San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez Appendix for Brief Amici Curiae
Public Court Documents
July 1, 1972

129 pages
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez Appendix for Brief Amici Curiae, 1972. 5b5b739e-c39a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/eefcc12b-2704-47d9-87c7-c32a4cdf715e/san-antonio-independent-school-district-v-rodriguez-appendix-for-brief-amici-curiae. Accessed April 28, 2025.
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/U, g IN T H E Supreme Court of tfje Urnteb g>tate$ October Term, 1971 No. 71-1332 SAN A N T O N IO IN D E P E N D E N T S C H O O L D IS T R IC T , et a l, Appellants, vs. D E M E T R IO P. R O D R IG U E Z , et a l, Appellees. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS APPENDIX FOR BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE: RICHARD M. CLOWES, SUPER- INTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, HAROLD J. OSTLY, TAX COLLECTOR AND TREASURER OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES: EL SEGUNDO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; GLENDALE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SAN MARINO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; LONG BEACH UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SOUTH BAY UNION HIGH SCHOOL DIS TRICT; BEVERLY HILLS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; AND SANTA MONICA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, ALL OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY. JO H N D . M A H A R G , County Counsel JAM ES W . BRIGGS, Division Chief, Schools Division D O N O V A N M . M A IN , Deputy County Counsel 648 Hall of Administration 500 West Temple Street Los Angeles, California 90012 (213) 625-3611, Ext. 65643 Attorneys for Amici Curiae. W E S T E R N P R IN T IN G C O M P A N Y , W H IT T IE R ----- O X B O W 3 * 1 7 2 2 APPENDIX '“ A” INTERDISTRICT INEQUALITIES IN SCHOOL FINANCING: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SERRANO v. PRIEST AND ITS PROGENY. S t e p h e n R. G o l d s t e i n + Rarely has a state supreme court decision received such extensive publicity and public comment as the recent California Supreme Court opinion in Serrano v. Priest,3 concerning the constitutionality of interdistrict disparities in financing California public school dis tricts. Indeed, one might have to go back to the United States Supreme Court reapportionment cases to find a decision of any court that has been as extensively dis cussed in the press as has Serrano. .Most significantly, the press comment seems to have been uniformly af firmative. The Serrano result has been popularly hailed as rightly egalitarian and a significant, if not the sig nificant, step in the struggle for better education in urban areas.2 Even those editorial writers who have traditionally been proponents of judicial restraint have refrained from commenting adversely upon the court’s decision invalidating California’s public school financ ing system. tAssociate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1959, L.L.B. 1962, University of Pennsylvania, Member, Pennsylvania Bar. *5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). '2See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1971, at 17, col. 1: id., Sept. 2, 1971, at 32, col. 1; at 55, cols. 1, 2; id., Sept 5, 1971, § 4, at 7, col. 1; at 10, col.3. Ill part this absence of adverse comment may be attributable to the fact that it was the California Su preme Court and not the United States Supreme Court that decided the case. Yet, the decision’s impact is clearly not confined to California. The California school finance system is similar in effect to the systems used in 49 of the 50 states/ and the court avowedly rested its decision on federal equal protection grounds.4 3Hawaii is the only state without local school district control of education. H a w a ii R e v . L a w s §§296-2, 298-2 (1968). 4The court specifically rejected the argument that the California financing system violated art. XX, §5 of the California Constitution, which provides for “ a system of common schools.” It then stated: “ Having disposed of these preliminary matters, we take up the chief contention underlying plaintiffs' complaint, namely that the California public school financing scheme violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 5 Cal. 3d at 596, 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609. Despite having thus based its decision on federal constitutional grounds, the court, in a puzzling footnote, id. at 596 n .ll, 487 P.2d at 1249 n .ll, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 n .l l , then referred to 2 provisions of the California Con stitution requiring that “ [a ]11 laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation,” C a l . C o n s t , art. I, §11, and prohibiting “ special privileges or immunities,” id. art. I, §21. The court went on to state that: We have construed these provisions as “substantially the equivalent” of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fed eral Constitution. (Dept, of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321.) Consequently, our analysis of plaintiffs’ equal protection contention is also applicable to their claim under these state constitutional provisions. Id. Following this, there was no further mention of the California Constitu tion in the opinion and almost all authorities cited concern federal law. The court also devoted considerable effort to avoiding the argument that the federal constitutional issues has been foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court summary affirmances in Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. 111. 1968), aff’ d mem. sub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), and Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff’d mem.] 397 U.S. 44 (1970). The California Supreme Court, of course, would not be limited by a United States Supreme Court interpretation of the California Constitution. The footnote quoted above, and the explicit citation to Kirchner, however, raise the issue whether, despite its express reliance on the Federal Consti tution, the court has not also relied on the California Constitution in a way that precludes United States Supreme Court review. In Kirchner, the Califoria Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state statute relating to liability for the care and maintenance of mentally ill per sons in state institutions. 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari but vacated and remanded the case to the California court on the grounds that the Cal ifornia opinoin was unclear as to whether it was based on the federal or state It has also been expressly followed by a federal dis trict court in Minnesota in denying a motion to dis miss5 and by a three-judge district court in Texas in holding that state’s financing scheme unconstitutional." While it is clear, at least at this time, that the Serrano decision itself will not be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court,7 * there are many other interdistrict consitutions or both, and that the United States Supreme Court would not have jurisdiction unless the federal Constitution had been the sole basis for the _ decision, or the state constitution had been interpreted under what the California court deemed the compulsion of the Federal Constitution. 380 U.S. 194 (1965). On remand, the California Supreme Court stated that although C a l . C o n s t , art I, §§11 & 21 were generally thought to be “ substantially the equivalent” of the federal aqual protection clause, the court was “ inde pendently constrained” in its result by these sections of the state constitution. The court stated that it had not acted “ solely by compulsion of the Fourteenth Amendment, either directly or in construing or applying state law . ” 62 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 400 P.2d 321, 322, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330 (1965). Although the issue is not completely free from doubt, the California Su preme Court in Serrano may have written an opinion expressly based on federal law yet at the same time insulated from review by the United States Supreme Court. ®Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971). ^Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971). Procedurally, Rodriguez has developed further than Serrano, as the court there, after a hearing, declared the Texas financing scheme un constitutional and permanently enjoined the defendants, the State Commis sioner of Education, and the members of the State Board of Education, from enforcing it. The court, however, stayed its mandate and retained jurisdiction for 2 years: in order to afford the defendants and the Legislature an opportunity to take all steps reasonably feasible to make the school system comply with the applicable law . . . . The Court retains jurisdiction of this action to take such further steps as may be necessary to implement both the purpose and spirit of this order, in the event the Legislature fails to act within the time stated . . . . Id. at 286. For retention of jurisdiction the court cited cases of judicially im posed reapportionment plans. 7See note 4 supra. In addition to the problem of the independent state ground for the Serrano decision, it is clear that the Supreme Court cannot review it at this time because it is not a final judgment. See 28 U.S C. §1257 (1 9 7 0 ). inequality cases in the process of litigation,8 at least one of which will soon present the United States Su preme Court with the Serrano problem.9 The primary reason for the favorable reception of Serrano is probably the growing public eagerness for its result. Unlike many other societal problems in ed ucation and other areas, the concept of fiscal equality in education is perceived as unambiguously good. It does not appear to involve the competing views of equality prevalent in desegregation and community control issues. Nor does it represent the significant clash between the values of equality and liberty that the desegregation and community control issues may present. The only visible liberty being curtailed is local economic self-determination, a value currently of low priority in our society when balanced against the prom ise of improving education for the poor and racial minorities. Fiscal equality also holds out the promise of improving education for the poor and racial minor ities, without raising the fears of personal adverse ef fects on the white middle-class family aroused by other proposed policies, such as desegregation. Fiscal equali- 8Also pending before a 3-judge court is the constitutionality of the Florida school financing system. See Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971), vacat ing per curiam Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (MX). Fla. 1970). Recent state court decisions that followed Serrano are: Hollins v. Shofstall, No. C- 253652 (Super. Ct. Maricopa County, Ariz. Jan. 13, 1972); Robinson v. Ca hill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972); Sweetwater County Planning Comm, for the Organization of School Dists, v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971). In disagreement with Serrano is Spano v. Board of Educ., 328 N.Y. S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972). The issue is now before the court in more than half the states. See Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1972, at 1, col. 6. 9It appears that the decision in Rodriguez is immediately appealable to the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. §1253 (1970). If appealed, it would presumably be heard in the October term, 1972. t,y involves the movement of inanimate dollars, not live children.10 Finally, fiscal equality corresponds to a basic American belief that more money, or money distributed more wisely, can solve major societal problems such as the current state of public education, and that all so ciety need do is to have the will to so spend or dis tribute it. In Daniel P. Moynihan’s terms, Serrano leads one to hope that what may have been considered a “ knowledge problem” is indeed a “ political” one, or better yet, a judicial one.11 Serrano is unquestionably sound as a matter of ab stract egalitarian philosophy. Nevertheless, there are many difficulties presented by its legal analysis. More over, it is not at all clear that the practical effect of the decision will be to improve the quality of public educa tion generally, or the quality of urban public education in particular. ■— 5— lOThe Serrano result and metropolitan desegregation, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd., 40 U.S.L.W. 2446 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 1972), can be viewed as alternative methods of improving the educational quality of urban minority groups, to the extent that the argument for metropolitan desegregation rests on a desire to give the black urban poor access to the tax base of their more affluent white suburban neighbors. Compare Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971), with Johnson v, San Francisco Unified School Dist., No. C-70 1331 SAW (N.D. Cal. June 2, 1971). See also Spencer v. Kugler, 40 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1972); United States v. Board of School Comm’rs 332 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971). u Moynihan, Can Courts and Money Dc ft?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1972. §E (Annual Education Review), at 1, col. 3; id. at 24, col. 1. 6 I . S c h o o l D i s t r i c t I n e q u a l i t y a n d t h e Serrano R e s p o n s e A. The Court’s Response to Interdistrict Financing Differentials As is true with every state except Hawaii, over 90% of California’s public school funds derive from a com bination of school district real property taxes and state aid based largely on sales or income taxation. Histori cally the state aid, or ‘ ‘ subvention, ’ ’ has been superim posed on the basic system of locally raised revenue. Al though the state aid component of educational expen ditures has been generally increasing as a percentage of the total expenditures, the local component has re mained dominant, California is typical in having total educational expenditures consist of 55.7 percent local property taxes and 35.5 percent state aid.12 The local component is a product of a locality’s tax base (primarily the assessed valuation of real property within its borders) and its tax rate, Tax bases in Cali fornia, as elsewhere, vary widely throughout the state. Tax rates also vary from district to district. 12ln addition, federal funds account for 6.1% and other sources for 2.7%. These figures and others given for California in this Article are taken from the court’s opinion in Serrano. 5 Cal. 3d at 591 n.2, 487 P.2d at 1246 n.2 96 Cal. Rptr. at 606 n.2. In discussig expenditure differentials, the Serrano court did not indicate whether or not its figures included federal revenues. Other authorities have excluded federal revenues from these calculations. This author has elsewhere questioned the validity of this exclusion. See Goldstein, Book Review, 59 C a l if . L. R ev . 302, 303-04 (1971). Nationwide, approximately 52% of all schooi revenue is collected locally, and from 97-98% of local tax revenue is derived from property taxes. Briley, Variation between School District Revenue and Financial Ability, in St a t u s an d I m p a c t of Ed u c ation al F in a n c e Pr o gram s 49-50 (R. Johns, K. Alexander & D. Stoilar eds. 1971) (National Educational Finance Project vol. 4). In California, all local school revenues are raised by property taxation. See C a l . Ed u c . C ode §§20701-06 (1969) -7— Tiie state component of school expenditures is gen erally distributed through a flat grant system, a foun dation system, or a combination of the two. The flat grant is the earliest and simplest form of subvention, consisting of an absolute number of dollars distributed to each school district on a per-pupil or other-unit stan dard. Foundation plans are more complicated and have a number of variants. In its simplest form, a founda tion plan consists of a state guarantee to a district of a minimum level of available dollars per student, if the district taxes itself at a specified minimum rate. The state aid makes up the difference between local collec tions at the specified rate and this guaranteed amount. I f the actual tax rate is greater than the specified rate, the funds raised by the additional taxes are retained by the locality but do not affect the amount of state aid. Finally, there are combinations of flat grants and foundation plans. Under one form of combination plan the flat grant is added to whatever foundation aid is due to the district: State Aid = [guaranteed amount — local collec tion at specified rate] + flat grant. Under the other combination system, the flat grant is added to the local collection in initially calculating the foundation grant: State Aid = [guaranteed amount — (local col lection at specified rate + flat grant)] + flat grant. Under tliis approach, a district that would qualify for a state foundation grant equal to, or in excess of, the flat grant does not in effect receive the flat grant. That grant is superfluous when it serves only to bring a dis trict up to the foundation level, because a district is always guaranteed the foundation level in any case. The full benefit of the flat grant goes only to those dis tricts where the local collection at the specified rate equals or exceeds the foundation guarantee. The latter combination plan is the system employed in California.13 The flat grant is $125 per pupil. The foundation minimum, based on a tax rate of 1.0 percent for elementary school districts and 0.8 percent for high school districts,14 is $355 for each elementary school pupil and $488 for each high school student, subject to specified minor exceptions. An additional state pro gram of “ supplemental aid” subsidizes particularly poor school districts that, are willing to set local tax rates above a certain statutory level. An elementary school district with an assessed valuation of $12,500 or less per pupil may obtain up to $125 more for each child under this plan. A high school district whose as sessed valuation does not exceed $24,500 per pupil can 18As noted, this results in the quirk that the full effects of the flat grant are available only to those districts whose revenue at the prescribed rate ex ceeds the foundation guarantee. There would seem to be no rational basis for this result. The Serrano court, however, did no more than mention this fact and there is no indication that the opinion rested on it. 14This is simply a computational tax rate used to measure the relative tax bases of the different districts. It does not necessarily relate to the actual rates levied. receive a supplement of up to $72 per pupil if it taxes at a sufficiently high rate.15 Although the foundation plan does help to equalize available educational funds throughout the state, the relatively low foundation guarantee nevertheless allows significant disparities among school districts. The Ser rano court cited the following statistics for the 1969- 1970 school year for district per-pupil educational ex penditures : Elementary Low $ 407 Median 672 High 2586 H igh School '$ 722 898 1767 Unified16 $ 612 766 2414 Statistics cited by the court for assessed valuations per pupil also reflected the disparities: 15There are other minor provisions in the state subvention system. Districts that maintain “ unnecessary small schools” receive $10 per pupil in their foundation guarantee, a sum intended to reduce class sizes in elementary schools. Unified districts (those which contain both elementary and secondary schools) receive $20 more per pupil in foundation grants. In addition, a spe cial program attempts to provide equalization in districts included in re organization plans that were rejected by the voters. It gives the poorer dis tricts in the reorganization the effect of the reorganization to the limited extent of levying a tax areawide, of 1.0% in elementary districts and 0.8% in high school districts. The resulting revenue is then distributed among the individual districts according to the ratio of each district’s foundation level to the areawide total revenue. Thus, in these rare circumstances of voter-re jected reorganization plans, poorer districts share in the higher tax bases of weal thier districts in their area. The districts are, of course, free to tax themselves above the 1.0% or 0.8% level and retain all additional revenue. 5 Cal. 3d at 593 n.8, 487 P.2d at 1247 n.8, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 607 n.8. !«W . at 593 n.9, 487 P.2d at 1247 n.9, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 607 n.9. 10 Low Median High Elementary $ 103 19,600 952,156 High School17 $ 11,959 41,300 349,093 The complaint in Serrano set forth two main causes of action. The first was that of plaintiff school children residing in all school districts except the one that “ af fords the greatest educational opportunity,” who al leged that: As a direct result of the financing scheme . . . sub stantial disparities in the quality and extent of availability of educational opportunities exist and are perpetuated among the several school districts of the State . . . . The educational opportunities made available to children attending public schools in the Districts, including plaintiff children, are substantially inferior to the educational opportuni ties made available to children attending public schools in many other districts in the State . . . ,18 The financing scheme was alleged, therefore, to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend ment and various clauses of the California Constitu tion. 17Id. Note that these figures and those in the text accompanying note 16 supra, represent the extremes and thus may be skewed, as extremes often are. In this case a major skewing mechanism may be an abnormally low number of public school students in a given district. Even outside the extremes, how ever, the discrepancies in California are substantial. These assessed valuation per pupil figures also assume uniform assessment practices. This assumption was not discussed by the court. The discrepancies were much less substantial in Texas but the system was invalidated nonetheless. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971). 185 Cal. 3d at 590. 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604. 11 The second cause of action, brought by the parents of the school children, as taxpayers, incorporated all the allegations of the first claim. It went on to allege that as a direct result of the financing scheme, plain tiffs were required to pay a higher tax rate than tax payers in many other school districts to obtain for their children the same or lesser educational opportun ities. The complaint sought: (1) a declaration that the system as it existed was unconstitutional; (2) an order directing state administrative officials to reallocate school funds to remedy the system’s constitutional in firmities ; and (3) retention of jurisdiction by the trial court so that it could restructure the system if the leg islature failed to do so within a reasonable time19 The trial court sustained a general demurrer to the com plaint and the action was dismissed. The dismissal of the complaint for failing to set forth a cause of action was appealed to the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court stated the issue in the first line of its opinion: We are called upon to determine whether the California public school financing system, with its substantial dependence on local property taxes and resultant wide disparities in school revenue, vio lates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 10 10Id. at 591. 487 P.2d at 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605. 20Id. at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604. —12— The court immediately went on to hold: We have determined that this funding scheme in vidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality of a child’s education a func tion of the wealth of his parents and neighbors. Recognizing as we must that the right to an edu cation in our public schools is a fundamental in terest which cannot be conditioned on wealth, we can discern no compelling state purpose necessitat ing the present method of financing. We have con cluded, therefore, that such a system cannot with stand constitutional challenge and must fall before the equal protection clause.21 In so holding, the California court employed the “'new equal protection” analysis. Under this doctrine, certain t y p e s of legislative classification require a higher level of state justification to pass judicial scrut iny than is required under the traditional “ rational basis” equal protection test. This doctrine holds that if a suspect classification is employed, and the classi fication pertains to a fundamental interest,22 then the 21Id. 22It is unclear whether the court regarded the fundamental interest and suspect classification tests as operating in conjunction with each other as stated in the text or as operating independently. Compare id. at 612 487 P.2d at 1261, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 621, with 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1257, 96 Cal, Rptr. at 615. To the extent the court suggested that either test, operating independently, would trigger the “ special scrutiny” review of state action, it appears to be an inaccurate view of the present state of the law as applied to state actions other than racial classifications. The invariable formulation of the doctrine as applied to wealth classifica tions requires both wealth classification and impairment of a fundamental in terest in some varying combination. See Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211, 4214 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-30 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (Harlan, J., dissenting.) See generally J. C o o n s , W. C l u n e & S. Su g ar - m a n , Private W e a l t h a n d P u blic Ed u cation 339-446 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Private W e a l t h an d P u blic Ed u c a t io n ]. 13— classification violates the equal protection clause un less it is necessitated by a compelling state purpose. A fuller discussion of the Serrano court’s use of this doc trine follows. B. The Choice of a Standard of Equality: Response to Activist Legal Scholarship The most striking element in the California Su preme Court’s holding was its reliance on the relation ship between the wealth of a school district and its ed ucational expenditures. By “ wealth” the court meant taxable wealth (property tax basis23 * * * *) per pupil o'r other unit. Yet, as stated above, the local component of school financing is a product of taxable wealth and tax rate. A district’s expenditures may be low because it is low in taxable wealth or because it chooses to tax itself at a low rate, or both. Why, then, did the court focus on wealth differences as the constitutional vice, rather than on disparities in expenditures, regardless of cause % 23Serrano and its progeny have been predicated on the assumption of the exclusive use of the real estate property tax for local education financing. As stated in note 12 .supra, however, nationwide property taxes constitute 97-98% of local taxes for education and thus are almost the exclusive but are not the exclusive means of local financing. Indeed, by 1968-1969, 22 states and the District of Columbia authorized the use of local nonproperty taxes by local school districts. A lt e r n a tiv e Program s for Fin a n c in g Edu cation 186 (1971) (National Educational Finance Project vol. 5). While this still amounted to less than 3% of local education taxes nationwide, in a given state the amount could be sufficiently significant that the Serrano analysis premised on exclusive real estate taxation would be inapplicable. For example, in Penn sylvania local nonproperty taxes in 1968-1969 produced a mean revenue per pupil of $101.30 in central city districts. Id. 187. Local nonproperty taxes include occupational, utility, and other excise taxes, as well as local sales and income taxes. Tax bases for such taxes would be much more difficult to calculate than is a given locality’s real property tax base. 14— To understand this, one must know something about the legal literature that predated Serrano. The litera ture in this field, particularly the book Private Wealth and Public Education,24 exemplifies a current wave of consciously activist scholarship, written with an avowed bias, and aimed at producing specific legal results. This new breed of writers, not content with pure scholar ship, actively engages in the litigation process to ac complish their aims.23 This activist legal scholarship— of a very high caliber—-produced the legal formulations manifested in Serrano™ Serrano apparently adopted as the constitutional ride what was denominated as Proposition 1 in Private Wealth and Public EducationP “ The quality of public education may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole.” 28 Proposition 1 24Supra note 22. 25Coons and Sugarman, for example, filed amicus briefs in Serrano and Rodriguez. 28Although the court acknowledged its reliance on Coons, Clune & Sugar- man by citations throughout the opinion, it cited a law review article, Coons Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity. A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 C a l if . L. R e v . 305 (1969), rather than the more comprehensive analysis in Private W e a l t h and P ublic Ed u c a tio n , supra note 22. The reason for this is not clear. This may reflect only the opinion writer’s relative access to the two works. It may also reflect the court’s sensitivity to the reader’s relative access to the two works. Finally, it might be suggested that it represents a possible reflection of the difference in esteem in California, between the California Law Review and the Harvard University Press. 27The following discussion of Proposition 1 and district power equalizing is based upon, and some parts are taken entirely from, an earlier analysis of Private Wealth and Public Education by this author. Goldstein, Book Review 59 C a l if . L. R e v . 302, 304-10 (1 9 7 1 ). 28Private W e a l t h an d P u blic Edu cation , supra note 22, at 2 (emphasis omitted). Proposition 1 is, however, never directly quoted by the Serrano Court. The federal court in Van Dusartz, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971) which expressly relied on Serrano. did quote Proposition 1 and explicitly ac cepted it as the constitutional standard. Id. at 872 & n.l. Somewhat less itself was a response to prior debate about interdistrict disparities in educational offerings. Recently there has been increased concern with inequalities in government, services, especially as they affect the poor. In particu lar, society has become increasingly concerned with the deplorable condition of urban public education. It has been argued that a major cause of this condition is the relative lack of resources available to urban school districts as compared to their more affluent suburban neighbors. Moreover, there has been increased recogni tion that plans for improving urban education through such alternatives as integration, decentralization and community control, or compensatory education are, in the final result, highly dependent on the availability of greater resources for urban school districts. Although the exact relationship between financially Poor school districts and poor people, particularly the urban poor, is unclear,29 the existence of large wealth discrepancies among school districts is undeniable. The disparity in the quality of education, as conventionally measured, between urban and suburban school districts clearly the 3-judge court in Rodriguez seemed to adopt Proposition 1 as the constitutional rule. One caveat must be stated regarding the Serrano court's acceptance of Proposition 1 as the constitutional test. As will be discussed at length text accompanying notes 30-44 infra, Proposition 1 and Serrano do not require equality of expenditures. Neither, however, is Proposition 1 satisfied by equality of expenditures. If equal expenditures were achieved by differential rates ap plied to differential tax bases, that is, lower tax base districts achieving the same revenue level by employing higher rates, Proposition 1 would not be satis fied. At this point Proposition 1 leaves education as its concern and becomes completely taxpayer oriented. Despite the taxpayer orientation in Serrano, see text accompanying notes 86-9! infra, it is unlikely that the Serrano court would go this far. Throughout the opinion, the court emphasized differential educational expenditures. 29See notes 65-75 infra & accompanying text. is also apparent. Thus the existing system of education al financing has been increasingly condemned as in tolerable. However, there has existed substantial dis agreement on methods of relief. Opponents of judicial intervention have argued against court action to in validate the current system: first, for lack of a work able judicial standard ; secondly, because an equality concept might result in a downward leveling of expen ditures when the real need is to improve low quality; thirdly, because judicial relief would result in centra lization of educational financing; and fourthly, because an equality requirement that prevented local school expenditures above the state norm would be either unworkable or would result in substantial middle class exodus from the public schools.30 Proposition 1 was an avowed attempt to respond to these criticisms. By adopting it, the California Su preme Court has apparently limited its decision to wealth-derived educational differentials and has not required equal expenditures statewide. On this basis of decision, there are a number of alternative school financing systems that would meet the court’s constitu tional standard. Among these is abolition of local school districts and their replacement with a completely state wide system. Short of that, centralized state financing 80 80See Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity. The Limits of Constitu tional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U.C h i . L. R ev . 583 (1968). For the views of the proponents of judicial intervention, see A, W is e , R ic h Sc h o o l s , Poor Sc h o o l s : T h e P ro m ise of Eq u a l Ed u c a tio n a l O p p o r t u n it y 143^ 59 (1968); Horowitz & Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Education and Public Assistance Programs From Place to Place With in a State, 15 U.C.L.A. R e v . 787 (1968) : Kirp, The Poor, the Schools, and Equal Protection, 38 H a r v . Ed u c . R ev . 635 (1968). 17- that raises and distributes all funds could be coupled with local district administration of the schools. Cen tralized financing, however, is not required under the Serrano rule invalidating only wealth-derived differ entials. A general school redistricting' that equalized wealth among school districts would satisfy the deci sion and at the same time allow the present system of financing and administration to continue. Finally, there is the innovative suggestion proposed in Private Wealth and Public Education—district power equaliz ing—a system t h a t allows differential expenditures among school districts, while removing the effect of differential tax bases on these expenditures. Under district power equalizing, existing school dis tricts would have funds available for education based on their tax rate regardless of their tax base. A school district would be free to choose any tax rate it desired and its available funds—defined as “ x dollars per edu cational unit” —would be established by the state for any given tax rate. In a simplified model, a district power equalizing scheme might appear as follows: Tax Hate Available Funds 1 % $ 400 per educational task unit 2 /a 3 2 600 800 1000 1200 A district with a low tax base whose chosen tax rate produced less revenue than the state prescribed amount 18 wpuld receive state funds to make up the difference. A district that produced more revenue than the state prescribed amount at its chosen rate would be required to pay the excess to the state. The scheme of power equalizing as a means to satis fy the requirements of Proposition 1 has been attacked on equalitarian grounds. It requires merely that dis trict wealth disparities be eliminated as a factor in financing education, thus still permitting districts to spend more by taxing more. What is in fact required, it is argued, is statewide equality of learning oppor tunity to the extent achievable by statewide financing.81 The Serrano decision is subject to the same attack in sofar as the court adopts an equal wealth formula, ra ther than an equal expenditure formula. It is not indisputably clear, however, that the court has rejected th e equalization o f expenditures formula. Although the language quoted above, a n d other statements in the opinion seem to accept the equal wealth standard, it might well be argued that the court decided only the facts before it—that the existing financing scheme was unconstitutional—and did not go so far as to endorse an equal wealth stan dard or reject the argument that an equalization of ex penditures standard is constitutionally required. In deed, in response to an argument that autonomous lo cal decisionmaking was so important a value that it 31See, e.g., Silard & White. Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 Wis L. R e v . 7, 26-28, 30. 19- justified the existing system, the court stated: “ We need not decide whether such decentralized financial decision-making is a compelling state interest, since under the present financing system, such fiscal free will is a cruel illusion for the poor school districts.” 32 Other evidence of the court’s possible acceptance of the equal expenditure formula as being constitutionally required is its specific recognition that many of the values of local choice could still be preserved under a spending equalization formula that centralized financ ing but localized administration of schools. The court’s possible failure to rule out a constitu tional command of expenditure equalization may also be explained by the fact that tax base, not tax rate, is the main determinant of local educational expendi tures. Available statistics, in California and elsewhere, indicate that districts with smaller tax bases, such as Baldwin Park, tax themselves at higher rates than do richer districts, such as Beverly Hills, even though their total yield is not as great,33 Therefore, the Ser rano court may have assumed that Proposition 1, which removes the wealth factor, would produce generally equal offerings among school districts, and thus left until another day the issue of what happens if it does not. These reasons, however, are not sufficient to ex plain the very strong equal wealth emphasis in the 325 Cal. 3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620. ssid . ; Private W e a l t h and Public Ed u c a tio n , supra note 22, at 127-50. See also A ltern ative Program s for F in a n c in g Edu cation 81-101 (1971) (National Educational Finance Project vol. 5). 20 Serrano opinion. The most logical reading of the de cision is that the court did adopt the formula of equal wealth rather than the equal expenditures formula as its constitutional command. The probable explanation for this is twofold. First, an expenditure equalization standard would cause problems with compensatory edu cation and other programs that would devote extra funds for the education of disadvantaged students. The propopents of equal expenditures are also in favor of this degree of inequality and struggle valiantly to make these concepts consistent. Perhaps their struggles are successful. It is much easier, however, to avoid the in consistency by not adopting an equal expenditure test- in the first place. The second basic argument in favor of an equal wealth standard is that it permits a local school dis trict to choose how much it wishes to spend on the ed ucation of its children. The desirability of retaining this local choice responds to basic federalist, pluralist values of diversity and local decisionmaking—-a con cept termed “ subsidiarity” in Private Wealth and Public EducationP In Serrano the state argued that the existing school financing system was constitutional ly valid because it incorporated just these values.85 ^ P rivate W e a l t h an d Public Ed u cation , supra note 22. at 14-15. Sub sidiarity is “ the principle that government should ordinarily leave decision making and administration to the smallest unit of society competent to handle them.” Id. 14. See also Goldstein, Book Review, 59 C a l if . L. R e v . 302, 306 (1971). 35The court quoted the state’s argument that: “ [I ] f one district raises a lesser amount per pupil than another district, this is a matter of choice and preference of the individual dis trict and reflects the individual desire for lower taxes rather than an expanded educational program, or may reflect a greater interest within — 21— The court’s response, while rejecting the state’s arg ument, shows sensitivity to the idea of local choice: [S]o long as the assessed valuation within a dis trict’s boundaries is a major determinant of how much it can spend for its schools, only a district with a large tax base will be truly able to decide how much it really cares about education. The poor district cannot freely choose to tax itself into an excellence which its tax rolls cannot provide. Far from being necessary to promote local fiscal choice, the present financing system actually deprives the less wealthy districts of that option.86 The Serrano court did recognize that local choice in nonfiscal educational matters might still be retained under centralized financing; yet this limited degree of choice is not sufficient. As a purely theoretical issue it is difficult to determine the value of retaining local control over educational spending, particularly when weighed against the possibility of continuing expendi ture inequalities, which the retention of local choice produces. But this issue is not merely a matter of po litical theory. Rather, adoption of the equal wealth standard in Serrano is an implicit recognition of the fact that, in light of our history and traditions, judicial or legislative decrees cannot be used to prevent local- ilies from trying to get better education for their chil dren by raising more funds locally. that district in such other services that are supported by local property taxes as, for example, police and fire protection or hospital services.” 5 Cal. 3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620. 22 A in-e-Serrano law review article37 by Silard and White, which dismissed district power equalizing in one paragraph as not producing equality of educational offerings, ended discussion of its equalization solution, centralized financing, by adding: “ The [centralized financing] mechanism might also be formulated in such a way as to retain a local option to surtax for addi tional education.” ™ This “ local option” is obviously a device to allow localities to spend more on education than the centrally determined norm, and thus produce inequalities in offering. Despite their very strong com mitment to egalitarian principles, proponents of judi cial action in this field obviously cannot resist the no tion that local districts should retain the option to spend more on education. It is this fact, deeply em bedded in our public consciousness, that primarily ex plains why the Serrano court did not and would not require spending equality.39 The existence of this public sense raises a further question about the limits of Serrano. Is the Silard and White system—centralized financing with a local op tion surtax—consistent with the California court’s con stitutional standard? While the spending equalization standard is not required under Serrano, it remains to be seen what minimal remedies are consistent with the ®7Silard & White, supra note 31. S8W. 29 (emphasis added). _S9Thi_s public feeling was clearly expressed in the response to the Serrano decision in a New York Times editorial. After hailing the case on egalitarian grounds, the editorial abruptly concluded with the assertion that the ideal so lution for school financing lies in centralized state financing “without discour- aging additional investments by education minded communities in the better ment of their schools.” N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1971, at 32, col. 1. standard actually adopted by the court, and thereby determine the limits of its holding. Any appearance of consistency between Serrano and the surtax proposal is nothing more than a semantic illusion, unless the surtax were based on power equalization or another scheme that removed differential tax bases as an ele ment in a district’s ability to surtax itself. Otherwise the surtax has the same constitutional defect as that condemned in Serrano because the quality of a child’s education remains dependent on the district’s wealth. In fact, the surtax system is the present system in Cal ifornia—it is the foundation plan. The justifications for the surtax are the reasons given above for preferr ing district power equalizing* over expenditure equali zation—subsidiarity and the deeply embedded feeling that one cannot preclude a locality from taxing itself more heavily, if it so chooses, to get better education for its children. But, if one accepts the Serrano equal protection reasoning, these concepts and this felt need are only sufficient to justify the surtax if the surtax is necessitated by a compelling state purpose. It is not clear that these factors even provide a sufficiently com pelling purpose to justify district power equalizing. Even if they do, however, they would not justify a non power equalized surtax. Such a surtax is not necessary, because its objective of allowing local choice can be achieved by power equalizing. Thus, because it has the (S'errario-determined constitutional vice of differential expenditures related to differential tax bases that power equalizing does not have, it must be invalid un der Serrano. 24 The proposal of a centralized financing system with a local surtax option also suggests that the evils of school finance might be remedied merely by increas ing the minimum spent per child. Following this line, a system that increased the California foundation plan, say from $500 to $1000, might be said to accomplish the goal of providing to each student, regardless of the district in which he resides, an adequate level of edu cational expenditure. Such a constitutional standard would be based not on equal protection but on a con stitutional right to an affirmative minimum provision of services similar to that suggested by Professor Frank Miehelman and discussed later in a footnote to this Article.40 One of the most fundamental objections to this concept of minimum provision of services is the inability of courts to determine at what point the mini mum of a given service has been reached. In the hypo thetical above, $1000 was used, but why should the min imum not be $1200? Indeed, why is the current mini mum of approximately $500 unacceptable ? Apparently the California legislature believed it to be sufficient. One might simply argue that a minimum of $500 is unreasonable, a determination that a court could make without having to determine exactly what the minimum should be. Such an approach, however, ignores the need for judicial standards as illustrated by recent Supreme Court history. As happened in reapportionment be- 0 i0See note 84 infra; Miehelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 H a r v . L . R e v . 7 (1 9 6 9 ). tween the Baker v. Carr*1 “ rationality” test and the Reynolds v. Sims42 “ one man-one vote” test, once a court defines a principle it is difficult to stop short of setting- a minimum standard.48 Lastly, one may argue that, under a system with a sufficiently large state minimum, the surtax is merely a minor deviation that will be permitted under Serrano in the same manner that the United States Sup'reme Court has allowed a degree of deviation from mathe matical precision under its one man-one vote rule. The two situations are not comparable, however. The sur tax, unlike the unavoidable, inconsequential deviations o f voting district mathematics, is a policy decision to allow some school districts to make their schools un equal to schools in other districts. The more apt reap portionment analogy is deviation for policy prefer ences, such as protecting rural areas. Such policy pre ferences have been rejected by the Supreme Court in the reapportionment cases.44 Of course, in school fi nancial equalization there will b e deviations f r o in «-369 U.S. 186 (1962). 42377 U.S. 533 (1964). 43Professor Michelman recognized this when he hypothesized the applica tion of his minimum protection theory to education. After suggesting that each child was constitutionally entitled to a minimum provision of education, he concluded that minimum provision would mean equalization. He based this conclusion on the fact that education is valued because of its relevance to competitive activities; thus the minimum required for A must be determined in relation to what his competitor, or future competitor, B, is receiving. While there is merit in this position, Professor Michelman overstates it when he thereby equates the minimum with no substantial inequality. The fact that he does so, however, is indicative of the standardless nature of the minimum pro vision theory. Professor Michelman thus is driven to equalization in order to provide a standard. Michelman, supra note 40, at 47-59, ^See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533. 562-68 (1964). But see Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971). 26 mathematical certainties as a result of such things as differential labor costs and economies of scale. Such deviations occur because o f a practical inability t o achieve perfect equality. The surtax is not such a de viation. It represents a conscious decision to create in equality. II. D i s t r i c t W e a l t h D i s c r i m i n a t i o n : A S u s p e c t G l a s s i f i c a t i o n ? While the California Supreme Court’s reliance on an equal wealth formula thereby precludes resort to remedies such as the surtax system, and limits the holding so that it does not require expenditure equa lization, the court’s adoption of equal wealth has sig nificance beyond its force as a limitation. Wealth dis crimination was, in fact, the affirmative basis used to invalidate an almost universal school financing system. The Serrano court cited “ wealth discrimination” as one of the “ suspect classifications” that, in conjunc tion with a fundamental interest, triggered the “ new equal protection. ’ HS The Serrano court held that “ this funding scheme invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality of a child’s education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors,” 46 that is, the wealth of his school district. The factual data relied on by the court in reaching this result, however, con sisted of disparities in tax bases and school expendi- Cal. 3d at 597, 487 P.2d at 1250. 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610. Mid. at 590, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604. —27 tures among school districts. Therefore, two basic ques tions must be answered before this holding is 'related to the data: 1. What is the relationship between school expen ditures and the “ quality” of a child’s education? 2. What is the relationship between poor districts —districts with low taxable wealth—and poor people? A. The Relationship of Expenditures to Educa tional Quality The problem of relating levels of educational ex penditures to quality of education is a persistent and annoying one. For one thing, there is no consensus on what the desired educational outputs are, or how edu cational quality should be measured. Secondly, there is very little empirical data to support a finding of an affirmative relationship between expenditure levels and measurable educational outputs. The Coleman Report,47 the leading study attempt ing to correlate selected educational outputs with vari ous inputs, founds little relationship between expendi ture levels and the educational outputs it measured, when other variables were held constant.48 While the Coleman Report’s methodology has been attacked per suasively,49 affirmative data that dispute its conclusion 47O ffice of Ed u c a t io n , U.S. D e p ’ t of H e a l t h , Edu cation & W e l fare , Eq u a l it y of Ed u c ation al O p p o r t u n it y (1966). 48See id. 20-21, 312-16. 49See Bowles & Levin, The Determinants of Scholastic Achievement— An Appraisal of Some Recent Evidence, 3 J. H u m an R esource s 3 (1968). -28 remain minimal.30 The Coleman Report and other studies are concerned with spending differentials only within the relatively narrow range of current school expenditures. The lack of correlation between expendi ture levels and educational outputs in this range does not preclude the possibility of some absolute minimum of expenditures being necessary to achieve measurable educational outputs. Further, this absence of correla tion between expenditures and outputs is more under standable when it is recognized that approximately two-thirds of a typical school district’s revenues are spent for teacher salaries.51 Differences in teacher sal aries are often a function not of teaching quality, but of such indirectly related factors as longevity and ed ucational degrees. Differences in salary scales among districts may be the result of such factors as differ ential general wage scales and the bargaining power of teacher unions. The Serrano court discussed the prob lem of relating expenditures to quality in a footnote and admitted that “ there is considerable controversy among educators over the relative impact of eduea- 50Some support for a correlation between expenditure level and quality of education is found in J. G u t h r ie , G . K lf.in d o r fe r , H. L evin & R. St o u t , Sc h o o l s an d I n e q u a lit y (1971). This support, however, is hardly sufficient to support a judicial finding of correlation. Moreover, a recently published re examination of the Coleman data by a score of eminent social scientists in a faculty seminar at Harvard University has confirmed the findings of the orig inal report, while avoiding some of the original report’s methodological prob lems. Indeed, this reexamination indicates that the influence of school ex penditures on student achievement is even weaker than was indicated by the original Coleman Report. See Hosteller & Moynihan, A. Pathbreaking Report, in O n E q u a l it y of Ed u c a tio n a l O p p o r t u n it y 36-45 (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972): Jencks, The Coleman Report and the Conven tional Wisdom, in id. 69-115; Smith, Equality of Educational Opportunity: The Basic Findings Reconsidered, in id. 230-42. 51Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education. 71 C o lu m L. R ev . 1355, 1359 (1971). 29 tional spending and environmental influences on school achievement . . . .” 52 The court avoided the problem in two ways. One was to cite other cases that have rejected the argument that there is no proof that different levels of expendi ture affect the quality of education.53 Except for the latest decision in Hobson v. Hansen,5i discussed below, these cases have not given a rationale for this rejection. Secondly, the court relied on the procedural pos ture of the case. Since the complaint was dismissed on demurrer, the court countered the defendant’s conten tion that different levels of educational expenditures do not affect the quality of education with the state ment that “ plaintiffs’ complaint specifically alleges the contrary, and for purposes of testing the sufficien cy of a complaint against a general demurrer, we must take its allegations to be true.” 55 It is not clear that this approach was consistent with the court’s earlier statement that the California procedure is to “ treat the B25 Cal. 3d at 601 n. 16, 487 P. 2nd at 1253 n. 16, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613 n. 16. ss/d . The court cited Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. 111. 1968), aff’d mem. sub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), in which a 3-judge federal court stated, without a supporting citation, in the course of rejecting a constitutional attack on interdistrict differentials in school financing, “ [presumably, students receiving a $1000 education are better educated that [sic] those acquiring a $600 schooling.” 293 F. Supp. at 331. In another case cited in Serrano, Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated on other grounds per curiam sub nom. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971), the district court stated: “ [I]t may be that in the abstract ‘the difference in dollars available does not necessarily produce a difference in the quality of education.’ But this abstract statement must give way to proof to the contrary in this case.” 313 F. Supp. at 947. No proof on this issue, however, was ever stated by the court in Hargrave and the opinion goes on not to discuss this, but to discuss the inability of school districts to raise school revenues under the Florida system. 543 2 7 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971). 525 Cal. 3d at 601 n. 16, 487 P. 2d at 1253 n. 16, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613 30— demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” 515 The court did not explain why, for example, the possibility of a causal relationship be tween expenditures and educational quality would not be considered a contention of fact. .More significantly, the reliance on this procedural posture, if this is what the court did, means that the issue still remains open for proof—proof that does not appear to be available. The authors of Private Wealth and Public Educa tion, in enunciating the equal wealth standard, try to finesse the problem by stating the issue as equality of resources available to the student rather than as equal ity of educational offerings. What is available, they then contend, are the goods and services purchased by school districts, and there is no reason to assume that the money spent for these goods and services is not the appropriate measure of their value.57 The problems may also be avoided in terms of bur den of proof. When A shows that the state is spending- more money on B than on him, the state must respond by demonstrating either that this fact is irrelevant be cause A is not really receiving less than B, or that even if A is receiving less, the differential is still constitu tionally permissible. Available data are insufficient to support a state’s assertion that expenditures are irrele vant to educational equality and thus the issue shifts to Mid. at 591, 487 P.2d at 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605. B’ Private W e a l t h and P u blic Ed u cation , supra note 22, at 25-27. —31 a determination of the constitutionality of differential treatment. This burden of proof approach to the issue was apparently the one taken by Judge Wright in the latest decision of Hobson v. Hansen/’8 although there were also elements of estoppel involved in the Hobson court’s reliance on the school administration’s own as sertions of a correlation beteen educational 'resources and quality of education.38 While the burden of proof argument has appeal as an expedient solution it is not a completely satisfying basis for judicial invalidation of a longstanding method of public school financing. From this perspective, arg uments for judicial action must be discounted some- Avhat by uncertainty about the present system’s detri mental effect on the quality of education, and also therefore, by doubts of improving education by such invalidation.60 58327 F. Supp. 844, 854-55. The court in Hobson was not concerned with a correlation between gross expenditures and quality of education, but rather with the specific differences in expenditures on teacher salaries, rated on a per pupil basis, between essentially “ white” and “ black” schools within the. District of Columbia. The quality-expenditure issue in terms of teacher sal aries per pupil was posed as the correlation or lack thereof between quality- instruction and higher salaries. Phrasing the issue as “ teacher salary per pupil” also raised the issue of the relationship between educational quality and class size or student-teacher ratio. 58Id. at 855. «oprofessor Moynihan has suggested that: [t]he only certain result that will come from [a rise in educational ex penditures, which he states Serrano will produce] is that a particular cadre of middle-class persons in the possession of certain licenses— that is to say teachers— will receive more public money in the future than they do now. Moynihan, Can Courts and Money Do It?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1972, §E (Annual Education Review) at 24, col. 1. Note that by ordering equalization of teacher salaries per pupil between “ white” and “black” schools, Judge Wright in Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971), allowed the school district the choice of transferring higher paid teachers from “white” schools to “black” schools or reducing the student-teacher ratio in the “ black” schools. Although the evidence of correlation between class size and pupil -32— 13. The Relationship of Poor Districts to Poor People The second question raised by the wealth analysis underlying the Serrano holding centers on the supposed relationship between a school district’s wealth, as mea sured by its real estate tax base, and the personal wealth of its people. For its wealth classification argu ment the court relied on United State Supreme Court “ de facto wealth classification” cases in which states have been restricted in imprisoning indigents for fail ure to pay fines,01 have been required to provide indi gent criminal defendants with such things as tran scripts02 and attorneys for appeal,63 and have been pre cluded from requiring the payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting.64 All of these eases, however, in volved “ wealth classifications” that operated against individuals, whereas Serrano involved school districts. The issue in Serrano would therefore be simpler if the wealth of school districts coincided with the wealth of its people, thus making poor districts aggregates of poor individuals. Available statistics, however, do not indicate this hypothesized 'relationship between poor districts and performance does not seem significantly greater than that between average teacher salary and pupil performance, one’s subjective sense is that the class size is the more significant factor to education. Both the intradistrict and racial aspects of Hobson also strengthened the case for judicial intervention. "Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 11970); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 \ 1^ / I / • 62Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). ,!8DougIas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 84Harper v. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 33- poor people. One recent study of 223 school districts in eight states indicates that there is no substantial pattern of differences in real estate tax basis per pupil among seven categories of school districts: major ur ban core cities, minor urban core cities, independent cities, established suburbs, developing suburbs, small cities, and small towns.66 It is true that the three-judge federal district court which invalidated the Texas school financing system in Rodrigues v. San Antonio Independent School District found that “ those dis tricts most rich in property also have the highest medi an family income and the lowest percentage of minority pupils, while the poor property districts are poor in income . . . . ” 06 The basis for this finding was an affi davit submitted by plaintiffs and cited by the court. As a basis for the court’s conclusion, this was a ques tionable source; a careful reading of the data contained in the affidavit creates grave doubts about the validity of its conclusions.67 e5S ee A lt e r n a tiv e Program s for F in a n c in g E d u cation 83-89 (1971) (National Educational Finance Project vol. 5). 66337 F. Supp. at 282 (W.D. Tex. 1971). e7The Rodriguez court cited the affidavit as showing a median family in come of $5900 in the 10 districts with the highest tax base per pupil and $3325 in the 4 districts with the lowest tax base per pupil. Id. at 282 n.3. The fol lowing are the study’s figures: Market Value of Taxable Property Per Pupil Above $100,000 (10 Districts) $100,000-$50,000 (26 Districts) $50,000-$30,000 (30 Districts) $30,000-$10,000 (40 Districts) Below $10,000 (4 Districts) Median Family Income From 1960 $5900 Per Cent Minority Pupils 8% State & Local Revenues Per Pupil $815 4425 32 544 4900 23 483 5050 31 462 3325 79 305 34 In tlie amicus brief filed in Serrano by the Harvard Centers for Educational Policy Research and for Law and Education, an attempt was made to avoid the ab sence of statistics correlating poor people and poor school districts, by defining the injured class as those poor people who also live in poor school districts,68 Al though the amicus brief never explains the basis for this definition of the injured class, it may be argued that the people in this narrow group are singularly disadvantaged because they have neither the advantage of a high tax base as do the poor in rich districts, nor the mobility68 and private school alternatives of the more wealthy residents of poor school districts. The flaw in this approach is that defining the injured class in these terms considerably weakens the wealth classi fication argument. The system no longer can be said to discriminate against the poor but only against a certain segment of the poor. In fact, when the school fi nance system is viewed from this perspective, the chief beneficiaries of the system when the class is so defined Affidavit of Joel S. Berke at 6 (footnotes omitted). The 5 category breakdown of school districts seems to be arbitrary, and it is only this breakdown which appears to produce the correlation of poor school districts and poor people. Even on this breakdown, however, the cor relation is doubtful. Note the very small number of districts in the top and bottom categories. Even more significant is the apparent inverse relationship between property value and median income in the three middle districts, where 96 of the 110 districts fall. While the family income differences among the 3 groups of districts are small, they may be even more significant if categories are weighted by the number of districts in each. At the very least, the study does not support the affirmative correlation of poor school districts and poor people stated by the court and the affiant; this is, however, the study the court relied upon, and it is apparently the only study which purports to show such correlation. 68Brief for the Center for Educational Policy Research and the Center for Law and Education as Amici Curiae at 3 n.l. 6»Id. 6 n.5. — 35— would be those pool’ families who live in rich districts. Not only do they have a resource advantage over those who live in poor districts, but also, they get more school for fewer tax dollars than do their more wealthy neigh bors in the rich districts. The relative advantage of the poor in rich districts is further increased by the very factors that arguably are the unique disadvantage of the poor in poor districts—their lack of mobility and private school alternatives. As with the wealthy in poor districts, the wealthy in rich districts are not as dependent on their district’s public schools as their less affluent neighbors and thus not as benefited by living in a rich district under the present system. Finally, to focus on aiding the poor who live in poor districts would probably require greater relief than that offered by Serrano and the subsequent cases. Un der this analysis, the poor in districts that undervalue education under such equal wealth alternatives as dis trict power equalizing would be just as disadvantaged as the poor who live in poor districts today. Their im mobility and lack of private school alternatives would still uniquely disadvantage them as compared to the wealthy inhabitants of the same districts, and the poor in districts with greater school expenditures. A focus on the poor in poor districts would, therefore, require equalization of expenditures to avoid the hypothesized legal wrong. Another complication in applying a district wealth classification theory is that any correlation that does exist between poor school districts and poor people 36— may vary from state to state. Also, it is quite possible that there is a greater correlation between the rural poor and poor school districts than there is between the urban poor and poor school districts. I f this cor relation is necessary to the legal analysis, the legiti macy of the Serrano result might very well vary from state to state. A decision by the United States Supreme Court, however, attempting to differentiate among the states, would be entirely inappropriate. It would be most unwise to have basically similar state systems held invalid or valid depending on where the state’s poor lived, or more accurately, depending on judges’ views of the difficult statistical analysis demonstrating a correlation between poor people and poor school dis tricts. A related failure to demonstrate a relationship be tween blacks or other racial minorities and poor dis tricts is particularly disappointing to proponents of judicial action for whom the presence of such correla tion would have significant legal effects.70 One report notes that in California, over half the minority pupils reside in districts with above average assessed wealth per pupil.71 ™$ee, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), in which statistical evidence of discriminatory distribution of municipal services along racial grounds triggered a “ compelling state interest” test. ^ P rivate W e a l t h an d P ublic E d u c a tio n , supra note 22, at 356-57 n.47. The complaint in Serrano alleged that “ [a] disproportionate number of school children who are black children, children with Spanish surnames, chil- dren. belonging to other minority groups reside in school districts in which a relatively inferior educational opportunity is provided.” 5 Cal. 3d at 590 n.l. 487 P.2d at 1245 n.l, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605 n.l. Other than quoting this al legation as part of the complaint, however, the California court did not rely on it. Hie affidavit relied on by the court in Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. at 282 The absence of a correlation between poor or racial minorities and poor districts may be attributable to, among other factors, the failure of the property tax as a measure of a man’s actual wealth. Most signifi cantly, however, the reason for the absence of correla tion is the location of industrial and commercial pro perty, the presence of w h i c h increases a district’s wealth by increasing its tax base, without a necessary increase in school population. These facts raise a basic question of the effect of Serrano and its progeny. While the case has been hailed on theoretical egalitarian grounds, many of its pro ponents are more concerned with the practical prob lem of getting more money for urban education. While some major cities with high concentrations of poor people are financially poor school districts, others, such as New York, San Francisco, and Philadelphia, have relatively high tax bases as compared to their respec tive state averages.72 * They also spend more per pupil than their respective state averages. Therefore, if cur rent expenditures for education were equalized on a statewide basis, major cities in many areas would have n.3 (see note 67 supra), however, did state that, of the districts sampled in Texas, the richest districts had 8% minority pupils while the poorest dis tricts had 79% minority pupils. Again, however, the validity of this conclu sion based on the study’s figures is doubtful. The “ correlation” only exists for the 10 richest and 4 poorest districts. This pattern disappears in the middle groups which include 96 of the 110 districts. Whatever correlation there is between the percentage of minority people and the tax base wealth of a school district in Texas may reflect the rural nature of Texas minority life or some other state peculiarity. 72Another reason, in addition to the presence of industrial ̂ and commer cial property, for the absence of correlation between major cities and poor districts may be the relatively large number of students in urban areas at tending nonpublic, schools. —38 less money to spend than they have now.73 The same would be true if wealth were equalized with tax rates remaining the same. It is possible that equal wealth systems may, by their nature, result not just in equalization of current expenditures but also in over-all increased spending for education, it may be that under a scheme of centralized financing it would be politically easier for state legis latures to raise taxes, and thereby increase total school expenditures, than it would be for local school board members. The latter are more visible to the taxpayer and may, indeed, have to get voter approval for tax increases or bond issues. Under district power equali zing Professor Brest suggests that, because it is po litically impossible for legislators to vote to take local ly collected taxes away from a district, tax rate and expenditure levels would have to be equalized at the highest figures previously available—that is, what the wealthiest district produced from its tax rate.74 The consequence of this would be enormous increases for 73An equalization principle that operated beyond the sphere of property tax base wealth could work against the cities in another area. Local non property taxes, though limited in significance to a few states, see note 23 supra, may also disproportionately favor urban centers. In a study of Alabama Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee for 1968-1969, school districts were classified into central city, suburban indepen dent city, and rural districts. It was found that in 5 of the 7 states (Ken tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Tennesseee) the rural dis tricts received the least amount of revenue per pupil from such local non- property taxes; in 4 of the 7 states (Kentucky, New York, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee) the central city districts received the most revenue per pupil The average ranking for the 7 states showed that the central city school districts on the average received the most revenue per pupil from local nonproperty taxes, followed in order by suburban, independent city, and rural districts A ltern ative _ Program s for F in a n c in g Ed u cation 186-87 (1971) (Na tional Educational Finance Project vol. 5). 74Brest, Book Review, 23 St a n . L. R ev . 591, 596 (1971). 39 education. So enormous, in fact, that Professor Brest uses it to demonstrate the improbabilty of any state ever adopting district power equalizing. Despite these hopes for a greater investment in education, the history of state legislative treatment of urban education, the serious economic difficulties cur rently facing state government, and the domination of state governments by r u r a l and suburban interests make it difficult to realistically predict that Serrano will result in greater total expenditures for education. And if total expenditures do not increase, then the cities, in their relatively wealthy status stand to gain little from the Serrano decision.75 C. “ Wealth Classifications” as Applied to School Districts In addressing the problem of correlating poor peo ple and poor school districts in its legal analysis, the California Supreme Court first relied on the proced ural posture of the case and noted again that the com plaint alleged a correlation between poor people and poor districts.76 The court did not quote the complaint nor state the basis, if any, given for the allegation. The 75It may aid rural education which would help the rural poor. It may also be argued that, when relieved of the obligation of financing education, by the adoption of a centralized financing scheme for education, urban areas will be more able to raise greater revenues for their other needs. This assumes either that the state financing scheme will not take the same revenue that the urban areas now take for education, or that taxpayers will be more responsive to local taxation for other needs if their education taxation goes to the state. Such assumptions appear unrealistic; present indications are that statewide financing for education will continue to be based on the same real property tax as that on which local taxation presently is based. 7«5 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612. — 40 court did not rest on this procedural argument, how ever, but went on to state: More basically, however, we reject defendants’ underlying thesis that classification by wealth is constitutional so long as the wealth is that of the district, not the individual. We think that discrim ination on the basis of district wealth is equally invalid. The commercial and industrial property which augments a district’s tax base is distributed unevenly throughout the state. To allot more edu cational dollars to the children of one district than to those of another merely because of the fortuitous presence of such property is to make the quality of a child’s education dependent upon the location of private commercial and industrial establish ments. Surely, this is to rely on the most irrelevant of factors as the basis for educational financing.77 There are, however, serious problems with this ap plication of the wealth discrimination cases to govern ment entities, as distinguished from individuals. Since district wealth is measured by the real estate tax base, and the development of a district ’s real estate is a var iable factor, the possibility of voluntary “ poverty” is more acute for government entities. Throughout the opinion, the court assumed that a district’s wealth was a “ fortuitous” given, beyond a district’s control, and not subject to voluntary choice. While this may generally be correct, it is increas ingly true in our environmentally conscious age that Jtld. at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Gal. Rptr. at 612-13 (footnote omitted). — 41— a rural or suburban district might voluntarily exclude industrial or commercial development that would in crease its wealth by increasing its tax base, without a corresponding increase in its school population.78 Un der centralized school financing this district would not be deprived of school revenues, because 'revenue would be independent of local decisions affecting the tax base. Under an equal wealth alternative, such as dis trict power equalizing, a decision to exclude new de velopment would likewise not affect revenues, which would be based on a district’s choice of tax rate, not wealth. Yet this choice would be logically indistinguish able from the choice of tax rates, with its correspond ing benefit or detriment to the district’s school reve nues, permitted, a n d indeed encouraged b y district power equalizing.79 Perhaps it is desirable that districts be able to choose to remain at a low level of wealth without ad versely affecting school revenue. This would have the beneficial effect of freeing a locality from the obliga tions of economic development, thus benefiting the area ecologically. On the other hand, it may be unfair to treat bucolic areas that choose not to expand rapidly 78School districts, as special function governmental units, rarely are delegated powers broader than those necessary to administer the school and raise funds by taxation and bond issues. General function units, such as mu nicipalities and townships, are usually the smallest entitles delegated the power over development suggested in the text. Yet, to the extent that general func tion units coincide with school districts, or to the extent that the smaller units have significant political power within the general unit, one may accurately speak of school district political choices. 79Some practical differences, of course, are that a tax rate choice can be redetermind on a periodic basis, is unambiguous, and is dearly visible; whereas wealth choices have more enduring consequences, may be ambiguous as to their basis, and of low visibility. ______42 the same as highly developed areas that have attendant congestion, pollution, and other problems that create a heavier tax burden for the urban dweller. Additionally, widespread decisions not to allow local development could seriously undermine a program of decentraliza tion of industry and commerce. These economic and social effects of Serrano obviously need more explora tion than the courts and commentators thus far have offered. The wealth classification precedents employed by the Serrano court present another problem. The prin ciple contained in this group of United States Supreme Court precedents is ambiguous. In the criminal pro cedure cases the Supreme Court required the free pro vision of transcripts80 and attorneys81 on the basis of the indigency of the accused82 On the other hand, the Court struck down the use of the poll tax as a precon dition to voting in all cases, without regard to finan cial ability to pay the tax.83 The United States Supreme 80Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 81Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 82See also Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970): Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), relieving only indigents of the penalty of imprisonment be cause of their inability to pay fines; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), relieving only indigents of the obligation to pay court fees and costs incidental to a divorce proceeding. 88Harper v. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); see Lindsey v Normet, 40 U.S.L.W. 4184 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1972), in which the Court held unconstitutional an Oregon statute that required a tenant appealing an evic tion judgment to post a bond for twice the rental value of the premises from the commencement of the action in which the judgment was rendered until the final judgment on appeal. In so holding, the Court invalidated the high bond requirement for all tenant-defendants, regardless of their ability to pay the bond. See also Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972). con cerning the validity of high filing fees for entry into Texas nominating pri maries. The decision is ambiguous as to whether the Court held the system unconstitutional as applied to all candidates, including those who could raise —43 Court lias subsequently cited these cases indistinguisb- ably as “ de facto wealth classifications,” without ap parent recognition of the difference between saying that no one can be made to pay for a given service, and saying that one who cannot afford to pay for a given service cannot for that reason alone be deprived of it.84 The former formula of requiring no payment from anyone has the advantage of encouraging all-—rich, poor, and in-between—to avail themselves of the ser vice. This is the aim, for example, of free public edu cation and, perhaps, the reason for voiding the poll the high fees, or only held that those who. because of their indigency, couid not raise the high fees had to be relieved from doing so. The Court did stress the issue of the “ inability” (without defining the term) of some candidates to pay the fee and thus indicated that it could be constitutionally permissible for Texas to maintain its general fee system and except only those with this “ inability.” 84Professor Frank Michelman, in his article, supra note 40, cited by the Serrano court, has argued persuasively that these cases are better understood as substantive due process “minimum protection” cases rather than as equal protection cases. The distinction between “minimum protection” and “equal protection” is set forth by Michelman as “ vindication of a state’s duty to pro tect against certain hazards which are endemic to an unequal society, rather than vindication of a duty to avoid complicity in unequal treatment,” Id. 9 (emphasis omitted). Minimum protection thus means state fulfillment of those just wants (or fundamental rights) that our society cannot constitutionally accept as being subject to normal market risks of nonsatisfaction. This changes the focus of inquiry from “ wealth classification” to the determination of what are just wants and what is meant by their nonsatisfaction. Justice Harlan adopted the Michelman approach in his concurring opinion in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259 (1970), and employed it for the Court in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) over the objection of Justice Douglas. Justice Harlan’s attempt to shift the Court to the Michel man due process approach has apparently been unsuccessful. See Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972).- In discussing the minimum protection thesis, Professor Michelman notes the difference in treatment discussed in the text between the poll tax and criminal procedure cases. H does not, however, appear to offer a rationale for this difference. Michelman, supra note 40, at 24-26. Fie suggests that under his minimum protection theory, the state’s obligation is normally satisfied “ by free provision to those and only to those who cannot satisfy their just wants out of their own means.” Id. 26. Nor would his theory require a grad uated schedule of payments above the indigency threshold. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Williams v. Illinois pointed out that logical conse quence of the Court’s equal protection theory would require a graduated sched ule of payments for those above the indigency level. 399 U.S. at 261. 44 tax as a prerequisite for voting. On the other hand, an exemption from payment only for the poor results in a greater redistribution of wealth than does a no payment principle. To view the problem only in terms of those who can pay all or those who can pay nothing is also to over simplify. One basic prerequisite is a determination of what level of sacrifice is required before one can say that a given individual or group is “ unable” to pay for a service. Again, the leading cases have not dealt with this pervasive problem. Perhaps the level of sac rifice required of an individual can also be related (in versely) to the degree that society desires that everyone avail himself of the service; that is, the more society wants the service used, the less sacrifice is required for it.8B Even this formula may need reevaluation to the extent that sacrifice is also considered to be a signifi cant measure of the value of a service to an individual and recognition of that value by the individual in creases the societal result desired. The ambiguous result presented by the individual wealth discrimination cases is compounded when ap plied, as in Serrano, to an aggregation of individuals —a school district. In this setting, level of sacrifice may become useless as a guideline for determining when to apply the no-payment principle. Governmental 85 Under Professor Michelman’s theory, Michelman, supra note 40, ab sent the “ remote” possibility that one might deliberately waive his claim to the satisfaction of a just want, a person is always entitled to satisfaction of his just wants regardless of the sacrifice he is or is not willing to make to attain such satisfaction. Id. 14. He does not, however, satisfactorily explain why this is so. 45 units may have a greater array of demands on re sources than do individuals; districts may he able to reallocate priorities in a way that individuals cannot. Arguably, street cleaning or hospital construction can always be cut back to pay for education. More signifi cantly, a poor district’s ability to raise its taxes or create revenue through borrowing may be so much greater than the ability of a poor person to raise rev enue that the issue of level of sacrifice becomes mean ingless. The California Supreme Sourt recognized the dif ficulty of deriving from the wealth classification pre cedents a rule that, as applied to districts, would de fine the limits of sacrifice—determine which districts could not, and therefore need not, pay. One response by the court was to assert that “ as a statistical matter, the poorer districts are financially unable to raise their taxes high enough to match the educational offerings of wealthier districts. ’ ,86 The authority given for t h i s statement was an unquoted reference to a Legislative Analyst study. The court, rightly, was unwilling to rest on that.87 Rather, it relied primarily on the proposition 865 Cal. 3d 599-600, 487 P.2d at 1251, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611. 87Under the California financing system there is no limit on the rate at which, with voter approval, a district can choose to tax itself. Thus, there is no legal limit on a district’s ability to raise its revenue. This may be con trasted with the situation in Florida which was presented to a 3-judge court in Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla.. 1970), vacated on other grounds per curiam sub nom. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971). Florida, in its “ Millage Rollback Act,” provided that, in order to qualify for state subvention, a school district could not tax itself at a rate greater than 10 mills. The district court accepted the argument that this limit was in valid because it put a limit on tax rates (or penalized districts for high rates), thus precluding school districts with lower tax bases from producing the same revenue as those with higher bases. The district court invalidated this limit on the grounds that there was no rational basis for it. In this the court was — 46— that even if poorer districts could achieve expenditure parity by higher tax rates, “ the richer district is fa vored when it can provide the same educational quality for its children with less tax effort.” 88 This statement suggests, that as applied to districts, the evil to be cured is not merely absolute deprivation, but relative disadvantage in ability to pay. This theory goes well beyond the de facto wealth eases that relieved only indigents of the obligation to pay for certain ser vices.89 Obviously, within the nonindigent category, the wealthier can purchase the service with less effort than the less wealthy. But the precedents do not require free provision of services to all or graded fees based on the ability to pay of those above the indigent cutoff line. patently in error. The state does have a rational purpose in preserving its own sources of revenue and protecting the taxpayers from overtaxation by their local school districts. The court did accurately recognize, however, that the limit meant that dis tricts with lower tax bases could not, even by taxing themselves more, equalize school expenditures with wealthier tax base districts. Yet, there is a para doxical effect here. Florida argued in the United States Supreme Court that the limit was intended to be, and was, equalizing in a way that benefited poorer school districts. It had this effect, because for each percentage increase m tax rate, the wealthier district could produce more dollars per pupil than the poor one. To illustrate this, consider the hypothetical case of 2 school dis tricts, A with $100,000 assessed valuation per pupil and B with $50,000 as sessed valuation per pupil. If a 1.0% limit were put on both A and B A could produce $1000 per pupil and B, $500, a difference of $500. By con trast, if there were no limit, and both A and B taxed at 1.5%, A would have $1500 and B, $750, a difference of $750, and so on. Thus, while holding A down, the limit also holds down the possible dollar divergence between A and B. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case, on the question of whether the district court should have refused to exercise jurisdiction under the abstention doctrine. 885 Cal. 3d at 599, 487 P.2d at 1251, 96 Cal. Rptr at 611. 8()It would also go beyond the court’s apparent limitation of Proposition 1 to cases in which there are expenditure differentials, and underlines the tax payer orientation of Proposition 1. See note 28 supra, 47 When applied to school districts, a constitutional standard of graded ability to pay becomes an even greater innovation than if it were applied to individ uals. When dealing with school districts we are deal ing with taxation. Let us assume, for example, equal spending per pupil among school districts. Each school district raises its required revenue by dividing its ex penditure total by the number of its inhabitants (or the number of its families). It then assesses each in habitant (or family) a per capita share of the total revenues required and levies a tax accordingly. I f the state is redistricted so that aggregate individual wealth of each district is the same, the system clearly would not violate the Serrano holding because no school dis trict, qua district, would have to make a greater effort than any other to raise the required revenues, never theless, is this the relevant issue ? Burdens of taxation fall not on school districts, but on taxpayers. Even though districts are equalized in wealth consistent with Serrano, individuals or families are not. It would make no difference to the poor tax payer who had difficulty meeting his tax burden, that there were an equal number of poor people with the same difficulty in other school districts. I f the school districts in the example did v a r y in the aggregate wealth of their residents this system might violate Serrano; one could say that it was easier for the school district with greater aggregate wealth to raise its rev enue than for the poorer one to do so. This approach still misses the point. The real problem is the individ __48. ual taxpayer’s difficulty in paying his tax bill. I f Ser rano labels relative deprivation among districts uncon stitutional, then does its logic not require elimination of disproportionate sacrifice among those who pay the tax ? Does the former proposition even make any sense without the latter? I f there is a constitutional vice created by the dif ferential ability of taxpayers to meet their obligations, does this then mean that proportional, or even pro gressive, taxation is constitutionally compelled? It is doubtful that the Serrano court meant to suggest this outcome.90 Nevertheless, without such a conclusion it is difficult to understand why it is unconstitutional to have a system whereby one district can more easily raise revenue than another. It is indeed probable un der present financing systems, including that of Cali fornia, that the average resident of a rich district pays higher taxes, in terms of gross dollars, for his schools than does the average resident of a poor district, des pite the fact that the resident of the rich district is taxed at a lower rate.91 This may be the result of the 90The complaint contained counts by both students and parent taxpayers. The court’s entire analysis was directed to the student plaintiff count, how ever. In addressing itself, at the end of the opinion to the dismissal of the taxpayer count, the court did not discuss the independent claims of the tax payers, qua taxpayers, that, being in a poor district, they were required to pay taxes at a higher rate to secure the same or less educational expenditures. It reversed the dismissal of the taxpayer count solely on the basis that the taxpayer plaintiffs had incorporated the unequal education allegations of the student plaintiffs into their count, and that, under California law, they had standing to assert the students’ educational interests. 5 Cal. 3d at 618 487 (P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625. 81In addition, taxpayers might very well be paying for the education of their children in the prices they pay for their homes, as well as in their tax payments. _ To the extent that the quality of education in a given district is disproportionately high in relation to real estate taxes paid by the home owners of the district, this fact should be reflected in the price of the district’s homes. -4 9 higher assessed valuation and, perhaps, larger average property holdings of the individual taxpayers in the rich district. A correlation may even exist between the amount of tax dollars paid by the average resident of a district and the educational expenditures of that dis trict. I f this is so, the difficulty is not with dispropor tionate payments but with inequitable taxation, not only in the hypotheticals above, but also in the existing financing schemes. The logic of Serrano, which invali dated these existing financing schemes, may therefore 'require the wealthy taxpayer to bear a greater burden than just having to pay more tax dollars than the poor. Instead it may demand at least a proportional tax sys tem, and possibly one that is progressive. The difficulties of relating the wealth of individ uals to the wealth of districts, of applying wealth class ification precedents to districts, and of finding a logi cal stopping place for the equality concepts involved, are not the only problems with the wealth classification analysis of Serrano v. Priest. In fact, the entire foun dation of the court’s constitutional argument may well have been destroyed by a United States Supreme Court decision which the Serrano court disturbingly ignored. In James v. ValtierraP the Supreme Court implied that even the existence of “ invidious classifications on the basis of wealth” are insufficient to trigger the com pelling interest standard of the new equal protection. In Valtierra, the Supreme Court upheld a Califor nia constitutional provision that no low-rent housing &2402 U.S. 137 (1971.) — 50- project could be constructed by a state public body unless the project bad been approved by a majority of those voting at a local election. Refusing to apply strict scrutiny, the Court upheld the mandatory referendum on the ground that it was rationally related to the legiti mate purpose of achieving popular participation in ex penditure decisions. Justice Marshall, in a vigorous dissent, noted that the mandatory referendum provi sion discriminated solely against the poor. “ Publically assisted housing developments designed to accommo date the aged, veterans,. . . or any class of citizens other than the poor, need not be approved by prior referen d a / ’93 Nevertheless, the Court ignored Douglas, Har per, and other cases that had deemed wealth classifica tions or discriminations against the poor as inherently suspect.94 The Valtierra decision casts an unavoidable shadow over the first half of the constitutional analy sis employed in Serrano v. Priest. I I I . E d u c a t i o n : A F u n d a m e n t a l I n t e r e s t ? A. Relationship Between Fundamentally and Impairment of an Interest The inherently suspect wealth classification argu ment is only one-half of the California Supreme Court’s constitutional attack on school financing. The court also relied on its conclusion that education is one of those fundamental interests that, when conditioned on wealth classifications, will trigger special scrutiny d. at 144 (footnote omitted). siSee notes 61-64 supra. Si- requiring a compelling state interest. The court con cluded that education is a fundamental interest based on its importance, and its similarity to interests pre viously held to be fundamental. The court’s analysis proceeded on the unstated assumption that having al ready found a suspect trait—wealth classification—if it is determined that education is fundamental, then the system of education financing here involved must meet a compelling interest test to survive consti tutional scrutiny. This analysis was developed, how ever, without any attempt by the court to correlate the various reasons for determining education to be funda mental with the constitutional vice here perceived, un equal educational expenditures based on differential tax bases among school districts. The Serrano court seems not to have perceived this as an issue at all. It was not an issue in the criminal process and voting cases decided by the United States Supreme Court and discussed above,93 because those were cases of total deprivation of the service involved. When the effect of state action is total deprivation of the service to the individual, whatever fundamental aspects of the service exist are necessarily eliminated.90 On the other hand, where a service is only impaired 95See notes 80-84 supra & accompanying text. 06It may be possible for a service to be held fundamental based solely on general societal benefit or externalities unrelated to any particular individual enjoying it. Because society’s interest would be in the level of the service en joyed by people in the aggregate, arguably this interest would not be impaired by inequality among society’s components. If this were so, a total deprivation limited to a number of individuals might not impair the bases of fundamen- tality. This would seem, however, to be a very rare situation of fundamentality. and has not yet arisen in any litigation. — 52— rather than total withheld, it would seem necessary to determine whether or not the impairment does affect the basis of the fundamentality of the service. As an illustration, assume that a state decided to provide all students with free education only through eighth grade, and thereafter to charge fees so that only those who could afford to pay could attend. In analyzing this hypothetical in terms of the fundamen- tality of education, one might conclude that all the at tributes of education that make it fundamental are satisfied by attendance only until eighth grade. I f that were so, the fundamentality of education would be ir relevant to the constitutionality of any state decision on post-eighth grade education. In the context of Ser rano, such an analysis would require detei'mination of the relationship between the various grounds for the court’s conclixsion that education is fundamental, and the inequalities of interdistrict expenditures based on differences in taxable wealth among districts. B. Is Education a Fundamental Interest f In its analysis of education’s fundamentality, the California Supreme Court first recognized that there was no direct authority for the proposition that edu cation is such a fundamental interest.97 The court then went on to make three basic arguments for the funda mentality of education, based on : 1. the importance of education to the individual and society; 97 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 F.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615. 53— 2- a comparison of education with the rights of criminal defendants and voting rights that have been held to be fundamental; and 3. the distinguishing of education from other gov ernmental functions that might arguably he as funda mental as education. 1. The “ Importance of Education” Argument The court first argued for the fundamentality of education because it is “ a major determinant of an in dividual’s chances for economic and social success in our competitive society; . . . [and] a unique influence on a child’s development as a citizen and his participa tion in political and community life.” 98 In support of these statements the court did not cite any social science data but rather relied on language in prior cases, prin cipally the well-known statements in Brown v. Board of Education99 concerning the importance of education in today’s world. As stated above, however, the court did not relate these attributes of education to the effect of interdis trict disparities in expenditures. Its only reference to the issue was an assertion that, while California pre cedents “ involved [only] actual exclusion from the public schools, surely the right to an education today means more than access to a classroom.” 100 For com- 9* « . at 605, 487 P.2d at 1255-56, 96 Gal. Rptr. at 615-16. »»347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). i»»5 Cal. 3d at 607, 487 P. 2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617 (footnote om itted). Otl---- parison the court q u o t e d language in Reynolds v. Sims™1 where the Supreme Court asserted that the right to vote is impaired not only by bars to voting but by dilution of power by malapportionment. Sims, however, is not relevant to the issue posed. The real issue in the voting case concerned individual political power, an interest clearly and directly impaired by the evil to be remedied—malapportionment. There is no a priori clear connection between those characteristics of education quoted above by the court to establish its fundamentality, and financing differentials; nor do ex isting data show such a connection. In terms of an individual’s social and economic suc cess, there are data, although hardly incontrovertible, correlating length of school attendance and economic attainment.102 However, such data do not correlate eco nomic or social attainment with differential expendi tures and, as indicated above, the whole issue of cor relating economic inputs and educational outputs is, at best, unclear. As to responsible citizenship there again are no empirical data to show a correlation with differential expenditures. One’s a priori judgment here might be that there is no such correlation. 1M377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964). 102See Ed u c a tio n a l I n v e s t m e n t in a n U rban So ciety (M . Levin & A. Shank eds. 1970), which contains summaries and analyses of a number of studies. — 55 2. Education Compared to Previously Recognized Fundamental Rights The second part of the court’s argument that edu cation is fundamental was a comparison of education with those rights the United States Supreme Court already has held to be fundamental: various rights of criminal defendants and voting. The court recognized the uniqueness of an individual’s interest in liberty which operates in the criminal procedure area, but suggested that education might well be as important because it has “ far greater social significance than [such procedural protections as] a free transcript or a court-appointed lawyer.” 103 Except for an aside that education may reduce the crime rate, however, the Ser rano court did not really try to equate education with the rights of criminal defendants. Nor .should it. The protection of the procedural rights of criminal defen dants is not solely recognition of a unique right to liberty but a recognition of the need for protection against the ultimate state attempt to curtail that lib erty. The individual, in classic terms, is defending him self against the state. This protection of citizen from government is the essence o f t h e constitutional re straints contained in the Bill of Rights and the four teenth amendment. Unlike the state’s function of giv ing children an education, in the criminal process cases the state fulfills its function by taking something—the liberty of the criminal. Thus these eases do not support 1035 Cal. 3d at 607, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr, at 618. — 56- the proposition that there are fundamental affirmative rights to the provision of government services. The right to vote is an affirmative right ensured by the state; it is, however, the ultimate political right in a democratic society in a way that makes it sui generis. Voting ensures the right to all other rights— including education—to the extent achievable through the political process. Public education, though certain ly relevant to political access, is not intrinsic to democ racy. Finally, the most obviously distinctive fact about both criminal procedural safeguards and voting is that they find expression in the structure of the Federal Constitution in a way that education does not.104 3. Education Compared to Other Government Functions In addition to extolling education and comparing it with acknowledged fundamental rights, the court in Serrano felt compelled to distinguish education from other services and interests. This ability to find educa tion unique is central to its fundamentality. I f every thing is fundamental, nothing is. Moreover, the unique ness of education is an essential limitation on the hold ing in the case. The court was most anxious to refute the argument that if differences in spending on ed ucation attributable to wealth differentials among geo graphical areas are unconstitutional, then so are sim ilar differentials in other governmental services. 10iSee Brest, supra note 74, at 606. — 5 7 - In attempting to distinguish education from other governmental services the court relied on five fac tors :105 1. Education is necessary to preserve an individ ual’s opportunity, despite a disadvantaged background, to compete successfully in the economic market place, thus maintaining the existence of “ free enterprise de mocracy. ’ ’ 2. Education is “ universally relevant.” Every per son benefits from education though not everyone finds it necessary to use other governmental services like the police or fire department. 3. Public education occupies much of an individ ual’s youth— between ten and thirteen years. Pew gov ernment services have such “ sustained, intensive con tact” with the individual. 4. No other government service molds the person ality of society’s youth as does education. 5. Education is compulsory. Again, there is the difficulty of relating these dis tinguishing features of education to spending differ entials. The unproven relationship of educational spending to social and economic success has already been discussed.106 The universality and prolonged na ture of education were used expressly to distinguish it from police and fire services. The universality of public 1055 Cal. 3d at 609-10, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Gal. Rptr. at 618-19. iW'See text accompanying notes 98-102 supra. -58— education is overstated, however. Although there are economic limitations on its use, the alternative of pri vate education is available. More significantly, police and fire protection are also universal and sustained. Their protective attributes do not consist solely of re sponding to cries of distress, but consist also of the security present on a daily, continuous basis in an in dividual’s surroundings. Thus, they cannot be said to be less universal or of a shorter duration than educa tion. Reasons four and five do distinguish education, at least in degree, from police and fire. This fact does not satify the question of what relationship these factors have to differential expenditures. The major thrust of the argument that education molds personalities and that it does so with the force of governmental compul sion behind it, would appear to be directed not against financing differentials, but against the danger to a free society in having the government effectively con trol and monopolize this crucial mind forming process. As such it would argue much more for the easier avail ability of diverse educational experiences, for example, through a tuition voucher system, than for equality of expenditures.107 The compulsory nature of education merits further discussion.108 It was argued that education is funda- 107It may be argued that the personality molding function of education is peripherally related to first amendment rights. The difficulties of relating this factor to a need for equal expenditures would still apply to the argument however. & 108In assessing the applicability of Serrano on a nationwide basis, it should be noted that education is not universally compulsory in this country. Mississippi —59 mental to the individual because by making it compul sory the state has designated its importance. On analy sis, however, this does not seem convincing. The rea sons for making education compulsory are two: (1) people might not otherwise avail themselves of this service; and (2) the value of freedom of choice is less applicable here because the choice of school attendance would not be the child’s, but his parents’. This latter, parens patriae reason presumes that the state is no worse a decisionmaker for a child than are his parents, and that a state choice of compulsory schooling pro vides a foundation for later choice by the child. The first reason, that education is compulsory be cause otherwise people would not avail themselves of the service, does not primarily demonstrate a judgment of importance to the individual. Indeed, the need to make education compulsory to be certain that all will avail themselves of it might indicate its relative unim portance to the individual; an opposite determination that there is no need to make a service compulsory could reflect the belief that all individuals, recogniz ing the importance of the service, would use it. The “ importance” reflected in the societal decision to make education compulsory does not represent the value choice of the individual, but rather, of society. It may be that the court was here finding the individ- and South Carolina do not have compulsory school attendance laws and Vir ginia has a local option system. Moreover, compulsory school attendance is generally limited to those between the ages of 7 to 16. whereas one is entitled to attend school generally from ages 6 to 21. See Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. Pa. L. R ev. 373, 393-94 n.74- (1969). — 60— ual’s interest in education to be fundamental because the external benefits of education are valuable to so ciety. The flaw in that approach is that society has al ready decided what benefits it wants from education by legislative determination; it does not need judicial intervention. dSTo'r does the second reason for making education compulsory—the parens patriae reasoning—necessari ly indicate a judgment of education’s unique impor tance to the individual. Rather, it relates to the pecu liar situation of the child, an individual for whom someone else, parent or state, must make a choice.109 While the reasons for making education compulsory do not therefore argue that education is fundamental, there remains the significance of compulsory atten dance itself. Initially, it should be remembered that enrollment in public school is not required. The option of private schooling is constitutionally protected.110 On the other hand, private school is a viable option only for those who can easily afford it, or who feel strong social, po litical, or religious needs that persuade them to make the sacrifice necessary to pay for private schooling. ’The Serrano court stated that the freedom to attend private schools “ is seldom available to the indigent. In this context, it has been suggested that ‘ a child of the l09The validity of these rationales for compulsory school laws has been challenged in the recent decision of State v. Yoder. 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539, cert, granted, 402 U.S. 994 (1971). 110See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). — 61- poor assigned willynilly to an inferior state school takes on the complexion of a prisoner, complete with a mini mum sentence of 12 years.’ ” m While this statement embodies some underlying truths, it falls short of per suasiveness when applied to interdistrict differentials in expenditures. As discussed above, the correlation between ex penditure levels and quality of education is unclear,112 and there is no demonstrated correlation between “ a child of the poor” and school districts with low real property tax bases.113 Moreover, the argument that com pelled attendance requires equal expenditures seems to be premised on a type of “ right to treatment” —the notion that restriction of freedom for a specified pur pose obligates the state to satisfy that purpose.114 Yet this right would only require a minimum level of treat ment to justify curtailing a child’s liberty, or more realistically, his parents’ liberty. S u c h a minimum right to treatment may not be in question at all under the California foundation plan guarantee and, if it is, it is subject to the problems discussed above of court determination of the minimum level of a foundation guarantee system. A child compelled to go to a poor school (rather than not compelled to go to school at all) is not hurt by that compulsion vis-a-vis another l « 5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (quoting from Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitu tional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 C a l if . L. R f.v . 305, 388 (1969)). 112See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra. xx&See notes 65-67 supra & accompanying text, u *See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Symposium— The Right to Treatment, 57 G eo . L.J. 673 (1969). 62 child compelled to go to a better school. He is only hurt by that compulsion if that poor school is worse than no school. In discussing the uniqueness of education, the Ser rano court, while trying to distinguish education from police and fire protection, did not even consider a com parison between education and provision of the essent ials of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter. Such a comparison would seem imperative, for in Dandridge v. Williams115 the United States Supreme Court up held welfare grant restrictions on a traditional rational basis test, not the compelling interest test employed by the Supreme Court in protecting fundamental in terests. This was done despite prior dictum that sub sistence was a fundamental interest.118 The Dandridge opinion does not expressly deny that subsistence is a fundamental interest. Rather, it states that welfare legislation, when not involved with a constitutionally protected freedom such as interstate travel, is not subject to a compelling interest test be cause it is “ a state regulation in the social and econom ic field . . . .” 117 Whether welfare regulation is not subject to a compelling interest test because it does not involve a fundamental interest or because it does involve economic and social regulation, the result in Dandridge creates difficulties for applying a compel- H5397 U.S. 471 (1970). 116See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1969) : Shapiro v. Thomp son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). ^ P m 397 U.S. at 484; accord, Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971). m ling interest test in Serrano. It is hard to argue that an affirmative right to education is more important than an affirmative r i g h t to subsistence. Education also shares the status of welfare as being primarily an eco nomic and social regulation despite its avowed mind- forming purpose. Most of the reasons given by the Serrano court for the fundamentality of education re late to economic or social factors. Moreover, as noted by Professor Brest, “ it is not obvious that educational finance systems embody economic judgments that are any less complex, intuitive, and ultimately nonjusti- ciable than those inherent in welfare legislation.” 118 118Brest, supra note 74, at 615. The recent Supreme Court decision in Pal mer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), in which the Court upheld the right of a city to close its municipal swimming pools rather than operate them on an integrated basis, is also relevant to the issue of the fundamentality of education. In so holding, the Court distinguished prior cases refusing to permit a school district to close its schools in order to avoid a desegregation order. The Cali- for Supreme Court quoted a statement of the majority opinion in Palmer distinguishing swimming pools from schools: “ Of course that case [a school closing case] did not involve swimming pools but rather public schools, an enterprise we have described as ‘perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.’ Brown v. Board of Education, supra at 493.” 5 Cal. 3d at 609 n.26, 487 P.2d at 1258-59 n.26, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19 n.26. That quotation was taken out of context by the California court, and when the entire case is reviewed, it is clear that the majority opinion and a number of other opinions in the case purposefully refused to draw a distinction be tween schools and swimming pools that would give greater constitutional protection to the former. The quotation cited above was from a footnote in the Palmer opinion in which Justice Black, writing for the Court, sought to distinguish a prior summary affirmance of a lower court decision invalidating Louisiana statutes empowering the governor to close any school ordered to integrate, or to close all schools in the state if one were integrated. The first difficulty with the quotation is that the sentence following it in the Palmer footnote stated: “ More important, the laws struck down in Bush were part of an elaborate package of legislation through which Louisiana sought to main tain public education on a segregated basis, not to end public education.” 403 U.S. at 221 (emphasis added). Moreover, the principal school closing case discussed in Palmer was Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), an opinion by Mr. Justice Black that invalidated school closings in one Virginia district to avoid desegregation while other schools in the state remained open. In distinguishing Griffin, Justice Black did not even mention a special status for schools, but rather relied ex clusively on other differences between that case and Palmer, principally the fact that Griffin did not involve a complete shutdown. In a concurrence, Mr. Justice Blackmum did indicate that he saw a dif- —64 I V . T h e Serrano R e s p o n s e : A n U n c e r t a i n P o r t e n t f o r E d u c a t i o n a n d E q u a l P r o t e c t i o n Serrano’s “ fundamental interest” analysis of edu cation is doubtful both logically and in terms of Su preme Court authority. Yet one cannot deny educa tion’s importance or avoid the conclusion that society must carefully scrutinize its distribution. The moral case is strong for a doctrine of equal educational op portunity that would limit differential treatment of educational entitlement. The questions that arise in adopting Serrano and a federal constitutional stan dard as the remedy for this moral need are not an swered solely according to one’s view of the impor tance o f education. There remains for studied consid eration the wisdom of yielding this role to the courts, and of attempting to cure societal problems with broad constitutional precepts. The California Supreme Court, finding an inher ently suspect wealth classification as well as a funda mental interest in the school financing system, required ference between schools and swimming pools. He stated as one of the 3 factors that influenced him in reaching the conclusion that swimming pools could be closed: “ The pools are not part of the city’s educational system. They are a general municipal service of the nice-to-have but not essential variety and they are a service, perhaps a luxury, not enjoyed by many communities.” 403 U.o. at 4^9. While this statement distinguishes schools from swimming pools it does not distinguish education from police, fire, welfare, or other common municipal services. Moreover in their respective dissents in Palmer, both Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall rejected any special status for schools that distinguishes them from swimming pools. Justice Douglas stated: “ I conclude that though a State may discontinue any of its municipal services— such as schools, parks, pools, athletic fields, and the like— it may not do so for the purpose of ner' petuatmg or installing apartheid or because it finds life in a multi-racial community difficult or unpleasant.” Id. at 239. Justice Marshall also equated schools with swimming pools or golf courses in conceding that a state‘ could close them if it had a proper basis to do so. — 65— that the system’s inequities be justified bv a compelling- state interest. The court was clearly correct in finding that the system, when compared with its equal wealth alternatives, could not withstand this stricter equal protection test. The question remains, however, whe ther an equal wealth alternative like district power- equalizing that still permits geographic disparities can itself survive a compelling interest test. For the rea sons stated above concerning the pervasive societal sense that one cannot prevent people from trying to obtain a better education for their children, it is prob able that district power equalizing could withstand strict scrutiny. This conclusion, however, is far from certain.118 U9The equal wealth formulation, which permits district power equalizing, is easiest understood as a constitutional attempt to equalize educational ex penditures, with some inequality permitted as an accommodation to other interests. This is the equal protection formulation discussed in the text above, and used by the Serrano, Van Dusartz and Rodriguez courts. One could argue for the equal wealth standard independently of equaliza tion of expenditures, however. Such an argument would have to support a constitutional norm that each student, or each taxpayer, is entitled to live in a district that has an equal resource base for education. Such a norm is diffi cult to construct and neither the California Supreme Court nor the authors of Private Wealth and Public Education in their development of Proposi tion 1 have even attempted to state or support it. A recent article by pro fessor Ferdinand P. Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Educa tion, 71 C o l u m . L. R ev . 1355, 1402-12 (1971), does make just such an argu ment. He states that lower tax base districts require greater taxpayer sacrifice than wealthier districts to raise educational revenue. Since the acceptability to voters of tax proposals “varies inversely with the burden,” id. 1407, “ voters in low tax base districts who seek to increase educational appropriations are forced to assume a proportionally heavier burden of electoral persuasion than those who wish to achieve an identical goal in the more affluent districts.” Id. This electoral burden, which varies from district to district, bears no reasonable relationship to a legitimate state policy and thus denies equal pro tection under a Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) voting rights rationale. Professor Schoettle concedes that this approach leaves the field of education completely and would apply to all decisions of monetary issues faced by local governing bodies. He also concedes that his constitutional argument does not depend on poverty as a classification, but applies to all relative taxpayer dis advantage. He concludes that his analysis would not compel absolute equaliza tion or elimination of local tax bases but only reduction of the gross wealth disparities to the point where they no longer affect the electoral persuasiveness — 66— On the other hand, it is doubtful that the Serrano holding requires this stricter equal protection test to justify an equal wealth system like district power equalizing. Serrano employed the compelling interest test because it found a combination of a wealth classi fication and a fundamental interest.120 District power equalizing satisfies the former test since the revenue it produces is based, not on district wealth, but on dis trict tax effort. District power equalizing, then, would not have to meet a compelling interest test, and could be upheld on only the rational basis analysis. This conclusion, however, points up the fundamen tal theoretical p r o b 1 e m in the Serrano approach. Viewed from the perspective of the child and his fam ily ’s interest in equal education, the current system and district power equalizing suffer the same inade- of adherents to the same goal among different districts. While provocative, the Schoettle thesis is ultimately unconvincing. It has all the difficulties of the lack of a manageable judicial standard that Serrano and Proposition 1 rightly try to avoid. These same difficulties of measur ing subtleties of differential political power are what compelled the United States Supreme Court to reject an argument similar to Professor Schoettle’s in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), concerning at-large elections, even in a racial context. Moreover, his theory would logically invalidate any number of things that affect electoral power unequally including multimem ber districts, single-party districts, and the seniority and committee systems in legislatures. Finally, all the electoral cases that Professor Schoettle cites in volve inequalities among electors in the same political entity, that is, electors competing for statewide decisionmaking influence. Thus in Baker v. Carr, the constitutional vice was unequal weighing, by district, of voters in relation to their ability to influence the state legislature. Professor Schoettle’s Serrano analysis, however, expressly eschews such a rationale as being foreclosed by James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). His rationale, rather,ds that electors of a poor district have less internal district power than do those of wealthy dis tricts. He thus posits lack of pure horizontal equality of voters in different areas, with no racial or poverty components and regardless of the issues in volved, as a basis for invalidating the universal American system of local gov ernment financing. This lack of horizontal equality is said to make the system “ irrational.” Yet a system that provides that local resources should be available to local government to finance its needs is clearly not irrational. 1205ee note 22 supra. — 67- quaeies. Neither is a wealth classification; they are both residence classifications in their actual effects. To the extent that expenditures are related to educational quality, the child receives a poorer education whether he lives in a poor district or simply one that under values education. Since the court’s equal wealth standard allows for these continued educational disparities, the essential concern of Serrano is not the school child but the tax payer. The California court has spawned a new, but perhaps logically inevitable corollary to Proposition 1: The economic burden of public education may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole. As such the principle of Serrano cannot realistically be limited to education, but applies to all burdens of taxation. APPENDIX “ B” AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY JUNE 22, 1972 AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY JUNE 16, 1972 AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY MAY 24, 1972 AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY MAY 3, 1972 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE—1972 REGULAR SESSION ASSEMBLY B ILL No. 1283 In trod uced b y the A ssem b ly C o m m ittee on E du cation (L eroy F . G reen e (C h a irm an ), C h a co n (V ice C h a irm a n ), Arnett, C lin e , C o ry , D e n t, D u n la p , F on g , Bill G reen e, K eysor, L ew is, M a d d y , M cA lister, R yan, and V aseoueeU os) and M u rp h y (A ssigned to Arnett) March 15, 1972 REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION An act to amend Sections 6741, 17300, 17303.5, 17414, 17417, 17503, 17603.5, 17651, 17654.5, 17655.5,17664, 17665, 18102.8, 18102.9,18102.10,18355,18358,18401, 20404, and20806 of, to add Sections 13520.3, 17301, 17301.1, 17301.2, 17301.3, 17653, 17662, 17662.3, 17662.5, 18102, and 20751 to, to add Chapter 6.10 (commencing with Section 6499.230) to Division 6 of, to add Chapter 1.7 (commencing with Section 17270) to, and Article 3 (commencing with Section 17701) to Chapter 3 o f Division 14 of, to repeal Sections 1835, 5661, 6854, 6855, 6913.1, 13704, 14657, 14758, 17301, 17656, 17660, 17662, 17665.5, 18102, 18102.2, 18102.4, 18102.6, 20751, 20800, 20801.5.20802.8.20807.20808.20808.5, and20816o f to repeal Article 2.1 (commencing with Section 17671), Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 17680), Article 3 (commencing AB 1283 — 2 — with Section 17701), Article 4 (commencing with Section 17751), Article 5 (commencing with Section 17801), Article 7 (commencing with Section 17901), Article 7.1 (commencing with Section 17920), Article 7.2 (commencing with Section 17940), and Article 8 (commencing with Section 17951) o f Chapter 3 o f Division 14 of, to amend the heading o f Article 2 (commencing with Section 17651) o f Chapter 3 ofDivision 14 of, the Education Code, relating to the financial support o f public education, making an appropriation therefor. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S DIGEST AB 1283, as amended, Arnett (Ed.). School finance. Provides for revised system of allocation of state support for public elementary and high schools, such system being based upon a specified percentage of the current expense of education, as defined. Provides for computation of maximum expenditures by such school districts. Specifies system whereby school districts set local tax rates, but prescribed amount of proceeds thereof revert to School District Wealth Equalization Fund, for redistribution to school districts based upon district’s ratio of assessed valuation to a.d.a. to statewide average ratio of assessed valuation to a.d.a. Deletes existing provisions re computation, allocation, and apportionment of amounts denoted as “basic state aid,” equalization aid,” and “supplemental support” for elementary school, high school, and community college levels. Eliminates use of computational tax rates as a factor in computing state and local shares of foundation program support. Eliminates unification and class size reduction bonuses in apportionment of state school funds. Eliminates areawide school support programs for areas included in defeated unification proposals. Revises method of computing the amount of allowances for physically handicapped, mentally retarded, and educationally handicapped pupils. Revises allowances for special — 3 — AB 1283 transportation programs. Makes numerous related changes. Vote-—Majority; Appropriation—Yes; Fiscal Committee—Yes. The people o f the State o f California do enact as follows: 1 S e c t i o n 1. It is the intent o f the Legislature in this 2 act to provide for the financial support of public 3 education in the following manner: 4 (a) A funding mechanism which (1) minimizes the 5 wealth disparities that presently exist between school 6 districts and (2) enables every child in the state to 7 receive an equal education opportunity. 8 (b) An adequate level of financial support for the 9 education of every child through a combination of a 10 reasonable level of state assistance and local effort. 11 (c) An orderly transition from the present system to a 12 new system of school finance. 13 (d) A system whereby at least §& 50 percent of the 14 educational support is provided from the General Fund 15 in the State Treasury. 16 (e) A reasonable level of annual increases from the 17 state to meet the pressures of inflation without the 18 necessity of annual legislative action. 19 (f) The continuation of local control of educational 20 programs and the level of local property tax rates. 21 (g) A mechanism of expenditure controls to replace 22 the present ineffective method of property tax 23 limitations. 24 (h) A system fe? the The elimination of most of the 25 presently authorized school district permissive override 26 taxes. 27 (i) A system for minimum reliance on the property tax 28 for the support of public education. 29 SEC. 2. Section 1835 of the Education Code is 30 repealed. 31 Sec. 3. Section 5661 of the Education Code is 32 repealed. 33 Sec. 3.5. Chapter 6.10 (commencing with Section AB 1283 — 4 1 6499.230) is added to Division 6 of the Education Code, 2 to read: 3 4 C h a p t e r 6 . 1 0 . E d u c a t i o n a l l y D i s a d v a n t a g e d 5 Y o u t h P r o g r a m s 6 7 6499.230. It is the intent of the Legislature to provide 8 quality educational opportunities for all children in the 9 California public schools. The Legislature recognizes that 10 because of differences in family income, differing 11 language barriers, and pupil transiency, differing levels of 12 financial aid are necessary to provide quality education 13 for all students. 14 6499.231. From the funds appropriated by the 15 Legislature for the purposes of this chapter, the 1 6 Superintendent of Public Instruction, with the approval 17 of the State Board of Education, shall administer this 18 chapter and make apportionments to school districts to 19 meet the total approved expense of the school districts 20 incurred in establishing education programs for pupils 21 who qualify economically and educationally in preschool, 22 kindergarten, or any of grades 1 through 12, inclusive. 23 Nothing in this chapter shall in any way preclude the use 24 of federal funds for educationally disadvantaged youth. 25 6499.232. Maximum apportionments allowable to 26 school districts shall be determined by the following 27 factors: 28 (a) An index of “potential impact of 29 bilingual-bicultural pupils” determined by dividing the 30 percent of pupils in the district with Spanish and Oriental 31 surnames, as determined by the annual ethnic survey 32 conducted by the Department of Education, by the 33 statewide average percentage of such pupils for unified, 34 e lem en ta ry , or secondary districts, as appropriate. 35 (b) A ratio of the district’s “index of family poverty,” 36 defined as the district’s Elementary and Secondary 37 Education Act, Title I entitlement, divided by its average 38 daily attendance in grades 1 through 12, or any thereof 39 maintained, divided in turn by the state average index of 40 family poverty for unified, elementary, or secondary AB 1283 1 districts, as appropriate. 2 (c) A ratio of the district’s “ index of pupil transiency,” 3 as computed from the relationship between the district’s 4 average daily attendance and its total annual enrollment, 5 divided by the state average index of pupil transiency for 6 unified, elementary, or secondary districts, as 7 appropriate. 8 The district’s total maximum apportionment under this 9 chapter shall be determined by computing the product of 10 (1) one-third the sum of the above three factors, (2) the 11 number of pupils receiving aid for dependent children 12 support, and (3) a constant amount of three hundred 13 dollars ($300), or such amount as the Superintendent of 14 Public Instruction may determine so that the sum of all 15 allocations will not exceed the funds appropriated by the 16 Legislature for the purposes of this chapter. 17 6499.233. For the fiscal year 1972-1973, the 18 superintendent shall allocate to local districts an amount 19 equal to not less than 40 percent of the total amount 20 computed under Section 6499.232. For the fiscal year 21 1973-1974, the superintendent shall allocate not less than 22 40 percent of the total amount so computed and not more 23 than 90 percent of the amount computed. For the 24 1974-1975 fiscal year and thereafter, the superintendent 25 shall allocate to each district not less than 40 percent nor 26 more than 100 percent of the amount so computed. 27 6499.234. In approving programs under this chapter, 28 the State Board of Education shall give due consideration 29 to the effectiveness of the program and shall not continue 30 in operation any program that, upon evaluation, has been 31 shown to be of low effectiveness and which has only 32 limited possibility of improved effectiveness. 33 For the fiscal year 1973-1974 and for each year 34 thereafter, districts which demonstrate a high degree of 35 program effectiveness shall receive amounts up to their 36 entitlement limits. Districts which demonstrate low 37 levels of program effectiveness shall continue to receive 38 their initial apportionments but the Superintendent of 39 Public Instruction may reduce the additional computed 40 apportionments due such districts, if he determines that — 5 — AB 1283 1 such programs have limited possibilities of improved 2 achievement. 3 6499.235. The Superintendent of Public Instruction 4 shall apportion the funds available for programs in accord 5 with procedures specified in this chapter and policies 6 which may be adopted by the State Board of Education. 7 Funds shall be allocated to each district within its 8 entitlement based upon a plan submitted by the district 9 to the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and 10 approved by the State Board of Education. The plan shall 11 include (1) an explicit statement of what the district 12 seeks to accomplish, (2) a description of the program and 13 activities designed to achieve these purposes, and (3) a 14 planned program of annual evaluation, including a 15 statement of the criteria to be used to measure the 16 effectiveness of the program. 17 6499.236. The State Board of Education shall adopt 18 regulations setting forth the standards and criteria to be 19 used in the administration, monitoring, evaluation, and 20 dissemination of programs submitted for consideration 21 under this chapter; 1 percent of the total appropriation 22 for the purposes of this chapter shall be retained by the 23 Department of Education for these purposes. Funds 24 appropriated for the purposes of this chapter not 25 allocated as previously specified shall be allocated by the 26 State Board of Education to promote the intent of this 27 chapter to provide education programs to as many 28 eligible pupils as possible and to stimulate the 29 development, implementation, and evaluation of 30 innovative programs. 31 6499.237. The Superintendent of Public Instruction 32 shall submit annually to the Governor and to each house 33 of the Legislature a report evaluating the programs 34 established pursuant to this chapter, together with his 35 recommendations concerning whether the same should 36 be continued in operation. 37 6499.238. There is hereby appropriated from the 38 General Fund in the State Treasury to the State School 39 Fund for the fiscal year 1972-1973 an amount equal to 40 twenty-one dollars and fifty cents ($21.50) multiplied by — 6 — 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 AB 1283 the total statewide average daily attendance of the preceding fiscal year in kindergarten and grades 1 to 12, inclusive, to be used for the purposes of Chapter 6.10 (commencing with Section 6499.230) of Division 6 of the Education Code. For the fiscal year 1973-1974 the amount per such unit of average daily attendance shall be forty-three dollars ($43); and for the fiscal year 1974-1975 and thereafter, it shall be fifty-three dollars and seventy-five cents ($53.75). SEC. 4. Section 6741 of the Education Code is amended to read: 6741. A student shall be deemed to be a resident of the high school district in which he lived at the time of his admission to the program and the excess cost for a school year of educating such student shall be paid by the high school district of which he is a resident to the county superintendent who is providing education for the students. The excess cost shall be determined by dividing the total current expense of education as defined in subdivision (b) o f Section 17503 and also excluding expense of boarding and lodging during such school year by the total number of units of average daily attendance in such school or classes during such school year, less state and federal apportionments on account of such average daily attendance. Average daily attendance of students shall be computed, for purposes of this article, by dividing the number of days such student attended the schools or classes by the number of days that the schools or classes were taught, except that with respect to a student attending such schools or classes for more than 175 days in a school year, the average daily attendance shall be computed by using the divisor of 175. For purposes of computing average daily attendance 180 minutes of class attendance shall be deemed to constitute a schoolday, and no more than 15 hours of class time per week shall be considered. Not later than July 15th of each year, the superintendent of schools of the county providing education for students shall forward his claim for the AB 1283 — 8 — 1 excess expense reimbursement to the high school district 2 of residence of each student during the preceding school 3 year, and the governing board of such high school district 4 shall upon receipt thereof pay such claims. 5 Sec. 5. Section 6854 of the Education Code is 6 repealed. 7 Sec. 6. Section 6855 of the Education Code is 8 repealed. 9 Sec. 7. Section 6913.1 of the Education Code is 10 repealed. 11 Sec. 8. Section 13520.3 is added to the Education 12 Code, to read: 13 13520.3. When a school district operates on a 14 year-around schedule pursuant to Chapter 7 15 (commencing with Section 32100) of Division 22, the 16 salaries of employees who are employed for the extended 17 school year may be adjusted in accordance with the ratio 18 of the extension of the school year in months bears to the 19 length of the school year in months prior to the 20 commencement of year-around operation. No classroom 21 teacher may be required to participate in a year-around 22 program without his consent. 23 Sec. 9. Section 13704 of the Education Code is 24 repealed. 25 Sec. 10. Section 14657 of the Education Code is 26 repealed. 27 Sec. 11. Section 14758 of the Education Code is 28 repealed. 29 Sec. 12. Chapter 1.7 (commencing with Section 30 17270) is added to Division 14 of the Education Code, to 31 read: 32 33 C h a p t e r 1.7. A d j u s t m e n t s t o U s a b l e A s s e s s e d 34 V a l u a t i o n 35 36 17270. The Legislature hereby declares that its intent 37 in enacting this chapter is to provide a reasonable and 38 equitable method for ascertaining the value of property 39 located within school districts for use in connection with 40 the administration of state laws providing for the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 AB 1283 allocation of state funds to such districts for school purposes on the basis of value and provide for more equal educational opportunity for students residing in districts of varying wealth per unit of average daily attendance and to improve the equity among taxpayers residing in or owning property in districts of varying wealth. The Legislature hereby further declares that in enacting this chapter it has no intention to affect in any way, whether directly or indirectly, any determination of the assessed value of property for tax purposes. 17271. Each school district shall report to the Superintendent of Public Instruction: (a) The total assessed valuation of the district; and (b) The amount equal to: (1) Ten percent of the total assessed valuation in the 1972-1973 fiscal year. (2) Twenty percent of the total assessed valuation in the 1973-1974 fiscal year. (3) Thirty percent of the total assessed valuation in the 1974- 1975 fiscal year. (4) Forty percent of the total assessed valuation in the 1975- 1976 fiscal year. (5) Fifty percent of the total assessed valuation in the 1976- 1977 fiscal year and following, 17272. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall compute the total amounts reported to him pursuant to subdivision (b-)» of Section 17271 for each type of district. He shall make a separate computation for elementary school districts, high school districts, and unified school districts. He shall divide the total for each type of district by the statewide average daily attendance for the preceding fiscal year for each type of district. The amount computed pursuant to this section is the assessed valuation redistribution amount per unit of average daily attendance for each type of district. 17273. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall compute for each school district the amount derived by multiplying the assessed valuation redistribution amount per unit of average daily attendance by the average daily attendance of the district for the preceding fiscal year. — 9 — AB 1283 10 — 1 The amount computed pursuant to this section is the 2 redistribution amount. 3 17273.5. The “district assessed valuation” for each 4 district is the total assessed valuation minus the amount 5 reported for it pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 6 17271 plus the redistribution amount for the type of 7 district computed pursuant to Section 17273. 8 17274. (a) Each school district shall compute the 9 amount which the revenue derived from the levy and 10 collection of school district taxes would have been if it 11 had been collected and been based upon an adjusted 12 assessed valuation computed pursuant to Section 17273.5 13 For the purpose of this subdivision chapter, the school 14 district tax shall not include any tax levied and collected 15 pursuant to Sections 15517, 15518, 16633, 16635, 16645.9, 16 19443, 19572, 19619, 19687, 19695, or 22101. 17 (b) Each district shall compute the total amount of 18 revenue derived from the levy of school district taxes on 19 property lying within the district. 20 (c) If the amount computed pursuant to subdivision 21 (a) is less than the amount computed pursuant to 22 subdivision (b), the difference shall be transmitted to the 23 School District Wealth Equalization Fund. 24 (d) If the amount computed pursuant to subdivision 25 (a) is more than the amount computed pursuant to 26 subdivision (b), the Superintendent of Public Instruction 27 shall allow to the district an amount equal to such 28 difference from the School District Wealth Equalization 29 Fund. 30 Sec. 13. Section 17300 of the Education Code is 31 amended to read: 32 17300. It is the intent of the Legislature that the 33 administration of the laws governing the financial 34 support of the public school system in this state be 35 conducted within the purview of the following principles 36 and policies: 37 The system of public school support should be designed 38 to strengthen and encourage local responsibility for 39 .control of public education. Local school districts should 40 be so organized that they can facilitate the provision of — 11 — AB 1283 1 full educational opportunities for all who attend the 2 public schools. Local control is best accomplished by the 3 development of strong, vigorous, and properly organized 4 local school administrative units. It is the state’s 5 responsibility to create or facilitate the creation of local 6 school districts of sufficient size to properly discharge 7 local responsibilities and to spend the tax dollar 8 effectively. 9 Effective local control requires that all local 10 administrative units contribute to the support of school 11 budgets in proportion to their respective abilities, and 12 that all have such flexibility in their taxing programs as 13 will readily permit of progress in the improvement of the 14 educational program. Effective local control requires a 15 local taxing power, and a local tax base which is not 16 unduly restricted or overburdened. 17 The system of public school support should assure that 18 state, local, and other funds are adequate for the support 19 of a realistic educational program. It is unrealistic and 20 unfair to the less wealthy districts to provide for only a 21 part of the financing necessary for an adequate 22 educational program. 23 The system of public school support should permit and 24 encourage local school districts to provide and support 25 improved district organization and educational 26 programs. The system of public school support should 27 prohibit the introduction of undesirable organization and 28 educational practices, and should discourage any such 29 practices now in effect. Improvement of programs in 30 particular districts is in the interests of the state as a 31 whole as well as of the people in individual districts, since 32 the excellence of the programs in some districts will tend 33 to bring about program improvement in other districts. 34 The system of public school support should make 35 provision for the apportionment of state funds to local 36 school districts on a strictly objective basis that can be 37 computed as well by the local districts as by the state. The 38 principle of local responsibility requires that the granting 39 of discretionary powers to state officials over the 40 distribution of state aid and the granting to these officials AB 1283 — 12 — 1 of the power to impose undue restriction on the use of 2 funds and the conduct of educational programs at the 3 local level be avoided. 4 The system of public school support should effect a 5 partnership between the state, the county, and the local 6 district, with each participating equitably in accordance 7 with its relative ability. The respective abilities should be 8 combined to provide a financial plan between the state 9 and the local agencies for public school support. Toward 10 this support program, each county and district, through 11 a uniform method should contribute in accordance with 12 its true financial ability. 13 The system of public school support should provide for 14 essential educational opportunities for all who attend the 15 public schools. Provision should be made for adequate 16 financing of all educational services. 17 The broader based taxing power of the state should be 18 utilized to raise the level of financial support in the 19 properly organized but financially weak districts of the 20 state, thus contributing greatly to the equalization of 21 educational opportunity for the students residing 22 therein. It should also be used to provide a minimum 23 amount of guaranteed support to all districts, for such 24 state assistance serves to develop among all districts a 25 sense of responsibility to the entire system of public 26 education in the state. State assistance to all districts also 27 would create a tax leeway for the exercise of local 28 initiative. 29 The Legislature further declares that in order to 30 reduce the burden of inequitable property taxation it is 31 in the best interest of the state to provide, from other 32 than ad valorem property taxes, a predominate portion of 33 the statewide cost of education in the elementary and 34 secondary schools of the state. The Legislature further 35 declares that the funds to be provided are required in 36 order to reduce the disproportionate demand upon 37 property taxpayers for support of educational services 38 and programs, equalize wide variations in the ability of 39 local communities to support such services and programs, 40 and to assist school districts in meeting increased — 13 — AB 1283 1 demands due to concentrations of educationally 2 disadvantaged pupils. 3 In recognition of these disparities it is the intent of the 4 Legislature to apportion funds for school purposes in such 5 a manner as to provide adequate educational programs 6 for all students regardless of where they reside or the 7 wealth of their parents and neighbors. 8 In implementing its intent the Legislature declares 9 that, although the present system of funding does not 10 meet desirable criteria, sudden changes of great 11 magnitude in the system of public school finance would 12 disrupt the educational system of many districts and 13 thereby damage the whole public school system of the 14 state, the educational welfare of all students, and the 15 economy of the state; therefore, rapid change is 16 undesirable and unacceptable. 17 Accordingly, the Legislature declares its intent to 18 improve with all reasonable and deliberate speed, 19 financial support of education in districts which have less 20 than the statewide average assessed valuation per unit of 21 average daily attendance as rapidly as those districts can 22 efficiently utilize additional support, and at the same 23 time allow districts with more than the statewide assessed 24 valuation per unit of average daily attendance sufficient 25 time to readjust their programs to new methods of 26 financing to avoid precipitous disruption of present 27 programs. 28 It is further the intent of the Legislature to study the 29 possibility of adopting an apportionment system based 30 upon weighted units of average daily attendance. 31 Sec. 14. Section 17301 of the Education Code is 32 repealed. 33 Sec. 15. Section 17301 is added to the Education 34 Code, to read: 35 17301. The State Controller shall during each fiscal 36 year transfer from the General Fund of the state to the 37 State School Fund such sums as are necessary for the state 38 to provide a specified percentage of the current expense 39 of education, as defined by subdivision -fb)- (c) of Section 40 17503, for each pupil in average daily attendance during AB 1283 14 1 the preceding fiscal year credited to all kindergarten, 2 elementary and high schools in the state and to the 3 county school tuition funds, as certified by the 4 Superintendent of Public Instruction. For the 1972-1973 5 and 1973-1974 fiscal years the percentage shall be 45 6 percent, and for the 1974-1975 fiscal year, and each fiscal 7 year thereafter, the percentage shall be 50 percent. The 8 In the 1972-1973 fiscal year and each fiscal year 9 thereafter, the amounts so transferred shall be increased 10 by an amount which shall reflect the application of an 11 adjustment index developed cooperatively by the 12 Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Legislative 13 Analyst, and the Director of Finance. This adjustment 14 index shall reflect the expected change in the cost of a 15 basic educational program, plus any additional costs 16 mandated by the Legislature, for the fiscal year under 17 consideration. The Controller shall adjust such transfers 18 to reflect increases or decreases as estimated by the 19 Superintendent of Public Instruction for the current year 20 in the statewide units of average daily attendance in the 21 kindergartens, elementary, and high schools of the state. 22 The Controller shall also transfer two hundred 23 ninety-eight dollars and thirty-eight cents ($298.38) from 24 the General Fund to the State School Fund per pupil in 25 average daily attendance credited to the community 26 colleges of the state during the preceding fiscal year. 27 SEC. 16. Section 17301.1 is added to the Education 28 Code, to read: 29 17301.1. The State Controller shall also transfer an 30 amount equal to the percentage specified in Section 31 17301 for any new or expanded program trtrtfe©*4«ed ©r 32 required by law which was not uutfaor-izcd ©r required in 33 the preceding fiscal year. 34 SEC. 17. Section 17301.2 is added to the Education 35 Code, to read: 36 17301.2. The State Controller shall also transfer an 37 amount from the General Fund to the School Disrict 38 Wealth Equalization Fund equal to any deficit created in 39 that fund. 40 Sec. 17.5. Section 17301.3 is added to the Education — 15 — AB 1283 1 Code, to read: 2 17301.3. The State Controller shall also transfer an 3 amount from the General Fund to the State School Fund 4 equal to thirty-eight dollars ($38) multiplied by the 5 average daily attendance credited to all kindergarten, 6 elementary, high school, community college, and adult 7 schools and to county school tuition funds during the 8 preceding fiscal year for expenditure pursuant to Section 9 17303.5. 1 0 S E C . 1 8 . Section 1 7 3 0 3 . 5 o f the Education Code is 11 amended to read: 12 17303.5. The amount transferred pursuant to Sections 13 17301 and 17301.3 shall be expended, in part, in 14 accordance with the following schedule: 15 (a) Twenty-one dollars and fifty cents ($21.50) 16 multiplied by the total average daily attendance credited 17 during the preceding school year to elementary school 18 districts which during the preceding school year had less 19 than 901 units of average daily attendance, to high school 20 districts which during the preceding school year had less 21 than 301 units of average daily attendance, and to unified 22 districts which during the preceding school year had less 23 than 1,501 units of average daily attendance, but not to 24 exceed an amount equal to seventy cents ($0.70) 25 multiplied by the average daily attendance credited 26 during the preceding fiscal year to all kindergarten, 27 elementary, high school, community college and adult 28 schools in the state and to county school tuition funds, for 29 allowance to county school service funds pursuant to 30 subdivision (a) of Section 18352. 31 (b) Four dollars and forty cents ($4.40) multiplied by 32 the total average daily attendance credited to all 33 kindergarten, elementary, high school, community 34 college and adult schools in the state and to county school 35 tuition funds during the preceding school year for the 36 purposes of Article 10 (commencing with Section 18051) 37 of Chapter 3 of this division. 38 (c) Nineteen dollars and fifty-two cents ($19.52) 39 multiplied by the total average daily attendance credited 40 to all kindergarten, elementary, high school, community AB 1283 16 1 college and adult schools in the state and to county school 2 tuition funds during the preceding school year, for the 3 purposes of Sections 18060 and 18062, and Article 11 4 (commencing with Section 18101) of Chapter 3 of this 5 division. 6 (d) Three dollars and six cents ($3.06) multiplied by 7 the total average daily attendance credited to all 8 kindergarten, elementary, high school, community 9 college and adult schools in the state and to county school 10 tuition funds during the preceding school year for 11 allowances to county school service funds pursuant to 12 subdivision (b) of Section 18352. 13 (e) One dollar and sixty-seven cents ($1.67) 14 multiplied by the average daily attendance during the 15 preceding fiscal year credited to all kindergarten, 16 elementary, high school, community college and adult 17 schools in the state and to county school tuition funds for 18 allowances to school districts for the purposes of Section 19 6426. 20 (f) Eight dollars and sixty-five cents ($8.65) multiplied 21 by the average daily attendance during the preceding 22 school year credited to all kindergarten, elementary, high 23 school, community college and adult schools in the state 24 and to county school tuition funds for purposes of 25 Chapter 7.1 (commencing with Section 6750) of Division 26 6. 27 S e c . 19. Section 17414 of the Education Code is 28 amended to read: 29 17414. If during any fiscal year there is apportioned to 30 a school district or to any fund from the State School Fund 31 at least one hundred dollars ($100) more or at least one 32 hundred dollars ($100) less than the amount to which the 33 district or fund was entitled, the Superintendent of 34 Public Instruction, in accordance with regulations that he 35 is herewith authorized to adopt not later than the third 36 succeeding fiscal year shall withhold from, or add to, the 37 apportionment made during such fiscal year, the amount 38 of such excess or deficiency, as the case may be. 39 Notwithstanding, any other provision of this code to the 40 contrary, excesses withheld or deficiencies added by the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 18 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 — 17 AB 1283 Superintendent of Public Instruction under this section shall be added to or allowed from any portion of the State School Fund. SEC. 20. Section 17417 of the Education Code is amended to read: 17417. Wherever the attendance of pupils is not included in the computation of the average daily attendance of a school district for any fiscal year because the certification document of the person employed by the district to instruct such pupils was not in force during the period of such attendance, the governing board of the district may, upon payment of the salary of such person pursuant to Section 13515, or similar provisions of law, report such attendance to the Superintendent of Public Instruction during the fiscal year in which such salary is paid. Such report shall be made in such form as shall be prescribed and furnished by the Superintendent of Public Instruction. Thereafter the Superintendent of Public Instruction shall add to the apportionment from the State School Fund to the district during the next succeeding fiscal year or years, as determined by him but not exceeding three, the additional amount to which the district would have been entitled in the fiscal year next succeeding that in which such attendance was not included in the computation of the average daily attendance of the district if such amount is at least one hundred dollars ($100) or more. Any such additional amount shall be apportioned from the State School Fund before any other apportionment from such fund is made and shall be allowed from any portion of such fund. SEC. 21. Section 17503 of the Education Code is amended to read: 17503. For purposes of this section: (a) “Salaries of classroom teachers” and “ teacher” shall have the same meanings as prescribed by Section 17200 of this code provided, however, that the cost of all health and welfare benefits provided to the teachers by the school district shall be included within the meaning of salaries of classroom teachers. AB 1283 — 18 — 1 (b) “Current expense of education” means the gross 2 total expended (not reduced by estimated income or 3 estimated federal and state apportionments) for the 4 purposes classified in the final budget of a school district 5 (except one which, during the preceding fiscal year, had 6 less than 101 units of average daily attendance) 7 submitted to and approved by the county superintendent 8 of schools pursuant to Section 20607 of this code for 9 administration, instruction (including salaries and other 10 expense), health services, operation of plant, 11 maintenance of plant, and fixed charges. “ Current 12 expense of education” shall not include those purposes 13 classified as transportation of pupils, food service, 14 community service, capital outlay, state school building 15 loan repayment; and shall not include the amount 16 expended pursuant to any lease agreement for plant and 17 equipment or the amount expended from funds received 18 from the federal government pursuant to the “Economic 19 Opportunity Act of 1964” or any extension of such act of 20 Congress. 21 (c) For the purposes of Sections 17301, 17654.5, 22 17655.5, 17662, 17664, 17665, and Article 3 (commencing 23 with Section 17701) of this chapter, the current expense 24 of education shall include only state funds apportioned as 25 basic aid, equalizaton aid, supplemental support and 26 additional equalization aid; local funds derived pursuant 27 to subdivision (a) of Section 17274; miscellaneous funds, 28 as defined in Section 17606; and any federal funds 29 allocated as general aid, such as funds allocated pursuant 30 to Public Law 81-874. 31 For 1973-1974 and each fiscal year thereafter, state 32 basic aid, equalization aid, supplemental support, and 33 additional equalization aid shall mean state funds 34 allocated pursuant to Sections 17654.5, 17655.5, 17662, 35 17664, and 17665. 36 The statewide average current expense of education 37 per unit of average daily attendance shall mean the sum 38 of the funds specified by this subdivision received by all 39 districts in the state of the particular type (elementary, 40 high school, or unified) divided by the foundation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 — 19 — AB 1283 program average daily attendance reported by those same districts. There shall be expended during each fiscal year for payment of salaries of classroom teachers: (a) By an elementary school district, sixty percent (60%) of the district’s current expense of education. (b) By a high school district, fifty percent (50%) of the district’s current expense of education, (c) By a community college district, fifty percent (50%) of the district’s current expense of education. (d) By a unified school district, fifty-five percent (55%) of the district’s current expense of education. If the Superintendent of Public Instruction determines that a school district has not expended the applicable percentage of current expense of education for the payment of salaries of classroom teachers during the preceding fiscal year, he shall, in apportionments made to the school district from the State School Fund after April 15 of the current fiscal year, designate an amount of such apportionment or apportionments equal to the apparent deficiency in district expenditures. Any amount so designated by the Superintendent of Public Instruction shall be deposited in the county treasury to the credit of the school district, but shall be unavailable for expenditure by the district pending the determination to be made by the Superintendent of Public Instruction on any application for exemption which may be submitted to the Superintendent of Public Instruction. In the event it appears to the governing board of a school district that the application of the preceding paragraphs of this section during a fiscal year results in serious hardship to the district, or in the payment of salaries of classroom teachers in excess of the salaries of classroom teachers paid by other districts of comparable type and functioning under comparable conditions, the board may, with the written approval of the county superintendent of schools having jurisdiction over the district apply to the Superintendent of Public Instruction in writing not later than September 15th of the succeeding fiscal year for exemption from the AB 1283 — 20 — 1 requirements of the preceding paragraphs of this section 2 for the fiscal year on account of which the application is 3 made. Upon receipt of such application, duly approved, 4 the Superintendent of Public Instruction shall grant the 5 district exemption for any amount that is less than one 6 thousand dollars ($1,000), and if the amount is one 7 thousand dollars ($1,000), or greater may grant the 8 district exemption, to the extent deemed necessary by 9 him, from such requirements for the fiscal year on 10 account of which the application is made. If such 11 exemption is granted the designated moneys shall be 12 immediately available for expenditure by the school 13 district governing board. If no application for exemption 14 is made or exemption is denied, the Superintendent of 15 Public Instruction shall order the designated amount or 16 amount not exempted to be added to the amounts to be 17 expended for salaries of classroom teachers during the 18 next fiscal year. 19 The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall enforce 20 the requirements prescribed by this section, and may 21 adopt necessary rules and regulations to that end. He may 22 require the submission to him, during the school year, by 23 school district governing boards and county 24 superintendents of schools, of such reports and 25 information as may be necessary to carry out the 26 provisions of this section. 27 Any reference in this code to “current expense o f 28 education as defined in Section 17503” enacted prior to 29 the enactment o f Chapter 1.7 (commencing with Section 30 17270) o f this division shall mean current expense o f 31 education as defined in subdivision (b) o f Section 17503. 32 Sec. 22. Section 17603.5 of the Education Code is 33 amended to read: 34 17603.5. The amounts computed as allowable to any 35 school community college district for state aid shall be 36 reduced by fifty percent (50%) of miscellaneous funds, as 37 defined in Section 17606. In no event shall the reduction 38 exceed the total amount allowable as state aid to the 39 school district for the fiscal yeafr Fer sueh pwpeses; 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 21 — AB 1283 fey a unified school dlstr-iet-,- shall fee allocated te the kmdorgartcn and elementary, high seheel and community college grades, respectively, ©n the basis e4 the preperti©© ©f the distriet’s total average daily attendance in eaeh sueh grade level-, and the previsions ©f Section 17601 shall fee applicable, for the fiscal year. Should the amount of miscellaneous funds, as defined in Section 17606, actually received by a school community college district for any fiscal year be more or less than that reported to the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Superintendent of Public Instruction shall during the fiscal year next succeeding withhold from or add to the apportionment made to the district from the State School Fund the amount of the excess or deficiency in the apportionment of state aid from the State School Fund for the preceding year, if the amount of the excess or deficiency in such apportionment was one hundred dollars ($100) or more. SEC. 23. The heading of Article 2 (commencing with Section 17651) of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code is amended to read: Article 2. Computation of Foundation Programs and School Support for School Districts S e c . 24. Section 17651 of the Education Code is amended to read: 17651. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall compute for each school district the amount of school support therefor, in the manner prescribed by this article. SEC. 25. Section 17653 is added to the Education Code, to read: 17653. No aid in excess of one hundred twenty dollars ($120) per unit of average daily attendance shall be allowed unless there shall have been levied pursuant to this code, for a district during the fiscal year, a tax, exclusive of taxes levied under Sections 1822,2, 1825, 16633,16635,16645.9,19443,19619,20801, and 22101, of not less than one dollar ($1) if an elementary district, eighty AB 1283 — 22 — 1 cents ($0.80) if a high school district, one dollar and 2 eighty cents ($1.80) i f a unified school district, and 3 twenty-five cents ($0.25) if a community college district. 4 S e c . 2 6 . Section 1 7 6 5 4 . 5 of the Education Code is 5 amended to read: 6 17654.5. For each elementary school district which 7 maintains only one school with an average daily 8 attendance of less than 101, he shall make one of the 9 following computations, whichever provides the lesser 10 amount: 11 (1) For each small school which has an average daily 12 attendance during the fiscal year of less than 26, exclusive 13 of pupils attending the seventh and eighth grades of a 14 junior high school, and for which school at least one 15 teacher was hired full time, he shall compute for the the 16 product of 25 multiplied by the appropriate percentage 17 specified in Section 17301 multiplied by the relative 18 support factor specified in Section 17662.5 multiplied by 19 the statewide average current expense of education for 20 elementary districts as determined pursuant to 21 subdivision (c) of Section 17503. 22 (2) For each small school which has an average daily 23 attendance during the fiscal year of 26 or more and less 24 than 51, exclusive of pupils attending the seventh and 25 eighth grades of a junior high school, and for which school 26 at least two teachers were hired full time for more than 27 one-half of the days schools were maintained, he shall 28 compute for the district the product of 50 multiplied by 29 the appropriate percentage specified in Section 17301 30 multiplied by the relative support factor specified in 31 Section 17662.5 multiplied by the statewide average 32 current expense of education for elementary districts as 33 determined pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 17503. 34 (3) For each small school which has an average daily 35 attendance during the fiscal year of 51 or more but less 36 than 76, exclusive of pupils attending the seventh and 37 eighth grades of a junior high school, and for which school 38 three teachers were hired full time for more than 39 one-half of the days schools were maintained, he shall 40 compute for the district the product of 75 multiplied by 23 — AB 1283 1 the relative support percentage specified in Section 2 17301 multiplied by the appropriate factor specified in 3 Section 17662.5 multiplied by the statewide average 4 current expense of education for elementary districts as 5 determined pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 17503. 6 (4) For each small school which has an average daily 7 attendance during the fiscal year of 76 or more and less 8 than 101, exclusive of pupils attending the seventh and 9 eighth grades of a junior high school, and for which school 10 four teachers were hired full time for more than one-half 11 of the days schools were maintained, he shall compute for 12 the district the product of 100 multiplied by the 13 appropriate percentage specified in Section 17301 14 multiplied by the appropriate relative support factor 15 specified in Section 47663 17662.5 multiplied by the 16 statewide average current expense o f education for 17 elementary districts as determined pursuant to 18 subdivision (c) o f Section 17503. 19 Sec. 27. Section 17655.5 of the Education Code is 20 amended to read: 21 17655.5. (a) For each district on account of each 22 necessary small school (giving regard to the number of 23 teachers actually employed or average daily attendance), 24 he shall make one of the following computations, 25 whichever provides the lesser amount: 26 (1) For each necessary small school which has an 27 average daily attendance during the fiscal year of less 28 than 26, exclusive of pupils attending the seventh and 29 eighth grades of a junior high school, and for which school 30 at least one teacher was hired full time, he shall compute 31 for the district the product of 25 multiplied by the 32 appropriate percentage specified in Section 17301 33 multiplied by the appropriate relative support factor 34 specified in Section 47663 17662.5 multiplied by the 35 statewide average current expense o f education for 36 elementary districts as determined pursuant to 37 subdivision (c) o f Section 17503. 38 12) For each necessary small school which has an 39 a v e r a g e daily attendance during the fiscal year of 26 or 40 more and less than 51, exclusive of pupils attending the AB 1283 — 24 — 1 seventh and eighth grades of a junior high school, and for 2 which school at least two teachers were hired full time for 3 more than one-half of the days schools were maintained, 4 he shall compute for the district the product of 50 5 multiplied by the appropriate percentage specified in 6 Section 17301 multiplied by the appropriate relative 7 support factor specified in Section 4-7-662 17662.5 8 multiplied by the statewide average current expense o f 9 education for elementary districts as determined 10 pun uant to subdivision (c) o f Section 17503. 11 (3) For each necessary small school which has an 12 average daily attendance during the fiscal year of 51 or 13 more but less than 76, exclusive of pupils attending the 14 seventh and eighth grades of a junior high school, and for 15 which school three teachers were hired full time for more 16 than one-half of the days schools were maintained, he 17 shall compute for the district the product of 75 multiplied 18 by the appropriate percentage specified in Section 17301 19 multiplied by the appropriate relative support factor 20 specified in Section 47662 17662.5 multiplied by the 21 statewide average current expense o f education for 22 elementary districts as determined pursuant to 23 subdivision (c) o f Section 17503. 24 (4) For each necessary small school which has an 25 average daily attendance during the fiscal year of 76 or 26 more and less than 101, exclusive of pupils attending the 27 seventh and eighth grades of a junior high school, and for 28 which school four teachers were hired full time for more 29 than one-half of the days schools were maintained, he 30 shall compute for the district the product of 100 31 multiplied by the appropriate percentage specified in 32 Section 17301 multiplied by the appropriate relative 33 support factor specified in Section 47662 17662.5 34 multiplied by the statewide average current expense o f 35 education for elementary districts as determined 36 pursuant to subdivision (c) o f Section 17503. 37 (b) For each elementary district which exclusive of 38 pupils attending the seventh and eighth grades of a junior 39 high school has an average daily attendance of 101 or 40 more during the fiscal year, he shall compute the — 25 — AB 1283 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 allowance in accordance with subdivision (b) of Section 17662, plus any amount pursuant to Sections 17654.5 and 17655.5. Section 17656 of the Education Code is Section 17660 of the Education Code is Section 17662 of the Education Code is Sec. 28. repealed. Sec. 29. repealed. Sec. 30. repealed. Sec. 31. Section 17662 is added to the Education Code, to read: 17662. (a) The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall allow to each school district on account of the average daily attendance credited to the district in the appropriate grade levels an amount computed in accordance with subdivision (b) of this section plus any amount pursuant to the provisions of Sections 17654.5, 17655.5, and 17664. No apportionment may be less than one hundred twenty dollars ($120) per unit of average daily attendance. (b) The apportionment to a school district equals shall be the product of (1) the number of units of average daily attendance of the district and, (2) the appropriate percentage specified in Section 17301 and, (3) the statewide average current expense of education for the type of district (elementary, high school, or unified) as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 17503 and (4) the relative support factor of the district, as determined pursuant to Section 17662.5. Sec. 32. Section 17662.3 is added to the Education Code, to read: 17662.3. The relative wealth index of a school district is the quotient of the assessed valuation per unit of average daily attendance of the district, as adjusted pursuant to Chapter 1.7 of Division 14 (commencing with Section 17270), divided by the statewide assessed valuation per unit of average daily attendance for the particular type of school district. SEC. 33. Section 17662.5 is added to the Education AB 1283 — 26 — 1 Code, to read: 2 17662.5. The relative support factor of a school district 3 is computed in the following manner: 4 (a) For districts with a relative wealth index of 0.5 or 5 less, the relative support factor is 0.991 plus one-half 6 multiplied by the quantity 1.5 minus twice the relative 7 wealth index. 8 (b) For districts with a relative wealth index greater 9 than 0.5 but equal to or less than 1.5, the relative support 10 factor is 0.991 plus one-half multiplied by the quantity one 11 minus the relative wealth index. 12 (c) For districts with a relative wealth index greater 13 than 1.5, the relative support factor is the reciprocal of 0.9 14 divided by the relative wealth index. 15 Sec. 34. Section 17664 of the Education Code is 16 amended to read: 17 17664. For each district on account of each necessary 18 small high school the Superintendent of Public 19 Instruction shall make one of the following computations 20 selected with regard only to the number of certificated 21 employees employed or average daily attendance, 22 whichever provides the lesser amount: 23 24 Minimum number 25 Average daily of certificated Amount to be 26 attendance employees allowed 27 1 - 20 .................................................... 3 $8,500 28 2 1 - 40 .................................................... 4 16,980 29 41- 6 0 ....................................... 5 25,470 30 61- 75 .................................................... 6 31,830 3 1 76 - 9 0 .................................................... 7 38,190 32 91-105 8 44,560 33 106-120 9 50,920 34 121-135 10 52,280 3 5 136 -1 50 .................................... 11 63,650 36 151-180 12 76,370 37 181-220 13 93,340 38 221-260 14 110,310 39 261-300 15 127,300 — 27 — AB 1283 1 For each district which has an average daily attendance 2 of less than 21 and for which fewer than three certificated 3 employees were employed, he shall_______ _ ($_______ ) 4 allow four thousand dollars ($4,000) for each of the 5 teachers employed in the school. 6 For the purposes of this section a “ certificated 7 employee” is an equivalent full-time position of an 8 individual holding a credential authorizing service, and 9 performing service in grades 9 through 12 in any 10 secondary school. Any fraction of an equivalent full-time 11 position shall be deemed to be a full-time position. 12 The allowance established by this section for high 13 schools with an average daily attendance of less than 301 14 shall not apply to any high school established after July 1, 15 1961 unless the establishment of such schools has been 16 approved by the Superintendent of Public Instruction. 17 Sec. 35. Section 17665 of the Education Code is 18 amended to read: 19 17665. For each high school district which has an 20 average daily attendance of 301 or more during the fiscal 21 year, he shall compute the allowance in accordance with 22 subdivision (b) of Section 17662 plus any amount 23 pursuant to Section 17664. 24 Sec. 36. Section 17665.5 of the Education Code is 25 repealed. 26 Sec. 37. Article 2.1 (commencing with Section 27 17671) of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code 28 is repealed. 29 Sec. 38. Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 30 17680) of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code 31 is repealed. 32 Sec. 39. Article 3 (commencing with Section 17701) 33 of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code is 34 repealed. 35 SEC. 40. Article 3 (commencing with Section 17701) 36 is added to Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education 37 Code, to read: AB 1283 — 28 — 1 Article 3. Adjustments to Expenditures 2 3 17701. fe Adjustments to expenditures pursuant to 4 this article shall commence in the 1972-1973 fiscal year as 5 adjustments to the 1971-1972 current expense o f 6 education as defined in subdivision (c) o f Section 17503. 7 In the 1973-1974 fiscal year, and each fiscal year 8 thereafter, similar adjustments to expenditures shall be 9 made annually. 10 In computing the transfer to the State School Fund 11 pursuant to Section 17301 and the apportionments to 12 districts pursuant to Section 17662, the Superintendent of 13 Public Instruction shall annually adjust the amounts by a 14 factor which is a function of the adjustment in the 15 adjustment index developed pursuant to Section 17301 as 16 prescribed by this article. 17 For the purposes of this article, reference to 18 expenditures per unit of average daily attendance shall 19 have the same meaning as “current expense of 20 education” as used in subdivision jb j (c) of Section 17503. 21 17702. For the purposes of this article the following 22 definitions shall apply: 23 (a) “Relative expenditure index” is the quotient of the 24 district’s expenditure per unit of average daily 25 attendance divided by the statewide average current 26 expense of education per unit of average daily 27 attendance for the particular type of district 28 (elementary, high school, or unified). 29 (b) “Relative salary index” is the quotient of the 30 district’s average salary for certificated or classified 31 employees by the statewide average salary for 32 certificated or classified employees. 33 Separate computations are to be made for each 34 category of employees. 35 (c) The “reasonable expenditure increment factor” 36 for a district which has a relative expenditure index 37 greater than one is the quotient of the change in the 38 adjustment index developed pursuant to Section 17301 39 divided by the square of the relative expenditure index. 40 The “reasonable expenditure increment factor” for a — 29 — AB 1283 1 district which has a relative expenditure index equal to or 2 less than one is the product of the adjustment index 3 developed pursuant to Section 17301 multiplied by the 4 quantity three minus twice the relative expenditure 5 index. 6 17703. Annual salary increases for the employees of a 7 district which has relative salary index greater than one 8 may not exceed the amount determined by the 9 application of a factor which is the quotient of a salary 10 index developed by the Superintendent of Public 11 Instruction, the Legislative Analyst, and the Department 12 of Finance divided by the square of the relative salary 13 index. 14 17704. Annual salary increases for the employees of a 15 district which has a relative salary index equal to or less 16 than one may not exceed the amount determined by the 17 application of a factor which is the product of the index 18 developed by the Superintendent of Public Instruction, 19 the Legislative Analyst, and the Department of Finance 20 multiplied by the quantity three minus twice the relative 21 salary index. 22 17705. With respect to increases in salaries of 23 certificated employees the Superintendent of Public 24 Instruction shall disregard any increases granted on 25 account of additional academic training or promotion to 26 a different job category. 27 17706, The expenditures per unit of average daily 28 attendance in any school district may not increase by a 29 factor greater than the reasonable expenditure 30 increment factor unless such expenditures have been 31 approved by the electorate pursuant to Section 20803. In 32 the event a district exceeds such expenditure guidelines 33 the Superintendent of Public Instruction shall disregard 34 such excess expenditures when computing the average 35 current expense of education pursuant to subdivision (c) 36 of Section 17503. 37 17707. In the event a district exceeds the increases 38 authorized by Sections 17703, 17704, and 17705 regarding 39 salary increases the Superintendent of Public Instruction 40 shall withhold from apportionments any amount in AB 1283 38 — 1 excess of such computations. When computing the 2 statewide average current expense of education pursuant 3 to subdivision (c) o f Section 17503 he shall also omit any 4 amounts attributable to excessive increases in salaries. 5 17708. Apportionments from the State School Fund 6 shall be adjusted to reflect the application of the 7 reasonable expenditure index to the apportionment for 8 each school district. 9 Se c . 41. Article 4 (commencing with Section 17751) 10 of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code is 11 repealed. 12 Se c . 42. Article 5 (commencing with Section 17801) 13 of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code is 14 repealed. 15 Sec. 43. Article 7 (commencing with Section 17901) 16 of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code is 17 repealed. 18 SEC. 44. Article 7.1 (commencing with Section 17920 19 of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code is 20 repealed. 21 Sec. 44.5. Article 7.2 (commencing with Section 22 17940) of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code 23 is repealed. 24 Sec. 45. Article 8 (commencing with Section 17951) 25 of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code is 26 repealed. 27 Sec. 46. Section 18102 of the Education Code is 28 repealed. 29 Sec. 47. Section 18102 is added to the Education 30 Code, to read: 31 18102. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall 32 allow to each school district and county superintendent 33 of schools for each particular category of minors in a 34 special education program during the current fiscal year 35 an amount computed as follows: 36 (a) He shall divide the average daily attendance n 37 each particular category of minors in a special education 38 program by the maximum class size established by law for 39 special day classes for each particular category of minor 40 in a special education program, and increasing the — 31 — AB 1283 quotient to the next highest integer where a fractional amount is produced. (b) He shall then determine for each particular category the product of the amount computed under subdivision (a) multiplied by the maximum class size established by law for special day classes for the particular category. (c) He shall then multiply the amount computed under subdivision (b) by the following amount for the 10 particular grade level and category: 11 12 Elementary school High school 13 Category grades (K-8) grades (9-12) 14 Physically handicapped 15 Class-size maximum of 3 ..... ...$5,400 16 Class-size maximum of 5 ........... $2,965 17 Class-size maximum of 6 ........ ... 2,520 ___ 18 Class-size maximum of 8 ....... ... 1,800 1,670 19 Class-size maximum of 10.... . ... 1,370 1,240 20 Class-size maximum of 12....... ... 1,080 950 21 Class-size maximum of 16....... 590 22 Class-size maximum of 20..... 375 23 Mentally retarded (as defined 24 in Section 6902) 25 Class-size maximum of 15 ........ ..... 570 440 26 Class-size maximum of 18....... ... 420 285 27 Mentally retarded (as 28 defined in Section 6903) ...... ..... 920 785 29 Educationally handicapped........ .. ..... 1,000 870 30 31 Sec. 48. Section 18102.2 of the Education Code is 32 repealed. 33 Sec. 49. Section 18102,4 of the Education Code is 34 repealed. 35 Sec. 50. Section 18102.6 of the Education Code is 36 repealed. 37 Sec. 51. Section 18102.8 of the Education Code is 38 amended to read: 39 18102.8. The governing board of a school district with 40 an average daily attendance of less than 2,000 pupils AB 1283 — 32 — 1 during the current fiscal year, or a county superintendent 2 of schools, may apply to the Superintendent of Public 3 Instruction whenever sparsity of population or 4 transportation distances make it impossible to maintain 5 classes of the maximum size as prescribed by this code or 6 by the State Board of Education. If the Superintendent of 7 Public Instruction, upon review, finds that it is impossible 8 to maintain classes of the maximum size as prescribed by 9 this code or by the State Board of Education, he may add 10 to the amounts allowed under Section 18102 an amount 11 sufficient to provide for the needed classes, but not more 12 per special class than the applicable amounts computed 13 in that section. 14 S e c . 52. Section 18102.9 of the Education Code is 15 amended to read: 16 18102.9. (1) In addition to the allowances provided 17 under Section 18102, the Superintendent of Public 18 Instruction shall allow to school districts and county 19 superintendents of schools for each unit of average daily 20 attendance for an amount as follows: 21 (a) For instruction of educationally handicapped 22 minors in learning disability groups, two thousand few 23 hundred eighty debars -($2,480) one thousand eight 24 hundred eighty dollars ($1,880) . 25 (b) For instruction of educationally handicapped 26 minors in homes or in hospitals, one thousand three 27 hundred dollars ($1,300). 28 (c) For instruction of physically handicapped minors 29 in remedial physical education, nine hundred fifty debars 30 ($950) seven hundred seventy-five dollars ($775) . 31 (d) For remedial instruction of physically 32 handicapped minors in other than physical education, 33 twe thousand seven hundred forty dollars ($2,740). two 34 thousand dollars ($2,000). 35 (e) For instruction of blind pupils when a reader has 36 actually been provided to assist the pupil with his studies, 37 or for individual instruction in mobility provided blind 38 pupils under regulations prescribed by the State Board of 39 Education, or when braille books are purchased, ink print 40 materials are transcribed into braille, or sound recordings 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 — 33 — AB 1283 and other special supplies and equipment are purchased for blind pupils, or for individual supplemental instruction in vocational arts, business arts, or homemaking for blind pupils, nine hundred ten dollars ($910). Braille books purchased, braille materials transcribed from ink print, sound recordings purchased or made, and special supplies and equipment purchased for blind pupils for which state or federal funds were allowed are property of the state and shall be available for use by blind pupils throughout the state as the State Board of Education shall provide. (f) For other individual instruction of physically handicapped minors, one thousand three hundred dollars ($1,300). '(g) For the instruction of physically handicapped minors in regular day classes, ene thousand ©ne hundred dollars one thousand eighteen dollars ($1,018) . (2) (a) The allowances provided under Section 18102 may be increased proportionately on account of special day classes convened, or other instruction provided a pupil, for days in a school year which are in excess of the number of days in the school year on which the regular day schools of a district are convened. (b) The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall compute for each applicant school district and county superintendent of schools in providing in such year a program of specialized consultation to teachers, counselors and supervisors for educationally handicapped minors, an amount equal to the product of ten dollars ($10) and the average daily attendance of pupils enrolled in special day classes, learning disability groups, and home and hospital instruction for educationally handicapped minors. Sec. 53. Section 18102.10 of the Education Code is amended to read: 18102.10. For each special class or program for which a state allowance is provided under this article or under Section 18060 or 18062, each school district and each county superintendent of schools maintaining such AB 1283 — 34 — 1 special classes or programs shall report annually to the 2 Superintendent of Public Instruction, on forms he shall 3 provide, all expenditures and income related to each 4 special class or program. 5 If the Superintendent of Public Instruction determines 6 that the current expense of operating a special class or 7 program as defined in the California School Accounting 8 Manual does not equal or exceed the sum of the basic 9 program support determined pursuant to Section 17662 10 and the allowance provided under this article for each 11 pupil in average daily attendance in the special class or 12 program maintained by a school district for each pupil in 13 average daily attendance in special classes or programs 14 maintained by the county superintendent of schools, then 15 the amount of such deficiency shall be withheld from 16 state apportionments to the school district or the county 17 superintendent of schools, as the case may be, in the 18 succeeding fiscal year in accordance with the procedure 19 prescribed in Section 17414. 20 Expenditures for equipment that the Superintendent 21 of Public Instruction determines are necessary for 22 instruction in a special class or program for physically 23 handicapped minors shall be considered as current 24 expense for purposes of this section. In any year the 25 district’s allowable expenditure for such equipment may 26 not exceed 1 percent of the current expense of operating 27 the district’s physically handicapped program. 28 SEC. 54. Section 18355 of the Education Code is 29 amended to read: 30 18355. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall 31 allow, in addition to all other allowances, to the county 32 school service funds: (a) for all emergency schools 33 maintained in each elementary school district of the 34 county by the county superintendent of schools, (b) all 35 special schools or classes for mentally retarded minors 36 and severely mentally retarded minors maintained in 37 each elementary school district of the county by the 38 county superintendent of schools, (c) each elementary 39 school maintained in juvenile halls, juvenile homes, and 40 juvenile camps, by the county superintendent of schools, — 35 — AB 1283 1 and all opportunity schools and classes maintained by the 2 county superintendent of schools pursuant to Sections 3 6502 and 6503, and (d) all schools and classes for 4 educationally handicapped minors maintained in each 5 elementary school district of the county by the county 6 superintendent of schools, the same amount per 7 elementary pupil as he would allow under Section 17662. 8 No allowance shall be made for emergency schools 9 which is in excess of the actual expense of maintaining the 10 emergency school. 11 Sec. 55. Section 18358 of the Education Code is 12 amended to read: 13 18358. For all physically handicapped pupils, 14 mentally retarded minors and educationally 15 handicapped minors of secondary grade, and 16 handicapped adults, educated by the county 17 superintendent of schools and for all secondary schools 18 maintained in juvenile halls, juvenile homes and juvenile 19 camps by the county superintendent of schools, the 20 Superintendent of Public Instruction shall allow the same 21 amount per high school pupil as he would allow under 22 Section 17662. 23 However, with respect to handicapped adults, the 24 following limits shall apply: 25 (a) The total of allowances for education of 26 handicapped adults in classes established by the county 27 superintendent of schools pursuant to Section 5746 shall 28 not exceed fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) in any one 29 fiscal year. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall 30 establish a system of priorities that he shall by rule or 31 regulation adopt which shall give highest priority to those 32 counties in which no or an insufficient program for the 33 education of handicapped adults is provided by the 34 school districts within the county, in order to comply with 35 the limitation prescribed by this subdivision. 36 (b) The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall 37 allow for handicapped adults the amount specified in 38 Section 17951 for each unit of average daily attendance 39 for adults for high school districts. 40 Sec. 56. Section 18401 of the Education Code is AB 1283 — 36 — 1 amended to read: 2 18401. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall 3 allow to each county school tuition fund one hundred 4 twenty dollars ($120) for each unit of average daily 5 attendance of pupils residing in the county and attending 6 school in an adjoining state during the fiscal year. Such 7 average daily attendance shall not be included in the 8 computations provided for in Section 17702. 9 SEC. 57. Section 20404 of the Education Code is 10 amended to read: 11 20404. On or before August 15, the county board of 12 education shall file with the board of supervisors a 13 certified statement showing the amount of money to be 14 raised by a county tax for purposes of this chapter. The 15 board of supervisors shall fix a rate for the county tax 16 sufficient to produce the amount specified in the 17 statement and shall, at the time of levying other county 18 taxes, levy the tax so fixed. 19 The proceeds of the tax levied pursuant to this section 20 shall be credited to the single county school service fund 21 of the county and any expenses of the county 22 superintendent of schools, the county board of education, 23 and the county committee on school district organization 24 required by Section 881 or any other sections of this code 25 required to be paid from the county general fund shall 26 not be paid from such fund but shall be paid from the 27 money in the single county school service fund. 28 A tax levied pursuant to this section shall not exceed 29 the rate of ten cents ($0.10) per one hundred dollars 30 ($100) of assessed valuation for administrative and 31 business functions. 32 Sec. 58. Section 20751 of the Education Code is 33 repealed. 34 Sec. 59. Section 20751 is added to the Education 35 Code, to read: 36 20751. (a) It is the intent of the Legislature that 37 statutory maximum -tax rates be sufficient te permit an 38 average wealth seheel district te provide an average 40 with state allowances and apperMenmentsy — 37 — AB 1283 -(b)- 33*e m axim u m lax rate p er each o n e hun dr ed dollars -($100 )■ o f assessed valu ation fo r an elem en tary ; ; aja 0.13 e e - f 4 /mitI-K »,■»-* 1-1-̂.. la Eft? aTTT Tf̂ TTTl TXT Titt? 4 following table; 6 Li** n fin 1 V' **•ntstonr Tnc?ttT E lem ent High School Unified 7 3072/1978t........ $3410 $430 $3t30 8 4973/4074—— 475 3t30 QQK 9 l£gX /4.Q7ST75T7KT“T£7TT?’ ’ 10 11 following....... 1 gfjX;T7t7 itTXTXj or.gn 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 -(e)- 34m maximum lax rale for a community eohegc purposes; and ten eents -f$QrlO)- for adult education vaf-uahem -(d)- 3%e maximum lax rales set forth m this seetien may he exceeded with the approval of a majority of the electorate pursuant to Section 20893t fiscal year exceeds seven hundred twcnty/five dollars ■(■$725) for elementary districts or exceeds nine hundred twelve dollars -($012( for high school districts, sueh expenditures may not he increased except hy election of the voters of the district: -(f)- Ifi during 3073/ 74; and in subsequent fiscal years, the authorized expenditure level exceeds the statewide daily attendance for the elementary distric ts and 343 percent of the statewide average current expense for high school districts; sueh expenditures may not he increased except hy election of the voters of the district. expenditure controls applied pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 17701) o f Chapter 3 o f Division 14 replace statutory school district tax rate limitations for elementary, high school, and unified districts. No district may exceed the authorized expenditure level determined pursuant to Article 3 (commencing AB 1283 — 38 — 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 with Section 17701) o f Chapter 3 o f Division 14 unless such excess expenditures have been approved by the electorate pursuant to Section 20803. For community college districts the maximum tax rate shall be thirty-five cents ($0.35) for community college purposes, and ten cents ($0.10) for adult education purposes, on each one.hundred dollars ($100) o f assessed valuation. Section 20800 of the EducationSe c . 60. repealed. Se c . 61. repealed. Se c . 62. repealed. Se c . 63. Code is Section 20801.5 of the Education Code is Section 20802.8 of the Education Code is Code isSection 20806 of the Education amended to read: 20806. For the purpose of providing funds for the payment by the district of all or part of the premiums, dues, or other charges for health and welfare benefits on active officers and employees and retired officers and employees who at the time of retirement were enrolled in a health and welfare benefit plan, or on the spouses and dependent children of such active and retired officers and employees, or on both such active and retired officers and employees and their spouses and dependent children, which the governing board of a district may have authorized in accordance with the provisions of Article 1 (commencing with Section 53200) of Chapter 2 of Part 1 of Division 2 of Title 5 of the Government Code and for the expenses incurred by the district in administration of a program involving the payment of such health and welfare benefits, district taxes, up to a maximum of five cents ($0.05) per one hundred dollars ($100) of assessed valuation, may be levied and collected annually by the respective district at the same time and in the same manner as other district taxes are levied and collected. The tax shall be in addition to any other district tax now or hereafter authorized by law, and shall not be considered in fixing maximum rates of tax for school district purposes. Moneys collected pursuant to this — 39 — AB 1283 is 1 section may also be expended for the requirements of 2 Section 13658. 3 The provisions of this section authorizing the payment 4 of all or part of the premiums, dues, or other charges for 5 health and welfare benefits for the retired officers and 6 employees who at the time of retirement were enrolled 7 in a health and welfare benefit plan, shall be limited in 8 applicability to any school district, or of two or more 9 school districts governed by governing boards of identical 10 personnel, having an average daily attendance of 400,000 11 or more as shown by the annual report of the county 12 superintendent of schools for the preceding year. 13 Se c . 64. Section 20807 of the Education Code 14 repealed. 1 5 S e c . 6 5 . 16 repealed. 1 7 S e c . 6 6 . 18 repealed. 1 9 S e c . 6 7 . 20 repealed. 21 Sfife 6& S eetio m Z-, % S-, h IQ, Ur, m , &r, m , &■, 22 6% and 67 ef this aet shall become operative Of* J[uly 23 -b 4674? From Jtdy h 4972; until July h 4974; the taxes for 24 speeial purposes actually levied in all school districts 26 aet shah be redueed by an amount which will limit the 27 revenues of eaeh distriet to not more than will provide 28 the prior year’s expenditure level plus the application of 2 9 t h e reasonable e x p e n d i t u r e i n c r e m e n t f a e t o r p u r s u a n t t o 30 Article 3 -feommcneing with Section 47794)- of Chapter 3 « 4 I A * \ JLJ& iCXt~ -jh-KVXV o 4-qL.f-vytL A l l m s ntn t/-in n h 11v laivii urs. v7X XXTv_7 XjOlXCxrCivTIT V-iv/uv--. x m tTttvTii TtTTCTcr oxsctix 32 be redueed proportionately unless the county 33 superintendent of schools approves an alternate method 34 of reduction. Section 20808 of the Education Code is Section 20808.5 of the Education Code is Section 20816 of the Education Code is O APPENDIX “ C” AMENDED IN SENATE JUNE 20, 1972 AMENDED IN SENATE MAY 23, 1972 SENATE BILL No. 1302 Introduced by Senators Dymally, Alquist, Grunsky, and Rodda Rod da, Be hr, and Moscone (Coauthors: Assemblymen Arnett, Cory, Dunlap, Bill Greene, and Lewis Lewis, Fong, and MacDonald) March 15, 1972 An act to add Chapter 6d ■(commencing with Section §445f to Division dAMEND SECTION 16601.5 of, to add Sections 16602.5 and 16602.6 to, and to amend Section 16601.5 TO ADD CHAPTER 6.1 (COMMENCING WITH SECTION 6445) TO DIVISION 6 OF, AND TO ADD ARTICLE 1.5 (COMMENCING WITH SECTION 16820) TO CHAPTER 1 OF DIVISION 13 of, the Education Code, AND to amend the heading o f Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 16150) o f Part 4 o f Division 9 of, to amend Section 16150 of, and to add Sections 16151.5 and 16153.5 to, the Welfare and Institutions Code, relating to early childhood education, and making and appropriation therefor. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST SB 1302, as amended, Dymally. Education Early childhood education. State s legislative intent re establishment of statewide program for early childhood education. Defines mdueatienal program for early childhood education ̂as the entire sehool/sponsorcd offering for pupils, other than exceptional ehddretg in early primary classes, kindergarten; and grades 4 through 3? including in/ekss and out/of/elass aetfoitiesr Requires State Board o f Education to establish comprehensive program for early childhood education at SB 1302 2 specified levels. A uthorizes governing boards o f school districts maintaining specified grade levels to develop master plans for early childhood level in the 1972-73 fiscal year. fErmits; beginning with 4-97&/1973 school year; and requires beginning with 1976/1077 sebooi year; eaeh school district maintaining kindergarten and specified elementary master plan for early ebddbood edeeafienr Requires such school districts to develop and submit master plans by 1976-77 school year. Authorizes governing boards to develop and submit joint master plans to Department o f Education. Specifies criteria to be contained in master plan- Requires master plans to incude comprehensive statement setting forth district’s educational program. Specifies factors to be considered by State Beard of Education in establishing preferences and priorities among school districts for purpose of apportioning state funds appropriated for implementation of early ehrfdheed education programs. Requires State Board o f Education to establish standards and criteria in evaluating district plans which shall include specified standards and criteria and specifies that the State Board o f Education shall approve a plan which provides for initiation o f classes for pupils who have attained the age o f 3 years and 9 months unless such provisions contain a restructuring o f kindergarten and grades one through three. Authorizes State Board of Education to condition future allowances on a priority basis and apportioning allowances thereby, and authorizes scheduled increases thereof on school district’s meeting objectives contained in master plan. Authorizes State Board of Education to establish performance objectives in reading and mathematics for pupils participating in early childhood education programs. Requires State Board o f Education to adopt reading and mathematics objectives by 1975-76school year, and allows the board to take all actions necessary to reach objectives. Establishes schedule of allowances to school districts for purposes of early ehifdhood educational programs; including — 3 — SB 1302 additional allowances for pupils with special educational needs.- Provides for allowances to districts with approved master plans in three specified classes. Provides for additional allowances to pupils having demonstrable educational needs in three specified classes. Authorizes Superintendent o f Public Instruction to reduce district apportionmen ts in accordance with amounts received pursuant to allowances for specialist teachers. Requires Superintendent o f Public Instruction to apportion funds. Prescribes child enrollment procedure for early primary class, minimum school day, and computation o f average daily attendance. Specifies age for admission to an early childhood education program as 3 years and 9 months. Specifies minimum schoolday for pupils in early childhood education classes as 180 minutes, including recesses. Appropriates fends for fiscal years 1973/1974 through 1977/ 10787 for purposes of early ehildhood education programs. Requires that of funds so appropriated, se much thereof as is needed shall fee used to mated federal funds to seeial services: Authorises Department of Education t© allocate funds appropriated for specified compensatory group ehild ear©; and early ehiftiheod educational programs: Declares legislative purpose in having program o f transportation o f pupils attending early primary classes and permits the governing board o f any school district to transport pupils or parents attending such classes maintained for pupils who have attained the age o f 3 years and 9 months. Appropriates funds, in varying amounts, to the Superintendent o f Public Instruction for providing state reimbursements for such transporta tion for each o f the fiscal years from 1973-74 through 1977-78, inclusive. Includes group child care and early childhood education programs within scope of various existing provisions relating to preschool, children’s center, and day care programs, and excludes day care programs from such provisions. SB 1302 — 4 — Requires Department of Social Welfare to contract with Department of Education to provide system of prescribed social services for children and families of children enrolled in an early childhood education program. Prohibits making of any per capita reimbursements under such social Services on account of any school district not meeting prescribed standards for educational component of a program. Makes appropriations o f specified amounts from the General Fund to the Department o f Education for purposes o f specified early childhood education programs for 1973-1974, 1974-1975, 1975-1976, 1976-1977, and 1977-1978 fiscal years. Makes provision re use of certain other funds for purposes of early childhood education programs contingent upon enactment of unspecified Assembly Bill AB 1283. Vote—Majority; Appropriation—Yes; Fiscal Committee-—Yes. The people o f the State o f California do enact as follows: 1 S e c t i o n 1. Chapter 6.1 (commencing with Section 2 6 4 4 5 ) is added to Division 6 of the Education Code, to 3 read: 4 5 C h a p t e r 6 .1 . E a r l y C h i l d h o o d E d u c a t i o n 6 7 6445r T h e feegtshttef c h ereb y finds and declares that 8 6445. For the purposes o f this chapter, “early 9 childhood education programs” are defined as all 10 educational programs, except those for exceptional 11 children as defined in Section 6870, offered in the public 12 school system, including in-class and out-of-class 13 activities, for children age 3years and 9months, to 8years 1 4 under a local school-by-school comprehensive master 15 plan approved by the State Board o f Education which is 16 designed to assure: 1 7 (a) A comprehensive restructuring o f primary 1 8 education in California kindergarten through third grade 19 to m ore fully m eet the unique needs, talents, interests 20 and abilities o f each child. — 5 — SB 1302 1 (b) That early educational opportunities are made 2 a vailable to children who are 3 years and 9 months o f age 3 to take advantage o f the capacity for learning o f children 4 at this age level. 5 (c) The cooperation and participation o f parents in 6 the educational program to the end that the total 7 community is involved in the developm ent o f the 8 program. 9 (d) The pupils participating will develop an increased 10 com petency in the skills necessary to the successful 11 achievement in later school subjects such as reading, 12 language, and mathematics. 13 (e) Maximize the use o f existing state and federal 14 funds in the implementation o f early childhood 15 education programs. 16 6445.1. The Legislature hereby finds and declares 17 that a comprehensive program o f early childhood 18 education is needed to restructure public education in 19 California. The Legislature, therefore, declares its intent 20 to require that the State Board o f Education develop a 21 comprehensive program for children ages 3 years and 9 22 months, to 8 years. The objectives o f this plan will include 23 assurance that each child will have an individualized 24 program to perm it the developm ent o f his maximum 25 potential and that all pupils who have com pleted the 26 third grade o f the state’s educational system will have 27 achieved a level o f com petence in the basic skills o f 28 reading, language, and mathematics sufficient to 29 continued success in their educational experiences. The 30 system will be based on the development o f a local 31 school-by-school master plan for early childhood 32 education which shall include a phase-in program based 33 on an increase in the number o f schools in the state 34 participating each year until maximum participation is 35 achieved. 36 a comprehensive and coordinated program of early > 37 efeddfeood education developed fey the State Board of 38 fidoeatfon is needed to improve and restructure public 39 education in California. The Legislature declares its 40 intent te require that the State Board of Education SB 1302 — 6 — includes fttt er elasses Ik* 1 establish « comprehensive program for *-ar!y childhood 9 education for ehtk en in early primary-, kindergarten? o ft id <*radob- 1 through 3? through a t.-otem for -the 4 development of a local master plan fot early ehddheod 5 ee need- - n Snob 'lystona shad include a phaaod/in pfograre 6 ha* ed ,n » f t r crease in the s tm y ’ ef schools fo the state 7 p _ -pating each year until mufoesum participation is b aefoeved? the eoordinatfon of all avadahle state and 9 fidera.' funding sources? mafomfoing available federal -0 fond, nd the elements specified in Seetfon 6445t4t 11 6445-d-r As used in this eheptert 12 -(a)- -•■Early 13 educational programs, 15 early primary classes-, kindergartens? and grades 1 to 3? 16 inclusive, er in any one or more sueh classes or grades. 17 -(h)- “Educational program for early ehildhood 18 education” means the entire school/sponsorcd offering 19 for pupils, exeept for exceptional children defined in 20 Seetfon 6870? in early primary classes? kindergartens, and 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 22 activities. 23 -(e)- “Early primary graded er -early primary class” 24 means a elass established pursuant to Education Code 25 Section 6446r 26 -(d)- D̂epartment” means the Department of 27 Edueafiom 28 6445.2. Beginning with the 1972-1973 school year? 29 fiscal year each school district maintaining kindergarten, 30 and grades 1 to 3, inclusive, or any one or more such class 31 or grade, may develop and submit to the department 32 Department o f Education for approval a master plan for 33 early childhood education. Each such school district shall 34 submit to the Department o f Education for approval a 35 master plan for early childhood education to the 36 department no later than the 1976-1977 school year. 37 Application shall be made in accordance with rules and 38 regulations adopted by the State Board of Education. 39 6445.3. The governing boards of two er mere any 40 school districts maintaining any such class or grade may, —- 7 —- SB 1302 1 with the approval of the department Department o f 2 Education, develop and submit for approval a joint 3 master plan for early childhood education. 4 6445.4. A master plan for early childhood education 5 shall include a comprehensive statement setting forth the 6 district’s educational program for early childhood 7 education. The State Board of Education shall establish 8 standards and criteria to be used in the evaluation of 9 plans submitted by school districts. Such standards and 10 criteria for review and approval o f plans by the State 11 Board o f Education shall include, but need not be limited 12 to ; criteria te insure that approved plans make provision 13 for: 14 (a) An assessment Assessment of educational needs of 15 the district. 16 (b) A program o f restructuring o f kindergarten 17 through third grade. 18 -(b)- (c) Opportunities for early primary education 19 provided by the district educational programs for pupils 20 three years and nine months o f age including children s 21 center, day care, preschool, and child care services. 22 -fej- (d) Defined and measurable program objectives. 23 -(d)- A earefaily articulated program from early 24 primary through grade 3r 25 (e) A local program designed to systematically phase 26 into the program all the schools o f the district in no more 27 than five years. 28 -(e)- (f) Coordination of all district resources with the 29 objectives of the local plan. 30 -(f)- (g) Emphasis on an individualized diagnostic 31 approach to instruction. 32 -(g)- Strong parental (h) Parental and community 33 involvement. 34 -(h)- (i) Staff development and inservice training. 35 ft)- (j) Transportation of pupils participating in the 36 program. 37 -(j)- (k) Evaluation of the program. , xaJli /a . XafOu ,f> ,’ST> MOilf Tt~t fT |~* cif - ,r> y t .rn -a--* <-i »XXX txfT̂ TTTvTrx̂ TTrWiJtxTF TJltTXTa TvTT vXtST~Ij v.iJiivtnwvi 39 education the department shall give preference to these 40 districts which have the largest number ef pupils SB 1302 — 8 — 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 d eterm in ed te h a v e special edu cation al n eed s an d th e edueatfonr T h e State B eard e f E d u ca tion shad ad ep t reg ulations settin g forth criteria fo r d e te rm in in g special educational ne e d s; takin g in te c onsideration se ed factors, am on g ethers^ as lew fam ily inc o m e an d lew le v e l e f academ ic ach ievem cn tr 6445^7 T h e State B eard e f E du catio n shall ad ep t setting forth priorities for allow an ces u n der th e b en efit e f all p up ils e lig ib le In a district a m in im u m o f 50 p ercen t e f th e a m eu n t allow ed fe th e district in any e n e year shall h e allocated fo r th e ben efi t e f p up ils w ith spe cial ed u cation al n e e d s as d e te rm in e d p u rsuant te criteria establish ed in accordan ee w ith S ection 644& fo Such stan dards m ay p rov id e th at allow an ces te a d istrict shad h e p rovid ed e n a p h asc /m basis rath er th an te aH pu pils e lig ib le th erefor u n d er Sectio ns 644fo8 an d 6 44 5fo The State Board o f Education shall not approve a plan which provides for the initiation o f classes for pupils who have attained the age o f 3 years and 9 months unless it also contains provisions for restructuring kindergarten and grades 1 through 3. 6445.5. School districts with master plans for early childhood education approved pursuant to Section 6445.4 shall be eligible for allowances authorized under Sections 6445.12, 6445.13, and 16821. Such allowances shall be apportioned to the extent that funds are available on a priority basis in accordance with a schedule established by the State Board o f Education. 6445.6. In apportioning allowances in accordance with Section 6445.5 for early childhood education, the Department o f Education shall give highest priority to (1) those districts which have the largest number o f pupils determined to have educational need, and (2) those districts with the lowest measure o f assessed valuation per pupil and making the most significant property tax effort. The State Board o f Education shall adopt regulations setting forth criteria for the determination o f educational — 9 — SB 1302 1 need which shall be based on such factors as a low level 2 o f pupil achievem ent and a low level o f family income. 3 6445.7. Districts receiving allowances pursuant to this 4 chapter shall provide that a minimum o f50 percent o f the 5 amount allowed to the district in any one year shall be 6 designated for schools with the largest number o f pupils 7 with educational need identified pursuant to Section 8 6445.6 until such time as allowances are authorized for all 9 schools. 10 6445.8. The State Board of Education may further 11 provide that i f , upon its determination - that a district has 12 not met the objectives of its approved plan, allowances 13 shall not be increased in accordance with the phase-in 14 schedule of the district’s approved plan. The board may 15 provide that the failure ef a distrieh over a designated 16 period; te meet the objectives of ds approved plan shall 17 subject the district to a termination of allowances under 18 this chapter? shall provide for an annual review o f the 19 success o f each local district in m eeting the objectives o f 20 its approved plan for early childhood education. The 21 board shall adopt rules and regulations governing the 22 termination o f allowances to districts which are 23 unsuccessful in m eeting the objectives o f their approved 24 plan. 25 644§~? 6445.9. The State Board of Education shall 26 adopt pupil performance objectives in reading and 27 mathematics for use in district early childhood education 28 programs not later than the 1975-1976 school year. The 29 board naay is authorized to take all actions necessary to 30 effect the development, testing, validation, adoption and 31 implementation of such objectives. 32 6445.10. (a) Each district with an approved master 33 plan shall submit to the Department o f Education a 34 report o f its early childhood education program. Such 35 report shall be submitted in a form and manner and at 36 such times, but not less than annually, as prescribed by 37 the State Board o f Education. The report shall include, 38 but not be limited to, factors relating to: 39 (1) Fiscal expenditures. 40 (2) D egree and success o f program implementation. SB 1302 — 10 — 1 (3) Quantitative estimate o f pupil progress. 2 (b) The Department o f Education shall derive a 3 composite score for each school which shall be obtained 4 from each o f the three factors listed in paragraphs (1), 5 (2), and (3) o f subdivision (a). In determining such score, 6 the Department o f Education shall, for the first year o f 7 participation by the school, assign a weight o f 20percent 8 for factor (1), 70 percent for factor (2), 10 percent for 9 factor (3). For the second year o f participation by the 10 school, the factors shall be assigned a weight o f 10percent 11 for factor (1), 50 percent for factor (2), 40 percent for 12 factor (3). For the third and each subsequent year o f 13 participation, only factors (2) and (3) shall be considered 14 and shall receive equal weighting. 15 6445.11. The Department o f Education shall compute 16 an index o f student attainment for each participating 17 school, using factors which have been shown to be 18 predictive o f school success. The obtained score for each 19 school shall be weighted by the degree this score m eets 20 or exceeds the predicted school achievement level. 21 Obtained scores falling below the predicted level o f 22 attainment shall be treated as a zero score. The 23 Department o f Education shall inform each participating 24 district o f the relative performance o f their participa ting 25 schools. Such data shall regularly be analyzed and 26 evaluated and submitted to the Legislature in the form o f 27 an annual report not later than the fifth legislative day o f 28 each regular session o f the Legislature. 29 % 6445.12. From the funds appropriated therefor 30 by the Legislature to the department Department o f 31 Education for the purposes of this chapter, the 32 Superintendent of Public Instruction shall allow 4© eaeh 33 school district with an approved master ptep school 34 districts with approved master plans for the education of 35 children pursuant to such plan an amount equal 4e plans: 36 (a) Five hundred dollars ($500) per pupil in average 37 daily attendance in the district in each early primary elaas 38 class maintained for pupils who have attained the age o f 39 3 years and 9 m onths. 40 (b) One hundred thirty dollars ($130) per pupil in — 11 — SB 1302 1 average daily attendance in the district in each 2 kindergarten class. 3 (c) One hundred thirty dollars ($130) per pupil in 4 average daily attendance in the district in grades 1 to 3, 5 inclusive. 6 §4410 6445.13. In addition to the allowances 7 provided for in Section §441b$ 6445.12, the 8 Superintendent of Public Instruction shad allow to each 9 school district having an approved master plan-, on 10 aeeount of pupils having demonstrated special 11 educational needs, as determined in accordance with 12 Section «44iMk an amount epnal tor shall provide grants 13 for pupils determined by him to have demonstrated 14 educational need, in accordance with Section 6445.6, as 15 follows: 16 (a) One hundred dollars ($100) per pupil in average 17 daily attendance in the district in each early primary elass 18 in each class for pupils who have attained the age o f 3 19 years and 9 m onths. 20 (b) Sixty-five dollars ($65) per pupil in average daily 21 attendance in the district in each kindergarten class. 22 (c) Sixty-five dollars ($65) per pupil in average daily 23 attendance m the district in grades 1 to 3, inclusive. 24 644540; Funds available for allowances by the 25 Superintendent of Public Instruction pursuant to Article 26 5 -(-commencing with Section 5789f of Chapter 5rS of 27 Division § of the Education Code to each school district 28 which is also eligible for allowances under this chapter 29 ft?© 1 30 under this chapter-; 31 6445.14. In computing allowances authorized 32 pursuant to Section 6445.12 the Superintendent o f Public 33 Instruction shall reduce such allowances by the amount 34 per pupil apportioned pursuant to Article 5 35 (commencing with Section 5789) o f Division 6. 36 644544 6445.15. Allowances under this chapter shall 37 be made by the Superintendent of Public Instruction 38 from funds appropriated therefor by the Legislature. The 39 allowances shall be made as early as practicable in the 40 fiscal year and upon order of the Superintendent of SB 1302 — 12 — 1 Public Instruction the State Controller shall draw his 2 warrants upon the money appropriated, in favor of the 3 eligible districts in the amounts ordered. 4 6445.16. The Department o f Education shall 5 continuously monitor and review to assure that all funds 6 appropriated to school districts under this chapter are 7 expended for the purposes intended. 8 6445.17. Allowances shall not be granted under this 9 chapter to a district unless the fiscal effort o f the district 10 with respect to early childhood education for any fiscal 11 year o f participa tion under this chapter was not less than 12 the fiscal effort for that purpose for the fiscal year 13 preceding the district’s participation under this chapter. 14 6445.18. Allowances shall not be granted to a district 15 unless the fiscal effort o f that district with respect to each 16 child participating in the early childhood education 17 program for any fiscal year o f participation under this 18 chapter is no less than the fiscal effort o f the district per 19 elementary child not participa ting in the early childhood 20 education program. The Department o f Education shall 21 annually review individual district expenditures to assure 22 the comparability o f local support based on rules and 23 regulations adopted by the State Board o f Education 24 which take into account growth in district enrollment 25 and increases in district costs. 26 6445:12 6445.19. The State Board of Education shall 27 have the power to adopt and promulgate all rules and 28 regulations necessary to the effective administration of 29 this chapter, including, but not necessarily limited to, 30 those specifically required to be adopted by particular 31 provisions of this chapter. 32 644545 6445.20. The governing board of the school 33 district, in its application for approval of a master plan, 34 may request waiver of the provisions of any section or 35 sections of this code if such waiver is necessary to 36 establish and operate an early childhood education 37 program. The need for waiver shall be explained and 38 justified in the application. The Superintendent of Public 39 Instruction, with approval of the State Board of 40 Education, may grant, in whole, or in part, any such 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 13 SB 1302 request when, in the opinion o f the Superintendent o f Public Instruction, failure to grant such request would hinder the implementation and maintenance o f the district’s program . 6445.21. A school district in its application for approval o f a master plan for early childhood education may include children s center services as provded for in Section 16603. 6446. The governing board o f any school district which has had a master plan for early childhood education approved by the department Department o f Education shall establish and maintain sufficient number ef early primary classes such number o f classes for pupils who have attained the age o f 3years and 9 months, as are necessary to implement such approved master plan for children residing in ffie district wb© living in the district that are eligible for admission pursuant to Section 6446.1 but are not eligible for admission pursuant to Section 5254 and whose parents or guardians present them for admission. 6446.1. A child may be admitted to an early primary a class established pursuant to Section 6446 only in any term during the first school month of the term and only if he is then i f he is of the age prescribed. For good cause the governing board of a school district may permit a child of the proper age to be admitted to the class after the first school month of the school term. If there is but one term during the school year, the child shall be three years and nine months of age on or before September 1 of the current school year. If there are two terms maintained during the school year, the child shall be three years and nine months on or before September 1 of the current school year, t© before he may be admitted in the first term of the school year, or three years and nine months of age on or before February 1 of the current school year, te before he may be admitted in the second term in any school year. As part o f a master plan approved under Section 6445.4 school districts may authorize admission o f any child who is four years o f age regardless o f time o f admission in the SB 1302 — 14 — 1 school year. 2 6446.2. The State Board of Education shall establish 3 minimum standards authorizing service of instructional 4 personnel in early primary classes classes established 5 pursuant to Section 6446. 6 6446.3. The minimum schoolday for pupils m early 7 primary classes classes established pursuant to Section 8 6446 is 180 minutes inclusive of recesses. 9 6446.4. The computation of average daily attendance 10 in early primary classes classes established pursuant to 11 Section 6446 for the purpose of determining allowances 12 under Sections 644o?8 and 64454) 6445.12 and 6445.13, 13 shall be as prescribed in Section 11301. Sections 10951 to 14 10955, inclusive, and Sections 11001, 11002, 11007 and 15 11301.6 shall apply to early primary classes . 16 6446.5. So much of the money aHeeated for 17 allowances pursuant to Section 644541 moneys 18 appropriated for allowances pursuant to Section 6445.12, 19 as is needed, shall be for the purpose of providing state 20 funds to match be matched with available federal funds 21 to slipport those pupils eligible under the Social Security 22 Act for public social services. Federal reimbursement 23 shall be obtained by the Department of Social Welfare for 24 services to children of those families, designated by the 25 State Department of Education, eligible for federal 26 financial participation under the Social Security Act. The 27 State Department of Social Welfare and the State 28 Department of Education shall enter into a contract 29 wherein the Department of Education agrees to provide 30 educational services for such pupils wherein the 31 Department of Social Welfare agrees to pay to the 32 Department of Education all costs of services to 33 participants. 34 6446r6? Nothing m this chapter shah he construed to 35 sanction; perpetuate, of promote the racial or ethnic 36 segregation of pupils « the pubhe schools? 37 Se c . 2. Section 16601.5 of the Education Code is 38 amended to read: 39 16601.5. The facilities used for any children’s center 40 established pursuant to this chapter shall first be used for 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 — 15 — SB 1302 children of families meeting the conditions of Section 16603.1 and may then be made available for children eligible for any children’s center, preschool or group child care program, authorized by the laws of this state, and any early childhood education program conducted under Chapter 6.1 (commencing with Section 6445) of Division 6. The Department of Education shall develop guidelines and procedures for allocating funds appropriated for compensatory preschool educational programs as defined in Section 16151 of the Welfare and Institutions Code to augment preschool, children’s center, and group child care programs, and early childhood education programs conducted under Chapter 6.1 (commencing with Section 6445) of Division 6. Any moneys appropriated for such purpose in any fiscal year which are not expended may be carried over into the next succeeding fiscal year, and shall be available for expenditure in such fiscal year in addition to those funds appropriated for such purpose for such year. Se c . 3. Section 16602.5 is added to the Education Code, to read: 16602.5. A school district in its application for approval of a master plan for early childhood education pursuant to Chapter 6.1 (commencing with Section 6445) of Division 6 shall include children’s centers’ services as provided for in this chapter. Se c . 4. Section 16602.6 is added to the Education Code, to read: 16602.6. The term “elementary school” contained in Section 425 of the United States Code (the National Defense Education Act of 1958, P.L, 85-864 as amended) shall include early primary, and preschool classes, including preschool classes in children’s centers, for the purpose of the cancellation provisions of the Loans to Students in Institutions of Higher Learning. Sec. 5. Article 1.5 (commencing with Section 16820) is added to Chapter 1 o f Division 13 o f the Education Code, to read: SB 1302 — 16 — 1 2 3 Article 1.5. Transportation for Early Primary Pupils 4 16820. The Legislature hereby declares that a 5 comprehensive program o f early childhood education is 6 necessary to improve and restructure public education in 7 California so as to provide each pupil with an opportunity 8 for the early developm ent o f primary skills. The program 9 shall include classes maintained for pupils, who have 10 attained the age o f 3 years and 9 months, as an integral 11 part o f early childhood education. 12 The Legislature further finds that the transportation o f 13 pupils in such classes to and from school is an essential 14 aspect o f such program and a necessary part o f any 15 educational program designed for such children. 16 16821. Notwithstanding any other provision o f law, 17 the governing board o f any school district may provide 18 for the transportation to and from school o f pupils who 19 have attained the age o f 3 years and 9 months and are 20 enrolled in classes established pursuant to Section 6446, 21 whenever in the judgm ent o f the board, such 22 transportation is advisable and good reasons exist 23 therefor. A governing board may allow for the 24 transporta tion ofparen ts o f pupils enrolled in such classes 25 for the purpose o f accompanying their children to and 26 from the attendance center offering such early primary 27 classes. 28 Children m eeting the eligible age requirement for 29 enrollment in such class who are attending a children s 30 center, child day care center, or preschool program 31 operated by a public or private agency are deem ed to be 32 enrolled in such class for the purpose o f this section. 33 Districts shall receive state reimbursements for the 34 transportation o f such pupils pursuant to Article 10 35 (commencing with Section 18051) o f Chapter 3 o f 36 Division 14 o f the Education Code. 37 SEC. 6. There is hereby appropriated from the 38 General Fund to the Super in tenden t o f Public 39 Instruction for the purpose o f providing state 40 reimbursement for the transporta tion o f pupils pursuant — 17 — SB 1302 1 to Section 16821, amounts for transfer to augment 2 subdivision (b) o f Section 17303.5 o f the Education Code 3 and which shall be made available for expenditure as 4 follows: 5 (a) For the fiscal year 1973-74, eight hundred 6 sixty-nine thousand eight hundred fifty dollars 7 ($869,850). 8 (b) For the fiscal year 1974-75, two million 9 twenty-nine thousand six hundred fifty dollars 10 ($2,029,850). 11 (c) For the fiscal year 1975-76, three million one 12 hundred eighty-nine thousand four hundred fifty dollars 13 ($3,189,450). 14 (d) For the fiscal year 1976-77, four million three 15 hundred forty-nine thousand two hundred fifty dollars 16 ($4,349,250). 17 (e) For the fiscal year 1977-78, five million seven 18 hundred ninety-nine thousand dollars ($5,799,000). 19 Any moneys made a vailable for expenditure under this 20 section in any such fiscal year which are not expended 21 may be carried over into the next succeeding fiscal year, 22 and shall be available for expenditure in such fiscal year 23 in addition to those funds otherwise made available by 24 this section for such year. 25 &E€t 5 Se c . 7. The heading of Chapter 2.5 26 (commencing with Section 16150) of Part 4 of Division 9 27 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is amended to read: 28 29 Chapter 2.5. Preschool, Children’s Center, 30 Group Child Care, and Early Childhood 31 Education Programs 32 33 Se€t % Se c . 8 . Section 16150 of the Welfare and 34 Institutions Code is amended to read: 35 16150. The Legislature finds and declares that 36 preschool programs with a strong educational 37 component are of great value to all children in preparing 38 them for success in school, and constitute an essential 39 component of public social services as defined in Section 40 16151. The Legislature further finds that such programs SB 1302 — 18 — 1 are often not available to many children who, because of 2 the low income of their families, parents in training, or 3 minimal employment, are deprived of adequate care and 4 this valuable educational experience, Therefore, it is the 5 intention of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to 6 provide equal educational opportunity to children of 7 low-income or disadvantaged families through 8 appropriate arrangements for preschool, children’s 9 center, group child care, and early childhood education 10 programs of an educational value to be developed in 11 accordance with a contractual agreement between the 12 State Department of Heakh Social Welfare and the State 13 Department of Education. The Legislature believes that 14 the introduction of young children to an atmosphere of 15 learning will improve their performance and increase 16 their motivation and productivity when they enter 17 school. In order to achieve this end, all programs 18 established under this chapter shall be centered upon a 19 defined educational program developed, conducted, and 20 administered with the maximum feasible participation of 21 the families served by the program. 22 SBC. 7 SEC. 9. Section 16151.5 is added to the 23 Welfare and Institutions Code, to read: 24 16151.5. The State Department of Social Welfare shall 25 enter into a contract with the State Department of 26 Education to provide for a statewide system of social 27 services for children educated under an early childhood 28 education master plan pursuant to Chapter 6.1 29 (commencing with Section 6445) of Division 6 of the 30 Education Code, to be established by school districts for 31 children and families who meet the requirement for 32 services under Education Code Section 6446.5. Social 33 services shall include those provided for in Section 10053 34 and in Part 3 (commencing with Section 11000) of 35 Division 9 of this code and the federal Social Security Act 36 Amendments of 1967. 37 &EG-. 8 Sec. 10. Section 16153.5 is added to the 38 Welfare and Institutions Code, to read: 39 16153.5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this 40 code, the State Department of Social Welfare shall not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 19 — SB 1302 provide any per capita reimbursement pursuant to Section 16151.5 on account of any local school district program established pursuant to this chapter which does not meet the educational standards established by the State Board of Education. All programs established pursuant to this chapter shall meet the requirements of Section 107 of Public Law 90-222 (Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967). The State Department of Social Welfare shall have only such functions, duties and responsibilities with respect to early childhood education programs conducted pursuant to Chapter 6.1 (commencing with Section 6445) of Division 6 of the Education Code as is required by law and federal regulations. &EC-. 9 Sec. 11. There is hereby appropriated from the General Fund to the Superintendent ef Public Instruction Department o f Education for the purposes of Chapter 6.1 (commencing with Section 6445) of Division 6 of the Education Code, the following amounts: (a) For allowances under Section 6445r8 6445.12 amounts which shall be made available for expenditure as follows: (1) For the fiscal year 1973-1974, forty-four million five hundred forty-four thousand dollars ($44,544,000). (2) For the fiscal year 1974-1975, one hundred three million nine hundred thirty-six thousand dollars ($103,936,000). (3) For the fiscal year 1975-1976, one hundred sixty-three million three hundred twenty-eight thousand dollars ($163,328,000). (4) For the fiscal year 1976-1977, two hundred twenty-two million seven hundred twenty thousand dollars ($222,720,000). (5) For the fiscal year 1977-1978, two hundred ninety-six million nine hundred sixty thousand dollars ($296,960,000). (b) For the purposes of subdivision (a) of Section 644S-.-9 6445.13, amounts which shall be made available for expenditure as follows: (1) For the 1973-1974 fiscal year, one million eight SB 1302 - 2 0 — 1 hundred twenty-seven thousand seven hundred fifty 2 dollars ($1,827,750. 3 (2) For the 1974-1975 fiscal year, four million two 4 hundred sixty-four thousand seven hundred fifty dollars ' 5 ($4,264,750). 6 (3) For the 1975-1976 fiscal year, six million seven 7 hundred one thousand seven hundred fifty dollars 8 ($6,701,750). 9 (4) For the 1976-1977 fiscal year, nine million one 10 hundred thirty-eight thousand seven hundred fifty 11 dollars ($9,138,750). 12 (5) For the 1977-1978 fiscal year, twelve million one 13 hundred eighty-five thousand dollars ($12,185,000). 14 (c) For the purposes of subdivisions (b) and (c) of 15 Section 64454) 6445.13, amounts which shall be made 16 available for expenditure as follows: 17 (1) For the 1973-1974 fiscal year, six million five 18 hundred sixty-six thousand five hundred thirty-seven 19 dollars ($6,566,537). 20 (2) For the 1974-1975 fiscal year, fifteen million three 21 hundred twenty-one thousand nine hundred twenty 22 dollars ($15,321,920). 23 (3) For" the 1975-1976 fiscal year, twenty-four million 24 seventy-seven thousand three hundred three dollars 25 ($24,077,303). 26 (4) For the 1976-1977 fiscal year, thirty-two million 27 eight hundred thirty-two thousand six hundred eighty-six 28 dollars ($32,832,686). 29 (5) For the 1977-1978 fiscal year, forty-three million 30 seven hundred seventy-six thousand nine hundred 31 fifteen dollars ($43,776,915). 32 (d) The sum of five hundred thousand dollars 33 ($500,000) for the administration by the State 34 Department of Education of the provisions of Chapter 6.1 35 (commencing with Section 6445) of Division 6 of ♦the 36 Education Code. 37 Any moneys made available for expenditure under this 38 section in any such fiscal year which are not expended 39 may be carried over into the next succeeding fiscal year, 40 and shall be available for expenditure in such fiscal year — 21 — SB 1302 1 in addition to those funds otherwise made available by 2 this section for such year. 3 Sfier 40 Se c . 1 2 . A master plan for early childhood 4 education shall provide that to the extent feasible, funds 5 allocated to the district pursuant to Chapter 6.10 6 (commencing with Section 6499.230) of Division 6 of the 7 Education Code, as added by Assembly Bill No. / / 8 1 2 8 3 , shall be for purposes of Chapter 6.1 (commencing 9 with Section 6445) of Division 6 of the Education Code. 10 This section shall become operative only if Chapter 6.10 11 (commencing with Section 6499.230) is added to Division 12 6 of the Education Code by Assembly Bill No. / / 1283 13 of the 1972 Regular Session. O Service of the within and receipt o f a copy thereof is hereby admitted this..,,...._............day o f July, A.D., 1972.