Kelley v. Board of Education of Nashville and Davidson County, TN Appendix to Appellants' Brief
Public Court Documents
September 23, 1955 - September 17, 1958

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Kelley v. Board of Education of Nashville and Davidson County, TN Appendix to Appellants' Brief, 1955. f39290c8-b99a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/eeca4485-1cb4-4353-8efc-18ebfbc56e43/kelley-v-board-of-education-of-nashville-and-davidson-county-tn-appendix-to-appellants-brief. Accessed August 19, 2025.
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MnlUh Bintm ( to r t rtf Appeals F oe t h e S ix t h C ir c u it No. 13,748 I u t h e R obert W . K e l l e y , et al., Plaintiff s-Appellants, B oard oe E d u cation of t h e C it y of N a sh v il l e , D avidson C o u n t y , T e n n e s s e e , et al., Defendants-Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, NASHVILLE DIVISION APPENDIX TO APPELLANTS’ BRIEF Z. A lexander L ooby A von N. W il l ia m s , J r. 327 Charlotte Avenue Nashville 3, Tennessee T hurgood M a rshall Suite 1790 10 Columbus Circle New York 19, N. Y. Counsel for Appellants W il l ia m L . T aylor Of Counsel TABLE OF CONTENTS OF APPENDIX Docket Entries ..................................... la Complaint....................... 4a Answer ........... 14a Supplemental Answer ...... 32a Transcript of Proceedings on November 13, 14, 1956 38a P l a in t if f s ’ W it n e s s e s : V. T. Thayer— Direct .................................................... 39a 0. B. Iiofstetter— Direct .................................................... 44a Memorandum Opinion of the Court.......................... 46a Findings and Conclusions........................................... 57a Judgment .................................................................... 65a The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench .... 67a O rder.......................................................................... - 81a Transcript of Testimony on January 28, 1958 ....... 82a D e fe n d a n t s’ W it n e s s : William H. Oliver— Direct ................................................... 82a Cross ..................................................... 84a PAGE Opinion ....................................................... ................ 88a Order ........................................................................... 103a Transcript of Proceedings on April 14, 1958 ............ 105a D e p e n d a n t s ’ W it n e s s e s : William H. Oliver— Direct ................................. 107a Cross ...................................... 117a Recalled by the C ourt.......................... 228a Elmer Lee Pettit— Direct .................................................... 129a Cross ............................................ 134a Redirect ............................ 148a Mary Brent— Direct .................................................... 150a Cross ..................................................... 156a W. A. B a ss- Direct .................................................... 159a Cross ..................................................... 163a P l a in t if f s ’ W it n e s s e s : Herman H. Long— Direct .................................................... 171a Cross ..................................................... 184a Dr. Preston Valien— Direct ..................................... 195a Cross ..................................................... 201a Mrs. Preston Valien— Direct .................................... 208a Cross ........... 215a 11 PAGE I l l Coyness L. Ennix— Direct .................................................... 222a Cross ..................................................... 224a Redirect ................................................ 225a Memorandum Opinion................................................ 236a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law................ 241a Judgment .................................................................... 246a PAGE In t h e Intfrfc itBtrirt CErntrl fo e t h e M iddle D istr ic t of T e n n e s s e e N a sh v ille D iv isio n .Robert W . K ell e y , et al., —v.- Plaintiffs-Appellants, B oard of E ducation of t h e C ity of N a sh v il l e , D avidson C o u n t y , T e n n e s s e e , et al., Defendants-Appellees. a ppea l from t h e d istrict court of t h e u n it e d states for THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, NASHVILLE DIVISION Docket Entries 1. Complaint, filed September 23, 1955. 2. Answer filed jointly by all named Defendants, filed November 16, 1955. 3. Amended Complaint, and Order allowing same, filed November 30, 1955, 4. Answer of New Co-Defendants, Isaiah Suggs and W. E. Turner, Jr., filed December 15, 1955. 5. Three-Judge Opinion and Order remanding this action to be heard by a District Judge, entered March 28, 1956. 6. Order entered allowing defendants to file Supple mental Answer, entered November 13, 1956. 7. Supplemental Answer filed by Defendants, filed No vember 13, 1956. 8. Transcript of Proceedings on November 13, 14, 1956. 2a Docket Entries 9. Memorandum Opinion of the Court, entered Janu ary 21, 1957. 10. Findings and Conclusions of Law, entered Febru ary 20, 1957. 11. Judgment Order, entered February 20, 1957. 12. Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Answer and Counter-Claim, filed by Defendants, filed August 30, 1957. 13. Transcript of the Court’s Statement from the bench on hearing of Defendants’ Motion to file Supple mental Answer and Counter-Claim on September 6, 1957. 14. Order Denying the Motion for Leave to File Sup plemental Answer and Counterclaim heretofore filed by defendants, entered September 23, 1957. 15. Report of Nashville Board of Education, filed De cember 6, 1957. 16. Specification of Objections to Report of Nashville Board of Education, filed by the Plaintiffs, filed De cember 23, 1957. 17. Motion to Dismiss filed by the Defendants, filed January 20,1958. 18. Transcript of Testimony, January 28, 1958. 19. Opinion of the Court, entered February 18, 1958. 20. Order entered Ordering that : (1) Motion to Dis miss Denied. (2) Plan for desegregation filed by School Board is disapproved. (3) Injunction should be withheld pending the submission by the Board of another Plan. (4) That Defendant shall file with the Court, not later than April 7, 1958, another Plan. (5) That a hearing on said last mentioned Plan be 3a Docket Entries held for approval or disapproval on the 14th day of April, 1958, entered March 19,1958. 21. Report of Nashville Board of Education, filed April 7, 1958. 22. Specification of Objections to Report of Nashville Board of Education filed by the Plaintiffs, filed April 14, 1958. 23. Transcript of Proceedings on April 14, 1958. 24. Memorandum Opinion of the Court, entered June 19, 1958. 25. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered July 17, 1958. 26. Order of Judgment entered Ordering that: (1) That the original plan of Board of Education of City of Nashville approved as amended by the judgment of this Court entered on February 20, 1957, and as further amended by the amended plan filed April 7, 1958—be approved, and that the prayer of the plaintiffs for injunctive relief be and is denied. (2) That jurisdiction of the action is retained during the period of transition, entered July 17, 1958. 27. Notice of Appeal to the Circuit Court—filed by Plaintiffs, August 15, 1958. 28. Bond for Costs on Appeal—filed by the Plaintiffs, August 15, 1958. 29. Notice of Cross-Appeal—filed by the Board of Edu cation of the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, Deft., August 15,1958. 30. Bond for Costs on Appeal filed by the Defendant, Board of Education of City of Nashville. 31. Order extending time to file Record on Appeal to Nov. 13,1958, filed September 17,1958. 4a (Filed September 23, 1955) 1. (a) The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Title 28, United States Code, section 1331. This action arises under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitu tion of the United States, section 1, and the Act of May 31, 1870, Chapter 114, section 16, 16 Stat. 144, (Title 42 United States Code, section 1981), as hereinafter more fully appears. The matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of Three Thousand ($3,000.00) Dollars. (b) The jurisdiction of this Court is also invoked under Title 28, United States Code, section 1343. This action is authorized by the Act of April 20, 1871, Chapter 22, section 1, 17 Stat. 13, (Title 42, United States Code, section 1983), to be commenced by any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to redress the deprivation, under color of a state law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of rights, privileges and im munities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, sec. 1, and by the Act of May 31, 1870, Chapter 114, section 16, 16 Stat. 144, (Title 42, United States Code, section 1981), providing for the equal rights of citizens and of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, as hereinafter more fully appears. (c) The jurisdiction of this Court is also invoked under Title 28, United States Code, section 2281. This is an action for a permanent injunction restraining, upon the ground of unconstitutionality, the enforcement, operation and execution of provisions of the Constitution and stat Complaint 5a utes of the State of Tennessee by restraining the action of defendants, officers of such State, in the enforcement and execution of such Constitutional provisions and statutes, as hereinafter more fully appears. 2. This action is a proceeding under Title 28, United States Code, sections 2201 and 2202, for a judgment de claring the rights and other legal relations of plaintiffs and all other Negro children eligible to attend elementary, junior high and high schools owned, maintained and oper ated by the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennes see and demanding an injunction, for the purpose of deter mining and redressing questions and matters of actual con troversy between the parties, to-wit: Whether Sections 11395, 11396, and 11397, Code of Tennessee and that portion of Section 12 of Article 11 of the Tennessee Constitution which makes it unlawful for white and colored persons to attend the same school vio late the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con stitution, and whether the exclusion of plaintiffs and other persons, similarly situated, from elementary, junior high and senior high schools owned, maintained and operated by the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, pursuant to these statutes and constitutional provisions and any other law, custom, practice or usage violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 3. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23 (a) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for themselves and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, who are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the Court and who seek a common relief based upon common questions of law and fact. Complaint 6a 4. Plaintiffs are Negroes and are citizens of the United States, State of Tennessee, and are residents of and domi ciled in the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Middle Division of the State of Tennessee. All of the infant plain tiffs can satisfy all requirements for admission to the public elementary, junior high and senior high schools maintained and operated by the defendants Board of Edu cation of the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennes see in and for said City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee. Adult plaintiffs not applicants, are either par ents or guardians of the infant plaintiffs who are applicants. 5. (a) The defendant, Board of Education of the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, is composed of the following board members, the defendants, Mrs. W. 0. Benson, Mrs. Tom A. Bland, Coyness L. Ennix, A. B. Gib son, 0. B. Hofstetter Sr., Henry Kantor, Elmer Lee Pettit, William H. Underhill and Neil H. Wright, who together constitute the Board of Education of the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, and who are hereinafter re ferred to as defendant Board of Education. (b) Said defendant Board of Education exists pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the State of Tennessee as an administrative department of the State of Tennessee, discharging governmental functions, and is by law a body corporate or a continuous body or entity. (c) All of said defendants, above named as board mem bers of defendant Board of Education, are citizens and residents of the State of Tennessee, and are being sued herein in their official capacities as such board members. (d) Defendant W. A. Bass is Superintendent of Schools of the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, and Complaint 7a holds office pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the State of Tennessee as an administrative officer of the free public school system of Tennessee. (e) Defendant William H. Oliver is Principal of East Nashville Senior High School and East Nashville Junior High School; defendant Jack Stanfill is Principal of Kirk patrick Elementary School; and defendant Miss Mary Brent is Principal of Glenn Elementary School; all of said Schools being public schools maintained and operated by defendant Board of Education in and for the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee. (f) Defendants W. A. Bass, William H. Oliver, Jack Stanfill and Miss Mary Brent are citizens and residents of the State of Tennessee, and are made defendants herein and sued, in their official capacities as stated hereinabove. 6. The State of Tennessee has declared public educa tion a State function. The Constitution of Tennessee, Article XI, Section 12, provides: “Knowledge, learning and virtue, being essential to the preservation of republican institutions, and the dif fusion of the opportunities and advantages of educa tion throughout the different portions of the State being highly conducive to the promotion of this end, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly, in all future periods of this Government to cherish literature and science.” Pursuant to this mandate the Legislature of Tennessee has established a uniform system of free public education in the State of Tennessee according to a plan set out in the Code of Tennessee of 1932, Sections 2306-2540.3, and sup Complaint 8a plements and amendments thereto. The establishment, maintenance and administration of the public school system of Tennessee is vested in a Commissioner of Education, a State Board of Education, County Superintendents of Public Schools, and County and City Boards of Education. 7. The public schools of the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee are under the control and supervision of defendant Board of Education and defendant W. A. Bass, acting as an administrative department or division, and as an agent of the State of Tennessee. Said Board of Education is under a duty to enforce the school laws of the State of Tennessee; to maintain an efficient system of public schools in the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee; to determine the studies to be pursued, the methods of teaching, and to establish such Schools as may be necessary to the completeness and efficiency of the school system. Defendant, W. A. Bass, as Superintendent, has the immediate control of the operation of the public schools of said City and is the administrative agent of the defendant Board of Education. 8. Defendant Board of Education maintains and oper ates in and for the said City of Nashville a number of public elementary, junior high and senior high schools, including those designated as Kirkpatrick Elementary, Glenn Ele mentary, East Nashville Junior High and East Nashville Senior High Schools, exclusively for the education, con venience and use of white school children residing in the City of Nashville. All of these schools afford adequate facilities to provide elementary and secondary instruction on a modern basis by grades. These schools are readily accessible to, and are used by, white school children re siding in the areas proximately surrounding the respective Complaint 9a schools; but the facilities afforded by these schools are denied by defendants to the infant plaintiffs and other Negro children, similarly situated, who reside in the areas proximately surrounding said schools, solely because of their race or color. 9. At the beginning of the Fall Term, 1955, eight of the infant plaintiffs presented themselves and made application for admission to Kirkpatrick Elementary School, four of the infant plaintiffs presented themselves and made ap plication for admission to Glenn Elementary School, two of the infant plaintiffs presented themselves and made ap plication for admission to East Nashville Junior High School, and seven of the infant plaintiffs presented them selves and made application for admission to East Nash ville Senior High School. Said infant plaintiffs reside in the areas served by said respective schools, and if they were white children they would have been admitted to said schools; but all of said plaintiffs were refused admis sion by defendants, to said respective schools, solely on account of their race or color. Defendants require Negro applicants to attend schools designated exclusively for Negro children. 10. The defendants rely on the following provisions of the Tennessee Constitution and Statutes, which read as follows: Constitution of 1870, Art. 11, Sec. 12: “ . . . No school established or aided under this section shall allow white and negro children to be received as scholars together in the same school. . . . ” Complaint 10a Code of Tennessee, 1932, Sections: “11395 6888a37. Unlawful for white and colored per sons to attend same school,—It shall be unlawful for any school, academy, college or other place of learning to allow white and colored persons to attend the same school, academy, college, or other place of learning. (1901, ch. 7, sec. 1.) “11396 6888a38. Unlawful for teacher to allow such mixed attendance or to teach them in same class.— It shall be unlawful for any teacher, professor, or educator in any college, academy, or school of learning to allow the white and colored races to attend the same school, or for any teacher or educator, or other per son to instruct or teach both the white and colored races in the same class, school, or college building, or in any other place or places of learning, or allow or permit the same to be done with their knowledge, con sent or procurement. (Ib., sec. 2) “11397 6888a39. Violation is a misdemeanor; fine and imprisonment.—Any person violating any of the pro visions of this article, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined for each offense fifty dollars, and imprisonment not less than thirty days nor more than six months. (Ib., sec. 4, Modified.)” 11. The infant plaintiffs and all other Negro school children in the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Ten nessee, are thereby deprived of their rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Plaintiffs aver that the said constitutional and statutory provisions and all other laws of the State of Tennessee permitting or requiring segregation of the races in public Complaint 11a education fall within the prohibited group which the Su preme Court of the United States holds must yield to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. But if, as defendant Board of Education appar ently insists, said constitutional and statutory provisions and laws of the State of Tennessee are valid until specif ically declared invalid in a judicial proceeding, the plain tiffs here and now aver that the said constitutional and statutory provisions and all other laws, customs, practices and usages of the State of Tennessee requiring or permit ting segregation of the Negro and white races in public education are in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and are therefore unconstitutional and void. 12. Plaintiffs and those similarly situated and affected, on whose behalf this suit is brought, are suffering irrepa rable injury and are threatened with irreparable injury in the future by reason of the acts herein complained of. They have no plain, adequate or complete remedy to redress the wrongs and illegal acts herein complained of other than this suit for a declaration of rights and an injunction. Any other remedy to which plaintiffs and those similarly situated could be remitted would be attended by such uncertainties and delays as to deny substantial relief, would involve multiplicity of suits, cause further irreparable injury and occasion damage, vexation and inconvenience, not only to the plaintiffs and those similarly situated, but to defen dants as governmental agencies. 13. There is between the parties an actual controversy as hereinbefore set forth. W h e r e fo r e , Plaintiffs respectfully pray the Court that upon the filing of this complaint, the Court convene a Three- Complaint 12a Judge District Court as required by Title 28, United States Code, Sections 2281 and 2284; the Court advance this cause on the docket and order a speedy hearing of this action according to law, and that upon such hearing: The Court adjudge, decree and declare the rights and legal relations of the parties to the subject matter here in controversy in order that such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. The Court enter a judgment or decree declaring that the above quoted portion of Article 11, Section 12 of the Constitution of Tennessee, Sections 11395, 11396 and 11397 of the Code of Tennessee, 1932, and any other laws, cus toms, practices and usages pursuant to which plaintiffs and other persons, similarly situated, are excluded from Kirkpatrick Elementary School, Glenn Elementary School, East Nashville Junior High School, and East Nashville Senior High School, or any other public elementary, junior high and senior high schools maintained and operated by defendant Board of Education in and for the City of Nash ville, Davidson County, Tennessee, solely because of race, violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This Court issue a permanent injunction forever re straining and enjoining defendants and each of them from refusing to admit plaintiffs, and other persons similarly situated, to Kirkpatrick Elementary School, Glenn Ele mentary School, East Nashville Junior High School, East Nashville Senior High School, or any other public elemen tary, junior high or senior high schools maintained and operated by defendant Board of Education in and for the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, solely be cause of their race. Complaint 13a Plaintiffs further pray that the Court will allow them their costs herein and such further, other or additional relief as may appear to the Court to be equitable and just. Z. A lexander L ooby and A von N. W illiams, J r. 327 Charlotte Avenue Nashville 3, Tennessee T hurgood Marshall 107 West 40th Street New York 36, New York Attorneys for Plaintiffs Complaint 14a Answer (Filed November 16,1955) Answer of Mrs. W. 0. Benson, Mrs. Tom A. Bland, Coyness L. Ennix, A. B. Gibson, 0. B. Hofstetter, Sr., Henry Kantor, Elmer Lee Pettit, William 11. Underhill and Neil 11. Wright, Members of the Board of Education of the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee: W. A. Bass, Superintendent of Schools of the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, William H. Oliver, Principal of East Nashville Senior High School, Jack Stanfill, Principal of Kirkpatrick Elementary School and Miss Mary Brent, Principal of Glenn Ele mentary School These defendants, for answer to the complaint filed against them in the above styled cause, say: 1, 2 and 3 Defendants admit the averments of Section 1, 2 and 3 of the complaint. 4 Defendants assume and, therefore, admit that plaintiffs are Negroes and are citizens of the United States and of the State of Tennessee and are residents of and domiciled in the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee. Defen dants also assume and, therefore, admit that the adult plaintiffs are either parents or guardians of the infant plaintiffs. Defendants are without information sufficient, to form a belief as to the truth of the averments that all of the infant plaintiffs can satisfy all requirements for admis sion to the public schools maintained and operated by the City of Nashville. 15a 5 Defendants admit the averments of Section 5 of the com plaint, except as hereinafter stated in this paragraph. Said Section 5 of the complaint avers that defendant William H. Oliver is Principal of East Nashville Senior High School and also of East Nashville Junior High School. Defendants admit that William H. Oliver is Principal of East Nash ville Senior High School. Defendants deny that William H. Oliver is Principal of East Nashville Junior High School. The Principal of said East Nashville Junior High School is H. B. McDonough. 6 and 7 Defendants admit the averments of Sections 6 and 7 of the complaint. 8 Defendants admit the averments of Section 8 of the com plaint subject to the explanation and qualification herein after stated in Section 14 hereof. 9 Defendants are without information sufficient to form a belief as to the averments of Section 9 of the complaint. The facts in respect to the matters stated in Section 9 of the complaint in so far as known to the defendants are as follows: At the beginning of the school term 1955-56, certain Negro children, accompanied by persons who were appar ently their guardians or parents, sought admission to Kirk patrick Elementary School, Glenn Elementary School and East Nashville Senior High School. All of such applicants Answer 16a were then refused admission, as more fully appears in Sec tion 14 hereof. Admission was then denied to all of such applicants in the particular schools they sought to attend, other schools of the City of Nashville being available to them, because they were Negro children and for the reasons fully set forth in Section 14 hereof. The schools to which such Negro applicants sought admission had been estab lished as schools for white children. Admission for the school term 1955-56 was refused to the plaintiff applicants for the reasons set forth in Section 14 hereof upon the assumption that they resided in the areas in which they now claim to reside and upon the assumption that they met the scholastic requirements, other than race, then a prerequisite for admission, and no evidence in this respect was demanded from applicants nor any investigation of their residence or scholastic qualifications made by defen dants. Defendants have no reason to question the substan tial accuracy of the averments that those applicants who were denied admission to Kirkpatrick, Glenn and East Nashville High School are plaintiffs herein, but for lack of sufficient information, defendants cannot admit that such applicants reside in the areas proximately surrounding said schools or that they are of an age and with requisite scholastic qualifications justifying their admission into said schools. Defendants deny that any applicants for admission to East Nashville Junior High School presented themselves to the Principal of such school. Defendants assume that those whom the complaint refers to as seeking admission to such school presented themselves to East Nashville Senior High School, William H. Oliver, Principal, and were denied admission by him upon the belief that they were seeking admission to the Senior High School. Answer 17a 10 Defendants admit the averments of Section 10 of the com plaint. 11 Defendants deny that they have deprived plaintiffs or others of their rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Defendants admit that the con stitutional and statutory provisions of the State of Ten nessee must yield to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States. Defendants deny that it is now their insistence or has ever been their in sistence, as the complaint supposes, that laws of Tennessee requiring racial segregation in the public schools are valid until specifically declared invalid. As more fully appears in Section 14 hereof, defendants are aware that the Su preme Court of the United States has said that all provi sions of Federal, State or local laws requiring or permit ting racial discrimination in public education are uncon stitutional. Defendants are also aware that the Constitution of the United States provides that such Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land and that such Constitution is binding, anything in the constitutions or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 12 and 13 Defendants deny the averments of Sections 12 and 13 of the complaint, as is more fully explained in Section 14 hereof. 14 Defendants aver that they are proceeding in good faith and with all reasonable promptness to implement the con Answer 18a stitutional principle announced by the Supreme Court of the United States on May 31, 1955 in the case of Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas. Such decision recognized as a fact what these defendants as school admin istrators and school board members know, that there are complexities and obstacles which demand that the situation be studied and an intelligent plan formulated, consistent with the various public and private interests involved. Defendants aver that their predecessors in office have created and established, and these defendants propose to operate and maintain, a public school system of high quality and with high standards and that the administration of such school system has been, and will be, without preju dice and without racial discrimination as the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the land are inter preted and applied in good faith. For many decades the school system of Nashville, Ten nessee has been developed, built and operated in compliance with the principle of segregation, expressly written into the Constitution of Tennessee (1870), Article XI, Section 12, by that provision forbidding that schools receiving State aid shall allow white and Negro children to be re ceived as scholars together in the same school and in com pliance with statutory provisions of Tennessee enacted pur suant to and consistent with said constitutional provision. Said principle of segregation having received the express approval of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson in 1896 and the implied ap proval of such Court in many other cases, it was not merely the right and privilege but it was also the solemn legal duty of these defendants and their predecessors in office to adhere to the policy of racial segregation and to build a public school system based thereon. The Supreme Court of the United States does not have the power nor claim the Answer 19a power by overruling its prior decisions thereby to erase a century of history built upon prior constitutional doc trines. As a consequence of the rule of segregation, schools have been located and built and they have been equipped and staffed to provide for these separate needs. If such opera tion is abruptly and totally abandoned without survey, without planning, without school census and without school districts established in the light of the constitutional doc trine, newly discovered as inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment, then the result will be very damaging to the quality of Nashville’s public school system, destructive to amicable association of the races and harmful to the pupils and the teachers. Defendants aver that, fully conscious of their duties and obligations to plaintiffs, they are also aware of their duties and obligations to all the pupils and teachers of the Nash ville School system. Defendants propose to formulate their plans and to administer the schools of Nashville with a recognition of both duties and obligations. Defendants aver that they, and their immediate prede cessors in office, have administered the affairs of the Nash ville school system without discrimination against the colored race. As evidence of this they point to the fact that during the past decade, capital expenditures for Negro schools have been a greater proportion of total capital expenditures than average daily attendance of Negro stu dents has been of total average daily attendance. Attached to this Answer and made a part hereof as Exhibit A is a statement showing average daily attendance and also show ing capital expenditures during each of the past ten years for schools for white pupils and for schools for colored pupils, and total expenditures. Defendants further aver as evidence of a school admin istration in good faith and without racial prejudice, that Answer 20a there are presently employed in the schools of the City of Nashville 1003 class room teachers, of whom 324 class room teachers are members of the colored race, and that there are presently employed in the schools of the City of Nash ville a total of 1085 principals, supervisors, class room teachers and assistants, of whom 343 are Negroes. As further evidence of school administration in good faith and without racial prejudice, defendants aver that the Negro teachers in Nashville are paid on the same salary scale as are the white teachers, that such salary scale is the best in the State of Tennessee and that such salary scale compares favorably with those in other cities of the United States of similar population. Defendants aver that the above mentioned decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of May 31, 1955 was brought to the attention of the defendant City Board of Education by the Defendant School Superintendent on June 9, 1955. On motion duly made and with one member, to-wit Coyness L. Ennix, voting in the negative, the matter was then referred to the Instruction Committee for study and report to said Board of Education. On July 14, 1955 the Instruction Committee made a progress report to the Board, copy of which is attached to this Answer and made a part hereof as Exhibit B. Said progress report was approved by said Board of Education. Said progress report advised the Board that the Instruc tion Committee had sent questionnaires to forty cities in the southern region in order that Nashville might make use of the experience of the other school systems, that replies had been received from approximately one-half of these and that the Committee was studying the data received. Said progress report informed the Board that to act in telligently, an accurate, up to date school census was neces sary and that permission had been asked of the State Answer 21a Board of Education to take such a census six months in advance of the normal date. The State Board of Education denied as impractical such request for an advanced date of the next school census, which Section 2474.1 of the Sup plement to the Code of Tennessee (1950) provides shall he taken between February 15th and May 31st, 1956. Said progress report also advised the Board that the Committee proposed to hold meetings of ail school principals to ask their advice and assistance in formulating a policy and suggested that interested citizens, including Parent Teach ers Association groups and other parents should be given an opportunity to meet and discuss the appropriate pro cedure. On August 11, 1955 said Instruction Committee made another progress report, copy of which is attached to this Answer and made a part hereof as Exhibit C. Said second progress report was also approved by the City Board of Education, with one member, Coyness L. Ennix, voting in the negative. In this progress report the Instruction Com mittee suggested to the Board that it was considering the problem in its many aspects, that the Board must deal with the matter positively and yet unhurried. Such prog ress report pointed out that the school system of Nashville had operated for approximately one hundred years and that during all of this period, pursuant to the constitutional and statutory provisions of Tennessee, and having the approval of the Supreme Court of the United States, sepa rate facilities and separate schools had been maintained for white and Negro children. Said progress report pointed out that in view of the many problems inherent in the matter, many of which were enumerated in the report, it was not in the interest of the schools to undertake imple mentation of the decision of the Supreme Court of the Answer 22a United States of May 31, 1955 during the school year 1955- 56. Defendants aver that by approving the second progress report of its Instruction Committee, the City Board of Education determined, with member Coyness L. Ennix voting in the negative, that implementation of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on May 31, 1955 would not be attempted during the school year 1955-56, but that the problem should have extensive study. Defen dants further aver that such is the specific status of the matter at this time. The Instruction Committee is working intensively on the matter and it has been directed by defen dant City Board of Education to make a further report as soon as may be practicable following the completion of the school census in 1956 provided for by Section 2474.1 of the Supplement to the Code of Tennessee (1950). Defendants further aver that when Defendant Board of Education has formulated a plan for implementing said decision of May 31, 1955, defendants will seek the permis sion of this Court to file a supplemental answer which sets forth the then status of the matter and any plan then formulated. Defendants, therefore, say that all proceed ings in this case should be stayed until the City Board of Education has had a reasonable opportunity to receive and act upon the report of its Committee now studying the problem and reasonable opportunity to formulate an appro priate plan. Laying aside their personal views and preferences, these defendants intend in their official capacities to comply with, and to be bound by, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States with respect to public education. In so doing, defendants do not intend to abdicate the adminis trative responsibilities committed to them by the govern Answer 23a mental system inherent in the Constitution of the United States, and they do not intend to permit any association for any racial group, majority or minority, to administer the affairs of the schools submitted as a sacred trust to these defendants. Defendants do not propose to ask the Federal Courts to assume the functions and responsibilities of school administration; and in view of the separation of powers required by the Constitution and inherent in our system of government, defendants are confident that the Courts will not yield to the pressures and insistences that they do so. Defendants aver the Supreme Court of the United States has not decided that the Federal Courts are to take over or regulate the public schools of the states. It has not decided that the states must mix persons of different races in the schools or must require them to attend schools or must deprive them of the right of choosing the schools they attend. What it has decided, and all that it has de cided, is that a state may not deny any person on account of race the right to attend any school that it maintains. This, under the decision of the Supreme Court, the state may not do directly or indirectly, but, if the schools which it maintains are open to children of all races, no violation of the Constitution is involved even though the children of different races voluntarily attend different schools, as they attend different churches. Nothing in the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court takes away from the people freedom to choose the schools they attend. It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce segregation. The Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation upon the exercise of power by the state or state agencies, not a limitation upon the freedom of in dividuals. Answer 24a And now having fully answered, these defendants pray to be hence dismissed. Answer R eber B oult E d w in F. H u n t Attorneys for Defendants H oward, D avis, B o ult & H u n t Of Counsel I hereby certify that a copy of this Answer has been mailed to Z. Alexander Looby, Esq., 327 Charlotte Avenue, Nashville, Tennessee, one of the counsel for plaintiffs. E d w in F. H u n t 25a EX H IBIT A ANNEXED TO ANSWER N a sh v ille C it y S chools Average Daily Attendance 1946-55 Year White Negro Total 1945-46 ..... 15,059 6,458 21,517 1946-47 ..... 14,885 6,664 21,549 1947-48 ..... 15,132 6,913 22,045 1948-49 ..... 14,999 6,846 21,845 1949-50 ..... 14,826 6,977 21,803 1950-51 ..... 14,814 6,957 21,771 1951-52 ..... 14,467 7,030 21,497 1952-53 ..... 15,029 7,128 22,157 1953-54 ..... 15,807 7,461 23,268 1954-55 ..... 16,080 8,089 24,169 Capital Expenditures 1946-55 Year White Negro Total 1945-46 ..... .... $ 16,566.00 $ 84,664.86 $ 101,230.86 1946-47 ..... 28,840.00 28,840.00 1947-48 ..... 90,474.31 30,837.88 121,312.19 1948-49 ..... 633,729.45 262,629.04 896,358.49 1949-50 ...... 2,368,343.65 572,058.29 2,940,401.94 1950-51 ..... 517,608.14 98,729.16 616,337.30 1951-52 .... 206,475.72 201,044.43 407,520.15 1952-53 .... 432,517.95 473,518.45 906,036.40 1953-54 .... 1,102,901.82 1,110,775.17 2,213,676.99 1954-55 .... 278,777.70 909,095.38 1,187,873.08 Total ...... ..... $5,647,394.74 $3,772,192.66 $9,419,587.40 26a July 14,1955 Nashville Board of Education Nashville, Tennessee Ladies and Gentlemen: I . P rogress R epo rt of t h e I n st r u c t io n C o m m it t e e of t h e B oard of E ducation on t h e Q u e st io n of D esegregation in t h e P u b lic S chools The Board of Education has referred to this Committee for consideration the decree of the United States Supreme Court with regard to desegregation in our schools. The Committee has given careful, thoughtful study to this problem, and we are aware of the necessity of action that will carry out the purpose of the Board and at the same time assure such procedures as will contribute to better understanding and harmonious cooperation of all our citizens in support of drastic changes that affect the lives of us all. We are presenting the Board with this progress report. 1. In order that we might profit by the experiences of other school systems, we have sent questionnaires to forty cities in the Southern region. Replies have been received from approximately half of these, and we are studying the data received. We believe that completion of this study will give us valuable help. 2. In order to act intelligently, we must have an accu rate, up-to-date school census. The problems of utilizing present buildings which have been built, equipped, and staffed by the Board of Education and the citizens of Nash ville must be decided when we know where the children are, grade placements, etc. The State Board of Education EX H IB IT B ANNEXED TO ANSWER 27a requires that this census he taken every four years, hut our Superintendent has asked permission to take the census six months in advance to facilitate our program. 3. We propose to hold meetings of all our School prin cipals for discussion of the problems, to ask their assistance and advice in formulating our policy. Furthermore, we believe that interested citizens, including parent-teacher association groups and other parents in each community who will be affected by decisions, should be given oppor tunity to meet and discuss in each school area the pro cedures that will be most appropriate in complying with the Board’s policy. 4. In view of the far reaching adjustments involved, we ask that the committee be given time to work out details, so that we may proceed with caution and guarantee the con tinued progress of a peaceful, harmonious cooperation for better relationships and the advancement of the best inter ests of all our children. We ask approval of the Board of this progress report, and assure you that any changes or further developments will be brought to you for approval. Bespectfully submitted, I n stb u c tio h C o m m ittee Neil H. Wright, Chairman Mrs. Tom A. Bland Henry Kantor Elmer Lee Pettit Exhibit B Annexed to Answer 28a August 11,1955 Nashville Board of Education Nashville, Tennessee Ladies and Gentlemen: P rogress R epo rt of t h e I n st r u c t io n C o m m it t e e on D esegregation The Board of Education by official action has referred to the Instruction Committee of the Board the matter of studying the question of desegregation in the public schools and other matters arising since the Supreme Court’s deci sion on this issue. Your Committee has gathered information from other cities and school districts affected by the Supreme Court’s decision and considered the problem in its many aspects, keeping in mind at all times that the Board must deal, justly with all concerned; that its course of action must be unhurried, yet positive. For approximately one hundred years successive Boards of Education in the City of Nashville have operated a system of public schools for all the children of the City. This program was interrupted during the period of the War Between the States but immediately thereafter the operation of the schools again got under way. During this period of time it has been the policy of the Nashville Board of Education to operate a system of public schools for the city in keeping with the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee, of the Statutes of the State of Ten nessee, and in harmony with the provisions of the Charter of the City of Nashville, and with the laws of the City. From the time of the establishment of the Schools in the City of EX H IBIT C ANNEXED TO ANSWER 29a Nashville until the present separate facilities and separate schools were provided for White and Negro children. This course of action was amply supported by the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and by the Statutes of the State of Tennessee. Furthermore, this position was supported by opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson in 1896. Now, on May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States announced that the court had reached a unanimous decision holding that the protection clause, the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools. On May 31, 1955, the Supreme Court issued its imple mentation decision. In this decision the court said: “Full implementation of these constitutional principles may re quire solution of varied local school problems. School au thorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these principles; courts will have to consider whether the action of the school authorities con stitutes good faith implementation of the governing con stitutional principles.” It is manifestly clear that it would not be in the interest of the schools to undertake implementation of the court’s decision during the school year 1955-56. There are too many unresolved problems for this course of action to be initiated now. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the Su preme Court itself directed the various Boards of Education to examine their individual local situations before making final decisions. The following problems are suggestive: 1—Determination of school boundaries This problem requires that a complete census of the city be taken and that existing school facilities be studied Exhibit C Annexed to Answer 30a to determine accessibility and adequacy for a rezoned school system of the City. 2— Age-grade distribution of pupils A careful study of the age-grade distribution of pupils will be required. That is to say, in a sixth grade school it will be necessary to determine how many children of a given age-grade category can be adequately taken care of and what demands will be made on each school. 3— The Selection and assignment of principals and teachers The selection and assignment of principals and teachers, under a policy of desegregation, constitutes a significant problem within itself. The solution of this problem will require extensive study. 4— Athletic policy Another problem on which policy will have to be deter mined is that of operation of an athletic program in the public high schools and junior high schools after desegregation. 5— Adaptation of the school curriculum so as to meet the needs of all the children, particularly in the high schools This problem will require extensive study. 6— Orientation of principals and teachers with respect to the issues involved in a change in policy from a segre gated to a desegregated school system Manifestly serious errors in judgment and practice on the part of principals and teachers might ensue without adequate preparation for such a significant change. Exhibit C Annexed to Answer 31a 7—Determination of the scope and the timing of action for the initial step to be taken in desegregating the schools This matter will require careful study on the part of all concerned, including teachers, principals and parents. The question of taking a small segment of the overall problem and learning by doing how to handle the overall problem is involved here. Respectfully submitted, I n steu c tio 'n C o m m ittee Neil H. Wright, Chairman Mrs. Tom A. Bland Henry Kantor Elmer Lee Pettit Exhibit C Annexed to Answer 32a Filed November 13,1956 Supplemental Answer to Amended Complaint of Mrs. W. 0. Benson, Mrs. Tom A. Bland, Coyness L. Ennix, A. B. Gibson, 0. B. Hofstetter, Sr., Maurice Pilsk, Elmer Lee Pettit, William H. Underhill and Neil H. Wright, Mem bers of the Board of Education of the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee; W. A. Bass, Superinten dent of Schools of the City of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, William H. Oliver, Principal of East Nashville Senior High School, Jack Stanfill, Principal of Kirkpatrick Elementary School, W. E. Turner, Jr., Principal of Pearl Elementary School and Isaiah Suggs, Principal of Washington Junior High School These defendants for Supplemental Answer to the Amended Complaint filed against them in the above styled cause, say: In their Answer heretofore filed, defendants stated that when the Nashville Board of Education formulated a plan for implementing the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of May 31, 1955, they would file, with the per mission of the Court, a Supplemental Answer setting forth the then status of the matter and any plan then formulated. Defendants now aver that said Board of Education, on October 29, 1956, adopted a plan, as set forth in a report of its Instruction Committee. Copy of said report and plan are attached to this Answer as an exhibit. In view of the fact that Exhibits designated A, B and C were attached to the original Answer, said exhibit attached hereto is desig nated Exhibit D. Defendants aver that said plan constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles Supplemental Answer 33a and is a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Defendants, therefore, aver that the injunc tion sought should not issue. And now having fully answered, these defendants pray to be hence dismissed. R eber B oult E d w in F . H u n t Attorneys for Defendants H oward, D avis, B oult & H u n t Of Counsel I hereby certify that copies of this Supplemental Answer have been delivered to Z. Alexander Looby, Esq., 327 Charlotte Avenue, Nashville, Tennessee, one of the counsel for plaintiffs. E d w in F. H u n t EXHIBIT D October 29, 1956 Nashville Board of Education Nashville Tennessee Re: Report of Instruction Committee on Abolishing Compulsory Segregation in the Public Schools Ladies and Gentlemen: On June 9, 1955, the Board of Education after being ad vised of the Opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States of May 31, 1955, referred the subject of “racial dis Supplemental Answer 34a crimination in public education” and all matters relating thereto to the Instruction Committee of the Board of Educa tion, with the request that said Committee make an inten sive study of the problem in all of its various aspects and make subsequent reports on its findings. Pursuant to the direction of the Board the Committee has heretofore made two written reports reflecting its findings, It is unnecessary now to summarize such reports, which are part of the records of the Board. In the Committee Report filed with this Board on August 11, 1955, Item 7 dealt with the subject “Determination of the Scope and the Timing of Action for the Initial Step to be Taken in Desegregating the Schools”. In connection with Item 7, the Committee said: “This matter will require careful study on the part of all concerned, including teachers, principals and par ents. The question of taking a small segment of the overall problem and learning by doing how to handle the overall problem is involved here”. Subsequent to the filing of Report No. 2 on August 11, 1955, your Committee has continued to study the problem. A number of meetings has been held by the Committee. In vestigation of progress or programs of other cities in the matter of desegregation has been made. Books and periodi cals relating to the matter have been examined. The Chair man of the Committee, the Superintendent and Supervisor of Secondary Education of the Nashville City Schools sought and obtained an extended conference with repre sentatives of two large cities which have executed plans for desegregation in public schools. Representatives of the Instruction Committee have attended work shop and other Supplemental Answer 35a group meetings to observe or to participate in discussions of the issues involved in desegregation. The further studies of the Committee have convinced its members as to the soundness of the suggestion made in Item 7 of its report on August 11, 1955, that a portion of the problem should be handled first and, based upon the results obtained and within the limits of facilities available, fur ther plans should be made. The segment selected for han dling should not be so large as to endanger the orderly ad ministration of public schools in a system that has been wholly segregated for many years. At the same time such segment should be sufficiently large to be a significant and worthwhile first step. After careful consideration, the Committee has concluded that the initial step should involve the first grade rather than older students who have here tofore been in segregated schools. This abolishing of com pulsory segregation in the first grade will involve an esti mated 3200 students. As a consequence of its studies and investigation, and the exchange of views between its members and other in vited to meet with the Committee, your Instruction Com mittee now feels it is ready to submit a report and recom mendation to the Nashville Board of Education dealing with the initial step to be taken. Your Committee recommends the adoption by the Board of Education of the following resolution: B e it resolved by the Nashville Board of Education that the Board approve the report of its Instruction Committee on abolishing compulsory segregation in the public schools. B e it f u r t h e r resolved that the Board of Education now determine and announce the following plan as the Supplemental Ansiver 36a initial step to comply with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Brown vs. Board of Education, said step to be taken as of Septem ber 1, 1957: Supplemental Answer P la n 1. Compulsory segregation based upon race is abol ished in Grade One of the elementary schools of the City of Nashville for the scholastic year beginning in September, 1957. 2. A plan of school zoning or districting based upon location of school buildings and the latest scholastic census without reference to race will be established for the administration of the first grade and of other grades as hereafter desegregated. 3. Every student entering the first grade will be per mitted to attend the school designated for the zone in which he or she resides, subject to regulations that may be necessary in particular instances. 4. Applications for transfer of first grade students from the school of their zone to another school will be given careful consideration and will be granted when made in writing by parents or guardians when good cause therefor is shown and when transfer is practicable, consistent with sound school administra tion. 5. The following will be regarded as some of the valid conditions to support application for transfer: (a) When a white student would otherwise be re quired to attend a school previously serving colored students only. 37a (b) When a colored student would otherwise be re quired to attend a school previously serving white students only. (c) When a student would otherwise be required to attend a school where the majority of students in that school or in his or her grade are of a different race. 6. The Instruction Committee is directed to continue its study of the problem and to recommend by De cember 31, 1957, the time of and the number of grades to be included in the next step to be taken in further abolishing compulsory segregation. Respectfully submitted, I n stb u c tio n C o m m it t e e Supplemental Answer Neil H. Wright, Chairman Mrs. Tom A. Bland Elmer Lee Pettit Maurice H. Pilsk 38a Transcript of Testimony of November 13-14, 1956 * * # * # E dwabd F. H u n t , Esq. Counsel for Defendants -V. -V. «J£. -V-TP W TP W TV* [13] “This is a class action brought by infant plaintiffs, by and through their parents or next of friends. The defendants are prepared to stipulate and now admit that those plaintiffs are residents of the City of Nash ville; that they are attending schools in the City of Nashville; that they sought admission in 1955 to schools other than those that they were attending; that the Negro plaintiffs sought admission to schools then operated for white children only and were denied such admission; that the white plaintiffs sought admission to schools operated for Negro children only and were de nied admission. “That the plaintiffs in seeking that admission sought to go to the school most proximate to them in point of space. They were denied that admission for the reason that the Board of Education had not then formulated a plan for abolishing compulsory segregation in the schools of Nashville. We are prepared to admit and will stipulate those facts. So there is no occasion to bring in these twenty-one plaintiffs to prove, or to say that they have applied for admission. We [14] have in vestigated and have determined that they are residents of the City of Nashville, and some one sought admission to these schools and we think the inference perfectly clear that these are the ones who did it. For that reason we admit those facts.” # # # # # 39a D r. Y. T. T hayer, the nex t w itness called in behalf of the p lain tiffs, hav ing been firs t duly sworn, testified as fo l lows : Direct Examination by Mr. Looby: [137] Q. Will you state your name, please, sir? A. My name is V. T. Thayer. Q. Dr. Thayer, you are listed in Who’s Who as an educa tor and editor. Is that your profession? A. That’s cor rect, educator, and I have been editor of a number of educa tional magazines. Q. I ’m sorry, I didn’t understand you. A. I say I am primarily an educator. I have been editor of one or two educational magazines. Q. And you also received your Bachelor of Arts, Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy Degrees from the Uni versity of [138] Wisconsin. Is that correct? A. That is correct. Q. And your Phi Beta Key as an under-graduate? A. Yes. Q. You served as Instructor of Philosophy and Psy chology in the University of Wisconsin from 1919 to 1922. Is that correct? A. That’s correct. Q. And you were principal of the Ethical Culture High School in New York City? A. Yes, I was principal of the Ethical Culture High School from 1922 to 1924. Then I went to the Ohio State University as professor of secondary edu cation, and then returned to the Ethical Culture School in 1928 as Educational Director. Q. You were also editor of the American Review?' A. That’s true. Q. 1923 to ’27, and were associate editor of the Journal of Educational Research 1929 to 1931? A. That’s correct. Dr. V. T. Thayer-—for Plaintiffs—Direct 40a Q. And yon were Educational Director of the Ethical Culture Schools in New York City from 1928 to 1948? A. That’s right. Q. When were you professor at the University of Hawaii? A. Following my retirement from the Ethical Culture Schools [139] in 1948, I became visiting professor at the University of Hawaii in 1949 and ’50. Q. From 1952 to 1956 what did you do? A. After return ing from Hawaii I was also visiting professor at Johns Hop kins University and the University of Maryland for a year. And in the past four years I have been visiting professor at the University of Virginia until, of course, this Fall. Q. You have also written a number of articles for educa tional journals. Will you tell the Court just a few of those and on what subjects? A. Well, I ’ve written a number of books as well as articles. The first book that I wrote was a book called “The Passing of Recitation”, which had to do with educational methods. Then I was the joint author with Professor Alberty, of Ohio State University, “Super vision in the Secondary School”. Then, between 1931-2 and 1940 I was chairman of the Commission on the secondary school curriculum, and joint author of the book called “Re organizing Secondary Education”, in addition, of course, to supervising the publication of the reports of other com mittees dealing with the work in science, mathematics, English, social studies and the like. And then in my own right, in addition, I have written a book called “Religion in Public Education”, “American Education Under [140] Fire”, “Public Education and its Critics”, and the “Attack upon the American Secular Schools”. Q. In your work, Doctor, have you had any opportunities to investigate segregation in the schools? A. For the last four years, of course, at the University of Virginia, teach Dr. V. T. Thayer—for Plaintiffs—Direct 41a ing in a Southern State, I considered that to be one of our most important problems to study and so as an integral part of my courses for the past four years, I have made a study of the problem of segregation, not carrying on research myself, but rather keeping informed regarding the research work that is going on, the problems that are involved and the like, so that I have attempted to study the problem from the standpoint of its administrative difficulties, the problems that it raises with reference to teaching in an organizational school and the like. Q. I believe prior to that you were Superintendent of Sec ondary Education? A. Well, years ago I was Superinten dent of Schools in Ashland, Wisconsin, and also on the staff of the Superior Public Schools. Q. From your training and your experience, especially in the last four years in the University of Virginia, when you studied and had your classes and work on segregation in the schools, I show you a copy of the plan submitted by the Nashville [141] Board of Education in compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision to desegregate, have you read that plan? A. I have. Yes. Q. Will you give your opinion as to the plan? A. Yes, I will be very happy to. I think you are asking me to give my opinion, now? Q. Yes. A. I wasn’t quite sure I heard you properly. I think the plan runs counter to the whole trend of research with reference to successful compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision for a number of reasons. The plan to abolish compulsory segregation as outlined by the Nashville Board indicates a rather timid and hesitant attitude toward the problem which confronts the City, and the experience with reference to desegregation has been that success turns quite largely upon the attitude, the initial attitude of the Dr. V. T. Thayer—for Plaintiffs—Direct 42a Board of Education. If it takes a forthright and courageous attitude with reference to compliance with the law and then seeks the cooperation of community agencies and organiza tions, success is more likely to follow. But where the Board takes, as I say, a timid and hesitant attitude and studies only a segment of the problem, thus encouraging unruly groups in opposition to develop, the tendency is then for pressure to be exerted upon the Board to backwater, to side step, or to modify its plan and [142] the like, so that that’s my first criticism,—namely, that this does not give evidence of any forthright intention on the part of the Board to realize what is inevitable, ultimate compliance with the law. Then, secondly, a further objection that I have, we also find from experience that success in eliminating compulsory segregation depends upon careful preparation for a change in each of the school communities affected. Now, this co operation on the part of the school community is best se cured when the community is dealt with as a whole. I mean a community of a school, an elementary school community, or a high school community, because all of the parents are involved when the school as a whole is taken into considera tion, the community as a whole is involved, but when you only take a fraction of the pupils in a school, such as the Nashville plan proposes to do in the first grade only, then it’s difficult to enlist the interest and support of the entire parent body through the Parent-Teachers Association, the community organizations that might be enlisted to support the plan to generate a favorable attitude and so on, are only partially involved. And so the weakness of this plan is that it does not make possible the Board of Education working with community groups to bring about wholehearted sup port of the plan on the part of the community and the school community as a [143] whole. Dr. V. T. Thayer—for Plaintiffs—Direct 43a On the other hand, it does make possible, almost invites opposition because only a portion of the community is in volved and it leaves open the question, What are we going to do next year, and the like? So, in a sense, it invites people who are opposed to compliance with the law to make their objections manifest and to create conditions that will cause the Board to be more hesitant the following year. It is said that this plan is designed to study the situa tion and to learn from the situation, but it’s not a normal situation. I t’s only a partial approach to the problem in each school, and as I say encouraging conditions of opposi tion and the like to be taken into consideration later, so that you do not have an opportunity on the part of the Board to draw conclusions from what I say is a normal school situation. Then, furthermore, within the school itself grades are going to be contrasted with each other. You have the younger children involved, but if we assume they go on grade by grade in subsequent years, you have within one and the same building children who are in segregated classes and children who are in non-segregated classes. They become easy agents for groups outside to create op position, so bullying tactics and the like may well be en couraged within the school, and [144] you are not utilizing the school staff and the student body as a whole to meet whatever problems arise. The very partial aspect, as I say, tends to create problems rather than to eliminate them. Those are my basic objections to it. I might add that where there are administrative problems involved, as we know, where the school as a whole is involved it is possible to start preparation in the Summer or in the Spring and run through the Summer to bring about the cooperation and ask for the cooperation of community groups and so on, Dr. V. T. Thayer—for Plaintiffs—Direct 44a and by instituting early registrations and the like, a good many of the administrative problems can be pretty well solved in advance by the school as a whole, as easily as handling with one or two grades. Q. Now, yon haven’t said anything about the interests of the children involved. You are saying that it creates an administrative problem by desegregating part of a school and not the other part? A. One part of the school is segregated and another part of the school is not segregated, I say that is to open opposition for unruly groups outside the school, to initiate, to stimulate, to encourage pupils to compare each other and introduce bullying tactics and create problems that would not be present at all if you were dealing with a school as a whole [145] and attempting to promote a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding. # * # # * 0. B. Hofstetter—for Plaintiffs—Direct Mr. 0. B. H o fstetter , being called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiffs, having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: Direct Examination by Mr. Looby. # * * * # [186] Q. I believe you are a member of the Roman Catholic faith, are you, Mr. Hofstetter? A. I am. Q. And have been all your life? A. Yes, ever since I was a year old, or somewhere in that neighborhood. Q. Do you live in Nashville, Tennessee? A. I ’ve lived in Nashville since 1910, and in the suburbs and in Nashville ever since I was born. Q. Are you a member of the School Board? A. Yes. 45a Q. And a defendant in this action? A. Yes. Q. Mr. Hofstetter, have the Roman Catholic Schools in Nashville desegregated their entire system? A. Yes, they have, as to the high school and possibly one or two of the other schools, the Cathedral School, and I don’t know whether any of the others have any integration or not. Q. How long has the Roman Catholic Church been de segregating its school system in Nashville? A. Since the beginning of the term in 1955, or possibly shortly after the beginning of the session, I ’m not certain. Q. And that system has operated successfully since that time, [187] hasn’t it? A. So far as I know, it has. I haven’t attended the school, and I haven’t had occasion to be in the schools to notice how successful it is, but so far as I know, it has been. I might say this, that about the time school started the only colored Catholic High School in the City had been discontinued. It was out here where the Sears-Roebuck Building is now and the Bishop was con fronted with the problem of what to do with those high school students, and I think that was his reason for de segregating. Q. And the School at St. Vincent’s on Highland Street, that has been closed and the children sent to the white school? A. If there are any white children going there, I don’t know it. I never heard that they were. Q. There are no colored children going there, are there? A. St. Vincent’s? Q. Yes. A. Yes, it’s filled up with colored children. Q. The children go to the Cathedral School now, don’t they? A. Yes, I understand there are some colored chil dren in the Cathedral School. 0. B. Hofstetter—for Plaintiffs—Direct 46a Entered January 21, 1957 On May 31, 1955, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 99 L. Ed. 1083, enunciated the principles which should govern the district courts in for mulating decrees to implement its prior ruling in the same case that racial discrimination in public education is un constitutional. Immediately thereafter, the Board of Education of the City of Nashville began an intensive study to determine the methods to be followed in the City school system to effectuate the constitutional principles declared by the Su preme Court. These studies included investigation of the programs of other cities in the matter of desegregation, an analysis and review of pertinent books and periodicals, at tendance by its representatives at work shops and other group meetings, and the exchange of views between its members and others invited to meet with its committee. From the outset the Board of Education frankly and openly recognized its obligation to maintain the school system upon a racially non-discriminatory basis. It has endeavored by its careful investigation and study of the question to find a solution which would accomplish the transition as soon as reasonably practicable consistent with the public interest and the efficient operation of the schools. The problem confronting the Board of Education was not one which was concerned with a single school but with an entire school system which had been maintained for practically a hundred years—always on a segregated basis —and having an aggregate school population of 27,000 students, of whom 10,000 were negro students. In this situa tion the Board concluded that it would need more time to formulate a workable plan of integration. Memorandum Opinion of the Court 47a In recognition of the reasonableness of this request for further time, a three-judge court, at the March 1956 term, granted the Board’s motion for a continuance of the case to the October 1956 term. In granting the continuance the Court specifically found that the Board of Education at an early date had announced that it would comply with the ruling of the Supreme Court in integrating the public schools of Nashville, and that it “has proceeded promptly to take steps toward that end, and is now acting in good faith and with appropriate dispatch in awaiting the tak ing of the school census and giving careful consideration to all factors involved, so as to arrive at a workable plan of integration, which appears to be a reasonable start toward full compliance with the May 17, 1954 ruling of the Supreme Court.” At the October 1956 term the case was called and set for trial November 13, 1956. At the hearing which was be gun on that date, the Board of Education submitted its plan, adopted on October 29, 1956. The primary question presently before the Court is whether the plan so adopted is adequate to meet constitutional requirements. The pertinent provisions of the plan are as follows: 1. Compulsory segregation based upon race is abolished in Grade One of the elementary schools of the City of Nashville for the scholastic year beginning in Septem ber, 1957. 2. A plan of school zoning or districting based upon loca tion of school buildings and the latest scholastic census without reference to race will be established for the administration of the first grade and of other grades as hereafter desegregated. 3. Every student entering the first grade will be permit ted to attend the school designated for the zone in Memorandum Opinion of the Court 48a which he or she resides, subject to regulations that may be necessary in particular instances. 4. Applications for transfer of first grade students from the school of their zone to another school will be given careful consideration and will be granted when made in writing by parents or guardians when good cause therefor is shown and when transfer is practicable, consistent with sound school administration. 5. The following will be regarded as some of the valid conditions to support application for transfer: (a) When a white student would otherwise be re quired to attend a school previously serving colored students only. (b) When a colored student would otherwise be re quired to attend a school previously serving white students only. (c) When a student would otherwise be required to attend a school where the majority of students in that school or in his or her grade are of a different race. 6. The Instruction Committee is directed to continue its study of the problem and to recommend by De cember 31, 1957, the time of and the number of grades to be included in the next step to be taken in further abolishing compulsory segregation. It is the considered opinion of the school authorities, after mature deliberation, that the change from a system of segregated schools should be upon a gradual or step-by-step basis. They have concluded that an abrupt change in all of the city schools would be inconsistent with the public inter Memorandum Opinion of the Court 49a est and with the efficient functioning of the school system itself. They believe that the soundest approach to the prob lem is to begin with desegregation in the first grade and to make plans for the future based upon the experience thus gained. Whether the solution proposed by the Board is the best one which could be devised is a matter of dispute in the evidence. The views of the school authorities are supported by the testimony of expert witnesses. Other experts, testi fying for the plaintiffs, have expressed contrary opinions. They insist that if a plan of partial desegregation is adopted, each step should include not less than a normal functioning unit, i.e., elementary schools, junior high schools, or high schools. They further insist that any plan adopted should be a “total plan” in that it should set forth all steps to be taken to accomplish complete desegregation together with the time for taking each step in order that all interested parties will know definitely what to expect for the future. In passing upon the adequacy of the plan submitted, this Court must give effect to the implementing opinion in the second Brown case, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 99 L. Ed. 1083, wherein the Supreme Court stated, inter alia, as follows: “Full implementation of these constitutional princi ples may require solution of varied local school prob lems. School authorities have the primary respon sibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith im plementation of the governing constitutional principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for further hearings, the courts which originally heard these cases can best perform this Memorandum Opinion of the Court 50a jud ic ia l ap p ra isa l. A ccordingly, we believe it ap p ro p r ia te to rem and the cases to those courts. “In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectu ate this interest may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional princi ples set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may properly take into account the public inter est in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles can not be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them. “While giving weight to these public and private con siderations, the courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full com pliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to estab lish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school trans Memorandum Opinion of the Court 51a portation system, personnel, revision of school dis tricts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. They will also consider the ade quacy of any plans the defendants may propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a ra cially nondiscriminatory school system. During this period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases.” From the foregoing language it is thus clear that the district courts in fashioning decrees in cases of this nature are to be guided by equitable principles and that they are required, therefore, to give due weight to considerations of public interest. While it is recognized that the plaintiffs have a personal interest in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis, the dis trict courts, as courts of equity, may take into account the necessity for time to eliminate a variety of obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. Primary responsibility for assessing the problems involved rests upon the local school authorities and the function of the courts is strictly judicial in character, i.e., to determine first, whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith imple mentation of governing constitutional principles, secondly, whether the school authorities have made a prompt and rea sonable start toward full compliance, and third, whether the school authorities have carried the burden to establish that more time is necessary in the public interest, consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date, to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. It is not the duty of the Court to devise a plan of desegregation nor to Memorandum Opinion of the Court 52a substitute its judgment in matters of school administration for that of the constituted school authorities. In the instant case, as already indicated, there is a dif ference of expert opinion as to whether desegregation of the first grade throughout the entire system, effective with the beginning of the September, 1957 school term, con stitutes a prompt and reasonable start toward full compli ance with the May 17, 1954 ruling of the Supreme Court. But viewing the question as a relative one which addresses itself to the local conditions obtaining in the City of Nash ville, the Court is of the opinion that the proposed first step is both prompt and reasonable. It involves 3400 students and 115 teachers of whom 1400 students and 42 teachers are negroes. It will abolish compulsory segregation for 12 per cent of the City’s aggregate school population, which is only 2 per cent less than the aggregate school population of the senior high schools. The evidence justifies the conclusion that desegregation will confront the Board with numerous administrative problems, including increased difficulty in procuring and re taining teachers, teaching adjustments required because of differences in achievement levels of students among negro and white children, problems arising from a liberalized student transfer system supplanting a strict transfer sys tem, as well as other problems inherent in accomplishing a change so profound and far-reaching in its effects. While it is possible to argue that the first step towards desegrega tion should include a greater number of grades or at least a normal functioning unit, the Court is not able to find from the evidence that the conclusion reached by the Board is an unreasonable one. But although the Court is of this view, and although it finds that the school authorities are acting in good faith Memorandum Opinion of the Court 53a and have carried the burden of showing that more time is necessary to comply with the decision of the Supreme Court, it cannot find that they have carried the burden of support ing the indefinite time to accomplish full compliance pro vided for in paragraph 6 of the plan. Paragraph 6 merely provides that the Instruction Committee of the Board shall continue its study of the problem and recommend by De cember 31, 1957, the time and number of grades to be in cluded in the next step to be taken in further abolishing compulsory segregation. There is no indication from the plan itself or from the evidence what the Instruction Committee would recommend to the Board or whether, in fact, it would recommend any thing more than further delay. Nor is there any indication, if the Instruction Committee made a recommendation for a substantial further step, whether the recommendation would be approved or disapproved by the Board itself. Nor does the plan require the Board to take action upon any recommendation by the Committee at any particular time. Also, according to the proposal, after the Committee once made a recommendation for another step to be taken, its function would have been completely exhausted with no obligation to make recommendations for further steps toward desegregation. It is manifest, therefore, that para graph 6 makes the plan submitted partial and incomplete, and that it is in effect simply a proposal for indefinite post ponement of further desegregation, directly contrary to the mandate of the Supreme Court that full compliance with its ruling shall be accomplished with all deliberate speed. The provisions of the plan for transfers of students from the school of their zone to another school were ap parently adopted upon the basis of the interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decisions set forth in Briggs v. Elliott, Memorandum Opinion of the Court 54a 132 F. Supp. 777. In that case a three-judge court, presided over by Circuit Judge Parker, construed the Brown deci sions of the Supreme Court as not requiring integration but as merely forbidding discrimination, and as not forbidding such segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary action. If this is a correct interpretation, and the Court believes that it is, provisions which merely confer upon white and negro students a nondiscriminatory right to transfer would not appear to violate the Constitution. If the provisions should be applied on a discriminatory basis, any aggrieved party would have an appropriate remedy. The Court has examined the recent opinion of the Court of Appeals in Booker v. State of Tennessee Board of Edu cation, in which a gradual plan for desegregating Memphis State College was disapproved. But because of material factual differences the decision in that case is not deemed to be in conflict with the conclusions herein reached. The Court found in that case that the plan was discriminatory in that it postponed the “qualified plaintiffs for five years in their admission to the freshman class, and expressly con templates that white students who have registered later than these plaintiffs shall be admitted earlier”. Further dis crimination was found in the fact that “plaintiffs may be compelled to seek education elsewhere in order to avoid dis crimination and to secure a college education now without being deferred for several years”. Manifestly the Nashville plan does not contemplate or involve such discrimination between the races. It merely postpones complete desegrega tion to provide time for the solution of varied administrative problems without impairment or denial of adequate educa tional opportunities to both races during the period of transition. Memorandum Opinion of the Court 55a Accordingly, the judgment to be entered pursuant to this memorandum will provide as follows: (a) That Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the proposed plan are approved; (b) That Paragraph 6 of the proposed plan is dis approved; (c) That the Board of Education shall submit to the Court not later than December 31, 1957, a report set ting forth a complete plan to abolish segregation in all of the remaining grades of the City school system, in cluding a time schedule therefor; (d) That upon the filing of such report the plaintiffs shall have a period of twenty days thereafter within which to file objections thereto; (e) That if objections are not filed to the report with in said period the report shall be automatically ap proved ; (f) That if objections are filed to the report within said period a hearing shall be held thereon before the Court upon five days’ written notice by the plaintiffs to the defendants, with the burden resting upon the de fendants to establish that the plan is adequate to meet the constitutional principles declared in the two Brown opinions; (g) That the rights of the plaintiffs and others similarly situated to attend the public schools of the City of Nashville without discrimination on account of race are recognized and declared, but that the issuance of an injunction is withheld pending the filing of the report provided for in Paragraph (c) above and the Memorandum Opinion of the Court 56a action of the Court upon any objections which may be made thereto; and (h) That jurisdiction of the action is retained during the period of transition. In addition to a form of judgment the parties will also submit to the Court proposed findings of fact and conclu sions of law to implement this memorandum. W m . E. M iller United States District Judge Memorandum Opinion of the Court 57a Findings and Conclusions Entered February 20, 1957 F in d in g s op F act 1. Plaintiffs, except as specified in Paragraph 3 hereof, are Negroes who are citizens of the United States and are residents of and domiciled in the City of Nashville, Ten nessee. 2. Adult plaintiffs are either parents or guardians of infant plaintiffs; and all infant plaintiffs (except Willie Dean Coleman who graduated from high school in June 1956) are presently attending public schools operated by the City of Nashville. 3. Plaintiffs Robert W. Rempfer and Mrs. Gertrude Fleming Rempfer, are white persons and are the parents of Jean Rempfer and Richard F. Rempfer, who are infants presently attending public schools operated by the City of Nashville. 4. Defendants include the members of the Board of Edu cation of the City of Nashville and the Superintendent of Schools of the City of Nashville, said defendants being the administrative officers having general supervision and con trol of the public schools of Nashville. 5. Defendants, other than those specified in Paragraph 4, are principals of particular public schools of Nashville. 6. At the beginning of the school year 1955-56, in late August or early September 1955, infant plaintiffs sought admission to particular public schools maintained and operated by the City of Nashville. 58a 7. Infant plaintiffs satisfied academic requirements for admission to the public schools in which they sought to en roll and said schools were most proximate in distance to the residences of the respective plaintiffs seeking admission thereto. 8. The schools to which infant plaintiffs who are Negroes sought admission were schools which were then and are still operated on a segregated basis for white students; and the schools to which infant plaintiffs who are white children sought admission were schools which were then operated on a segregated basis for Negro students. 9. Infant plaintiffs were refused admission to the schools of their choice; and they were required, if they chose to attend public schools, which they did choose to do, to attend different public schools which were operated on a segregated basis for students of their own race. 10. The school system of Nashville has been developed, built and operated for almost one hundred years in com pliance with the principle of segregation, expressly written into the Constitution of Tennessee in 1870, and subsequently embodied in statutory provisions. 11. The school system of Nashville consists of forty-six schools, with a total enrollment of 27,595 students, of whom 10,322 are Negro students and 17,273 are white students. 12. The Nashville school system employs a total of 1,057 principals and teachers, of whom 702 are white persons and 355 are Negroes. 13. The enrollment in the first grade of the Nashville school system is approximately 3,400 students, of whom ap Findings and Conclusions 59a proximately 2,000 are white students and 1,400 Negro students. 14. Teachers employed for the first grade of the Nash ville school system number 115, of whom 73 are white per sons and 42 Negroes. 15. The enrollment in the first grade of the Nashville school system is twelve percent of the aggregate school population and is only two percent less than the aggregate school population of the senior high schools—grades ten to twelve, inclusive. 16. In so far as physical facilities are concerned, the public schools of Nashville operated for Negro students are substantially equal to the public schools of Nashville operated for white students. 17. In the public schools of Nashville there is no differ ence in the salary schedule of Negro teachers and white teachers. 18. During the past decade, capital expenditures for Negro schools in Nashville have been a greater proportion of total capital expenditures than average daily attendance of Negro students has been of total average daily attend ance. 19. Immediately after the decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, on May 31, 1955, the Board of Education of the City of Nashville began an intensive study to determine the methods to be followed in the City school system to effectuate the con stitutional principles declared by the Supreme Court. Findings and Conclusions 60a 20. Such study by the Board included investigation of the program of other cities in the matter of desegregation, an analysis and review of pertinent books and periodicals, attendance by its representatives at work shops and other group meetings, and the exchange of views between its members and others invited to meet with its committee. 21. From the outset the Board of Education frankly and openly recognized its obligation to maintain the school system of Nashville upon a racially non-discriminatory basis. 22. Said Board of Education has endeavored by its care ful investigation and study of the question to find a solution which would accomplish the transition of an entire school system as soon as reasonably practicable consistent with the public interest and the efficient operation of the schools. 23. The public schools of Nashville are operated on the basis of an entire school year as the unit of operations, as distinguished from the semester or term basis. 24. Desegregation will confront the Board of Education of Nashville with numerous administrative problems, in cluding increased difficulty in procuring and retaining teachers, teaching adjustments required because of differ ences in achievement levels of students among Negro and white children, problems arising from a liberalized student transfer system supplanting a strict transfer system, as well as other problems inherent in accomplishing a change so profound and far-reaching in its effects. 25. The school authorities are acting in good faith and have carried the burden of showing that more time is neces- Findings and Conclusions 61a sary to comply with the decision of the Supreme Court in the Brown case. 26. It is the considered opinion of the school authorities, after mature deliberation, that the change from a system of segregated schools should be upon a gradual or step-by-step basis; that an abrupt change in all the city schools would be inconsistent with the public interest and with the efficient functioning of the school system itself; and that the soundest approach to the problem is to begin with desegregation in the first grade and to make plans for the future based upon the experience thus gained. 27. At the hearing, the Board of Education submitted its plan, adopted on October 29, 1956, which is as follows: 1. Compulsory segregation based upon race is abolished in Grade One of the elementary schools of the City of Nashville for the scholastic year beginning in Septem ber, 1957. 2. A plan of school zoning or districting based upon loca tion of school buildings and the latest scholastic cen sus without reference to race will be established for the administration of the first grade and of other grades as hereafter desegregated. 3. Every student entering the first grade will be per mitted to attend the school designated for the zone in which he or she resides, subject to regulations that may be necessary in particular instances. 4. Applications for transfer of first grade students from the school of their zone to another school will be given careful consideration and will be granted when made in writing by parents or guardians or those acting in Findings and Conclusions 62a the position of parents, when good cause therefor is shown and when transfer is practicable, consistent with sound school administration. 5. The following will be regarded as some of the valid conditions to support application for transfer: (a) When a white student would otherwise be re quired to attend a school previously serving colored students only. (b) When a colored student would otherwise be re quired to attend a school previously serving white students only. (c) When a student would otherwise be required to attend a school where the majority of students in that school or in his or her grade are of a differ ent race. 6. The Instruction Committee is directed to continue its study of the problem and to recommend by Decem ber 31, 1957, the time of and the number of grades to be included in the next step to be taken in fur ther abolishing compulsory segregation. 28. Whether the plan proposed by the Board is the best one which could be devised is a matter of dispute in the testimony; the views of the school authorities being sup ported by the testimony of expert witnesses and the op posing views on behalf of plaintiffs being supported by other experts. Findings and Conclusions Conclusions of L aw 1. The Court has jurisdiction of the parties and the sub ject matter of this action. Title 28 U.S.C.A., Sections 2201 and 1343. 63a 2. This suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States and seeks redress for the deprivation of civil rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Title 42 U.S.C.A., Sections 1983 and 1985. 3. This action is properly brought as a class action under Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Title 28 U.S.C.A. 4. In passing upon the adequacy of the plan submitted by the Nashville Board of Education for abolishing segre gation in its public schools, the Court must give effect to the implementing opinion in the second Brown case, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 99 L. Ed. 1083, and is to be guided by equitable principles. 5. Primary responsibility for assessing the problems involved rests upon the local school authorities and the func tion of the courts is strictly judicial in character, i.e., to determine first, whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of governing con stitutional principles, secondly, whether the school authori ties have made a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance, and third, whether the school authorities have carried the burden to establish that more time is neces sary in the public interest, consistent with good faith com pliance at the earliest practicable date, to carry out the rul ing in an effective manner. 6. It is not the duty of the Court to devise a plan of desegregation nor to substitute its judgment in matters of school administration for that of the constituted school au thorities. Findings and Conclusions Findings and Conclusions 1. The provisions of the plan proposed by the Nashville Board of Education, except Paragraph 6 thereof, constitute a prompt and reasonable first step and are not violative of any constitutional provisions. 8. Paragraph 6 of the proposed plan is contrary to the mandate of the Supreme Court in the Brown case that com pulsory segregation shall be abolished with all deliberate speed. Judge 65a Judgment (Entered February 20,1957) This cause came on to be heard on November 13 and 14, 1956 upon the entire record, upon oral testimony without the intervention of a jury, and upon briefs and argument of counsel, pursuant to which the Court, on January 21, 1957, filed its Memorandum and has this day filed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, all of which are herein incorporated by reference. It is, therefore, Obdebed, A djudged and D ecreed as fol lows: 1. That Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the proposed plan are approved; 2. That Paragraph 6 of the proposed plan is disap proved ; 3. That the Board of Education shall submit to the Court not later than December 31, 1957, a report setting forth a complete plan to abolish segregation in all of the remaining grades of the City school system, including a time schedule therefor; 4. That upon the filing of such report the plaintiffs shall have a period of twenty days thereafter within which to file objections thereto; 5. That if objections are not filed to the report within said period the report shall be automatically approved; 6. That if objections are filed to the report within said period a hearing shall be held thereon before the Court upon five days’ written notice by the plaintiffs to the defen- 66a Judgment dants, with the burden resting upon the defendants to estab lish that the plan is adequate to meet the constitutional principles declared in the two Brown opinions; 7. That the rights of the plaintiffs and others similarly situated to attend the public schools of the City of Nash ville without discrimination on account of race are recog nized and declared, but that the issuance of an injunction is withheld pending the filing of the report provided for in Paragraph 3 above and the action of the Court upon any objections which may be made thereto; and 8. That jurisdiction of the action is retained during the period of transition. W il l ia m E . M iller Judge Approved as to Form: Z. A lexander L ooby A von N. W il l ia m s , J b . Attorneys for Plaintiffs B eber B oult E d w in P . H u n t Attorneys for Defendants February 20, 1957. 67a M il l e r , District Judge. As the Court intimated a moment ago, it feels strongly that the question which has been presented here should be passed upon with all possible dispatch since the school year is about to begin and since the school board is under an order from this Court to carry out a plan of integration in compliance with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The timing of the plan is an essential part of it. The question presented by the motion to file the supple mental answer and counterclaim is not new to the Court, as it has been considered by the Court since the motion was filed a week ago. Knowing that this hearing was to arise, the Court asked for the file in the case, and read the proposed supplemental answer and counterclaim, and im mediately began an investigation of the legal questions involved, taking that course because of the public interest in the matter and because of the importance of the time element. I feel that I am as ready to pass upon the ques tions presented today as I will ever be. I have been greatly assisted by the able arguments which have been made here on behalf of the various parties, the movants who seek to file this supplemental answer, the attorneys for the original plaintiffs, the attorneys for the School Preference Committee, and the attorneys for the State of Tennessee. The arguments have been sincerely and capably made and presented, and have brought to the attention of the Court the issues in a forcible and thorough manner. The pleading in this case, as already stated, is a motion by which the School Board of Nashville, being the defen The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench, September 6, 1957 68a dants in the action, asks the permission of the Court to file a supplemental answer and counterclaim which, in turn, would ask the Court to declare the rights of the school board under a certain act of the 1957 Legislature of Ten nessee, being Chapter 11 of the Public Acts of 1957, known as the School Preference Law. The supplemental answer and counterclaim would call upon the Court to determine in effect and substance (a) the validity of the statute, (b) whether or not it is in conflict with the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States, (c) whether or not it is in conflict with the orders of the Court heretofore entered in this cause, and (d) just what rights and privileges the school board possesses under the statute. In other words, the pleading is in the nature of a request for a declaratory judgment, declaring the rights of the parties, as indeed is the nature of the entire suit itself, the original complaint having been filed in this action as a declaratory judgment action. A brief word ought to be said, it seems to me, about the history of this litigation. The action wTas filed, as already pointed out, by certain parents of colored children and later by parents of certain white children of the City of Nashville, to have their rights declared under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States enunciating the doctrine that racial segregation in public education is unconstitutional and disapproving the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson which was decided, I believe, in 1896 or thereabouts. The school board filed an answer to the complaint in which it in effect, if not in so many words, conceded the unconstitutionality of the segregation laws of the State of Tennessee. The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench, September 6, 1957 69a The matter first came before a three-judge court, con vened in view of the nature of the relief sought by the original complaint. At that time the defendants made a motion for a continuance of the case on the ground that they had not had sufficient time to formulate a plan to carry out the decisions of the Supreme Court. That application for a continuance was extensively argued before the three- judge court and resulted in an order being entered to the effect that the school board had taken prompt steps in an effort to formulate a plan, that it needed more time to complete the formulation of the plan, and granting a con tinuance of the case as requested by the school board. Thereafter, the three-judge court was dissolved, since it appeared that no constitutional question was involved in the case in view of the concession made by the school board that the segregation laws of Tennessee must necessarily yield to the principles declared by the Supreme Court, that is, to the paramount authority of federal law. The case was called on the docket when the court regu larly convened at the October 1956 term, and at that time a motion was made by the school board to further postpone the case until after the meeting of the 1957 legislature of Tennessee on the assumption that the legislature would presumably pass some kind of legislation which might enter into the matter and have a bearing upon the kind of plan which the school board would submit to the Court. That application was denied by the Court, and the case was set for hearing in November of 1956. It was heard at the time set. Testimony was taken from witnesses on both sides of the controversy, extensive arguments were made, and elaborate briefs were filed by both parties, the Court taking the case under advisement and holding it for some The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench, September 6, 1957 70a several weeks in order to give the issues mature and de liberate consideration. The crucial question at that time was whether or not a gradual plan of integration would meet the constitutional tests laid down by the Supreme Court, more specifically whether or not a gradual plan of integration would be con stitutional which contemplated as a first step desegregation only in the first grade, and thereafter desegregation of the remaining grades as might in the future be recommended by the instruction committee of the school board. After giving the case what the Court believed was its very best effort, it was able to conclude that the plan was valid insofar as it proceeded on the basic principle that gradual desegregation was permissible and insofar as it contemplated desegregating the first grade in 1957. The Court believed that that was a substantial step, that the issue must be looked upon as presenting a local problem peculiar to the City of Nashville, about which the school board would have more knowledge than any other agency, certainly more knowledge than the Court itself could pos sibly have. Viewed in that light, the Court felt that the de cision of the school board to desegregate the first grade as the first step should be respected and that the plan to that extent should be approved. However, the Court was unable to see that the plan was valid or constitutional insofar as it deferred all action with respect to remaining grades and only provided for further study to be made by the instruction committee with no particular obligation to submit any particular plan at any particular time; and consequently, that portion of the plan was disapproved, and the school board was requested to submit by December 31,1957, a plan which would abolish compulsory segregation The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench, September 6, 1957 71a in. the remaining grades of the school system together with a time schedule therefor. The result so reached by the Court was strenuously re sisted by the plaintiffs in the case, the plaintiffs taking the position that the plan presented was no plan at all, that it wTas not substantial, that it was not a prompt and reason able start as required by the Supreme Court, and that since the school board had had ample time to study the matter and had not presented a substantial plan, the entire plan should be disapproved and all of the schools of Nash ville required to desegregate simultaneously and immedi ately. That was the position of the plaintiffs in the case, but (as stated) the Court believed that the school board of Nashville from the very outset had acted in the utmost good faith to meet a very serious problem and to solve a problem having obviously many complications. Now, after the Court so decided, the legislature of Ten nessee in 1957 passed the law which is before us here today, the pertinent part of which reads as follows, omitting the caption of the act: “Section 1. Be it Enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, That boards of education of counties, cities and special school districts in this state are authorized to provide separate schools for white and negro children whose parents, legal custodians or guardians voluntarily elect that such children attend school with members of their own race.” That act was passed in January of 1957, and the mo tion in this case to be permitted to file the supplemental answer and counterclaim to have rights declared under the act, was not filed until just recently, many months after the passage of the act. The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench, September 6, 1957 72a In the meantime, however, the school board was met with a petition signed by thousands of citizens and parents of Nashville, requesting that the school board invoke the pro visions of the School Preference Act of Tennessee, or at least take steps to have the act brought to the attention of the Court in order that it could be passed upon, and the rights of the school board declared. It is in response to that petition, as I understand it, that this motion is filed by the school board to ask for instruc tions from the Court. At the outset, I want to make it clear that I think that the School Preference Committee has acted in a perfectly normal and legal manner and in the true American way to bring the question to the Court’s attention. It has not sought to resort to any kind of violence or to defy the au thority of the law but rather to petition, as it has a legal right to do, under our constitution, the school board, and to make its wishes known; and the Court feels that the School Preference Committee is to be commended for the manner in which it has handled the cause which it repre sents. Also, the Court does not feel that it would be possible to say that the school board was negligent or did not act with due diligence or that the school board did not act in good faith in not bringing this matter to the attention of the Court, sooner that it did, because I am confident that the members of the school board felt and probably their attorneys felt that the matter had already been passed upon by the Court, its judgment had been entered, and that the School Preference Law could not enter into the picture at all, but that the order of the Court would have to be car ried out; and therefore no action was taken until the peti tion was filed by the interested citizens. So I do not find in The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench, September 6, 1957 73a the case that the school board has acted in bad faith. On the contrary, I think it has acted in good faith from the very outset. I fully appreciate the fact that the school board is met with a very serious problem, one that has many complica tions, and no doubt involving many pressures; and the Court is gratified to see the firm way that it has gone about the discharge of its duties under the difficult circumstances which sometimes have prevailed. But the school board, just like this Court, is met with the duty to comply with the law of the land. As already stated, the motion necessarily presents to the Court the question of whether or not this act of the Tennessee Legislature, Chapter 11 of the Acts of 1957, is a constitutional enactment. If it is on its face in conflict with the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in the two Brown opinions, necessarily it must give way because of the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution. Various arguments have been presented here to the Court in an effort to sustain the validity of the act. It is argued by the school board and their attorneys, first, that the act should be sustained because it involves a principle of voluntary action which was in effect approved by a three- judge court in the case of Briggs v. Elliott, cited by this Court in its prior memorandum. It is further argued that the act is one which simply allows the parents of both races a choice or an alternative to send their children to schools of their own race or to schools of a mixed race, and that it does not involve enforced or compulsory segregation. Furthermore, it is argued that the act applies only to school systems and not to individual schools, presumably that argument meaning that it would be possible under the The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench, September 6, 1957 74a act to set up one or more segregated schools so long as the entire system itself did not discriminate on account of race. Another argument is that the principles declared by the Supreme Court of the United States apply only to units of government and not to individual citizens, and that the act of the Tennessee Legislature now under consideration confers upon the citizens themselves the right of preference or choice. The arguments of the School Preference Committee are somewhat the same but with particular stress upon the right of freedom of choice, the right to be free from compulsion or restraint, it being argued generally that such freedom is a fundamental part of our law or a fundamental concept in our system of government, that this act seeks to give effect to that principle and, therefore, should be sustained. The State of Tennessee makes the argument that the con stitutionality of the statute is not presented to the Court at this time and will not arise until the school board actu ally presents a plan which would set forth in what way the school board intends to use the School Preference Law; in other words, that the constitutionality of the act at this time is premature and should not be passed upon or deter mined by the Court until such time as the school board does present a plan which contemplates the use of the School Preference Law in some way or another. Furthermore, the State says that in any event this Court should not declare the act unconstitutional but, on the contrary, is required to convene a three-judge court before the act could be so declared. After careful consideration of the arguments, all of which (I might say) the Court itself anticipated before they were presented here today, the Court is of the opinion that the The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench, September 6, 1957 75a Tennessee Public Act of 1957, Chapter 11, is on its face antagonistic to the principles declared by the Supreme Court in the two Brown cases and is, therefore, unconstitu tional. Referring to the two Brown cases and reading from the headnotes, we find in the first Brown case the following: “Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a state solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or requiring such segregation, denies to Negro children the equal pro tection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment—even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors of white and Negro schools may be equal.” In the second Brown opinion, the following appears in the headnote: “Racial discrimination in public education is uncon stitutional,” citing the first Brown case, “and all pro visions of federal, state, or local law requiring or per mitting such discrimination must yield to this prin ciple.” Taking the Act of 1957, Chapter 11, and laying it along side those declarations by the Supreme Court of the United States, it is manifest that the state statute is unconstitu tional, for it says in so many words that boards of educa tion of counties, cities, and school districts in this state are authorized (which is another way of saying are per mitted”) to provide separate schools for white and Negro children whose parents, legal custodians, or guardians voluntarily elect that such children attend schools with The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench, September 6, 1957 76a members of their own race. In other words, the act would directly authorize the school board of the City of Nashville to take a census and then to set up separate white schools and separate schools for colored children, whose parents so elected. After those schools were so set up, they would not only be separate schools, but they would be separated because of race and for no other reason. In addition, the separation, once made, would be compulsory. In other words, no col ored student thereafter would have a right to attend a school so designated as a white school regardless of the inconvenience involved or any other factor. The colored student would be denied the right to attend that school for white children solely because of his race, and the same thing, of course, would apply the other way. So the Court sees no alternative but to say that the act does not comply with the constitutional test that discrimination in public education because of race is abolished. The arguments made to the contrary, to the effect that the act contemplates voluntary action cannot prevail. The transfer system which the Court approved in its memo randum opinion heretofore rendered, giving the colored students and the white students an equal right to transfer from one school to another, was a limited right, and the Court felt that it wras reasonable under the circumstances and could be sustained. There was no compulsion connected with it, but the present act is a compulsory act in that it authorizes separate schools for the races from which mem bers of the other race are excluded by law. To the argument that it applies only to school systems and not to individual schools there are two answers. In the first place, I see no basis for saying that the doctrine declared by the Supreme Court applies only to school sys- The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench, September 6, 1957 77a terns and not to individual schools. I think, on the con trary, that the Supreme Court principle applies to all schools, in other words, that discrimination in public edu cation on account of race is prohibited. In the second place, the argument is not sound because the act of the Tennessee Legislature applies to school systems as a whole. It does not say anything about in dividual schools. It applies to the entire system and gives the school board a right to take a census or a vote and determine the preference of all parents in the entire system, and then to set up segregated schools and thereafter to maintain them in that way. The argument that the act applies to individual citizens and not to units of government is clearly unsound for the act specifically confers upon state agencies the authority to set up and maintain schools on a segregated basis. The school authorities are to determine the wishes of indi viduals only to the extent necessary to decide whether there shall be separate schools and, if so, how many, etc. The further argument that the act is merely one which involves the principle of voluntary choice is, of course, an oversimplification of the act and of the problem presented. It does have a voluntary element in it in that it permits or contemplates as a preliminary step that the preferences of the parents will be ascertained. But after preferences are once ascertained and the schools established, then this act says, in effect and in substance, that those schools shall be compulsorily maintained thereafter as separate and segregated schools. That is the way the Court construes the act. Of course, it is carrying the argument too far to say that no restraint can be placed upon citizens in connection with education and other matters. We all know that compulsion The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench, September 6, 1957 78a is an essential part of government. There are many laws that we do not like that we have to comply with. There are many people who do not like the ruling of the Supreme Court, but nevertheless it is the law of the land, and the duty of this Court to apply that law is clear and unrnis- takeable. The argument that a three-judge court should be con vened: As I see it, the requirement of a three-judge court does not apply to this case for two reasons: First, this act is patently and manifestly unconstitutional on its face. It so clearly conflicts with the Supreme Court decisions that it does not present a substantial federal question, and this Court therefore under the decisions has the right as a single court or judge to refuse to enforce rights under it without convening a three-judge court. Secondly, the stat ute requiring a three-judge court does not apply to a situa tion of this kind where the board of education in a case which has already been tried by a single judge is applying to that judge for instructions in carrying out its duties and as to what it shall do to comply with an order which the Court has already entered. In other words, what this Court is doing is merely enforcing its own order which it has already decided as a single judge and (by admission of the defendants) rightly decided as a single judge and not as a three-judge court. The application to this Court is not for an injunction to enjoin state action but a request for the Court to modify its order already entered. So, for that further reason, I do not believe that the requirement of a three-judge court applies in this instance. As a practical matter, if a three-judge court should be convened in this case, it would be possible for the Court to refuse to vacate its order as to the first grade and to The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench, September 6, 1957 79a allow integration in tire first grade to proceed, and we will, therefore, assume that it would cause no delay mso ar as the first grade is concerned to convene a three-judge cour_ But it must he remembered that the prior order of this Court also required the hoard of education o su mi plan hy December 31, 1957, for abolishing compulsory seg regation in all of the remaining grades of the system. _ Clearly, the board of education, if this state statute i not passed upon and a three-judge court 18 ^ not be expected to take any steps to formulate a plan for the other grades until the three-judge «onr does meet a d does decide the case. All lawyers know the difficulty convening a three-judge court, that is, the time which is required in doing so, having the court appointed and[ get ting it together. As a practical matter, if this Court shou undertake to convene a three-judge court, it would probably be long after December 31, 1957, before the court could act which would mean that the order of the Court here tofore entered, requiring the submission of a further plan would have to be vacated. Even if the Court could convene a three-judge court within a month from now or six weeks f c l BOW, there would be that much time wasted m the formulation of this further plan by the school board, tim which it needs to study this serious problem. The position of the State’s attorneys, as friends of the Court that the constitutional question is premature has been considered, but as I view the case a decision on the validity of the state law is directly presented and should be decided without delay. To overrule the motion for pie- maturity would leave the school board at sea to decide t “ estion for itself and would probably result m the submis sion of a plan geared to the School Preference Law. This m The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench, September 6, 1957 80a turn would require its disapproval by the Court and hence further unnecessary delay in accomplishing desegregation in Nashville and compliance with the Supreme Court’s ruling. Therefore, the Court directs that an order be entered in this case, denying the motion to be permitted to file the supplemental answer and counterclaim. The Court’s Statement Delivered From the Bench, September 6, 1957 81a Order (Entered September 23,1957) This cause came on to be heard on September 6, 1957 before the Honorable William E. Miller, Judge, upon mo tion by defendants for leave to file Supplemental Answer and Counter-Claim and to set the same for hearing, and upon arguments in open Court by attorneys for defendants (movants), attorney for plaintiffs, attorneys for the State of Tennessee appearing as amicus curiae in support of the constitutionality of Chapter 11 of the Public Acts of Ten nessee for 1957, and attorneys for the Parents Preference Committee as amicus curiae, the Court is of the opinion for reasons set forth in oral opinion which has been tran scribed as “Statement from the Bench” and which is hereby ordered filed and made a part of the record, that said motion is not well taken. It is accordingly Ordered, A djudged and D ecreed that the motion for leave to file Supplemental Answer and Counter-Claim be and the same is hereby denied. To the action of the Court defendants escepted on their own behalf, and, at the request of the Attorney General of the State of Tennessee, also on behalf of said State appearing as amicus curiae, and by request on behalf of the Parents Preference Committee appearing as amicus curiae. Enter : (s ) W m . E. M iller United States District Judge Attest: A True Copy J o h n 0. A nderson , Clerk U. S. District Court Middle District of Tennessee By P ra n k W illia m s D.C. (Seal) 82a Transcript of Testimony of January 28, 1958 w *vr w *Jv "Tr W illia m H . Oliv er , Superintendent of Schools, called as a witness in behalf of defendants, first duly sworn, testified as follows: Direct Examination by Mr. Hunt: ̂ ^ ̂ ^ [5] Q. That plan contemplated a liberal transfer policy, did it not! A. Yes, sir. Q. Who administered that transfer policy under the supervision of the Board! A. I administered the transfer problem. The—The [6] superintendent assigned to me that duty, to administer the transfers. Q. How many pupils, either exactly or approximately, enrolled in the first grade in September 1957! A. All to gether! Q. The total number, yes. A. 3367, I believe was the number on roll as of October 4th. And that is approxi mately correct. Q. Of those 3367, how many or approximately how many were Negroes and how many were white students! A. There were 1400 first-grade students, approximately 1400. Q. 1400 that were what! I mean what race! A. Negro students. Q. And the balance then would be white students! A. That is correct. Q. Mr. Oliver, in formulating your zoning plans, how many white students or white pupils eligible for the first grade were there in a zone where the elementary school was a school that had previously been segregated as an all-white school! A. About 55. Q. And those 55 were eligible to attend the school in 83a their zone or they were eligible to seek transfers? [7] A. (Interrupting) That is correct. Q. Were they not? A. That is correct. They had a choice. Q. How many of those 55 did seek transfers? A. All 55 of them. Q. Were those transfers granted or denied? A. They were all granted. Q. They were all granted? A. Yes, sir. Q. Then, how many Negro pupils were there who lived in zones and were eligible to attend a previously segregated white school? A. Well, so far as I could say, 115. We had estimated that there would be about 127 on the basis of census figures, but when they enrolled in school, there were only 115 who enrolled, and I—I assumed that was the number. About 115, I ’d say. Q. Approximately 115. Of the 115 Negroes who were eligible to attend a previously segregated white school, how many of those sought transfers back to other schools? A. One hundred and five, I believe. Q. One hundred and five? A. Yes sir. Q. Were those transfers granted or denied? [8] A. They were all granted. Q. They were all granted? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did any of the 105 who transferred seek to be re transferred back to the school of their zone? A. Yes, sir. Three or four of them did. Yes, sir. Q. Were those transfers requested by parents or by other persons or by them jointly? Tell something of those re-transfer requests. A. Well, as I recall, I didn’t have a written request from any parent, but some of the parents came to see me with their children and some other adults who were more or less counseling the parents. One parent called me by telephone. I don’t believe he came to see William H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct 84a me. But the requests for re-transfer were made, I would say, by the parents in consultation with some of their friends or counselors. Q. Were the requests for re-transfer granted or were they denied? A. They were denied. Q. In summary, you granted all original transfer re quests and denied re-transfer requests. Is that a correct statement? A. That is correct. Yes, sir. * # # # # Cross Examination by Mr. Looby: [16] Q. Mr. Oliver, I think I understood you to have said that there were some students on the first-grade level that have asked to be transferred or re-transferred to integrated schools and were refused? A. I said that some of the students who had requested and been given transfers to (we will say the Negro schools) the schools in which the other students were Negroes asked for re-transfer, and those requests for re-transfer were denied. That is what I said. Q. The requests for transfer were to the so-called inte grated schools? A. That is correct. [17] Q. And they were refused by you? A. That is correct. Q. Why? A. Well, because I didn’t think they had suffi cient reasons for asking for the transfers. Furthermore, I felt in some cases they were—they really didn’t want the transfers, that they were influenced by somebody else. I talked with the parents. I talked with their advocates, shall we say? I talked with one or two of the children The children didn’t want to be transferred. The parents were a little uncertain, some of them, and—I—I just didn’t think they had sufficient reasons. William H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross 85a Q. But they were living sufficiently close to the requested school so as to justify a transfer on grounds of nearness. Isn’t that true! A. I presume that they were. However, they hadn’t moved. They—They hadn’t gotten any closer to the school they wanted to get into. They were still living at the same place. Q. But they were living closer to the school to which they asked for a transfer than they were to the school in which they were! A. Well, I wouldn’t say they were liv ing closer to it, hut they were living in that zone. [18] Q. I see. A. And, generally speaking, I would assume they did live closer to it. Q. In a number of cases, the white students who wanted to transfer were granted without exception their requests for transfer! A. All the white and all the Negro were granted without exception. Q. Well, those you were just talking about, they were the exceptions, weren’t they! A. They were—No. They had asked for transfers and had been given transfers. Then, when they asked for re-transfers, those were denied. There is nothing particularly unusual about that. We have many requests for transfer which we don’t grant. Q. You say these cases in which re-transfers were re quested, that you talked to the children! A. In some cases, yes, and the children were with the parent. Q. And your decision was predicated upon the statement of the first-grade students! A. Not altogether. Q. Well, at least in part! A. Well, I was possibly influenced somewhat by the [19] feelings of the child. Q. Were you influenced by your own feeling that you prefer that they not be re-transferred to these integrated schools! A. Well, I had a feeling that if the child didn’t want to be re-transferred, I ought to sort of consider that. But the parent was there. I ’ll tell you. The parent was William H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross 86a there, and the child was there, and some other folks were there; and sometimes the parents impressed me as not really wanting what they were asking for. I think they were influenced by somebody else, and I figured I couldn’t afford to just change a student in and out and in and out every time somebody changed his mind. I did everything I could to give the parents a good opportunity to decide whether they wanted to leave the student in this zone or transfer him without any intimidation, without any pres sure from anybody. As far as I could I tried to let each parent decide what he thought was best for his own student. Then when they made their decision, I thought it was best for them to stick to it unless they had better reasons than any of them had for asking for a re-transfer. Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. Oliver, you were influenced by your own preference that they not transfer to these integrated schools'? A. I don’t think so, Mr. Looby. I really tried to give the parent an opportunity to make his own decision, but after he had made it, I—I thought he ought to stick to it. # # # * * [25] Q. You are familiar then with the geographical living [26] conditions with respect to the races? You know that the races are somewhat segregated in their residential areas? A. Somewhat, yes. Q. And the school zoning is predicated upon residential location? A. Primarily, yes. Q. So that in a school zone, even if you had complete desegregation predicated upon residential areas, you would have little or no problem, would you? A. Well, I wouldn’t say I wouldn’t have any problem, but I would say that the figures in the first grade are—give a pretty good picture of what the whole situation would be. Fourteen hundred— William H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross 87a 1400 Negro first-grade students are enrolled, and of those 1400, only about 115 live in the zones where they would have gone to school with the white students. Do I make myself clear! Q. Yes, I think you do. Now, following that same pat tern, if all complete desegregation is ordered or adopted by the Board, you would have little or no administrative problem because of your residential zoning. Isn’t that true! A. Well, I would say that there wouldn’t be large numbers where they would be mixed, not large numbers. There would be—I don’t know whether you would call them administrative problems, but I think there would be a lot of problems. [27] There were last fall with these first graders. I think we would have the same problems we had last fall greatly magnified. That is my opinion. Q. And those problems you had last fall were controlled by the Police Department and law-enforcement agencies, weren’t they! A. That’s correct. # # # * William H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross * 88a (Entered February 18, 1958) [842] The complaint was tiled September 23, 1955, as a class action, by negro children eligible to attend the public schools of Nashville, Tennessee, by their parents as next friends, to have declared their rights to attend the public schools without discrimination on account of race and for an injunction restraining such discrimination. Named as defendants were the members of the Board of Education and the Superintendent of Schools of the City, in addition to principals of particular public schools. Additional par ties were added by amendment to the complaint but with out changing the nature of the cause of action or of the relief sought. [843] By their answer to the complaint the defendants conceded, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court, the unenforceability of the school segregation law's of Tennessee and acknowledged their eventual obligation to operate the schools of the City of Nashville in compliance with the constitutional principles therein declared. How ever, the position was taken that the defendants should be allowed time to solve various administrative problems and that the transition to a racially non-discriminatory system should not be accomplished immediately but on a gradual basis. Pursuant to the prayer of the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened and upon a hearing at the March 1956 term, that Court granted the defendants’ mo tion for a continuance of the case to the October 1956 term. In granting the continuance the Court specifically noted that the Board of Education at an early date had announced that it would comply with the ruling of the Supreme Court in integrating the public schools of Nash- Opinion 89a ville, that it had proceeded promptly to take steps toward that end, and that it was acting in good faith and with appropriate dispatch in awaiting the taking of the school census and giving careful consideration to all factors in volved, so as to arrive at a workable plan of integration, “which appears to be a reasonable start toward full com pliance with the May 17, 1954 ruling of the Supreme Court.” In view of the defendants’ concession that Tennes see’s school segregation laws were invalid, the three-judge court was dissolved and the case remanded to a single judge court. 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 519 (1956). [844] At the October 1956 term the Board of Education submitted a plan of desegregation, providing for the elimi nation of compulsory segregation in the first grade begin ning with the 1957-1958 school year, for a voluntary right of transfer on the basis of the racial composition of the school attended, and directing its Instruction Committee to make further studies and to recommend by December 31, 1957, “the time of and the number of grades to be included in the next step to be taken in the further abolish ing of compulsory segregation.” After a full hearing upon the plan the Court on January 21, 1957, by a memorandum opinion, approved the plan in part as constituting a prompt and reasonable start toward complete desegrega tion but directed the Board to submit not later than De cember 31, 1957, “a report setting forth a complete plan to abolish segregation in all of the remaining grades of the city school system, including a time schedule therefor.” 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 21 (1957). On January 9, 1957, the Governor of Tennessee ap peared before a joint session of the General Assembly to propose five bills permitting local authorities to act with respect to questions of racial integration in the public schools. On January 25, 1957, the bills were finally ap- Opinion 90a proved by the General Assembly and, as enacted, included: (1) legislation authorizing the establishment of separate schools for pupils whose parents or guardians voluntarily elect that they attend schools only with members of their own race, generally referred to as [845] the School Pref erence Law, (2) a Pupil Assignment Act to provide for the assignment of pupils to public schools by county or city boards of education, (3) an amendment to the present law authorizing the transfer of pupils between school systems, (4) authorization for the joint operation of school facilities, and (5) an amendatory bill dealing with trans portation of pupils. 2 Race. Eel. L. Rep. 215 (1957). Shortly before the beginning of the 1957-1958 school year, the Board of Education, acting in response to a peti tion which had been filed with it by a citizens committee, filed a motion with the Court requesting permission to file a supplemental answer and counterclaim to ascertain its authority under and the validity of the School Preference LawT, Chapter 11 of the Public Acts of 1957, authorizing Boards of Education of cities and counties to provide separate schools for white and negro children, whose parents, legal custodians or guardians voluntarily elect that such children attend school with members of their own race. On September 6, 1957, after a hearing, the Court held that the School Preference Law was on its face antagonistic to the principles declared by the Supreme Court in the two Brown cases and, therefore, unconsti tutional. 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 970 (1957). Accordingly, an order was entered denying the motion for leave to file the supplemental answer and counterclaim. The Board of Education on December 6, 1957, filed its report, setting forth what is described as “a complete plan to [846] abolish segregation in all grades of the City Opinion 91a School System,” in compliance with the prior order of the Court requiring it to submit such a plan not later than December 31, 1957. The plaintiffs have filed objections to the plan, principally upon the ground that it does not comply with constitutional requirements, and one question presently before the Court is whether the plan should be approved. Before discussing that question, however, it is necessary to consider a motion of the defendants, filed on January 20, 1958, to dismiss the action, such motion, the objections to the School Board’s plan for desegregation, and all re lated questions having been heard by the Court on January 28, 1958. The issues have been fully briefed and orally argued by the parties to the action, and in addition the Court has had the benefit of elaborate briefs submitted as amicus curiae by attorneys for the School Preference Com mittee, a local group sponsoring and supporting the pro posed plan, and on behalf of the Attorney General of the State as amicus curiae. The motion to dismiss the action is based upon the pro visions of the Pupil Assignment Act, referred to above, Chapter 13 of the Tennessee Public Acts of 1957. It is argued on behalf of the Board of Education that the Act provides the plaintiffs with an adequate administrative remedy to obtain admission or transfer to particular schools and that they should be required to exhaust such remedy before resorting to a court for relief, particularly before resorting to a Federal Court [847] for an injunction. In support of this argument, it is insisted that this Court has already declared the rights of the plaintiffs and others similarly situated to attend the public schools of Nashville without discrimination on account of race and that it is, therefore, not necessary for the Court longer to retain Opinion 92a jurisdiction since the only remaining problem is the assign ment of individual students to particular schools, a matter now governed by the Pupil Assignment Act. To support its contention as to the validity of the Pupil Assignment Act, the Board of Education relies upon Carson v. Board of Education of McDowell County, 4 Cir., 227 P. 2d 789, and Carson v. War lick, 4 Cir., 238 F. 2d 724, certiorari denied 353 U. S. 910, in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the North Carolina Pupil Enrollment Act was not unconstitutional on its face, and that negro children denied admission to schools would first be required to exhaust the administrative remedies provided for by the Act before being entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief in a Federal Court with respect to their right to attend school. The standards provided for in the North Carolina Act required that the enrollment be made “so as to provide for the orderly and efficient administration of such public schools, the effective instruction of the pupils therein enrolled, and the health, safety, and general wel fare of such pupils.” The Act further provided for appli cation to and prompt hearing by the Board in the case of any child whose admission to any public school within the county or city had been denied, with right of appeal from an adverse ruling to the courts. [848] However, notwithstanding the apparent scope and generality of the rulings of the Fourth Circuit in the two cases just cited, the Court is unable to reach the conclusion on the facts of the instant ease that the action should be dismissed and the plaintiffs remitted to a so-called adminis trative remedy, with the implied invitation to return to the Federal Court if that remedy is exhausted without obtain ing satisfactory results. This is true because the Court is of the opinion that the administrative remedy under the Opinion 93a Act in question would not be an adequate remedy. In this connection, it must be recalled that the relief sought by the complaint is not merely to obtain assignment to particular schools but in addition to have a system of compulsory segregation declared unconstitutional and an injunction granted restraining the Board of Education and other school authorities from continuing the practice and custom of maintaining and operating the schools of the city upon a racially discriminatory basis. While it is true that by its order entered pursuant to its memorandum of January 21, 1957, this Court “recognized and declared” the rights of the plaintiffs and others similarly situated to attend the public schools of the City of Nashville without discrimina tion on account of race, it was specifically provided that “the issuance of an injunction is withheld pending the filing of a report” with respect to complete desegregation and the action of the Court upon any objections thereto. By the same order jurisdiction of the action was retained “during the period of transition.” The effect of the order was therefore not to direct the immediate discontinuance of the [849] practice of compulsory segregation in the public schools, but on the contrary, to permit its continu ance during a gradual period of transition in keeping with what the Court believed was the true meaning of the second Brown opinion of the Supreme Court. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 99 L. Ed. 1083. Thus the argu ment of defendants that the case is now moot is not sup ported by the record, for the primary purpose of the complaint to end racial discrimination in the public school system has not been accomplished. Clearly the principal reason why the administrative remedy under the Act is inadequate is that the administra tive agency would be in the instant case, the Board of Edu Opinion 94a cation of the City of Nashville. That agency, according to the record in this case, has never abandoned a policy of compulsory segregation in the public schools, other than the first grade as provided for by its plan which was heretofore approved in part by the Court. To require the plaintiffs to go before a board committed in advance to a continuance of compulsory segregation would be to require them to perform a futile act or to pursue a remedy which would have no reasonable prospect of success. That the Board of Education is in fact committed to such a policy is the inescapable conclusion from the posi tion which it has consistently taken from the outset of the litigation. In its first application to the Court for a con tinuance, the Board insisted that it should be allowed to effect a transition [850] to a racially non-discriminatory system on a gradual basis, and it therefore requested a continuance of the case to permit it to make a further study and to formulate a workable plan of integration. The first plan submitted proposed to abolish compulsory segregation in the first grade only and to refer the prob lem of further integration to its Instruction Committee for additional study and a later recommendation. Its next appeal to the Court was to have its rights declared under the Tennessee School Preference Law which would have allowed the Board to establish and maintain segregated schools in accordance with the wishes of school parents. And finally, the Board has presently before the Court a plan similar to the provisions of the School Preference Law authorizing it to maintain and operate both segre gated and integrated schools dependent upon the prefer ences of school patrons. Notwithstanding the good faith of the Board of Education in its efforts to meet a grave problem, the Court would indeed be “closing its eyes to Opinion 95a the obvious” if it should not conclude that the Board is presently committed to compulsory segregation in the public schools other than in grade one. Nor has the Court been given any assurance that this fixed practice and policy of the Board will be discontinued in the future. The inadequacy of the administrative remedy proposed by the defendants is emphasized when the present segre gation policy of the Board of Education is considered in the light of the criteria and factors prescribed by the Pupil Assignment Act to determine pupil assignments. Thus by Section 2 of the Act [851] it is provided that the Board of Education may consider and base its decision on any one or more of a large number of factors, including “the effect of the enrolment on the welfare and best interests of such pupil and all other pupils in said school as w7ell as the effect on the efficiency of the operation of said school” ; . . . “the psychological qualifications of the pupil for the type of teaching and associations involved” ; . . . “the effect of admission of the pupil upon the academic program of other students in a particular school or facility thereof” ; . . . “the psychological effect upon the pupil of attendance at a particular school” ; . . . “the effect of any disparity between the physical and mental ages of any pupil to be enrolled, especially when contrasted with the average physical and mental ages of the group with which the pupil may be placed” ; . . . “the sociological, psychological, and like intangible social scientific factors as will prevent, as nearly as possible, a condition of socioeconomic class consciousness among the pupils” ; . . . “the possibility or threat of friction or disorder among pupils or others” ; . . . “the possibility of breaches of the peace or ill will or economic retaliation within the community” ; . . . “the home environment of the pupil” ; . . . “the maintenance or sever Opinion 96a ance of established social and psychological relationships with other pupils and with teachers” ; . . . “the choice and interests of the pupil” ; . . . “the request or consent of parents or guardians and the reasons assigned therefor” ; . . . and “any and all other factors which the Board may consider pertinent, relevant [852] or material in their effect upon the welfare and best interest of the applicant, other pupils of the county, city, or special school district as a whole and the inhabitants of the county, city or special school district.” Whether or not the Pupil Assignment Act is constitu tional (a question which is not decided), at least there can be no doubt that there is nothing in the language of the Act which would preclude a Board of Education from taking into account racial distinctions in making pupil as signments. Nor is there anything in the Act which is in any manner inconsistent with a continued policy of com pulsory racial segregation, with the result that the admin istrative remedy itself would not afford the plaintiffs in the instant case any opportunity or ground upon which to resist the fixed policy of the Board to operate the city’s schools on a compulsorily segregated basis. It is recognized by the authorities that the necessity of pursuing an administrative remedy provided by state law before seeking injunctive relief in a Federal Court does not apply unless the administrative remedy is “adequate.” School Board of City of Newport News, Va. v. Adkins, 4 Cir., 246 F. 2d 325; Gibson v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, Florida, 5 Cir., 246 F. 2d 913. In the Adkins case the Virginia Pupil Placement Act was de clared unconstitutional but the Court further found that the statute did not furnish an adequate remedy to the plaintiffs because “of the fixed [853] and definite policy of the school authorities with respect to segregation . . . ” Opinion 97a And in the Gibson case the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in holding that the plaintiffs were not required to pursue administrative remedies under the Florida Pupil Assignment law, stated: “Neither that nor any other law can justify a viola tion of the Constitution of the United States by the requirement of racial segregation in the public schools. So long as that requirement continues throughout the public school system of Dade County, it would be pre mature to consider the effect of the Florida laws as to the assignment of pupils to particular schools.” Being of the opinion upon the facts here presented that the suggested administrative remedy is inadequate, and that the case is not moot, the motion of defendants to dis miss the action cannot prevail. If the action is not dismissed, the Board then requests approval by the Court of its plan for desegregation filed with its report to the Court on December 6, 1957. The proposed plan is as follows: P lan 1. No compulsory integration or segregation shall be required in any grade of the Nashville Public School System. 2. There shall be conducted annually a parents prefer ence census to determine which parents desire their children to attend school with members of their own race exclusively and which parents desire that their children attend school with the members of another race. Such preference shall be stated by parents or those standing in the position of parents, and if no Opinion 98a preference is indicated the child shall be assigned by the Board under rules in conformity with this plan. [854] 3. Three groups of schools of equal standards, opportunity and facilities in accordance with the preferences indicated above shall be established in as nearly accessible and convenient locations as practicable: a. Schools for Negro students whose parents prefer that their children attend school with members of their own race exclusively; b. Schools for White students whose parents prefer that their children attend school with members of their own race exclusively; c. Integrated schools for those students whose parents prefer that their children attend schools available to both Negro and White children. 4. Requests by parents for transfer of their children from one school to another shall be acted upon by the Board in accordance with existing laws. 5. All administrative details and procedures for the operation of this plan within the framewTork thereof shall be determined by the Superintendent of Nash ville City Schools under the direction of this Board. The arguments advanced to support the constitutionality of the plan are practically the same as those advanced and considered by the Court in passing upon the School Prefer ence Law above referred to, inasmuch as there is no real or substantial difference between the plan and the pro visions of the Law which the Court found to be unconstitu tional on its face at the hearing on September 6, 1957. It Opinion 99a is true that the plan, unlike the School Preference Law, specifically provides that an annual census be taken to de termine the preferences of school parents, and that the Board is authorized, in addition to separate white and negro schools, to maintain integrated schools for children whose parents desire that their children attend such schools. [855] However, these provisions were clearly implicit in the School Preference Law itself. Upon further consideration, the Court finds no reason to alter its view that such a plan wholly fails to meet the test of constitutionality. It would sanction by law, if ap proved, the separation of schools in accordance with racial distinctions and once the schools were separated, negro children because of their race alone would be excluded by operation of law from schools designated for white chil dren only. The discrimination would not be removed simply by providing a third school or group of schools which could be attended by members of both the white and colored races. It is a mistaken interpretation of the segregation decisions of the Supreme Court to argue that the doctrine of those cases applies only to an entire school system and not to individual schools. The fundamental basis of the decisions is that members of the negro or minority race are denied the equal protection of the law if they are denied admission to public schools which they are otherwise qualified to attend solely upon grounds of their race. The discrimination is clearly not eliminated by maintaining and operating some schools in the system on a racially segre gated basis and others with the discrimination removed. Another objectionable feature to the plan is that it does not offer in any realistic sense an alternative or choice to the members of the minority race. To hold out to them the [856] right to attend schools with members of the white Opinion 100a Opinion race if the members of that race consent is plainly such a dilution of the right itself as to rob it of meaning or sub stance. The right of negroes to attend the public schools without discrimination upon the ground of race cannot be made to depend upon the consent of the members of the majority race. That the proposal to establish a group of integrated schools is, as a practical matter, illusory and meaningless is clearly shown byr the testimony of the Super intendent of Schools. He stated, in substance, that if the census provided for in the plan should be taken, it would be doubtful that any substantial number of white parents would consent to have their children attend school with members of the colored race. In such circumstances, to approve the plan would be in effect to deny to the members of the colored race the protection of the Fourteenth Amend ment as construed by the Supreme Court, for they would be remitted solely to schools of their own race. The case of Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 cannot by any reasonable interpretation be construed as authority for the plan presently proposed. The most that the Elliott case decided was that the Supreme Court decision in the Brown cases did not require integration but merely pro hibited segregation on account of race. On any fair ap praisal of the plan now under consideration it must be concluded that it would in fact require and give the sanction of the law to a continuation of compulsory segregation in public education. [857] Despite the sincere and earnest arguments which have been advanced in support of the plan both by attorneys representing the school Board and attorneys representing the School Preference Committee, the Court is unable to find either that it is constitutional or that it is practically 101a Opinion feasible and workable. The plan must, therefore, be dis approved. In this posture of the ease, the question remains whether an injunction should issue requiring desegregation in all of the remaining grades of the school system beginning with the next school term, or whether an injunction should be withheld pending the submission by the Board of an other plan which would offer a workable and legal solution to the problem of accomplishing a transition to a system having no racial discrimination. The first alternative is strongly urged upon the Court by the plaintiffs, with the Board of Education requesting further time to submit an other plan. The Court is mindful of the fact that it has been approxi mately four years since the Supreme Court first declared invalid racial discrimination in public education, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to have their constitutional rights enforced without undue delay. Nevertheless, the record is replete with evidence that the problem with which the School Board is confronted is one of a grave and complex nature, the solution of which requires not only time but also patience and understanding on the part of the school authorities and on the part [858] of the members of both the white and colored races. The conditions in Nashville must be appraised and assessed primarily by the constituted school authorities. They are certain in their belief that the best interests of the entire school system require that integration not be accomplished in all grades simultaneously but rather in accordance with a gradual step-by-step plan. The Superintendent of Schools so testified at the last hear ing and there was similar evidence upon the hearing of the first plan. The Federal Courts cannot operate the public schools and should refrain from any interference with their 102a Opinion operation by the regular school authorities unless it is plainly necessary to intervene to protect constitutional rights. Notwithstanding the failure of the Board thus far to submit an acceptable plan, the Court is of the opinion that it should be accorded a further opportunity to study the problem and to present a plan for desegregating the remaining grades of the school system together with a time schedule therefor. However, in view of the history of the litigation as set forth in this opinion, and the delay since the applicable constitutional principles were first announced, it should be apparent that the School Board must adopt a substantial plan and one which contemplates elimination of racial discrimination throughout the school system with all deliberate speed. An order will be passed to the Court carrying out the terms of this opinion, allowing the School Board until the 7th day of April 1958 to file with the Court another plan, and [859] directing that a hearing be held thereon before this Court for approval or disapproval on the 14th day of April 1958. /s / W il l ia m E. M illeb United States District Judge 103a [979] Order (entered March 19,1958) This cause came on to be heard on January 28, 1958 before the Honorable William E. Miller, Judge, upon the entire record and especially upon the Plan filed by the defendants, Board of Education, on December 6, 1957, the Objections to said Plan filed by the plaintiffs, the Motion to Dismiss filed by said defendants on January 20, 1958, and Application for Injunction requiring desegregation in all of the remaining grades of the school system beginning with the next school term, the evidence heard in open Court, oral arguments and written briefs submitted by attorneys for the parties, attorneys for the State of Ten nessee as amicus curiae, and attorneys for the Parents Preference Committee as amicus curiae, from all of which the Court makes the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in its Opinion filed on February 18, 1958, which Opinion is hereby made a part of the record and incorporated herein by reference as a part of this Order; and for the reasons stated in said Opinion, the Court finds and holds that the Motion to Dismiss should be denied, that the said Plan submitted should be disapproved, that is suance of an injunction should be withheld pending the submission by the Board of Education of another Plan in accordance with said Opinion of the Court, that the defendants, Board of [980] Education, should be allowed until April 7, 1958 to file another Plan and that there should be a hearing thereon on April 14, 1958. It is accordingly Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed as follows: 1. That the Motion to Dismiss filed herein by defen dants, Board of Education, on January 20, 1958, be and the same is hereby denied. 104a Order 2. That the Plan for desegregation filed herein by said defendants, Board of Education, with its report to the Court on December 6, 1957, be and the same is hereby disapproved. 3. That an injunction should be withheld pending the submission by the Board of Education of another Plan. 4. That said defendants, Board of Education, shall file with the Court, not later than the 7th day of April, 1958, another Plan for desegregating the remaining grades of the school system together with a time schedule therefor. 5. That a hearing on said last mentioned Plan be held before this Court for approval or disapproval on the 14th day of April 1958. To the action of the Court in denying the Motion to Dismiss and in disapproving the Plan submitted, defen dants excepted. To the extent they are permitted by law to do so, the State of Tennessee and the Parents Prefer ence Committee, as amici curiae and not as parties to the action, also except. A pproved as to F orm : , / s / Z. A lexander L ooby / s / A von W illia m s Attorneys f or Plaintiffs W m . E. M iller Judge 105a Transcript of Testimony (April 14,1958) I n t h e D istrict C ourt of t h e U n ited S tates for t h e M iddle D istrict of T e n n e sse e N a sh v ille D iv isio n Civil Action No. 2094 R obert W . K ell e y , e t a l. B oard of E ducation of t h e C ity of N ashvil l e , T e n n e s s e e , e t a l. B e f o r e : T h e H onorable W il l ia m E. M il l e r , Judge of said Court, on the “Plan of the Board of Education” on April 14, 1958, at Nashville, Tennessee. A p p e a r a n c e s : For the Plaintiffs: Z. A lexander L ooby, Esq. A von W illia m s , Esq. Attorneys at Law 327 Charlotte Avenue Nashville, Tennessee For the Defendants: R eber B o u lt , Esq. E d w in F. H u n t , Esq. Attorneys at Law American Trust Building Nashville, Tennessee 106a Colloquy T r a n sc r ipt op t h e P roceedings [3] (All parties announced ready.) The Court: The matter is before the Court (as I under stand it) on the plan contained in a report which was filed on April 7, 1958, the plan of the Board of Education. I am ready at this time to hear any matters which the Board has to present in support of this plan. Mr. Hunt: May it please the Court, in thinking about this matter, we concluded that we definitely would not go over the things that have heretofore been presented. How ever, in support of this plan, we will offer as witnesses the Superintendent of Schools, the acting Chairman of the School Board, the Principal of one of the schools. It will then be our hope that we will offer the former Superin tendent of Schools who indicated that he would be here as a witness if his health permitted. We will offer them and ask a few questions about the plan, and then turn them over for examination by adversary counsel. The Court: That will be satisfactory. Mr. Hunt: Their presentation, I might add, we antici pate will be brief. We are not going into any great detail. The Court: All right. [4] Mr. Hunt: The first witness will be Mr. Oliver, the Superintendent of Schools. He has not been sworn at this hearing. Of course, he was sworn at a former hearing. The Court: Does any party request the rule on the witnesses? Mr. Looby: We do not, if Your Honor please. We have filed objections to the plan. The Court: You have filed objections? I have not seen those. Mr. Looby: They were filed this morning. Mr. Hunt: Do you want to present any matter in con nection with your objections? 107a Mr. Looby: No more: than to say that if it becomes necessary after the witnesses for the defendant will we be heard? The Court: Oh, yes. Mr. Looby: We will ask the privilege to call witnesses. The Court: All right. (The witnesses were sworn.) W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct Mb . W. H. Oliv er , c a lle d a s a w itn e s s in b e h a lf o f th e d e fe n d a n ts , b e in g f i r s t d u ly sw o rn , te s tif ie d a s f o l lo w s : [5] Direct Examination by Mr. Hunt: Q. Is this Mr. W. H. Oliver? A. Yes, sir; William Henry Oliver. Q. Mr. Oliver, you are at present the Superintendent of Schools of the City of Nashville? A. Yes, sir; I am. Q. And you were a witness in this case, I believe at the hearing in January. Is that correct? A. That’s cor rect. Q. Since you have been Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent, have you met with the Board in its meet ings where the matter of complying with the Court order has been the subject of discussion? A. Yes, sir. I have met regularly with the Board since I became Assistant Superintendent last July the first. Q. Now, I believe this matter that we are now con cerned with was the subject of discussion before one of the committees of the Board. What committee was that? A. The instruction committee. Q. And did you meet with that committee in its de liberations considering this question? A. Yes, sir. I have met regularly with that committee also. 108a [6] Q. You are familiar, Mr. Oliver, with the plan that has been filed with the Court? A. Yes, sir. Mr. Hunt: I assume, if Your Honor please, that there is no technical need to identify and tender it to him as the plan. We will do that if the Court desires that he examine it and say that that is the plan adopted. The Court: I think that is all right. By Mr. Hunt: Q. Just read the plan, not the preliminary things that do not concern you, and tell whether or not that is the plan. A. (After reading from document handed witness by counsel) Yes, s ir; this is the plan. Q. That is the plan that was adopted— A. (Interrupt ing) By the Board. Q. (Continuing) —by the Board. Now, Mr. Oliver, state the substance of that plan. What does it provide for? A. Well, there are three essential provisions. One is that the abolishing of segregation by race in the public schools of Nashville will proceed one grade each year, the second grade in September 1958, the third grade in Sep tember of 1959, and so on until we have gone through the 12th. The second provision is that the policies followed [7] with regard to the first grade with respect to zoning and matters of that kind will be continued. And the third is that as the job of desegregation pro gresses it will be subject to review by the Court, direction from the Court, submission to the Court of any informa tion which circumstances may justify as we go along. W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct 109a Q. Mr. Oliver, state whether or not before formulating that plan the Board sought the recommendation of the principals in the schools of Nashville! A. I don’t know that the— Well, yes, through the Superintendent the Board did. Q. You sought the recommendation! A. Yes, sir. Q. Now, tell how that was done. A. Well, I called all the principals together and told them that we had the job of making a plan for desegregating the remaining eleven grades, that I had a great deal of respect for their judg ment in the matter, that they were close to the matter, they were interested in the childern, and that I would like to know—I would like to have suggestions from them as to how—as to what would be the best plan. Q. How were their suggestions received! Were they received orally! Were they received in response to a questionnaire! [8] Were they received by letters from them! How did the principals respond in giving their recommendations! A. Well, as I recall, it was this way: The principals themselves appointed a committee of them selves to draw up a sort of questionnaire which all of the principals were invited to answer but without signing. It was thought that a principal might come a little nearer to saying exactly what he thought if he were not asked to sign the statement. Also, it was desired that no princi pal be embarrassed in the matter. Of course, we had principals of both races. So the principals filled out these questionnaires. Mr. Looby: If Your Honor please, I want to raise an objection to this line of testimony as to what the principals did and about being a coward enough not to sign their name or do anything but simply draw up the questionnaire; and, if Your W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct 110a Honor please, it is totally irrelevant to the issues before the Court. The Court: I think it would be pertinent to in quire into any procedure that the Board followed in adopting the plan. I think that is to be con sidered. Your objection goes to the weight of it and the value it might have rather than to the admissibility of it as I see it. I will allow him to answer it. [9] By Mr. Hunt: Q. All right. A. I am just trying to tell how it was done. Then these answered questionnaires were collected and submitted to the Superintendent that he might study them and use the information which they gave in advising the Instruction Committee. Q. Did any or all of those recommendations propose a gradual handling of the problem? A. Yes, sir; practically all of them did. Not quite all of them. I believe there was one that advocated total and immediate desegregation, but the vast majority of them advocated a gradual plan, and several of them suggested the year-by-year plan. Mr. Williams: May it please Your Honor, with reference to the objection which was made pre viously and Your Honor’s ruling on it, we submit that even if this evidence is heard as a matter of determining the way that the Board reached the conclusion, that still the testimony of the Superin tendent as to what was contained in the question naires is incompetent under the best evidence rule, that the questionnaires themselves would be the best evidence of that. W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct 111a The Court: All right. Mr. Hunt: May it please the Court, we are not [10] offering this to prove as such the contents. We are offering it to prove how the Board acted and how it proceeded in the information that it sought to assemble with respect to the matter. As a matter of fact, we have sent for those ques tionnaires so that if they wanted them filed in the record, they could be. We have sent for them, and at the appropriate time they will be produced. Mr. Oliver was talking with me this morning, and I said, “Well, bring those things in.” Actually, I think that is to clutter up the record with these recommendations. The Court: When I overruled the objection a moment ago, what I had in mind was that you were offering evidence to show just what the Board did as a matter of fact as bearing on the question of good faith for one thing. Mr. Hunt: Exactly. The Court: To show that it acted deliberately and in an effort to obtain information from relevant sources. That is the reason I admitted it, not as evidence to prove whether this plan should be ap proved by the Court or disapproved, and it will not be considered in that way. [11] Mr. Williams: I see. The Court: If you have the questionnaires, though, you might file them. Mr. Hunt: I will do that. It may be in the interest of expedition that we will want to proceed with other witnesses because that information is being brought. Mr. Oliver has asked for it. The Court: All right. W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct 112a W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct By Mr. Hunt: Q. Now, Mr. Oliver, I believe you stated that among these unsigned recommendations of the principals, all except one recommended a gradual handling of the prob lem and one recommended immediate and total desegrega tion next fall. Am I correct there in what you said! A. Yes, sir. As I recall there was one, only one, which sug gested total and immediate desegregation. By immediate I mean in September 1958. Q. Mr. Oliver, as the Superintendent of Schools, is it your opinion that the plan recommended is the best plan available? A. Yes, sir. It very definitely is. Q. Will you state to the Court your reasons for hold ing that opinion? A. Well, I can’t do that in just a word or two. If I [12] talk too long, somebody can say so. That’s been a big question with me for a long time, one which I have asked and tried very much to answer and which I have answered in my own mind. When you ask me why I think this plan is the best plan there is, I would say—I don’t know just how much to say or not to say. But right to the question, I ’d say in the first place I think this is the best plan because it would incur the least opposition, the smallest number and size of difficulties to deal with. Judging from past experience, there are difficulties encountered in this pro cess of desegregation. And I would like to make this clear, too, if I may, that in speaking of this plan and in using such terms as “desegregation” I am speaking only of the attendance of students in the public schools of Nashville, Tennessee. I am not saying that this is the best plan for everywhere, but I am saying that in my opinion it is the best plan for us here in Nashville. 113a Now, if I may say this, it’s a matter of record in this court, that we had considerable difficulty and confusion and disorder last fall in spite of the fact that we did every thing that we knew to do to avoid it. "VVe held advance registrations so that when the little first-graders regis tered, there wouldn’t be any upperclassmen or their parents [13] there. We arranged so that the little Negro children and their parents would not have to go to a school where the majority of the folk were white to get their transfers. We made the same arrangement with regard to the white children who had to get transfers, and we— We did everything we knew to do, and in spite of everything we could do we lost above $70,000 worth of the Hattie Cotton building, and a great many little children whose first ex perience in school should have been one of security and harmony and joy found themselves faced with a situation where they were subjected to dread and fright and in many cases actual danger. I think that the effect of that sort of thing on a child is something that should be avoided. We begged the reactionaries to stay away from the schools last fall, but they didn’t do it. And I think that the year-by-year plan (if I may call it that) will involve less of this damage to the children than any other plan which we could propose. Another reason (I hope it’s a good reason) why I think that this is the best plan is that it gives a maximum of consideration for the will or the wishes of the majority of the citizens, the taxpayers, the parents; and I— I can’t help thinking that under a government such as ours, which is of and by and for the people, it’s in order. [14] Of course, I know we must carry out the law, and I think this plan is perfectly in accord with every ruling the Supreme Court has made, otherwise I wouldn’t consider it W. //. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct 114a a proper plan; but still I think that it is in order to give as much consideration to the wishes of the people as is practical under the law, and our Board has tried very hard to respect the wishes of the people whom it represents and whom it serves. There are a great many people in our community who are opposed to desegregation according to any plan. We can not go by their wishes but I think it’s practical and I think it’s wise to give some consideration to their wishes. I think they are entitled to consideration, and I believe that this year-by-year plan will come nearer being acceptable to the majority of the parents, the citizens, the taxpayers in Nashville, Tennessee, than any other plan would be. Another reason why I think this is the best plan is that it doesn’t—it doesn’t rush an adjustment which at best is going to be a difficult adjustment in our community among the people and among the students. Segregation by race in the public schools of Nashville (right or wrong) is a practice of long standing, and to change it goes counter to the feelings of a great many people. There are a lot of adjustments that must be made [15] on the part of the Negro children (It’s something they’re not accustomed to), on the part of the white chil dren (It’s something they’re not accustomed to), on the part of parents, and on the part of teachers. I t’s something none of us are accustomed to. It involves more difficulty in adjustment than someone just looking on from the sidelines would recognize or rea lize, and I firmly believe that this adjustment can be made with less friction, it can be made with less disadvantage to everybody concerned, it can be made more smoothly, it can be made with less difficulty psychologically, educa tionally, socially, and otherwise, if it is done slowly. This plan, of course, proposes that it be done slowly. W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct 115a I think that to undertake to do it all at once would be a most unwise thing to do. I t’s not going to be easy if we do it a year at a time. If it can be accomplished peacefully in the twelve years, it will be a noteworthy accomplishment. I think that this plan is the best plan for making the ad justments in the school, in the community, among the teachers, among the students, that could be proposed. And another reason is that it will give us a more homogeneous grouping of students. At least, it will make possible a more homogeneous grouping of students. And I [16] think that most educators feel that homogeneous group ing is wise as far as it is practical to practice it. We cannot always have students of just the same aptitude. We cannot always have students of just the same social background. We cannot always have students of just the same chrono logical age. We cannot always have students of just the same achievement level. But we’ll be further from having that if we desegregate fast, in my opinion. Now, the princi pal person whose welfare is to be considered in the matter of homogeneous grouping is the student. Now, it may be that if we said, “We’ll desegregate the whole school system all at once,” it may be that not a large number of students would be involved, but you can’t assume that. There might be a large number of them in volved. And if there were, then you’d have students put into classes together who had a very different background in the community, in the home, in social life, and in the school; and you would have a situation—- If they all came in together, you would have a situation where there would be a group of students or (we will say) individual students competing with others at a disadvantage, and you’d have students who would have to be held back because of others who were not on the same achievement plane with them. W. U. Oliver-—for Defendants—Direct 116a I—I hope I make myself clear there. If homogeneous [17] grouping has any value, then we can get the greatest value out of it by a gradual plan. Now, I ’d like to give one other reason if I may. I think that it’s very important that we do all we can to preserve good relationships between the two races. We have the two races. There is— There’s no way around that. We have the two races. They— They are two races. I don’t suppose either race wants to be merged with the other. I assume that the white race wants to remain a white race and the Negro race wants to remain a Negro race as far as race is con cerned. The two races live together and work together in the same city and the same community. I t’s very important that there be between the two races and between individuals representing the two races a relationship of friendliness, co operation, and respect such as I think we have had in the past to a great degree and which I think has improved a great deal during the past twenty or thirty years. Frankly, I think that the desegregation issue has threatened that relationship, made it in some cases a little more difficult to maintain, but we must maintain it some how ; and I believe that the gradual plan of putting students together in school will do more toward preserving proper relationship between the two races in our community than would any other kind of plan. [18] Now, Mr. Attorney, those are my principal reasons, I would say, for thinking that this is the best plan. I have left out a good bit. I hope I haven’t taken too much time in answering. I will be glad to answer any specific questions about it. Q. I think you have covered my direct questions, Mr. Oliver. W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Direct 117a Cross examination by Mr. Looby: Q. Mr. Oliver, will you tell the Court your experience in desegregating schools in any community other than Nash ville1? A. Well, I don’t suppose I have had any experience in desegregating schools in any community other than Nash ville. I have made some observations elsewhere, but I haven’t had any experience except in Nashville. Q. To what extent have you made any observations ? A. Well, I ’ve visited schools in Washington, D. C. I ’ve visited in Evanston, Illinois. I have made observations in Chicago and Indianapolis. Not to a very extensive degree, but I have made observations in all those places. Q. Then, you also said that the majority of taxpayers in Nashville are opposed to this ruling. How many tax payers are there in Nashville? [19] A. I don’t know. Q. How do you know then what is a majority? A. Well, if I—I would say that it’s not necessary to know the num ber in a group to know whether—what is a majority. Q. How did you arrive at your conclusion that there was a majority of the taxpayers that were opposed? A. By read ing, by listening, by talking, by hearing a great deal. Q. By reading what? A. By reading newspapers, by— Q. (Interrupting) What newspapers? A. Well, the Nashville Tennessean and the Nashville Banner in particu lar. Q. Can you tell me whereabouts in the Nashville Tennes sean have you found that and what issue? A. No, I don’t think I could. They have been many issues. I have talked with many, many people. I don’t think it matters how I came to my conclusion. That’s my opinion, Mr. Looby, and it may be open to be contested. Q. We want to know whether your opinion is based upon the facts or if it’s wishful thinking. A. I wouldn’t say it W. II. Oliver-—for Defendants—Cross 118a was wishful thinking. I t’s based upon— I have had many contacts with many people in Nashville, [20] and my opin ion is that the majority of the taxpayers and parents of Nashville do not favor desegregation at all as a matter of fact, but I think also that this plan would be more ac ceptable to them than any other plan. Q. But in your opinion, no plan at all (that is, no de segregation) would be preferable? A. I think that the majority of the people in Nashville would prefer that white children and Negro children attend school separately. I think that. Q. And that is your opinion? A. That is my opinion? Q. Yes. A. Well, frankly, I don’t think we are gaining anything educationally by putting them together. No, sir. Q. So that it is— A. (Interrupting) But my opinion is not— Of course, I think that we must respect the Supreme Court’s decision. I don’t advocate ignoring that, of course. Q. But regardless of what you think about that, you are giving your opinion as to desegregation under the question by Mr. Hunt, weren’t you? A. I don’t quite understand you. Q. Under the question by Mr. Hunt you were giving your opinion of desegregation? [21] A. In Nashville, Tennes see? Q. Yes. A. That’s right. I— Under Mr. Hunt’s ques tion I was giving my—I was not giving my opinion about desegregation in Nashville, Tennessee. I was giving my opinion about this plan. Mr. Hunt did not ask me anything about what I thought of desegregation, generally speaking, in Nashville. I was talking about this plan which I think is the best plan. Q. Enumerating the basis upon which you arrived at your ultimate decision, you spoke about the homogeneity of W. E. Oliver-—for Defendants—Cross 119a students. Are yon saying now that the difference in students is based on race! A. No, not exactly. Q. So that homogeneity or lack of homogeneity has noth ing whatsoever to do with the races, has it! A. Well, I would say that race and the conditions under which the races live may have something to do with causing the differences. I wouldn’t— Q. (Interrupting) Are you saying conditions under which the races live or conditions under which the people live! A. Well, the races are people. Q. And people are races, aren’t they! A. People are divided into races. [22] Q. Now, when you talk, say, about economic condi tions, economic conditions affect people regardless of their race, don’t they! A. Economic conditions affect people regardless of their race! Q. Yes. A. I suppose that is true. Q. And so the sociological effect upon people does not —is not affected by race but is affected by the sociological environment and the like. That’s true, isn’t it! A. I ’m not sure. Q. You are not sure? A. In the first place, I ’m not sure that I quite understand your question. Q. All right. You talked about sociological reasons. I am asking you whether those sociological reasons don’t result the same without regard to race? A. Well, I ’d say there are certain sociological conditions which are appar ently more pronounced with one race than with another. Q. And it is upon that basis and with that philosophy that you are performing your functions as Superintendent of Schools? A. I don’t see that that has much to do with my performing [23] my function as the Superintendent of Schools. As the Superintendent of Schools I must try to provide the best possible educational opportunities for all W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross 120a the children regardless of race, regardless of economic or sociological situation. Q. Now, let’s get back to that meeting with your prin cipals. You called the principals together, you said? A. That’s right. Q. And that’s all the principals, colored and white? A. All the elementary principals, I believe. I don’t think I had the high-school principals in the meeting. Q. You had all the principals of the elementary schools, both colored and white, meet together? A. Yes, sir. Q. And you explained to them what you wanted? A. Well— Yes. I ’ll say it this way: I said about this to them: “You are close to the problem. You are interested in the children. We want to make the best plan. We respect your opinions in the matter, and we would like to know what you think would be the best plan for us to submit to the Court.” I was asking for help from them because I thought they were in pretty good position to have opinions as to what would be the best plan. Q. Did you take into consideration then that their indi vidual interests may conflict with what you were seeking to [24] obtain? A. Well, not especially. I—- Q. (Interrupting) Didn’t take that into consideration? A. (Continuing) —hardly think it did. It was not a matter of individual preference. It was a matter of professional judgment. Q. Well, each had to exercise his individual judgment, didn’t he? A. That’s right, and I pooled— Q. (Interrupting) And his economic interests would in fluence his judgment, wouldn’t they? A. I don’t think there would be so much difference in the economic interests of the elementary-school principals. Q. I see. Was there any special reason why you re quested them not to sign their name to each individual W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross 121a ballot? A. Yes. I— I thought that perhaps if a man were asked to sign it, he might not be quite so free to say exactly what he thought because there might be a possibility of his being different from someone else in opinion, and that might make him fear some embarrassment in the matter. Q. You have individual reports from every principal in your office, haven’t you? A. I— You mean on that matter? Q. On any matter. From the schools? [25] A. I wouldn’t say I have individual reports from the principals on every matter or any matter. Q. You don’t have it? A. Well, I don’t know what you mean. Q. Do you have anything in writing from the principals in your office? A. Regarding what? Q. Regarding anything? A. Yes, regarding some things. There are routine reports which principals turn in and sign, such as fire-drill reports, attendance reports, and things of that sort; but this was an entirely different matter. Q. I know that, but— How often are those reports made, any reports from the elementary principals to your office? A. Well, some of them are made every semester, some of them are made once a year, and some of them are made once a month. Q. And those are part of your records? A. That is correct. Q. So that it would be most easy to determine the sig nature of a—the writing of a principal in any of those blanks which you asked them to turn in? A. No, I don’t think so. It wasn’t required that they be written. They might have been typed. Probably some of [26] them were. Q. And that— A. (Interrupting) I ’ll say— Excuse me. Q. Go ahead. Finish your answer. A. No, there wasn’t. No, I couldn’t go through them all and say this belonged to this man, this belonged to this man, this belonged to this man, and so on; no. I can’t do that. W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross 122a Q. Was the answer required of the principal to be turned in at the same time or at some later time! A, You mean— You mean was he supposed to fill out that questionnaire right then and there and turn it in or at a later time? Q. Yes, sir. A. At a later time. Q. I see. Now, was their reaction to that submitted to the Board? A. As I recall, it was submitted to the Instruction Committee but not to the Board because the Instruction Committee was charged with—with the job of proposing the plan or recommending a plan to the Board. Now, I don’t— I ’m not sure that I presented all the questionnaires to the Instruction Committee. Possibly I didn’t, but I carried to the Instruction Committee the impressions which I received, [27] the expressions of the elementary principals—of the elementary principals as something which we thought might help us in formulating a plan. Q. What do you mean by “expressions?” A. I mean— I mean indication as to what they thought just as I stated a while ago, that the majority of them favored a gradual plan, that a very small number preferred an immediate plan. I believe there was one—I think there was only one who favored an immediate and complete plan. The majority of them wanted a gradual plan and I reported that to the Instruction Committee. By that— That’s what I mean by an expression from this—from the elementary principals. There was a sort of pooling of their opinions. Q. And your Instruction Committee reported one plan to the Board, didn’t it? A. The Instruction Committee rec ommended a plan to the Board. Q. And but one plan, and that’s the plan that was sub mitted to the Court? A. Well— Of course, you know that— Q. (Interrupting) Answer that yes or no, Mr. Oliver, and then you can explain anything you want. A. No, I can’t W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—-Cross 123a answer that yes or no because I don’t know—I ’ll answer it, but if you will—if you will say [28] when, then I can answer it yes or no. Q. I believe you say that you attended all of the meetings of the Instruction Committee as well as all of the meetings of the Board! A. Let me see if I can get this clear. You mean that since the last direction we had from the Court—• Q. (Interrupting) Yes. A. (Continuing) —the Board submitted one plan. That’s what you mean, isn’t it? Q. Yes. A. Then the answer is yes. Q. Yes. A. I ’m sorry. I didn’t quite understand you. Q. So that the Board had no other plan to consider ex cept this one that was submitted to the Court? A. Well, I wouldn’t say that. Members of the Board were sometimes invited to meet with the Instruction Committee while the Instruction Committee was considering plans. No, I wouldn’t say that the Board had no opportunity to consider another plan. Q. I didn’t say that. A. The Board knew. Of course, the members of the Instruction Committee are members of the Board and on certain occasions, other members of the Board were invited to meet [29] with the Instruction Com mittee, and the Instruction Committee did consider other plans and the Board of Education was aware of that but the Instruction Committee finally recommended the plan which the Board is now presenting to the Court. That is the only plan which the Instruction Committee submitted finally to the Board. Q. And the Board never considered any plan up until the Instruction Committee reported this plan? A. I would say officially—officially the Board was not in position to con sider a plan until the Instruction Committee presented a plan or recommended a plan, and the Instruction Commit tee recommended only one plan. So officially that, I suppose, W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross 124a is the only plan which the Board considered because it is the only plan which was officially recommended to them. Q. Mr. Oliver, prior to this question being brought before the Court did the Board consider homogeneity in placing its students where it had separate schools! A. Will you ask that question again please! Q. Prior to this question being raised relative to segrega tion, did homogeneity constitute one of the bases upon which the Board placed students in the schools! A. Mr. Looby, I wouldn’t be in a position to say what the Board discussed officially really prior to the bringing up [30] of the question of desegregation because the question of de segregation before the Board is older than I am as Superin tendent, but I will say that the matter of homogeneous grouping is something which we have been dealing with in Nashville for a good many years. I t’s— It’s not a new matter at all. We have been dealing with it for a long time and wrestling with it, and we don’t know-— We don’t know what is the best thing to do. We have tried various plans of homogeneous grouping, and some schools do it more successfully than others. But if you are trying to find out now whether that is a new question which has arisen, it is not. Q. It is not! A. That’s right. Q. So that that question was with you before and is with you now and will be with you long after this question that we are talking about is settled! A. Yes. I would say that is true. The question of homogeneous grouping will—is one which will continue with us. Q. And from your knowledge of the problems in the field of education, that remains in all school systems, whether integrated or not, doesn’t it? A. The question of homo geneous grouping is one with [31] which I would say— Well, I— I— Maybe I ’m about to cover too much territory. W. //. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross 125a I would say in a public-school system such as Nashville. Of course, they have school systems in which there are ad mitted homogeneous groupings in the country, but in a public school system such as Nashville, the problem of homogeneous grouping, taking into consideration several factors, several factors other than race— In fact, I wouldn’t consider that as the principal factor that I had in mind. It is a matter of—of background, a matter of aptitudes. I t’s a matter of achievement. But let me answer your question a little more directly and apologize for not being more direct. Yes, in a school system such as that of Nashville, the matter of homogeneous grouping is a—is a question which will remain with us. Q. Yes. Now, let’s get back to a question or two relative to disturbances which you emphasize occurred last fall. Do you contemplate a similar occurrence each year? A. Mr. Looby, it’s pretty difficult to know what to contemplate. We try to assume that there won’t be anything that the law- enforcement agencies available to us cannot handle. They handled it last fall, handled it pretty well, but in spite of their handling of it, a great many students were, I think, damaged by the disturbances which we had. [32] Q. And do you think an annual disturbance of that nature for the next 12 years will be profitable? More so than to have it all over at once? A. Ask that again please, if you please. Q. Do you think an annual disturbance that you say— You say that was a disturbance of the students, a psycho logical disturbance or whatever disturbance you call it. Do you think going through that every year for twelve years will be more profitable to students than getting it all over at one time? A. Well, I will say this, that if I thought that it would be the same every year, I think it W. II. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross 126a would be better to have it one time rather than eleven, but that is not the case. I think there is a certain amount, we might say, of reaction which we may expect, and the more people that are involved, the more of that we shall encounter. I t’s pretty difficult to cope with, and I think it would be better to scatter it out over a period of years. I think I can make myself clear by saying this: One time I came in contact with a rabid dog, and I had to take rabies shots. It would have been possible to give me the whole dose at one time, but the reaction to the rabies vaccine is something, so it was given to me in fourteen instalments. And I think that this is somewhat the [33] same situation. Q. You mean it’s just like rabies shots, ehf A. If I may explain it this way, I think there is a great deal of violent reaction and opposition we are going to encounter from the people in our community, and I think that if it is distributed over a period of years, we can take it better. Q. Then your primary objection, if you perchance pro pose to interpret the action of the Board, is that there may be public disturbances, is one of your reasons for your objection to total desegregation1? A. If I understand you correctly, Mr. Looby, and I think I do, one reason why— In answering your question, yes. One reason why I think the year-by-year plan is best is that I think that there will be a good bit of reaction against it and opposition to it and that that reaction will be easier to deal with and will be less violent if it is distributed over a period of years. And the principal person I am pleading for there is the child himself. I think that the material loss which we suffered last fall is small compared with the dread and fright and the dis turbance which was caused to our children and to the W. II. Oliver—for Defendants—Cross 127a principals and to the teachers. It was difficult to work, and a good many students stayed out for a week or two or [34] three, and there are probably a few still out today in so-called private schools of maybe questionable quality. It is the impact of it all on education which I am trying to distribute because it will be less harmful in my opinion if it is distributed over a period of years than if it all comes at one time. Is that a clear answer? Q. My question was directed towards your opinion or rather how the public acceptance or public rejection af fected your plan? A. Well, I think that one reason for favoring this plan is that it will be less objectionable to the people. Q. That is one of your primary objections? A. I may have been a little too brief in answering that. Of course, what I ’m thinking about is not so much the objection of the people but the results of that objection on the work of the schools. Q. Have you any of those children or the record of any of those children to show its effect upon the children or just your opinion? A. Well, I don’t know what kind of record you could make. Of course, we have attendance records to show how they were kept out of school. Q. And that was during the first few days? [35] A. I beg your pardon? Q. That was during the first few days? A. It was a little more than a few days. Some of it extended out over three or four weeks. Some of them— Some of them never came back but went to private schools, a small number of them. Q. And there’s a number of them go to private schools all the time, aren’t there? A. Well, these wouldn’t have. W. II, Oliver—for Defendants—Cross 128a Q. What private schools are you referring to! A. Well, let’s see if I can name them. There are two. One of them was—• I ’m afraid I can’t give the names of them. They were schools— They were not regularly established private schools. I wouldn’t have objected to those, but they were private schools so-called set up just for the specific pur pose of taking care of children who didn’t want to go to the mixed schools. Q. Did they meet the requirements of the public-school law! A. I assume that they did, some question maybe. Q. You have no objection to children going to schools that meet the public-school requirement, do you! A. I have no objection to students going to a private school. I think that the private schools to which we are [36] gen erally accustomed provide good educational opportunities for children, but I have some doubt as to whether these did because in one of them, for instance, they had one teacher and they had students of about seven different grades. It was somewhat like the old one-room eight-grade school house which I think has generally been considered not as good as what we have now. Q. What have you or the Board of Education done with respect to those children that are not attending public schools and not attending schools approved by the Board of Education or some accrediting agency! A. The Board of Education doesn’t approve the private schools in the city. Q. I said “or some accrediting agency.” A. There is an accrediting agency which approves high schools. Q. Mr. Oliver, let’s get right down to the meat of the question I ’m asking you. Has anything been done about those children not attending adequate public schooling! A. Well, we have got a list of their names and their ages W. H. Oliver—for Defendants-—Cross 129a and their addresses and their grades. We were not in posi tion to do anything about them except to leave them alone. Q. I see. Well, isn’t it true that children who are not [37] attending public-—who are of public-school age and not attending public school, that their parents may be prosecuted? A. No. The law states that they must attend a school which meets in the daytime, and it is pretty indefi nite as to the requirements of that school. It is hard to say from the state requirements just what constitutes a school really. Q. Those children weren’t denied admission to any school, were they? A. No. No. They were not denied admission to the public schools. Q. And the public schools are now open to them? A. That is correct. Mr. Looby: I believe that is all. Mr. Hunt: That is all, Mr. Oliver, unless the Court has some question. The Court: No, I don’t think of any at this time. I might later on. Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Direct E l m e r L ee P e t t it , c a lle d a s a w itn e s s in b e h a lf o f th e d e fe n d a n t, b e in g f i r s t d u ly sw o rn , te s tif ie d a s f o l lo w s : Direct Examination by Mr. Boult: [38] Q. Mr. Pettit, will you please state your age and residence? A. 49 years of age; Nashville, Tennessee; 1915 Tenth Avenue, North. Q. I believe it can be stated that you are the acting Chairman of the School Board of the City of Nashville. Is that correct? A. That’s correct. 130a Q. Will you state for the record why the Chairman is not here and really why you are acting as acting Chairman? A. Well, the Chairman is convalescing from a heart attack and for that reason I was elected Chairman pro tern. Q. How long have you been a member of the School Board? A. Six years. Q. How long have you been a member of the Instruc tion Committee? A. Six years. Q. Are you at the present time Chairman of the Instruc tion Committee? A. Yes, sir. Q. Mr. Pettit, referring to the matters which have de veloped under the authority of the Instruction Committee since the last hearing in this court in January, will you state whether or not the Instruction Committee has con tinued [39] its discussion and investigation of the problem of furnishing an additional and supplemental report to this Court upon the question of desegregation? A. The In struction Committee has met numerous times, and also we have invited—insisted that each Board member be at those meetings and especially when we knew that we would dis cuss the desegregation. Most members have attended those meetings and taken part in the discussion of those—of the plan. Q. As a result of those discussions did the Instruction Committee prepare and submit to the Board a report recommending a plan of desegregation? A. Yes. Q. Was that plan adopted by the Board? A. Yes. Q. Can you identify the plan which has been filed here with the Court and which was identified by Mr. Oliver as being the plan submitted by the Instruction Committee with its recommendation and subsequently officially adopted by the Board? A. Yes. Q. You have heard Mr. Oliver testify and he testified to Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants■—Direct 131a the essential components of that plan. They are correct, are they not? [40] A. Yes, sir. Q. Of course, the plan speaks for itself as filed with the records of the Court. Mr. Pettit, do you have any children in the public schools of Nashville? A. Yes. Q. How many do you have in the public schools of Nash ville and in what grades are they during the present school year? A. I have one daughter, a senior in high school, North High. I have a boy eight years in the second grade at Jones, and I have a boy, Jimmy, that’s in the first grade at Jones. Q. Was Jones School one of the schools which was in volved in certain disturbances which are described as a part of the record in this case which occurred last August and September 1957 ? A. Yes, sir. Q. Have your two boys continued to go to Jones School since that time? A. Yes, sir. Q. You are then familiar with the occurrences which occurred last September and you had a personal interest in those occurrences because your two little boys were in that school? A. Yes. [41] Q. Mr. Pettit, you then have been acting not only as a member of the School Board but your interests include those of a concerned parent, do they not? A. Yes. Q. State to the Court, Mr. Pettit, why you individually and as acting - Chairman of the School Board feel that the plan which has been filed with this Court is the best plan for the City of Nashville in its public schools. A. Well, first after we had—- 1 might say that at all times we never refused any groux) of people or anyone that came to our Board meetings to offer anything on the subject. We didn’t turn down any x>erson.. We also never turned down anyone that came to the Instruction Committee to talk with us Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Direct 132a about it. We did not go out and invite special groups to come in, but we did— We listened to all, and we studied it. The— We came up with two different views. We had one view that—people that were very strong towards desegre gation. The other group were very bitterly opposed to desegregation. Those two groups of people made up—- They were the majority of the people that appeared before the Board. We had one group, only one group of parents that really represented the parents of the school children. Most of the others were organizations that were either sponsored, I ’d say, or more or less had outside interests that came into Nashville to try to [42] give us advice and professional and expert assistance, as they might call it, but each side claimed that they were experts, but they were so far apart that the Board decided the thing that we were concerned about was to—to obey the Court order and at the same time try to do what was best for the schools of Nashville with the main thing in mind was that our children who everybody had been forgetting are the ones that should be educated; and that’s the thing that we are concerned about, educating the children, and also we are concerned about obeying the laws of the land. And for that reason we, after talking with our supervisors and superintendent, that we thought the wisest plan was the gradual plan to go up one year at a time. Q. Now, Mr. Pettit, state your opinion or reason, your judgment, why you feel that a one-year-at-a-time plan, the year-by-year plan as Mr. Oliver has referred to it, is pref erable to any other type of block plan or total desegre gation. A. Well, I think the— When we resolve one prob lem, it creates so many other problems that by doing it in the first grade— We— We had to— We didn’t have too much trouble in the class room. Of course, the teachers Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Direct 133a were—did have tension, I mean, but they were— The classes, most of them, had probably one colored in the class along with the white, [43] and the teacher was able to cope with it, and for that reason, the problems—our main prob lems were on the outside in this; but had we started at the other end, our problems would have been on the inside and outside, and then our educational system would have suf fered as far as the children were concerned. This way, I think we were able to still give our first-graders the— the education they deserved, maybe not as good as we should have, but it—the trouble was at a minimum inside the school. Q. Can you state whether or not there is still— You have stated, I believe, that there is still some tension! A. There is. Naturally, the—the teacher in a new experience, she’s concerned. She doesn’t want to hurt the—the minority, the little colored boy in the class, and still she’s tense, afraid— She doesn’t want all the white parents jumping on her neck, and— So far, though, the teachers have been able to handle the—as far as I know, handle the situa tions, and we’ve had no trouble with that. Q. In spite of the existence of tension, the size of the problem has been such that the teachers have been able to handle it! A. That’s right, Q. Under the present one year. Is the fact that, you have in effect learned by doing on this one year going to be [44] of assistance in the year-by-year plan, step up year by year in your opinion! A. I think so. I think from the inside, in the school room, if they move up, they are already in the class and part of the class, and your problem won’t— won’t exist there as far as the educational— And, then, too, if their adjustment, their level, their achievement level, if there is a difference there, then the child— We still— Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Direct 134a Here in Nashville, if they don’t pass the grade, we still leave them; and for that reason, they—things will be ad justed that way regardless, and they will keep their level, achievement level as they go through school. Q. They will have gone through the same educational experiences themselves, all from the first grade on up through the 12th grade year by year? A. That’s right. Q. Now, Mr. Pettit, in order to make the record perfectly clear, is it or not true that the plan which was adopted by the Board was adopted with the Chairman absent on account of her health and one negative vote cast by a mem ber, Coyness L. Ennix? A. That’s right. Q. Is that or not correct? A. Yes. [45] Q. And all of the other votes of the Board were in favor of the plan which was filed with the Court? A. Yes. Q. Is there anything else that you would like to say to the Court, Mr. Pettit, in connection with the present hear ing and the present plan? A. No, I don’t think there is anything else. Mr. Boult: You may ask him. Cross Examination by Mr. Williams: Q. Mr. Pettit? That is correct, isn’t it? A. Yes, that’s right. Q. You testified that you had a personal interest in this— A. That’s right. Q. —because of your children having been involved in the desegregation situation last September? A. That’s right. Q. Your children didn’t have any rocks or bricks thrown at them, did they? A. No, sir. Q. They weren’t spit on? A. No, sir. Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross 135a Q. I believe that occurred purely with regard to the [46] Negro children last September. The children who were members of the class here seeking the desegregation of the schools, they were the ones who were spit on and had rocks thrown at them. Is that correct, sir? A. Well, the only way I know was reading it in the paper. I didn’t see it. Q. You weren’t there on the scene? A. I was— I was at one school, yes, on the scene. I made it a point to stay there those days. Q. Yes. I believe you testified that in the vote on this plan that you had one dissenting— The Chairman was absent, and you had one dissenting vote? A. Yes. Q. Which was the vote of the Negro member, Mr. Ennix? A. Yes. Q. Was there any plan, Mr. Pettit, wThich was considered which would have desegregated more slowly than the plan which you now propose to the Court? A. You mean did we discuss plans like that? Q. Was there considered by the Instruction Committee or the Board any plan which would have— A. (Interrupt ing) We talked— Yes. We talked of several different ap proaches to it. Q. Well, sir, what I am asking is if there was any plan [47] which was considered which would have extended the period of desegregation out over a longer period than the 12 years which the Board now proposes to the Court? A. Over a longer, no. No, there were none. Q. Then, in point of gradualism, this was the most ex treme plan which was considered by the Board. Is that cor rect, sir? A. That’s right. We— Q. What other plans have been considered by the Board at times in the past, Mr. Pettit? A. We— We considered Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross 136a starting at the high-school level, probably the 12th—11th and 12th, but we— Q. That was prior to the January hearing in this case? A. That was a couple of years ago. Q. A couple of years ago, you had considered starting at the high-school level? A. We didn’t really consider it. I mean it was brought up to debate the question. We didn’t consider it seriously. Q. I don’t know whether I ’m in order in asking this ques tion, but was the plan for beginning at the high-school level proposed by your Negro member, your minority mem ber? A. No, sir. Q. What position did he take? A. On that particular— [48] Q. (Interrupting) What position has he taken with regard to the plan which the Board should submit? A. Well, I don’t— As— As Chairman, when we all discussed it, I don’t know that— Q. You are not familiar with that position? A. Not familiar enough to say what— I think he would be the one to answer that. Q. This plan in which you stated the Board considered two years ago to begin at the high-school level, would you state that plan in greater detail to the Court, if you please, sir? A. Well, we thought we would start wuth the 12th grade one year, and the 11th, but after we— We didn’t discuss it too long because the Superintendent said educa tionally it wasn’t sound. And I might— I might add that (and I think that probably the purpose was that) in that plan that probably there wouldn’t be any that would trans fer in the 12th grade, and maybe there wouldn’t be any in the 11th; and then, if they did, why then, we’d have a lot of trouble, but we—we just discarded that plan because we—we— We thought it would be trying to get around the Court order, and we were not trying to do that. We Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross 137a were trying to abide by the Court ruling, and not try to get around it. So we switched ends there and started to try to work it out the [49] best we could from an educa tional standpoint. Q. Mr. Pettit, did the Board at any time consider a three- stage plan of taking a normal functioning unit each year : this year the first six grades, this year the junior-high grades, and the following year the senior-high grades! Did the Board at any time consider such a plan? A. We— We had discussed it. Q. And that was over two years ago also, was it not? A. Oh, no. No. I wouldn’t say. I mean any member is free to bring up any plan, and we would— We’d pick it apart and then we— Q. (Interrupting) Was such a plan also considered by the Instruction Committee? A. You mean in our unit? Q. Yes, sir. A. Not as— I don’t recall any specific plan where it would take the different units, primary, elemen tary, junior high, and high school. Q. Then the Board hasn’t even considered that plan, the plan of desegregating a normal functioning unit at a time? A. We—We had— We had discussed the fact where the elementary and high schools, and then we discussed the two or three, and it’s hard to say. In our school, we don’t— We don’t have the three-grade division really as a func tional [50] separation there in the operation of them like the three grades and next three grades. Q. Mr. Pettit, assuming that the high schools of the City of Nashville were to be desegregated this coming Septem ber, on the racial zones which were provided in the plan which was partially approved by this Court on January 21, 1957, can you state how many—approximately how many Negroes there would be in integrated situations in high schools? A. No, I couldn’t. Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross 138a Q. Has the Instruction Committee considered such fig ures'? A. No. Q. Then, the Instruction Committee has not taken the school population and the respective geographical loca tions of the schools according to the zones which the Board has set up and determined how many Negro students would he integrated in white schools in hypothetical situations? A. We had that. I think at first we had the number. Q. Tou had it as to the first grade? A. No. When we first started discussing it, I—we had the—the— In our census we had it broken down then. That’s been probably two years ago since we had that number. Q. Then, in submitting the plan which is now proposed [51] to the Court, the Instruction Committee and the Board of Education as a matter of fact do not know exactly how large an integrated situation you would have if the entire school system was desegregated in September, do they? A. I don’t right now. I couldn’t give you that figure. Q. And if the high schools were to be integrated in Sep tember, they wouldn’t know how many? A. Well, it’s— It’s hard to— It— It would be hard to tell. We had those figures, but we can’t— When we built a new school, accord ing to the census and the Bureau of Statistics, we figured that we needed a hundred—we had a hundred first-graders. When school opened, there were 160 first-graders. And you can’t— And the way the population shifts and moves, it’s hard to know. Q. Well, as a matter of fact, it was in evidence before the Court on January 21, 1957, that there were approximately 3,000 children involved in the integration situation for this past September in the first grade. As a matter of fact, there are actually only eight or nine Negro children in inte grated situations. Is that correct, Mr. Pettit? A. At the present time? Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross 139a Q. Yes. And how many schools does that situation in volve! A. Six—seven. I might say there’s only your nine [52] Negro students involved, but you have your white. I think you should— Your white students are involved in that, too. We’re not just— Our problem is not just the nine colored children. Q. Oh, we understand that, sir. A. They’re all involved. The only difference is the hundred or so that out of that total that chose to go to the—to remain or go to the colored school. Q. Yes, s ir; but how many first-grade schools do you have here in the City of Nashville? A. Elementary? Q. How many schools, that is, that include the first grade, sir? A. That include the first grade? Q. Yes, sir. A. Let’s see. About—I don’t know the exact number. Thirty-some-odd. Q. Approximately 30? A. Something. Q. And of the first-grade integration, which occurred under your present zoning system which you adopted last January (that is, January ’57) or thereafter pursuant to the plan approved on that date, only six out of 30 schools were involved in integrated situations? [53] A. Six or seven. I believe it’s six. Q. Yes, sir. Is that entire number of six presently in volved or was that the number originally involved? A. They’re the ones involved now. Q. Now, Mr. Pettit, you say that—- You testified, I be lieve, that the people—that the Board invited people— Bid the Board actually extend a formal invitation to people from the Community to render whatever assistance they could on the desegregation problem? A. I can’t say. The only thing, I think we announced in our meeting, but we never— We had so many people there we didn’t have room to invite anybody else. Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross 140a Q. Well, sir, has that been true at every meeting that the Board has had! A. Not every meeting, just when some one heard that we were going to discuss this problem. Then it filled up fast. Q. People have attended the Board meetings! A. Yes, they have. Q. I believe that was true even before this suit was filed, was it not, sir! A, Well, not to the extent that they did after the—- Yes. Before— Not before the suit was filed. Q. Well, isn’t it true as a matter of fact that before the suit was filed, that a number of Negro parents attended [54] your Board meetings and asked the—both Negro and some white parents! A. Some white, yes. We had the white ones first. Q. And asked the Board to desegregate the schools! A. That’s right. Q. And the people who have been meeting with you re cently are primarily white, some white people. Is that cor rect! A. No. We— It’s about half. We’ve had more representing the colored, or— Q. You had— Pardon me. A. Yes, we had recently— We had two groups the last meeting, one wanting to— Well, like they always— They don’t want to desegregate. The other group, bringing in some petitions signed by lots of—• some religious organization. Of course, they were all colored, and they were probably sponsored by this CORE outfit. Q. Well, sir, I ’m not asking you what— I ’m not asking you to speculate now. A. O.K. Q. If you please, Mr. Pettit, if you will just testify what happened. I don’t want your speculation. A. I ’m just tell ing you the groups that came and who— [55] Q. (Interrupting) This remark, “probably was sponsored.” May I ask you this, sir: Will you name some Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross 141a of the organizations whose names appeared on that petition asking the Board to desegregate? A. The names on the petition? Q. Yes, sir. I believe you stated that there were some names of some organizations on the petition asking the Board to desegregate. A. Well, they were mostly churches, a group of Methodist churches and Baptist churches and one labor union, but mostly they were all organizations— Q. (Interrupting) A labor union? A. Yes. Q. What labor union was that, sir? A. Some— Well, I don’t recall the name. It was some local. Q. Were there any Jewish organizations listed on that? A. On that particular one, I don’t recall. Q. Well, have you had petitions from Jewish organiza tions, sir, with regard to the desegregation question? A. Yes, we have. Q. What has been the tenor of their— A. I couldn’t tell you exactly what they— They weren’t— [56] Q. In general, has it been favorable toward deseg regation? A. Yes, I think so. Q. Where were these churches located that you indicated were listed on these petitions that were recently brought? A. They were all located around— Q. Here in Nashville? A. Here in Nashville. I think all of them were Nashville churches. Q. How many were there, sir, all together? A. Well, I got a supplement to that with probably 10 or 15 more, and I don’t know the exact number. Q. Well, on the original, could you approximate it please, sir? A. I—I just couldn’t. There was a big stack of them, but I don’t—I didn’t count the exact number. Q. I call your attention to the newspaper report that there were 26 organizations on the original. Would that— A. That would be about— Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross 142a Q. That would be approximately correct, wouldn’t it? A. That would be probably correct, I would say. Q. Then you didn’t intend to say— You didn’t intend the Court to understand you as saying a while ago as I did —as I understood you to say, that these people who were [57] petitioning the Board, represented outside—to de segregate the schools, represented outside interests that merely came into Nashville and tried to tell you what to do? A. What I— What I mean, I think the extremes on both sides are probably pressured from the outside. Q. Yes, sir. Oh, you— A. (Interrupting) Except the— Q. (Interrupting) Are you taking the position, Mr. Pettit, that the Nashville Board of Education cannot find anything of value to assist it in desegregating that comes from out side the State of Tennessee? A. No, sir. Q. Are you taking the position that all textbooks are written in the State of Tennessee, sir? A. No, sir. I know—- Q. (Interrupting) You use textbooks in your schools that are written outside the State of Tennessee? A. Yes, sir. I—I am aware of that. Q. Yes, sir. I gather from what you have stated that the Board of Education then is taking the position that in approaching desegregation that outside help should be shunned insofar as devising any technique, insofar as de termining techniques and methods of desegregating the schools? A. No. We didn’t— We didn’t take that at titude. [58] Q. On what facts did you base your statement, sir, that you thought that— Well, let me withdraw that ques tion. You stated that there were two extremes, that there was a group which wanted to—that was bitterly opposed to desegregation, and that there was a group which was very— ah, bitterly opposed to desegregation, and that there was a Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross 143a group which, was very strong for desegregation. Mr. Pettit, hasn’t the Board taken the position that it would comply with the law as declared by the Supreme Court? A. We have. We have. Q. Then, Mr. Pettit, isn’t the Board strong for desegrega tion? A. That— That’s— It’s according to— We intend (and have always) to follow the order of the Court, but at the same time, the Supreme Court didn’t say, “You’ve got to do that September 1st, 1956,” or “’7,” and in good conscience, we’re trying to work out something that’s been given us as a school board to work out with the idea of educating the children and complying with the law, but—but for some thing that’s gone on for 70 years, and then expect us to remedy it over night— Our main purpose is education. Q. Yes, sir. A. And we’re— We’ve tried to (and to the best that we know how)—to work it out where we can and not have any [59] trouble like we had last fall. Q. Yes, sir. And I agree with you, Mr. Pettit, on the side— If I may just make that remark on the side, I agree with you that your main problem is education. I would like to ask you this: Doesn’t the efficiency of your education depend to some extent in this desegregation situation on the extent to which you educate the public? A. Sure. I think the public must be educated, yes. Q. What steps has the Board taken since the desegrega tion decision in 1954 to attempt to educate the public? A. We had— Our Superintendent at that time did go to all the schools. He didn’t get to all of them because of his health. And—and they had meetings and we tried to ex plain it, and that— As far as the school, that’s as far as we went with it because primarily we—we’re supposed to run the school inside, to educate the children, and as far as— It’s not really our problem to educate the parents. I mean we try to, but it’s just more than we can—we can do. Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross 144a Q. Well, Mr. Pettit, isn’t it the policy of the Board to try to educate the public insofar as safety matters are con cerned, insofar as school safety of children going to and from school is concerned? A. School safety, yes. Q. And safety of children in school insofar as the [60] conduct of their parents may affect that? A. We— We teach safety in school, but as far as trying to teach the parents outside, I mean after school or things like that, we don’t go into that. Q. Sir, aren’t your parent-teacher associations designed to obtain a close liaison between the school officials and teachers and the public? A. I—I think that’s what the Parent Teacher Association tries to do. Q. Was any effort made by the Board of Education after the first or second desegregation—segregation decision in the Brown case, or at any time, to attempt to educate the parents and the general public to the idea that the Board was going to comply with the law and that it was inevitable ? Was that at any time done through the PTA’s or through any other method? A. We have a PTA panel at our Board representing two groups, and they at first said they would —they would help the Board. And, also, there has always been cooperation between us and the PTA, and I think they have—they have worked hard to—to help in this. Q. Mr. Pettit, has the Board ever made any firm, un equivocal statement through its PTA’s, or to the community through any other organization, that “We intend to comply [61] with the law and we intend to do it soon and we expect the cooperation of the community”? A. We made that statement not long after the Supreme Court made—that we were going to abide by the law, that we were going to follow the Supreme Court, but as far as telling the PTA that we were going to do it and expected them to cooperate, I don’t recall ever doing it—the Board ever doing it. Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross 145a Q. And as a matter of fact, the Board has been lukewarm about its attempt to comply with the Supreme Court’s deci sion throughout the time since the decision? A. No, sir; I can’t agree with you. Q. Well, sir, I think you testified—or did you testify that you thought the majority of the community was in favor—was against desegregation? A. I didn’t say that. I think it’s— It’s probably generally believed that most of the white people are against it, and I can’t speak for other people. Q. Is that why you thought:—you testified that you thought the wisest plan was a gradual plan to go up one year at a time, that the Board thought that? A. That is one reason. Surely. Q. That is the main reason, isn’t it? A. Not— No. I don’t know as it is the main. I t’s [62] one of the main. I t’s one. I t’s a main reason. I t’s a strong reason. Q. Now, Mr. Pettit, last September when the schools desegregated— The first grade has been desegregated now insofar as situations, which you mentioned, since last Sep tember. That involves six principals, does it not? A. Yes. Q. Has there ever been a meeting of those principals among themselves on the desegregation question? A. I know we had one the first day. Q. Have you had one since the first day, Mr. Pettit? A. That— The Superintendent probably has.. I wouldn’t know. The Board hasn’t. Q. Insofar as he has reported to the Board, you have no knowledge of any such meeting? A. The Board did not call them in. Q. You testified, I believe, that you thought that you could handle the situation as long as it was in that context, in the context of one grade at a time and in small situations. Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross 146a What do you base that statement on, Mr. Pettit, what factual basis ? A. Facts ? Q. Yes, sir. A. Just the nine members on the Board get ting together [63] and trying to reason out what would be the best, and after we tried one grade this fall, if we had had twice that many schools, you wouldn’t have had the police to take care of them because we used every one they had, and it was still pretty rough because I was— I went through the crowd to take my child to school, and if I hadn’t been on the Board, he wouldn’t have gone back the next day because it wasn’t the right condition for a child to go to school. Q. Yes, sir; and then the Board— And that is another reason why the Board has reached the conclusion that the 12-year plan is best because, based on your reasoning among yourselves from the September incident, you think that if that situation were magnified that it would be a problem that the police couldn’t handle. Is that correct, sir? A. That— That’s not the— That’s one reason. That’s one reason only. The main— The main reason is education, and after our Superintendent and supervisors, and they believed to the best of their knowledge that they could handle the situation, that they could educate the children, and it would work out and not be too hard to administer, the School Board— We took their advice and judgment on it. Q. The Board has not at any time considered a compro mise on the question of this time? A. We— We— We’ve discussed all different angles. [64] Q. Has the Board considered, Mr. Pettit, in its assumption that the incident difficulties in September would be magnified if integration were begun at once ? Has the Board considered that it would be considerably more magnified if it occurred a year at a time for the next 12 years? A. I don’t—don’t get all your question just like— Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross 147a Q. Well, sir, you stated that one of the reasons why the Board favored the 12-year plan was that based on the diffi culty, reasoning among the nine members-—that based on the difficulty which occurred last September, the Board felt that if all the schools had been desegregated at the same time, the police would not have been able to handle them, that that was one of the main reasons. A. That— Q. (Interrupting) Now, I ’m asking you, sir, has the Board considered the great difficulty which would be in volved should that situation re-occur every September for the next 11 years? A. We—- We believe that on the gradual plan that it will get smaller each year, the opposi tion to it, and that’s— Q. (Interrupting) Then, sir, the Board does not believe that you will have that problem for any number of years. Is that true, sir ? A. I don’t think it will be as great as we had. [65] Q. Well, sir, if— Assuming your first pos tulate, that desegregation was to occur all at once, if it had been ordered all at once in September, are you taking the position that the difficulties which you are assuming would have occurred then would continue to exist? A. I don’t know. Q. Then, sir, you— Well, what is your belief in that regard, sir? A. You mean whether—if we desegregated the whole thing, what would have happened then? Q. Do you believe that any difficulties that you might have would just continue indefinitely or do you believe that that would subside just as you think it will subside before the end of this 12 years? A. That’s something that I can’t answer, and I don’t believe anybody else can. Q. You can’t answer this, but you would attempt to an swer the other? A. Well, I think—I think any gradual, as Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Cross 148a people become accustomed to it, there will be less opposition to it. Q. Thank you, sir. Redirect Examination by Mr. Boult: Q. Mr. Pettit, I want to ask you if the PTA organization [66] as such is organized by or responsible to the Board of Education? A. No, sir. Q. State whether or not it is a purely voluntary organiza tion at each separate school? A. It is a voluntary organiza tion, and I know nothing else about it, only I pay my dues. Q. It has its own city-wide and state-wide organization, but the Board of Education has nothing to do with that? A. It has nothing to do with it. Q. Mr. Pettit, I believe you testified in connection with your own child at the school. I will ask you if you remained at the school with your child? A. Yes, I did. Q. For how many days? A. Two whole— Two days and then the next day there wasn’t anybody there but about one or two boys, mine and another boy and a little colored boy. That’s just about all they had the rest of the week so I didn’t see any use staying there. Q. You mean there were only three children in the grade? A. There might—might have been— Q. Three or four children? A. There was one or two, just two in his class, I think, [67] but they got up as high as 15 or 20, I guess, during the week. I ’m not sure. Q. With reference to the attendance, I will ask you if that did not only occasion—the incidents of last September did not only occasion the physical damage to the Hattie Cotton School, but was there or not a loss in the daily attendance average figures? A. There was quite a loss in the—as far as our state revenue— Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Redirect 149a Q. State funds? A. State funds on average daily at tendance. Q. And that was in a substantial amount? A. Yes. Q. Now, in connection with the high-school situation and the abatement of the impact of admittance of a large group to more than one grade, and simply for the record, I want to ask you if there are not colored students in more than one grade admitted in Little Rock, Arkansas, according to the reports? Mr. Looby: If Your Honor please, I object to what happened in Little Rock, Arkansas, unless he can testify of his own knowledge. The Court: Yes. He would have to know of his own knowledge. [68] By the Court : Q. Ho you know that of your own knowledge? A. No, sir. By Mr. Boult: Q. That is all, only what public information has been reported. Now, Mr. Pettit, in your opinion would the mul tiplying of the problem by two, six, or twelve times result in making it easier to handle or more difficult to handle? A. You mean if we take more than the— Q. (Interrupting) One grade year by year. A. I think so. Q. You think it would be more difficult? A. It would be more difficult. Q. Also, in that connection, state whether or not you and the Instruction Committee and the Board have tried to relate the problem to the city limits of Nashville, Tennessee? A. Yes. Elmer Lee Pettit—for Defendants—Redirect 150a Q. And its educational system? A. We have. Q. And your testimony is that the plan submitted is in your judgment the best for Nashville, Tennessee, public schools? [69] A. That’s right. Mr. Boult: Come down, Mr. Pettit. Further this witness saith not. The Court: We will take a 10-minute recess. (A brief recess was taken at 11:00 A.M.) Mary Brent—for Defendants—Direct Miss Mary B rent, called as a witness in behalf of the defendant, being first duly sworn, testified as follows: Direct Examination by Mr. Boult: Q. This is Miss Mary Brent? A. Yes, sir. Q. Miss Brent, I am not going to ask you how old you are, but I am going to ask you how long you have been a teacher or a principal in the system of the Nashville Board of Education, the City Schools? A. I have been a teacher in the Nashville Schools for 24 years. Nineteen years of those I have been principal. Q. Where are you now principal and how long have you been principal? A. I am now at Glenn School in East Nashville, and this [70] is my 16th year there. Q. Glenn School is located, I believe, at 322 Cleveland Street, East Nashville, Tennessee? A. Yes, sir. Q. Miss Brent, were you the principal and on duty as such at Glenn School during the days of August and Sep tember 1957 during which time disturbances and violence occurred in connection with the enrollment and attendance of certain Negro children in the first grade at Glenn School? A. Yes, sir; in August and September. 151a Q. There appears in the record in this case an affidavit signed by you in connection with the hearing for an in junction in connection with such disturbances. I will ask you if you have recently re-read that affidavit and if it accurately states your recollection of the occurrences at and around your school during that time? A. Yes, sir. Q. Without going further into it at this time, it can be referred to as your testimony in that connection as a part of the record upon this hearing? A. That is true. Q. Miss Brent, how many Negro children, first-graders, are in your school, Glenn School, at the present time? A. We have two students—two Negro students enrolled. [71] Q. Are they presently in attendance at Glenn School? A. Yes, sir. Q. And have they been since last fall when they enrolled? A. Since the very beginning. Q. Are they in the same section of the first grade, or are they in separate sections? A. No, sir. They are in sepa rate sections, and I would like to make an explanation of that. In— When beginning first grades come in, they are not all of exactly the same age. Of course, they may come in just any time within their sixth year. We divide the children chronologically. We put the children of the first— born in the first four months in one group, the second four months in another, the last four months in another. We have three groups of the first grade. When these two Negro children were enrolled, one of them fell in the group of the oldest children, the other fell in the group of the youngest. Q. That was a natural— A. (Interrupting) That was a natural. Q. (Continuing) —and historical classification? A. That’s right. They were enrolled, in other words, and divided just as the rest of the children. Mary Brent—for Defendants—Direct 152a Q. Miss Brent, since September 1957, state whether or [72] not there has continued to exist a tension in your school and in your school constituency? A. Yes, sir; there has. We have managed, since there are only the two children. We have fairly well managed to keep it down within the school itself, but it’s mostly on the outside that we have felt it. The two Negro children are brought to school each day and are taken home by one or other of the parents. That’s one thing. There have been two or three incidents within the school that older children had brought about. As far as the children with their own first-grade group, they are well accepted. Things have gone on fairly smoothly, but with the older children we have had some trouble. I myself have been the brunt of several pretty bad things. I mean such as anonymous telephone calls and call ing me different names that a lady doesn’t appreciate. And for the first— I ’d say the first six weeks, there was a con stant stream of parents in and out of the school putting up the arguments to me that I had listened to most of the summer; and sometimes they would go away satisfied, some times they would not. Some of them have never come back into the school since that time. Q. And has there been dissension or tension in the Parent- Teacher organization itself? [73] A. Well, as far as the organization itself, the president—most of the officers have been determined that they were going to make it hold to gether, and they have done so; but I would say maybe 20 parents, maybe more (between 20 and 30), have failed to join the Parent-Teacher Association for the first time, and they gave that reason, not to me but to other people, that that was why they did not join. Q. In connection with these abusive telephone calls that you have received, state whether or not they have occurred Mary Brent—for Defendants—Direct 153a as late as within the last several weeks of 19581 A. Yes, sir. The last one I had was the Saturday night, or rather early Sunday morning following the bombing of the Jewish Temple. That’s about three weeks ago. Q. I am not going to ask you to repeat the language which was used, but ask you the hour of the night that you were called? A. It was about 1:30 in the morning. Q. And did the -caller identify who it wras calling? A. Not at all. And on that occasion, I tried to get the person to repeat. It was a lady—a woman (let’s put it that way) at that time, and I tried to. get her to repeat what she said so that I might be able to get the voice. I couldn’t do it. [74] Q. Miss Brent, in connection with education and the education of children, that I believe you would regard as your primary responsibility? A. That’s right. Q. Do you. actually teach at the present time? A. No. I am not a teacher. Q. Do you feel that the education of the two Negro chil dren in the first grade has progressed satisfactorily? A. Yes, sir; I do. In the case of one child, it has been excep tionally good. In the case of the other child, she is im mature, she is young, and the work has been hard for her. Q. In connection with the other children in the grade, the white children, have they also seemed to progress satis factorily, meaning compared to other years educationally? A. I can’t see that this has made any difference in their progress. The only thing is: We almost had to discount the first month of school because of the pulling and pushing, pulling children out of school and bringing them back; and deciding that they’d go to the county, and bringing them back again. Until about the second week in October, we did not have our roll set up to where we honestly knew which children belonged to us and which were going to stay. Now, that is the only thing which has held us back. Mary Brent—for Defendants—Direct 154a [75] Q. Have your teachers, particularly the first-grade teachers, undertaken to perform their duties under these difficult circumstances? A. They certainly have, and they have done a beautiful job. Q. Has it been difficult? A. It has been very difficult. Q. Are you familiar with (meaning have you read) the plan which is proposed at this time by the Nashville Board of Education and which has been filed with this court and which is the subject matter of this hearing? A. I have only read it in the paper. Q. I believe it wTas accurately copied and reported— quoted in the newspaper. You are familiar with the fact that it is a year-by-year plan as it has been called in the courtroom this morning? A. Yes, sir. Q. And it retains the transfer provisions and also con tains a provision providing for subsequent report to this court if deemed necessary. Now, that refreshes your mind about it, does it not? A. Yes, sir. Q. Miss Brent, based upon your experience as a teacher and as a principal, as one who has had the experiences at [76] Glenn School which you have described, give us your opinion and judgment about the advisability of the new proposed year-by-year plan. Mr. Looby: If Your Honor please, we want to object to that question, this witness’s opinion. The opinion of the defendant may be admissible, but I doubt if the opinion of this lady would be admissible. The Court: Well, she has had 24 years of school experience. I think she qualifies as an expert on school matters. Mr. Looby: Your Honor allows it? The Court: Yes. I will allow her to answer. I think she clearly qualifies to express an opinion. Mary Brent—for Defendants—Direct 155a Mary Brent—for Defendants—Direct By Mr. Boult: Q. Miss Brent, answer the question please. Do you think it advisable? And if so, why? A. I think it’s the only plan that we in Nashville can accept right nowr and make work. If people had been at Glenn School as I was during the last of August and most all of September last year—in 1957, they would realize that it was not an easy thing to do. Any radical change is bound to bring chaos, and this was certainly a radical change. Now, in an educational institution, teachers cannot [77] do their best in the midst of excitement and turmoil and upheaval. I feel that if we can do this and get it over in people’s minds that it is the law of the land, that we are trying to do our best to accomplish the purpose that the Supreme Court—the thing that the Supreme Court has set up for us to do, if we do it gradually, let them get ac customed to it gradually, I believe we will have a much better chance of succeeding in the end. To me, integration and desegregation are not the same thing, and we would like very much at the end of 11 years, or however many years it takes, to feel that the schools are truly integrated, that it’s not just a question of their being desegregated. That feeling will have to come from the hearts of people. It cannot be forced, and it certainly cannot be thrust upon them in a hurry. In the second place, I feel that little children, for instance, these children in the first grade, now are absolutely accustomed to having the Negro and the white child right there together. They play together. They eat together. Everything goes along just the same. There’s no difference whatsoever made. Well, if that group moves on next year to the second grade, they will still be accustomed to that. The children that are coming in in the first grade naturally expect their 156a group to be desegregated. If you jump and begin to take [78] children in higher grades, you are going to double your trouble. I firmly believe that it is the only plan. Q. Thank you, Ma’am. Mr. Boult: You may ask her. Cross Examination by Mr. Looby: Q. Miss Brent, I understand that your opinion is predi cated upon the community resistance, as to how the com munity accepted. Am I correct in that assumption? A. Well, after all, Mr. Looby, the only situation with which I am very familiar is the situation right there at Glenn School. Q. And your opinion is based upon the fact that people resented this desegregation? A. That is part of it, yes. Q. Well, what is the other part? A. Well, the other part is this, Mr. Looby: Those children have come in— We firmly believe now that they have a foundation that will pre pare them to go along into the second grade with the white children. They will the next year be able to progress. There will be no differences in their (shall we say) background. We feel that educationally it mil be the best thing for the child, and after all, that is what we are concerned with. We leave the outside trouble [79] to the policemen. Q. The outside trouble (since you mentioned that), after the police got busy, you had no further trouble, did you? A. Oh, yes. Q. What trouble did you have after the policemen— A. (Interrupting) Well, we did not have any—oh, I mean any screaming and things like that. The police were on duty (I would say) for possibly three weeks over there, Mary Brent—for Defendants—Cross 157a but that is not the only trouble. There has been a— As I said before, there has been a constant stream of parents from one thing and another coming in. They will come in. We have had, oh, such things as rock fights involving chil dren of the two races which we had never had before. Q. Have you had any trouble involving children of the same race? A. Oh, yes. We still have child problems. Q. And that exists regardless of the race, doesn’t it? A. That’s true. Q. All right. Now, let’s get back to this question: Chil dren themselves have no prejudice, have they? A. Small children do not. Q. Do not. And insofar as the children are concerned, we could have desegregation at any time, couldn’t we ? A. No. Now, I would wonder about that. The few times [80] that we have had trouble within the school when I would consider it really a race problem, every time older children have been involved. Q. And you also have that same kind of trouble between older and younger children of the same race? A. No. Not the same type problems. Q. What type are they? A. Well, now, for instance, at one time one of the little Negro girls had not finished her lunch on time, and as we do with most first-graders, the teacher left her at the table. She was still there when the class came in that was supposed to take the place of the first grade at that section of the lunch room. A boy came and sat at the table, a fifth-grade—a fourth-grade boy sat at the table, and when he saw the little Negro girl there, he slammed his tray down on the table and took his chair and shoved it out, and said, “I won’t eat at the table with a nigger.” So I was able to handle that problem because it Mary Brent—for Defendants—Cross was one. 158a Q. And it was a disciplinary problem that any principal may encounter! A. If you don’t have too many of them, yes. Q. All right. Now, other than community objection, what problems have you had! A. Well, now, the mother of one of the little Negro [81] girls has come to the teacher. She did not come to me. But she has come to the teacher saying that some of the older children were making fun of her little girl in the rest room; and when we got down to find out how to overcome that, the only (thing we could do was to see that the teacher went to the rest room when this child goes. Q. And from that time on, the teacher has to go with one of them every time she goes to the rest room! A. With the little Negro girl, yes. Q. Insofar as the aptitude is concerned, there is no dif ference between the races, is there! A. With these two children— Now, that’s the only—of course, the only ex perience that I have had. Q. I see. A. But, no, sir; I cannot see any difference with those two. Q. Now, those children have been in the school from since last September! A. That’s right. Q. And they are making satisfactory progress! A. Yes, sir. Q. Now, as to the older child, he was in a different grade, wasn’t he! A. Yes, sir. He was in the fourth grade. You mean the [82] one in the lunch-room incident! Q. Yes. A. Yes, he was in the fourth grade. Q. And so the difficulty arose because only one grade was desegregated and the other grades were not! A. No. Now, that’s not the way that I meant to imply. I meant that the younger children realize less difference of any Mary Brent—for Defendants—Cross 159a sort. They are not conscious of racial differences, relig ious differences, or any other kind, but older children are. Q. What difference in grade were these two children involved? A. One, of course the little Negro girl, was in the first. The other boy was—I think he was either fourth or fifth., I am not. sure which. Q. So then you would not recommend that the fourth or fifth grade be desegregated? A. Not right at this time; no, sir. Q. Now, these calls that you have been getting, when did you say was the last one? A. Sunday morning after the Jewish Temple was bombed. Q. You didn’t get one last Saturday morning? A. Didn’t get one last Sunday morning? Q. Well, I did. [83] A. You did? Q. Yes. Mr. Looby: I guess that is all. The Court: Is that all of this witness? Mr. Boult: That is all. Thank you, Miss Brent. Further this witness saith not. W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Direct W. A. B ass, c a lle d a s a w itn e s s in b e h a lf o f th e d e fe n d a n t , b e in g f i r s t d u ly sw o rn , te s t if ie d a s f o l lo w s : Direct Examination by Mr. Hunt: Q. Is this Mr. W. A. Bass? A. Yes, sir. Q. Mr. Bass, I believe you were one of the defendants in this case, being Superintendent of Schools at the time this lawsuit began. Is that a fact? A- That’s correct. Q. How long were you Superintendent of Schools in Nash ville? A. Twenty years. 160a Q. And have you now retired? A. I have. [84] Q. As of what date? A. As of January 1st last. Q. I believe you were a witness in the hearing at which the plan was proposed under which the first grade was desegregated, were you not? A. I was. Q. Are you familiar, Mr. Bass, with the plan which the Board has adopted for further desegregation in Nashville? A. Yes, sir. Q. You have read that plan? A. Yes, sir. Q. State whether or not that is in substance the plan which you as Superintendent prior to your retirement recommended to the Board? A. It is. In fact, I made the written recommendation, one of the last recommendations I made to the Board before retirement. It was that the Board continue desegregation in the first grade and add to it the second grade coming September next, it being under stood that the original plan regarding maintenance of recognition of school zones and transfer features adopted by the Board and approved by the Court would be in continuation. Q. If it is the plan you recommended, I assume— I will ask you, Mr. Bass, if it is not in your opinion the best plan [85] that is available for Nashville? A. I wouldn’t have recommended it if I hadn’t thought it was the best thing to do for the City of Nashville. Q. Now, Mr. Bass, endeavoring to be concise, will you state to the Court the reasons why you think this is the best plan available? A. I think I have two reasons I should like to state: Number one is the—is the distinct recogni tion of the fact that the children grow from what they are to what they subsequently become. They don’t become what they do become immediately and at once. And so I based my recommendation on that fact, that adjustment W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Direct 161a to an entirely new community problem, such as is involved in the change of attitude, the change of practice, the change in tradition that this plan or that the desegregation in volves, I figured that— I reached the conclusion that bas ing any decision upon the natural growth and development of children would be the only safe and sound approach to the problem. Another problem: Schools are not—not just school build ings and just school children. They have teachers there. I took into account the teacher problem and experience I had had with teachers. When I came to Nashville as Superintendent of Schools (and this fact can be established in the mouths of many [86] witnesses), I called a meeting of the English teachers in the junior- and senior-high-school groups. It had not occurred— It never occurred to me that I would have any difficulty because as State Supervisor of High Schools I had held conferences all over the state involving both white and Negro teachers primarily in the county schools. Well, the day came for the meeting I had personally called. I was in my office gathering up some material I was taking to the meeting. At that time, our Negro schools were opened ten minutes earlier than the white, and as a consequence they dismissed ten minutes earlier. Our Negro teachers arrived on the scene ten minutes ahead of the white teachers. They went in the room and in a normal manner took their seats in the room. Just before I started from my offi.ce down to the meet ing place, the Principal of Hume-Fogg High School, C. T. Kirkpatrick then (He is dead now), came down all excited. He said: “The white teachers won’t go in. The Negro teachers have taken their places about over the room, and they won’t go in and sit by them.” That was the coldest, W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Direct 162a most unsatisfactory educational meeting I ever presided over. Now, I never forgot that. I didn’t know what to do. I was confronted with a hard problem, and yet I knew— Any Superintendent would have known that the efficacy of his [87] administration in the last analysis depended upon what he could do through the teachers, and it was highly necessary that we establish a way of work that brought about mutual respect and mutual confidence. And so I had to change my tactics, and I started with the principals and supervisors. We had mixed meetings and we finally got common understanding, but it took 10 years to get that done where the teachers and—ah, princi pals and supervisors would sit down and talk in confidence. Now, when you consider adults having that sort of diffi culty, you must remember that you can’t force desegrega tion upon children and the adults and maintain that favor able attitude for learning. If you don’t have that favorable attitude, you just as well close the door and have a holiday that day because children will not learn where they are under stress and strife. I stood at Glenn School and engaged a group of people who were there, a big delegation of them, and one man stoutly maintained that he would not send his child to any city school (not just Glenn) if a single school permitted Negro children to attend with the whites, that he wouldn’t patronize the public schools. And so we had a lively dis cussion. I saw the Negro parent who brought his child up to Glenn School. He went in and came around through the [88] auditorium and registered—enrolled his child, and came out the front door. He couldn’t get that little girl through the crowd without the intervention of a policeman. W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Direct 163a Now, that little six-year-old girl was getting her first im pression of a school. I don’t want to see this community throw the baby out with the wash. We’ve got too good a school system (both white and colored) to permit anything that will tear down what some of us have worked hard to maintain. That’s why I made that recommendation. Q. And this plan is the one that you recommended? A. Yes, sir. Cross Examination by Mr. Looby: Q. Mr. Bass, it is your considered opinion that a segre gated system is more desirable, isn’t it? A. I beg your pardon? Q. It is your considered opinion that a segregated sys tem is more desirable? A. Mr. Looby, I don’t want to go into my personal views. I think, since the Supreme Court has spoken, what I think is not the material question. The question, it seems to me, is one of law, what is the best way to comply with the law of the United States as ex pressed through the Supreme Court. [89] And— Q. (Interrupting) Do you know what it is? A. (Con tinuing) —I ’m in favor of the Board of Education carry ing it out. I know what it is. Sure I do. I have read it over and over, every word of it, and I gave considerable thought to that question of “all deliberate speed.” Now, we deliberated (and I think we were entitled under the Supreme Court’s decision to be deliberate) about this mat ter. We are not just trying to stand in the way. We are trying to determine the scope that we can take and do the job effectively. I told this Court the first time— I said: “This is a new problem with us. We’ve never desegregated a school system, and we want to learn by doing.” I main W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross 164a tain that we still have a lot to learn. We will build on what we have achieved and do thoroughly and well not just for the white children but for the Negroes as well. I have— Time after time in talking with our groups (principals, supervisors, and teachers), I have made the statement that we don’t want a single child, white or colored, to be injured as a result of the attempt of the Board of Education to comply with the Supreme Court’s decision. I ’m not so concerned about a bunch of adults, but I am concerned about these children. And this plan is in the interest of the children who [90] will be affected, either white or colored, and I think our colored people who know me know that I am sincere in that remark. Q. Well, Mr. Bass, I am going to ask you a question now. I have no objection to your making a speech, but just an swer this question please: Isn’t your opinion as to whether this system is best predicated upon your considered opin ion that segregation is not desirable? A. Not at all. Q. That desegregation is not desirable? A. Not at all. If we had been in the formative stages here proposing an interpretation, we would have argued that question on its merits. Your question should apply not now but at the time the Supreme Court made its decision. I have tried as the Superintendent of the schools, through the principals and teachers at my disposal, to teach people to respect the law, and that I maintain today. Q. In your entire administration of the City School Sys tem of Nashville, you have maintained a segregated system throughout, haven’t you? A. I have. Q. And even in payment of teachers, jmu had a system where you had one salary scale for white teachers and one salary scale for Negro teachers, and maintained that sys W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross 165a tem [91] until you were forced by the court to change it? A. That-— I aired that problem, and we maintained it until the Board of Education, through acts of the court (federal court), was required to make a change in it. And I want to say in following that up that we have been assiduous and as faithful in trying to meet every requirement of that court decision as we knew how. I want to say another thing since you have raised that question. Q. Yes, sir. A. I was Commissioner of Education of Tennessee one time, and at that time I— I used whatever influence I had with the legislature and with the governor to write a plan of equalization of educational opportunity in Tennessee, and one plank we insisted upon was that equal service (as indicated by training and experience) carried with it equal salary. And I think that ought to be stated in connection with this record as much as the answer I have made to your question. Q. Now, you say it took you ten years to get the teachers to meet together? A. Not to get them to meet together. I could have— I could have called them together, and did, but I didn’t get the morale. I didn’t get at the bottom of the problem of [92] teaching. This business of teaching and working through teachers is not just a legal matter. I t’s a spiritual matter at base, and unless we can develop that rapport which a teaching group must have to touch the lives of children, we are not a successful school system, however good our buildings may be or whatever other physical features we may have. Q. Is that one of the elements you take into considera tion in saying that this plan is the best plan? A. I said this. I say that this is the best plan for the reason that it enables us to consolidate the gains we make from year W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross 166a to year and not to create a lot of confusion and haranguing and threats and counterthreats around a school building. Q. Did those confusion and threats and counterthreats to which you refer result from community objection? A. Basically, yes; and misunderstanding. Q. So your plan is predicated primarily upon community objection to this—to desegregation? A. I am going to state the answer a little different from that. I am going to say that we take into account the community in which we are trying to operate, and if we know that community is going to be split in many splinters, we know right away that we have got a different instructional program from what we would have had had we had a community [93] that would have community of interest. Q. I see. So that your plan for this one year—12-year plan is based upon what you consider would be the com munity objection? A. I think there are two answers to that question. I think the teachers can’t absorb too big a piece of this problem at one time, and I think the community will gradually see that their first impressions were erroneous and that this problem can be handled systematically with mutual benefit. Q. Did you determine how many schools would be af fected if a rule for total desegregation were adopted? A. The answer to that question is that we asked— We called our principals all in to work on the question of determin ing school zones without reference or regard to race, and then we called—we laid this matter—we consolidated those whole reports. We had had a census taken. We had con solidated that whole business and made a map that we saw all the way across the board room. Every board member could see the zones of the separate schools proposed. Only one of those school zones was changed, and that was to extend one block further than their—than the original plan W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross 167a called for. It didn’t make much difference one way or the other. There weren’t very many children, either white or colored, in that block. That was the only change that was made, in that zone [94] block. Q. I still ask you how many schools in Nashville would be affected if you had not based upon zones, your residen tial zones? How many schools would be affected if an order for total desegregation went down? A. I suspect every school in the city practically now. See, Mr. Looby, any day you answer that question, your answer may be based on facts that you had when you prepared the an swer, but due to the shifting in population, we could have— Take— I’ll illustrate what I ’m trying to say. Over at Lock- land School when we opened there, we didn’t have a single Negro child residing in the Lockland School territory. Today there may be one. I would guess that practically every school in the city. Q. Based upon the census which you took? A. Based upon the zones which the Board adopted. Q. All right, based upon the zones, you are saying there would be Negro children in every school in Nashville? Are you saying that? A. I ’m saying that might be true now. Of course, we had a group of schools last fall— Q. (Interrupting) I ’m not talking about possibility. I ’m talking about the actuality, not the possibility of what may happen a hundred years from now. But based upon the [95] zoning which you made last year, how many schools would be affected? A. I don’t recall. The record is over there. It will speak for itself. Q. Do you know? A. No. I say I don’t recall the num ber. I think there were eight or ten maybe that didn’t have a single Negro child in them. Q. How many schools in Nashville? A. Well, they W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross 168a opened the new school out on Twelfth Avenue after I retired. Q. Well, at the time that the— A. (Interrupting) There were thirty— I guess there are 36 or 37 elementary schools today. Q. Assuming then that there are 37, you are saying that 37 schools would be affected in a desegregation order! A. Assuming what! Q. Assuming that there was an order for total desegrega tion, you are saying that 37 elementary schools of Nashville would be affected! A. They might be. I said a moment ago Lockland School last September did not have a single Negro child residing in it. Q, And there are several others in the same category! [96] A. There were eight or ten as I recall, but I won’t make a positive statement on the exact number because I don’t recall it. Q. Well, Mr. Bass— A. (Interrupting) I ’ve been sick since last—the 20th of last May. Q. You had to form an opinion! A. Yes, I did. Q. To submit to the district court, and you had all that information available to you! A. Yes, sir. Q. And why didn’t you use that information! A. We did use it. Q. Well, can you give me the results of that now! A. We used it in preparing the original first-grade proposi tion. And we are asking that that plan be continued, and add the second grade to it. Q. You say you used it in preparing the plan for the first grade! How many schools were affected by that! A. All of them except eight or ten. The exact number I don’t recall. Q. Can you explain to the Court why there are only nine W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross 169a colored students in the desegregated— A. (Interrupting) I would like to ask you a question: [97] Why did those who didn’t go ask that they not be sent there, made request for transfer? Q. Well, the schools were not affected then, were they? A. (The witness did not reply.) Q. How many schools now are there in which there are first-grade Negro students? A. I didn’t get your question. Q. How many schools in which there are first-grade Negro students? How many schools there were at the time you retired? A. We had— When I retired from the City Schools, there had been six schools that had a child for one or more days. Q. And that is six of the thirty-seven. A. One of those schools had one child for one day, and that night (I be lieve it was that night) somebody bombed the building. That left five existing schools at that time who had one or more Negro children. Q. But there were six schools that were affected of the thirty-seven? A. That’s right. Q. I see. And that ratio would hold the same in all the grades, wouldn’t it? A. Had those children not asked for transfers, there would have been a lot more schools that had one or more Negro [98] children in them. Q. I thought you said there were seven, and one asked for a transfer. How many schools in which there were Negro students eligible based upon the zoning system? A. You will have to ask that question of Mr. Oliver because he has handled that problem. I don’t know it, Q. You don’t know. So that didn’t enter into your opin ion? A. My opinion— My— My judgment— It’s more than an opinion. My judgment regarding the proposed scope of this next step was based on our experience plus what I knew about the City Schools of Nashville. IF. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross 170a Q. And it was not based upon the number of schools that would be affected? A. Not at all. I— I assumed in making that recommendation that every one of them would have one or more Negro children in it. Q. And knowing the housing situation in Nashville and with the zoning that was made—the zoning which was re ported, you still say that that’s true, that all 37 schools would be affected? A. Potentially they could all be af fected. Q. What do you mean by potentially? A. Well, I mean that there—there could be Negro [99] children in every one of the elementary school zones in the city. Q. Would that statement be true today? A. Today? Q. Yes, sir. A. I say I ’m assuming it would be. Q. Is that so? A. You take in this—this growth out here towards Ward-Belmont—Ward College—what I mean, Belmont College. There’s been such a change in the popu lation out there that it’s hard to tell what school zone they would be in. Mr. Looby: That’s all. Mr. Hunt: That is all, Mr. Bass. Further this witness saith not. Mr. Hunt: That concludes the defendant’s testi mony. The Court: All right. Any proof? Mr. Looby: (Reply was inaudible.) The Court: How is that? Mr. Looby: We have some proof reflecting on this plan. The Court: All right. Call any proof you have. W. A. Bass—for Defendants—Cross 171a [100] H er m a n H. L ong , c a lle d a s a w itn e s s in b e h a lf o f th e p la in t i f f s , b e in g f i r s t d u ly sw o rn , te s t if ie d a s f o l lo w s : Direct Examination by Mr. Williams: Q. This is Dr. Herman H. Long! Is that your name, sir? A. Yes, sir; that’s right. Q. Dr. Long, where do you live? A. I live in Nashville on Phillips Street, 1611. Q. How long have you lived here, sir? A. About 15 years. Q. What is your occupation? A. I work in the field of race relations for the Board of Home Missions for the Congregational Churches. We have offices at Fisk Uni versity. I am a psychologist by training. Q. I see. Since you have mentioned your training, will you state your professional qualifications please or educa tional background and qualifications? A. Bachelor’s degree from Talladega College in Alabama and master’s degree from Hartford Seminary Foundation and the doctorate degree in Psychology from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Q. Did you accept the job with the American Missionary Association immediately after acquisition of your doctorate or have you engaged in other occupations? [101] A. Well, I taught for a while before accepting the work in race relations. I taught in Miles College in Birmingham, and I was Dean of Instruction at Miles for a year before I entered—followed up my graduate work and then came back in the field of race relations. Q. How long in all did you teach at Miles College? A. Four years. Q. Four years. Is that a junior college or— A. It was a regular four-year college. Herman II. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct 172a Q. All right, sir. I believe the agency in which yon work is known as the Department of Race Relations at Fisk University. Is that correct! A. Yes, it is. Q. That is located here in Nashville! A. That’s right. Q. How long has it been here in Nashville! A. For 16 years. Q. Sixteen years. Dr. Long, what are the functions of the Department of Race Relations! A. Well, we are a research and consultative agency in the field of race rela tions. Our services are made available to communities and to organizations in the community who wish to use our services in the field. Q. Do your services relate to the furnishing of [102] scientific data and so forth with reference to various prob lems which may be related to interaction of Negro and white people and integration and desegregation of Negro and white people in various areas of life! A. Only on the occasion that we may be called into some consultative role with the community where we are dealing with a concrete set of problems that may relate to such relationships. Q. Have you had any experience with the desegregation problem in the city or county public schools in the United States! A. Not directly except through indirect roles we have had in some community situations like Baltimore, Maryland. We were there at the invitation of the Gov ernor’s Interracial Commission and the Mayor’s Interracial Commission. Q. Will you just tell the Court what you did in Balti more! A. Well, this was essentially an effort the year before the schools were desegregated in that community to lay a basis of fact for the community in terms of what the problems were in the community that needed to be solved in order for all citizens to have an equal opportunity. Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct 173a Q. Did you conduct a survey there! A. We conducted a survey and— [103] Q. What was that called! A. Well, it was called the Baltimore Community Self Service. Q. I believe it obtained some national recognition, did it not! A. It was featured over the CBS Television Sys tem. Q. You might tell us what you did in that survey. A. Well, we essentially took an inventory of what the practices were in Baltimore in the field of education, in the field of housing, in the field of employment, in the field of social- welfare services, hospital services, what the practices were in these fields that affected the status of minorities, espe cially the Negro group in the community in terms of whether or not these practices were providing for them equal op portunity along with other citizens in the community. Q. Did you— In connection with that and in connection with the education part of it, did your survey include an evaluation—an ascertainment and evaluation of the atti tudes of school teachers, for example! A. Yes. One phase of it dealt with— At that time, Baltimore had separate Negro and white schools, and we were concerned— I might say that the Superintendent of Schools was a member of the Commission-—of the Committee of the [104] Survey which dealt with these problems as was the one of the Commissioners of Education for the state at large. We attempted to see whether or not, for example, the physical facilities under the school system were equal. We found some differentials especially as between Negro and white schools where the age of—age of buildings was con cerned, equipment, and so on. We did also ask the teachers in these schools whether or not they believed they would have any difficulties in Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct 174a teaching Negro and white students in the same class, as suming that the school board were to—were to integrate the school system. Q. What were your findings with particular regard to the teachers? A. We— We were, I suppose, surprised to learn in a way that the teachers felt that—that there would be some difficulties, that they wouldn’t—they wouldn’t be able successfully to—to teach Negro and white children in the same classes. Q. Did all of the teachers feel that way? A. Well, I would say about the largest percentage. About 30 per cent of them felt that way. You had a distribution of—of re sponses. Q. Of varying shades of attitudes? [105] A. Yes. And yet the—the—the following term the school was success fully desegregated, and Negro students were integrated in classes and the teachers did teach them fairly successfully according to reports from the board. Q. Did Baltimore have the aspects of a southern com munity with regard to racial segregation or a northern community? A. Well, I think Baltimore in some respects wms more southern than Nashville if you mean—if you mean the extremes to which the practice of segregation can be taken. It certainly had segregated schools just as Nashville has. It had— In the downtown department stores, it had separate Negro and white facilities. Q. Does that exist in Nashville? A. It exists— It exists in Nashville, and even some of the department stores in Baltimore don’t extend credit accounts to Negro clients. This does not obtain in Nashville to my—to my opinion. Q. Is there a custom in Baltimore against allowing Negroes to try on clothes in some of the department stores? A. And hats especially. Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct 175a Q. Does that exist in Nashville? A. I don’t believe it does to any large scale. Maybe there are some small ex ceptions, minor practices. [106] Q. Have you also— Have you been called upon by any agency in Nashville (that is, in an official role as head of the Department of Eace Relations) to render any technical assistance to any agency in Nashville? A. Not in an official capacity. I have had the good fortune to be invited to serve as a consultant at one of the workshop sessions of the Nashville School System a year ago last September when they—• Q. (Interrupting) Was that when— A. (Interrupting) These were integrated— These were integrated Negro-and- white-teacher orientation sessions. I was present at one of the workshop sessions at the invitation of the board. Q. Were you advised that the board had been having these sessions previously, or was this a new thing? A. It was my impression that—that this was an innovation of the School Board. Q. And this was July of—the summer of 1957? A. This was September 1956. I believe this was probably the second year. I think they have had three years nowT of integrated teacher-orientation workshops at the beginning of the school term. Q. In your capacity as consultant at that workshop, were you able to draw any conclusions with regard to the [107] attitudes of the teachers in Nashville with regard to desegregation? A. I— I couldn’t say that I had any reliable impressions. The— As much of an exchange as there was in these sessions, the only recurring comment that—that I remember was one of concern on the part of the teachers and the principals who w7ere there (I assume there were principals in the audience) that they would re ceive help themselves in dealing with the difficult problems Herman II. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct 176a of integration, that they needed help from somewhere, from somebody to help them in dealing with the protests, the— the attitude of—of—of complete unconcern on the part of some element of the public, people who were responsible for the anonymous telephone calls and so forth. Q. I see. Then it was with regard to matters outside of the school room that the teachers indicated that they needed help? Is that correct? A. I had the impression that they— that they felt that they could deal with the educational problems in the classroom and in the school situation if— if they had adequate support and assistance in dealing with these irritations which come from the extreme ele ments outside the classroom situation, those who were op posed to integration, desegregation. [108] Q. Dr. Long, who asked you to appear as a con sultant at that workshop? A. The invitation came, I be lieve, from the school superintendent. I believe I received a letter from Mr. Bass to that effect. Q. Who was superintendent at that time? A. Who was superintendent at that time. Q. And that was one workshop. How long did that last?, A. I think it was a one-day workshop. Q. A one-day workshop. A. Although some phases of it extended over two days or more. Q. But your services were required for only—asked for only that one day? And you appeared merely as a lecturer? Is that correct? A. As a discussant on a panel. Q. As a discussant on a panel. All right. But ever since the first decision of the Supreme Court and down to the present date your agency is and has been available to the Nashville Board of Education, has it not? A. Yes. Q. And that’s the only occasion you’ve been called on? A. To my knowledge, yes. Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct 177a Q. You have been called all over—in other areas of [109] the country but not here in Nashville? A. Yes, sir. Q. Dr. Long, based on your experience in race relations, could you give an opinion as to the desirability, as to the feasibility and desirability of the plan which has been pro posed by the Board of Education here today to extend desegregation over an additional 11-year period? That is, in terms of race relations? A. I— I think I can. I am afraid that a large number of people tend to believe that a special kind of plan used by a school board to desegregate the schools is the final test of whether or not you will have effective desegregation, and the assumption seems to be that if the plan protracts the process of change over a long period of years (I think this is—is basic to the Nashville proposal) that you will have a smoother plan of operation and you will have less difficulty. I believe that this assumption isn’t entirely sound in looking at the ex perience of other school systems and the experience I have had generally in the field of race relations for several reasons: One reason is that any proposed change in this field as well as in others takes place within a climate of opinion and a climate of expectation that is created by the kind of policies which a Board of Education or which any other board, [110] whether it is a board of—of an industry, creates in the public mind. I think it has been fairly well shown that when policies enacted by such boards are vacil lating policies (that is, they do not proceed with clear pronunciation of purpose and without qualification) that when the processes of change in the school system are at tempted, you get resistance because the public does not expect that the board means what it says in many of these instances. Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct 178a Q. Can yon give an illustration of that! A. Well, I think one of the best examples is—is—is the case of the action of the school board in Delaware, one of the first school systems that was desegregated. There, you had a board deciding to—to desegregate the schools and, because of pressure, withdrawing its decision and referring it to the State Board of Education, and the State Board of Education refusing to grant the local board the authority to move forth, and you had— At the opening of school, you had actual difficulty in the community because the com munity didn’t know what to expect on the part of its obliga tions in the—in the field of education. I think there are some other examples. Q. What is the positive side of that! Can you give an illustration of the positive side of that! A. I think the positive side on the policy matter is—[111] is fairly well represented in the successful efforts of school integration in St. Louis, Missouri, in Washington, D. C., and in Louis ville, Kentucky, recently, in which cases the boards adopted— Mr. Hunt: Just a moment. May it please the Court, I think this witness should be qualified as to what he knows about Washington and St. Louis before he expresses an opinion on it. He has qualified himself, I believe, to express an opinion on Balti more. I don’t believe he has been qualified to ex press— The Court: He might briefly go into that. Mr. Williams: I believe Counsel is correct, if Tour Honor please. By Mr. Williams: Q. Are you familiar with those situations, Dr. Long! A. I visited St. Louis, and I talked with members of the Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct 179a supervisory staff in St. Louis, Missouri. I know— I’ve been in direct contact with the school authorities in Baltimore. I can’t say that’s true with Louisville. I haven’t been in the Louisville situation, and I can’t—only know it except as I have studied the reports which have come from the superintendent’s office. Q. All right, sir. Do you have any further reasons that [112] you wish to point out to the Court, the reasons under lying your opinion of this Nashville plan! A. The second ■—the second reason is I believe that—that one of the assumptions is—is that if you minimize the change, you reduce the resistance. I believe that the character—- We need to analyze the character of the resistance, and if one looks—if we look at our experience in Nashville last year, the people who constituted the protesters and the mobs, the people who were arrested and fined, either fined in court or put under injunction in the court, expressed an attitude which was completely unreasoning as to any kind of change. I think the pattern that is expressing itself is one in which any kind of change toward desegregating schools or any other institutions will meet resistance on the part of this element of the population. And I see— I see— I see that the merits of whether or not the change is done in 12 years or whether it’s, done in one year doesn’t enter into this—this kind of resistance effort be cause it is fairly completely unreasoning and inconsiderate effort. I t’s not an effort to meet the issues in terms of any kind of statesmanship. Q. Is it your conclusion then that the protraction of the period during which desegregation is attempted will not alleviate the conditions created by the people who are [113] bitterly opposed to desegregation as a matter of principle? A. I— I see nothing to—to leave the conclusion Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct 180a that a 12-year plan will reduce the actual resistance on the part of the extremist elements in this community to de segregating the schools. Q. Can you explain that"? A. Well, last year we only desegregated the first-grade level. There were only nine Negro children involved in six schools, and yet we had a demonstration which approached tremendous extremes in this community. There wasn’t even a commitment as I understand the proposal to continue desegregation the second year. This was a minimal amount of change, and yet you had in effect a maximum kind of resistance. In other words, it wasn’t a resistance which was predi cated on the assumption that this was—this was complete desegregation. In other words, it was protest against even the most minor kind of change. Q. All right, Dr. Long. Now, I want to ask you this: What are some of the community resources which are or dinarily mobilized in an attempt to solve a race-relations problem? A. Well, I— This varies with—with the com munity. Q. Well, with particular application to the education problem, what in your opinion would be some of the re sources? A. Well, of course, parent and parent-teacher groups [114] are a logical and necessary community re source. Chambers of Commerce— Although this isn’t a direct function, they have a very important indirect func tion in setting the climate of leadership in the community. The organizations that are representative of minority groups in the community are important to have— Q. (Interrupting) With reference to that, may I ask you this, Dr. Long: Based on your experience as a race- relations expert, is it in your opinion possible to arrive at a plan which will approach a solution of the race- Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct 181a relations problem in education without close consultation with the minority group itself in the community? A. Well, I— I wouldn’t think that it would be—be possible to have a meeting of minds on an issue of this sort if—if the persons involved most directly aren’t—aren’t consulted and involved in the consultationskip. Q. Is it your opinion, carrying that further, that the opinions and ideas and desires of the minority group should be considered if one is to reach a peaceful solution of a race-relations problem? A. I think so as long as they represent responsible leadership groups in the community. Q. You have lived here in the community before and during the desegregation problem in the City Schools here? [115] A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you know whether or not the Nashville Board of Education has made any attempt to mobilize those com munity resources? A. My knowledge is very sketchy there. I couldn’t say that I—that I did. I— I know that the—from his own report that the school superintendent has spoken to a lot of groups, parent—parent groups at— at local schools. Now, I had— My impression was that this was primarily in the white schools and not among the Negro parent-teacher groups. Q. Dr. Long, do you know whether or not certain agencies in the community itself have voluntarily come forward and sponsored community workshops to try to attack the prob lem of community sentiment at any period of time since the Supreme Court decision? A. Yes. The Nashville Com munity Relations Conference has held two community-wide workshops for— I think for the purpose of helping to build some constructive opinion in this community. Q. When and where were those held, sir? A. I— The first workshop was held at the Jewish Community Center, Herman II. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct 182a I believe two years ago or three years ago now. I am not quite certain. In the following year a second workshop was held at the Belmont Methodist Church. [116] Q. Do you know how many participating groups there were in the first workshop? A. I don’t know the actual number of groups that were involved. I would say that in attendance at the general session there were some six hundred people present that evening. Q. This was at the Jewish Community Center? A. Jewish Community Center. And about the same number the following year at the meeting at the Belmont Methodist Church. That’s a slightly larger group. Q. Did you attend those workshops? A. I participated in the workshops. Q. Did any member of the Board of Education appear or speak or take part in either of those workshops ? A. I don’t remember, and I couldn’t say that there was or was not. Q. At the Belmont Methodist Church Workshop, were any experts other than—any race experts in the school— desegregation situation called in from outside the state? A. Yes. There were representatives from both the Balti more Public Schools and the St. Louis Public Schools who were present at these workshops mainly giving and evaluat ing their own experience in the field of school desegregation. [117] Q. Were these workshops conducted by Negroes al together or were there other races? A. These were inter racial groups. Q. What would you say with regard to the respective proportions of the audiences at these workshops racially? A. I—I would guess that racially Negroes were about 20% of the group—of the total group. I t’s a very rough guess. Q. Do you know of your own knowledge whether find ings were promulgated as a result of either of these work shops ? A. I believe the second workshop— The first was Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct 183a not an attempt to reach any kind of consensus on the part of the people who participated. As a matter of fact, the second was not organized for the purpose of passing resolu tions, but there were conclusions out of the individual dis cussion groups reached by—by these discussion groups, and the— If there was any consensus as I remember it, it was a fairly common consensus, and it was later expressed to the School Board, that the School Board begin some effec tive desegregation as of September 1957 or ’56. I ’ve for gotten which year it was now. Q. I see. Can you name a few of the organizations who sponsored that second workshop ? A. I believe the—among the original sponsors was the [118] United Church Women, the Jewish— Q. Is that a white organization? A. White. Well, it’s interracial. Q. Interracial! A. Yes. The Jewish— Federation of Jewish Women, I believe was another sponsor. The Nash ville Council of Churches I believe was another sponsor. Q. Are all these interracial organizations ? A. Those are interracial. The Parent-Teachers— I ’m not sure about the Parent-Teacher Association, but I believe the Negro ad junct of the Parent-Teacher Association was one of the spon sors of it. I think you can get better—you can get better evi dence than I can give you on that because I don’t quite re member the details. Q. It was a large number of organizations ? A. Quite a large number. I believe the second workshop had some 26 organizations as sponsors. Q. In your opinion, the community forces which were mobilized and waiting to be used in those two workshops, have they been utilized by the Board of Education in the City of Nashville in trying to approach a solution to this Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Direct 184a problem! A. I don’t know that—that they have. I can’t say that they have. [119] Q. Does the plan which the Board is proposing here today— Does that seem to indicate that those re sources have been utilized! A. Would the plan itself in dicate that these sources-— Q. (Interrupting) Well, let me re-phrase that. Would the evidence which the Board has offered here today seem to indicate that those resources have been utilized! You have heard the evidence. A. I— I don’t— I don’t believe that— that the plan reflects (It may. This is merely an opinion.)— reflects an assessment of the—of the attitudes and opinions of this segment of the community that have been involved in these workshops. Q. That is exactly what I am getting at. Thank you. Cross Examination by Mr. Hunt: Q. Dr. Long, it was not clear to me, your exact relation ship to Fisk University. Are you part of Fisk! Are you employed by Fisk as a professor or otherwise! What is your relationship to Fisk! A. I am Director of the Race Rela tions Department of the Board of Home Missions (This is a long one), the Congregational Christian Churches, which has offices at Fisk University. Fisk is church-related. It is Congregationally [120] related so that explains it. Q. Your relationship is that you have offices there, but you are not part of the university as such. A. Not as an operating unit of the university. Q. You are reasonably familiar with the university! A. Yes. I—I should say that at one stage of our relationship, we were actually a unit of the university when Dr. Johnson was both director of the Social Science Department and of our race-relations program. Herman II. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross 185a Q. Is Fisk University a segregated school? A. No, sir. It is not. Q. What is the proportion then of white and Negro students in Fisk if it is not segregated! A. It is— If you mean by segregated, by policy, it is not segregated by policy. Q. It is not segregated by policy. It is segregated in fact in practice ? A. It is not segregated in practice. It accepts white students. Q. How many white students are there now! A. I think there must be about three or four there now. I ’m not sure exactly. Q. What is the enrollment of the university, the total enrollment approximately! [121] A. I think around 750 is the— Q. And you think there are three or four white students ? A. Three or four white students. Q. Now, I gathered the impression that you were testi fying as an expert in race relations and not as an expert in education. Am I correct? A. Ah, I—I would think— You embarrass me to try to—try to declare myself as an expert in one or the other field. Q. Well, I think that is:— A. (Interrupting) I think I could qualify as an expert in either field because of the nature of my training and experience. Q. Then you were testifying in both. Then, as an expert in education, are you familiar with a book quite recently published by the Macmillan Company by Dr, Henry H. Hill of Nashville, Changing Options in American Educationf A. No, sir; I am not. Q. It is quite new. I wondered. Now, I wanted to see to what extent as an educator your views and his disagree, and I wanted to ask you a few questions about opinions ex Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross 186a pressed by Dr. Hill and see wherein you may agree or dis agree with him. A. I wish you hadn’t mentioned the name of the man. You [122] put me in the position of differing with a man whose—ah, whom—whose reputation I know and whom I know in the community. Q. Now, I am reading from this book, and I would hand you another copy but this is the only one I have. I assure you I will try to read accurately. Page 42: (Eeading) “There are admitted difficulties in de segregation which are clearly seen by the moderates. Negroes in the South as a group rank below the whites in health, in general educational achievement, and in other ways.” Now, would you agree or disagree with that statement of opinion? A. I ’ll almost have to have you read that again. You say Negroes in general? Q. Negroes in the South as a group rank below the whites in health, in general educational achievement, and in other ways. A. I couldn’t— I couldn’t accept that. What he means by health, I don’t know. And there are all kinds of statistics which you can quote in the field of health where you may have Negroes not as much at a disadvantage as compared with whites, and in other areas of—of the health field where they are obviously below whites in terms of incidence of certain kinds of illnesses or sicknesses. That’s the kind [123] of general statement that I— I— I would have to qualify before I could agree with it. Q. You don’t agree with it unqualifiedly. All right. A. I would certainly agree that there are certain educational differentials as between Negroes and whites as a group. There may not be differentials in some—in some school systems. I don’t know what—about the Nashville School System here. Herman II. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross 187a Q. Here is another statement on page 46. I want to ask your opinion as to this: (Reading) “After an initial apparent acceptance of the Supreme Court’s decision, or at least a period dur ing which the voices of the moderates were heard, there has come a hardening reaction against this decision in many of the southern states where new organiza tions and voices have been raised in opposition and where the voices of politicians and demagogues have been in crescendo.” Now, the particular part I wanted to query you about: Do you agree that there has come a hardening reaction against the decision in the Brown case in the South! A. As qualified by Mr. Hill, I would have to agree; and if you see the context there, he says, “the hardening of reaction as expressed in the voice of—political voices of the South.” [124] Q. (Reading) “There has come a hardening reaction against this decision in many of the southern states where new organizations and voices have been raised in opposition.” A. Right. Q. (Reading) “And where the voices of politicians and demagogues have been in crescendo.” A. Right. I assume that he is referring to the rise of the citizens—the White Citizens Council, the Federation for Constitutional Government, the Ku Klux Klan, and similar organizations which have organized deliberately to circum vent the Supreme Court’s decision. I assume on the other Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross 188a hand when he refers to politicians, he refers to the kind of legislation which has come out of the legislatures of the South aimed at curtailing the expressions of the NAACP and other groups which are supporting the Supreme Court’s decision. Of all of the repressive legislation, I think the Southern Education News reported some 84 pieces which had been enacted. Now, this is what I call political reaction, and with that I would agree with Mr. Hill. Q. Now, would you agree with this? (Heading) “It is necessary, however, to be realistic. The majority of whites in the South want to attend school with whites only. The Negroes want the option of attending white schools. There is no pat solution to [125] this impasse.” A. Would I agree with it? Q. Yes. A. I don’t know what the majority of white people want. I frankly don’t know. I would be hesitant to say what the majority of Negroes want or feel. I think that we are dealing with an area of experience that is entirely new to all of us. This is the area of the great unknown. I think we have the resources to meet the challenge of this kind of experience. Q. Now, another statement on page 51: (Reading) “ . . . Just as it was impossible to enforce the prohibition laws of the land in areas where prohibi tion was contrary to the mores of the people, just so it will be relatively impossible to enforce, to any great degree, mixing of the races in areas where the pat tern of living and thought is equally opposed to de segregation.” A. Do I agree with the statement? Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross 189a Q. Do you agree with that? A. I don’t agree with the statement. Q. You can give your reasons, of course. A. Well, ex perience has proved to the contrary. You have now out of the nine states—-of the 17 states that were originally operat ing on the basis of segregated schools, [126] you have nine of those states which have begun desegregation. You have over 300,000 or 350,000 Negro children in integrated schools within three years’ time. You have a complete—almost com plete desegregation of the school systems of West Virginia. All of these instances were where people had the same at titude toward desegregation that I presume we have in Nashville to a more or less degree. Q. Now, speaking as an educator do you agree with this statement on page 57: (Reading) “Regardless of religion or color or gen eral conditions, children do learn somewhat better when the group is relatively homogeneous.” A. That depends on whether you mean homogeneous with reference to what. You are using a rather big term. People can be homogeneous with reference to intelligence. They can be homogeneous with reference to a number of things. Q. You agree with the statement, as I understand, if you define homogeneous? I mean do I correctly state your posi tion? I am not seeking to misrepresent it. A. No, I—I wouldn’t think you would. I—I don’t know frankly. I—I would think that children of relatively equal ability would achieve in terms of the rudiments of learning, would achieve better because they are challenged more by each other; but obviously this is not a racial [127] factor, so I—I don’t necessarily see its pertinence. Q. I think that statement must be connected with Dr. Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross 190a Hill’s earlier statement that in the South the Negroes as a group rank below the whites in general educational achieve ment. Now, he has laid the premise that he thinks they are not homogeneous, and I believe you didn’t express an opin ion on that. Am I right? A. Well, you can’t talk about a difference in educational achievement and homogeneity as being the same thing. As a— As a group you may find that as a— If you take the Negro population as a whole, you may find a difference of about two-grade level in achieve ment as compared with whites, but if you would take a segment of fourth graders, of fifth graders, or sixth graders of Negro students, you may find some of those sixth graders achieving at the eight or ninth grade level or even higher; and you would find the same differential within the white— a group of white students at the same age level. Now, if you put those two—two groups of students to gether, those that would be homogeneous as to achieve ment would be both Negroes and whites. It wouldn’t be only the Negroes or only the white students. Q. Now, I want to read another statement from Hr. Hill, and see if you agree with this. I am going to read two [128] sentences and let you comment on the two. A. Hr. Hill did not say homogeneous as to race, did he, in that statement ? Q. He said homogeneous. He did not say as to race. I think the language carries the clear implication that he was talking of race because the section is on segregation. I think that is what he meant, but he said homogeneous. Now, here are the two sentences, and I would like your comment, whether you agree or disagree and then your reasons: (Reading) “ . . . The point is that schools cannot be satisfactory learning places when they are bitter and Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross 191a disturbed over some of the contentions of their elders. Presumably the Supreme Court had such a situation in mind when they fashioned the phrase, ‘with all deliber ate speed.’” (pp. 58-59) Do you agree or disagree with that? A. Any statement which has the word “presumably” in it doesn’t—doesn’t—is —is ambiguous as to—uncertain as to its own meaning so I couldn’t very well say whether—what the Supreme Court had in mind. Q. Well, you don’t presume the Supreme Court— A. (Interrupting) And I don’t presume to say that he has said what the Supreme Court had in mind, that I even agree with it. I couldn’t agree with it. [129] Q. I will read the sentence again. I think it is clear what he said. And then we are asking your opinion. The sentence is : (Reading) “Presumably the Supreme Court had such a situation in mind when they fashioned the phrase, ‘with all deliberate speed.’ ” A. I can’t—I can’t—I can’t enter judgment on saying what the Supreme Court had in mind in using the term, “delib erate speed.” What I would call deliberate speed may be quite different from what Mr. Hill— Q. (Interrupting) Now, do you agree or disagree with this which is near the end of his conclusion: (Reading) “ . . . We must go along with some kind of waiting period which may avoid the multiplication of mob scenes and continued bitterness and provide a pro gressive gradualism with some chance of good will and acceptance.” Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross A. Do I agree with that? 192a Q. Yes. A. That’s his judgment. My judgment is quite different. I think it’s tragic in terms of creating expecta tions in the public as to what the obligations of the public are. If you create the attitude that the jjrocess of school desegregation has to wait upon some kind of acceptance by the public at large, whatever that acceptance is, when is consensus [130] arrived at? Nobody knows when consensus is arrived at, and this plan which I understand that you are proposing doesn’t even propose to move one grade each year because it’s not moving one grade this year because you really— As I understand the plan, you are even back ing up now. Q. How do you understand the plan? A. I understand that the plan means that you are proceeding—you integrate the second grade as of this year. When your first graders move into that grade level, you will accept some students at the second-grade level; but you are already desegregat ing the—the second grade by permitting these students to move into the second grade. Q. How does the plan move backward under your state ment? A. You don’t add another year. You aren’t add ing another year this year. If you had added even the third grade, you would have moved a step forward. In other words, you are consolidating where you are now. Q. Are you familiar with the publication, Southern School News ? A. Yes, s ir; I receive it every month. Q. Ho you regard it as objective and impartial in its attempts to solve— A. (Interrupting) I think it attempts to be objective. I ’m not sure that it’s always impartial be cause it’s reported by newspaper reporters who are on staffs of local [131] newspapers, and I ’m sure their opinions are influenced by their—the context in which they work and report to some degree. Herman II. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross 193a Q. Are you acquainted with Congressman Adam Clayton Powell? A. Only through reputation. I don’t know him personally at all. Q. You know that he is a Negro Congressman from New York? A. Yes, sir. Q. I would like to read you one of his statements quoted in the March 1958 issue, and ask you to agree or disagree with i t : (Reading) “Adam Clayton Powell, Negro Congress man from New York, said in Houston that the entire South will be desegregated in 20 years. But he said not to expect integration ‘overnight.’ ” Now, the quotation begins: (Reading) “ ‘I don’t believe there should be immedi ate integration all over the South,’ he said. ‘But there should be a beginning, a plan in sensitive areas. Inte gration should start in kindergartens. In this manner, the problem could be eliminated in 12 years.’ ” Now, I believe you take issue with that viewpoint? [132] A. I take issue with the viewpoint as—as— It expresses a general philosophy which—with which I concur. I take issue with protracting school desegregation over a 12-year period. I don’t think that it solves—I think I gave the reasons why. I think it’s— It’s the hard way around the problem rather than the easy way around. Q. Did I understand that you were acquainted with the St. Louis situation? A. Yes. Q. Have you read the study made of desegregated St. Louis Schools by Southern School News as appears in the issue for December 1957, or do you recall reading it? Let me hand it to you. (Handing document to witness) Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross 194a You can see if you have read that report or not. A. I haven’t read this article, Mr. Attorney. I haven’t read it. Q. Now, there is a study of desegregation at the Clark School in St. Louis. It states that during the first year of desegregation this all-white school became 50-50 and that within three years it nad reached a percentage of 80% Negro and 20% white. Would you regard that fact as indicating success or failure! A. Changes in the nature of the school population! I don’t see how that proves one way or the other. You have [133] got a process of change, ap parently a change in the area in which you have displace ment. Q. This Clark School, it states, in the first year of deseg regation had 31 teachers, 30 white and one Negro, that of the 30 white teachers 24 have resigned or retired leaving six of the original teachers. Would you say that indicated success or failure! A. The resignation of white teachers! Q. The retirement of 24 out of 30 teachers in one school! A. For what cause! Q. The article simply said that they had retired or re signed. A. I don’t think that shows anything. That— Q. You don’t think it shows anything! A. It doesn’t describe— To say that 30 teachers resigned or retired doesn’t say anything about why they—why they resigned or retired. Q. This article further— A. (Interrupting) Whether they were old-age or not. You could have had an accumu lation of teachers who reached the retirement age in a school like this. Q. You don’t think it indicates anything! A. I don’t know. I— You can’t reach any conclusion [134] on the basis of that statement. Q. This article also states that every white teacher that had been replaced in that school had of necessity been re Herman H. Long—for Plaintiffs—Cross 195a placed with an inexperienced teacher because no experi enced teacher would transfer to the school. Do you think that indicates success or failure! A. Well, I wish I had read these in context and larger context. I think it’s un fortunate when you—when you get teachers, that you get an abundance of teachers who are inexperienced in any school system because you need a balance between experi ence and youth. In and of itself, it may not be a bad thing because new teachers may be better trained and they may be younger and have more ideas and more initiative than the older—older teachers. Q. You think on the whole, inexperienced teachers are better than experienced teachers? A. Oh, no; no. Q. This article also says that in the first year of de segregation 30% of the class failed. Do you think that indicates success? A. I don’t know what it shows. I don’t know what percentage of the class failed in previous years before desegregation, Further this witness saith not. Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct [135] Ds. P beston V a l ie n , called as a w itness in behalf of the plain tiffs, being first duly sworn, testified as fo llow s: Direct Examination by Mr. Williams: Q. This is Dr. Preston Valien? A. Yes, sir. Q. Dr. Valien, where do you live? A. I live in Nashville, Tennessee. Q. How long have you lived here? A. Twenty years. Q. What is your occupation? A. I am a professor at Fisk University. Q. How long have you taught there? A. Twenty years. Q. What is your position there? A. I am Professor of 196a Sociology and Chairman of the Department of Social Sci ences. I also serve as consultant on educational matters, and I am Director of the Phelps-Stokes Workshop which works with high-school teachers in 10 states of the South. Q. When you say the Phelps-Stokes Workshop works with high-school teachers, what do you mean? A. I t’s a workshop which we have been conducting for the [136] last two summers drawing teachers from high schools in 10 states of the South. I ’m director of that workshop. Q. Is this workshop designed to improve the— A. (In terrupting) Instruction in secondary schools. Q. Instruction in secondary schools. Mr. Hunt: Will the witness speak louder please? By Mr. Williams: Q. Will you speak up so these gentlemen can hear you please? They may want to cross-examine you about some of these things. I believe you testified previously in this case, did you not, Dr. Valien? A. I did. Q. In January of 1957 ? A. Yes, I did. Q. Dr. Valien, have you read the plan which the Nash ville Board of Education has proposed? A. I read it as it was published in the newspaper. Q. The 12-year plan? A. Yes. Q. Is that in your opinion a good plan? A. In my opin ion it is not a good plan. Q. Why? A. We have engaged in—at Fisk University in studies [137] of desegregated situations in many places: St. Louis, Missouri. We have— My wife and I have served as consultants at University of Kentucky, with teachers in Louisville and Lexington. We have studied the Clinton situation on which we have published a pamphlet upon it. Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct 197a We are at the present time engaged in a study of the—of the Little Rock situation. In— In— In all of the situations that we have studied personally as well as the literature which we have re viewed in connection with our studies, we have always found — It has been almost universally true that—that part-time or partial desegregation on a non-functional basis has usually resulted in greater confusion and greater resistance than desegregation on a functional unit basis. That has been true of the situations as studied in very great detail by my wife in St. Louis as my assistant, by our studies together in—in—in Clinton, and of course by our present studies going on now in Little Rock, and also of course our studies on Cairo, Illinois. This plan, for example, is not sound educationally. I am very, very concerned—I am equally concerned as an edu cator myself with the welfare of the children involved in this plan. The plan as set up, for example, means that a whole [138] generation of public-school Negro students, for ex ample, beginning with those who are at present this year in the second grade, would be denied the right to have their constitutional rights determined under this particular plan. Any student who is this year in the second grade would never have the right to go to a school nearer—nearer— nearer his home, for example. This plan also—also makes no provision at all for the— for the elimination of segregation and discriminatory prac tices in the special classes, sight-saving classes, for ex ample, and other types of classes. By the Court: Q. What! A. Sight-saving classes and home-bound-chil d ren classes. Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct 198a This plan also makes no provision at all for any incor poration of students into the vocational high-school pro gram which is—which is so patently unequal that-—that it has not been even denied by the school board itself. By Mr. Williams: Q. In other words, do you mean by that that in the Nash ville School System the vocational high-school segment is a separate phase of the educational set-up? A. That’s right. And it’s—and it’s— And it is decidedly unequal in its present distribution in courses [139] offered Negro students and courses offered white students which means that—that for 12 years almost or at least for the next eight years there would be no possibility under this plan for the students to get the type of training which is offered a Hume-Fogg if they are Negro students. Q. Now, you have mentioned the normal functioning unit. I believe you gave testimony about that at the previous hearing. Do you mean by that a unit of grades such as the first six grades, the junior-high grades, and the senior-high grades? A. No. I meant to say a—a—a—a usual function ing unit of—of administrative—ah, within the administra tive context. We have talked, for example—I have talked with—with the school superintendents in Louisville, for example, and they have indicated that—that they have found it much more easy to administer a functional unit of operation than they would have found to have adminis tered a situation where one grade— There is no one grade—• ah, PTA, there is no one— There is no first-grade PTA, no first-grade lavatory, no first-grade lunch room as was pointed out; and the situation thereby is—is one which is calculated to engender tension within the school system be cause you have not only families—ah, families divided up Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct 199a in return in the sense that their children cannot go to the school—the same [140] school to which they both—which they all are eligible. You have teachers divided up because some of them are opposed to—to teaching desegregated classes and some are not. You have children that are di vided up because some are in classes which are desegregated and others are not. And so that is a plan calculated to engender confusion and tension, and it has usually done so. The total plan or the—or the partial plan has—has en gendered more confusion where it has taken place than in those situations such as pointed out, St. Louis and—and Louisville and Washington, D. C., where a functional unit was desegregated. Q. Well, now, let me ask you this: Were you here when Miss Brent testified, the Principal of Glenn School! A. Yes, I was. Q. In the courtroom. Did you hear the illustration that she gave of tension in her school to the effect that the little first-grade Negro girl was left sitting at the table and the little fourth-grade white boy came and made a scene about the situation, the grades above the first grade not being segregated—not being desegregated! Now, in your opinion, is that an illustration of just what you— A. (Interrupt ing) That might well be— Q. (Continuing) —mention there? [141] A. I don’t know that particular incident, but that—that might well be. We— We have found, for example, that when a large number of people are involved and intimately concerned with a particular social-change process, that the—that the transition is likely to be smoother than when it focuses on a smaller number and leaves a large crowd who acts as spectator and not—not concerned in the situation. Q. Dr. Valien, specifically, based on your experience in Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct 200a these surveys that you have made, can you make a state ment with regard to whether or not difficulties insofar as community resistance may be concerned are likely to de crease on a protracted period for desegregation? Can you make a statement in that regard? A. On the basis of studies that we have—have—have made and have exam ined as well, we—it would appear to me that wherever the authorities take a firm position and take a firm position with respect to enforcement of their policies that—that the difficulty will be minimum. We— We must expect some difficulties in any form of social change, but whenever they take a strong position and take a strong position with en forcement, the difficulty would be minimum. Now, this plan seems to me to—to—to merely extend the period of indecision and the period of—of—of tension, the period when people who do not wish to—to [142] have the school desegregated can feel that the issue is still unde cided from year to year. And, therefore, it would seem to me that it would—that it would merely spread the period of resistance over a longer period of time rather than—• rather than minimize the amount of resistance which would develop. Q. Dr. Yalien, your Sociology Department was formerly headed by the late Dr. Charles H. Johnson. Is that correct? A. Charles S. Johnson. Q. Of Fisk University. And I believe both under Dr. Johnson and under you that department is well known here at Nashville, is it not? A. Yes. Q. And its resources are available and have been avail able to the School Board? A. That’s right. Q. Has the School Board called on your agency for any assistance at all with regard to the desegregation situa tion? A. No, it has not. Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct 201a Q. The surveys which your department makes, are they unbiased surveys, unbiased objective surveys, or do you just approach it from the point of view that this is a Negro institution and we want to stress one side? A. No, We attempt, to be—We tend to be objective, [143] to present both sides. Q. Do you feel that you are as objective in the publica tions that you make out there as Peabody College or Southern School News or any of the other agencies here in Nashville? A. We feel so. We hope so. The Court: All right. Cross examine. Cross Examination hy Mr. Boult: Q. Dr. Yalien, in your testimony on the previous occa sion when you were here in the fall of 1956 (I believe it was), you testified (if I remember correctly) that you had never been a teacher, a supervisor, nor a principal, nor a superintendent in any public school system. Is that correct? A. That’s correct. Q. That your training, which you detailed at that time and which is a part of the record, once you reached the stage of major emphasis in your educational training was in the field of sociology. Is that correct? A. That’s cor rect. Q. And you have continued to emphasize that specialty (that is, the field of sociology) through your professional connection such as the one you now hold at Fisk Uni versity? A. Yes. But may I point out the field of soci ology includes education as well. There is a specialty of educational [144] sociology as well as sociology of race relations. Q. Sociology is involved in education? A. That’s right. Q. Have you ever in any of your activities, either gradu Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—-Cross 202a ate or postgraduate, taken courses in the techniques of public education, meaning the teaching of students, the techniques of it! A. I did—I did in my undergraduate training, yes. Q. Have you ever experienced or had any experience in applying any of that since you got out of school, teaching the techniques of teaching? A. Yes. Q. In what way? In this workshop? A. In this work shop, yes. Q. Where do those teachers come from? A. They came from high schools in Arkansas, Alabama, Georgia, Ken tucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vir ginia, Tennessee. Q. Where? A. Tennessee. I think I have named ten or eleven, haven’t I? They are all from the South. Q. Where did they meet? A. At Fisk University. Q. Was this an interracial meeting? [145] A. No. Q. What race were they? A. They were Negroes. Q. So that the workshop you spoke of was Negro teachers in the South? A. That’s right. Q. Have you ever participated in any such teacher training workshop with white teachers? A. Yes, I have. Q. Where was that? A. This was in St. Louis. Q. Not in the South? A. And— And at University of Kentucky. Q. Not in Tennessee? A. If you call that the South. Q. Well, I won’t express an opinion on that. I believe it’s generally known as a border state. A. And I have participated in workshops at Peabody College. I have been over there for lectures and for class discussions with classes in Peabody College. Q. I believe at Fisk there is a policy of non-participation in any civic or public affair in the City of Nashville Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross 203a which is segregated. Is that not true? A. That is, ah, involuntary segregation. [146] Q. Such as observance of the laws of the State of Tennessee in previous years, if it was involuntary segrega tion, it was the policy of Fisk University that none of its faculty or people would go? A. I don’t quite understand what you mean. Q. There was a time when the laws of the State of Tennessee required segregation which was involuntary. Fisk University did not participate as a policy in anything that came under those laws? Mr. Williams: May it please Tour Honor, we object to that question on the ground that it is too broad to say that there was a time when the laws of Tennessee required segregation; and, secondly, on the ground that Mr. Valien wouldn’t be the proper individual to ask what the policy of Fisk University was. Mr. Boult: I only asked him if he knew that and if he participated. The Court: You might ask him if he knows that was a policy. By Mr. Boult: Q. Do you know that to have been a policy of Fisk? A. Well, we have— We have a policy of not participating in segregated—in segregated events, but we did not [147] have a policy of violating the law. Q. So that for these years that you have been at Fisk, and how many are they? A. Twenty years. Q. How many? A. Twenty. Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross 204a Q. These years that you have been at Fisk, that has been a policy which you have observed? A. Yes, as long as I didn’t break— I didn’t break the law in observing it. Q. And you are also, I believe, a member of the Na tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People? A. I am. Yes, I am. Q, Were you in Nashville in the latter part of August and the early part of September 1957? A. Yes, I was. Q. Where were you on those occasions where there was disturbance and violence in the Nashville Public Schools or at certain Nashville Public Schools? A. I think X should qualify. I was in Nashville the first part of September, but I was not here during August. I was— I was out of Nashville during the month of August. Q. You were in Nashville during the September violence then? [148] A. Yes. Q. Did you leave the campus of Fisk University during that time? A. Well, I live off the campus. Q. Well, did you visit the schools involved at that time? A. No, I did not. Q. Did you— A. (Interrupting) Not during the time of the violence. Q. That’s what I mean, during the days or the week or 10 days in which the violence was apparent in the city. You did not visit any of the scenes of the violence? A. No. Q. Do I understand that it is your recommendation at this time that if the size of the problem be multiplied by 12 all at one time, then there would be less violence and less confusion and less opportunity for disturbance? A. Well, may X answer that by making another statement; that is, that there was only one student at Hattie Cotton School, one Negro student, and the school was bombed. Could you get a problem any smaller than that? Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross 205a Q. You can’t get it any smaller than that, but doesn’t that indicate the size of the problem? A. I think that indicates the fact that this—that [149] this school was— became a focus for—for tension which probably would not have been true in the case if there had been more students from Negro groups there and all students had been in volved, all parents. Q. Your theory is then that if all the grades at Hattie Cotton School had received some Negro students that there would have been less disturbance? A. That—that would be my—my feeling. Q. And your feeling is that that would have been true over all of the Nashville Public School System? A. That would be my—my feeling. Q. Then to a sociologist, multiplying the size of the prob lem diminishes the size of the results which may come from it? A. Multiplying the number of people who are involved in it increases the concern of those people and the hope that they will—and—and the activities on their part to make it work smoothly. Q. And it also involves a proportionate number of per sons with an opposite point of view, does it not, in the other grades of the school? A. Not necessarily. And the amount of violence is not necessarily related and has never been related to the number of Negro students involved in a particular school. That [150] has—seems to have been a factor which has not been related at all. If it has been re lated, it’s been related in a negative way. We have had more violence where we have had the smaller number of children—Negro children integrated into the schools. Q. But sociologically speaking, you would recommend that the entire system be desegregated at one time. A. Oh, you mean at one time? Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross 206a Q. Yes, sir. A. At one time. Well, it would depend upon the—the ability of the administrative system. My— My sociological training would certainly lead me to feel that— that the system should be—should be functionally—should be desegregated as functional units. Q. That would be your sociological training— It would be the indication from your sociological training! A. That’s right. Q. Is that the way I understand you! A. That’s right. Q. But you do concede that the operational and super visory aspects related to that problem do have a signifi cance! A. Well, they—they have some bearing, yes. Q. And also the ability of the forces of law and order to control potential disturbances, they do have a significance, [151] do they not? A. They do indeed. Q. They cannot be taken out of the equation? A. They—• They cannot indeed. Q. Will you concede then that sociological approach is not the only factor which must be considered in the solu tion of a human problem such as here presented? A. All these facts which you have been presenting are sociological problems. Q. And you think then that it ought to be determined on a sociological basis? A. All these problems— All these facts you have been mentioning are sociological, Q. You think the public school system should be admin istered on a sociological basis by sociologists? A. Oh, no; no. I wouldn’t— I’m not— I ’m not saying that. Q. Well, you are testifying as I understand it as an ex pert in public education. A. Well, the public school sys tem shouldn’t be administered by—by a chemist, but they use chemists. Q. And they also use people as principals, supervisors, Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross 207a and superintendents who are trained in public education, do they not? [152] A. Yes, they do. Q. And you have never had any of that? A. Well, I have had training, yes. Q. You have had some training? A. Yes, Q. In your undergraduate days you say in the techniques of teacher instruction? A. Yes. Q. So that your recommendation is to enlarge the size of the problem and diminish the potential results? A. Not— Not the size of the problem, the size of the people involved in it. Q. And that would not enlarge the size of the problem? A. It would not. By the Court: Q. I understand you would advocate that it be desegre gated on a functional unit basis— A. (Interrupting) That would be my— Q. (Continuing) •—rather than desegregated in its en tirety at one time? A. Well, it would seem to me that— that over a short period of time, Your Honor, that it could be desegregated on the basis of elementary schools one period, high schools in another period, and have the junior high school fitting in [153] there somewhere. But at the present—present basis of the plan, the-—the vocational— For example, the vocational training of Negro children would be postponed for at least another eight, nine, or 12 years. Q. What would an administrative unit include? A. It would include the elementary schools. Q. What grades are in that? A. That’s from one to six, sir. These—these— Q. What is the next unit after that? A. I think you Dr. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross 208a would— You will probably want to get this from the Super intendent, but these—these vary. Q. I just wanted to get clear what your testimony is. You are advocating the desegregation of one of these units at a time? A. That’s right. The Court: That is all I wanted to ask. Mr. Williams: Come down. Further this witness saith not. Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct Mrs. P reston Valien , called as a witness in behalf of the plaintiffs, being first duly sworn, testified as follows: [154] Direct Examination by Mr. Looby. Q. Please state your name. A. I am Mrs. Preston Valien. Q. Mrs. Valien, do you live in Nashville? A. Yes. Q. How long have you lived here? A. Twenty years. Q. What is your business or profession? A. I am a sociologist by training and profession. I am associate pro fessor of sociology at Fisk on leave this year doing de segregation research. Q. Just state for the benefit of the record what your educational background is. A. Sociology both at the under graduate and graduate level in Texas and University of Wisconsin at graduate level. Q. What degrees do you hold? A. A.B. and M. Q. You have done graduate work? A. At University— Q. Beyond the A.M.? A. Oh, yes; at the University of Wisconsin. Q. Have you in your work as a sociologist been called upon to make any investigation with reference to desegre 209a gation [155] in the public schools? A. Yes. I participated in the—in practically most of the desegregation research 'that has been done now. I participated in the Ashmore study, the Negro in the Schools, Schools in Transition. I did the St. Louis Story which is a study of desegregation. I participated in doing the research in Clinton, in Cairo, Illinois. I have been working as a consultant to the South ern Regional Council doing research in Kentucky, and presently engaged out in Dallas, Texas, and in Kentucky as a social science consultant for Southern Regional Coun cil. Q. Have you written any article or book concerning this desegregation question? A. Yes. I ’ve published in both Negro and the Schools and published in Schools in Transi tion. I ’m the author of the S i Louis Story and co-author of the Clinton study, and I have done numeral—numerous articles in the field. Q. If my memory serves me right, I believe a copy of your book on the St. Louis Story was filed as part of this record in the last trial. A. Yes. Q. And you are the same person who authored that book? A. TJh huh. Q. Talk so she can hear you. [156] A. Yes. Q. Have you read the plan submitted by the Board of Education which is under consideration today? A. I read the newspaper account of it. Q. It is conceded by the defendants that that is a sub stantial report of the plan and it may be so considered. What is your opinion relative to that plan? A. Well, on the basis of my research, I consider the plan a—an in adequate plan and not at all feasible educationally or so ciologically. Q. What is defective in that plan if anything? A. Well, Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct 210a I think that all of the research up to this point does suggest that a plan where you desegregate year by year, you simply add to tension. You simply vie tension be cause only one element that is involved in a plan is so concerned, and the longer the plan’s drawn out, the less the difficulty. I believe we do have sufficient research now in com munities to suggest that where desegregation has been done completely and rapidly, the amount of tension is minimized. Q. Now, you have lived in Nashville, you say, for how long! A. Twenty years. Q. And with your training and your experience both in [157] the work and living in Nashville, what would you consider to be a desirable plan for the City of Nashville 1 A. Well, a—a desirable plan I think for the City of Nash ville, I—In viewing Nashville over against the numerous other communities in which I have visited, I think Nash ville is more than ready for desegregation than many of the other communities that have desegregated success fully. As I view Louisville or Baltimore or any of the other communities, I think our community is ready, and I think it could desegregate as rapidly as Louisville did, and I think it could if it had a school board that said forthrightly that this is what we are going to do because I think we do have citizens who are awfully anxious to get this behind them. I think Nashville could desegregate its entire school system just as adequately, just as completely, and without any more friction than Louisville, Kentucky, did; and it did it all at one time. I think it could do it as easily as St. Louis because St. Louis is admitted sociologically— has many of the kinds of things which we in another area of the South suggest are peculiarly very southern. St. Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct 211a Louis desegregated schools on the unit plan. They did elementary schools, then the high schools, but I think Nash ville could if it wanted to, and I think there are enough citizens who [158] really want to. I think, beginning in September on the basis of its cli mate, it could desegregate its entire school system if it so chose to do so. Q. Is that opinion based upon your training, your ex perience, and your observation? A. I t’s— It is based upon all of them, yes. Q. And are— A. (Interrupting) I might say this: I— I think that the longer Nashville waits, the less likely it’s going to be able to do its job as efficiently and as thoroughly and without less tension than it would have earlier because I think increasingly the longer we wait, the more difficulty and the more tension we vie. And that’s in the nature of social change. That always happens. Q. And what cities that had desegregation problems did you say you have visited and studied? A. Well, St. Louis is one; and the desegregation was done without trauma as you know, and although the experience was a happy one, it had all the dissident groups that we claim we have here. There was the—all of the anti-groups. There were all the statements which we have heard, that blood will flow in the streets. All of the things that you have always heard were said before St. Louis [159] desegregated schools. None of the things happened. There— There were in stances as you know, people who were unhappy in Louis ville. As you know, Louisville had a very happy experience. So there is very little correlation between what people say they will do and what they really will do, once you have people who will unequivocally say, “This is what we do.” Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct 212a Q. Now, you say you visited Louisville and made a study there? A. Yes. I— I was up in Louisville participating in a workshop last summer with my husband. I have been called in as a consultant about a month ago, and on this Friday I am going back to Louisville in a conference deal ing entirely with desegregation. At this point, what Louisville is doing is, they are say ing that since admittedly college teachers who are now training will enter into a desegregated experience, we now want to begin teaching them the kinds of things they ought to know. I want to introduce another dimension, though, that I think hasn’t been said. I think we have done an awful lot of discussion with reference to what this does for Negroes. As a social scientist, I am concerned about children. I ’m concerned about what this does for all people. And in every [160] community where I have been, the one thing that I want to report to this audience is the number of happy white mothers and white children who say that for once “I can enter as a citizen and feel whole and complete. No longer do I feel guilty.” And one of the things that we have to face, and that is that we are now moving into a world in winch there is no place really for the perpetuation of the kind of society which we have. The largest percentage of our people over this world are now colored people. It is unfair to children to give them a false conception of the world in which we now live. Desegregation will help not only Negro children, but as a social scientist I cannot fail to pass on to you the im portance of desegregation not only for Negro children but for the wholesome and healthy development of white children, and this is what my research each day is pointing- out. Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct 213a White children also want to be heard, and in their be half I want to say that they, too, are experiencing with reference to homogeneity, we are finding— For example, in St. Louis, teachers said that white children who had a tendency to be a little slow and to sort of feel in a—in a setting in which they were all there together that they were rather superior, once Negro children came in and whom they [161] had always felt were inferior, once they saw Negro children have a little bit of educational train ing, too, that that made them work a little bit harder. So, really, desegregation is even helping the white child very often in sort of pacing himself a little bit more rapidly in the area of competition. Q. Did you visit Washington, D. C.! A. Yes, I have. Q. What is your opinion as to desegregation in Wash ington, D. C.f A. Well, I—- I think— I think the real story of Washington is told very well by Mr. Hanson, the superintendent, in The Miracle of Adjustment, and I think unfortunately Washington has gotten some very bad publicity, but the Washington School System is -working really very, very well. There are problems to be sure, but I think no person in his right mind would expect not to have problems in an area in which there had been this long type of lag in our educational system. Q. What other city have you visited? A. Well, I ’ve— I’ve visited practically all the cities—cities in which there has been desegregation. Another thing with reference to— There are many schools, you know, now that have been heretofore Negro schools that white students have entered. I suppose most [162] of you will be interested in knowing— This is college level, but West Virginia which for years had been an all-Negro school, once the doors were opened, they now Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct 214a have many more white students at West Virginia College than they have Negro students who now say, “We are very pleased we can get an education without restriction.” There are also even in Louisville white children going to what heretofore has been all-Negro children, Negro schools, one or two being taught by Negro teachers. I visited all the areas. Q. Now, the defendants introduced a book just off the press by Doctor— What’s his name ? A. Hill. Q. Dr. Hill. Have you read that book? A. I have not. No. Q. Have you read The Paths to Desegregation by Charles M. Black? A. Paths what? Q. Paths to Desegregation. A. Oh, I glanced at it. Q. Glanced at it. You haven’t read it? A. No. Mr. Looby: Cross examine. Just a minute. Q. By the way, you say you have been to these different [163] cities. Have you been invited by those cities? A. In every instance I have been invited. I have made ab solutely no— Q. Even Baltimore? A. I ’m sorry? Q. Baltimore, Maryland? A. Was I— Was I invited into— Q. Yes. A. No. No, no; no, no; no, no. I meant where— Where I went as a consultant, I ’ve gone in by agency to do research. I think I didn’t make clear I am a consultant for the Southern Regional Council, and in some instances— In all instances, I do research. But in— in—in Kentucky and all the other areas, I have been in vited in. Q. Now, the Nashville Board of Education that has been Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Direct 215a confronted with this problem for the last two or three years, have they ever called you in! A. No. Q. Never have! A. No. Q. Have you attended any workshop here sponsored by the Board of Education! A. Not by the Board of Educa tion. I did participate in the two earlier mentioned by Hr. Long and was on the Steering [164] Committee of the first one. Q. But they were sponsored by interested private people! A. Yes. Q. But the Board of Education has not sponsored any thing of that nature! A. Well, not to my knowledge. I can’t say that they haven’t, but not to my knowledge. Mr. Looby: Cross examine. Cross Examination by Mr. Hunt: Q. Did I understand you, Mrs. Yalien, to say that where you have made these studies you were invited by the public officers of the particular city or by a private agency! A. Agencies. Q. Agencies! A. That’s right, uh huh. Q. You were not there at the invitation, for example, of the School Board! A. No. Q, Did I understand you correctly when I say that you think the problem of desegregation can be handled the same in one city as in another city! A. I think the prin ciples— Yes, I— I— I— I do very much. [165] Q. In other words, it can be handled in a par ticular manner without reference to local conditions! Local conditions do not enter into the problem! Is that your understanding of the matter! A. No. I wouldn’t say that completely. I think local conditions have some place. I Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs-—Cross 216a think there are certain principles, however, that will hold one good in every community, and I think communities are not sufficiently unalike because they have all people in them, that the principles could not be the same in all communities. Q. You think the problem of handling desegregation in St. Louis is precisely the same as handling it in Birming ham, Atlanta, or Columbia, South Carolina? A. The prob lem of handling it? Q. Yes. And the solution to the problem. Let’s put it— A. (Interrupting) Yes, I would say. Q. Let’s put it that the solution of the problem is the same? A. Yes, I would say that the basic principles are the same. May I suggest what they are? The basic prin ciples-— Q. No. That is not in my question. A. (Continuing) -—are a well-defined plan. Q. If your counsel wants to go into it. I asked you— Mr. Williams: Your Honor, pardon me. I [166] think she is entitled to explain her answer. The Court: If it is an explanation of her answer, yes. Mr. Hunt: That’s right, but I didn’t think so. I thought my question was whether she thought the solution to the problem of segregation was the same in St. Louis as in Nashville, Atlanta, Columbia, South Carolina, or any other city without reference to local conditions. The Witness: On the basis of the principle, I .would say unequivocally yes. Mr. Looby: If Your Honor please— The Court: Ho you want to make any explana tion of that answer? Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross 217a The Witness: I say Number One. The Court: She is entitled to make an explanation. The “Witness: Number One, where you have a well-defined— The Court: Do you want to say anything? Mr. Looby: No, sir. Your Honor has ruled. By the Court: Q. All right. Go ahead. A. Number one, where you have a well-defined plan [167] irrespective of that plan; number two, where you have a school board that acts with authority without equivocation and says, “This is the plan. This is what we are going to follow,” a school board that does not in the face of opposition throw in the towel and say, “This is what we want,” but a school board that is— that is committed to the principle of desegregation, whether it is in Mississippi, when people of authority act with authority, it matters very little. People respect authority. People expect—respect people who, once a position is taken, that—that position is—is upheld. So in principle, there is—there—there is very little difference whether—no mat ter where it is. By Mr. Hunt'. Q. Then, from your viewpoint evidence as to local con ditions is irrelevant? Is that correct? A. I don’t think they are totally irrelevant. I do think in the desegregation picture, however, they have been played all out of propor tion to their relevance, I would say. Q. Do you have an opinion as to what the majority of the white people in Nashville want? A. My own opinion— Q. (Interrupting) In reference to segregation? A. I think the majority of white people in Nashville are like Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross 218a the majority in any place. People generally vocalize [168] and want to perpetuate the status quo. I think Nashville has no less people in its community who are honest, law- abiding people who want to see right and justice done than—than in any other community, and I— I would sug gest that it has its quota of law-abiding people. Q. In your opinion, do the majority of white people in Nashville prefer that their children go to a segregated school or a desegregated school? A. I haven’t the slightest notion. I do know this, though—, Q. (Interrupting) You have no opinion? A. I do know this, that what people have thought had very little to do with how people act. Q. You have answered me that you have no opinion. I believe that answers all of that question that could come. Mr. Hunt: Does it not, Your Honor? The Court: Possibly so. Yes. By Mr. Hunt: Q. You testified, I believe, on the first hearing of this case. Am I right? A. Yes. Q. You testified in opposition to the transfer plan and stated as your opinion, I believe (and you can correct me if I am wrong), that you did not think there should be transfers [169] because you thought the races should be compelled to go to school together. Am I correctly stating what you testified? A. I ’m awfully— I’m awfully glad you brought that up because I think those are words put in my mouth. Q. Please answer my question, and then give your ex planation. A. No. I was interpreted as saying it. I didn’t say it. Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross 219a Q. You did not say it! A. I did not. I was interpreted as saying it. Q. Do you think there should be a voluntary transfer plan in any plan adopted by Nashville? A. I would like to see how it fitted into the entire plan. I wouldn’t like to commit myself on a total voluntary plan unless I saw it. Q. There is a voluntary transfer plan in this plan. A. You say is there one? Q. There is one in the plan that has been presented to the Court. Do you or not favor that transfer plan? A. I— I— I— I— I don’t favor the plan at all, so I don’t favor any feature of it. Q. Did you testify heretofore that you wanted that trans fer feature eliminated from the plan? A. As I remember, when I testified before, I testified in opposition to the plan, and I did not at all suggest what [170] I thought about transfer because I think the plan itself is one to which I totally object, and that would include all facets of it. Q. Well, now, let’s get into what— You think Nashville should desegregate next fall totally and completely? A. I think it could. Q. It could. Do you think it should? A. I think it should. Q. You think it should. Do you think its plan should per mit of transfers from the school zones of those where one race was in the majority, and the other race was asking for transfer. A. It has nothing at all to do with it. I cer tainly would not. I would not predicate any plan on that basis of transfer. I think it’s sociologically, psychologically, and every other way wrong. No, I would not. Q. You think that is wrong? A. Yes, I do. Q. Do you think any plan could successfully work which is forced upon a majority by a minority? A. I— I— I— Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross 220a 1 don’t like for you to suggest the word “forced” because I don’t think I want to address myself to that kind of—• Q. Well, answer my question and then give any explana tion you want. Do you think a plan can successfully work [171] which is forced upon a majority by a minority by court procedure. A. Well, I think most— Mr. Looby: If Your Honor please, I object to that question. It is not a question of forcing any thing by a majority. It is a question of following the Supreme Court’s rules. Now, as to some plan forced by the majority on a minority, that is a different proposition altogether. The Court: I think it bears on the total picture that we have to take into account in order to pass on the matter. I will allow her to give her opinion on it. By Mr. Hunt: A. I think that the citizens of Nashville should have the opportunity to abide completely and without equivocation and without any conscience the Supreme Court decision. Q. You did not answer my question. Do you prefer not to answer it? Do you think a plan can work successfully forced upon a majority by a minority? Mr. Williams: If Your Honor please, I think she has answered that question. The use of the phrase ology has no support in the evidence or in law. [172] Mr. Hunt: That is your answer, Mr. Wil liams. The witness has not answered it. If she wants to adopt that answer, I am agreeable. Mr. Williams: If Your Honor please, I respect fully submit that it is improper for counsel to ask Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross 221a the witness whether a plan which would be forced on the majority by the minority would be proper when as a matter of fact this question constitutes an interpretation by counsel of this Supreme Court decision. The Court: That may be true. This is cross examination though, and I think he is entitled to test her opinions about various phases of the prob lem that we have. I think that is a proper question. The Witness: May I suggest that if—if abiding by the Supreme Court decision in its entirety means force, then that’s my answer. I believe—- I believe unequivocally it—it—ah, it should be abided by. The Court: All right. Is that all of this witness. Mr. Looby: If Your Honor please, we have a witness we want to call-— (Counsel’s voice faded out and remainder of statement could not be heard by the reporter.) [173] The Court: You want to recall him? Mr. Looby: No, not recall. We are calling him. The Court: Who is this witness ? Mr. Looby: He is a member of the Board of Education. The Court: Oh, a member of the Board of Edu cation. All right. Is that all of the present witness we have ? Mr. Looby: Yes. Further this witness saith not. Mrs. Preston Valien—for Plaintiffs—Cross 222a Coyness L. E nnix , called as a w itness in behalf of the p lain tiffs, being first duly sworn, testified as follows: Direct Examination by Mr, Williams: Q. This is Mr. Coyness Ennix? A. That’s right. By the Court: Q. How do yon spell that? A. C-o-y-n-e-s-s. Q. How do you spell the last name? [174] A. E-n-n-i-x. Q. All right. By Mr. Williams : Q. You are a member of the Nashville School Board, are you? A. Yes, s ir; I am. Q. It was stated earlier here by counsel that you voted against this plan. Did you? A. I did. Q. Why did you vote against it? A. Well, I gave my opinion. I give it now, that I felt that it was too slow. Q. Why did you feel like it was too slow, Mr. Ennix? A. Well, the— As I interpret the Supreme Court’s deci sion, the Board should proceed with all deliberate speed, and I felt that we were proceeding with the least speed to— That was—wasn’t deliberate. That wasn’t all deliber ate speed. That was my interpretation and my thoughts about it, and I so stated. Q. Were any other plans discussed, Mr. Ennix, by the Board in your presence? A. Beg pardon? Q. Were any other plans ever discussed by the Board? A. Yes. Pardon me. Just as the— Mr. Pettit, the [175] Chairman pro tern, just as he stated, the Board met on several occasions with the Instruction Committee, and we discussed various type of plans. Q. What other plans were discussed? A. Well, now, Coyness L. Ennix—for Plaintiffs—Direct 223a one plan I know I brought up myself, one suggestion rather, that I thought would be a good plan. That was to take the elementary school from one to six. Well, from two to six now it would be, starting with next year. And after that the junior and the high school, and also sug gested perhaps the junior high school and then the high school. Take it in three stages. Q. Then you suggested either a two- or three-year stage, is that correct ? A. Yes, that was— Q. You didn’t insist on integration in September, Mr. Ennix? A. No, I didn’t insist on it. Q. You are the only Negro on the Board, aren’t you? A.. I— Yes, I happen to be the only Negro on the Board. Q. Were there plans suggested to the Board in-between the plan that you mentioned, that you suggested, and the plan which the Board now proposes? A. Was what now? Q. The plan which you mentioned was to desegregate [176] within two or three years. Is that correct? A. Yeah, that’s—- Q. Was there anybody who suggested a plan any faster than that? Did the Board ever consider desegregating at— A. (Interrupting) I don’t know. Q. Within the same year? A. I don’t know now. Q. They never considered it? A. Wait— Wait one second please. I didn’t—- I want to go back. Last year, in ’57 and ’56 I did advocate complete desegregation start ing in the fall of ’57, but after—after the fall of ’57 I was tempered down some, and so stated to the Board, and— but not tempered to one grade a year. I— We had a long discussion of it, and I so stated that I thought that if we would make it in two or three stages and not as I originally thought that we would have the whole thing. That was my discussion. Q. All right, sir. Thank you. Coyness L. Ennix—for Plaintiffs—Direct 224a Cross Examination by Mr. Boult: Q. Mr. Ennix, yon stated that you attended meetings of the Instruction Committee in your capacity as a member of the Board? A. That’s right. [177] Q. You are not a member of the Instruction Com mittee? A. No, sir. Q. And were there more than one of such meetings? A. Yes, it was. Q. And the matter was the subject of free and general discussion by all those present? A. It was that. Q. Were you given full opportunity to express your point of view in those meetings? A. I have always had and have always expressed it. Q. Even when there was some difference of opinion be tween you and some other member or members of the Board? A. We have different—differed sharply on nu merous occasions. Q. And there have been other occasions when there have been differences of opinion between you and other members? A. That’s right. Q. And you voted in the negative on this resolution when it came up for the reasons that you have stated? A. On numerous occasions I ’ve voted negative, on this and other—■ Q. On this and on other matters ? A. That’s right. Q. And you do concede, you do believe that your fellow [178] members of the Board have been acting in good faith through this matter? A. I think that— Mr. Williams: If Your Honor please, if he is asking for his opinion, then I won’t object, but otherwise. The Court: You can do the same, can you not? Coyness L. Ennix—for Plaintiffs—Cross 225a The Witness: If Your Honor please, I think they are conscientious about what they are doing. By Mr. Boult: Q. And have acted in good faith according to their conscience? A. I think so. The Court: All right. Mr. Williams: May it please Your Honor, I have another question if I may. Redirect Examination toy Mr. Williams: Q. Mr. Ennis, you are the only Negro on the Board? A. I certainly am. Q. You say you all differ, you and the other members of the Board differ sharply on many occasions? A. On— on—on numerous occasions. Q. This question is a problem which affects you as a [179] Negro, does it not? A. That’s right. That’s right. Q. Bid you feel that in this particular situation, inas much as it was something which involved race relations and you were in the extreme minority on the Board, did you feel that the Board should give your thinking more than ordinary and weightier consideration than usual? Didn’t you feel that? A. Ah, yes; and I think that the Board— It has been my experience and my belief that occasions when—where the racial matter was concerned with the exception of this particular— Q. (Interrupting) This is the only thing where you really have felt that the Board had not given your views as much consideration as they ought to have been given? A. No. I— I wouldn’t say that. I wouldn’t say that. I don’t know— I don’t know whether they should have given me Coyness L. Ennix—for Plaintiffs—Redirect 226a as much consideration as I—as they ought to. I think that we differed and differed— We were way apart. I think they were conscientious about what they were saying, and I certainly was conscientious about mine. Q. Well, Mr. Ennix, were you trying to be objective in the conclusions which you drew on this plan and the previous plan which was submitted by the Board? [180] A. Was I— Q. Did you have any factual data there to consider? A. No. Not necessarily other than the factual data that I— I didn’t have any at the board. I have it in my library. Q. Did the Board have any? A. I don’t know whether the Board had any factual data or not. We didn’t have—■ We didn’t have it before us, but we discussed factual data that we had—that the various members of the Board had in their library. Q. What factual data, for example? A. Well, some of this—this—this Southern Regional School News. Q. You mean information gleaned from Southern School News? A. Well, yes. That has been discussed and also— I don’t know whether that has been discussed. Several— Q. That’s all right. A. I want to tell you. In our dis cussion we would bring up what different articles and different books on segregation or desegregation— That— that—that had been discussed on numerous occasions. Q. Mr. Ennix, when you testify that you think the Board was acting in good faith, will you explain to the Court [181] exactly what you mean by that? A. I think that the Board members, each one of them, conscientiously feel that it is best to go grade for grade. I believe they feel that way. Q. Yes, sir. Now, Mr. Ennix, do you feel that that feel ing is based on the facts—on any facts which have been Coyness L. Ennix—for Plaintiffs—-Redirect 227a presented to the Board and that that feeling is reasonable in the light of those facts? A. Well, of course, if I felt that reasonable—if I ’d felt that were reasonable, I would—would certainly have voted along with it. Q. You do not feel then that that feeling on the part of the members of the Board was based on any facts which have been presented to the Board? A. Not necessarily so. I— Q. (Interrupting) It is based on their personal opinion, isn’t it? A. Well, their personal opinion and their inter pretation. Mr. Hunt: That is cross examination on redirect, Your Honor. The Court: I think we are getting into a very speculative field. Mr. Williams: All right, sir. If Your Honor [182] please, we called him; but he is after all a defen dant, and he stated that in his opinion each member of the Board was acting according to his conscience. I don’t deny that, if Your Honor please, but— The Court: That is the way he feels. Mr. Williams: I wanted to inquire into whether or not there is any—into what that means. The Court: He could not know what each member of the Board based his opinion on, what particular factual data. They get factual data outside of the meetings no doubt that they take into the meetings. It seems to me that it would be impossible for him to probe the underlying data that each member of the Board acted on in voting as he did vote. Mr. Williams: I would just like to ask him one or two more questions, if Your Honor please. Coyness L. Ennix—for Plaintiffs—Redirect 228a The Court: Hurry up as much as you can because I am way past my adjournment time. Mr. "Williams: All right. By Mr. Williams-. Q. Has the Board of Education ever had any meetings out in the Negro community that you know of to discuss this question of desegregation? [183] A. The Board— The Board of Education has never had any. Q. Has never had any? A. No. Q. So far as you know, has the Board of Education made any attempt to mobilize the community, the organizations in a community in support of a program of compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision? A. The Board of Education as a board has not. Q. Thank you. A. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Williams : That is all. Further this witness saith not. The Court: Let the Superintendent of Schools take the witness stand. W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Recalled—By the Court W . H. Oliv er , a witness in behalf of the defendants recalled by the Court, having been sworn previously, testi fied further as follows: E x a m in a tio n By the Court -. Q. Something has been said in some of the testimony about special classes in addition to the regular classes. [184] Explain to the Court what that includes. A. Your Honor, I think that reference was made to special classes for the cerebral palsied, for students whose sight is sub 229a normal, and to vocational and technical training. Now, I will do the best I can describing our program in those fields. I have my director of technical and vocational training in the court room who can describe the present program better if you wish to bring him to the stand. We have plans under way for providing special train ing for the Negro children on the same basis as we pro vide for the whites. That is our intention. The training has not been provided in the past years as well for the Negroes as for the whites. Our plan is to provide the same quality of special training, sight-saving classes, cerebral palsied, mentally retarded, and—both severely and train- able without regard for race. We propose to do that. Q. But as of the present time the Negro students do not have those facilities? Is that correct? A. That is— That is correct so far as the special training is concerned. Q. Special classes. What about vocational training? A. That is not correct so far as vocational training is con cerned. We have a pretty good program of vocational training for the Negroes at Pearl High School. [185] Q. That vocational training is on the high-school level, is it? A. Yes, sir. Q. And Negro students have facilities for vocational training in their different high schools? A. They have about the same as the white schools have. Now, you see, there are only two Negro senior high schools, and the white schools don’t all have the same facilities for training. We try to meet whatever the demand is in any of the schools, and our philosophy is to meet the demand with out regard for race in all of the high schools. We increased our commercial training program at Pearl High School this fall. We plan to provide the same vocational and technical training in the Negro high schools that we have in the white as the occasion may require it. W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Recalled—By the Court 230a Q. These special classes, going hack to those, where are they held! Any particular place? A. Yes, sir. We have the cerebral palsied classes at Buena Yista School. We have the sight-saving classes at different schools. And we have the classes for— We have one class for the severely mentally retarded. That is at Edgehill School, and it is in a building in which there are no other classes, and there are not any Negro students in that school at the present time. What I want to do and what [186] I believe the Board will have done is to establish another class for white students. We are not taking care of all white students by any means who need that training, but add another class for the white students and establish a class for the Negro students. In other words, we have in mind to enlarge our program because it is not adequate either for the whites or the Negroes. Q. It has been proposed here by various witnesses that the best plan for Nashville would be to desegregate all of the schools at one time; that is, next fall. Could you give the Court any idea how many schools would be af fected by that plan under the present zoning? A. Your Honor, that would depend— That would depend on whether we permitted choice, transfers. Q. With the present transfer system as was proposed in the first plan submitted. A. If we desegregated the whole school system this fall, how many schools would be involved according to our present zoning plan? Q. Yes. A. I don’t know exactly how many, but a great majority of them, I would say; most of them. There would be few school zones comparatively in which there were not both races. Q. How many elementary schools are there in Nash ville? [187] A. How many elementary schools? Q. Yes. A. I believe 35 not counting the annexes. W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Recalled—By the Court 231a Q. And how many junior high schools! A. Strictly junior high schools? Q. Yes. A. Let’s see. In the white schools we have Waverly-Belmont and Cavert that are strictly—and High land Heights, three that are strictly junior high schools. Now, we have a lot— We have some other schools in which junior-high-school grades are taught, but they are not strictly junior high schools. Q. And how many high schools? A. How many senior high schools ? Q. Yes, senior high schools. A. Now, these senior high schools are not all alike. One of them has all twelve of the grades in it. We have one of those of the white schools. We have two white schools that are strictly senior high schools. Those are East and Hume-Fogg Technical School, and we have Cohn, North, and West End that are six- year schools, junior and senior high schools. Now, in the Negro Schools we have Pearl which is strictly a senior high school. We have Cameron which is a junior- senior high school, and we have Meigs which is an [188] elementary and junior high school and becoming a senior high school. I believe that’s correct. I might say, Your Honor, I have in the court room a directory of our schools and can give each school and the grades in that school if you would like to have it. Q. Do you have a directory that you can put into the evidence in the case? A. Yes, s ir; I have. Mr. Hunt: We will. I don’t thing there is one in evidence. Wait a minute, Mr. Oliver. The Witness: Mr. Nagy had one in his possession. The Court: I think that ought to be made a part of the record. It might clarify some of the matters. W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Recalled—By the Court 232a The Witness: I asked that these be here in case they might be needed. Mr. Boult: May I hand it to the witness ? The Court: Yes. (Mr. Boult handed document to the witness.) The Witness: Thank you. By the Court: Q. That is a directory as of what time? A. This is a directory for the present school year. [189] Q. All right. I think you can just file that. That shows all of the information I have been asking about, does it not? A. Yes, sir; I believe it does except the loca tion of the classes for special training. Well, it possibly has that in it, too. I believe it has everything you asked for. (Said directory was passed to the Court.) The Court: File that as a part of the record. (Said directory of Nashville Public Schools was marked “Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1,” and filed in evidence.) By the Court: Q. On the basis of a total desegregation order, do you have any idea how many people would be affected by that, how many schools would actually be mixed schools as a result of such an order? A. In the whole school system? Q. Yes, in the whole school system. A. I don’t know exactly. I would estimate that at least three fourths of the schools would be. Q. On this voluntary basis, if that plan were put into W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Recalled—By the Court 233a effect along with the total desegregation order, how much mixing in the classes do you think would take place as a result? [190] A. Your Honor, I— I don’t have much to base that on except our experience last fall. Q. That is about all you could do. You could project that experience possibly and arrive at some conclusion on it. A. Last fall, we had (as nearly as I can say) 115 Negro first-grade students who might have gone to white schools. Ten of them chose to do so and 105 chose not to do so. We had 55 white first-grade students living in what I shall call the Negro school zones, and all of them asked for transfers. So on the basis of that experience, I would say that a vast—that nearly all of the whites, possibly all of them, and the vast majority of the Negroes would probably ask for transfers in order to be with members of their own race. Of course, you understand that I don’t know at all. Q. Yes, that is true. That is just your opinion. A. That’s right. Q. Based on such facts as you have available. A. That’s right. Q. All right. I believe that is all the questions I have. A. Thank you, sir. Further this witness saith not. [191] The Court: We are way past the time that I usually adjourn. So we will have to continue the case until tomorrow. I have another case that was postponed on account of the hearing of this case. So I will want to limit the time tomorrow. Mr. Looby: If Your Honor please, we have no further proof. The Court: I thought I would hear you in oral argument briefly if you would like to be heard. W. H. Oliver—for Defendants—Recalled—By the Court 234a Colloquy Mr. Looby: We prefer to submit a brief. The Court: Submit a brief without oral argument. That will be satisfactory with the Court. Mr. Hunt: Your Honor, that will be satisfactory with us. There are some rather pressing matters which necessitate that we ask for some time in which to reply to their brief. We do not have a brief ready. The Court: All right. Mr. Hunt: I am engaged in another case. I won’t take more time than we need. It may be a week or ten days. The Court: That is reasonable. There is no doubt about that. How much time do you want to prepare your brief ? Mr. Looby: We can submit it any time. As a matter of fact, we can submit it now, but inasmuch as the burden of proof is on them probably they will submit their brief. [192] We can submit it today. The burden of proof is on them. (Here, Court and Counsel discussed further the time needed for filing the briefs.) The Court: All right. That is reasonable enough. Two weeks then for you to get your brief in, and then 10 days for a reply brief. Is there any further matter now that any party wants to bring up at this time ? (There was no response.) (Thereupon court was adjourned.) 235a Certification I, Opal Smith, Official Court Reporter for the District Court of the United States for the Middle District of Tennessee, certify that I recorded verbatim by Stenotypy and electronic means the proceedings had in open court in the case, Robert W. Kelley, et al, v. Board of Educa tion of the City of Nashville, Tennessee, et al. (Civil Ac tion No. 2094), before The Honorable William E. Miller, Judge of said Court, at Nashville, Tennessee, April 14, 1958, on “Plan of School Board.” I further certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief the foregoing typescript constitutes a true and cor rect transcript of said proceedings. This 23rd day of October, 1958. / s / Opal Smith Official Court Reporter 236a (entered June 19,1958) [188] The question at issue is whether the Court should approve the School Board’s plan filed April 7, 1958, to desegregate the public schools of Nashville. A hearing was held on April 14, 1958, at which witnesses were offered on behalf of the defendants to support the plan and by the plaintiffs in opposition to it. Following the hearing the case was thoroughly briefed by the attorneys for the respective parties. The history of the litigation since the filing of the com plaint was fully set forth in the Court’s opinion filed Febru ary 18, 1958, which required further study by the School Board and the submission of another plan not later than April 7,1958. The plan so filed is as follows: [189] “That the Plan heretofore submitted to the Court, and approved by the Court as modified, be supplemented as follows: A. Compulsory segregation based upon race is abolished in Grade Two of the schools of the City of Nashville for the scholastic year begin ning in September 1958, and thereafter for one additional grade beginning with each subsequent school year, i. e., for Grade Three in September 1959, Grade Four in September 1960, etc. B. All provisions of the Plan with respect to zoning, transfers and the like shall continue in force and effect with respect to each additional grade as the Plan becomes applicable to such grade. C. The Board of Education declares its policy to be to keep the United States District Court for M emorandum Opinion 237a the Middle District of Tennessee informed of the progress being made at such intervals as the Court may desire or direct and of such prob lems as may arise or be solved, which in the opinion of the Board of Education should be called to the attention of the Court.” A review of the evidence offered at the hearing discloses divergent theories as to the best plan to effect a transition from the long-standing segregated system of public edu cation in Nashville to a desegregated system. The plan of the School Board to desegregate the schools one grade each year beginning with the lower grades is strongly supported by the testimony of Superintendent of Schools, W. H. Oliver, by the former Superintendent of Schools, W. A. Bass, by the Chairman of the Instruction Committee of the Board, Elmer Lee Pettit, and by the principal of Glenn School, Miss Mary Brent. There can be no doubt that these witnesses, based upon their years of experience in education and upon their intimate knowledge of condi tions [190] in Nashville, sincerely believe that a sudden or abrupt transition to a desegregated basis would engender administrative problems of such complexity and magnitude as to seriously undermine and impair the educational system of the city. They are convinced that the change over from a segregated system of public education in this particular area of the south is one of such drastic charac ter, such a reversal of custom, tradition, and settled prac tice, that disagreement with it is pervasive, far-reaching and deep seated. It is their opinion that proper school administration requires that the School Board in devising a plan should take into account the existence of this factor in order to minimize its effects upon the efficiency of the Memorandum Opinion 238a schools. They support the School Board’s plan primarily because they feel that it offers the best opportunity to bring about full desegregation harmoniously and without serious disruption of the educational program of the city. The witnesses testifying for the plaintiffs, although of undoubted educational background and experience, have had no direct or official connection with the public schools of Nashville other than the witness Coyness L. Ennix, the only colored member of the School Board. Moreover, these witnesses are in disagreement among themselves as to the best plan to be followed in effecting the change from a segregated system as required by the decisions of the Su preme Court. The witnesses, Herman H. Long and Mrs. Preston Valien, apparently favor a plan which would re quire immediate desegregation in all of the public schools of [191] the city. Dr. Preston Valien, on the other hand, advocates a plan which would accomplish desegregation on the basis of administrative units, that is, first, the ele mentary schools would be desegregated, then the junior high schools, and finally the high schools. Coyness L. Ennix, according to his testimony, first favored the plan of total and immediate desegregation but his views under went a change after the violent eruption which occurred upon the opening of the schools in the fall of 1957. He now supports the administrative unit plan advocated by Dr. Valien, or some gradual plan of a similar nature. In summary, all four of the defendants’ witnesses, all of whom have had years of experience in the administra tion of the schools of Nashville and are in intimate contact with the conditions in that city, support without reserva tion the gradual plan adopted and submitted by the School Board. On the other hand, of the four witnesses for the plaintiffs, only two of them support a plan of total and Memorandum Opinion 239a immediate desegregation, whereas the other two support some type of gradual, desegregation. It, therefore, appears that the defendants have carried the burden of proof to establish the validity of the School Board plan and that it should receive the approval of the Court. As the Court in this case has repeatedly pointed out, it is not the business of the Federal Courts to operate the public schools and they should intervene only when it is necessary, for the enforcement of rights protected by the Federal Constitution. [192] If the judgment of the School Board was clearly erroneous, or if it was not supported by the evidence, the Court would be justified in finding that the defendants had not carried the burden of proof rest ing upon them and that the School Board’s plan should be disapproved. However, where, as in this case, the judg ment of the School Board is supported by the clear pre ponderance of the evidence, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the lawful prerogatives of the legally consti tuted school authority if the Court should undertake to set its judgment, aside and substitute some other plan. Ad mittedly the problem is not susceptible of an easy solu tion. The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that adjustment must be made in accordance with the exigencies of each case and that the concept of “all deliberate speed” is a flexible one. For this reason deci sions applying the desegregation doctrine in other cities or areas where different conditions obtain are of little value. Local conditions call for the application of a local remedy. In approving the present plan no denial of the consti tutional rights of the plaintiffs or others similarly situated is involved. Such rights are distinctly recognized and the plan contemplates their full enforcement and application Memorandum Opinion 240a in accordance with, a time schedule which though protracted for the best interests of the school system as a whole is nevertheless definite and unambiguous. Full desegrega tion is not denied. It is merely postponed. [193] A form of judgment together with appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law will be submitted for the approval of the Court. Memorandum Opinion / s / W m . E. M illeb United States District Judge 241a [298] (entered July 17, 1958) F in d in g s of F act 1. Reference is here made to the previous opinions and findings of this Court* which appear in the record. 2. Pursuant to order heretofore entered, the Board of Education of the City of Nashville filed with this Court its plan for desegregating the remaining grades of the school system, together. with a time schedule therefor, as follows: “That the Plan heretofore submitted to the Court, and approved by the Court as modified, be supple mented as follows: A. Compulsory, segregation based upon race is abolished in Grade . Two of the schools of the City of Nashville for the scholastic year begin ning in September 1958, and thereafter for one additional grade beginning with each subsequent school year, i. e., for Grade Three in September 1959, Grade Four in September 1960, etc. B. All provisions of the Plan with respect to zoning, transfers and the like shall continue in force and effect with respect to each additional grade as the Plan becomes applicable to such grade. [299] C. The Board of Education declares its policy to be to keep the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee informed of the progress being made at such intervals as the Court may desire or direct and of such prob lems as may arise or be solved, which in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 242a opinion of the Board of Education should be called to the attention of the Court.” 3. At the hearing held on April 14, 1958, the plan of the Board of Education was supported by testimony offered by the present Superintendent of Schools, by the former and now retired Superintendent of Schools, by the Chair man of the Instruction Committee and Acting Chairman of the Board and by a principal of one of the elementary schools in Nashville in which desegregation of the First Grade was accomplished in September, 1957 pursuant to a previous order of this Court. 4. The four witnesses for defendants were unanimous in their sincere belief, based upon their years of experience in education and upon their intimate knowledge of the conditions in Nashville, that a sudden or abrupt transi tion to a desegregated basis would engender administrative problems of such complexity and magnitude as to seriously undermine and impair the educational system of the City. 5. The four witnesses for defendants were convinced that the change-over from a segregated system of public education in this particular area of the South is one of such drastic character, such a reversal of custom, tradi tion and settled practice, that disagreement with it is per vasive, far-reaching and deep seated; that proper school administration requires that the School Board in devising a plan should take into account the existence of this factor in order to minimize its effects upon the efficiency of the schools; and they support the School Board’s plan primarily because they feel that it offers the best opportunity to bring about full desegregation harmoniously and without serious disruption of the educational program of the City. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 243a [300] 6. The plaintiffs offered witnesses in opposition to the School Board’s plan who, although of undoubted educational background and experience, have had no direct or official connection with the public schools of Nashville other than one such witness, who is the only colored mem ber of the School Board. 7. Plaintiffs’ four witnesses are in disagreement among themselves as to the best plan to be followed in effecting the change from a segregated system as required by the decisions of the Supreme Court. Two of said witnesses apparently favor a plan which would require immediate desegregation in all of the public schools of the City. One other such witness, advocates a plan which would accom plish desegregation on the basis of administrative units, that is, first the elementary schools would be desegregated, then the junior high schools, and finally the high schools. The colored school board member first favored the plan of total and immediate desegregation but his views under went a change after the violent eruption which occurred upon the opening of schools in the Fall of 1957, and he now supports the administrative unit plan just referred to, or some gradual plan of a similar nature. 8. In summary, all four of the witnesses for the defen dant School Board, all of whom have had years of experi ence in the administration of schools of Nashville and are in intimate contact with the conditions in that City, sup port without reservation the gradual plan adopted and submitted by the School Board. On the other hand, of the four witnesses for the plaintiffs, only two of them support a plan of total and immediate desegregation, whereas, the other two support some type of gradual de segregation. It, therefore, appears that defendant School Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 244a Board has carried the burden of proof to establish the validity of the School Board plan, and the [301] plan is supported by the clear preponderance of the evidence. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. This cause has heretofore been retained in Court pursuant to the previous opinions and orders of this Court, and Conclusions of Law, to all of which reference is here made, and is now appropriately before this Court for final judgment. 2. It is not the business of the Federal Courts to operate the public schools and they should intervene only when it is necessary for the enforcement of rights protected by the Federal Constitution. 3. If the judgment of the School Board was clearly erroneous, or if it was not supported by the evidence, the Court would be justified in finding that the defendants had not carried the burden of the proof resting upon them and that the School Board’s plan should be disap proved. However, where, as in this case, the judgment of the School Board is supported by the clear preponderance of the evidence, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the lawful prerogatives of the legally constituted school authority if the Court should undertake to set its judg ment aside and substitute some other plan. 4. Admittedly the problem is not susceptible of an easy solution. The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that adjustment must be made in accordance with the exigencies of each case and that the concept of “all deliberate speed” is a flexible one. For this reason, decisions applying the desegregation doctrine in other Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 245a cities or areas where different conditions obtain are of little value. Local conditions call for the application of a local remedy. [302] 5. In approving the present plan, no denial of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs or others similarly situated is involved. Such rights are distinctly recognized and the plan contemplates their full enforcement and ap plication in accordance with a time schedule which though protracted for the best interests of the school system as a whole is nevertheless definite and unambiguous. Full desegregation is not denied. It is merely postponed. 6. The original plan approved as amended by the order of this Court entered February 20, 1957, and of record in Volume 19, page 783, and as further amended by said amended plan hereinbefore quoted and which was the sub ject matter of the hearing held on April 14, 1958 consti tutes a compliance with the applicable and constitutional provisions as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States. 7. Said original plan as previously approved by this Court, and as herein amended, should be approved by this Court, and the prayer of the plaintiff for injunctive relief should be denied. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law /s / W il l ia m E. M iller Judge 246a Judgment [303] (entered July 7, 1958) This cause came on to be heard on April 14, 1958 upon the entire record, upon oral testimony without the inter vention of a jury, and upon briefs and argument of counsel pursuant to which the Court, on June 19, 1958, filed its Memorandum and has this day filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, all of which are herein incorporated by reference. It is , th e r e fo re , Obdebed , A djudged a n d D ecbeed a s f o l lo w s : 1. That the original plan of the Board of Education of the City of Nashville approved as amended by the judg ment of this Court entered on February 20, 1957, of record in Volume 19, pages 785-786, and as further amended by the amended plan filed April 7, 1958 and which was the subject matter of the hearing held thereon on April 14, 1958, be approved, and that the prayer of the plaintiffs for injunctive relief be and is denied. [304] 2. That jurisdiction of the action is retained dur ing the period of transition. To the foregoing action of the Court the plaintiffs except. A ppboved as to F obm : /s / W il l ia m E. M illeb Judge Attorneys for Plaintiffs / s / R e b e b B oult / s / E d w in F . H u n t Attorneys for Defendants