hand
you another copy but this is the only one I have. I assure
you I will try to read accurately. Page 42:
(Eeading) “There are admitted difficulties in de
segregation which are clearly seen by the moderates.
Negroes in the South as a group rank below the whites
in health, in general educational achievement, and in
other ways.”
Now, would you agree or disagree with that statement
of opinion? A. I ’ll almost have to have you read that
again. You say Negroes in general?
Q. Negroes in the South as a group rank below the whites
in health, in general educational achievement, and in other
ways. A. I couldn’t— I couldn’t accept that. What he
means by health, I don’t know. And there are all kinds of
statistics which you can quote in the field of health where
you may have Negroes not as much at a disadvantage as
compared with whites, and in other areas of—of the health
field where they are obviously below whites in terms of
incidence of certain kinds of illnesses or sicknesses. That’s
the kind [123] of general statement that I— I— I would
have to qualify before I could agree with it.
Q. You don’t agree with it unqualifiedly. All right. A.
I would certainly agree that there are certain educational
differentials as between Negroes and whites as a group.
There may not be differentials in some—in some school
systems. I don’t know what—about the Nashville School
System here.
Herman II. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross
187a
Q. Here is another statement on page 46. I want to ask
your opinion as to this:
(Reading) “After an initial apparent acceptance of
the Supreme Court’s decision, or at least a period dur
ing which the voices of the moderates were heard, there
has come a hardening reaction against this decision
in many of the southern states where new organiza
tions and voices have been raised in opposition and
where the voices of politicians and demagogues have
been in crescendo.”
Now, the particular part I wanted to query you about:
Do you agree that there has come a hardening reaction
against the decision in the Brown case in the South! A.
As qualified by Mr. Hill, I would have to agree; and if you
see the context there, he says, “the hardening of reaction as
expressed in the voice of—political voices of the South.”
[124] Q. (Reading) “There has come a hardening
reaction against this decision in many of the southern
states where new organizations and voices have been
raised in opposition.”
A. Right.
Q. (Reading) “And where the voices of politicians
and demagogues have been in crescendo.”
A. Right. I assume that he is referring to the rise of the
citizens—the White Citizens Council, the Federation for
Constitutional Government, the Ku Klux Klan, and similar
organizations which have organized deliberately to circum
vent the Supreme Court’s decision. I assume on the other
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross
188a
hand when he refers to politicians, he refers to the kind of
legislation which has come out of the legislatures of the
South aimed at curtailing the expressions of the NAACP
and other groups which are supporting the Supreme Court’s
decision. Of all of the repressive legislation, I think the
Southern Education News reported some 84 pieces which
had been enacted. Now, this is what I call political reaction,
and with that I would agree with Mr. Hill.
Q. Now, would you agree with this?
(Heading) “It is necessary, however, to be realistic.
The majority of whites in the South want to attend
school with whites only. The Negroes want the option
of attending white schools. There is no pat solution to
[125] this impasse.”
A. Would I agree with it?
Q. Yes. A. I don’t know what the majority of white
people want. I frankly don’t know. I would be hesitant to
say what the majority of Negroes want or feel. I think that
we are dealing with an area of experience that is entirely
new to all of us. This is the area of the great unknown. I
think we have the resources to meet the challenge of this
kind of experience.
Q. Now, another statement on page 51:
(Reading) “ . . . Just as it was impossible to enforce
the prohibition laws of the land in areas where prohibi
tion was contrary to the mores of the people, just so
it will be relatively impossible to enforce, to any great
degree, mixing of the races in areas where the pat
tern of living and thought is equally opposed to de
segregation.”
A. Do I agree with the statement?
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross
189a
Q. Do you agree with that? A. I don’t agree with the
statement.
Q. You can give your reasons, of course. A. Well, ex
perience has proved to the contrary. You have now out of
the nine states—-of the 17 states that were originally operat
ing on the basis of segregated schools, [126] you have nine
of those states which have begun desegregation. You have
over 300,000 or 350,000 Negro children in integrated schools
within three years’ time. You have a complete—almost com
plete desegregation of the school systems of West Virginia.
All of these instances were where people had the same at
titude toward desegregation that I presume we have in
Nashville to a more or less degree.
Q. Now, speaking as an educator do you agree with this
statement on page 57:
(Reading) “Regardless of religion or color or gen
eral conditions, children do learn somewhat better when
the group is relatively homogeneous.”
A. That depends on whether you mean homogeneous with
reference to what. You are using a rather big term. People
can be homogeneous with reference to intelligence. They
can be homogeneous with reference to a number of things.
Q. You agree with the statement, as I understand, if you
define homogeneous? I mean do I correctly state your posi
tion? I am not seeking to misrepresent it. A. No, I—I
wouldn’t think you would. I—I don’t know frankly. I—I
would think that children of relatively equal ability would
achieve in terms of the rudiments of learning, would achieve
better because they are challenged more by each other; but
obviously this is not a racial [127] factor, so I—I don’t
necessarily see its pertinence.
Q. I think that statement must be connected with Dr.
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross
190a
Hill’s earlier statement that in the South the Negroes as a
group rank below the whites in general educational achieve
ment. Now, he has laid the premise that he thinks they are
not homogeneous, and I believe you didn’t express an opin
ion on that. Am I right? A. Well, you can’t talk about a
difference in educational achievement and homogeneity as
being the same thing. As a— As a group you may find that
as a— If you take the Negro population as a whole, you
may find a difference of about two-grade level in achieve
ment as compared with whites, but if you would take a
segment of fourth graders, of fifth graders, or sixth graders
of Negro students, you may find some of those sixth graders
achieving at the eight or ninth grade level or even higher;
and you would find the same differential within the white—
a group of white students at the same age level.
Now, if you put those two—two groups of students to
gether, those that would be homogeneous as to achieve
ment would be both Negroes and whites. It wouldn’t be only
the Negroes or only the white students.
Q. Now, I want to read another statement from Hr. Hill,
and see if you agree with this. I am going to read two
[128] sentences and let you comment on the two. A. Hr.
Hill did not say homogeneous as to race, did he, in that
statement ?
Q. He said homogeneous. He did not say as to race. I
think the language carries the clear implication that he was
talking of race because the section is on segregation. I
think that is what he meant, but he said homogeneous.
Now, here are the two sentences, and I would like your
comment, whether you agree or disagree and then your
reasons:
(Reading) “ . . . The point is that schools cannot be
satisfactory learning places when they are bitter and
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross
191a
disturbed over some of the contentions of their elders.
Presumably the Supreme Court had such a situation in
mind when they fashioned the phrase, ‘with all deliber
ate speed.’” (pp. 58-59)
Do you agree or disagree with that? A. Any statement
which has the word “presumably” in it doesn’t—doesn’t—is
—is ambiguous as to—uncertain as to its own meaning so I
couldn’t very well say whether—what the Supreme Court
had in mind.
Q. Well, you don’t presume the Supreme Court— A.
(Interrupting) And I don’t presume to say that he has
said what the Supreme Court had in mind, that I even agree
with it. I couldn’t agree with it.
[129] Q. I will read the sentence again. I think it is clear
what he said. And then we are asking your opinion. The
sentence is :
(Reading) “Presumably the Supreme Court had such
a situation in mind when they fashioned the phrase,
‘with all deliberate speed.’ ”
A. I can’t—I can’t—I can’t enter judgment on saying what
the Supreme Court had in mind in using the term, “delib
erate speed.” What I would call deliberate speed may be
quite different from what Mr. Hill—
Q. (Interrupting) Now, do you agree or disagree with
this which is near the end of his conclusion:
(Reading) “ . . . We must go along with some kind
of waiting period which may avoid the multiplication of
mob scenes and continued bitterness and provide a pro
gressive gradualism with some chance of good will and
acceptance.”
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross
A. Do I agree with that?
192a
Q. Yes. A. That’s his judgment. My judgment is quite
different. I think it’s tragic in terms of creating expecta
tions in the public as to what the obligations of the public
are. If you create the attitude that the jjrocess of school
desegregation has to wait upon some kind of acceptance by
the public at large, whatever that acceptance is, when is
consensus [130] arrived at? Nobody knows when consensus
is arrived at, and this plan which I understand that you
are proposing doesn’t even propose to move one grade each
year because it’s not moving one grade this year because
you really— As I understand the plan, you are even back
ing up now.
Q. How do you understand the plan? A. I understand
that the plan means that you are proceeding—you integrate
the second grade as of this year. When your first graders
move into that grade level, you will accept some students
at the second-grade level; but you are already desegregat
ing the—the second grade by permitting these students
to move into the second grade.
Q. How does the plan move backward under your state
ment? A. You don’t add another year. You aren’t add
ing another year this year. If you had added even the third
grade, you would have moved a step forward. In other
words, you are consolidating where you are now.
Q. Are you familiar with the publication, Southern School
News ? A. Yes, s ir; I receive it every month.
Q. Ho you regard it as objective and impartial in its
attempts to solve— A. (Interrupting) I think it attempts
to be objective. I ’m not sure that it’s always impartial be
cause it’s reported by newspaper reporters who are on
staffs of local [131] newspapers, and I ’m sure their opinions
are influenced by their—the context in which they work and
report to some degree.
Herman II. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross
193a
Q. Are you acquainted with Congressman Adam Clayton
Powell? A. Only through reputation. I don’t know him
personally at all.
Q. You know that he is a Negro Congressman from New
York? A. Yes, sir.
Q. I would like to read you one of his statements quoted
in the March 1958 issue, and ask you to agree or disagree
with i t :
(Reading) “Adam Clayton Powell, Negro Congress
man from New York, said in Houston that the entire
South will be desegregated in 20 years. But he said not
to expect integration ‘overnight.’ ”
Now, the quotation begins:
(Reading) “ ‘I don’t believe there should be immedi
ate integration all over the South,’ he said. ‘But there
should be a beginning, a plan in sensitive areas. Inte
gration should start in kindergartens. In this manner,
the problem could be eliminated in 12 years.’ ”
Now, I believe you take issue with that viewpoint? [132]
A. I take issue with the viewpoint as—as— It expresses a
general philosophy which—with which I concur. I take issue
with protracting school desegregation over a 12-year period.
I don’t think that it solves—I think I gave the reasons why.
I think it’s— It’s the hard way around the problem rather
than the easy way around.
Q. Did I understand that you were acquainted with the
St. Louis situation? A. Yes.
Q. Have you read the study made of desegregated St.
Louis Schools by Southern School News as appears in
the issue for December 1957, or do you recall reading it?
Let me hand it to you. (Handing document to witness)
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross
194a
You can see if you have read that report or not. A. I
haven’t read this article, Mr. Attorney. I haven’t read it.
Q. Now, there is a study of desegregation at the Clark
School in St. Louis. It states that during the first year
of desegregation this all-white school became 50-50 and
that within three years it nad reached a percentage of 80%
Negro and 20% white. Would you regard that fact as
indicating success or failure! A. Changes in the nature of
the school population! I don’t see how that proves one way
or the other. You have [133] got a process of change, ap
parently a change in the area in which you have displace
ment.
Q. This Clark School, it states, in the first year of deseg
regation had 31 teachers, 30 white and one Negro, that
of the 30 white teachers 24 have resigned or retired leaving
six of the original teachers. Would you say that indicated
success or failure! A. The resignation of white teachers!
Q. The retirement of 24 out of 30 teachers in one school!
A. For what cause!
Q. The article simply said that they had retired or re
signed. A. I don’t think that shows anything. That—
Q. You don’t think it shows anything! A. It doesn’t
describe— To say that 30 teachers resigned or retired
doesn’t say anything about why they—why they resigned
or retired.
Q. This article further— A. (Interrupting) Whether
they were old-age or not. You could have had an accumu
lation of teachers who reached the retirement age in a
school like this.
Q. You don’t think it indicates anything! A. I don’t
know. I— You can’t reach any conclusion [134] on the basis
of that statement.
Q. This article also states that every white teacher that
had been replaced in that school had of necessity been re
Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross
195a
placed with an inexperienced teacher because no experi
enced teacher would transfer to the school. Do you think
that indicates success or failure! A. Well, I wish I had
read these in context and larger context. I think it’s un
fortunate when you—when you get teachers, that you get
an abundance of teachers who are inexperienced in any
school system because you need a balance between experi
ence and youth. In and of itself, it may not be a bad thing
because new teachers may be better trained and they may
be younger and have more ideas and more initiative than
the older—older teachers.
Q. You think on the whole, inexperienced teachers are
better than experienced teachers? A. Oh, no; no.
Q. This article also says that in the first year of de
segregation 30% of the class failed. Do you think that
indicates success? A. I don’t know what it shows. I don’t
know what percentage of the class failed in previous years
before desegregation,
Further this witness saith not.
Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct
[135] Ds. P beston V a l ie n , called as a w itness in behalf
of the plain tiffs, being first duly sworn, testified as fo llow s:
Direct Examination by Mr. Williams:
Q. This is Dr. Preston Valien? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Dr. Valien, where do you live? A. I live in Nashville,
Tennessee.
Q. How long have you lived here? A. Twenty years.
Q. What is your occupation? A. I am a professor at
Fisk University.
Q. How long have you taught there? A. Twenty years.
Q. What is your position there? A. I am Professor of
196a
Sociology and Chairman of the Department of Social Sci
ences. I also serve as consultant on educational matters,
and I am Director of the Phelps-Stokes Workshop which
works with high-school teachers in 10 states of the South.
Q. When you say the Phelps-Stokes Workshop works
with high-school teachers, what do you mean? A. I t’s a
workshop which we have been conducting for the [136] last
two summers drawing teachers from high schools in 10
states of the South. I ’m director of that workshop.
Q. Is this workshop designed to improve the— A. (In
terrupting) Instruction in secondary schools.
Q. Instruction in secondary schools.
Mr. Hunt: Will the witness speak louder please?
By Mr. Williams:
Q. Will you speak up so these gentlemen can hear you
please? They may want to cross-examine you about some
of these things. I believe you testified previously in this
case, did you not, Dr. Valien? A. I did.
Q. In January of 1957 ? A. Yes, I did.
Q. Dr. Valien, have you read the plan which the Nash
ville Board of Education has proposed? A. I read it as
it was published in the newspaper.
Q. The 12-year plan? A. Yes.
Q. Is that in your opinion a good plan? A. In my opin
ion it is not a good plan.
Q. Why? A. We have engaged in—at Fisk University
in studies [137] of desegregated situations in many places:
St. Louis, Missouri. We have— My wife and I have served
as consultants at University of Kentucky, with teachers in
Louisville and Lexington. We have studied the Clinton
situation on which we have published a pamphlet upon it.
Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct
197a
We are at the present time engaged in a study of the—of
the Little Rock situation.
In— In— In all of the situations that we have studied
personally as well as the literature which we have re
viewed in connection with our studies, we have always found
— It has been almost universally true that—that part-time
or partial desegregation on a non-functional basis has
usually resulted in greater confusion and greater resistance
than desegregation on a functional unit basis. That has
been true of the situations as studied in very great detail
by my wife in St. Louis as my assistant, by our studies
together in—in—in Clinton, and of course by our present
studies going on now in Little Rock, and also of course
our studies on Cairo, Illinois.
This plan, for example, is not sound educationally. I am
very, very concerned—I am equally concerned as an edu
cator myself with the welfare of the children involved in
this plan.
The plan as set up, for example, means that a whole
[138] generation of public-school Negro students, for ex
ample, beginning with those who are at present this year
in the second grade, would be denied the right to have their
constitutional rights determined under this particular plan.
Any student who is this year in the second grade would
never have the right to go to a school nearer—nearer—
nearer his home, for example.
This plan also—also makes no provision at all for the—
for the elimination of segregation and discriminatory prac
tices in the special classes, sight-saving classes, for ex
ample, and other types of classes.
By the Court:
Q. What! A. Sight-saving classes and home-bound-chil
d ren classes.
Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct
198a
This plan also makes no provision at all for any incor
poration of students into the vocational high-school pro
gram which is—which is so patently unequal that-—that it
has not been even denied by the school board itself.
By Mr. Williams:
Q. In other words, do you mean by that that in the Nash
ville School System the vocational high-school segment is
a separate phase of the educational set-up? A. That’s
right. And it’s—and it’s— And it is decidedly unequal in
its present distribution in courses [139] offered Negro
students and courses offered white students which means
that—that for 12 years almost or at least for the next eight
years there would be no possibility under this plan for
the students to get the type of training which is offered
a Hume-Fogg if they are Negro students.
Q. Now, you have mentioned the normal functioning unit.
I believe you gave testimony about that at the previous
hearing. Do you mean by that a unit of grades such as the
first six grades, the junior-high grades, and the senior-high
grades? A. No. I meant to say a—a—a—a usual function
ing unit of—of administrative—ah, within the administra
tive context. We have talked, for example—I have talked
with—with the school superintendents in Louisville, for
example, and they have indicated that—that they have
found it much more easy to administer a functional unit
of operation than they would have found to have adminis
tered a situation where one grade— There is no one grade—•
ah, PTA, there is no one— There is no first-grade PTA,
no first-grade lavatory, no first-grade lunch room as was
pointed out; and the situation thereby is—is one which is
calculated to engender tension within the school system be
cause you have not only families—ah, families divided up
Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct
199a
in return in the sense that their children cannot go to the
school—the same [140] school to which they both—which
they all are eligible. You have teachers divided up because
some of them are opposed to—to teaching desegregated
classes and some are not. You have children that are di
vided up because some are in classes which are desegregated
and others are not. And so that is a plan calculated to
engender confusion and tension, and it has usually done so.
The total plan or the—or the partial plan has—has en
gendered more confusion where it has taken place than in
those situations such as pointed out, St. Louis and—and
Louisville and Washington, D. C., where a functional unit
was desegregated.
Q. Well, now, let me ask you this: Were you here when
Miss Brent testified, the Principal of Glenn School! A.
Yes, I was.
Q. In the courtroom. Did you hear the illustration that
she gave of tension in her school to the effect that the little
first-grade Negro girl was left sitting at the table and the
little fourth-grade white boy came and made a scene about
the situation, the grades above the first grade not being
segregated—not being desegregated! Now, in your opinion,
is that an illustration of just what you— A. (Interrupt
ing) That might well be—
Q. (Continuing) —mention there? [141] A. I don’t
know that particular incident, but that—that might well be.
We— We have found, for example, that when a large
number of people are involved and intimately concerned
with a particular social-change process, that the—that the
transition is likely to be smoother than when it focuses on
a smaller number and leaves a large crowd who acts as
spectator and not—not concerned in the situation.
Q. Dr. Valien, specifically, based on your experience in
Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct
200a
these surveys that you have made, can you make a state
ment with regard to whether or not difficulties insofar as
community resistance may be concerned are likely to de
crease on a protracted period for desegregation? Can you
make a statement in that regard? A. On the basis of
studies that we have—have—have made and have exam
ined as well, we—it would appear to me that wherever
the authorities take a firm position and take a firm position
with respect to enforcement of their policies that—that
the difficulty will be minimum. We— We must expect some
difficulties in any form of social change, but whenever they
take a strong position and take a strong position with en
forcement, the difficulty would be minimum.
Now, this plan seems to me to—to—to merely extend the
period of indecision and the period of—of—of tension, the
period when people who do not wish to—to [142] have the
school desegregated can feel that the issue is still unde
cided from year to year. And, therefore, it would seem to
me that it would—that it would merely spread the period
of resistance over a longer period of time rather than—•
rather than minimize the amount of resistance which would
develop.
Q. Dr. Yalien, your Sociology Department was formerly
headed by the late Dr. Charles H. Johnson. Is that correct?
A. Charles S. Johnson.
Q. Of Fisk University. And I believe both under Dr.
Johnson and under you that department is well known here
at Nashville, is it not? A. Yes.
Q. And its resources are available and have been avail
able to the School Board? A. That’s right.
Q. Has the School Board called on your agency for any
assistance at all with regard to the desegregation situa
tion? A. No, it has not.
Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct
201a
Q. The surveys which your department makes, are they
unbiased surveys, unbiased objective surveys, or do you
just approach it from the point of view that this is a Negro
institution and we want to stress one side? A. No, We
attempt, to be—We tend to be objective, [143] to present
both sides.
Q. Do you feel that you are as objective in the publica
tions that you make out there as Peabody College or
Southern School News or any of the other agencies here
in Nashville? A. We feel so. We hope so.
The Court: All right. Cross examine.
Cross Examination hy Mr. Boult:
Q. Dr. Yalien, in your testimony on the previous occa
sion when you were here in the fall of 1956 (I believe it
was), you testified (if I remember correctly) that you
had never been a teacher, a supervisor, nor a principal,
nor a superintendent in any public school system. Is that
correct? A. That’s correct.
Q. That your training, which you detailed at that time
and which is a part of the record, once you reached the
stage of major emphasis in your educational training was
in the field of sociology. Is that correct? A. That’s cor
rect.
Q. And you have continued to emphasize that specialty
(that is, the field of sociology) through your professional
connection such as the one you now hold at Fisk Uni
versity? A. Yes. But may I point out the field of soci
ology includes education as well. There is a specialty of
educational [144] sociology as well as sociology of race
relations.
Q. Sociology is involved in education? A. That’s right.
Q. Have you ever in any of your activities, either gradu
Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—-Cross
202a
ate or postgraduate, taken courses in the techniques of
public education, meaning the teaching of students, the
techniques of it! A. I did—I did in my undergraduate
training, yes.
Q. Have you ever experienced or had any experience in
applying any of that since you got out of school, teaching
the techniques of teaching? A. Yes.
Q. In what way? In this workshop? A. In this work
shop, yes.
Q. Where do those teachers come from? A. They came
from high schools in Arkansas, Alabama, Georgia, Ken
tucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vir
ginia, Tennessee.
Q. Where? A. Tennessee. I think I have named ten
or eleven, haven’t I? They are all from the South.
Q. Where did they meet? A. At Fisk University.
Q. Was this an interracial meeting? [145] A. No.
Q. What race were they? A. They were Negroes.
Q. So that the workshop you spoke of was Negro
teachers in the South? A. That’s right.
Q. Have you ever participated in any such teacher
training workshop with white teachers? A. Yes, I have.
Q. Where was that? A. This was in St. Louis.
Q. Not in the South? A. And— And at University of
Kentucky.
Q. Not in Tennessee? A. If you call that the South.
Q. Well, I won’t express an opinion on that. I believe
it’s generally known as a border state. A. And I have
participated in workshops at Peabody College. I have
been over there for lectures and for class discussions with
classes in Peabody College.
Q. I believe at Fisk there is a policy of non-participation
in any civic or public affair in the City of Nashville
Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross
203a
which is segregated. Is that not true? A. That is, ah,
involuntary segregation.
[146] Q. Such as observance of the laws of the State of
Tennessee in previous years, if it was involuntary segrega
tion, it was the policy of Fisk University that none of its
faculty or people would go? A. I don’t quite understand
what you mean.
Q. There was a time when the laws of the State of
Tennessee required segregation which was involuntary.
Fisk University did not participate as a policy in anything
that came under those laws?
Mr. Williams: May it please Tour Honor, we
object to that question on the ground that it is too
broad to say that there was a time when the laws
of Tennessee required segregation; and, secondly,
on the ground that Mr. Valien wouldn’t be the proper
individual to ask what the policy of Fisk University
was.
Mr. Boult: I only asked him if he knew that and
if he participated.
The Court: You might ask him if he knows that
was a policy.
By Mr. Boult:
Q. Do you know that to have been a policy of Fisk? A.
Well, we have— We have a policy of not participating in
segregated—in segregated events, but we did not [147]
have a policy of violating the law.
Q. So that for these years that you have been at Fisk,
and how many are they? A. Twenty years.
Q. How many? A. Twenty.
Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross
204a
Q. These years that you have been at Fisk, that has been
a policy which you have observed? A. Yes, as long as I
didn’t break— I didn’t break the law in observing it.
Q. And you are also, I believe, a member of the Na
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People?
A. I am. Yes, I am.
Q, Were you in Nashville in the latter part of August
and the early part of September 1957? A. Yes, I was.
Q. Where were you on those occasions where there was
disturbance and violence in the Nashville Public Schools
or at certain Nashville Public Schools? A. I think X should
qualify. I was in Nashville the first part of September,
but I was not here during August. I was— I was out of
Nashville during the month of August.
Q. You were in Nashville during the September violence
then? [148] A. Yes.
Q. Did you leave the campus of Fisk University during
that time? A. Well, I live off the campus.
Q. Well, did you visit the schools involved at that time?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you— A. (Interrupting) Not during the time
of the violence.
Q. That’s what I mean, during the days or the week or
10 days in which the violence was apparent in the city. You
did not visit any of the scenes of the violence? A. No.
Q. Do I understand that it is your recommendation at
this time that if the size of the problem be multiplied by 12
all at one time, then there would be less violence and less
confusion and less opportunity for disturbance? A. Well,
may X answer that by making another statement; that is,
that there was only one student at Hattie Cotton School,
one Negro student, and the school was bombed. Could you
get a problem any smaller than that?
Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross
205a
Q. You can’t get it any smaller than that, but doesn’t
that indicate the size of the problem? A. I think that
indicates the fact that this—that [149] this school was—
became a focus for—for tension which probably would not
have been true in the case if there had been more students
from Negro groups there and all students had been in
volved, all parents.
Q. Your theory is then that if all the grades at Hattie
Cotton School had received some Negro students that there
would have been less disturbance? A. That—that would
be my—my feeling.
Q. And your feeling is that that would have been true
over all of the Nashville Public School System? A. That
would be my—my feeling.
Q. Then to a sociologist, multiplying the size of the prob
lem diminishes the size of the results which may come from
it? A. Multiplying the number of people who are involved
in it increases the concern of those people and the hope
that they will—and—and the activities on their part to
make it work smoothly.
Q. And it also involves a proportionate number of per
sons with an opposite point of view, does it not, in the other
grades of the school? A. Not necessarily. And the amount
of violence is not necessarily related and has never been
related to the number of Negro students involved in a
particular school. That [150] has—seems to have been a
factor which has not been related at all. If it has been re
lated, it’s been related in a negative way. We have had
more violence where we have had the smaller number of
children—Negro children integrated into the schools.
Q. But sociologically speaking, you would recommend
that the entire system be desegregated at one time. A. Oh,
you mean at one time?
Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross
206a
Q. Yes, sir. A. At one time. Well, it would depend upon
the—the ability of the administrative system. My— My
sociological training would certainly lead me to feel that—
that the system should be—should be functionally—should
be desegregated as functional units.
Q. That would be your sociological training— It would
be the indication from your sociological training! A.
That’s right.
Q. Is that the way I understand you! A. That’s right.
Q. But you do concede that the operational and super
visory aspects related to that problem do have a signifi
cance! A. Well, they—they have some bearing, yes.
Q. And also the ability of the forces of law and order
to control potential disturbances, they do have a significance,
[151] do they not? A. They do indeed.
Q. They cannot be taken out of the equation? A. They—•
They cannot indeed.
Q. Will you concede then that sociological approach is
not the only factor which must be considered in the solu
tion of a human problem such as here presented? A. All
these facts which you have been presenting are sociological
problems.
Q. And you think then that it ought to be determined on
a sociological basis? A. All these problems— All these
facts you have been mentioning are sociological,
Q. You think the public school system should be admin
istered on a sociological basis by sociologists? A. Oh, no;
no. I wouldn’t— I’m not— I ’m not saying that.
Q. Well, you are testifying as I understand it as an ex
pert in public education. A. Well, the public school sys
tem shouldn’t be administered by—by a chemist, but they
use chemists.
Q. And they also use people as principals, supervisors,
Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross
207a
and superintendents who are trained in public education,
do they not? [152] A. Yes, they do.
Q. And you have never had any of that? A. Well, I have
had training, yes.
Q. You have had some training? A. Yes,
Q. In your undergraduate days you say in the techniques
of teacher instruction? A. Yes.
Q. So that your recommendation is to enlarge the size of
the problem and diminish the potential results? A. Not—
Not the size of the problem, the size of the people involved
in it.
Q. And that would not enlarge the size of the problem?
A. It would not.
By the Court:
Q. I understand you would advocate that it be desegre
gated on a functional unit basis— A. (Interrupting) That
would be my—
Q. (Continuing) •—rather than desegregated in its en
tirety at one time? A. Well, it would seem to me that—
that over a short period of time, Your Honor, that it could
be desegregated on the basis of elementary schools one
period, high schools in another period, and have the junior
high school fitting in [153] there somewhere. But at the
present—present basis of the plan, the-—the vocational—
For example, the vocational training of Negro children
would be postponed for at least another eight, nine, or 12
years.
Q. What would an administrative unit include? A. It
would include the elementary schools.
Q. What grades are in that? A. That’s from one to six,
sir. These—these—
Q. What is the next unit after that? A. I think you
Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross
208a
would— You will probably want to get this from the Super
intendent, but these—these vary.
Q. I just wanted to get clear what your testimony is.
You are advocating the desegregation of one of these units
at a time? A. That’s right.
The Court: That is all I wanted to ask.
Mr. Williams: Come down.
Further this witness saith not.
Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct
Mrs. P reston Valien , called as a witness in behalf of
the plaintiffs, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:
[154] Direct Examination by Mr. Looby.
Q. Please state your name. A. I am Mrs. Preston
Valien.
Q. Mrs. Valien, do you live in Nashville? A. Yes.
Q. How long have you lived here? A. Twenty years.
Q. What is your business or profession? A. I am a
sociologist by training and profession. I am associate pro
fessor of sociology at Fisk on leave this year doing de
segregation research.
Q. Just state for the benefit of the record what your
educational background is. A. Sociology both at the under
graduate and graduate level in Texas and University of
Wisconsin at graduate level.
Q. What degrees do you hold? A. A.B. and M.
Q. You have done graduate work? A. At University—
Q. Beyond the A.M.? A. Oh, yes; at the University of
Wisconsin.
Q. Have you in your work as a sociologist been called
upon to make any investigation with reference to desegre
209a
gation [155] in the public schools? A. Yes. I participated
in the—in practically most of the desegregation research
'that has been done now. I participated in the Ashmore
study, the Negro in the Schools, Schools in Transition. I
did the St. Louis Story which is a study of desegregation.
I participated in doing the research in Clinton, in Cairo,
Illinois. I have been working as a consultant to the South
ern Regional Council doing research in Kentucky, and
presently engaged out in Dallas, Texas, and in Kentucky
as a social science consultant for Southern Regional Coun
cil.
Q. Have you written any article or book concerning this
desegregation question? A. Yes. I ’ve published in both
Negro and the Schools and published in Schools in Transi
tion. I ’m the author of the S i Louis Story and co-author
of the Clinton study, and I have done numeral—numerous
articles in the field.
Q. If my memory serves me right, I believe a copy of
your book on the St. Louis Story was filed as part of this
record in the last trial. A. Yes.
Q. And you are the same person who authored that book?
A. TJh huh.
Q. Talk so she can hear you. [156] A. Yes.
Q. Have you read the plan submitted by the Board of
Education which is under consideration today? A. I read
the newspaper account of it.
Q. It is conceded by the defendants that that is a sub
stantial report of the plan and it may be so considered.
What is your opinion relative to that plan? A. Well, on
the basis of my research, I consider the plan a—an in
adequate plan and not at all feasible educationally or so
ciologically.
Q. What is defective in that plan if anything? A. Well,
Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct
210a
I think that all of the research up to this point does
suggest that a plan where you desegregate year by year,
you simply add to tension. You simply vie tension be
cause only one element that is involved in a plan is so
concerned, and the longer the plan’s drawn out, the less
the difficulty.
I believe we do have sufficient research now in com
munities to suggest that where desegregation has been
done completely and rapidly, the amount of tension is
minimized.
Q. Now, you have lived in Nashville, you say, for how
long! A. Twenty years.
Q. And with your training and your experience both in
[157] the work and living in Nashville, what would you
consider to be a desirable plan for the City of Nashville 1
A. Well, a—a desirable plan I think for the City of Nash
ville, I—In viewing Nashville over against the numerous
other communities in which I have visited, I think Nash
ville is more than ready for desegregation than many of
the other communities that have desegregated success
fully. As I view Louisville or Baltimore or any of the
other communities, I think our community is ready, and
I think it could desegregate as rapidly as Louisville did,
and I think it could if it had a school board that said
forthrightly that this is what we are going to do because
I think we do have citizens who are awfully anxious to
get this behind them.
I think Nashville could desegregate its entire school
system just as adequately, just as completely, and without
any more friction than Louisville, Kentucky, did; and it
did it all at one time. I think it could do it as easily as
St. Louis because St. Louis is admitted sociologically—
has many of the kinds of things which we in another area
of the South suggest are peculiarly very southern. St.
Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct
211a
Louis desegregated schools on the unit plan. They did
elementary schools, then the high schools, but I think Nash
ville could if it wanted to, and I think there are enough
citizens who [158] really want to.
I think, beginning in September on the basis of its cli
mate, it could desegregate its entire school system if it
so chose to do so.
Q. Is that opinion based upon your training, your ex
perience, and your observation? A. I t’s— It is based
upon all of them, yes.
Q. And are— A. (Interrupting) I might say this: I—
I think that the longer Nashville waits, the less likely it’s
going to be able to do its job as efficiently and as thoroughly
and without less tension than it would have earlier because
I think increasingly the longer we wait, the more difficulty
and the more tension we vie. And that’s in the nature of
social change. That always happens.
Q. And what cities that had desegregation problems did
you say you have visited and studied? A. Well, St. Louis
is one; and the desegregation was done without trauma
as you know, and although the experience was a happy one,
it had all the dissident groups that we claim we have here.
There was the—all of the anti-groups. There were all the
statements which we have heard, that blood will flow in
the streets. All of the things that you have always heard
were said before St. Louis [159] desegregated schools.
None of the things happened. There— There were in
stances as you know, people who were unhappy in Louis
ville. As you know, Louisville had a very happy experience.
So there is very little correlation between what people
say they will do and what they really will do, once you
have people who will unequivocally say, “This is what we
do.”
Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct
212a
Q. Now, you say you visited Louisville and made a study
there? A. Yes. I— I was up in Louisville participating
in a workshop last summer with my husband. I have been
called in as a consultant about a month ago, and on this
Friday I am going back to Louisville in a conference deal
ing entirely with desegregation.
At this point, what Louisville is doing is, they are say
ing that since admittedly college teachers who are now
training will enter into a desegregated experience, we now
want to begin teaching them the kinds of things they
ought to know.
I want to introduce another dimension, though, that I
think hasn’t been said. I think we have done an awful
lot of discussion with reference to what this does for
Negroes. As a social scientist, I am concerned about
children. I ’m concerned about what this does for all
people. And in every [160] community where I have been,
the one thing that I want to report to this audience is
the number of happy white mothers and white children
who say that for once “I can enter as a citizen and feel
whole and complete. No longer do I feel guilty.”
And one of the things that we have to face, and that
is that we are now moving into a world in winch there is
no place really for the perpetuation of the kind of society
which we have. The largest percentage of our people over
this world are now colored people. It is unfair to children
to give them a false conception of the world in which we
now live.
Desegregation will help not only Negro children, but as
a social scientist I cannot fail to pass on to you the im
portance of desegregation not only for Negro children but
for the wholesome and healthy development of white
children, and this is what my research each day is pointing-
out.
Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct
213a
White children also want to be heard, and in their be
half I want to say that they, too, are experiencing with
reference to homogeneity, we are finding— For example,
in St. Louis, teachers said that white children who had a
tendency to be a little slow and to sort of feel in a—in a
setting in which they were all there together that they
were rather superior, once Negro children came in and
whom they [161] had always felt were inferior, once they
saw Negro children have a little bit of educational train
ing, too, that that made them work a little bit harder. So,
really, desegregation is even helping the white child very
often in sort of pacing himself a little bit more rapidly in
the area of competition.
Q. Did you visit Washington, D. C.! A. Yes, I have.
Q. What is your opinion as to desegregation in Wash
ington, D. C.f A. Well, I—- I think— I think the real
story of Washington is told very well by Mr. Hanson,
the superintendent, in The Miracle of Adjustment, and I
think unfortunately Washington has gotten some very bad
publicity, but the Washington School System is -working
really very, very well. There are problems to be sure, but
I think no person in his right mind would expect not to
have problems in an area in which there had been this
long type of lag in our educational system.
Q. What other city have you visited? A. Well, I ’ve—
I’ve visited practically all the cities—cities in which there
has been desegregation.
Another thing with reference to— There are many
schools, you know, now that have been heretofore Negro
schools that white students have entered. I suppose most
[162] of you will be interested in knowing— This is
college level, but West Virginia which for years had been
an all-Negro school, once the doors were opened, they now
Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct
214a
have many more white students at West Virginia College
than they have Negro students who now say, “We are very
pleased we can get an education without restriction.”
There are also even in Louisville white children going
to what heretofore has been all-Negro children, Negro
schools, one or two being taught by Negro teachers.
I visited all the areas.
Q. Now, the defendants introduced a book just off the
press by Doctor— What’s his name ? A. Hill.
Q. Dr. Hill. Have you read that book? A. I have not.
No.
Q. Have you read The Paths to Desegregation by
Charles M. Black? A. Paths what?
Q. Paths to Desegregation. A. Oh, I glanced at it.
Q. Glanced at it. You haven’t read it? A. No.
Mr. Looby: Cross examine. Just a minute.
Q. By the way, you say you have been to these different
[163] cities. Have you been invited by those cities? A.
In every instance I have been invited. I have made ab
solutely no—
Q. Even Baltimore? A. I ’m sorry?
Q. Baltimore, Maryland? A. Was I— Was I invited
into—
Q. Yes. A. No. No, no; no, no; no, no. I meant
where— Where I went as a consultant, I ’ve gone in by
agency to do research. I think I didn’t make clear I am
a consultant for the Southern Regional Council, and in
some instances— In all instances, I do research. But in—
in—in Kentucky and all the other areas, I have been in
vited in.
Q. Now, the Nashville Board of Education that has been
Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct
215a
confronted with this problem for the last two or three
years, have they ever called you in! A. No.
Q. Never have! A. No.
Q. Have you attended any workshop here sponsored by
the Board of Education! A. Not by the Board of Educa
tion. I did participate in the two earlier mentioned by
Hr. Long and was on the Steering [164] Committee of the
first one.
Q. But they were sponsored by interested private people!
A. Yes.
Q. But the Board of Education has not sponsored any
thing of that nature! A. Well, not to my knowledge. I
can’t say that they haven’t, but not to my knowledge.
Mr. Looby: Cross examine.
Cross Examination by Mr. Hunt:
Q. Did I understand you, Mrs. Yalien, to say that where
you have made these studies you were invited by the public
officers of the particular city or by a private agency! A.
Agencies.
Q. Agencies! A. That’s right, uh huh.
Q. You were not there at the invitation, for example,
of the School Board! A. No.
Q, Did I understand you correctly when I say that you
think the problem of desegregation can be handled the
same in one city as in another city! A. I think the prin
ciples— Yes, I— I— I— I do very much.
[165] Q. In other words, it can be handled in a par
ticular manner without reference to local conditions! Local
conditions do not enter into the problem! Is that your
understanding of the matter! A. No. I wouldn’t say that
completely. I think local conditions have some place. I
Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs-—Cross
216a
think there are certain principles, however, that will hold
one good in every community, and I think communities are
not sufficiently unalike because they have all people in them,
that the principles could not be the same in all communities.
Q. You think the problem of handling desegregation in
St. Louis is precisely the same as handling it in Birming
ham, Atlanta, or Columbia, South Carolina? A. The prob
lem of handling it?
Q. Yes. And the solution to the problem. Let’s put it—
A. (Interrupting) Yes, I would say.
Q. Let’s put it that the solution of the problem is the
same? A. Yes, I would say that the basic principles are
the same. May I suggest what they are? The basic prin
ciples-—
Q. No. That is not in my question. A. (Continuing)
-—are a well-defined plan.
Q. If your counsel wants to go into it. I asked you—
Mr. Williams: Your Honor, pardon me. I [166]
think she is entitled to explain her answer.
The Court: If it is an explanation of her answer,
yes.
Mr. Hunt: That’s right, but I didn’t think so. I
thought my question was whether she thought the
solution to the problem of segregation was the same
in St. Louis as in Nashville, Atlanta, Columbia, South
Carolina, or any other city without reference to local
conditions.
The Witness: On the basis of the principle, I
.would say unequivocally yes.
Mr. Looby: If Your Honor please—
The Court: Ho you want to make any explana
tion of that answer?
Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross
217a
The Witness: I say Number One.
The Court: She is entitled to make an explanation.
The “Witness: Number One, where you have a
well-defined—
The Court: Do you want to say anything?
Mr. Looby: No, sir. Your Honor has ruled.
By the Court:
Q. All right. Go ahead. A. Number one, where you
have a well-defined plan [167] irrespective of that plan;
number two, where you have a school board that acts with
authority without equivocation and says, “This is the plan.
This is what we are going to follow,” a school board that
does not in the face of opposition throw in the towel and
say, “This is what we want,” but a school board that is—
that is committed to the principle of desegregation, whether
it is in Mississippi, when people of authority act with
authority, it matters very little. People respect authority.
People expect—respect people who, once a position is taken,
that—that position is—is upheld. So in principle, there
is—there—there is very little difference whether—no mat
ter where it is.
By Mr. Hunt'.
Q. Then, from your viewpoint evidence as to local con
ditions is irrelevant? Is that correct? A. I don’t think
they are totally irrelevant. I do think in the desegregation
picture, however, they have been played all out of propor
tion to their relevance, I would say.
Q. Do you have an opinion as to what the majority of
the white people in Nashville want? A. My own opinion—
Q. (Interrupting) In reference to segregation? A. I
think the majority of white people in Nashville are like
Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross
218a
the majority in any place. People generally vocalize [168]
and want to perpetuate the status quo. I think Nashville
has no less people in its community who are honest, law-
abiding people who want to see right and justice done
than—than in any other community, and I— I would sug
gest that it has its quota of law-abiding people.
Q. In your opinion, do the majority of white people in
Nashville prefer that their children go to a segregated
school or a desegregated school? A. I haven’t the slightest
notion. I do know this, though—,
Q. (Interrupting) You have no opinion? A. I do know
this, that what people have thought had very little to do
with how people act.
Q. You have answered me that you have no opinion. I
believe that answers all of that question that could come.
Mr. Hunt: Does it not, Your Honor?
The Court: Possibly so. Yes.
By Mr. Hunt:
Q. You testified, I believe, on the first hearing of this
case. Am I right? A. Yes.
Q. You testified in opposition to the transfer plan and
stated as your opinion, I believe (and you can correct me
if I am wrong), that you did not think there should be
transfers [169] because you thought the races should be
compelled to go to school together. Am I correctly stating
what you testified? A. I ’m awfully— I’m awfully glad
you brought that up because I think those are words put
in my mouth.
Q. Please answer my question, and then give your ex
planation. A. No. I was interpreted as saying it. I didn’t
say it.
Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross
219a
Q. You did not say it! A. I did not. I was interpreted as
saying it.
Q. Do you think there should be a voluntary transfer
plan in any plan adopted by Nashville? A. I would like
to see how it fitted into the entire plan. I wouldn’t like to
commit myself on a total voluntary plan unless I saw it.
Q. There is a voluntary transfer plan in this plan. A.
You say is there one?
Q. There is one in the plan that has been presented to
the Court. Do you or not favor that transfer plan? A.
I— I— I— I— I don’t favor the plan at all, so I don’t
favor any feature of it.
Q. Did you testify heretofore that you wanted that trans
fer feature eliminated from the plan? A. As I remember,
when I testified before, I testified in opposition to the plan,
and I did not at all suggest what [170] I thought about
transfer because I think the plan itself is one to which I
totally object, and that would include all facets of it.
Q. Well, now, let’s get into what— You think Nashville
should desegregate next fall totally and completely? A. I
think it could.
Q. It could. Do you think it should? A. I think it
should.
Q. You think it should. Do you think its plan should per
mit of transfers from the school zones of those where one
race was in the majority, and the other race was asking
for transfer. A. It has nothing at all to do with it. I cer
tainly would not. I would not predicate any plan on that
basis of transfer. I think it’s sociologically, psychologically,
and every other way wrong. No, I would not.
Q. You think that is wrong? A. Yes, I do.
Q. Do you think any plan could successfully work which
is forced upon a majority by a minority? A. I— I— I—
Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross
220a
1 don’t like for you to suggest the word “forced” because
I don’t think I want to address myself to that kind of—•
Q. Well, answer my question and then give any explana
tion you want. Do you think a plan can successfully work
[171] which is forced upon a majority by a minority by
court procedure. A. Well, I think most—
Mr. Looby: If Your Honor please, I object to
that question. It is not a question of forcing any
thing by a majority. It is a question of following
the Supreme Court’s rules. Now, as to some plan
forced by the majority on a minority, that is a
different proposition altogether.
The Court: I think it bears on the total picture
that we have to take into account in order to
pass on the matter. I will allow her to give her
opinion on it.
By Mr. Hunt:
A. I think that the citizens of Nashville should have the
opportunity to abide completely and without equivocation
and without any conscience the Supreme Court decision.
Q. You did not answer my question. Do you prefer not
to answer it? Do you think a plan can work successfully
forced upon a majority by a minority?
Mr. Williams: If Your Honor please, I think she
has answered that question. The use of the phrase
ology has no support in the evidence or in law.
[172] Mr. Hunt: That is your answer, Mr. Wil
liams. The witness has not answered it. If she
wants to adopt that answer, I am agreeable.
Mr. Williams: If Your Honor please, I respect
fully submit that it is improper for counsel to ask
Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross
221a
the witness whether a plan which would be forced
on the majority by the minority would be proper
when as a matter of fact this question constitutes
an interpretation by counsel of this Supreme Court
decision.
The Court: That may be true. This is cross
examination though, and I think he is entitled to
test her opinions about various phases of the prob
lem that we have. I think that is a proper question.
The Witness: May I suggest that if—if abiding
by the Supreme Court decision in its entirety means
force, then that’s my answer. I believe—- I believe
unequivocally it—it—ah, it should be abided by.
The Court: All right. Is that all of this witness.
Mr. Looby: If Your Honor please, we have a
witness we want to call-— (Counsel’s voice faded out
and remainder of statement could not be heard by
the reporter.)
[173] The Court: You want to recall him?
Mr. Looby: No, not recall. We are calling him.
The Court: Who is this witness ?
Mr. Looby: He is a member of the Board of
Education.
The Court: Oh, a member of the Board of Edu
cation. All right.
Is that all of the present witness we have ?
Mr. Looby: Yes.
Further this witness saith not.
Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross
222a
Coyness L. E nnix , called as a w itness in behalf of the
p lain tiffs, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:
Direct Examination by Mr, Williams:
Q. This is Mr. Coyness Ennix? A. That’s right.
By the Court:
Q. How do yon spell that? A. C-o-y-n-e-s-s.
Q. How do you spell the last name? [174] A. E-n-n-i-x.
Q. All right.
By Mr. Williams :
Q. You are a member of the Nashville School Board, are
you? A. Yes, s ir; I am.
Q. It was stated earlier here by counsel that you voted
against this plan. Did you? A. I did.
Q. Why did you vote against it? A. Well, I gave my
opinion. I give it now, that I felt that it was too slow.
Q. Why did you feel like it was too slow, Mr. Ennix?
A. Well, the— As I interpret the Supreme Court’s deci
sion, the Board should proceed with all deliberate speed,
and I felt that we were proceeding with the least speed
to— That was—wasn’t deliberate. That wasn’t all deliber
ate speed. That was my interpretation and my thoughts
about it, and I so stated.
Q. Were any other plans discussed, Mr. Ennix, by the
Board in your presence? A. Beg pardon?
Q. Were any other plans ever discussed by the Board?
A. Yes. Pardon me. Just as the— Mr. Pettit, the [175]
Chairman pro tern, just as he stated, the Board met on
several occasions with the Instruction Committee, and we
discussed various type of plans.
Q. What other plans were discussed? A. Well, now,
Coyness L. Ennix—for Plaintiffs—Direct
223a
one plan I know I brought up myself, one suggestion
rather, that I thought would be a good plan. That was
to take the elementary school from one to six. Well, from
two to six now it would be, starting with next year. And
after that the junior and the high school, and also sug
gested perhaps the junior high school and then the high
school. Take it in three stages.
Q. Then you suggested either a two- or three-year stage,
is that correct ? A. Yes, that was—
Q. You didn’t insist on integration in September, Mr.
Ennix? A. No, I didn’t insist on it.
Q. You are the only Negro on the Board, aren’t you?
A.. I— Yes, I happen to be the only Negro on the Board.
Q. Were there plans suggested to the Board in-between
the plan that you mentioned, that you suggested, and the
plan which the Board now proposes? A. Was what now?
Q. The plan which you mentioned was to desegregate
[176] within two or three years. Is that correct? A. Yeah,
that’s—-
Q. Was there anybody who suggested a plan any faster
than that? Did the Board ever consider desegregating at—
A. (Interrupting) I don’t know.
Q. Within the same year? A. I don’t know now.
Q. They never considered it? A. Wait— Wait one
second please. I didn’t—- I want to go back. Last year,
in ’57 and ’56 I did advocate complete desegregation start
ing in the fall of ’57, but after—after the fall of ’57 I was
tempered down some, and so stated to the Board, and—
but not tempered to one grade a year. I— We had a long
discussion of it, and I so stated that I thought that if
we would make it in two or three stages and not as I
originally thought that we would have the whole thing.
That was my discussion.
Q. All right, sir. Thank you.
Coyness L. Ennix—for Plaintiffs—Direct
224a
Cross Examination by Mr. Boult:
Q. Mr. Ennix, yon stated that you attended meetings of
the Instruction Committee in your capacity as a member
of the Board? A. That’s right.
[177] Q. You are not a member of the Instruction Com
mittee? A. No, sir.
Q. And were there more than one of such meetings? A.
Yes, it was.
Q. And the matter was the subject of free and general
discussion by all those present? A. It was that.
Q. Were you given full opportunity to express your
point of view in those meetings? A. I have always had
and have always expressed it.
Q. Even when there was some difference of opinion be
tween you and some other member or members of the
Board? A. We have different—differed sharply on nu
merous occasions.
Q. And there have been other occasions when there
have been differences of opinion between you and other
members? A. That’s right.
Q. And you voted in the negative on this resolution
when it came up for the reasons that you have stated?
A. On numerous occasions I ’ve voted negative, on this
and other—■
Q. On this and on other matters ? A. That’s right.
Q. And you do concede, you do believe that your fellow
[178] members of the Board have been acting in good faith
through this matter? A. I think that—
Mr. Williams: If Your Honor please, if he is
asking for his opinion, then I won’t object, but
otherwise.
The Court: You can do the same, can you not?
Coyness L. Ennix—for Plaintiffs—Cross
225a
The Witness: If Your Honor please, I think they
are conscientious about what they are doing.
By Mr. Boult:
Q. And have acted in good faith according to their
conscience? A. I think so.
The Court: All right.
Mr. Williams: May it please Your Honor, I have
another question if I may.
Redirect Examination toy Mr. Williams:
Q. Mr. Ennis, you are the only Negro on the Board?
A. I certainly am.
Q. You say you all differ, you and the other members of
the Board differ sharply on many occasions? A. On—
on—on numerous occasions.
Q. This question is a problem which affects you as a
[179] Negro, does it not? A. That’s right. That’s right.
Q. Bid you feel that in this particular situation, inas
much as it was something which involved race relations
and you were in the extreme minority on the Board, did
you feel that the Board should give your thinking more
than ordinary and weightier consideration than usual?
Didn’t you feel that? A. Ah, yes; and I think that the
Board— It has been my experience and my belief that
occasions when—where the racial matter was concerned
with the exception of this particular—
Q. (Interrupting) This is the only thing where you
really have felt that the Board had not given your views
as much consideration as they ought to have been given?
A. No. I— I wouldn’t say that. I wouldn’t say that. I don’t
know— I don’t know whether they should have given me
Coyness L. Ennix—for Plaintiffs—Redirect
226a
as much consideration as I—as they ought to. I think
that we differed and differed— We were way apart. I
think they were conscientious about what they were saying,
and I certainly was conscientious about mine.
Q. Well, Mr. Ennix, were you trying to be objective in
the conclusions which you drew on this plan and the
previous plan which was submitted by the Board? [180]
A. Was I—
Q. Did you have any factual data there to consider?
A. No. Not necessarily other than the factual data that
I— I didn’t have any at the board. I have it in my library.
Q. Did the Board have any? A. I don’t know whether
the Board had any factual data or not. We didn’t have—■
We didn’t have it before us, but we discussed factual data
that we had—that the various members of the Board had
in their library.
Q. What factual data, for example? A. Well, some of
this—this—this Southern Regional School News.
Q. You mean information gleaned from Southern School
News? A. Well, yes. That has been discussed and also—
I don’t know whether that has been discussed. Several—
Q. That’s all right. A. I want to tell you. In our dis
cussion we would bring up what different articles and
different books on segregation or desegregation— That—
that—that had been discussed on numerous occasions.
Q. Mr. Ennix, when you testify that you think the Board
was acting in good faith, will you explain to the Court
[181] exactly what you mean by that? A. I think that
the Board members, each one of them, conscientiously feel
that it is best to go grade for grade. I believe they feel
that way.
Q. Yes, sir. Now, Mr. Ennix, do you feel that that feel
ing is based on the facts—on any facts which have been
Coyness L. Ennix—for Plaintiffs—-Redirect
227a
presented to the Board and that that feeling is reasonable
in the light of those facts? A. Well, of course, if I felt
that reasonable—if I ’d felt that were reasonable, I
would—would certainly have voted along with it.
Q. You do not feel then that that feeling on the part
of the members of the Board was based on any facts which
have been presented to the Board? A. Not necessarily
so. I—
Q. (Interrupting) It is based on their personal opinion,
isn’t it? A. Well, their personal opinion and their inter
pretation.
Mr. Hunt: That is cross examination on redirect,
Your Honor.
The Court: I think we are getting into a very
speculative field.
Mr. Williams: All right, sir. If Your Honor [182]
please, we called him; but he is after all a defen
dant, and he stated that in his opinion each member
of the Board was acting according to his conscience.
I don’t deny that, if Your Honor please, but—
The Court: That is the way he feels.
Mr. Williams: I wanted to inquire into whether
or not there is any—into what that means.
The Court: He could not know what each member
of the Board based his opinion on, what particular
factual data. They get factual data outside of the
meetings no doubt that they take into the meetings.
It seems to me that it would be impossible for him
to probe the underlying data that each member of
the Board acted on in voting as he did vote.
Mr. Williams: I would just like to ask him one
or two more questions, if Your Honor please.
Coyness L. Ennix—for Plaintiffs—Redirect
228a
The Court: Hurry up as much as you can because
I am way past my adjournment time.
Mr. "Williams: All right.
By Mr. Williams-.
Q. Has the Board of Education ever had any meetings
out in the Negro community that you know of to discuss
this question of desegregation? [183] A. The Board—
The Board of Education has never had any.
Q. Has never had any? A. No.
Q. So far as you know, has the Board of Education made
any attempt to mobilize the community, the organizations
in a community in support of a program of compliance
with the Supreme Court’s decision? A. The Board of
Education as a board has not.
Q. Thank you. A. Not to my knowledge,
Mr. Williams : That is all.
Further this witness saith not.
The Court: Let the Superintendent of Schools
take the witness stand.
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Recalled—By the Court
W . H. Oliv er , a witness in behalf of the defendants
recalled by the Court, having been sworn previously, testi
fied further as follows:
E x a m in a tio n
By the Court -.
Q. Something has been said in some of the testimony
about special classes in addition to the regular classes.
[184] Explain to the Court what that includes. A. Your
Honor, I think that reference was made to special classes
for the cerebral palsied, for students whose sight is sub
229a
normal, and to vocational and technical training. Now, I
will do the best I can describing our program in those
fields. I have my director of technical and vocational
training in the court room who can describe the present
program better if you wish to bring him to the stand.
We have plans under way for providing special train
ing for the Negro children on the same basis as we pro
vide for the whites. That is our intention. The training
has not been provided in the past years as well for the
Negroes as for the whites. Our plan is to provide the same
quality of special training, sight-saving classes, cerebral
palsied, mentally retarded, and—both severely and train-
able without regard for race. We propose to do that.
Q. But as of the present time the Negro students do not
have those facilities? Is that correct? A. That is— That
is correct so far as the special training is concerned.
Q. Special classes. What about vocational training? A.
That is not correct so far as vocational training is con
cerned. We have a pretty good program of vocational
training for the Negroes at Pearl High School.
[185] Q. That vocational training is on the high-school
level, is it? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And Negro students have facilities for vocational
training in their different high schools? A. They have
about the same as the white schools have. Now, you see,
there are only two Negro senior high schools, and the
white schools don’t all have the same facilities for training.
We try to meet whatever the demand is in any of the
schools, and our philosophy is to meet the demand with
out regard for race in all of the high schools. We increased
our commercial training program at Pearl High School
this fall. We plan to provide the same vocational and
technical training in the Negro high schools that we have
in the white as the occasion may require it.
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Recalled—By the Court
230a
Q. These special classes, going hack to those, where are
they held! Any particular place? A. Yes, sir. We have
the cerebral palsied classes at Buena Yista School. We
have the sight-saving classes at different schools. And
we have the classes for— We have one class for the
severely mentally retarded. That is at Edgehill School,
and it is in a building in which there are no other classes,
and there are not any Negro students in that school at
the present time. What I want to do and what [186] I
believe the Board will have done is to establish another
class for white students. We are not taking care of all
white students by any means who need that training, but
add another class for the white students and establish a
class for the Negro students. In other words, we have
in mind to enlarge our program because it is not adequate
either for the whites or the Negroes.
Q. It has been proposed here by various witnesses that
the best plan for Nashville would be to desegregate all
of the schools at one time; that is, next fall. Could you
give the Court any idea how many schools would be af
fected by that plan under the present zoning? A. Your
Honor, that would depend— That would depend on
whether we permitted choice, transfers.
Q. With the present transfer system as was proposed
in the first plan submitted. A. If we desegregated the
whole school system this fall, how many schools would be
involved according to our present zoning plan?
Q. Yes. A. I don’t know exactly how many, but a great
majority of them, I would say; most of them. There would
be few school zones comparatively in which there were
not both races.
Q. How many elementary schools are there in Nash
ville? [187] A. How many elementary schools?
Q. Yes. A. I believe 35 not counting the annexes.
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Recalled—By the Court
231a
Q. And how many junior high schools! A. Strictly
junior high schools?
Q. Yes. A. Let’s see. In the white schools we have
Waverly-Belmont and Cavert that are strictly—and High
land Heights, three that are strictly junior high schools.
Now, we have a lot— We have some other schools in
which junior-high-school grades are taught, but they are
not strictly junior high schools.
Q. And how many high schools? A. How many senior
high schools ?
Q. Yes, senior high schools. A. Now, these senior high
schools are not all alike. One of them has all twelve of
the grades in it. We have one of those of the white schools.
We have two white schools that are strictly senior high
schools. Those are East and Hume-Fogg Technical School,
and we have Cohn, North, and West End that are six-
year schools, junior and senior high schools.
Now, in the Negro Schools we have Pearl which is strictly
a senior high school. We have Cameron which is a junior-
senior high school, and we have Meigs which is an [188]
elementary and junior high school and becoming a senior
high school. I believe that’s correct.
I might say, Your Honor, I have in the court room a
directory of our schools and can give each school and the
grades in that school if you would like to have it.
Q. Do you have a directory that you can put into the
evidence in the case? A. Yes, s ir; I have.
Mr. Hunt: We will. I don’t thing there is one in
evidence. Wait a minute, Mr. Oliver.
The Witness: Mr. Nagy had one in his possession.
The Court: I think that ought to be made a part
of the record. It might clarify some of the matters.
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Recalled—By the Court
232a
The Witness: I asked that these be here in case
they might be needed.
Mr. Boult: May I hand it to the witness ?
The Court: Yes.
(Mr. Boult handed document to the witness.)
The Witness: Thank you.
By the Court:
Q. That is a directory as of what time? A. This is a
directory for the present school year.
[189] Q. All right. I think you can just file that. That
shows all of the information I have been asking about,
does it not? A. Yes, sir; I believe it does except the loca
tion of the classes for special training. Well, it possibly
has that in it, too. I believe it has everything you asked
for.
(Said directory was passed to the Court.)
The Court: File that as a part of the record.
(Said directory of Nashville Public Schools was
marked “Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1,” and filed
in evidence.)
By the Court:
Q. On the basis of a total desegregation order, do you
have any idea how many people would be affected by that,
how many schools would actually be mixed schools as a
result of such an order? A. In the whole school system?
Q. Yes, in the whole school system. A. I don’t know
exactly. I would estimate that at least three fourths of
the schools would be.
Q. On this voluntary basis, if that plan were put into
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Recalled—By the Court
233a
effect along with the total desegregation order, how much
mixing in the classes do you think would take place as a
result? [190] A. Your Honor, I— I don’t have much to
base that on except our experience last fall.
Q. That is about all you could do. You could project
that experience possibly and arrive at some conclusion on
it. A. Last fall, we had (as nearly as I can say) 115
Negro first-grade students who might have gone to white
schools. Ten of them chose to do so and 105 chose not to
do so. We had 55 white first-grade students living in what
I shall call the Negro school zones, and all of them asked
for transfers. So on the basis of that experience, I would
say that a vast—that nearly all of the whites, possibly
all of them, and the vast majority of the Negroes would
probably ask for transfers in order to be with members
of their own race. Of course, you understand that I don’t
know at all.
Q. Yes, that is true. That is just your opinion. A.
That’s right.
Q. Based on such facts as you have available. A. That’s
right.
Q. All right. I believe that is all the questions I have.
A. Thank you, sir.
Further this witness saith not.
[191] The Court: We are way past the time that
I usually adjourn. So we will have to continue the
case until tomorrow. I have another case that was
postponed on account of the hearing of this case.
So I will want to limit the time tomorrow.
Mr. Looby: If Your Honor please, we have no
further proof.
The Court: I thought I would hear you in oral
argument briefly if you would like to be heard.
W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Recalled—By the Court
234a
Colloquy
Mr. Looby: We prefer to submit a brief.
The Court: Submit a brief without oral argument.
That will be satisfactory with the Court.
Mr. Hunt: Your Honor, that will be satisfactory
with us. There are some rather pressing matters
which necessitate that we ask for some time in
which to reply to their brief. We do not have a
brief ready.
The Court: All right.
Mr. Hunt: I am engaged in another case. I won’t
take more time than we need. It may be a week or
ten days.
The Court: That is reasonable. There is no doubt
about that. How much time do you want to prepare
your brief ?
Mr. Looby: We can submit it any time. As a
matter of fact, we can submit it now, but inasmuch
as the burden of proof is on them probably they
will submit their brief. [192] We can submit it
today. The burden of proof is on them.
(Here, Court and Counsel discussed further the
time needed for filing the briefs.)
The Court: All right. That is reasonable enough.
Two weeks then for you to get your brief in, and
then 10 days for a reply brief.
Is there any further matter now that any party
wants to bring up at this time ?
(There was no response.)
(Thereupon court was adjourned.)
235a
Certification
I, Opal Smith, Official Court Reporter for the District
Court of the United States for the Middle District of
Tennessee, certify that I recorded verbatim by Stenotypy
and electronic means the proceedings had in open court
in the case, Robert W. Kelley, et al, v. Board of Educa
tion of the City of Nashville, Tennessee, et al. (Civil Ac
tion No. 2094), before The Honorable William E. Miller,
Judge of said Court, at Nashville, Tennessee, April 14,
1958, on “Plan of School Board.”
I further certify that to the best of my knowledge and
belief the foregoing typescript constitutes a true and cor
rect transcript of said proceedings.
This 23rd day of October, 1958.
/ s / Opal Smith
Official Court Reporter
236a
(entered June 19,1958)
[188] The question at issue is whether the Court should
approve the School Board’s plan filed April 7, 1958, to
desegregate the public schools of Nashville. A hearing
was held on April 14, 1958, at which witnesses were offered
on behalf of the defendants to support the plan and by
the plaintiffs in opposition to it. Following the hearing
the case was thoroughly briefed by the attorneys for the
respective parties.
The history of the litigation since the filing of the com
plaint was fully set forth in the Court’s opinion filed Febru
ary 18, 1958, which required further study by the School
Board and the submission of another plan not later than
April 7,1958. The plan so filed is as follows:
[189] “That the Plan heretofore submitted to the
Court, and approved by the Court as modified, be
supplemented as follows:
A. Compulsory segregation based upon race is
abolished in Grade Two of the schools of the
City of Nashville for the scholastic year begin
ning in September 1958, and thereafter for one
additional grade beginning with each subsequent
school year, i. e., for Grade Three in September
1959, Grade Four in September 1960, etc.
B. All provisions of the Plan with respect to zoning,
transfers and the like shall continue in force and
effect with respect to each additional grade as
the Plan becomes applicable to such grade.
C. The Board of Education declares its policy to
be to keep the United States District Court for
M emorandum Opinion
237a
the Middle District of Tennessee informed of
the progress being made at such intervals as
the Court may desire or direct and of such prob
lems as may arise or be solved, which in the
opinion of the Board of Education should be
called to the attention of the Court.”
A review of the evidence offered at the hearing discloses
divergent theories as to the best plan to effect a transition
from the long-standing segregated system of public edu
cation in Nashville to a desegregated system. The plan of
the School Board to desegregate the schools one grade
each year beginning with the lower grades is strongly
supported by the testimony of Superintendent of Schools,
W. H. Oliver, by the former Superintendent of Schools,
W. A. Bass, by the Chairman of the Instruction Committee
of the Board, Elmer Lee Pettit, and by the principal of
Glenn School, Miss Mary Brent. There can be no doubt
that these witnesses, based upon their years of experience
in education and upon their intimate knowledge of condi
tions [190] in Nashville, sincerely believe that a sudden or
abrupt transition to a desegregated basis would engender
administrative problems of such complexity and magnitude
as to seriously undermine and impair the educational
system of the city. They are convinced that the change
over from a segregated system of public education in this
particular area of the south is one of such drastic charac
ter, such a reversal of custom, tradition, and settled prac
tice, that disagreement with it is pervasive, far-reaching
and deep seated. It is their opinion that proper school
administration requires that the School Board in devising
a plan should take into account the existence of this factor
in order to minimize its effects upon the efficiency of the
Memorandum Opinion
238a
schools. They support the School Board’s plan primarily
because they feel that it offers the best opportunity to bring
about full desegregation harmoniously and without serious
disruption of the educational program of the city.
The witnesses testifying for the plaintiffs, although of
undoubted educational background and experience, have
had no direct or official connection with the public schools
of Nashville other than the witness Coyness L. Ennix, the
only colored member of the School Board. Moreover, these
witnesses are in disagreement among themselves as to
the best plan to be followed in effecting the change from a
segregated system as required by the decisions of the Su
preme Court. The witnesses, Herman H. Long and Mrs.
Preston Valien, apparently favor a plan which would re
quire immediate desegregation in all of the public schools
of [191] the city. Dr. Preston Valien, on the other hand,
advocates a plan which would accomplish desegregation
on the basis of administrative units, that is, first, the ele
mentary schools would be desegregated, then the junior
high schools, and finally the high schools. Coyness L.
Ennix, according to his testimony, first favored the plan
of total and immediate desegregation but his views under
went a change after the violent eruption which occurred
upon the opening of the schools in the fall of 1957. He
now supports the administrative unit plan advocated by
Dr. Valien, or some gradual plan of a similar nature.
In summary, all four of the defendants’ witnesses, all
of whom have had years of experience in the administra
tion of the schools of Nashville and are in intimate contact
with the conditions in that city, support without reserva
tion the gradual plan adopted and submitted by the School
Board. On the other hand, of the four witnesses for the
plaintiffs, only two of them support a plan of total and
Memorandum Opinion
239a
immediate desegregation, whereas the other two support
some type of gradual, desegregation. It, therefore, appears
that the defendants have carried the burden of proof to
establish the validity of the School Board plan and that
it should receive the approval of the Court.
As the Court in this case has repeatedly pointed out,
it is not the business of the Federal Courts to operate the
public schools and they should intervene only when it is
necessary, for the enforcement of rights protected by the
Federal Constitution. [192] If the judgment of the School
Board was clearly erroneous, or if it was not supported by
the evidence, the Court would be justified in finding that
the defendants had not carried the burden of proof rest
ing upon them and that the School Board’s plan should be
disapproved. However, where, as in this case, the judg
ment of the School Board is supported by the clear pre
ponderance of the evidence, it would be an unwarranted
invasion of the lawful prerogatives of the legally consti
tuted school authority if the Court should undertake to set
its judgment, aside and substitute some other plan. Ad
mittedly the problem is not susceptible of an easy solu
tion. The Supreme Court of the United States has made
it clear that adjustment must be made in accordance with
the exigencies of each case and that the concept of “all
deliberate speed” is a flexible one. For this reason deci
sions applying the desegregation doctrine in other cities
or areas where different conditions obtain are of little
value. Local conditions call for the application of a local
remedy.
In approving the present plan no denial of the consti
tutional rights of the plaintiffs or others similarly situated
is involved. Such rights are distinctly recognized and the
plan contemplates their full enforcement and application
Memorandum Opinion
240a
in accordance with, a time schedule which though protracted
for the best interests of the school system as a whole is
nevertheless definite and unambiguous. Full desegrega
tion is not denied. It is merely postponed.
[193] A form of judgment together with appropriate
findings of fact and conclusions of law will be submitted
for the approval of the Court.
Memorandum Opinion
/ s / W m . E. M illeb
United States District Judge
241a
[298] (entered July 17, 1958)
F in d in g s of F act
1. Reference is here made to the previous opinions and
findings of this Court* which appear in the record.
2. Pursuant to order heretofore entered, the Board of
Education of the City of Nashville filed with this Court
its plan for desegregating the remaining grades of the
school system, together. with a time schedule therefor, as
follows:
“That the Plan heretofore submitted to the Court,
and approved by the Court as modified, be supple
mented as follows:
A. Compulsory, segregation based upon race is
abolished in Grade . Two of the schools of the
City of Nashville for the scholastic year begin
ning in September 1958, and thereafter for one
additional grade beginning with each subsequent
school year, i. e., for Grade Three in September
1959, Grade Four in September 1960, etc.
B. All provisions of the Plan with respect to zoning,
transfers and the like shall continue in force and
effect with respect to each additional grade as
the Plan becomes applicable to such grade.
[299] C. The Board of Education declares its policy
to be to keep the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Tennessee informed of
the progress being made at such intervals as
the Court may desire or direct and of such prob
lems as may arise or be solved, which in the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
242a
opinion of the Board of Education should be
called to the attention of the Court.”
3. At the hearing held on April 14, 1958, the plan of the
Board of Education was supported by testimony offered
by the present Superintendent of Schools, by the former
and now retired Superintendent of Schools, by the Chair
man of the Instruction Committee and Acting Chairman
of the Board and by a principal of one of the elementary
schools in Nashville in which desegregation of the First
Grade was accomplished in September, 1957 pursuant to
a previous order of this Court.
4. The four witnesses for defendants were unanimous
in their sincere belief, based upon their years of experience
in education and upon their intimate knowledge of the
conditions in Nashville, that a sudden or abrupt transi
tion to a desegregated basis would engender administrative
problems of such complexity and magnitude as to seriously
undermine and impair the educational system of the City.
5. The four witnesses for defendants were convinced
that the change-over from a segregated system of public
education in this particular area of the South is one of
such drastic character, such a reversal of custom, tradi
tion and settled practice, that disagreement with it is per
vasive, far-reaching and deep seated; that proper school
administration requires that the School Board in devising
a plan should take into account the existence of this factor
in order to minimize its effects upon the efficiency of the
schools; and they support the School Board’s plan primarily
because they feel that it offers the best opportunity to
bring about full desegregation harmoniously and without
serious disruption of the educational program of the City.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
243a
[300] 6. The plaintiffs offered witnesses in opposition
to the School Board’s plan who, although of undoubted
educational background and experience, have had no direct
or official connection with the public schools of Nashville
other than one such witness, who is the only colored mem
ber of the School Board.
7. Plaintiffs’ four witnesses are in disagreement among
themselves as to the best plan to be followed in effecting
the change from a segregated system as required by the
decisions of the Supreme Court. Two of said witnesses
apparently favor a plan which would require immediate
desegregation in all of the public schools of the City. One
other such witness, advocates a plan which would accom
plish desegregation on the basis of administrative units,
that is, first the elementary schools would be desegregated,
then the junior high schools, and finally the high schools.
The colored school board member first favored the plan
of total and immediate desegregation but his views under
went a change after the violent eruption which occurred
upon the opening of schools in the Fall of 1957, and he now
supports the administrative unit plan just referred to, or
some gradual plan of a similar nature.
8. In summary, all four of the witnesses for the defen
dant School Board, all of whom have had years of experi
ence in the administration of schools of Nashville and are
in intimate contact with the conditions in that City, sup
port without reservation the gradual plan adopted and
submitted by the School Board. On the other hand, of
the four witnesses for the plaintiffs, only two of them
support a plan of total and immediate desegregation,
whereas, the other two support some type of gradual de
segregation. It, therefore, appears that defendant School
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
244a
Board has carried the burden of proof to establish the
validity of the School Board plan, and the [301] plan is
supported by the clear preponderance of the evidence.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This cause has heretofore been retained in Court
pursuant to the previous opinions and orders of this Court,
and Conclusions of Law, to all of which reference is here
made, and is now appropriately before this Court for
final judgment.
2. It is not the business of the Federal Courts to operate
the public schools and they should intervene only when it
is necessary for the enforcement of rights protected by
the Federal Constitution.
3. If the judgment of the School Board was clearly
erroneous, or if it was not supported by the evidence,
the Court would be justified in finding that the defendants
had not carried the burden of the proof resting upon
them and that the School Board’s plan should be disap
proved. However, where, as in this case, the judgment of
the School Board is supported by the clear preponderance
of the evidence, it would be an unwarranted invasion of
the lawful prerogatives of the legally constituted school
authority if the Court should undertake to set its judg
ment aside and substitute some other plan.
4. Admittedly the problem is not susceptible of an easy
solution. The Supreme Court of the United States has
made it clear that adjustment must be made in accordance
with the exigencies of each case and that the concept of
“all deliberate speed” is a flexible one. For this reason,
decisions applying the desegregation doctrine in other
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
245a
cities or areas where different conditions obtain are of
little value. Local conditions call for the application of a
local remedy.
[302] 5. In approving the present plan, no denial of the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs or others similarly
situated is involved. Such rights are distinctly recognized
and the plan contemplates their full enforcement and ap
plication in accordance with a time schedule which though
protracted for the best interests of the school system as
a whole is nevertheless definite and unambiguous. Full
desegregation is not denied. It is merely postponed.
6. The original plan approved as amended by the order
of this Court entered February 20, 1957, and of record
in Volume 19, page 783, and as further amended by said
amended plan hereinbefore quoted and which was the sub
ject matter of the hearing held on April 14, 1958 consti
tutes a compliance with the applicable and constitutional
provisions as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
7. Said original plan as previously approved by this
Court, and as herein amended, should be approved by this
Court, and the prayer of the plaintiff for injunctive relief
should be denied.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
/s / W il l ia m E. M iller
Judge
246a
Judgment
[303] (entered July 7, 1958)
This cause came on to be heard on April 14, 1958 upon
the entire record, upon oral testimony without the inter
vention of a jury, and upon briefs and argument of counsel
pursuant to which the Court, on June 19, 1958, filed its
Memorandum and has this day filed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, all of which are herein incorporated
by reference.
It is , th e r e fo re , Obdebed , A djudged a n d D ecbeed a s
f o l lo w s :
1. That the original plan of the Board of Education of
the City of Nashville approved as amended by the judg
ment of this Court entered on February 20, 1957, of record
in Volume 19, pages 785-786, and as further amended by
the amended plan filed April 7, 1958 and which was the
subject matter of the hearing held thereon on April 14,
1958, be approved, and that the prayer of the plaintiffs
for injunctive relief be and is denied.
[304] 2. That jurisdiction of the action is retained dur
ing the period of transition.
To the foregoing action of the Court the plaintiffs except.
A ppboved as to F obm :
/s / W il l ia m E. M illeb
Judge
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
/ s / R e b e b B oult
/ s / E d w in F . H u n t
Attorneys for Defendants