San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez Appendix for Brief Amici Curiae
Public Court Documents
July 1, 1972
129 pages
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez Appendix for Brief Amici Curiae, 1972. 5b5b739e-c39a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/eefcc12b-2704-47d9-87c7-c32a4cdf715e/san-antonio-independent-school-district-v-rodriguez-appendix-for-brief-amici-curiae. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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IN T H E
Supreme Court of tfje Urnteb g>tate$
October Term, 1971
No. 71-1332
SAN A N T O N IO IN D E P E N D E N T S C H O O L D IS
T R IC T , et a l,
Appellants,
vs.
D E M E T R IO P. R O D R IG U E Z , et a l,
Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
APPENDIX
FOR
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE: RICHARD M. CLOWES, SUPER-
INTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF THE COUNTY OF LOS
ANGELES, HAROLD J. OSTLY, TAX COLLECTOR AND
TREASURER OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES: EL
SEGUNDO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; GLENDALE
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; SAN MARINO UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT; LONG BEACH UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT; SOUTH BAY UNION HIGH SCHOOL DIS
TRICT; BEVERLY HILLS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT;
AND SANTA MONICA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, ALL
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY.
JO H N D . M A H A R G ,
County Counsel
JAM ES W . BRIGGS,
Division Chief, Schools Division
D O N O V A N M . M A IN ,
Deputy County Counsel
648 Hall of Administration
500 West Temple Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
(213) 625-3611, Ext. 65643
Attorneys for Amici Curiae.
W E S T E R N P R IN T IN G C O M P A N Y , W H IT T IE R ----- O X B O W 3 * 1 7 2 2
APPENDIX '“ A”
INTERDISTRICT INEQUALITIES IN SCHOOL
FINANCING: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
SERRANO v. PRIEST AND ITS PROGENY.
S t e p h e n R. G o l d s t e i n +
Rarely has a state supreme court decision received
such extensive publicity and public comment as the
recent California Supreme Court opinion in Serrano v.
Priest,3 concerning the constitutionality of interdistrict
disparities in financing California public school dis
tricts. Indeed, one might have to go back to the United
States Supreme Court reapportionment cases to find
a decision of any court that has been as extensively dis
cussed in the press as has Serrano. .Most significantly,
the press comment seems to have been uniformly af
firmative. The Serrano result has been popularly hailed
as rightly egalitarian and a significant, if not the sig
nificant, step in the struggle for better education in
urban areas.2 Even those editorial writers who have
traditionally been proponents of judicial restraint have
refrained from commenting adversely upon the court’s
decision invalidating California’s public school financ
ing system.
tAssociate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1959, L.L.B.
1962, University of Pennsylvania, Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
*5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
'2See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1971, at 17, col. 1: id., Sept. 2, 1971, at
32, col. 1; at 55, cols. 1, 2; id., Sept 5, 1971, § 4, at 7, col. 1; at 10, col.3.
Ill part this absence of adverse comment may be
attributable to the fact that it was the California Su
preme Court and not the United States Supreme Court
that decided the case. Yet, the decision’s impact is
clearly not confined to California. The California
school finance system is similar in effect to the systems
used in 49 of the 50 states/ and the court avowedly
rested its decision on federal equal protection grounds.4
3Hawaii is the only state without local school district control of education.
H a w a ii R e v . L a w s §§296-2, 298-2 (1968).
4The court specifically rejected the argument that the California financing
system violated art. XX, §5 of the California Constitution, which provides for
“ a system of common schools.” It then stated: “ Having disposed of these
preliminary matters, we take up the chief contention underlying plaintiffs'
complaint, namely that the California public school financing scheme violates
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.” 5 Cal. 3d at 596, 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
Despite having thus based its decision on federal constitutional grounds, the
court, in a puzzling footnote, id. at 596 n .ll, 487 P.2d at 1249 n .ll, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 609 n .l l , then referred to 2 provisions of the California Con
stitution requiring that “ [a ]11 laws of a general nature shall have a uniform
operation,” C a l . C o n s t , art. I, §11, and prohibiting “ special privileges or
immunities,” id. art. I, §21. The court went on to state that:
We have construed these provisions as “substantially the equivalent” of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fed
eral Constitution. (Dept, of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1965) 62 Cal.
2d 586, 588, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321.) Consequently, our
analysis of plaintiffs’ equal protection contention is also applicable to
their claim under these state constitutional provisions.
Id.
Following this, there was no further mention of the California Constitu
tion in the opinion and almost all authorities cited concern federal law. The
court also devoted considerable effort to avoiding the argument that the
federal constitutional issues has been foreclosed by the United States Supreme
Court summary affirmances in Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D.
111. 1968), aff’ d mem. sub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), and
Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff’d mem.] 397
U.S. 44 (1970). The California Supreme Court, of course, would not be limited
by a United States Supreme Court interpretation of the California Constitution.
The footnote quoted above, and the explicit citation to Kirchner, however,
raise the issue whether, despite its express reliance on the Federal Consti
tution, the court has not also relied on the California Constitution in a way
that precludes United States Supreme Court review.
In Kirchner, the Califoria Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state
statute relating to liability for the care and maintenance of mentally ill per
sons in state institutions. 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488
(1964). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari but vacated
and remanded the case to the California court on the grounds that the Cal
ifornia opinoin was unclear as to whether it was based on the federal or state
It has also been expressly followed by a federal dis
trict court in Minnesota in denying a motion to dis
miss5 and by a three-judge district court in Texas in
holding that state’s financing scheme unconstitutional."
While it is clear, at least at this time, that the Serrano
decision itself will not be reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court,7 * there are many other interdistrict
consitutions or both, and that the United States Supreme Court would not
have jurisdiction unless the federal Constitution had been the sole basis for
the _ decision, or the state constitution had been interpreted under what the
California court deemed the compulsion of the Federal Constitution. 380 U.S.
194 (1965). On remand, the California Supreme Court stated that although
C a l . C o n s t , art I, §§11 & 21 were generally thought to be “ substantially
the equivalent” of the federal aqual protection clause, the court was “ inde
pendently constrained” in its result by these sections of the state constitution.
The court stated that it had not acted “ solely by compulsion of the Fourteenth
Amendment, either directly or in construing or applying state law . ” 62
Cal. 2d 586, 588, 400 P.2d 321, 322, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330 (1965).
Although the issue is not completely free from doubt, the California Su
preme Court in Serrano may have written an opinion expressly based on federal
law yet at the same time insulated from review by the United States Supreme
Court.
®Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
^Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.
Tex. 1971). Procedurally, Rodriguez has developed further than Serrano, as
the court there, after a hearing, declared the Texas financing scheme un
constitutional and permanently enjoined the defendants, the State Commis
sioner of Education, and the members of the State Board of Education, from
enforcing it. The court, however, stayed its mandate and retained jurisdiction
for 2 years:
in order to afford the defendants and the Legislature an opportunity to
take all steps reasonably feasible to make the school system comply with
the applicable law . . . .
The Court retains jurisdiction of this action to take such further steps
as may be necessary to implement both the purpose and spirit of this
order, in the event the Legislature fails to act within the time stated . . . .
Id. at 286. For retention of jurisdiction the court cited cases of judicially im
posed reapportionment plans.
7See note 4 supra. In addition to the problem of the independent state
ground for the Serrano decision, it is clear that the Supreme Court cannot
review it at this time because it is not a final judgment. See 28 U.S C. §1257
(1 9 7 0 ).
inequality cases in the process of litigation,8 at least
one of which will soon present the United States Su
preme Court with the Serrano problem.9
The primary reason for the favorable reception of
Serrano is probably the growing public eagerness for
its result. Unlike many other societal problems in ed
ucation and other areas, the concept of fiscal equality
in education is perceived as unambiguously good. It
does not appear to involve the competing views of
equality prevalent in desegregation and community
control issues. Nor does it represent the significant
clash between the values of equality and liberty that
the desegregation and community control issues may
present. The only visible liberty being curtailed is local
economic self-determination, a value currently of low
priority in our society when balanced against the prom
ise of improving education for the poor and racial
minorities. Fiscal equality also holds out the promise
of improving education for the poor and racial minor
ities, without raising the fears of personal adverse ef
fects on the white middle-class family aroused by other
proposed policies, such as desegregation. Fiscal equali-
8Also pending before a 3-judge court is the constitutionality of the Florida
school financing system. See Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971), vacat
ing per curiam Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (MX). Fla. 1970). Recent
state court decisions that followed Serrano are: Hollins v. Shofstall, No. C-
253652 (Super. Ct. Maricopa County, Ariz. Jan. 13, 1972); Robinson v. Ca
hill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972); Sweetwater County Planning
Comm, for the Organization of School Dists, v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo.
1971). In disagreement with Serrano is Spano v. Board of Educ., 328 N.Y.
S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972). The issue is now before the court in more than half
the states. See Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
9It appears that the decision in Rodriguez is immediately appealable to
the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. §1253 (1970). If appealed,
it would presumably be heard in the October term, 1972.
t,y involves the movement of inanimate dollars, not live
children.10
Finally, fiscal equality corresponds to a basic
American belief that more money, or money distributed
more wisely, can solve major societal problems such as
the current state of public education, and that all so
ciety need do is to have the will to so spend or dis
tribute it. In Daniel P. Moynihan’s terms, Serrano
leads one to hope that what may have been considered
a “ knowledge problem” is indeed a “ political” one,
or better yet, a judicial one.11
Serrano is unquestionably sound as a matter of ab
stract egalitarian philosophy. Nevertheless, there are
many difficulties presented by its legal analysis. More
over, it is not at all clear that the practical effect of the
decision will be to improve the quality of public educa
tion generally, or the quality of urban public education
in particular.
■— 5—
lOThe Serrano result and metropolitan desegregation, e.g., Bradley v. School
Bd., 40 U.S.L.W. 2446 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 1972), can be viewed as alternative
methods of improving the educational quality of urban minority groups, to the
extent that the argument for metropolitan desegregation rests on a desire to
give the black urban poor access to the tax base of their more affluent white
suburban neighbors. Compare Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C.
1971), with Johnson v, San Francisco Unified School Dist., No. C-70 1331
SAW (N.D. Cal. June 2, 1971). See also Spencer v. Kugler, 40 U.S.L.W.
3333 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1972); United States v. Board of School Comm’rs 332
F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971).
u Moynihan, Can Courts and Money Dc ft?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1972.
§E (Annual Education Review), at 1, col. 3; id. at 24, col. 1.
6
I . S c h o o l D i s t r i c t I n e q u a l i t y a n d t h e
Serrano R e s p o n s e
A. The Court’s Response to Interdistrict
Financing Differentials
As is true with every state except Hawaii, over 90%
of California’s public school funds derive from a com
bination of school district real property taxes and state
aid based largely on sales or income taxation. Histori
cally the state aid, or ‘ ‘ subvention, ’ ’ has been superim
posed on the basic system of locally raised revenue. Al
though the state aid component of educational expen
ditures has been generally increasing as a percentage
of the total expenditures, the local component has re
mained dominant, California is typical in having total
educational expenditures consist of 55.7 percent local
property taxes and 35.5 percent state aid.12
The local component is a product of a locality’s tax
base (primarily the assessed valuation of real property
within its borders) and its tax rate, Tax bases in Cali
fornia, as elsewhere, vary widely throughout the state.
Tax rates also vary from district to district.
12ln addition, federal funds account for 6.1% and other sources for 2.7%.
These figures and others given for California in this Article are taken from the
court’s opinion in Serrano. 5 Cal. 3d at 591 n.2, 487 P.2d at 1246 n.2 96
Cal. Rptr. at 606 n.2.
In discussig expenditure differentials, the Serrano court did not indicate
whether or not its figures included federal revenues. Other authorities have
excluded federal revenues from these calculations. This author has elsewhere
questioned the validity of this exclusion. See Goldstein, Book Review, 59 C a l if .
L. R ev . 302, 303-04 (1971). Nationwide, approximately 52% of all schooi
revenue is collected locally, and from 97-98% of local tax revenue is derived
from property taxes. Briley, Variation between School District Revenue and
Financial Ability, in St a t u s an d I m p a c t of Ed u c ation al F in a n c e Pr o
gram s 49-50 (R. Johns, K. Alexander & D. Stoilar eds. 1971) (National
Educational Finance Project vol. 4). In California, all local school revenues
are raised by property taxation. See C a l . Ed u c . C ode §§20701-06 (1969)
-7—
Tiie state component of school expenditures is gen
erally distributed through a flat grant system, a foun
dation system, or a combination of the two. The flat
grant is the earliest and simplest form of subvention,
consisting of an absolute number of dollars distributed
to each school district on a per-pupil or other-unit stan
dard. Foundation plans are more complicated and have
a number of variants. In its simplest form, a founda
tion plan consists of a state guarantee to a district of
a minimum level of available dollars per student, if the
district taxes itself at a specified minimum rate. The
state aid makes up the difference between local collec
tions at the specified rate and this guaranteed amount.
I f the actual tax rate is greater than the specified rate,
the funds raised by the additional taxes are retained
by the locality but do not affect the amount of state aid.
Finally, there are combinations of flat grants and
foundation plans. Under one form of combination plan
the flat grant is added to whatever foundation aid is
due to the district:
State Aid = [guaranteed amount — local collec
tion at specified rate] + flat grant.
Under the other combination system, the flat grant is
added to the local collection in initially calculating the
foundation grant:
State Aid = [guaranteed amount — (local col
lection at specified rate + flat grant)] + flat
grant.
Under tliis approach, a district that would qualify for
a state foundation grant equal to, or in excess of, the
flat grant does not in effect receive the flat grant. That
grant is superfluous when it serves only to bring a dis
trict up to the foundation level, because a district is
always guaranteed the foundation level in any case.
The full benefit of the flat grant goes only to those dis
tricts where the local collection at the specified rate
equals or exceeds the foundation guarantee.
The latter combination plan is the system employed
in California.13 The flat grant is $125 per pupil. The
foundation minimum, based on a tax rate of 1.0 percent
for elementary school districts and 0.8 percent for high
school districts,14 is $355 for each elementary school
pupil and $488 for each high school student, subject to
specified minor exceptions. An additional state pro
gram of “ supplemental aid” subsidizes particularly
poor school districts that, are willing to set local tax
rates above a certain statutory level. An elementary
school district with an assessed valuation of $12,500 or
less per pupil may obtain up to $125 more for each
child under this plan. A high school district whose as
sessed valuation does not exceed $24,500 per pupil can
18As noted, this results in the quirk that the full effects of the flat grant
are available only to those districts whose revenue at the prescribed rate ex
ceeds the foundation guarantee. There would seem to be no rational basis for
this result. The Serrano court, however, did no more than mention this fact
and there is no indication that the opinion rested on it.
14This is simply a computational tax rate used to measure the relative tax
bases of the different districts. It does not necessarily relate to the actual rates
levied.
receive a supplement of up to $72 per pupil if it taxes
at a sufficiently high rate.15
Although the foundation plan does help to equalize
available educational funds throughout the state, the
relatively low foundation guarantee nevertheless allows
significant disparities among school districts. The Ser
rano court cited the following statistics for the 1969-
1970 school year for district per-pupil educational ex
penditures :
Elementary
Low $ 407
Median 672
High 2586
H igh School
'$ 722
898
1767
Unified16
$ 612
766
2414
Statistics cited by the court for assessed valuations per
pupil also reflected the disparities:
15There are other minor provisions in the state subvention system. Districts
that maintain “ unnecessary small schools” receive $10 per pupil in their
foundation guarantee, a sum intended to reduce class sizes in elementary
schools. Unified districts (those which contain both elementary and secondary
schools) receive $20 more per pupil in foundation grants. In addition, a spe
cial program attempts to provide equalization in districts included in re
organization plans that were rejected by the voters. It gives the poorer dis
tricts in the reorganization the effect of the reorganization to the limited
extent of levying a tax areawide, of 1.0% in elementary districts and 0.8%
in high school districts. The resulting revenue is then distributed among the
individual districts according to the ratio of each district’s foundation level to
the areawide total revenue. Thus, in these rare circumstances of voter-re
jected reorganization plans, poorer districts share in the higher tax bases of weal
thier districts in their area. The districts are, of course, free to tax themselves
above the 1.0% or 0.8% level and retain all additional revenue. 5 Cal. 3d
at 593 n.8, 487 P.2d at 1247 n.8, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 607 n.8.
!«W . at 593 n.9, 487 P.2d at 1247 n.9, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 607 n.9.
10
Low
Median
High
Elementary
$ 103
19,600
952,156
High School17
$ 11,959
41,300
349,093
The complaint in Serrano set forth two main causes
of action. The first was that of plaintiff school children
residing in all school districts except the one that “ af
fords the greatest educational opportunity,” who al
leged that:
As a direct result of the financing scheme . . . sub
stantial disparities in the quality and extent of
availability of educational opportunities exist and
are perpetuated among the several school districts
of the State . . . . The educational opportunities
made available to children attending public schools
in the Districts, including plaintiff children, are
substantially inferior to the educational opportuni
ties made available to children attending public
schools in many other districts in the State . . . ,18
The financing scheme was alleged, therefore, to violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend
ment and various clauses of the California Constitu
tion.
17Id. Note that these figures and those in the text accompanying note 16
supra, represent the extremes and thus may be skewed, as extremes often are.
In this case a major skewing mechanism may be an abnormally low number
of public school students in a given district. Even outside the extremes, how
ever, the discrepancies in California are substantial. These assessed valuation
per pupil figures also assume uniform assessment practices. This assumption
was not discussed by the court. The discrepancies were much less substantial
in Texas but the system was invalidated nonetheless. See Rodriguez v. San
Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
185 Cal. 3d at 590. 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
11
The second cause of action, brought by the parents
of the school children, as taxpayers, incorporated all
the allegations of the first claim. It went on to allege
that as a direct result of the financing scheme, plain
tiffs were required to pay a higher tax rate than tax
payers in many other school districts to obtain for
their children the same or lesser educational opportun
ities.
The complaint sought: (1) a declaration that the
system as it existed was unconstitutional; (2) an order
directing state administrative officials to reallocate
school funds to remedy the system’s constitutional in
firmities ; and (3) retention of jurisdiction by the trial
court so that it could restructure the system if the leg
islature failed to do so within a reasonable time19 The
trial court sustained a general demurrer to the com
plaint and the action was dismissed. The dismissal of
the complaint for failing to set forth a cause of action
was appealed to the California Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court stated the issue in
the first line of its opinion:
We are called upon to determine whether the
California public school financing system, with its
substantial dependence on local property taxes and
resultant wide disparities in school revenue, vio
lates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.20 10
10Id. at 591. 487 P.2d at 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
20Id. at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
—12—
The court immediately went on to hold:
We have determined that this funding scheme in
vidiously discriminates against the poor because
it makes the quality of a child’s education a func
tion of the wealth of his parents and neighbors.
Recognizing as we must that the right to an edu
cation in our public schools is a fundamental in
terest which cannot be conditioned on wealth, we
can discern no compelling state purpose necessitat
ing the present method of financing. We have con
cluded, therefore, that such a system cannot with
stand constitutional challenge and must fall before
the equal protection clause.21
In so holding, the California court employed the
“'new equal protection” analysis. Under this doctrine,
certain t y p e s of legislative classification require a
higher level of state justification to pass judicial scrut
iny than is required under the traditional “ rational
basis” equal protection test. This doctrine holds that
if a suspect classification is employed, and the classi
fication pertains to a fundamental interest,22 then the
21Id.
22It is unclear whether the court regarded the fundamental interest and
suspect classification tests as operating in conjunction with each other as stated
in the text or as operating independently. Compare id. at 612 487 P.2d at
1261, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 621, with 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1257, 96
Cal, Rptr. at 615. To the extent the court suggested that either test, operating
independently, would trigger the “ special scrutiny” review of state action, it
appears to be an inaccurate view of the present state of the law as applied to
state actions other than racial classifications.
The invariable formulation of the doctrine as applied to wealth classifica
tions requires both wealth classification and impairment of a fundamental in
terest in some varying combination. See Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211,
4214 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-30
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
658 (Harlan, J., dissenting.) See generally J. C o o n s , W. C l u n e & S. Su g ar -
m a n , Private W e a l t h a n d P u blic Ed u cation 339-446 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Private W e a l t h an d P u blic Ed u c a t io n ].
13—
classification violates the equal protection clause un
less it is necessitated by a compelling state purpose. A
fuller discussion of the Serrano court’s use of this doc
trine follows.
B. The Choice of a Standard of Equality:
Response to Activist Legal Scholarship
The most striking element in the California Su
preme Court’s holding was its reliance on the relation
ship between the wealth of a school district and its ed
ucational expenditures. By “ wealth” the court meant
taxable wealth (property tax basis23 * * * *) per pupil o'r other
unit. Yet, as stated above, the local component of school
financing is a product of taxable wealth and tax rate.
A district’s expenditures may be low because it is low
in taxable wealth or because it chooses to tax itself at
a low rate, or both. Why, then, did the court focus on
wealth differences as the constitutional vice, rather
than on disparities in expenditures, regardless of
cause %
23Serrano and its progeny have been predicated on the assumption of the
exclusive use of the real estate property tax for local education financing. As
stated in note 12 .supra, however, nationwide property taxes constitute 97-98%
of local taxes for education and thus are almost the exclusive but are not the
exclusive means of local financing. Indeed, by 1968-1969, 22 states and the
District of Columbia authorized the use of local nonproperty taxes by local
school districts. A lt e r n a tiv e Program s for Fin a n c in g Edu cation 186
(1971) (National Educational Finance Project vol. 5). While this still
amounted to less than 3% of local education taxes nationwide, in a given state
the amount could be sufficiently significant that the Serrano analysis premised
on exclusive real estate taxation would be inapplicable. For example, in Penn
sylvania local nonproperty taxes in 1968-1969 produced a mean revenue per
pupil of $101.30 in central city districts. Id. 187.
Local nonproperty taxes include occupational, utility, and other excise
taxes, as well as local sales and income taxes. Tax bases for such taxes would
be much more difficult to calculate than is a given locality’s real property tax
base.
14—
To understand this, one must know something about
the legal literature that predated Serrano. The litera
ture in this field, particularly the book Private Wealth
and Public Education,24 exemplifies a current wave of
consciously activist scholarship, written with an avowed
bias, and aimed at producing specific legal results. This
new breed of writers, not content with pure scholar
ship, actively engages in the litigation process to ac
complish their aims.23 This activist legal scholarship—
of a very high caliber—-produced the legal formulations
manifested in Serrano™
Serrano apparently adopted as the constitutional
ride what was denominated as Proposition 1 in Private
Wealth and Public EducationP “ The quality of public
education may not be a function of wealth other than
the wealth of the state as a whole.” 28 Proposition 1
24Supra note 22.
25Coons and Sugarman, for example, filed amicus briefs in Serrano and
Rodriguez.
28Although the court acknowledged its reliance on Coons, Clune & Sugar-
man by citations throughout the opinion, it cited a law review article, Coons
Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity. A Workable Constitutional Test
for State Financial Structures, 57 C a l if . L. R e v . 305 (1969), rather than the
more comprehensive analysis in Private W e a l t h and P ublic Ed u c a tio n ,
supra note 22. The reason for this is not clear. This may reflect only the
opinion writer’s relative access to the two works. It may also reflect the court’s
sensitivity to the reader’s relative access to the two works. Finally, it might
be suggested that it represents a possible reflection of the difference in esteem
in California, between the California Law Review and the Harvard University
Press.
27The following discussion of Proposition 1 and district power equalizing
is based upon, and some parts are taken entirely from, an earlier analysis of
Private Wealth and Public Education by this author. Goldstein, Book Review
59 C a l if . L. R e v . 302, 304-10 (1 9 7 1 ).
28Private W e a l t h an d P u blic Edu cation , supra note 22, at 2 (emphasis
omitted). Proposition 1 is, however, never directly quoted by the Serrano
Court. The federal court in Van Dusartz, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971)
which expressly relied on Serrano. did quote Proposition 1 and explicitly ac
cepted it as the constitutional standard. Id. at 872 & n.l. Somewhat less
itself was a response to prior debate about interdistrict
disparities in educational offerings. Recently there has
been increased concern with inequalities in government,
services, especially as they affect the poor. In particu
lar, society has become increasingly concerned with
the deplorable condition of urban public education. It
has been argued that a major cause of this condition is
the relative lack of resources available to urban school
districts as compared to their more affluent suburban
neighbors. Moreover, there has been increased recogni
tion that plans for improving urban education through
such alternatives as integration, decentralization and
community control, or compensatory education are, in
the final result, highly dependent on the availability
of greater resources for urban school districts.
Although the exact relationship between financially
Poor school districts and poor people, particularly the
urban poor, is unclear,29 the existence of large wealth
discrepancies among school districts is undeniable. The
disparity in the quality of education, as conventionally
measured, between urban and suburban school districts
clearly the 3-judge court in Rodriguez seemed to adopt Proposition 1 as the
constitutional rule.
One caveat must be stated regarding the Serrano court's acceptance of
Proposition 1 as the constitutional test. As will be discussed at length text
accompanying notes 30-44 infra, Proposition 1 and Serrano do not require
equality of expenditures. Neither, however, is Proposition 1 satisfied by equality
of expenditures. If equal expenditures were achieved by differential rates ap
plied to differential tax bases, that is, lower tax base districts achieving the
same revenue level by employing higher rates, Proposition 1 would not be satis
fied. At this point Proposition 1 leaves education as its concern and becomes
completely taxpayer oriented. Despite the taxpayer orientation in Serrano, see
text accompanying notes 86-9! infra, it is unlikely that the Serrano court
would go this far. Throughout the opinion, the court emphasized differential
educational expenditures.
29See notes 65-75 infra & accompanying text.
is also apparent. Thus the existing system of education
al financing has been increasingly condemned as in
tolerable. However, there has existed substantial dis
agreement on methods of relief. Opponents of judicial
intervention have argued against court action to in
validate the current system: first, for lack of a work
able judicial standard ; secondly, because an equality
concept might result in a downward leveling of expen
ditures when the real need is to improve low quality;
thirdly, because judicial relief would result in centra
lization of educational financing; and fourthly, because
an equality requirement that prevented local school
expenditures above the state norm would be either
unworkable or would result in substantial middle class
exodus from the public schools.30
Proposition 1 was an avowed attempt to respond to
these criticisms. By adopting it, the California Su
preme Court has apparently limited its decision to
wealth-derived educational differentials and has not
required equal expenditures statewide. On this basis
of decision, there are a number of alternative school
financing systems that would meet the court’s constitu
tional standard. Among these is abolition of local school
districts and their replacement with a completely state
wide system. Short of that, centralized state financing 80
80See Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity. The Limits of Constitu
tional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U.C h i . L. R ev . 583 (1968). For the
views of the proponents of judicial intervention, see A, W is e , R ic h Sc h o o l s ,
Poor Sc h o o l s : T h e P ro m ise of Eq u a l Ed u c a tio n a l O p p o r t u n it y 143^
59 (1968); Horowitz & Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in
Public Education and Public Assistance Programs From Place to Place With
in a State, 15 U.C.L.A. R e v . 787 (1968) : Kirp, The Poor, the Schools, and
Equal Protection, 38 H a r v . Ed u c . R ev . 635 (1968).
17-
that raises and distributes all funds could be coupled
with local district administration of the schools. Cen
tralized financing, however, is not required under the
Serrano rule invalidating only wealth-derived differ
entials. A general school redistricting' that equalized
wealth among school districts would satisfy the deci
sion and at the same time allow the present system of
financing and administration to continue. Finally,
there is the innovative suggestion proposed in Private
Wealth and Public Education—district power equaliz
ing—a system t h a t allows differential expenditures
among school districts, while removing the effect of
differential tax bases on these expenditures.
Under district power equalizing, existing school dis
tricts would have funds available for education based
on their tax rate regardless of their tax base. A school
district would be free to choose any tax rate it desired
and its available funds—defined as “ x dollars per edu
cational unit” —would be established by the state for
any given tax rate. In a simplified model, a district
power equalizing scheme might appear as follows:
Tax Hate Available Funds
1 % $ 400 per educational task unit
2 /a
3
2
600
800
1000
1200
A district with a low tax base whose chosen tax rate
produced less revenue than the state prescribed amount
18
wpuld receive state funds to make up the difference.
A district that produced more revenue than the state
prescribed amount at its chosen rate would be required
to pay the excess to the state.
The scheme of power equalizing as a means to satis
fy the requirements of Proposition 1 has been attacked
on equalitarian grounds. It requires merely that dis
trict wealth disparities be eliminated as a factor in
financing education, thus still permitting districts to
spend more by taxing more. What is in fact required,
it is argued, is statewide equality of learning oppor
tunity to the extent achievable by statewide financing.81
The Serrano decision is subject to the same attack in
sofar as the court adopts an equal wealth formula, ra
ther than an equal expenditure formula.
It is not indisputably clear, however, that the
court has rejected th e equalization o f expenditures
formula. Although the language quoted above, a n d
other statements in the opinion seem to accept the
equal wealth standard, it might well be argued that
the court decided only the facts before it—that the
existing financing scheme was unconstitutional—and
did not go so far as to endorse an equal wealth stan
dard or reject the argument that an equalization of ex
penditures standard is constitutionally required. In
deed, in response to an argument that autonomous lo
cal decisionmaking was so important a value that it
31See, e.g., Silard & White. Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education:
The Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 Wis
L. R e v . 7, 26-28, 30.
19-
justified the existing system, the court stated: “ We
need not decide whether such decentralized financial
decision-making is a compelling state interest, since
under the present financing system, such fiscal free
will is a cruel illusion for the poor school districts.” 32
Other evidence of the court’s possible acceptance of the
equal expenditure formula as being constitutionally
required is its specific recognition that many of the
values of local choice could still be preserved under a
spending equalization formula that centralized financ
ing but localized administration of schools.
The court’s possible failure to rule out a constitu
tional command of expenditure equalization may also
be explained by the fact that tax base, not tax rate, is
the main determinant of local educational expendi
tures. Available statistics, in California and elsewhere,
indicate that districts with smaller tax bases, such as
Baldwin Park, tax themselves at higher rates than do
richer districts, such as Beverly Hills, even though
their total yield is not as great,33 Therefore, the Ser
rano court may have assumed that Proposition 1, which
removes the wealth factor, would produce generally
equal offerings among school districts, and thus left
until another day the issue of what happens if it does
not.
These reasons, however, are not sufficient to ex
plain the very strong equal wealth emphasis in the
325 Cal. 3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
ssid . ; Private W e a l t h and Public Ed u c a tio n , supra note 22, at 127-50.
See also A ltern ative Program s for F in a n c in g Edu cation 81-101 (1971)
(National Educational Finance Project vol. 5).
20
Serrano opinion. The most logical reading of the de
cision is that the court did adopt the formula of equal
wealth rather than the equal expenditures formula as
its constitutional command. The probable explanation
for this is twofold. First, an expenditure equalization
standard would cause problems with compensatory edu
cation and other programs that would devote extra
funds for the education of disadvantaged students. The
propopents of equal expenditures are also in favor of
this degree of inequality and struggle valiantly to make
these concepts consistent. Perhaps their struggles are
successful. It is much easier, however, to avoid the in
consistency by not adopting an equal expenditure test-
in the first place.
The second basic argument in favor of an equal
wealth standard is that it permits a local school dis
trict to choose how much it wishes to spend on the ed
ucation of its children. The desirability of retaining
this local choice responds to basic federalist, pluralist
values of diversity and local decisionmaking—-a con
cept termed “ subsidiarity” in Private Wealth and
Public EducationP In Serrano the state argued that
the existing school financing system was constitutional
ly valid because it incorporated just these values.85
^ P rivate W e a l t h an d Public Ed u cation , supra note 22. at 14-15. Sub
sidiarity is “ the principle that government should ordinarily leave decision
making and administration to the smallest unit of society competent to handle
them.” Id. 14. See also Goldstein, Book Review, 59 C a l if . L. R e v . 302, 306
(1971).
35The court quoted the state’s argument that:
“ [I ] f one district raises a lesser amount per pupil than another
district, this is a matter of choice and preference of the individual dis
trict and reflects the individual desire for lower taxes rather than an
expanded educational program, or may reflect a greater interest within
— 21—
The court’s response, while rejecting the state’s arg
ument, shows sensitivity to the idea of local choice:
[S]o long as the assessed valuation within a dis
trict’s boundaries is a major determinant of how
much it can spend for its schools, only a district
with a large tax base will be truly able to decide
how much it really cares about education. The poor
district cannot freely choose to tax itself into an
excellence which its tax rolls cannot provide. Far
from being necessary to promote local fiscal choice,
the present financing system actually deprives the
less wealthy districts of that option.86
The Serrano court did recognize that local choice
in nonfiscal educational matters might still be retained
under centralized financing; yet this limited degree of
choice is not sufficient. As a purely theoretical issue it
is difficult to determine the value of retaining local
control over educational spending, particularly when
weighed against the possibility of continuing expendi
ture inequalities, which the retention of local choice
produces. But this issue is not merely a matter of po
litical theory. Rather, adoption of the equal wealth
standard in Serrano is an implicit recognition of the
fact that, in light of our history and traditions, judicial
or legislative decrees cannot be used to prevent local-
ilies from trying to get better education for their chil
dren by raising more funds locally.
that district in such other services that are supported by local property
taxes as, for example, police and fire protection or hospital services.”
5 Cal. 3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
22
A in-e-Serrano law review article37 by Silard and
White, which dismissed district power equalizing in
one paragraph as not producing equality of educational
offerings, ended discussion of its equalization solution,
centralized financing, by adding: “ The [centralized
financing] mechanism might also be formulated in such
a way as to retain a local option to surtax for addi
tional education.” ™ This “ local option” is obviously
a device to allow localities to spend more on education
than the centrally determined norm, and thus produce
inequalities in offering. Despite their very strong com
mitment to egalitarian principles, proponents of judi
cial action in this field obviously cannot resist the no
tion that local districts should retain the option to
spend more on education. It is this fact, deeply em
bedded in our public consciousness, that primarily ex
plains why the Serrano court did not and would not
require spending equality.39
The existence of this public sense raises a further
question about the limits of Serrano. Is the Silard and
White system—centralized financing with a local op
tion surtax—consistent with the California court’s con
stitutional standard? While the spending equalization
standard is not required under Serrano, it remains to
be seen what minimal remedies are consistent with the
®7Silard & White, supra note 31.
S8W. 29 (emphasis added).
_S9Thi_s public feeling was clearly expressed in the response to the Serrano
decision in a New York Times editorial. After hailing the case on egalitarian
grounds, the editorial abruptly concluded with the assertion that the ideal so
lution for school financing lies in centralized state financing “without discour-
aging additional investments by education minded communities in the better
ment of their schools.” N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1971, at 32, col. 1.
standard actually adopted by the court, and thereby
determine the limits of its holding. Any appearance of
consistency between Serrano and the surtax proposal
is nothing more than a semantic illusion, unless the
surtax were based on power equalization or another
scheme that removed differential tax bases as an ele
ment in a district’s ability to surtax itself. Otherwise
the surtax has the same constitutional defect as that
condemned in Serrano because the quality of a child’s
education remains dependent on the district’s wealth.
In fact, the surtax system is the present system in Cal
ifornia—it is the foundation plan. The justifications
for the surtax are the reasons given above for preferr
ing district power equalizing* over expenditure equali
zation—subsidiarity and the deeply embedded feeling
that one cannot preclude a locality from taxing itself
more heavily, if it so chooses, to get better education
for its children. But, if one accepts the Serrano equal
protection reasoning, these concepts and this felt need
are only sufficient to justify the surtax if the surtax
is necessitated by a compelling state purpose. It is not
clear that these factors even provide a sufficiently com
pelling purpose to justify district power equalizing.
Even if they do, however, they would not justify a non
power equalized surtax. Such a surtax is not necessary,
because its objective of allowing local choice can be
achieved by power equalizing. Thus, because it has the
(S'errario-determined constitutional vice of differential
expenditures related to differential tax bases that
power equalizing does not have, it must be invalid un
der Serrano.
24
The proposal of a centralized financing system with
a local surtax option also suggests that the evils of
school finance might be remedied merely by increas
ing the minimum spent per child. Following this line,
a system that increased the California foundation plan,
say from $500 to $1000, might be said to accomplish the
goal of providing to each student, regardless of the
district in which he resides, an adequate level of edu
cational expenditure. Such a constitutional standard
would be based not on equal protection but on a con
stitutional right to an affirmative minimum provision
of services similar to that suggested by Professor
Frank Miehelman and discussed later in a footnote to
this Article.40 One of the most fundamental objections
to this concept of minimum provision of services is the
inability of courts to determine at what point the mini
mum of a given service has been reached. In the hypo
thetical above, $1000 was used, but why should the min
imum not be $1200? Indeed, why is the current mini
mum of approximately $500 unacceptable ? Apparently
the California legislature believed it to be sufficient.
One might simply argue that a minimum of $500 is
unreasonable, a determination that a court could make
without having to determine exactly what the minimum
should be. Such an approach, however, ignores the need
for judicial standards as illustrated by recent Supreme
Court history. As happened in reapportionment be- 0
i0See note 84 infra; Miehelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 H a r v . L .
R e v . 7 (1 9 6 9 ).
tween the Baker v. Carr*1 “ rationality” test and the
Reynolds v. Sims42 “ one man-one vote” test, once a
court defines a principle it is difficult to stop short of
setting- a minimum standard.48
Lastly, one may argue that, under a system with a
sufficiently large state minimum, the surtax is merely
a minor deviation that will be permitted under Serrano
in the same manner that the United States Sup'reme
Court has allowed a degree of deviation from mathe
matical precision under its one man-one vote rule. The
two situations are not comparable, however. The sur
tax, unlike the unavoidable, inconsequential deviations
o f voting district mathematics, is a policy decision to
allow some school districts to make their schools un
equal to schools in other districts. The more apt reap
portionment analogy is deviation for policy prefer
ences, such as protecting rural areas. Such policy pre
ferences have been rejected by the Supreme Court in
the reapportionment cases.44 Of course, in school fi
nancial equalization there will b e deviations f r o in
«-369 U.S. 186 (1962).
42377 U.S. 533 (1964).
43Professor Michelman recognized this when he hypothesized the applica
tion of his minimum protection theory to education. After suggesting that each
child was constitutionally entitled to a minimum provision of education, he
concluded that minimum provision would mean equalization. He based this
conclusion on the fact that education is valued because of its relevance to
competitive activities; thus the minimum required for A must be determined
in relation to what his competitor, or future competitor, B, is receiving. While
there is merit in this position, Professor Michelman overstates it when he
thereby equates the minimum with no substantial inequality. The fact that he
does so, however, is indicative of the standardless nature of the minimum pro
vision theory. Professor Michelman thus is driven to equalization in order to
provide a standard. Michelman, supra note 40, at 47-59,
^See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533. 562-68 (1964). But see Abate v.
Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
26
mathematical certainties as a result of such things as
differential labor costs and economies of scale. Such
deviations occur because o f a practical inability t o
achieve perfect equality. The surtax is not such a de
viation. It represents a conscious decision to create in
equality.
II. D i s t r i c t W e a l t h D i s c r i m i n a t i o n : A S u s p e c t
G l a s s i f i c a t i o n ?
While the California Supreme Court’s reliance on
an equal wealth formula thereby precludes resort to
remedies such as the surtax system, and limits the
holding so that it does not require expenditure equa
lization, the court’s adoption of equal wealth has sig
nificance beyond its force as a limitation. Wealth dis
crimination was, in fact, the affirmative basis used to
invalidate an almost universal school financing system.
The Serrano court cited “ wealth discrimination” as
one of the “ suspect classifications” that, in conjunc
tion with a fundamental interest, triggered the “ new
equal protection. ’ HS
The Serrano court held that “ this funding scheme
invidiously discriminates against the poor because it
makes the quality of a child’s education a function of
the wealth of his parents and neighbors,” 46 that is, the
wealth of his school district. The factual data relied
on by the court in reaching this result, however, con
sisted of disparities in tax bases and school expendi-
Cal. 3d at 597, 487 P.2d at 1250. 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
Mid. at 590, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
—27
tures among school districts. Therefore, two basic ques
tions must be answered before this holding is 'related
to the data:
1. What is the relationship between school expen
ditures and the “ quality” of a child’s education?
2. What is the relationship between poor districts
—districts with low taxable wealth—and poor people?
A. The Relationship of Expenditures to Educa
tional Quality
The problem of relating levels of educational ex
penditures to quality of education is a persistent and
annoying one. For one thing, there is no consensus on
what the desired educational outputs are, or how edu
cational quality should be measured. Secondly, there
is very little empirical data to support a finding of an
affirmative relationship between expenditure levels
and measurable educational outputs.
The Coleman Report,47 the leading study attempt
ing to correlate selected educational outputs with vari
ous inputs, founds little relationship between expendi
ture levels and the educational outputs it measured,
when other variables were held constant.48 While the
Coleman Report’s methodology has been attacked per
suasively,49 affirmative data that dispute its conclusion
47O ffice of Ed u c a t io n , U.S. D e p ’ t of H e a l t h , Edu cation & W e l
fare , Eq u a l it y of Ed u c ation al O p p o r t u n it y (1966).
48See id. 20-21, 312-16.
49See Bowles & Levin, The Determinants of Scholastic Achievement— An
Appraisal of Some Recent Evidence, 3 J. H u m an R esource s 3 (1968).
-28
remain minimal.30 The Coleman Report and other
studies are concerned with spending differentials only
within the relatively narrow range of current school
expenditures. The lack of correlation between expendi
ture levels and educational outputs in this range does
not preclude the possibility of some absolute minimum
of expenditures being necessary to achieve measurable
educational outputs. Further, this absence of correla
tion between expenditures and outputs is more under
standable when it is recognized that approximately
two-thirds of a typical school district’s revenues are
spent for teacher salaries.51 Differences in teacher sal
aries are often a function not of teaching quality, but
of such indirectly related factors as longevity and ed
ucational degrees. Differences in salary scales among
districts may be the result of such factors as differ
ential general wage scales and the bargaining power of
teacher unions. The Serrano court discussed the prob
lem of relating expenditures to quality in a footnote
and admitted that “ there is considerable controversy
among educators over the relative impact of eduea-
50Some support for a correlation between expenditure level and quality
of education is found in J. G u t h r ie , G . K lf.in d o r fe r , H. L evin & R. St o u t ,
Sc h o o l s an d I n e q u a lit y (1971). This support, however, is hardly sufficient
to support a judicial finding of correlation. Moreover, a recently published re
examination of the Coleman data by a score of eminent social scientists in a
faculty seminar at Harvard University has confirmed the findings of the orig
inal report, while avoiding some of the original report’s methodological prob
lems. Indeed, this reexamination indicates that the influence of school ex
penditures on student achievement is even weaker than was indicated by
the original Coleman Report. See Hosteller & Moynihan, A. Pathbreaking
Report, in O n E q u a l it y of Ed u c a tio n a l O p p o r t u n it y 36-45 (F. Mosteller
& D. Moynihan eds. 1972): Jencks, The Coleman Report and the Conven
tional Wisdom, in id. 69-115; Smith, Equality of Educational Opportunity:
The Basic Findings Reconsidered, in id. 230-42.
51Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education. 71 C o lu m
L. R ev . 1355, 1359 (1971).
29
tional spending and environmental influences on school
achievement . . . .” 52
The court avoided the problem in two ways. One
was to cite other cases that have rejected the argument
that there is no proof that different levels of expendi
ture affect the quality of education.53 Except for the
latest decision in Hobson v. Hansen,5i discussed below,
these cases have not given a rationale for this rejection.
Secondly, the court relied on the procedural pos
ture of the case. Since the complaint was dismissed on
demurrer, the court countered the defendant’s conten
tion that different levels of educational expenditures
do not affect the quality of education with the state
ment that “ plaintiffs’ complaint specifically alleges
the contrary, and for purposes of testing the sufficien
cy of a complaint against a general demurrer, we must
take its allegations to be true.” 55 It is not clear that
this approach was consistent with the court’s earlier
statement that the California procedure is to “ treat the
B25 Cal. 3d at 601 n. 16, 487 P. 2nd at 1253 n. 16, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613
n. 16.
ss/d . The court cited Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. 111.
1968), aff’d mem. sub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), in
which a 3-judge federal court stated, without a supporting citation, in the
course of rejecting a constitutional attack on interdistrict differentials in school
financing, “ [presumably, students receiving a $1000 education are better
educated that [sic] those acquiring a $600 schooling.” 293 F. Supp. at 331.
In another case cited in Serrano, Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D.
Fla. 1970), vacated on other grounds per curiam sub nom. Askew v. Hargrave,
401 U.S. 476 (1971), the district court stated: “ [I]t may be that in the
abstract ‘the difference in dollars available does not necessarily produce a
difference in the quality of education.’ But this abstract statement must give
way to proof to the contrary in this case.” 313 F. Supp. at 947. No proof on
this issue, however, was ever stated by the court in Hargrave and the opinion
goes on not to discuss this, but to discuss the inability of school districts to
raise school revenues under the Florida system.
543 2 7 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
525 Cal. 3d at 601 n. 16, 487 P. 2d at 1253 n. 16, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613
30—
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly
pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law.” 515 The court did not explain why, for
example, the possibility of a causal relationship be
tween expenditures and educational quality would not
be considered a contention of fact. .More significantly,
the reliance on this procedural posture, if this is what
the court did, means that the issue still remains open
for proof—proof that does not appear to be available.
The authors of Private Wealth and Public Educa
tion, in enunciating the equal wealth standard, try to
finesse the problem by stating the issue as equality of
resources available to the student rather than as equal
ity of educational offerings. What is available, they
then contend, are the goods and services purchased
by school districts, and there is no reason to assume
that the money spent for these goods and services is
not the appropriate measure of their value.57
The problems may also be avoided in terms of bur
den of proof. When A shows that the state is spending-
more money on B than on him, the state must respond
by demonstrating either that this fact is irrelevant be
cause A is not really receiving less than B, or that even
if A is receiving less, the differential is still constitu
tionally permissible. Available data are insufficient to
support a state’s assertion that expenditures are irrele
vant to educational equality and thus the issue shifts to
Mid. at 591, 487 P.2d at 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
B’ Private W e a l t h and P u blic Ed u cation , supra note 22, at 25-27.
—31
a determination of the constitutionality of differential
treatment. This burden of proof approach to the issue
was apparently the one taken by Judge Wright in the
latest decision of Hobson v. Hansen/’8 although there
were also elements of estoppel involved in the Hobson
court’s reliance on the school administration’s own as
sertions of a correlation beteen educational 'resources
and quality of education.38
While the burden of proof argument has appeal as
an expedient solution it is not a completely satisfying
basis for judicial invalidation of a longstanding method
of public school financing. From this perspective, arg
uments for judicial action must be discounted some-
Avhat by uncertainty about the present system’s detri
mental effect on the quality of education, and also
therefore, by doubts of improving education by such
invalidation.60
58327 F. Supp. 844, 854-55. The court in Hobson was not concerned with
a correlation between gross expenditures and quality of education, but rather
with the specific differences in expenditures on teacher salaries, rated on a
per pupil basis, between essentially “ white” and “ black” schools within the.
District of Columbia. The quality-expenditure issue in terms of teacher sal
aries per pupil was posed as the correlation or lack thereof between quality-
instruction and higher salaries. Phrasing the issue as “ teacher salary per pupil”
also raised the issue of the relationship between educational quality and class
size or student-teacher ratio.
58Id. at 855.
«oprofessor Moynihan has suggested that:
[t]he only certain result that will come from [a rise in educational ex
penditures, which he states Serrano will produce] is that a particular
cadre of middle-class persons in the possession of certain licenses— that
is to say teachers— will receive more public money in the future than
they do now.
Moynihan, Can Courts and Money Do It?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1972, §E
(Annual Education Review) at 24, col. 1. Note that by ordering equalization
of teacher salaries per pupil between “ white” and “black” schools, Judge
Wright in Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971), allowed the
school district the choice of transferring higher paid teachers from “white”
schools to “black” schools or reducing the student-teacher ratio in the “ black”
schools. Although the evidence of correlation between class size and pupil
-32—
13. The Relationship of Poor Districts to Poor
People
The second question raised by the wealth analysis
underlying the Serrano holding centers on the supposed
relationship between a school district’s wealth, as mea
sured by its real estate tax base, and the personal
wealth of its people. For its wealth classification argu
ment the court relied on United State Supreme Court
“ de facto wealth classification” cases in which states
have been restricted in imprisoning indigents for fail
ure to pay fines,01 have been required to provide indi
gent criminal defendants with such things as tran
scripts02 and attorneys for appeal,63 and have been pre
cluded from requiring the payment of a poll tax as a
precondition to voting.64 All of these eases, however, in
volved “ wealth classifications” that operated against
individuals, whereas Serrano involved school districts.
The issue in Serrano would therefore be simpler if the
wealth of school districts coincided with the wealth of
its people, thus making poor districts aggregates of
poor individuals.
Available statistics, however, do not indicate this
hypothesized 'relationship between poor districts and
performance does not seem significantly greater than that between average
teacher salary and pupil performance, one’s subjective sense is that the class
size is the more significant factor to education. Both the intradistrict and racial
aspects of Hobson also strengthened the case for judicial intervention.
"Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 11970); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395
\ 1^ / I / •
62Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
,!8DougIas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
84Harper v. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
33-
poor people. One recent study of 223 school districts
in eight states indicates that there is no substantial
pattern of differences in real estate tax basis per pupil
among seven categories of school districts: major ur
ban core cities, minor urban core cities, independent
cities, established suburbs, developing suburbs, small
cities, and small towns.66 It is true that the three-judge
federal district court which invalidated the Texas
school financing system in Rodrigues v. San Antonio
Independent School District found that “ those dis
tricts most rich in property also have the highest medi
an family income and the lowest percentage of minority
pupils, while the poor property districts are poor in
income . . . . ” 06 The basis for this finding was an affi
davit submitted by plaintiffs and cited by the court.
As a basis for the court’s conclusion, this was a ques
tionable source; a careful reading of the data contained
in the affidavit creates grave doubts about the validity
of its conclusions.67
e5S ee A lt e r n a tiv e Program s for F in a n c in g E d u cation 83-89 (1971)
(National Educational Finance Project vol. 5).
66337 F. Supp. at 282 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
e7The Rodriguez court cited the affidavit as showing a median family in
come of $5900 in the 10 districts with the highest tax base per pupil and $3325
in the 4 districts with the lowest tax base per pupil. Id. at 282 n.3. The fol
lowing are the study’s figures:
Market Value of
Taxable Property
Per Pupil
Above $100,000
(10 Districts)
$100,000-$50,000
(26 Districts)
$50,000-$30,000
(30 Districts)
$30,000-$10,000
(40 Districts)
Below $10,000
(4 Districts)
Median Family
Income From
1960
$5900
Per Cent
Minority
Pupils
8%
State & Local
Revenues Per
Pupil
$815
4425 32 544
4900 23 483
5050 31 462
3325 79 305
34
In tlie amicus brief filed in Serrano by the Harvard
Centers for Educational Policy Research and for Law
and Education, an attempt was made to avoid the ab
sence of statistics correlating poor people and poor
school districts, by defining the injured class as those
poor people who also live in poor school districts,68 Al
though the amicus brief never explains the basis for
this definition of the injured class, it may be argued
that the people in this narrow group are singularly
disadvantaged because they have neither the advantage
of a high tax base as do the poor in rich districts, nor
the mobility68 and private school alternatives of the
more wealthy residents of poor school districts. The
flaw in this approach is that defining the injured class
in these terms considerably weakens the wealth classi
fication argument. The system no longer can be said
to discriminate against the poor but only against a
certain segment of the poor. In fact, when the school fi
nance system is viewed from this perspective, the chief
beneficiaries of the system when the class is so defined
Affidavit of Joel S. Berke at 6 (footnotes omitted).
The 5 category breakdown of school districts seems to be arbitrary, and it
is only this breakdown which appears to produce the correlation of poor
school districts and poor people. Even on this breakdown, however, the cor
relation is doubtful. Note the very small number of districts in the top and
bottom categories. Even more significant is the apparent inverse relationship
between property value and median income in the three middle districts, where
96 of the 110 districts fall. While the family income differences among the
3 groups of districts are small, they may be even more significant if categories
are weighted by the number of districts in each. At the very least, the study
does not support the affirmative correlation of poor school districts and poor
people stated by the court and the affiant; this is, however, the study the
court relied upon, and it is apparently the only study which purports to show
such correlation.
68Brief for the Center for Educational Policy Research and the Center for
Law and Education as Amici Curiae at 3 n.l.
6»Id. 6 n.5.
— 35—
would be those pool’ families who live in rich districts.
Not only do they have a resource advantage over those
who live in poor districts, but also, they get more school
for fewer tax dollars than do their more wealthy neigh
bors in the rich districts. The relative advantage of
the poor in rich districts is further increased by the
very factors that arguably are the unique disadvantage
of the poor in poor districts—their lack of mobility
and private school alternatives. As with the wealthy
in poor districts, the wealthy in rich districts are not
as dependent on their district’s public schools as their
less affluent neighbors and thus not as benefited by
living in a rich district under the present system.
Finally, to focus on aiding the poor who live in poor
districts would probably require greater relief than
that offered by Serrano and the subsequent cases. Un
der this analysis, the poor in districts that undervalue
education under such equal wealth alternatives as dis
trict power equalizing would be just as disadvantaged
as the poor who live in poor districts today. Their im
mobility and lack of private school alternatives would
still uniquely disadvantage them as compared to the
wealthy inhabitants of the same districts, and the poor
in districts with greater school expenditures. A focus
on the poor in poor districts would, therefore, require
equalization of expenditures to avoid the hypothesized
legal wrong.
Another complication in applying a district wealth
classification theory is that any correlation that does
exist between poor school districts and poor people
36—
may vary from state to state. Also, it is quite possible
that there is a greater correlation between the rural
poor and poor school districts than there is between
the urban poor and poor school districts. I f this cor
relation is necessary to the legal analysis, the legiti
macy of the Serrano result might very well vary from
state to state. A decision by the United States Supreme
Court, however, attempting to differentiate among the
states, would be entirely inappropriate. It would be
most unwise to have basically similar state systems
held invalid or valid depending on where the state’s
poor lived, or more accurately, depending on judges’
views of the difficult statistical analysis demonstrating
a correlation between poor people and poor school dis
tricts.
A related failure to demonstrate a relationship be
tween blacks or other racial minorities and poor dis
tricts is particularly disappointing to proponents of
judicial action for whom the presence of such correla
tion would have significant legal effects.70 One report
notes that in California, over half the minority pupils
reside in districts with above average assessed wealth
per pupil.71
™$ee, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), in
which statistical evidence of discriminatory distribution of municipal services
along racial grounds triggered a “ compelling state interest” test.
^ P rivate W e a l t h an d P ublic E d u c a tio n , supra note 22, at 356-57 n.47.
The complaint in Serrano alleged that “ [a] disproportionate number of
school children who are black children, children with Spanish surnames, chil-
dren. belonging to other minority groups reside in school districts in which a
relatively inferior educational opportunity is provided.” 5 Cal. 3d at 590 n.l.
487 P.2d at 1245 n.l, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605 n.l. Other than quoting this al
legation as part of the complaint, however, the California court did not rely
on it.
Hie affidavit relied on by the court in Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. at 282
The absence of a correlation between poor or racial
minorities and poor districts may be attributable to,
among other factors, the failure of the property tax
as a measure of a man’s actual wealth. Most signifi
cantly, however, the reason for the absence of correla
tion is the location of industrial and commercial pro
perty, the presence of w h i c h increases a district’s
wealth by increasing its tax base, without a necessary
increase in school population.
These facts raise a basic question of the effect of
Serrano and its progeny. While the case has been hailed
on theoretical egalitarian grounds, many of its pro
ponents are more concerned with the practical prob
lem of getting more money for urban education. While
some major cities with high concentrations of poor
people are financially poor school districts, others, such
as New York, San Francisco, and Philadelphia, have
relatively high tax bases as compared to their respec
tive state averages.72 * They also spend more per pupil
than their respective state averages. Therefore, if cur
rent expenditures for education were equalized on a
statewide basis, major cities in many areas would have
n.3 (see note 67 supra), however, did state that, of the districts sampled in
Texas, the richest districts had 8% minority pupils while the poorest dis
tricts had 79% minority pupils. Again, however, the validity of this conclu
sion based on the study’s figures is doubtful. The “ correlation” only exists for
the 10 richest and 4 poorest districts. This pattern disappears in the middle
groups which include 96 of the 110 districts. Whatever correlation there is
between the percentage of minority people and the tax base wealth of a
school district in Texas may reflect the rural nature of Texas minority life
or some other state peculiarity.
72Another reason, in addition to the presence of industrial ̂ and commer
cial property, for the absence of correlation between major cities and poor
districts may be the relatively large number of students in urban areas at
tending nonpublic, schools.
—38
less money to spend than they have now.73 The same
would be true if wealth were equalized with tax rates
remaining the same.
It is possible that equal wealth systems may, by
their nature, result not just in equalization of current
expenditures but also in over-all increased spending for
education, it may be that under a scheme of centralized
financing it would be politically easier for state legis
latures to raise taxes, and thereby increase total school
expenditures, than it would be for local school board
members. The latter are more visible to the taxpayer
and may, indeed, have to get voter approval for tax
increases or bond issues. Under district power equali
zing Professor Brest suggests that, because it is po
litically impossible for legislators to vote to take local
ly collected taxes away from a district, tax rate and
expenditure levels would have to be equalized at the
highest figures previously available—that is, what the
wealthiest district produced from its tax rate.74 The
consequence of this would be enormous increases for
73An equalization principle that operated beyond the sphere of property
tax base wealth could work against the cities in another area. Local non
property taxes, though limited in significance to a few states, see note 23
supra, may also disproportionately favor urban centers. In a study of Alabama
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee for
1968-1969, school districts were classified into central city, suburban indepen
dent city, and rural districts. It was found that in 5 of the 7 states (Ken
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Tennesseee) the rural dis
tricts received the least amount of revenue per pupil from such local non-
property taxes; in 4 of the 7 states (Kentucky, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Tennessee) the central city districts received the most revenue per pupil The
average ranking for the 7 states showed that the central city school districts
on the average received the most revenue per pupil from local nonproperty
taxes, followed in order by suburban, independent city, and rural districts
A ltern ative _ Program s for F in a n c in g Ed u cation 186-87 (1971) (Na
tional Educational Finance Project vol. 5).
74Brest, Book Review, 23 St a n . L. R ev . 591, 596 (1971).
39
education. So enormous, in fact, that Professor Brest
uses it to demonstrate the improbabilty of any state
ever adopting district power equalizing.
Despite these hopes for a greater investment in
education, the history of state legislative treatment of
urban education, the serious economic difficulties cur
rently facing state government, and the domination of
state governments by r u r a l and suburban interests
make it difficult to realistically predict that Serrano
will result in greater total expenditures for education.
And if total expenditures do not increase, then the
cities, in their relatively wealthy status stand to gain
little from the Serrano decision.75
C. “ Wealth Classifications” as Applied to School
Districts
In addressing the problem of correlating poor peo
ple and poor school districts in its legal analysis, the
California Supreme Court first relied on the proced
ural posture of the case and noted again that the com
plaint alleged a correlation between poor people and
poor districts.76 The court did not quote the complaint
nor state the basis, if any, given for the allegation. The
75It may aid rural education which would help the rural poor. It may also
be argued that, when relieved of the obligation of financing education, by
the adoption of a centralized financing scheme for education, urban areas will
be more able to raise greater revenues for their other needs. This assumes
either that the state financing scheme will not take the same revenue that the
urban areas now take for education, or that taxpayers will be more responsive
to local taxation for other needs if their education taxation goes to the state.
Such assumptions appear unrealistic; present indications are that statewide
financing for education will continue to be based on the same real property
tax as that on which local taxation presently is based.
7«5 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
— 40
court did not rest on this procedural argument, how
ever, but went on to state:
More basically, however, we reject defendants’
underlying thesis that classification by wealth is
constitutional so long as the wealth is that of the
district, not the individual. We think that discrim
ination on the basis of district wealth is equally
invalid. The commercial and industrial property
which augments a district’s tax base is distributed
unevenly throughout the state. To allot more edu
cational dollars to the children of one district than
to those of another merely because of the fortuitous
presence of such property is to make the quality
of a child’s education dependent upon the location
of private commercial and industrial establish
ments. Surely, this is to rely on the most irrelevant
of factors as the basis for educational financing.77
There are, however, serious problems with this ap
plication of the wealth discrimination cases to govern
ment entities, as distinguished from individuals. Since
district wealth is measured by the real estate tax base,
and the development of a district ’s real estate is a var
iable factor, the possibility of voluntary “ poverty” is
more acute for government entities. Throughout the
opinion, the court assumed that a district’s wealth was
a “ fortuitous” given, beyond a district’s control, and
not subject to voluntary choice.
While this may generally be correct, it is increas
ingly true in our environmentally conscious age that
Jtld. at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Gal. Rptr. at 612-13 (footnote
omitted).
— 41—
a rural or suburban district might voluntarily exclude
industrial or commercial development that would in
crease its wealth by increasing its tax base, without a
corresponding increase in its school population.78 Un
der centralized school financing this district would not
be deprived of school revenues, because 'revenue would
be independent of local decisions affecting the tax
base. Under an equal wealth alternative, such as dis
trict power equalizing, a decision to exclude new de
velopment would likewise not affect revenues, which
would be based on a district’s choice of tax rate, not
wealth. Yet this choice would be logically indistinguish
able from the choice of tax rates, with its correspond
ing benefit or detriment to the district’s school reve
nues, permitted, a n d indeed encouraged b y district
power equalizing.79
Perhaps it is desirable that districts be able to
choose to remain at a low level of wealth without ad
versely affecting school revenue. This would have the
beneficial effect of freeing a locality from the obliga
tions of economic development, thus benefiting the area
ecologically. On the other hand, it may be unfair to
treat bucolic areas that choose not to expand rapidly
78School districts, as special function governmental units, rarely are
delegated powers broader than those necessary to administer the school and
raise funds by taxation and bond issues. General function units, such as mu
nicipalities and townships, are usually the smallest entitles delegated the power
over development suggested in the text. Yet, to the extent that general func
tion units coincide with school districts, or to the extent that the smaller units
have significant political power within the general unit, one may accurately
speak of school district political choices.
79Some practical differences, of course, are that a tax rate choice can
be redetermind on a periodic basis, is unambiguous, and is dearly visible;
whereas wealth choices have more enduring consequences, may be ambiguous
as to their basis, and of low visibility.
______42
the same as highly developed areas that have attendant
congestion, pollution, and other problems that create a
heavier tax burden for the urban dweller. Additionally,
widespread decisions not to allow local development
could seriously undermine a program of decentraliza
tion of industry and commerce. These economic and
social effects of Serrano obviously need more explora
tion than the courts and commentators thus far have
offered.
The wealth classification precedents employed by
the Serrano court present another problem. The prin
ciple contained in this group of United States Supreme
Court precedents is ambiguous. In the criminal pro
cedure cases the Supreme Court required the free pro
vision of transcripts80 and attorneys81 on the basis of
the indigency of the accused82 On the other hand, the
Court struck down the use of the poll tax as a precon
dition to voting in all cases, without regard to finan
cial ability to pay the tax.83 The United States Supreme
80Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
81Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
82See also Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970): Tate v. Short, 401
U.S. 395 (1971), relieving only indigents of the penalty of imprisonment be
cause of their inability to pay fines; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971), relieving only indigents of the obligation to pay court fees and costs
incidental to a divorce proceeding.
88Harper v. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); see Lindsey v
Normet, 40 U.S.L.W. 4184 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1972), in which the Court held
unconstitutional an Oregon statute that required a tenant appealing an evic
tion judgment to post a bond for twice the rental value of the premises from
the commencement of the action in which the judgment was rendered until
the final judgment on appeal. In so holding, the Court invalidated the high
bond requirement for all tenant-defendants, regardless of their ability to pay
the bond.
See also Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972). con
cerning the validity of high filing fees for entry into Texas nominating pri
maries. The decision is ambiguous as to whether the Court held the system
unconstitutional as applied to all candidates, including those who could raise
—43
Court lias subsequently cited these cases indistinguisb-
ably as “ de facto wealth classifications,” without ap
parent recognition of the difference between saying
that no one can be made to pay for a given service, and
saying that one who cannot afford to pay for a given
service cannot for that reason alone be deprived of it.84
The former formula of requiring no payment from
anyone has the advantage of encouraging all-—rich,
poor, and in-between—to avail themselves of the ser
vice. This is the aim, for example, of free public edu
cation and, perhaps, the reason for voiding the poll
the high fees, or only held that those who. because of their indigency, couid
not raise the high fees had to be relieved from doing so. The Court did stress
the issue of the “ inability” (without defining the term) of some candidates to
pay the fee and thus indicated that it could be constitutionally permissible
for Texas to maintain its general fee system and except only those with this
“ inability.”
84Professor Frank Michelman, in his article, supra note 40, cited by the
Serrano court, has argued persuasively that these cases are better understood
as substantive due process “minimum protection” cases rather than as equal
protection cases. The distinction between “minimum protection” and “equal
protection” is set forth by Michelman as “ vindication of a state’s duty to pro
tect against certain hazards which are endemic to an unequal society, rather
than vindication of a duty to avoid complicity in unequal treatment,” Id. 9
(emphasis omitted). Minimum protection thus means state fulfillment of those
just wants (or fundamental rights) that our society cannot constitutionally
accept as being subject to normal market risks of nonsatisfaction. This changes
the focus of inquiry from “ wealth classification” to the determination of what
are just wants and what is meant by their nonsatisfaction.
Justice Harlan adopted the Michelman approach in his concurring opinion
in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259 (1970), and employed it for the
Court in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) over the objection of
Justice Douglas. Justice Harlan’s attempt to shift the Court to the Michel
man due process approach has apparently been unsuccessful. See Bullock v.
Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972).-
In discussing the minimum protection thesis, Professor Michelman notes
the difference in treatment discussed in the text between the poll tax and
criminal procedure cases. H does not, however, appear to offer a rationale
for this difference. Michelman, supra note 40, at 24-26. Fie suggests that under
his minimum protection theory, the state’s obligation is normally satisfied
“ by free provision to those and only to those who cannot satisfy their just
wants out of their own means.” Id. 26. Nor would his theory require a grad
uated schedule of payments above the indigency threshold. Justice Harlan in
his concurring opinion in Williams v. Illinois pointed out that logical conse
quence of the Court’s equal protection theory would require a graduated sched
ule of payments for those above the indigency level. 399 U.S. at 261.
44
tax as a prerequisite for voting. On the other hand,
an exemption from payment only for the poor results
in a greater redistribution of wealth than does a no
payment principle.
To view the problem only in terms of those who can
pay all or those who can pay nothing is also to over
simplify. One basic prerequisite is a determination of
what level of sacrifice is required before one can say
that a given individual or group is “ unable” to pay
for a service. Again, the leading cases have not dealt
with this pervasive problem. Perhaps the level of sac
rifice required of an individual can also be related (in
versely) to the degree that society desires that everyone
avail himself of the service; that is, the more society
wants the service used, the less sacrifice is required
for it.8B Even this formula may need reevaluation to the
extent that sacrifice is also considered to be a signifi
cant measure of the value of a service to an individual
and recognition of that value by the individual in
creases the societal result desired.
The ambiguous result presented by the individual
wealth discrimination cases is compounded when ap
plied, as in Serrano, to an aggregation of individuals
—a school district. In this setting, level of sacrifice
may become useless as a guideline for determining
when to apply the no-payment principle. Governmental
85 Under Professor Michelman’s theory, Michelman, supra note 40, ab
sent the “ remote” possibility that one might deliberately waive his claim to
the satisfaction of a just want, a person is always entitled to satisfaction of
his just wants regardless of the sacrifice he is or is not willing to make to
attain such satisfaction. Id. 14. He does not, however, satisfactorily explain
why this is so.
45
units may have a greater array of demands on re
sources than do individuals; districts may he able to
reallocate priorities in a way that individuals cannot.
Arguably, street cleaning or hospital construction can
always be cut back to pay for education. More signifi
cantly, a poor district’s ability to raise its taxes or
create revenue through borrowing may be so much
greater than the ability of a poor person to raise rev
enue that the issue of level of sacrifice becomes mean
ingless.
The California Supreme Sourt recognized the dif
ficulty of deriving from the wealth classification pre
cedents a rule that, as applied to districts, would de
fine the limits of sacrifice—determine which districts
could not, and therefore need not, pay. One response
by the court was to assert that “ as a statistical matter,
the poorer districts are financially unable to raise their
taxes high enough to match the educational offerings of
wealthier districts. ’ ,86 The authority given for t h i s
statement was an unquoted reference to a Legislative
Analyst study. The court, rightly, was unwilling to rest
on that.87 Rather, it relied primarily on the proposition
865 Cal. 3d 599-600, 487 P.2d at 1251, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
87Under the California financing system there is no limit on the rate at
which, with voter approval, a district can choose to tax itself. Thus, there is
no legal limit on a district’s ability to raise its revenue. This may be con
trasted with the situation in Florida which was presented to a 3-judge court
in Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla.. 1970), vacated on other
grounds per curiam sub nom. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971).
Florida, in its “ Millage Rollback Act,” provided that, in order to qualify for
state subvention, a school district could not tax itself at a rate greater than
10 mills. The district court accepted the argument that this limit was in
valid because it put a limit on tax rates (or penalized districts for high rates),
thus precluding school districts with lower tax bases from producing the same
revenue as those with higher bases. The district court invalidated this limit
on the grounds that there was no rational basis for it. In this the court was
— 46—
that even if poorer districts could achieve expenditure
parity by higher tax rates, “ the richer district is fa
vored when it can provide the same educational quality
for its children with less tax effort.” 88
This statement suggests, that as applied to districts,
the evil to be cured is not merely absolute deprivation,
but relative disadvantage in ability to pay. This theory
goes well beyond the de facto wealth eases that relieved
only indigents of the obligation to pay for certain ser
vices.89 Obviously, within the nonindigent category, the
wealthier can purchase the service with less effort than
the less wealthy. But the precedents do not require
free provision of services to all or graded fees based
on the ability to pay of those above the indigent cutoff
line.
patently in error. The state does have a rational purpose in preserving its own
sources of revenue and protecting the taxpayers from overtaxation by their local
school districts.
The court did accurately recognize, however, that the limit meant that dis
tricts with lower tax bases could not, even by taxing themselves more, equalize
school expenditures with wealthier tax base districts. Yet, there is a para
doxical effect here. Florida argued in the United States Supreme Court that
the limit was intended to be, and was, equalizing in a way that benefited
poorer school districts. It had this effect, because for each percentage increase
m tax rate, the wealthier district could produce more dollars per pupil than
the poor one. To illustrate this, consider the hypothetical case of 2 school dis
tricts, A with $100,000 assessed valuation per pupil and B with $50,000 as
sessed valuation per pupil. If a 1.0% limit were put on both A and B A
could produce $1000 per pupil and B, $500, a difference of $500. By con
trast, if there were no limit, and both A and B taxed at 1.5%, A would have
$1500 and B, $750, a difference of $750, and so on. Thus, while holding
A down, the limit also holds down the possible dollar divergence between A
and B.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case, on the question of
whether the district court should have refused to exercise jurisdiction under
the abstention doctrine.
885 Cal. 3d at 599, 487 P.2d at 1251, 96 Cal. Rptr at 611.
8()It would also go beyond the court’s apparent limitation of Proposition
1 to cases in which there are expenditure differentials, and underlines the tax
payer orientation of Proposition 1. See note 28 supra,
47
When applied to school districts, a constitutional
standard of graded ability to pay becomes an even
greater innovation than if it were applied to individ
uals. When dealing with school districts we are deal
ing with taxation. Let us assume, for example, equal
spending per pupil among school districts. Each school
district raises its required revenue by dividing its ex
penditure total by the number of its inhabitants (or
the number of its families). It then assesses each in
habitant (or family) a per capita share of the total
revenues required and levies a tax accordingly. I f the
state is redistricted so that aggregate individual wealth
of each district is the same, the system clearly would
not violate the Serrano holding because no school dis
trict, qua district, would have to make a greater effort
than any other to raise the required revenues, never
theless, is this the relevant issue ?
Burdens of taxation fall not on school districts, but
on taxpayers. Even though districts are equalized in
wealth consistent with Serrano, individuals or families
are not. It would make no difference to the poor tax
payer who had difficulty meeting his tax burden, that
there were an equal number of poor people with the
same difficulty in other school districts. I f the school
districts in the example did v a r y in the aggregate
wealth of their residents this system might violate
Serrano; one could say that it was easier for the school
district with greater aggregate wealth to raise its rev
enue than for the poorer one to do so. This approach
still misses the point. The real problem is the individ
__48.
ual taxpayer’s difficulty in paying his tax bill. I f Ser
rano labels relative deprivation among districts uncon
stitutional, then does its logic not require elimination of
disproportionate sacrifice among those who pay the
tax ? Does the former proposition even make any sense
without the latter?
I f there is a constitutional vice created by the dif
ferential ability of taxpayers to meet their obligations,
does this then mean that proportional, or even pro
gressive, taxation is constitutionally compelled? It is
doubtful that the Serrano court meant to suggest this
outcome.90 Nevertheless, without such a conclusion it is
difficult to understand why it is unconstitutional to
have a system whereby one district can more easily
raise revenue than another. It is indeed probable un
der present financing systems, including that of Cali
fornia, that the average resident of a rich district pays
higher taxes, in terms of gross dollars, for his schools
than does the average resident of a poor district, des
pite the fact that the resident of the rich district is
taxed at a lower rate.91 This may be the result of the
90The complaint contained counts by both students and parent taxpayers.
The court’s entire analysis was directed to the student plaintiff count, how
ever. In addressing itself, at the end of the opinion to the dismissal of the
taxpayer count, the court did not discuss the independent claims of the tax
payers, qua taxpayers, that, being in a poor district, they were required to
pay taxes at a higher rate to secure the same or less educational expenditures.
It reversed the dismissal of the taxpayer count solely on the basis that the
taxpayer plaintiffs had incorporated the unequal education allegations of the
student plaintiffs into their count, and that, under California law, they had
standing to assert the students’ educational interests. 5 Cal. 3d at 618 487
(P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
81In addition, taxpayers might very well be paying for the education of
their children in the prices they pay for their homes, as well as in their tax
payments. _ To the extent that the quality of education in a given district is
disproportionately high in relation to real estate taxes paid by the home owners
of the district, this fact should be reflected in the price of the district’s homes.
-4 9
higher assessed valuation and, perhaps, larger average
property holdings of the individual taxpayers in the
rich district. A correlation may even exist between the
amount of tax dollars paid by the average resident of
a district and the educational expenditures of that dis
trict. I f this is so, the difficulty is not with dispropor
tionate payments but with inequitable taxation, not
only in the hypotheticals above, but also in the existing
financing schemes. The logic of Serrano, which invali
dated these existing financing schemes, may therefore
'require the wealthy taxpayer to bear a greater burden
than just having to pay more tax dollars than the poor.
Instead it may demand at least a proportional tax sys
tem, and possibly one that is progressive.
The difficulties of relating the wealth of individ
uals to the wealth of districts, of applying wealth class
ification precedents to districts, and of finding a logi
cal stopping place for the equality concepts involved,
are not the only problems with the wealth classification
analysis of Serrano v. Priest. In fact, the entire foun
dation of the court’s constitutional argument may well
have been destroyed by a United States Supreme Court
decision which the Serrano court disturbingly ignored.
In James v. ValtierraP the Supreme Court implied that
even the existence of “ invidious classifications on the
basis of wealth” are insufficient to trigger the com
pelling interest standard of the new equal protection.
In Valtierra, the Supreme Court upheld a Califor
nia constitutional provision that no low-rent housing
&2402 U.S. 137 (1971.)
— 50-
project could be constructed by a state public body
unless the project bad been approved by a majority of
those voting at a local election. Refusing to apply strict
scrutiny, the Court upheld the mandatory referendum
on the ground that it was rationally related to the legiti
mate purpose of achieving popular participation in ex
penditure decisions. Justice Marshall, in a vigorous
dissent, noted that the mandatory referendum provi
sion discriminated solely against the poor. “ Publically
assisted housing developments designed to accommo
date the aged, veterans,. . . or any class of citizens other
than the poor, need not be approved by prior referen
d a / ’93 Nevertheless, the Court ignored Douglas, Har
per, and other cases that had deemed wealth classifica
tions or discriminations against the poor as inherently
suspect.94 The Valtierra decision casts an unavoidable
shadow over the first half of the constitutional analy
sis employed in Serrano v. Priest.
I I I . E d u c a t i o n : A F u n d a m e n t a l I n t e r e s t ?
A. Relationship Between Fundamentally and
Impairment of an Interest
The inherently suspect wealth classification argu
ment is only one-half of the California Supreme Court’s
constitutional attack on school financing. The court
also relied on its conclusion that education is one of
those fundamental interests that, when conditioned
on wealth classifications, will trigger special scrutiny
d. at 144 (footnote omitted).
siSee notes 61-64 supra.
Si-
requiring a compelling state interest. The court con
cluded that education is a fundamental interest based
on its importance, and its similarity to interests pre
viously held to be fundamental. The court’s analysis
proceeded on the unstated assumption that having al
ready found a suspect trait—wealth classification—if
it is determined that education is fundamental, then
the system of education financing here involved must
meet a compelling interest test to survive consti
tutional scrutiny. This analysis was developed, how
ever, without any attempt by the court to correlate the
various reasons for determining education to be funda
mental with the constitutional vice here perceived, un
equal educational expenditures based on differential
tax bases among school districts.
The Serrano court seems not to have perceived this
as an issue at all. It was not an issue in the criminal
process and voting cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court and discussed above,93 because those
were cases of total deprivation of the service involved.
When the effect of state action is total deprivation of
the service to the individual, whatever fundamental
aspects of the service exist are necessarily eliminated.90
On the other hand, where a service is only impaired
95See notes 80-84 supra & accompanying text.
06It may be possible for a service to be held fundamental based solely on
general societal benefit or externalities unrelated to any particular individual
enjoying it. Because society’s interest would be in the level of the service en
joyed by people in the aggregate, arguably this interest would not be impaired
by inequality among society’s components. If this were so, a total deprivation
limited to a number of individuals might not impair the bases of fundamen-
tality. This would seem, however, to be a very rare situation of fundamentality.
and has not yet arisen in any litigation.
— 52—
rather than total withheld, it would seem necessary to
determine whether or not the impairment does affect
the basis of the fundamentality of the service.
As an illustration, assume that a state decided to
provide all students with free education only through
eighth grade, and thereafter to charge fees so that
only those who could afford to pay could attend. In
analyzing this hypothetical in terms of the fundamen-
tality of education, one might conclude that all the at
tributes of education that make it fundamental are
satisfied by attendance only until eighth grade. I f that
were so, the fundamentality of education would be ir
relevant to the constitutionality of any state decision
on post-eighth grade education. In the context of Ser
rano, such an analysis would require detei'mination of
the relationship between the various grounds for the
court’s conclixsion that education is fundamental, and
the inequalities of interdistrict expenditures based on
differences in taxable wealth among districts.
B. Is Education a Fundamental Interest f
In its analysis of education’s fundamentality, the
California Supreme Court first recognized that there
was no direct authority for the proposition that edu
cation is such a fundamental interest.97 The court then
went on to make three basic arguments for the funda
mentality of education, based on :
1. the importance of education to the individual
and society;
97 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 F.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
53—
2- a comparison of education with the rights of
criminal defendants and voting rights that have been
held to be fundamental; and
3. the distinguishing of education from other gov
ernmental functions that might arguably he as funda
mental as education.
1. The “ Importance of Education” Argument
The court first argued for the fundamentality of
education because it is “ a major determinant of an in
dividual’s chances for economic and social success in
our competitive society; . . . [and] a unique influence
on a child’s development as a citizen and his participa
tion in political and community life.” 98 In support of
these statements the court did not cite any social science
data but rather relied on language in prior cases, prin
cipally the well-known statements in Brown v. Board
of Education99 concerning the importance of education
in today’s world.
As stated above, however, the court did not relate
these attributes of education to the effect of interdis
trict disparities in expenditures. Its only reference to
the issue was an assertion that, while California pre
cedents “ involved [only] actual exclusion from the
public schools, surely the right to an education today
means more than access to a classroom.” 100 For com-
9* « . at 605, 487 P.2d at 1255-56, 96 Gal. Rptr. at 615-16.
»»347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
i»»5 Cal. 3d at 607, 487 P. 2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617 (footnote
om itted).
Otl----
parison the court q u o t e d language in Reynolds v.
Sims™1 where the Supreme Court asserted that the
right to vote is impaired not only by bars to voting
but by dilution of power by malapportionment. Sims,
however, is not relevant to the issue posed. The real
issue in the voting case concerned individual political
power, an interest clearly and directly impaired by the
evil to be remedied—malapportionment. There is no a
priori clear connection between those characteristics of
education quoted above by the court to establish its
fundamentality, and financing differentials; nor do ex
isting data show such a connection.
In terms of an individual’s social and economic suc
cess, there are data, although hardly incontrovertible,
correlating length of school attendance and economic
attainment.102 However, such data do not correlate eco
nomic or social attainment with differential expendi
tures and, as indicated above, the whole issue of cor
relating economic inputs and educational outputs is,
at best, unclear. As to responsible citizenship there
again are no empirical data to show a correlation with
differential expenditures. One’s a priori judgment here
might be that there is no such correlation.
1M377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964).
102See Ed u c a tio n a l I n v e s t m e n t in a n U rban So ciety (M . Levin & A.
Shank eds. 1970), which contains summaries and analyses of a number of
studies.
— 55
2. Education Compared to Previously Recognized
Fundamental Rights
The second part of the court’s argument that edu
cation is fundamental was a comparison of education
with those rights the United States Supreme Court
already has held to be fundamental: various rights of
criminal defendants and voting. The court recognized
the uniqueness of an individual’s interest in liberty
which operates in the criminal procedure area, but
suggested that education might well be as important
because it has “ far greater social significance than
[such procedural protections as] a free transcript or a
court-appointed lawyer.” 103 Except for an aside that
education may reduce the crime rate, however, the Ser
rano court did not really try to equate education with
the rights of criminal defendants. Nor .should it. The
protection of the procedural rights of criminal defen
dants is not solely recognition of a unique right to
liberty but a recognition of the need for protection
against the ultimate state attempt to curtail that lib
erty. The individual, in classic terms, is defending him
self against the state. This protection of citizen from
government is the essence o f t h e constitutional re
straints contained in the Bill of Rights and the four
teenth amendment. Unlike the state’s function of giv
ing children an education, in the criminal process cases
the state fulfills its function by taking something—the
liberty of the criminal. Thus these eases do not support
1035 Cal. 3d at 607, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr, at 618.
— 56-
the proposition that there are fundamental affirmative
rights to the provision of government services.
The right to vote is an affirmative right ensured
by the state; it is, however, the ultimate political right
in a democratic society in a way that makes it sui
generis. Voting ensures the right to all other rights—
including education—to the extent achievable through
the political process. Public education, though certain
ly relevant to political access, is not intrinsic to democ
racy. Finally, the most obviously distinctive fact about
both criminal procedural safeguards and voting is that
they find expression in the structure of the Federal
Constitution in a way that education does not.104
3. Education Compared to Other Government
Functions
In addition to extolling education and comparing it
with acknowledged fundamental rights, the court in
Serrano felt compelled to distinguish education from
other services and interests. This ability to find educa
tion unique is central to its fundamentality. I f every
thing is fundamental, nothing is. Moreover, the unique
ness of education is an essential limitation on the hold
ing in the case. The court was most anxious to refute
the argument that if differences in spending on ed
ucation attributable to wealth differentials among geo
graphical areas are unconstitutional, then so are sim
ilar differentials in other governmental services.
10iSee Brest, supra note 74, at 606.
— 5 7 -
In attempting to distinguish education from other
governmental services the court relied on five fac
tors :105
1. Education is necessary to preserve an individ
ual’s opportunity, despite a disadvantaged background,
to compete successfully in the economic market place,
thus maintaining the existence of “ free enterprise de
mocracy. ’ ’
2. Education is “ universally relevant.” Every per
son benefits from education though not everyone finds
it necessary to use other governmental services like the
police or fire department.
3. Public education occupies much of an individ
ual’s youth— between ten and thirteen years. Pew gov
ernment services have such “ sustained, intensive con
tact” with the individual.
4. No other government service molds the person
ality of society’s youth as does education.
5. Education is compulsory.
Again, there is the difficulty of relating these dis
tinguishing features of education to spending differ
entials. The unproven relationship of educational
spending to social and economic success has already
been discussed.106 The universality and prolonged na
ture of education were used expressly to distinguish it
from police and fire services. The universality of public
1055 Cal. 3d at 609-10, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Gal. Rptr. at 618-19.
iW'See text accompanying notes 98-102 supra.
-58—
education is overstated, however. Although there are
economic limitations on its use, the alternative of pri
vate education is available. More significantly, police
and fire protection are also universal and sustained.
Their protective attributes do not consist solely of re
sponding to cries of distress, but consist also of the
security present on a daily, continuous basis in an in
dividual’s surroundings. Thus, they cannot be said to
be less universal or of a shorter duration than educa
tion.
Reasons four and five do distinguish education, at
least in degree, from police and fire. This fact does not
satify the question of what relationship these factors
have to differential expenditures. The major thrust of
the argument that education molds personalities and
that it does so with the force of governmental compul
sion behind it, would appear to be directed not against
financing differentials, but against the danger to a
free society in having the government effectively con
trol and monopolize this crucial mind forming process.
As such it would argue much more for the easier avail
ability of diverse educational experiences, for example,
through a tuition voucher system, than for equality of
expenditures.107
The compulsory nature of education merits further
discussion.108 It was argued that education is funda-
107It may be argued that the personality molding function of education is
peripherally related to first amendment rights. The difficulties of relating this
factor to a need for equal expenditures would still apply to the argument
however. &
108In assessing the applicability of Serrano on a nationwide basis, it should
be noted that education is not universally compulsory in this country. Mississippi
—59
mental to the individual because by making it compul
sory the state has designated its importance. On analy
sis, however, this does not seem convincing. The rea
sons for making education compulsory are two: (1)
people might not otherwise avail themselves of this
service; and (2) the value of freedom of choice is less
applicable here because the choice of school attendance
would not be the child’s, but his parents’. This latter,
parens patriae reason presumes that the state is no
worse a decisionmaker for a child than are his parents,
and that a state choice of compulsory schooling pro
vides a foundation for later choice by the child.
The first reason, that education is compulsory be
cause otherwise people would not avail themselves of
the service, does not primarily demonstrate a judgment
of importance to the individual. Indeed, the need to
make education compulsory to be certain that all will
avail themselves of it might indicate its relative unim
portance to the individual; an opposite determination
that there is no need to make a service compulsory
could reflect the belief that all individuals, recogniz
ing the importance of the service, would use it.
The “ importance” reflected in the societal decision
to make education compulsory does not represent the
value choice of the individual, but rather, of society.
It may be that the court was here finding the individ-
and South Carolina do not have compulsory school attendance laws and Vir
ginia has a local option system. Moreover, compulsory school attendance is
generally limited to those between the ages of 7 to 16. whereas one is entitled
to attend school generally from ages 6 to 21. See Goldstein, The Scope and
Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status:
A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. Pa. L. R ev. 373, 393-94 n.74- (1969).
— 60—
ual’s interest in education to be fundamental because
the external benefits of education are valuable to so
ciety. The flaw in that approach is that society has al
ready decided what benefits it wants from education
by legislative determination; it does not need judicial
intervention.
dSTo'r does the second reason for making education
compulsory—the parens patriae reasoning—necessari
ly indicate a judgment of education’s unique impor
tance to the individual. Rather, it relates to the pecu
liar situation of the child, an individual for whom
someone else, parent or state, must make a choice.109
While the reasons for making education compulsory
do not therefore argue that education is fundamental,
there remains the significance of compulsory atten
dance itself.
Initially, it should be remembered that enrollment
in public school is not required. The option of private
schooling is constitutionally protected.110 On the other
hand, private school is a viable option only for those
who can easily afford it, or who feel strong social, po
litical, or religious needs that persuade them to make
the sacrifice necessary to pay for private schooling.
’The Serrano court stated that the freedom to attend
private schools “ is seldom available to the indigent. In
this context, it has been suggested that ‘ a child of the
l09The validity of these rationales for compulsory school laws has been
challenged in the recent decision of State v. Yoder. 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182
N.W.2d 539, cert, granted, 402 U.S. 994 (1971).
110See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
— 61-
poor assigned willynilly to an inferior state school takes
on the complexion of a prisoner, complete with a mini
mum sentence of 12 years.’ ” m While this statement
embodies some underlying truths, it falls short of per
suasiveness when applied to interdistrict differentials
in expenditures.
As discussed above, the correlation between ex
penditure levels and quality of education is unclear,112
and there is no demonstrated correlation between “ a
child of the poor” and school districts with low real
property tax bases.113 Moreover, the argument that com
pelled attendance requires equal expenditures seems
to be premised on a type of “ right to treatment” —the
notion that restriction of freedom for a specified pur
pose obligates the state to satisfy that purpose.114 Yet
this right would only require a minimum level of treat
ment to justify curtailing a child’s liberty, or more
realistically, his parents’ liberty. S u c h a minimum
right to treatment may not be in question at all under
the California foundation plan guarantee and, if it is,
it is subject to the problems discussed above of court
determination of the minimum level of a foundation
guarantee system. A child compelled to go to a poor
school (rather than not compelled to go to school at
all) is not hurt by that compulsion vis-a-vis another
l « 5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (quoting from
Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitu
tional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 C a l if . L. R f.v . 305, 388 (1969)).
112See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra.
xx&See notes 65-67 supra & accompanying text,
u *See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971);
Symposium— The Right to Treatment, 57 G eo . L.J. 673 (1969).
62
child compelled to go to a better school. He is only
hurt by that compulsion if that poor school is worse
than no school.
In discussing the uniqueness of education, the Ser
rano court, while trying to distinguish education from
police and fire protection, did not even consider a com
parison between education and provision of the essent
ials of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter. Such a
comparison would seem imperative, for in Dandridge
v. Williams115 the United States Supreme Court up
held welfare grant restrictions on a traditional rational
basis test, not the compelling interest test employed
by the Supreme Court in protecting fundamental in
terests. This was done despite prior dictum that sub
sistence was a fundamental interest.118
The Dandridge opinion does not expressly deny
that subsistence is a fundamental interest. Rather, it
states that welfare legislation, when not involved with
a constitutionally protected freedom such as interstate
travel, is not subject to a compelling interest test be
cause it is “ a state regulation in the social and econom
ic field . . . .” 117 Whether welfare regulation is not
subject to a compelling interest test because it does
not involve a fundamental interest or because it does
involve economic and social regulation, the result in
Dandridge creates difficulties for applying a compel-
H5397 U.S. 471 (1970).
116See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1969) : Shapiro v. Thomp
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). ^ P
m 397 U.S. at 484; accord, Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
m
ling interest test in Serrano. It is hard to argue that an
affirmative right to education is more important than
an affirmative r i g h t to subsistence. Education also
shares the status of welfare as being primarily an eco
nomic and social regulation despite its avowed mind-
forming purpose. Most of the reasons given by the
Serrano court for the fundamentality of education re
late to economic or social factors. Moreover, as noted
by Professor Brest, “ it is not obvious that educational
finance systems embody economic judgments that are
any less complex, intuitive, and ultimately nonjusti-
ciable than those inherent in welfare legislation.” 118
118Brest, supra note 74, at 615. The recent Supreme Court decision in Pal
mer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), in which the Court upheld the right of
a city to close its municipal swimming pools rather than operate them on an
integrated basis, is also relevant to the issue of the fundamentality of education.
In so holding, the Court distinguished prior cases refusing to permit a school
district to close its schools in order to avoid a desegregation order. The Cali-
for Supreme Court quoted a statement of the majority opinion in Palmer
distinguishing swimming pools from schools: “ Of course that case [a school
closing case] did not involve swimming pools but rather public schools, an
enterprise we have described as ‘perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments.’ Brown v. Board of Education, supra at 493.” 5 Cal.
3d at 609 n.26, 487 P.2d at 1258-59 n.26, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19 n.26.
That quotation was taken out of context by the California court, and when
the entire case is reviewed, it is clear that the majority opinion and a number
of other opinions in the case purposefully refused to draw a distinction be
tween schools and swimming pools that would give greater constitutional
protection to the former. The quotation cited above was from a footnote in
the Palmer opinion in which Justice Black, writing for the Court, sought to
distinguish a prior summary affirmance of a lower court decision invalidating
Louisiana statutes empowering the governor to close any school ordered to
integrate, or to close all schools in the state if one were integrated. The first
difficulty with the quotation is that the sentence following it in the Palmer
footnote stated: “ More important, the laws struck down in Bush were part of
an elaborate package of legislation through which Louisiana sought to main
tain public education on a segregated basis, not to end public education.”
403 U.S. at 221 (emphasis added).
Moreover, the principal school closing case discussed in Palmer was Griffin
v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), an opinion by Mr. Justice Black
that invalidated school closings in one Virginia district to avoid desegregation
while other schools in the state remained open. In distinguishing Griffin, Justice
Black did not even mention a special status for schools, but rather relied ex
clusively on other differences between that case and Palmer, principally the
fact that Griffin did not involve a complete shutdown.
In a concurrence, Mr. Justice Blackmum did indicate that he saw a dif-
—64
I V . T h e Serrano R e s p o n s e : A n U n c e r t a i n P o r t e n t
f o r E d u c a t i o n a n d E q u a l P r o t e c t i o n
Serrano’s “ fundamental interest” analysis of edu
cation is doubtful both logically and in terms of Su
preme Court authority. Yet one cannot deny educa
tion’s importance or avoid the conclusion that society
must carefully scrutinize its distribution. The moral
case is strong for a doctrine of equal educational op
portunity that would limit differential treatment of
educational entitlement. The questions that arise in
adopting Serrano and a federal constitutional stan
dard as the remedy for this moral need are not an
swered solely according to one’s view of the impor
tance o f education. There remains for studied consid
eration the wisdom of yielding this role to the courts,
and of attempting to cure societal problems with broad
constitutional precepts.
The California Supreme Court, finding an inher
ently suspect wealth classification as well as a funda
mental interest in the school financing system, required
ference between schools and swimming pools. He stated as one of the 3 factors
that influenced him in reaching the conclusion that swimming pools could
be closed: “ The pools are not part of the city’s educational system. They are
a general municipal service of the nice-to-have but not essential variety and
they are a service, perhaps a luxury, not enjoyed by many communities.” 403
U.o. at 4^9. While this statement distinguishes schools from swimming pools
it does not distinguish education from police, fire, welfare, or other common
municipal services.
Moreover in their respective dissents in Palmer, both Justice Douglas
and Justice Marshall rejected any special status for schools that distinguishes
them from swimming pools. Justice Douglas stated: “ I conclude that though
a State may discontinue any of its municipal services— such as schools, parks,
pools, athletic fields, and the like— it may not do so for the purpose of ner'
petuatmg or installing apartheid or because it finds life in a multi-racial
community difficult or unpleasant.” Id. at 239. Justice Marshall also equated
schools with swimming pools or golf courses in conceding that a state‘ could
close them if it had a proper basis to do so.
— 65—
that the system’s inequities be justified bv a compelling-
state interest. The court was clearly correct in finding
that the system, when compared with its equal wealth
alternatives, could not withstand this stricter equal
protection test. The question remains, however, whe
ther an equal wealth alternative like district power-
equalizing that still permits geographic disparities can
itself survive a compelling interest test. For the rea
sons stated above concerning the pervasive societal
sense that one cannot prevent people from trying to
obtain a better education for their children, it is prob
able that district power equalizing could withstand
strict scrutiny. This conclusion, however, is far from
certain.118
U9The equal wealth formulation, which permits district power equalizing,
is easiest understood as a constitutional attempt to equalize educational ex
penditures, with some inequality permitted as an accommodation to other
interests. This is the equal protection formulation discussed in the text above,
and used by the Serrano, Van Dusartz and Rodriguez courts.
One could argue for the equal wealth standard independently of equaliza
tion of expenditures, however. Such an argument would have to support a
constitutional norm that each student, or each taxpayer, is entitled to live in
a district that has an equal resource base for education. Such a norm is diffi
cult to construct and neither the California Supreme Court nor the authors
of Private Wealth and Public Education in their development of Proposi
tion 1 have even attempted to state or support it. A recent article by pro
fessor Ferdinand P. Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Educa
tion, 71 C o l u m . L. R ev . 1355, 1402-12 (1971), does make just such an argu
ment. He states that lower tax base districts require greater taxpayer sacrifice
than wealthier districts to raise educational revenue. Since the acceptability
to voters of tax proposals “varies inversely with the burden,” id. 1407, “ voters
in low tax base districts who seek to increase educational appropriations are
forced to assume a proportionally heavier burden of electoral persuasion than
those who wish to achieve an identical goal in the more affluent districts.”
Id. This electoral burden, which varies from district to district, bears no
reasonable relationship to a legitimate state policy and thus denies equal pro
tection under a Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) voting rights rationale.
Professor Schoettle concedes that this approach leaves the field of education
completely and would apply to all decisions of monetary issues faced by local
governing bodies. He also concedes that his constitutional argument does not
depend on poverty as a classification, but applies to all relative taxpayer dis
advantage. He concludes that his analysis would not compel absolute equaliza
tion or elimination of local tax bases but only reduction of the gross wealth
disparities to the point where they no longer affect the electoral persuasiveness
— 66—
On the other hand, it is doubtful that the Serrano
holding requires this stricter equal protection test to
justify an equal wealth system like district power
equalizing. Serrano employed the compelling interest
test because it found a combination of a wealth classi
fication and a fundamental interest.120 District power
equalizing satisfies the former test since the revenue
it produces is based, not on district wealth, but on dis
trict tax effort. District power equalizing, then, would
not have to meet a compelling interest test, and could
be upheld on only the rational basis analysis.
This conclusion, however, points up the fundamen
tal theoretical p r o b 1 e m in the Serrano approach.
Viewed from the perspective of the child and his fam
ily ’s interest in equal education, the current system
and district power equalizing suffer the same inade-
of adherents to the same goal among different districts.
While provocative, the Schoettle thesis is ultimately unconvincing. It has
all the difficulties of the lack of a manageable judicial standard that Serrano
and Proposition 1 rightly try to avoid. These same difficulties of measur
ing subtleties of differential political power are what compelled the United
States Supreme Court to reject an argument similar to Professor Schoettle’s
in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), concerning at-large elections,
even in a racial context. Moreover, his theory would logically invalidate any
number of things that affect electoral power unequally including multimem
ber districts, single-party districts, and the seniority and committee systems
in legislatures. Finally, all the electoral cases that Professor Schoettle cites in
volve inequalities among electors in the same political entity, that is, electors
competing for statewide decisionmaking influence. Thus in Baker v. Carr, the
constitutional vice was unequal weighing, by district, of voters in relation to
their ability to influence the state legislature. Professor Schoettle’s Serrano
analysis, however, expressly eschews such a rationale as being foreclosed by
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). His rationale, rather,ds that electors
of a poor district have less internal district power than do those of wealthy dis
tricts. He thus posits lack of pure horizontal equality of voters in different
areas, with no racial or poverty components and regardless of the issues in
volved, as a basis for invalidating the universal American system of local gov
ernment financing. This lack of horizontal equality is said to make the system
“ irrational.” Yet a system that provides that local resources should be available
to local government to finance its needs is clearly not irrational.
1205ee note 22 supra.
— 67-
quaeies. Neither is a wealth classification; they are
both residence classifications in their actual effects. To
the extent that expenditures are related to educational
quality, the child receives a poorer education whether
he lives in a poor district or simply one that under
values education.
Since the court’s equal wealth standard allows for
these continued educational disparities, the essential
concern of Serrano is not the school child but the tax
payer. The California court has spawned a new, but
perhaps logically inevitable corollary to Proposition 1:
The economic burden of public education may not be
a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state
as a whole. As such the principle of Serrano cannot
realistically be limited to education, but applies to all
burdens of taxation.
APPENDIX “ B”
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY JUNE 22, 1972
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY JUNE 16, 1972
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY MAY 24, 1972
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY MAY 3, 1972
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE—1972 REGULAR SESSION
ASSEMBLY B ILL No. 1283
In trod uced b y the A ssem b ly C o m m ittee on E du cation (L eroy
F . G reen e (C h a irm an ), C h a co n (V ice C h a irm a n ), Arnett,
C lin e , C o ry , D e n t, D u n la p , F on g , Bill G reen e, K eysor,
L ew is, M a d d y , M cA lister, R yan, and V aseoueeU os) and
M u rp h y
(A ssigned to Arnett)
March 15, 1972
REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
An act to amend Sections 6741, 17300, 17303.5, 17414, 17417,
17503, 17603.5, 17651, 17654.5, 17655.5,17664, 17665, 18102.8,
18102.9,18102.10,18355,18358,18401, 20404, and20806 of, to
add Sections 13520.3, 17301, 17301.1, 17301.2, 17301.3, 17653,
17662, 17662.3, 17662.5, 18102, and 20751 to, to add Chapter
6.10 (commencing with Section 6499.230) to Division 6 of,
to add Chapter 1.7 (commencing with Section 17270) to,
and Article 3 (commencing with Section 17701) to Chapter
3 o f Division 14 of, to repeal Sections 1835, 5661, 6854, 6855,
6913.1, 13704, 14657, 14758, 17301, 17656, 17660, 17662,
17665.5, 18102, 18102.2, 18102.4, 18102.6, 20751, 20800,
20801.5.20802.8.20807.20808.20808.5, and20816o f to repeal
Article 2.1 (commencing with Section 17671), Article 2.5
(commencing with Section 17680), Article 3 (commencing
AB 1283 — 2 —
with Section 17701), Article 4 (commencing with Section
17751), Article 5 (commencing with Section 17801), Article
7 (commencing with Section 17901), Article 7.1
(commencing with Section 17920), Article 7.2
(commencing with Section 17940), and Article 8
(commencing with Section 17951) o f Chapter 3 o f Division
14 of, to amend the heading o f Article 2 (commencing with
Section 17651) o f Chapter 3 ofDivision 14 of, the Education
Code, relating to the financial support o f public education,
making an appropriation therefor.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S DIGEST
AB 1283, as amended, Arnett (Ed.). School finance.
Provides for revised system of allocation of state support for
public elementary and high schools, such system being based
upon a specified percentage of the current expense of
education, as defined.
Provides for computation of maximum expenditures by
such school districts.
Specifies system whereby school districts set local tax rates,
but prescribed amount of proceeds thereof revert to School
District Wealth Equalization Fund, for redistribution to
school districts based upon district’s ratio of assessed valuation
to a.d.a. to statewide average ratio of assessed valuation to
a.d.a.
Deletes existing provisions re computation, allocation, and
apportionment of amounts denoted as “basic state aid,”
equalization aid,” and “supplemental support” for
elementary school, high school, and community college
levels.
Eliminates use of computational tax rates as a factor in
computing state and local shares of foundation program
support.
Eliminates unification and class size reduction bonuses in
apportionment of state school funds.
Eliminates areawide school support programs for areas
included in defeated unification proposals.
Revises method of computing the amount of allowances for
physically handicapped, mentally retarded, and educationally
handicapped pupils. Revises allowances for special
— 3 — AB 1283
transportation programs.
Makes numerous related changes.
Vote-—Majority; Appropriation—Yes;
Fiscal Committee—Yes.
The people o f the State o f California do enact as follows:
1 S e c t i o n 1. It is the intent o f the Legislature in this
2 act to provide for the financial support of public
3 education in the following manner:
4 (a) A funding mechanism which (1) minimizes the
5 wealth disparities that presently exist between school
6 districts and (2) enables every child in the state to
7 receive an equal education opportunity.
8 (b) An adequate level of financial support for the
9 education of every child through a combination of a
10 reasonable level of state assistance and local effort.
11 (c) An orderly transition from the present system to a
12 new system of school finance.
13 (d) A system whereby at least §& 50 percent of the
14 educational support is provided from the General Fund
15 in the State Treasury.
16 (e) A reasonable level of annual increases from the
17 state to meet the pressures of inflation without the
18 necessity of annual legislative action.
19 (f) The continuation of local control of educational
20 programs and the level of local property tax rates.
21 (g) A mechanism of expenditure controls to replace
22 the present ineffective method of property tax
23 limitations.
24 (h) A system fe? the The elimination of most of the
25 presently authorized school district permissive override
26 taxes.
27 (i) A system for minimum reliance on the property tax
28 for the support of public education.
29 SEC. 2. Section 1835 of the Education Code is
30 repealed.
31 Sec. 3. Section 5661 of the Education Code is
32 repealed.
33 Sec. 3.5. Chapter 6.10 (commencing with Section
AB 1283 — 4
1 6499.230) is added to Division 6 of the Education Code,
2 to read:
3
4 C h a p t e r 6 . 1 0 . E d u c a t i o n a l l y D i s a d v a n t a g e d
5 Y o u t h P r o g r a m s
6
7 6499.230. It is the intent of the Legislature to provide
8 quality educational opportunities for all children in the
9 California public schools. The Legislature recognizes that
10 because of differences in family income, differing
11 language barriers, and pupil transiency, differing levels of
12 financial aid are necessary to provide quality education
13 for all students.
14 6499.231. From the funds appropriated by the
15 Legislature for the purposes of this chapter, the
1 6 Superintendent of Public Instruction, with the approval
17 of the State Board of Education, shall administer this
18 chapter and make apportionments to school districts to
19 meet the total approved expense of the school districts
20 incurred in establishing education programs for pupils
21 who qualify economically and educationally in preschool,
22 kindergarten, or any of grades 1 through 12, inclusive.
23 Nothing in this chapter shall in any way preclude the use
24 of federal funds for educationally disadvantaged youth.
25 6499.232. Maximum apportionments allowable to
26 school districts shall be determined by the following
27 factors:
28 (a) An index of “potential impact of
29 bilingual-bicultural pupils” determined by dividing the
30 percent of pupils in the district with Spanish and Oriental
31 surnames, as determined by the annual ethnic survey
32 conducted by the Department of Education, by the
33 statewide average percentage of such pupils for unified,
34 e lem en ta ry , or secondary districts, as appropriate.
35 (b) A ratio of the district’s “index of family poverty,”
36 defined as the district’s Elementary and Secondary
37 Education Act, Title I entitlement, divided by its average
38 daily attendance in grades 1 through 12, or any thereof
39 maintained, divided in turn by the state average index of
40 family poverty for unified, elementary, or secondary
AB 1283
1 districts, as appropriate.
2 (c) A ratio of the district’s “ index of pupil transiency,”
3 as computed from the relationship between the district’s
4 average daily attendance and its total annual enrollment,
5 divided by the state average index of pupil transiency for
6 unified, elementary, or secondary districts, as
7 appropriate.
8 The district’s total maximum apportionment under this
9 chapter shall be determined by computing the product of
10 (1) one-third the sum of the above three factors, (2) the
11 number of pupils receiving aid for dependent children
12 support, and (3) a constant amount of three hundred
13 dollars ($300), or such amount as the Superintendent of
14 Public Instruction may determine so that the sum of all
15 allocations will not exceed the funds appropriated by the
16 Legislature for the purposes of this chapter.
17 6499.233. For the fiscal year 1972-1973, the
18 superintendent shall allocate to local districts an amount
19 equal to not less than 40 percent of the total amount
20 computed under Section 6499.232. For the fiscal year
21 1973-1974, the superintendent shall allocate not less than
22 40 percent of the total amount so computed and not more
23 than 90 percent of the amount computed. For the
24 1974-1975 fiscal year and thereafter, the superintendent
25 shall allocate to each district not less than 40 percent nor
26 more than 100 percent of the amount so computed.
27 6499.234. In approving programs under this chapter,
28 the State Board of Education shall give due consideration
29 to the effectiveness of the program and shall not continue
30 in operation any program that, upon evaluation, has been
31 shown to be of low effectiveness and which has only
32 limited possibility of improved effectiveness.
33 For the fiscal year 1973-1974 and for each year
34 thereafter, districts which demonstrate a high degree of
35 program effectiveness shall receive amounts up to their
36 entitlement limits. Districts which demonstrate low
37 levels of program effectiveness shall continue to receive
38 their initial apportionments but the Superintendent of
39 Public Instruction may reduce the additional computed
40 apportionments due such districts, if he determines that
— 5 —
AB 1283
1 such programs have limited possibilities of improved
2 achievement.
3 6499.235. The Superintendent of Public Instruction
4 shall apportion the funds available for programs in accord
5 with procedures specified in this chapter and policies
6 which may be adopted by the State Board of Education.
7 Funds shall be allocated to each district within its
8 entitlement based upon a plan submitted by the district
9 to the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and
10 approved by the State Board of Education. The plan shall
11 include (1) an explicit statement of what the district
12 seeks to accomplish, (2) a description of the program and
13 activities designed to achieve these purposes, and (3) a
14 planned program of annual evaluation, including a
15 statement of the criteria to be used to measure the
16 effectiveness of the program.
17 6499.236. The State Board of Education shall adopt
18 regulations setting forth the standards and criteria to be
19 used in the administration, monitoring, evaluation, and
20 dissemination of programs submitted for consideration
21 under this chapter; 1 percent of the total appropriation
22 for the purposes of this chapter shall be retained by the
23 Department of Education for these purposes. Funds
24 appropriated for the purposes of this chapter not
25 allocated as previously specified shall be allocated by the
26 State Board of Education to promote the intent of this
27 chapter to provide education programs to as many
28 eligible pupils as possible and to stimulate the
29 development, implementation, and evaluation of
30 innovative programs.
31 6499.237. The Superintendent of Public Instruction
32 shall submit annually to the Governor and to each house
33 of the Legislature a report evaluating the programs
34 established pursuant to this chapter, together with his
35 recommendations concerning whether the same should
36 be continued in operation.
37 6499.238. There is hereby appropriated from the
38 General Fund in the State Treasury to the State School
39 Fund for the fiscal year 1972-1973 an amount equal to
40 twenty-one dollars and fifty cents ($21.50) multiplied by
— 6 —
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AB 1283
the total statewide average daily attendance of the
preceding fiscal year in kindergarten and grades 1 to 12,
inclusive, to be used for the purposes of Chapter 6.10
(commencing with Section 6499.230) of Division 6 of the
Education Code. For the fiscal year 1973-1974 the
amount per such unit of average daily attendance shall be
forty-three dollars ($43); and for the fiscal year 1974-1975
and thereafter, it shall be fifty-three dollars and
seventy-five cents ($53.75).
SEC. 4. Section 6741 of the Education Code is
amended to read:
6741. A student shall be deemed to be a resident of
the high school district in which he lived at the time of
his admission to the program and the excess cost for a
school year of educating such student shall be paid by the
high school district of which he is a resident to the county
superintendent who is providing education for the
students. The excess cost shall be determined by dividing
the total current expense of education as defined in
subdivision (b) o f Section 17503 and also excluding
expense of boarding and lodging during such school year
by the total number of units of average daily attendance
in such school or classes during such school year, less state
and federal apportionments on account of such average
daily attendance.
Average daily attendance of students shall be
computed, for purposes of this article, by dividing the
number of days such student attended the schools or
classes by the number of days that the schools or classes
were taught, except that with respect to a student
attending such schools or classes for more than 175 days
in a school year, the average daily attendance shall be
computed by using the divisor of 175.
For purposes of computing average daily attendance
180 minutes of class attendance shall be deemed to
constitute a schoolday, and no more than 15 hours of class
time per week shall be considered.
Not later than July 15th of each year, the
superintendent of schools of the county providing
education for students shall forward his claim for the
AB 1283 — 8 —
1 excess expense reimbursement to the high school district
2 of residence of each student during the preceding school
3 year, and the governing board of such high school district
4 shall upon receipt thereof pay such claims.
5 Sec. 5. Section 6854 of the Education Code is
6 repealed.
7 Sec. 6. Section 6855 of the Education Code is
8 repealed.
9 Sec. 7. Section 6913.1 of the Education Code is
10 repealed.
11 Sec. 8. Section 13520.3 is added to the Education
12 Code, to read:
13 13520.3. When a school district operates on a
14 year-around schedule pursuant to Chapter 7
15 (commencing with Section 32100) of Division 22, the
16 salaries of employees who are employed for the extended
17 school year may be adjusted in accordance with the ratio
18 of the extension of the school year in months bears to the
19 length of the school year in months prior to the
20 commencement of year-around operation. No classroom
21 teacher may be required to participate in a year-around
22 program without his consent.
23 Sec. 9. Section 13704 of the Education Code is
24 repealed.
25 Sec. 10. Section 14657 of the Education Code is
26 repealed.
27 Sec. 11. Section 14758 of the Education Code is
28 repealed.
29 Sec. 12. Chapter 1.7 (commencing with Section
30 17270) is added to Division 14 of the Education Code, to
31 read:
32
33 C h a p t e r 1.7. A d j u s t m e n t s t o U s a b l e A s s e s s e d
34 V a l u a t i o n
35
36 17270. The Legislature hereby declares that its intent
37 in enacting this chapter is to provide a reasonable and
38 equitable method for ascertaining the value of property
39 located within school districts for use in connection with
40 the administration of state laws providing for the
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AB 1283
allocation of state funds to such districts for school
purposes on the basis of value and provide for more equal
educational opportunity for students residing in districts
of varying wealth per unit of average daily attendance
and to improve the equity among taxpayers residing in or
owning property in districts of varying wealth.
The Legislature hereby further declares that in
enacting this chapter it has no intention to affect in any
way, whether directly or indirectly, any determination of
the assessed value of property for tax purposes.
17271. Each school district shall report to the
Superintendent of Public Instruction:
(a) The total assessed valuation of the district; and
(b) The amount equal to:
(1) Ten percent of the total assessed valuation in the
1972-1973 fiscal year.
(2) Twenty percent of the total assessed valuation in
the 1973-1974 fiscal year.
(3) Thirty percent of the total assessed valuation in the
1974- 1975 fiscal year.
(4) Forty percent of the total assessed valuation in the
1975- 1976 fiscal year.
(5) Fifty percent of the total assessed valuation in the
1976- 1977 fiscal year and following,
17272. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall
compute the total amounts reported to him pursuant to
subdivision (b-)» of Section 17271 for each type of district.
He shall make a separate computation for elementary
school districts, high school districts, and unified school
districts. He shall divide the total for each type of district
by the statewide average daily attendance for the
preceding fiscal year for each type of district. The
amount computed pursuant to this section is the assessed
valuation redistribution amount per unit of average daily
attendance for each type of district.
17273. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall
compute for each school district the amount derived by
multiplying the assessed valuation redistribution amount
per unit of average daily attendance by the average daily
attendance of the district for the preceding fiscal year.
— 9 —
AB 1283 10 —
1 The amount computed pursuant to this section is the
2 redistribution amount.
3 17273.5. The “district assessed valuation” for each
4 district is the total assessed valuation minus the amount
5 reported for it pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section
6 17271 plus the redistribution amount for the type of
7 district computed pursuant to Section 17273.
8 17274. (a) Each school district shall compute the
9 amount which the revenue derived from the levy and
10 collection of school district taxes would have been if it
11 had been collected and been based upon an adjusted
12 assessed valuation computed pursuant to Section 17273.5
13 For the purpose of this subdivision chapter, the school
14 district tax shall not include any tax levied and collected
15 pursuant to Sections 15517, 15518, 16633, 16635, 16645.9,
16 19443, 19572, 19619, 19687, 19695, or 22101.
17 (b) Each district shall compute the total amount of
18 revenue derived from the levy of school district taxes on
19 property lying within the district.
20 (c) If the amount computed pursuant to subdivision
21 (a) is less than the amount computed pursuant to
22 subdivision (b), the difference shall be transmitted to the
23 School District Wealth Equalization Fund.
24 (d) If the amount computed pursuant to subdivision
25 (a) is more than the amount computed pursuant to
26 subdivision (b), the Superintendent of Public Instruction
27 shall allow to the district an amount equal to such
28 difference from the School District Wealth Equalization
29 Fund.
30 Sec. 13. Section 17300 of the Education Code is
31 amended to read:
32 17300. It is the intent of the Legislature that the
33 administration of the laws governing the financial
34 support of the public school system in this state be
35 conducted within the purview of the following principles
36 and policies:
37 The system of public school support should be designed
38 to strengthen and encourage local responsibility for
39 .control of public education. Local school districts should
40 be so organized that they can facilitate the provision of
— 11 — AB 1283
1 full educational opportunities for all who attend the
2 public schools. Local control is best accomplished by the
3 development of strong, vigorous, and properly organized
4 local school administrative units. It is the state’s
5 responsibility to create or facilitate the creation of local
6 school districts of sufficient size to properly discharge
7 local responsibilities and to spend the tax dollar
8 effectively.
9 Effective local control requires that all local
10 administrative units contribute to the support of school
11 budgets in proportion to their respective abilities, and
12 that all have such flexibility in their taxing programs as
13 will readily permit of progress in the improvement of the
14 educational program. Effective local control requires a
15 local taxing power, and a local tax base which is not
16 unduly restricted or overburdened.
17 The system of public school support should assure that
18 state, local, and other funds are adequate for the support
19 of a realistic educational program. It is unrealistic and
20 unfair to the less wealthy districts to provide for only a
21 part of the financing necessary for an adequate
22 educational program.
23 The system of public school support should permit and
24 encourage local school districts to provide and support
25 improved district organization and educational
26 programs. The system of public school support should
27 prohibit the introduction of undesirable organization and
28 educational practices, and should discourage any such
29 practices now in effect. Improvement of programs in
30 particular districts is in the interests of the state as a
31 whole as well as of the people in individual districts, since
32 the excellence of the programs in some districts will tend
33 to bring about program improvement in other districts.
34 The system of public school support should make
35 provision for the apportionment of state funds to local
36 school districts on a strictly objective basis that can be
37 computed as well by the local districts as by the state. The
38 principle of local responsibility requires that the granting
39 of discretionary powers to state officials over the
40 distribution of state aid and the granting to these officials
AB 1283 — 12 —
1 of the power to impose undue restriction on the use of
2 funds and the conduct of educational programs at the
3 local level be avoided.
4 The system of public school support should effect a
5 partnership between the state, the county, and the local
6 district, with each participating equitably in accordance
7 with its relative ability. The respective abilities should be
8 combined to provide a financial plan between the state
9 and the local agencies for public school support. Toward
10 this support program, each county and district, through
11 a uniform method should contribute in accordance with
12 its true financial ability.
13 The system of public school support should provide for
14 essential educational opportunities for all who attend the
15 public schools. Provision should be made for adequate
16 financing of all educational services.
17 The broader based taxing power of the state should be
18 utilized to raise the level of financial support in the
19 properly organized but financially weak districts of the
20 state, thus contributing greatly to the equalization of
21 educational opportunity for the students residing
22 therein. It should also be used to provide a minimum
23 amount of guaranteed support to all districts, for such
24 state assistance serves to develop among all districts a
25 sense of responsibility to the entire system of public
26 education in the state. State assistance to all districts also
27 would create a tax leeway for the exercise of local
28 initiative.
29 The Legislature further declares that in order to
30 reduce the burden of inequitable property taxation it is
31 in the best interest of the state to provide, from other
32 than ad valorem property taxes, a predominate portion of
33 the statewide cost of education in the elementary and
34 secondary schools of the state. The Legislature further
35 declares that the funds to be provided are required in
36 order to reduce the disproportionate demand upon
37 property taxpayers for support of educational services
38 and programs, equalize wide variations in the ability of
39 local communities to support such services and programs,
40 and to assist school districts in meeting increased
— 13 — AB 1283
1 demands due to concentrations of educationally
2 disadvantaged pupils.
3 In recognition of these disparities it is the intent of the
4 Legislature to apportion funds for school purposes in such
5 a manner as to provide adequate educational programs
6 for all students regardless of where they reside or the
7 wealth of their parents and neighbors.
8 In implementing its intent the Legislature declares
9 that, although the present system of funding does not
10 meet desirable criteria, sudden changes of great
11 magnitude in the system of public school finance would
12 disrupt the educational system of many districts and
13 thereby damage the whole public school system of the
14 state, the educational welfare of all students, and the
15 economy of the state; therefore, rapid change is
16 undesirable and unacceptable.
17 Accordingly, the Legislature declares its intent to
18 improve with all reasonable and deliberate speed,
19 financial support of education in districts which have less
20 than the statewide average assessed valuation per unit of
21 average daily attendance as rapidly as those districts can
22 efficiently utilize additional support, and at the same
23 time allow districts with more than the statewide assessed
24 valuation per unit of average daily attendance sufficient
25 time to readjust their programs to new methods of
26 financing to avoid precipitous disruption of present
27 programs.
28 It is further the intent of the Legislature to study the
29 possibility of adopting an apportionment system based
30 upon weighted units of average daily attendance.
31 Sec. 14. Section 17301 of the Education Code is
32 repealed.
33 Sec. 15. Section 17301 is added to the Education
34 Code, to read:
35 17301. The State Controller shall during each fiscal
36 year transfer from the General Fund of the state to the
37 State School Fund such sums as are necessary for the state
38 to provide a specified percentage of the current expense
39 of education, as defined by subdivision -fb)- (c) of Section
40 17503, for each pupil in average daily attendance during
AB 1283 14
1 the preceding fiscal year credited to all kindergarten,
2 elementary and high schools in the state and to the
3 county school tuition funds, as certified by the
4 Superintendent of Public Instruction. For the 1972-1973
5 and 1973-1974 fiscal years the percentage shall be 45
6 percent, and for the 1974-1975 fiscal year, and each fiscal
7 year thereafter, the percentage shall be 50 percent. The
8 In the 1972-1973 fiscal year and each fiscal year
9 thereafter, the amounts so transferred shall be increased
10 by an amount which shall reflect the application of an
11 adjustment index developed cooperatively by the
12 Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Legislative
13 Analyst, and the Director of Finance. This adjustment
14 index shall reflect the expected change in the cost of a
15 basic educational program, plus any additional costs
16 mandated by the Legislature, for the fiscal year under
17 consideration. The Controller shall adjust such transfers
18 to reflect increases or decreases as estimated by the
19 Superintendent of Public Instruction for the current year
20 in the statewide units of average daily attendance in the
21 kindergartens, elementary, and high schools of the state.
22 The Controller shall also transfer two hundred
23 ninety-eight dollars and thirty-eight cents ($298.38) from
24 the General Fund to the State School Fund per pupil in
25 average daily attendance credited to the community
26 colleges of the state during the preceding fiscal year.
27 SEC. 16. Section 17301.1 is added to the Education
28 Code, to read:
29 17301.1. The State Controller shall also transfer an
30 amount equal to the percentage specified in Section
31 17301 for any new or expanded program trtrtfe©*4«ed ©r
32 required by law which was not uutfaor-izcd ©r required in
33 the preceding fiscal year.
34 SEC. 17. Section 17301.2 is added to the Education
35 Code, to read:
36 17301.2. The State Controller shall also transfer an
37 amount from the General Fund to the School Disrict
38 Wealth Equalization Fund equal to any deficit created in
39 that fund.
40 Sec. 17.5. Section 17301.3 is added to the Education
— 15 — AB 1283
1 Code, to read:
2 17301.3. The State Controller shall also transfer an
3 amount from the General Fund to the State School Fund
4 equal to thirty-eight dollars ($38) multiplied by the
5 average daily attendance credited to all kindergarten,
6 elementary, high school, community college, and adult
7 schools and to county school tuition funds during the
8 preceding fiscal year for expenditure pursuant to Section
9 17303.5.
1 0 S E C . 1 8 . Section 1 7 3 0 3 . 5 o f the Education Code is
11 amended to read:
12 17303.5. The amount transferred pursuant to Sections
13 17301 and 17301.3 shall be expended, in part, in
14 accordance with the following schedule:
15 (a) Twenty-one dollars and fifty cents ($21.50)
16 multiplied by the total average daily attendance credited
17 during the preceding school year to elementary school
18 districts which during the preceding school year had less
19 than 901 units of average daily attendance, to high school
20 districts which during the preceding school year had less
21 than 301 units of average daily attendance, and to unified
22 districts which during the preceding school year had less
23 than 1,501 units of average daily attendance, but not to
24 exceed an amount equal to seventy cents ($0.70)
25 multiplied by the average daily attendance credited
26 during the preceding fiscal year to all kindergarten,
27 elementary, high school, community college and adult
28 schools in the state and to county school tuition funds, for
29 allowance to county school service funds pursuant to
30 subdivision (a) of Section 18352.
31 (b) Four dollars and forty cents ($4.40) multiplied by
32 the total average daily attendance credited to all
33 kindergarten, elementary, high school, community
34 college and adult schools in the state and to county school
35 tuition funds during the preceding school year for the
36 purposes of Article 10 (commencing with Section 18051)
37 of Chapter 3 of this division.
38 (c) Nineteen dollars and fifty-two cents ($19.52)
39 multiplied by the total average daily attendance credited
40 to all kindergarten, elementary, high school, community
AB 1283 16
1 college and adult schools in the state and to county school
2 tuition funds during the preceding school year, for the
3 purposes of Sections 18060 and 18062, and Article 11
4 (commencing with Section 18101) of Chapter 3 of this
5 division.
6 (d) Three dollars and six cents ($3.06) multiplied by
7 the total average daily attendance credited to all
8 kindergarten, elementary, high school, community
9 college and adult schools in the state and to county school
10 tuition funds during the preceding school year for
11 allowances to county school service funds pursuant to
12 subdivision (b) of Section 18352.
13 (e) One dollar and sixty-seven cents ($1.67)
14 multiplied by the average daily attendance during the
15 preceding fiscal year credited to all kindergarten,
16 elementary, high school, community college and adult
17 schools in the state and to county school tuition funds for
18 allowances to school districts for the purposes of Section
19 6426.
20 (f) Eight dollars and sixty-five cents ($8.65) multiplied
21 by the average daily attendance during the preceding
22 school year credited to all kindergarten, elementary, high
23 school, community college and adult schools in the state
24 and to county school tuition funds for purposes of
25 Chapter 7.1 (commencing with Section 6750) of Division
26 6.
27 S e c . 19. Section 17414 of the Education Code is
28 amended to read:
29 17414. If during any fiscal year there is apportioned to
30 a school district or to any fund from the State School Fund
31 at least one hundred dollars ($100) more or at least one
32 hundred dollars ($100) less than the amount to which the
33 district or fund was entitled, the Superintendent of
34 Public Instruction, in accordance with regulations that he
35 is herewith authorized to adopt not later than the third
36 succeeding fiscal year shall withhold from, or add to, the
37 apportionment made during such fiscal year, the amount
38 of such excess or deficiency, as the case may be.
39 Notwithstanding, any other provision of this code to the
40 contrary, excesses withheld or deficiencies added by the
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— 17 AB 1283
Superintendent of Public Instruction under this section
shall be added to or allowed from any portion of the State
School Fund.
SEC. 20. Section 17417 of the Education Code is
amended to read:
17417. Wherever the attendance of pupils is not
included in the computation of the average daily
attendance of a school district for any fiscal year because
the certification document of the person employed by
the district to instruct such pupils was not in force during
the period of such attendance, the governing board of the
district may, upon payment of the salary of such person
pursuant to Section 13515, or similar provisions of law,
report such attendance to the Superintendent of Public
Instruction during the fiscal year in which such salary is
paid. Such report shall be made in such form as shall be
prescribed and furnished by the Superintendent of
Public Instruction. Thereafter the Superintendent of
Public Instruction shall add to the apportionment from
the State School Fund to the district during the next
succeeding fiscal year or years, as determined by him but
not exceeding three, the additional amount to which the
district would have been entitled in the fiscal year next
succeeding that in which such attendance was not
included in the computation of the average daily
attendance of the district if such amount is at least one
hundred dollars ($100) or more.
Any such additional amount shall be apportioned from
the State School Fund before any other apportionment
from such fund is made and shall be allowed from any
portion of such fund.
SEC. 21. Section 17503 of the Education Code is
amended to read:
17503. For purposes of this section:
(a) “Salaries of classroom teachers” and “ teacher”
shall have the same meanings as prescribed by Section
17200 of this code provided, however, that the cost of all
health and welfare benefits provided to the teachers by
the school district shall be included within the meaning
of salaries of classroom teachers.
AB 1283 — 18 —
1 (b) “Current expense of education” means the gross
2 total expended (not reduced by estimated income or
3 estimated federal and state apportionments) for the
4 purposes classified in the final budget of a school district
5 (except one which, during the preceding fiscal year, had
6 less than 101 units of average daily attendance)
7 submitted to and approved by the county superintendent
8 of schools pursuant to Section 20607 of this code for
9 administration, instruction (including salaries and other
10 expense), health services, operation of plant,
11 maintenance of plant, and fixed charges. “ Current
12 expense of education” shall not include those purposes
13 classified as transportation of pupils, food service,
14 community service, capital outlay, state school building
15 loan repayment; and shall not include the amount
16 expended pursuant to any lease agreement for plant and
17 equipment or the amount expended from funds received
18 from the federal government pursuant to the “Economic
19 Opportunity Act of 1964” or any extension of such act of
20 Congress.
21 (c) For the purposes of Sections 17301, 17654.5,
22 17655.5, 17662, 17664, 17665, and Article 3 (commencing
23 with Section 17701) of this chapter, the current expense
24 of education shall include only state funds apportioned as
25 basic aid, equalizaton aid, supplemental support and
26 additional equalization aid; local funds derived pursuant
27 to subdivision (a) of Section 17274; miscellaneous funds,
28 as defined in Section 17606; and any federal funds
29 allocated as general aid, such as funds allocated pursuant
30 to Public Law 81-874.
31 For 1973-1974 and each fiscal year thereafter, state
32 basic aid, equalization aid, supplemental support, and
33 additional equalization aid shall mean state funds
34 allocated pursuant to Sections 17654.5, 17655.5, 17662,
35 17664, and 17665.
36 The statewide average current expense of education
37 per unit of average daily attendance shall mean the sum
38 of the funds specified by this subdivision received by all
39 districts in the state of the particular type (elementary,
40 high school, or unified) divided by the foundation
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program average daily attendance reported by those
same districts.
There shall be expended during each fiscal year for
payment of salaries of classroom teachers:
(a) By an elementary school district, sixty percent
(60%) of the district’s current expense of education.
(b) By a high school district, fifty percent (50%) of the
district’s current expense of education,
(c) By a community college district, fifty percent
(50%) of the district’s current expense of education.
(d) By a unified school district, fifty-five percent
(55%) of the district’s current expense of education.
If the Superintendent of Public Instruction determines
that a school district has not expended the applicable
percentage of current expense of education for the
payment of salaries of classroom teachers during the
preceding fiscal year, he shall, in apportionments made to
the school district from the State School Fund after April
15 of the current fiscal year, designate an amount of such
apportionment or apportionments equal to the apparent
deficiency in district expenditures. Any amount so
designated by the Superintendent of Public Instruction
shall be deposited in the county treasury to the credit of
the school district, but shall be unavailable for
expenditure by the district pending the determination to
be made by the Superintendent of Public Instruction on
any application for exemption which may be submitted
to the Superintendent of Public Instruction. In the event
it appears to the governing board of a school district that
the application of the preceding paragraphs of this
section during a fiscal year results in serious hardship to
the district, or in the payment of salaries of classroom
teachers in excess of the salaries of classroom teachers
paid by other districts of comparable type and
functioning under comparable conditions, the board
may, with the written approval of the county
superintendent of schools having jurisdiction over the
district apply to the Superintendent of Public Instruction
in writing not later than September 15th of the
succeeding fiscal year for exemption from the
AB 1283 — 20 —
1 requirements of the preceding paragraphs of this section
2 for the fiscal year on account of which the application is
3 made. Upon receipt of such application, duly approved,
4 the Superintendent of Public Instruction shall grant the
5 district exemption for any amount that is less than one
6 thousand dollars ($1,000), and if the amount is one
7 thousand dollars ($1,000), or greater may grant the
8 district exemption, to the extent deemed necessary by
9 him, from such requirements for the fiscal year on
10 account of which the application is made. If such
11 exemption is granted the designated moneys shall be
12 immediately available for expenditure by the school
13 district governing board. If no application for exemption
14 is made or exemption is denied, the Superintendent of
15 Public Instruction shall order the designated amount or
16 amount not exempted to be added to the amounts to be
17 expended for salaries of classroom teachers during the
18 next fiscal year.
19 The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall enforce
20 the requirements prescribed by this section, and may
21 adopt necessary rules and regulations to that end. He may
22 require the submission to him, during the school year, by
23 school district governing boards and county
24 superintendents of schools, of such reports and
25 information as may be necessary to carry out the
26 provisions of this section.
27 Any reference in this code to “current expense o f
28 education as defined in Section 17503” enacted prior to
29 the enactment o f Chapter 1.7 (commencing with Section
30 17270) o f this division shall mean current expense o f
31 education as defined in subdivision (b) o f Section 17503.
32 Sec. 22. Section 17603.5 of the Education Code is
33 amended to read:
34 17603.5. The amounts computed as allowable to any
35 school community college district for state aid shall be
36 reduced by fifty percent (50%) of miscellaneous funds, as
37 defined in Section 17606. In no event shall the reduction
38 exceed the total amount allowable as state aid to the
39 school district for the fiscal yeafr Fer sueh pwpeses;
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21 — AB 1283
fey a unified school dlstr-iet-,- shall fee allocated te the
kmdorgartcn and elementary, high seheel and
community college grades, respectively, ©n the basis e4
the preperti©© ©f the distriet’s total average daily
attendance in eaeh sueh grade level-, and the previsions
©f Section 17601 shall fee applicable, for the fiscal year.
Should the amount of miscellaneous funds, as defined
in Section 17606, actually received by a school community
college district for any fiscal year be more or less than that
reported to the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the
Superintendent of Public Instruction shall during the
fiscal year next succeeding withhold from or add to the
apportionment made to the district from the State School
Fund the amount of the excess or deficiency in the
apportionment of state aid from the State School Fund
for the preceding year, if the amount of the excess or
deficiency in such apportionment was one hundred
dollars ($100) or more.
SEC. 23. The heading of Article 2 (commencing with
Section 17651) of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the
Education Code is amended to read:
Article 2. Computation of Foundation Programs and
School Support for School Districts
S e c . 24. Section 17651 of the Education Code is
amended to read:
17651. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall
compute for each school district the amount of school
support therefor, in the manner prescribed by this
article.
SEC. 25. Section 17653 is added to the Education
Code, to read:
17653. No aid in excess of one hundred twenty dollars
($120) per unit of average daily attendance shall be
allowed unless there shall have been levied pursuant to
this code, for a district during the fiscal year, a tax,
exclusive of taxes levied under Sections 1822,2, 1825,
16633,16635,16645.9,19443,19619,20801, and 22101, of not
less than one dollar ($1) if an elementary district, eighty
AB 1283 — 22 —
1 cents ($0.80) if a high school district, one dollar and
2 eighty cents ($1.80) i f a unified school district, and
3 twenty-five cents ($0.25) if a community college district.
4 S e c . 2 6 . Section 1 7 6 5 4 . 5 of the Education Code is
5 amended to read:
6 17654.5. For each elementary school district which
7 maintains only one school with an average daily
8 attendance of less than 101, he shall make one of the
9 following computations, whichever provides the lesser
10 amount:
11 (1) For each small school which has an average daily
12 attendance during the fiscal year of less than 26, exclusive
13 of pupils attending the seventh and eighth grades of a
14 junior high school, and for which school at least one
15 teacher was hired full time, he shall compute for the the
16 product of 25 multiplied by the appropriate percentage
17 specified in Section 17301 multiplied by the relative
18 support factor specified in Section 17662.5 multiplied by
19 the statewide average current expense of education for
20 elementary districts as determined pursuant to
21 subdivision (c) of Section 17503.
22 (2) For each small school which has an average daily
23 attendance during the fiscal year of 26 or more and less
24 than 51, exclusive of pupils attending the seventh and
25 eighth grades of a junior high school, and for which school
26 at least two teachers were hired full time for more than
27 one-half of the days schools were maintained, he shall
28 compute for the district the product of 50 multiplied by
29 the appropriate percentage specified in Section 17301
30 multiplied by the relative support factor specified in
31 Section 17662.5 multiplied by the statewide average
32 current expense of education for elementary districts as
33 determined pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 17503.
34 (3) For each small school which has an average daily
35 attendance during the fiscal year of 51 or more but less
36 than 76, exclusive of pupils attending the seventh and
37 eighth grades of a junior high school, and for which school
38 three teachers were hired full time for more than
39 one-half of the days schools were maintained, he shall
40 compute for the district the product of 75 multiplied by
23 — AB 1283
1 the relative support percentage specified in Section
2 17301 multiplied by the appropriate factor specified in
3 Section 17662.5 multiplied by the statewide average
4 current expense of education for elementary districts as
5 determined pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 17503.
6 (4) For each small school which has an average daily
7 attendance during the fiscal year of 76 or more and less
8 than 101, exclusive of pupils attending the seventh and
9 eighth grades of a junior high school, and for which school
10 four teachers were hired full time for more than one-half
11 of the days schools were maintained, he shall compute for
12 the district the product of 100 multiplied by the
13 appropriate percentage specified in Section 17301
14 multiplied by the appropriate relative support factor
15 specified in Section 47663 17662.5 multiplied by the
16 statewide average current expense o f education for
17 elementary districts as determined pursuant to
18 subdivision (c) o f Section 17503.
19 Sec. 27. Section 17655.5 of the Education Code is
20 amended to read:
21 17655.5. (a) For each district on account of each
22 necessary small school (giving regard to the number of
23 teachers actually employed or average daily attendance),
24 he shall make one of the following computations,
25 whichever provides the lesser amount:
26 (1) For each necessary small school which has an
27 average daily attendance during the fiscal year of less
28 than 26, exclusive of pupils attending the seventh and
29 eighth grades of a junior high school, and for which school
30 at least one teacher was hired full time, he shall compute
31 for the district the product of 25 multiplied by the
32 appropriate percentage specified in Section 17301
33 multiplied by the appropriate relative support factor
34 specified in Section 47663 17662.5 multiplied by the
35 statewide average current expense o f education for
36 elementary districts as determined pursuant to
37 subdivision (c) o f Section 17503.
38 12) For each necessary small school which has an
39 a v e r a g e daily attendance during the fiscal year of 26 or
40 more and less than 51, exclusive of pupils attending the
AB 1283 — 24 —
1 seventh and eighth grades of a junior high school, and for
2 which school at least two teachers were hired full time for
3 more than one-half of the days schools were maintained,
4 he shall compute for the district the product of 50
5 multiplied by the appropriate percentage specified in
6 Section 17301 multiplied by the appropriate relative
7 support factor specified in Section 4-7-662 17662.5
8 multiplied by the statewide average current expense o f
9 education for elementary districts as determined
10 pun uant to subdivision (c) o f Section 17503.
11 (3) For each necessary small school which has an
12 average daily attendance during the fiscal year of 51 or
13 more but less than 76, exclusive of pupils attending the
14 seventh and eighth grades of a junior high school, and for
15 which school three teachers were hired full time for more
16 than one-half of the days schools were maintained, he
17 shall compute for the district the product of 75 multiplied
18 by the appropriate percentage specified in Section 17301
19 multiplied by the appropriate relative support factor
20 specified in Section 47662 17662.5 multiplied by the
21 statewide average current expense o f education for
22 elementary districts as determined pursuant to
23 subdivision (c) o f Section 17503.
24 (4) For each necessary small school which has an
25 average daily attendance during the fiscal year of 76 or
26 more and less than 101, exclusive of pupils attending the
27 seventh and eighth grades of a junior high school, and for
28 which school four teachers were hired full time for more
29 than one-half of the days schools were maintained, he
30 shall compute for the district the product of 100
31 multiplied by the appropriate percentage specified in
32 Section 17301 multiplied by the appropriate relative
33 support factor specified in Section 47662 17662.5
34 multiplied by the statewide average current expense o f
35 education for elementary districts as determined
36 pursuant to subdivision (c) o f Section 17503.
37 (b) For each elementary district which exclusive of
38 pupils attending the seventh and eighth grades of a junior
39 high school has an average daily attendance of 101 or
40 more during the fiscal year, he shall compute the
— 25 — AB 1283
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allowance in accordance with subdivision (b) of Section
17662, plus any amount pursuant to Sections 17654.5 and
17655.5.
Section 17656 of the Education Code is
Section 17660 of the Education Code is
Section 17662 of the Education Code is
Sec. 28.
repealed.
Sec. 29.
repealed.
Sec. 30.
repealed.
Sec. 31. Section 17662 is added to the Education
Code, to read:
17662. (a) The Superintendent of Public Instruction
shall allow to each school district on account of the
average daily attendance credited to the district in the
appropriate grade levels an amount computed in
accordance with subdivision (b) of this section plus any
amount pursuant to the provisions of Sections 17654.5,
17655.5, and 17664.
No apportionment may be less than one hundred
twenty dollars ($120) per unit of average daily
attendance.
(b) The apportionment to a school district equals shall
be the product of (1) the number of units of average daily
attendance of the district and, (2) the appropriate
percentage specified in Section 17301 and, (3) the
statewide average current expense of education for the
type of district (elementary, high school, or unified) as
defined in subdivision (c) of Section 17503 and (4) the
relative support factor of the district, as determined
pursuant to Section 17662.5.
Sec. 32. Section 17662.3 is added to the Education
Code, to read:
17662.3. The relative wealth index of a school district
is the quotient of the assessed valuation per unit of
average daily attendance of the district, as adjusted
pursuant to Chapter 1.7 of Division 14 (commencing with
Section 17270), divided by the statewide assessed
valuation per unit of average daily attendance for the
particular type of school district.
SEC. 33. Section 17662.5 is added to the Education
AB 1283 — 26 —
1 Code, to read:
2 17662.5. The relative support factor of a school district
3 is computed in the following manner:
4 (a) For districts with a relative wealth index of 0.5 or
5 less, the relative support factor is 0.991 plus one-half
6 multiplied by the quantity 1.5 minus twice the relative
7 wealth index.
8 (b) For districts with a relative wealth index greater
9 than 0.5 but equal to or less than 1.5, the relative support
10 factor is 0.991 plus one-half multiplied by the quantity one
11 minus the relative wealth index.
12 (c) For districts with a relative wealth index greater
13 than 1.5, the relative support factor is the reciprocal of 0.9
14 divided by the relative wealth index.
15 Sec. 34. Section 17664 of the Education Code is
16 amended to read:
17 17664. For each district on account of each necessary
18 small high school the Superintendent of Public
19 Instruction shall make one of the following computations
20 selected with regard only to the number of certificated
21 employees employed or average daily attendance,
22 whichever provides the lesser amount:
23
24 Minimum number
25 Average daily of certificated Amount to be
26 attendance employees allowed
27 1 - 20 .................................................... 3 $8,500
28 2 1 - 40 .................................................... 4 16,980
29 41- 6 0 ....................................... 5 25,470
30 61- 75 .................................................... 6 31,830
3 1 76 - 9 0 .................................................... 7 38,190
32 91-105 8 44,560
33 106-120 9 50,920
34 121-135 10 52,280
3 5 136 -1 50 .................................... 11 63,650
36 151-180 12 76,370
37 181-220 13 93,340
38 221-260 14 110,310
39 261-300 15 127,300
— 27 — AB 1283
1 For each district which has an average daily attendance
2 of less than 21 and for which fewer than three certificated
3 employees were employed, he shall_______ _ ($_______ )
4 allow four thousand dollars ($4,000) for each of the
5 teachers employed in the school.
6 For the purposes of this section a “ certificated
7 employee” is an equivalent full-time position of an
8 individual holding a credential authorizing service, and
9 performing service in grades 9 through 12 in any
10 secondary school. Any fraction of an equivalent full-time
11 position shall be deemed to be a full-time position.
12 The allowance established by this section for high
13 schools with an average daily attendance of less than 301
14 shall not apply to any high school established after July 1,
15 1961 unless the establishment of such schools has been
16 approved by the Superintendent of Public Instruction.
17 Sec. 35. Section 17665 of the Education Code is
18 amended to read:
19 17665. For each high school district which has an
20 average daily attendance of 301 or more during the fiscal
21 year, he shall compute the allowance in accordance with
22 subdivision (b) of Section 17662 plus any amount
23 pursuant to Section 17664.
24 Sec. 36. Section 17665.5 of the Education Code is
25 repealed.
26 Sec. 37. Article 2.1 (commencing with Section
27 17671) of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code
28 is repealed.
29 Sec. 38. Article 2.5 (commencing with Section
30 17680) of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code
31 is repealed.
32 Sec. 39. Article 3 (commencing with Section 17701)
33 of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code is
34 repealed.
35 SEC. 40. Article 3 (commencing with Section 17701)
36 is added to Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education
37 Code, to read:
AB 1283 — 28 —
1 Article 3. Adjustments to Expenditures
2
3 17701. fe Adjustments to expenditures pursuant to
4 this article shall commence in the 1972-1973 fiscal year as
5 adjustments to the 1971-1972 current expense o f
6 education as defined in subdivision (c) o f Section 17503.
7 In the 1973-1974 fiscal year, and each fiscal year
8 thereafter, similar adjustments to expenditures shall be
9 made annually.
10 In computing the transfer to the State School Fund
11 pursuant to Section 17301 and the apportionments to
12 districts pursuant to Section 17662, the Superintendent of
13 Public Instruction shall annually adjust the amounts by a
14 factor which is a function of the adjustment in the
15 adjustment index developed pursuant to Section 17301 as
16 prescribed by this article.
17 For the purposes of this article, reference to
18 expenditures per unit of average daily attendance shall
19 have the same meaning as “current expense of
20 education” as used in subdivision jb j (c) of Section 17503.
21 17702. For the purposes of this article the following
22 definitions shall apply:
23 (a) “Relative expenditure index” is the quotient of the
24 district’s expenditure per unit of average daily
25 attendance divided by the statewide average current
26 expense of education per unit of average daily
27 attendance for the particular type of district
28 (elementary, high school, or unified).
29 (b) “Relative salary index” is the quotient of the
30 district’s average salary for certificated or classified
31 employees by the statewide average salary for
32 certificated or classified employees.
33 Separate computations are to be made for each
34 category of employees.
35 (c) The “reasonable expenditure increment factor”
36 for a district which has a relative expenditure index
37 greater than one is the quotient of the change in the
38 adjustment index developed pursuant to Section 17301
39 divided by the square of the relative expenditure index.
40 The “reasonable expenditure increment factor” for a
— 29 — AB 1283
1 district which has a relative expenditure index equal to or
2 less than one is the product of the adjustment index
3 developed pursuant to Section 17301 multiplied by the
4 quantity three minus twice the relative expenditure
5 index.
6 17703. Annual salary increases for the employees of a
7 district which has relative salary index greater than one
8 may not exceed the amount determined by the
9 application of a factor which is the quotient of a salary
10 index developed by the Superintendent of Public
11 Instruction, the Legislative Analyst, and the Department
12 of Finance divided by the square of the relative salary
13 index.
14 17704. Annual salary increases for the employees of a
15 district which has a relative salary index equal to or less
16 than one may not exceed the amount determined by the
17 application of a factor which is the product of the index
18 developed by the Superintendent of Public Instruction,
19 the Legislative Analyst, and the Department of Finance
20 multiplied by the quantity three minus twice the relative
21 salary index.
22 17705. With respect to increases in salaries of
23 certificated employees the Superintendent of Public
24 Instruction shall disregard any increases granted on
25 account of additional academic training or promotion to
26 a different job category.
27 17706, The expenditures per unit of average daily
28 attendance in any school district may not increase by a
29 factor greater than the reasonable expenditure
30 increment factor unless such expenditures have been
31 approved by the electorate pursuant to Section 20803. In
32 the event a district exceeds such expenditure guidelines
33 the Superintendent of Public Instruction shall disregard
34 such excess expenditures when computing the average
35 current expense of education pursuant to subdivision (c)
36 of Section 17503.
37 17707. In the event a district exceeds the increases
38 authorized by Sections 17703, 17704, and 17705 regarding
39 salary increases the Superintendent of Public Instruction
40 shall withhold from apportionments any amount in
AB 1283 38 —
1 excess of such computations. When computing the
2 statewide average current expense of education pursuant
3 to subdivision (c) o f Section 17503 he shall also omit any
4 amounts attributable to excessive increases in salaries.
5 17708. Apportionments from the State School Fund
6 shall be adjusted to reflect the application of the
7 reasonable expenditure index to the apportionment for
8 each school district.
9 Se c . 41. Article 4 (commencing with Section 17751)
10 of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code is
11 repealed.
12 Se c . 42. Article 5 (commencing with Section 17801)
13 of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code is
14 repealed.
15 Sec. 43. Article 7 (commencing with Section 17901)
16 of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code is
17 repealed.
18 SEC. 44. Article 7.1 (commencing with Section 17920
19 of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code is
20 repealed.
21 Sec. 44.5. Article 7.2 (commencing with Section
22 17940) of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code
23 is repealed.
24 Sec. 45. Article 8 (commencing with Section 17951)
25 of Chapter 3 of Division 14 of the Education Code is
26 repealed.
27 Sec. 46. Section 18102 of the Education Code is
28 repealed.
29 Sec. 47. Section 18102 is added to the Education
30 Code, to read:
31 18102. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall
32 allow to each school district and county superintendent
33 of schools for each particular category of minors in a
34 special education program during the current fiscal year
35 an amount computed as follows:
36 (a) He shall divide the average daily attendance n
37 each particular category of minors in a special education
38 program by the maximum class size established by law for
39 special day classes for each particular category of minor
40 in a special education program, and increasing the
— 31 — AB 1283
quotient to the next highest integer where a fractional
amount is produced.
(b) He shall then determine for each particular
category the product of the amount computed under
subdivision (a) multiplied by the maximum class size
established by law for special day classes for the particular
category.
(c) He shall then multiply the amount computed
under subdivision (b) by the following amount for the
10 particular grade level and category:
11
12 Elementary school High school
13 Category grades (K-8) grades (9-12)
14 Physically handicapped
15 Class-size maximum of 3 ..... ...$5,400
16 Class-size maximum of 5 ........... $2,965
17 Class-size maximum of 6 ........ ... 2,520 ___
18 Class-size maximum of 8 ....... ... 1,800 1,670
19 Class-size maximum of 10.... . ... 1,370 1,240
20 Class-size maximum of 12....... ... 1,080 950
21 Class-size maximum of 16....... 590
22 Class-size maximum of 20..... 375
23 Mentally retarded (as defined
24 in Section 6902)
25 Class-size maximum of 15 ........ ..... 570 440
26 Class-size maximum of 18....... ... 420 285
27 Mentally retarded (as
28 defined in Section 6903) ...... ..... 920 785
29 Educationally handicapped........ .. ..... 1,000 870
30
31 Sec. 48. Section 18102.2 of the Education Code is
32 repealed.
33 Sec. 49. Section 18102,4 of the Education Code is
34 repealed.
35 Sec. 50. Section 18102.6 of the Education Code is
36 repealed.
37 Sec. 51. Section 18102.8 of the Education Code is
38 amended to read:
39 18102.8. The governing board of a school district with
40 an average daily attendance of less than 2,000 pupils
AB 1283 — 32 —
1 during the current fiscal year, or a county superintendent
2 of schools, may apply to the Superintendent of Public
3 Instruction whenever sparsity of population or
4 transportation distances make it impossible to maintain
5 classes of the maximum size as prescribed by this code or
6 by the State Board of Education. If the Superintendent of
7 Public Instruction, upon review, finds that it is impossible
8 to maintain classes of the maximum size as prescribed by
9 this code or by the State Board of Education, he may add
10 to the amounts allowed under Section 18102 an amount
11 sufficient to provide for the needed classes, but not more
12 per special class than the applicable amounts computed
13 in that section.
14 S e c . 52. Section 18102.9 of the Education Code is
15 amended to read:
16 18102.9. (1) In addition to the allowances provided
17 under Section 18102, the Superintendent of Public
18 Instruction shall allow to school districts and county
19 superintendents of schools for each unit of average daily
20 attendance for an amount as follows:
21 (a) For instruction of educationally handicapped
22 minors in learning disability groups, two thousand few
23 hundred eighty debars -($2,480) one thousand eight
24 hundred eighty dollars ($1,880) .
25 (b) For instruction of educationally handicapped
26 minors in homes or in hospitals, one thousand three
27 hundred dollars ($1,300).
28 (c) For instruction of physically handicapped minors
29 in remedial physical education, nine hundred fifty debars
30 ($950) seven hundred seventy-five dollars ($775) .
31 (d) For remedial instruction of physically
32 handicapped minors in other than physical education,
33 twe thousand seven hundred forty dollars ($2,740). two
34 thousand dollars ($2,000).
35 (e) For instruction of blind pupils when a reader has
36 actually been provided to assist the pupil with his studies,
37 or for individual instruction in mobility provided blind
38 pupils under regulations prescribed by the State Board of
39 Education, or when braille books are purchased, ink print
40 materials are transcribed into braille, or sound recordings
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
— 33 — AB 1283
and other special supplies and equipment are purchased
for blind pupils, or for individual supplemental
instruction in vocational arts, business arts, or
homemaking for blind pupils, nine hundred ten dollars
($910).
Braille books purchased, braille materials transcribed
from ink print, sound recordings purchased or made, and
special supplies and equipment purchased for blind
pupils for which state or federal funds were allowed are
property of the state and shall be available for use by
blind pupils throughout the state as the State Board of
Education shall provide.
(f) For other individual instruction of physically
handicapped minors, one thousand three hundred dollars
($1,300).
'(g) For the instruction of physically handicapped
minors in regular day classes, ene thousand ©ne hundred
dollars one thousand eighteen dollars ($1,018) .
(2) (a) The allowances provided under Section 18102
may be increased proportionately on account of special
day classes convened, or other instruction provided a
pupil, for days in a school year which are in excess of the
number of days in the school year on which the regular
day schools of a district are convened.
(b) The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall
compute for each applicant school district and county
superintendent of schools in providing in such year a
program of specialized consultation to teachers,
counselors and supervisors for educationally
handicapped minors, an amount equal to the product of
ten dollars ($10) and the average daily attendance of
pupils enrolled in special day classes, learning disability
groups, and home and hospital instruction for
educationally handicapped minors.
Sec. 53. Section 18102.10 of the Education Code is
amended to read:
18102.10. For each special class or program for which
a state allowance is provided under this article or under
Section 18060 or 18062, each school district and each
county superintendent of schools maintaining such
AB 1283 — 34 —
1 special classes or programs shall report annually to the
2 Superintendent of Public Instruction, on forms he shall
3 provide, all expenditures and income related to each
4 special class or program.
5 If the Superintendent of Public Instruction determines
6 that the current expense of operating a special class or
7 program as defined in the California School Accounting
8 Manual does not equal or exceed the sum of the basic
9 program support determined pursuant to Section 17662
10 and the allowance provided under this article for each
11 pupil in average daily attendance in the special class or
12 program maintained by a school district for each pupil in
13 average daily attendance in special classes or programs
14 maintained by the county superintendent of schools, then
15 the amount of such deficiency shall be withheld from
16 state apportionments to the school district or the county
17 superintendent of schools, as the case may be, in the
18 succeeding fiscal year in accordance with the procedure
19 prescribed in Section 17414.
20 Expenditures for equipment that the Superintendent
21 of Public Instruction determines are necessary for
22 instruction in a special class or program for physically
23 handicapped minors shall be considered as current
24 expense for purposes of this section. In any year the
25 district’s allowable expenditure for such equipment may
26 not exceed 1 percent of the current expense of operating
27 the district’s physically handicapped program.
28 SEC. 54. Section 18355 of the Education Code is
29 amended to read:
30 18355. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall
31 allow, in addition to all other allowances, to the county
32 school service funds: (a) for all emergency schools
33 maintained in each elementary school district of the
34 county by the county superintendent of schools, (b) all
35 special schools or classes for mentally retarded minors
36 and severely mentally retarded minors maintained in
37 each elementary school district of the county by the
38 county superintendent of schools, (c) each elementary
39 school maintained in juvenile halls, juvenile homes, and
40 juvenile camps, by the county superintendent of schools,
— 35 — AB 1283
1 and all opportunity schools and classes maintained by the
2 county superintendent of schools pursuant to Sections
3 6502 and 6503, and (d) all schools and classes for
4 educationally handicapped minors maintained in each
5 elementary school district of the county by the county
6 superintendent of schools, the same amount per
7 elementary pupil as he would allow under Section 17662.
8 No allowance shall be made for emergency schools
9 which is in excess of the actual expense of maintaining the
10 emergency school.
11 Sec. 55. Section 18358 of the Education Code is
12 amended to read:
13 18358. For all physically handicapped pupils,
14 mentally retarded minors and educationally
15 handicapped minors of secondary grade, and
16 handicapped adults, educated by the county
17 superintendent of schools and for all secondary schools
18 maintained in juvenile halls, juvenile homes and juvenile
19 camps by the county superintendent of schools, the
20 Superintendent of Public Instruction shall allow the same
21 amount per high school pupil as he would allow under
22 Section 17662.
23 However, with respect to handicapped adults, the
24 following limits shall apply:
25 (a) The total of allowances for education of
26 handicapped adults in classes established by the county
27 superintendent of schools pursuant to Section 5746 shall
28 not exceed fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) in any one
29 fiscal year. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall
30 establish a system of priorities that he shall by rule or
31 regulation adopt which shall give highest priority to those
32 counties in which no or an insufficient program for the
33 education of handicapped adults is provided by the
34 school districts within the county, in order to comply with
35 the limitation prescribed by this subdivision.
36 (b) The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall
37 allow for handicapped adults the amount specified in
38 Section 17951 for each unit of average daily attendance
39 for adults for high school districts.
40 Sec. 56. Section 18401 of the Education Code is
AB 1283 — 36 —
1 amended to read:
2 18401. The Superintendent of Public Instruction shall
3 allow to each county school tuition fund one hundred
4 twenty dollars ($120) for each unit of average daily
5 attendance of pupils residing in the county and attending
6 school in an adjoining state during the fiscal year. Such
7 average daily attendance shall not be included in the
8 computations provided for in Section 17702.
9 SEC. 57. Section 20404 of the Education Code is
10 amended to read:
11 20404. On or before August 15, the county board of
12 education shall file with the board of supervisors a
13 certified statement showing the amount of money to be
14 raised by a county tax for purposes of this chapter. The
15 board of supervisors shall fix a rate for the county tax
16 sufficient to produce the amount specified in the
17 statement and shall, at the time of levying other county
18 taxes, levy the tax so fixed.
19 The proceeds of the tax levied pursuant to this section
20 shall be credited to the single county school service fund
21 of the county and any expenses of the county
22 superintendent of schools, the county board of education,
23 and the county committee on school district organization
24 required by Section 881 or any other sections of this code
25 required to be paid from the county general fund shall
26 not be paid from such fund but shall be paid from the
27 money in the single county school service fund.
28 A tax levied pursuant to this section shall not exceed
29 the rate of ten cents ($0.10) per one hundred dollars
30 ($100) of assessed valuation for administrative and
31 business functions.
32 Sec. 58. Section 20751 of the Education Code is
33 repealed.
34 Sec. 59. Section 20751 is added to the Education
35 Code, to read:
36 20751. (a) It is the intent of the Legislature that
37 statutory maximum -tax rates be sufficient te permit an
38 average wealth seheel district te provide an average
40 with state allowances and apperMenmentsy
— 37 — AB 1283
-(b)- 33*e m axim u m lax rate p er each o n e hun dr ed
dollars -($100 )■ o f assessed valu ation fo r an elem en tary ;
; aja 0.13 e e - f 4 /mitI-K »,■»-* 1-1-̂.. la Eft? aTTT Tf̂ TTTl TXT Titt?
4 following table;
6 Li** n fin 1 V' **•ntstonr Tnc?ttT E lem ent High School Unified
7 3072/1978t........ $3410 $430 $3t30
8 4973/4074—— 475 3t30 QQK
9 l£gX /4.Q7ST75T7KT“T£7TT?’ ’
10
11 following....... 1 gfjX;T7t7 itTXTXj or.gn
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
-(e)- 34m maximum lax rale for a community eohegc
purposes; and ten eents -f$QrlO)- for adult education
vaf-uahem
-(d)- 3%e maximum lax rales set forth m this seetien
may he exceeded with the approval of a majority of the
electorate pursuant to Section 20893t
fiscal year exceeds seven hundred twcnty/five dollars
■(■$725) for elementary districts or exceeds nine hundred
twelve dollars -($012( for high school districts, sueh
expenditures may not he increased except hy election of
the voters of the district:
-(f)- Ifi during 3073/ 74; and in subsequent fiscal years,
the authorized expenditure level exceeds the statewide
daily attendance for the elementary distric ts and 343
percent of the statewide average current expense for
high school districts; sueh expenditures may not he
increased except hy election of the voters of the district.
expenditure controls applied pursuant to Article 3
(commencing with Section 17701) o f Chapter 3 o f
Division 14 replace statutory school district tax rate
limitations for elementary, high school, and unified
districts.
No district may exceed the authorized expenditure
level determined pursuant to Article 3 (commencing
AB 1283 — 38 —
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
with Section 17701) o f Chapter 3 o f Division 14 unless
such excess expenditures have been approved by the
electorate pursuant to Section 20803.
For community college districts the maximum tax rate
shall be thirty-five cents ($0.35) for community college
purposes, and ten cents ($0.10) for adult education
purposes, on each one.hundred dollars ($100) o f assessed
valuation.
Section 20800 of the EducationSe c . 60.
repealed.
Se c . 61.
repealed.
Se c . 62.
repealed.
Se c . 63.
Code is
Section 20801.5 of the Education Code is
Section 20802.8 of the Education Code is
Code isSection 20806 of the Education
amended to read:
20806. For the purpose of providing funds for the
payment by the district of all or part of the premiums,
dues, or other charges for health and welfare benefits on
active officers and employees and retired officers and
employees who at the time of retirement were enrolled
in a health and welfare benefit plan, or on the spouses and
dependent children of such active and retired officers
and employees, or on both such active and retired officers
and employees and their spouses and dependent
children, which the governing board of a district may
have authorized in accordance with the provisions of
Article 1 (commencing with Section 53200) of Chapter 2
of Part 1 of Division 2 of Title 5 of the Government Code
and for the expenses incurred by the district in
administration of a program involving the payment of
such health and welfare benefits, district taxes, up to a
maximum of five cents ($0.05) per one hundred dollars
($100) of assessed valuation, may be levied and collected
annually by the respective district at the same time and
in the same manner as other district taxes are levied and
collected. The tax shall be in addition to any other district
tax now or hereafter authorized by law, and shall not be
considered in fixing maximum rates of tax for school
district purposes. Moneys collected pursuant to this
— 39 — AB 1283
is
1 section may also be expended for the requirements of
2 Section 13658.
3 The provisions of this section authorizing the payment
4 of all or part of the premiums, dues, or other charges for
5 health and welfare benefits for the retired officers and
6 employees who at the time of retirement were enrolled
7 in a health and welfare benefit plan, shall be limited in
8 applicability to any school district, or of two or more
9 school districts governed by governing boards of identical
10 personnel, having an average daily attendance of 400,000
11 or more as shown by the annual report of the county
12 superintendent of schools for the preceding year.
13 Se c . 64. Section 20807 of the Education Code
14 repealed.
1 5 S e c . 6 5 .
16 repealed.
1 7 S e c . 6 6 .
18 repealed.
1 9 S e c . 6 7 .
20 repealed.
21 Sfife 6& S eetio m Z-, % S-, h IQ, Ur, m , &r, m , &■,
22 6% and 67 ef this aet shall become operative Of* J[uly
23 -b 4674? From Jtdy h 4972; until July h 4974; the taxes for
24 speeial purposes actually levied in all school districts
26 aet shah be redueed by an amount which will limit the
27 revenues of eaeh distriet to not more than will provide
28 the prior year’s expenditure level plus the application of
2 9 t h e reasonable e x p e n d i t u r e i n c r e m e n t f a e t o r p u r s u a n t t o
30 Article 3 -feommcneing with Section 47794)- of Chapter 3
« 4 I A * \ JLJ& iCXt~ -jh-KVXV o 4-qL.f-vytL A l l m s ntn t/-in n h 11v laivii urs. v7X XXTv_7 XjOlXCxrCivTIT V-iv/uv--. x m tTttvTii TtTTCTcr oxsctix
32 be redueed proportionately unless the county
33 superintendent of schools approves an alternate method
34 of reduction.
Section 20808 of the Education Code is
Section 20808.5 of the Education Code is
Section 20816 of the Education Code is
O
APPENDIX “ C”
AMENDED IN SENATE JUNE 20, 1972
AMENDED IN SENATE MAY 23, 1972
SENATE BILL No. 1302
Introduced by Senators Dymally, Alquist, Grunsky, and
Rodda Rod da, Be hr, and Moscone
(Coauthors: Assemblymen Arnett, Cory, Dunlap, Bill
Greene, and Lewis Lewis, Fong, and MacDonald)
March 15, 1972
An act to add Chapter 6d ■(commencing with Section §445f
to Division dAMEND SECTION 16601.5 of, to add Sections
16602.5 and 16602.6 to, and to amend Section 16601.5 TO
ADD CHAPTER 6.1 (COMMENCING WITH SECTION
6445) TO DIVISION 6 OF, AND TO ADD ARTICLE 1.5
(COMMENCING WITH SECTION 16820) TO CHAPTER
1 OF DIVISION 13 of, the Education Code, AND to amend
the heading o f Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section
16150) o f Part 4 o f Division 9 of, to amend Section 16150 of,
and to add Sections 16151.5 and 16153.5 to, the Welfare and
Institutions Code, relating to early childhood education,
and making and appropriation therefor.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
SB 1302, as amended, Dymally. Education Early childhood
education.
State s legislative intent re establishment of statewide
program for early childhood education.
Defines mdueatienal program for early childhood
education ̂as the entire sehool/sponsorcd offering for pupils,
other than exceptional ehddretg in early primary classes,
kindergarten; and grades 4 through 3? including in/ekss and
out/of/elass aetfoitiesr
Requires State Board o f Education to establish
comprehensive program for early childhood education at
SB 1302 2
specified levels.
A uthorizes governing boards o f school districts maintaining
specified grade levels to develop master plans for early
childhood level in the 1972-73 fiscal year.
fErmits; beginning with 4-97&/1973 school year; and
requires beginning with 1976/1077 sebooi year; eaeh school
district maintaining kindergarten and specified elementary
master plan for early ebddbood edeeafienr
Requires such school districts to develop and submit master
plans by 1976-77 school year.
Authorizes governing boards to develop and submit joint
master plans to Department o f Education.
Specifies criteria to be contained in master plan-
Requires master plans to incude comprehensive statement
setting forth district’s educational program.
Specifies factors to be considered by State Beard of
Education in establishing preferences and priorities among
school districts for purpose of apportioning state funds
appropriated for implementation of early ehrfdheed
education programs.
Requires State Board o f Education to establish standards
and criteria in evaluating district plans which shall include
specified standards and criteria and specifies that the State
Board o f Education shall approve a plan which provides for
initiation o f classes for pupils who have attained the age o f 3
years and 9 months unless such provisions contain a
restructuring o f kindergarten and grades one through three.
Authorizes State Board of Education to condition future
allowances on a priority basis and apportioning allowances
thereby, and authorizes scheduled increases thereof on school
district’s meeting objectives contained in master plan.
Authorizes State Board of Education to establish
performance objectives in reading and mathematics for
pupils participating in early childhood education programs.
Requires State Board o f Education to adopt reading and
mathematics objectives by 1975-76school year, and allows the
board to take all actions necessary to reach objectives.
Establishes schedule of allowances to school districts for
purposes of early ehifdhood educational programs; including
— 3 — SB 1302
additional allowances for pupils with special educational
needs.-
Provides for allowances to districts with approved master
plans in three specified classes.
Provides for additional allowances to pupils having
demonstrable educational needs in three specified classes.
Authorizes Superintendent o f Public Instruction to reduce
district apportionmen ts in accordance with amounts received
pursuant to allowances for specialist teachers.
Requires Superintendent o f Public Instruction to apportion
funds.
Prescribes child enrollment procedure for early primary
class, minimum school day, and computation o f average daily
attendance.
Specifies age for admission to an early childhood education
program as 3 years and 9 months.
Specifies minimum schoolday for pupils in early childhood
education classes as 180 minutes, including recesses.
Appropriates fends for fiscal years 1973/1974 through
1977/ 10787 for purposes of early ehildhood education
programs. Requires that of funds so appropriated, se much
thereof as is needed shall fee used to mated federal funds to
seeial services: Authorises Department of Education t©
allocate funds appropriated for specified compensatory
group ehild ear©; and early ehiftiheod educational programs:
Declares legislative purpose in having program o f
transportation o f pupils attending early primary classes and
permits the governing board o f any school district to transport
pupils or parents attending such classes maintained for pupils
who have attained the age o f 3 years and 9 months.
Appropriates funds, in varying amounts, to the
Superintendent o f Public Instruction for providing state
reimbursements for such transporta tion for each o f the fiscal
years from 1973-74 through 1977-78, inclusive.
Includes group child care and early childhood education
programs within scope of various existing provisions relating
to preschool, children’s center, and day care programs, and
excludes day care programs from such provisions.
SB 1302 — 4 —
Requires Department of Social Welfare to contract with
Department of Education to provide system of prescribed
social services for children and families of children enrolled
in an early childhood education program. Prohibits making of
any per capita reimbursements under such social Services on
account of any school district not meeting prescribed
standards for educational component of a program.
Makes appropriations o f specified amounts from the
General Fund to the Department o f Education for purposes
o f specified early childhood education programs for
1973-1974, 1974-1975, 1975-1976, 1976-1977, and 1977-1978
fiscal years.
Makes provision re use of certain other funds for purposes
of early childhood education programs contingent upon
enactment of unspecified Assembly Bill AB 1283.
Vote—Majority; Appropriation—Yes;
Fiscal Committee-—Yes.
The people o f the State o f California do enact as follows:
1 S e c t i o n 1. Chapter 6.1 (commencing with Section
2 6 4 4 5 ) is added to Division 6 of the Education Code, to
3 read:
4
5 C h a p t e r 6 .1 . E a r l y C h i l d h o o d E d u c a t i o n
6
7 6445r T h e feegtshttef c h ereb y finds and declares that
8 6445. For the purposes o f this chapter, “early
9 childhood education programs” are defined as all
10 educational programs, except those for exceptional
11 children as defined in Section 6870, offered in the public
12 school system, including in-class and out-of-class
13 activities, for children age 3years and 9months, to 8years
1 4 under a local school-by-school comprehensive master
15 plan approved by the State Board o f Education which is
16 designed to assure:
1 7 (a) A comprehensive restructuring o f primary
1 8 education in California kindergarten through third grade
19 to m ore fully m eet the unique needs, talents, interests
20 and abilities o f each child.
— 5 — SB 1302
1 (b) That early educational opportunities are made
2 a vailable to children who are 3 years and 9 months o f age
3 to take advantage o f the capacity for learning o f children
4 at this age level.
5 (c) The cooperation and participation o f parents in
6 the educational program to the end that the total
7 community is involved in the developm ent o f the
8 program.
9 (d) The pupils participating will develop an increased
10 com petency in the skills necessary to the successful
11 achievement in later school subjects such as reading,
12 language, and mathematics.
13 (e) Maximize the use o f existing state and federal
14 funds in the implementation o f early childhood
15 education programs.
16 6445.1. The Legislature hereby finds and declares
17 that a comprehensive program o f early childhood
18 education is needed to restructure public education in
19 California. The Legislature, therefore, declares its intent
20 to require that the State Board o f Education develop a
21 comprehensive program for children ages 3 years and 9
22 months, to 8 years. The objectives o f this plan will include
23 assurance that each child will have an individualized
24 program to perm it the developm ent o f his maximum
25 potential and that all pupils who have com pleted the
26 third grade o f the state’s educational system will have
27 achieved a level o f com petence in the basic skills o f
28 reading, language, and mathematics sufficient to
29 continued success in their educational experiences. The
30 system will be based on the development o f a local
31 school-by-school master plan for early childhood
32 education which shall include a phase-in program based
33 on an increase in the number o f schools in the state
34 participating each year until maximum participation is
35 achieved.
36 a comprehensive and coordinated program of early >
37 efeddfeood education developed fey the State Board of
38 fidoeatfon is needed to improve and restructure public
39 education in California. The Legislature declares its
40 intent te require that the State Board of Education
SB 1302 — 6 —
includes fttt
er elasses Ik*
1 establish « comprehensive program for *-ar!y childhood
9 education for ehtk en in early primary-, kindergarten?
o ft id <*radob- 1 through 3? through a t.-otem for -the
4 development of a local master plan fot early ehddheod
5 ee need- - n Snob 'lystona shad include a phaaod/in pfograre
6 ha* ed ,n » f t r crease in the s tm y ’ ef schools fo the state
7 p _ -pating each year until mufoesum participation is
b aefoeved? the eoordinatfon of all avadahle state and
9 fidera.' funding sources? mafomfoing available federal
-0 fond, nd the elements specified in Seetfon 6445t4t
11 6445-d-r As used in this eheptert
12 -(a)- -•■Early
13 educational programs,
15 early primary classes-, kindergartens? and grades 1 to 3?
16 inclusive, er in any one or more sueh classes or grades.
17 -(h)- “Educational program for early ehildhood
18 education” means the entire school/sponsorcd offering
19 for pupils, exeept for exceptional children defined in
20 Seetfon 6870? in early primary classes? kindergartens, and 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
22 activities.
23 -(e)- “Early primary graded er -early primary class”
24 means a elass established pursuant to Education Code
25 Section 6446r
26 -(d)- D̂epartment” means the Department of
27 Edueafiom
28 6445.2. Beginning with the 1972-1973 school year?
29 fiscal year each school district maintaining kindergarten,
30 and grades 1 to 3, inclusive, or any one or more such class
31 or grade, may develop and submit to the department
32 Department o f Education for approval a master plan for
33 early childhood education. Each such school district shall
34 submit to the Department o f Education for approval a
35 master plan for early childhood education to the
36 department no later than the 1976-1977 school year.
37 Application shall be made in accordance with rules and
38 regulations adopted by the State Board of Education.
39 6445.3. The governing boards of two er mere any
40 school districts maintaining any such class or grade may,
—- 7 —- SB 1302
1 with the approval of the department Department o f
2 Education, develop and submit for approval a joint
3 master plan for early childhood education.
4 6445.4. A master plan for early childhood education
5 shall include a comprehensive statement setting forth the
6 district’s educational program for early childhood
7 education. The State Board of Education shall establish
8 standards and criteria to be used in the evaluation of
9 plans submitted by school districts. Such standards and
10 criteria for review and approval o f plans by the State
11 Board o f Education shall include, but need not be limited
12 to ; criteria te insure that approved plans make provision
13 for:
14 (a) An assessment Assessment of educational needs of
15 the district.
16 (b) A program o f restructuring o f kindergarten
17 through third grade.
18 -(b)- (c) Opportunities for early primary education
19 provided by the district educational programs for pupils
20 three years and nine months o f age including children s
21 center, day care, preschool, and child care services.
22 -fej- (d) Defined and measurable program objectives.
23 -(d)- A earefaily articulated program from early
24 primary through grade 3r
25 (e) A local program designed to systematically phase
26 into the program all the schools o f the district in no more
27 than five years.
28 -(e)- (f) Coordination of all district resources with the
29 objectives of the local plan.
30 -(f)- (g) Emphasis on an individualized diagnostic
31 approach to instruction.
32 -(g)- Strong parental (h) Parental and community
33 involvement.
34 -(h)- (i) Staff development and inservice training.
35 ft)- (j) Transportation of pupils participating in the
36 program.
37 -(j)- (k) Evaluation of the program.
, xaJli /a . XafOu ,f> ,’ST> MOilf Tt~t fT |~* cif - ,r> y t .rn -a--* <-i »XXX txfT̂ TTTvTrx̂ TTrWiJtxTF TJltTXTa TvTT vXtST~Ij v.iJiivtnwvi
39 education the department shall give preference to these
40 districts which have the largest number ef pupils
SB 1302 — 8 —
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d eterm in ed te h a v e special edu cation al n eed s an d th e
edueatfonr T h e State B eard e f E d u ca tion shad ad ep t
reg ulations settin g forth criteria fo r d e te rm in in g special
educational ne e d s; takin g in te c onsideration se ed factors,
am on g ethers^ as lew fam ily inc o m e an d lew le v e l e f
academ ic ach ievem cn tr
6445^7 T h e State B eard e f E du catio n shall ad ep t
setting forth priorities for allow an ces u n der
th e b en efit e f all p up ils e lig ib le In a district a m in im u m
o f 50 p ercen t e f th e a m eu n t allow ed fe th e district in any
e n e year shall h e allocated fo r th e ben efi t e f p up ils w ith
spe cial ed u cation al n e e d s as d e te rm in e d p u rsuant te
criteria establish ed in accordan ee w ith S ection 644& fo
Such stan dards m ay p rov id e th at allow an ces te a d istrict
shad h e p rovid ed e n a p h asc /m basis rath er th an te aH
pu pils e lig ib le th erefor u n d er Sectio ns 644fo8 an d 6 44 5fo
The State Board o f Education shall not approve a plan
which provides for the initiation o f classes for pupils who
have attained the age o f 3 years and 9 months unless it
also contains provisions for restructuring kindergarten
and grades 1 through 3.
6445.5. School districts with master plans for early
childhood education approved pursuant to Section 6445.4
shall be eligible for allowances authorized under Sections
6445.12, 6445.13, and 16821. Such allowances shall be
apportioned to the extent that funds are available on a
priority basis in accordance with a schedule established
by the State Board o f Education.
6445.6. In apportioning allowances in accordance
with Section 6445.5 for early childhood education, the
Department o f Education shall give highest priority to
(1) those districts which have the largest number o f
pupils determined to have educational need, and (2)
those districts with the lowest measure o f assessed
valuation per pupil and making the most significant
property tax effort.
The State Board o f Education shall adopt regulations
setting forth criteria for the determination o f educational
— 9 — SB 1302
1 need which shall be based on such factors as a low level
2 o f pupil achievem ent and a low level o f family income.
3 6445.7. Districts receiving allowances pursuant to this
4 chapter shall provide that a minimum o f50 percent o f the
5 amount allowed to the district in any one year shall be
6 designated for schools with the largest number o f pupils
7 with educational need identified pursuant to Section
8 6445.6 until such time as allowances are authorized for all
9 schools.
10 6445.8. The State Board of Education may further
11 provide that i f , upon its determination - that a district has
12 not met the objectives of its approved plan, allowances
13 shall not be increased in accordance with the phase-in
14 schedule of the district’s approved plan. The board may
15 provide that the failure ef a distrieh over a designated
16 period; te meet the objectives of ds approved plan shall
17 subject the district to a termination of allowances under
18 this chapter? shall provide for an annual review o f the
19 success o f each local district in m eeting the objectives o f
20 its approved plan for early childhood education. The
21 board shall adopt rules and regulations governing the
22 termination o f allowances to districts which are
23 unsuccessful in m eeting the objectives o f their approved
24 plan.
25 644§~? 6445.9. The State Board of Education shall
26 adopt pupil performance objectives in reading and
27 mathematics for use in district early childhood education
28 programs not later than the 1975-1976 school year. The
29 board naay is authorized to take all actions necessary to
30 effect the development, testing, validation, adoption and
31 implementation of such objectives.
32 6445.10. (a) Each district with an approved master
33 plan shall submit to the Department o f Education a
34 report o f its early childhood education program. Such
35 report shall be submitted in a form and manner and at
36 such times, but not less than annually, as prescribed by
37 the State Board o f Education. The report shall include,
38 but not be limited to, factors relating to:
39 (1) Fiscal expenditures.
40 (2) D egree and success o f program implementation.
SB 1302 — 10 —
1 (3) Quantitative estimate o f pupil progress.
2 (b) The Department o f Education shall derive a
3 composite score for each school which shall be obtained
4 from each o f the three factors listed in paragraphs (1),
5 (2), and (3) o f subdivision (a). In determining such score,
6 the Department o f Education shall, for the first year o f
7 participation by the school, assign a weight o f 20percent
8 for factor (1), 70 percent for factor (2), 10 percent for
9 factor (3). For the second year o f participation by the
10 school, the factors shall be assigned a weight o f 10percent
11 for factor (1), 50 percent for factor (2), 40 percent for
12 factor (3). For the third and each subsequent year o f
13 participation, only factors (2) and (3) shall be considered
14 and shall receive equal weighting.
15 6445.11. The Department o f Education shall compute
16 an index o f student attainment for each participating
17 school, using factors which have been shown to be
18 predictive o f school success. The obtained score for each
19 school shall be weighted by the degree this score m eets
20 or exceeds the predicted school achievement level.
21 Obtained scores falling below the predicted level o f
22 attainment shall be treated as a zero score. The
23 Department o f Education shall inform each participating
24 district o f the relative performance o f their participa ting
25 schools. Such data shall regularly be analyzed and
26 evaluated and submitted to the Legislature in the form o f
27 an annual report not later than the fifth legislative day o f
28 each regular session o f the Legislature.
29 % 6445.12. From the funds appropriated therefor
30 by the Legislature to the department Department o f
31 Education for the purposes of this chapter, the
32 Superintendent of Public Instruction shall allow 4© eaeh
33 school district with an approved master ptep school
34 districts with approved master plans for the education of
35 children pursuant to such plan an amount equal 4e plans:
36 (a) Five hundred dollars ($500) per pupil in average
37 daily attendance in the district in each early primary elaas
38 class maintained for pupils who have attained the age o f
39 3 years and 9 m onths.
40 (b) One hundred thirty dollars ($130) per pupil in
— 11 — SB 1302
1 average daily attendance in the district in each
2 kindergarten class.
3 (c) One hundred thirty dollars ($130) per pupil in
4 average daily attendance in the district in grades 1 to 3,
5 inclusive.
6 §4410 6445.13. In addition to the allowances
7 provided for in Section §441b$ 6445.12, the
8 Superintendent of Public Instruction shad allow to each
9 school district having an approved master plan-, on
10 aeeount of pupils having demonstrated special
11 educational needs, as determined in accordance with
12 Section «44iMk an amount epnal tor shall provide grants
13 for pupils determined by him to have demonstrated
14 educational need, in accordance with Section 6445.6, as
15 follows:
16 (a) One hundred dollars ($100) per pupil in average
17 daily attendance in the district in each early primary elass
18 in each class for pupils who have attained the age o f 3
19 years and 9 m onths.
20 (b) Sixty-five dollars ($65) per pupil in average daily
21 attendance in the district in each kindergarten class.
22 (c) Sixty-five dollars ($65) per pupil in average daily
23 attendance m the district in grades 1 to 3, inclusive.
24 644540; Funds available for allowances by the
25 Superintendent of Public Instruction pursuant to Article
26 5 -(-commencing with Section 5789f of Chapter 5rS of
27 Division § of the Education Code to each school district
28 which is also eligible for allowances under this chapter
29 ft?© 1
30 under this chapter-;
31 6445.14. In computing allowances authorized
32 pursuant to Section 6445.12 the Superintendent o f Public
33 Instruction shall reduce such allowances by the amount
34 per pupil apportioned pursuant to Article 5
35 (commencing with Section 5789) o f Division 6.
36 644544 6445.15. Allowances under this chapter shall
37 be made by the Superintendent of Public Instruction
38 from funds appropriated therefor by the Legislature. The
39 allowances shall be made as early as practicable in the
40 fiscal year and upon order of the Superintendent of
SB 1302 — 12 —
1 Public Instruction the State Controller shall draw his
2 warrants upon the money appropriated, in favor of the
3 eligible districts in the amounts ordered.
4 6445.16. The Department o f Education shall
5 continuously monitor and review to assure that all funds
6 appropriated to school districts under this chapter are
7 expended for the purposes intended.
8 6445.17. Allowances shall not be granted under this
9 chapter to a district unless the fiscal effort o f the district
10 with respect to early childhood education for any fiscal
11 year o f participa tion under this chapter was not less than
12 the fiscal effort for that purpose for the fiscal year
13 preceding the district’s participation under this chapter.
14 6445.18. Allowances shall not be granted to a district
15 unless the fiscal effort o f that district with respect to each
16 child participating in the early childhood education
17 program for any fiscal year o f participation under this
18 chapter is no less than the fiscal effort o f the district per
19 elementary child not participa ting in the early childhood
20 education program. The Department o f Education shall
21 annually review individual district expenditures to assure
22 the comparability o f local support based on rules and
23 regulations adopted by the State Board o f Education
24 which take into account growth in district enrollment
25 and increases in district costs.
26 6445:12 6445.19. The State Board of Education shall
27 have the power to adopt and promulgate all rules and
28 regulations necessary to the effective administration of
29 this chapter, including, but not necessarily limited to,
30 those specifically required to be adopted by particular
31 provisions of this chapter.
32 644545 6445.20. The governing board of the school
33 district, in its application for approval of a master plan,
34 may request waiver of the provisions of any section or
35 sections of this code if such waiver is necessary to
36 establish and operate an early childhood education
37 program. The need for waiver shall be explained and
38 justified in the application. The Superintendent of Public
39 Instruction, with approval of the State Board of
40 Education, may grant, in whole, or in part, any such
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request when, in the opinion o f the Superintendent o f
Public Instruction, failure to grant such request would
hinder the implementation and maintenance o f the
district’s program .
6445.21. A school district in its application for
approval o f a master plan for early childhood education
may include children s center services as provded for in
Section 16603.
6446. The governing board o f any school district
which has had a master plan for early childhood
education approved by the department Department o f
Education shall establish and maintain sufficient number
ef early primary classes such number o f classes for pupils
who have attained the age o f 3years and 9 months, as are
necessary to implement such approved master plan for
children residing in ffie district wb© living in the district
that are eligible for admission pursuant to Section 6446.1
but are not eligible for admission pursuant to Section 5254
and whose parents or guardians present them for
admission.
6446.1. A child may be admitted to an early primary
a class established pursuant to Section 6446 only in any
term during the first school month of the term and only
if he is then i f he is of the age prescribed. For good cause
the governing board of a school district may permit a
child of the proper age to be admitted to the class after
the first school month of the school term.
If there is but one term during the school year, the
child shall be three years and nine months of age on or
before September 1 of the current school year. If there
are two terms maintained during the school year, the
child shall be three years and nine months on or before
September 1 of the current school year, t© before he may
be admitted in the first term of the school year, or three
years and nine months of age on or before February 1 of
the current school year, te before he may be admitted in
the second term in any school year.
As part o f a master plan approved under Section 6445.4
school districts may authorize admission o f any child who
is four years o f age regardless o f time o f admission in the
SB 1302 — 14 —
1 school year.
2 6446.2. The State Board of Education shall establish
3 minimum standards authorizing service of instructional
4 personnel in early primary classes classes established
5 pursuant to Section 6446.
6 6446.3. The minimum schoolday for pupils m early
7 primary classes classes established pursuant to Section
8 6446 is 180 minutes inclusive of recesses.
9 6446.4. The computation of average daily attendance
10 in early primary classes classes established pursuant to
11 Section 6446 for the purpose of determining allowances
12 under Sections 644o?8 and 64454) 6445.12 and 6445.13,
13 shall be as prescribed in Section 11301. Sections 10951 to
14 10955, inclusive, and Sections 11001, 11002, 11007 and
15 11301.6 shall apply to early primary classes .
16 6446.5. So much of the money aHeeated for
17 allowances pursuant to Section 644541 moneys
18 appropriated for allowances pursuant to Section 6445.12,
19 as is needed, shall be for the purpose of providing state
20 funds to match be matched with available federal funds
21 to slipport those pupils eligible under the Social Security
22 Act for public social services. Federal reimbursement
23 shall be obtained by the Department of Social Welfare for
24 services to children of those families, designated by the
25 State Department of Education, eligible for federal
26 financial participation under the Social Security Act. The
27 State Department of Social Welfare and the State
28 Department of Education shall enter into a contract
29 wherein the Department of Education agrees to provide
30 educational services for such pupils wherein the
31 Department of Social Welfare agrees to pay to the
32 Department of Education all costs of services to
33 participants.
34 6446r6? Nothing m this chapter shah he construed to
35 sanction; perpetuate, of promote the racial or ethnic
36 segregation of pupils « the pubhe schools?
37 Se c . 2. Section 16601.5 of the Education Code is
38 amended to read:
39 16601.5. The facilities used for any children’s center
40 established pursuant to this chapter shall first be used for
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children of families meeting the conditions of Section
16603.1 and may then be made available for children
eligible for any children’s center, preschool or group
child care program, authorized by the laws of this state,
and any early childhood education program conducted
under Chapter 6.1 (commencing with Section 6445) of
Division 6.
The Department of Education shall develop guidelines
and procedures for allocating funds appropriated for
compensatory preschool educational programs as
defined in Section 16151 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code to augment preschool, children’s center, and group
child care programs, and early childhood education
programs conducted under Chapter 6.1 (commencing
with Section 6445) of Division 6. Any moneys
appropriated for such purpose in any fiscal year which
are not expended may be carried over into the next
succeeding fiscal year, and shall be available for
expenditure in such fiscal year in addition to those funds
appropriated for such purpose for such year.
Se c . 3. Section 16602.5 is added to the Education
Code, to read:
16602.5. A school district in its application for
approval of a master plan for early childhood education
pursuant to Chapter 6.1 (commencing with Section 6445)
of Division 6 shall include children’s centers’ services as
provided for in this chapter.
Se c . 4. Section 16602.6 is added to the Education
Code, to read:
16602.6. The term “elementary school” contained in
Section 425 of the United States Code (the National
Defense Education Act of 1958, P.L, 85-864 as amended)
shall include early primary, and preschool classes,
including preschool classes in children’s centers, for the
purpose of the cancellation provisions of the Loans to
Students in Institutions of Higher Learning.
Sec. 5. Article 1.5 (commencing with Section 16820)
is added to Chapter 1 o f Division 13 o f the Education
Code, to read:
SB 1302 — 16 —
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Article 1.5. Transportation for Early
Primary Pupils
4 16820. The Legislature hereby declares that a
5 comprehensive program o f early childhood education is
6 necessary to improve and restructure public education in
7 California so as to provide each pupil with an opportunity
8 for the early developm ent o f primary skills. The program
9 shall include classes maintained for pupils, who have
10 attained the age o f 3 years and 9 months, as an integral
11 part o f early childhood education.
12 The Legislature further finds that the transportation o f
13 pupils in such classes to and from school is an essential
14 aspect o f such program and a necessary part o f any
15 educational program designed for such children.
16 16821. Notwithstanding any other provision o f law,
17 the governing board o f any school district may provide
18 for the transportation to and from school o f pupils who
19 have attained the age o f 3 years and 9 months and are
20 enrolled in classes established pursuant to Section 6446,
21 whenever in the judgm ent o f the board, such
22 transportation is advisable and good reasons exist
23 therefor. A governing board may allow for the
24 transporta tion ofparen ts o f pupils enrolled in such classes
25 for the purpose o f accompanying their children to and
26 from the attendance center offering such early primary
27 classes.
28 Children m eeting the eligible age requirement for
29 enrollment in such class who are attending a children s
30 center, child day care center, or preschool program
31 operated by a public or private agency are deem ed to be
32 enrolled in such class for the purpose o f this section.
33 Districts shall receive state reimbursements for the
34 transportation o f such pupils pursuant to Article 10
35 (commencing with Section 18051) o f Chapter 3 o f
36 Division 14 o f the Education Code.
37 SEC. 6. There is hereby appropriated from the
38 General Fund to the Super in tenden t o f Public
39 Instruction for the purpose o f providing state
40 reimbursement for the transporta tion o f pupils pursuant
— 17 — SB 1302
1 to Section 16821, amounts for transfer to augment
2 subdivision (b) o f Section 17303.5 o f the Education Code
3 and which shall be made available for expenditure as
4 follows:
5 (a) For the fiscal year 1973-74, eight hundred
6 sixty-nine thousand eight hundred fifty dollars
7 ($869,850).
8 (b) For the fiscal year 1974-75, two million
9 twenty-nine thousand six hundred fifty dollars
10 ($2,029,850).
11 (c) For the fiscal year 1975-76, three million one
12 hundred eighty-nine thousand four hundred fifty dollars
13 ($3,189,450).
14 (d) For the fiscal year 1976-77, four million three
15 hundred forty-nine thousand two hundred fifty dollars
16 ($4,349,250).
17 (e) For the fiscal year 1977-78, five million seven
18 hundred ninety-nine thousand dollars ($5,799,000).
19 Any moneys made a vailable for expenditure under this
20 section in any such fiscal year which are not expended
21 may be carried over into the next succeeding fiscal year,
22 and shall be available for expenditure in such fiscal year
23 in addition to those funds otherwise made available by
24 this section for such year.
25 &E€t 5 Se c . 7. The heading of Chapter 2.5
26 (commencing with Section 16150) of Part 4 of Division 9
27 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is amended to read:
28
29 Chapter 2.5. Preschool, Children’s Center,
30 Group Child Care, and Early Childhood
31 Education Programs
32
33 Se€t % Se c . 8 . Section 16150 of the Welfare and
34 Institutions Code is amended to read:
35 16150. The Legislature finds and declares that
36 preschool programs with a strong educational
37 component are of great value to all children in preparing
38 them for success in school, and constitute an essential
39 component of public social services as defined in Section
40 16151. The Legislature further finds that such programs
SB 1302 — 18 —
1 are often not available to many children who, because of
2 the low income of their families, parents in training, or
3 minimal employment, are deprived of adequate care and
4 this valuable educational experience, Therefore, it is the
5 intention of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to
6 provide equal educational opportunity to children of
7 low-income or disadvantaged families through
8 appropriate arrangements for preschool, children’s
9 center, group child care, and early childhood education
10 programs of an educational value to be developed in
11 accordance with a contractual agreement between the
12 State Department of Heakh Social Welfare and the State
13 Department of Education. The Legislature believes that
14 the introduction of young children to an atmosphere of
15 learning will improve their performance and increase
16 their motivation and productivity when they enter
17 school. In order to achieve this end, all programs
18 established under this chapter shall be centered upon a
19 defined educational program developed, conducted, and
20 administered with the maximum feasible participation of
21 the families served by the program.
22 SBC. 7 SEC. 9. Section 16151.5 is added to the
23 Welfare and Institutions Code, to read:
24 16151.5. The State Department of Social Welfare shall
25 enter into a contract with the State Department of
26 Education to provide for a statewide system of social
27 services for children educated under an early childhood
28 education master plan pursuant to Chapter 6.1
29 (commencing with Section 6445) of Division 6 of the
30 Education Code, to be established by school districts for
31 children and families who meet the requirement for
32 services under Education Code Section 6446.5. Social
33 services shall include those provided for in Section 10053
34 and in Part 3 (commencing with Section 11000) of
35 Division 9 of this code and the federal Social Security Act
36 Amendments of 1967.
37 &EG-. 8 Sec. 10. Section 16153.5 is added to the
38 Welfare and Institutions Code, to read:
39 16153.5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
40 code, the State Department of Social Welfare shall not
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provide any per capita reimbursement pursuant to
Section 16151.5 on account of any local school district
program established pursuant to this chapter which does
not meet the educational standards established by the
State Board of Education.
All programs established pursuant to this chapter shall
meet the requirements of Section 107 of Public Law
90-222 (Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967).
The State Department of Social Welfare shall have only
such functions, duties and responsibilities with respect to
early childhood education programs conducted pursuant
to Chapter 6.1 (commencing with Section 6445) of
Division 6 of the Education Code as is required by law
and federal regulations.
&EC-. 9 Sec. 11. There is hereby appropriated from
the General Fund to the Superintendent ef Public
Instruction Department o f Education for the purposes of
Chapter 6.1 (commencing with Section 6445) of Division
6 of the Education Code, the following amounts:
(a) For allowances under Section 6445r8 6445.12
amounts which shall be made available for expenditure as
follows:
(1) For the fiscal year 1973-1974, forty-four million
five hundred forty-four thousand dollars ($44,544,000).
(2) For the fiscal year 1974-1975, one hundred three
million nine hundred thirty-six thousand dollars
($103,936,000).
(3) For the fiscal year 1975-1976, one hundred
sixty-three million three hundred twenty-eight thousand
dollars ($163,328,000).
(4) For the fiscal year 1976-1977, two hundred
twenty-two million seven hundred twenty thousand
dollars ($222,720,000).
(5) For the fiscal year 1977-1978, two hundred
ninety-six million nine hundred sixty thousand dollars
($296,960,000).
(b) For the purposes of subdivision (a) of Section
644S-.-9 6445.13, amounts which shall be made available for
expenditure as follows:
(1) For the 1973-1974 fiscal year, one million eight
SB 1302 - 2 0 —
1 hundred twenty-seven thousand seven hundred fifty
2 dollars ($1,827,750.
3 (2) For the 1974-1975 fiscal year, four million two
4 hundred sixty-four thousand seven hundred fifty dollars
' 5 ($4,264,750).
6 (3) For the 1975-1976 fiscal year, six million seven
7 hundred one thousand seven hundred fifty dollars
8 ($6,701,750).
9 (4) For the 1976-1977 fiscal year, nine million one
10 hundred thirty-eight thousand seven hundred fifty
11 dollars ($9,138,750).
12 (5) For the 1977-1978 fiscal year, twelve million one
13 hundred eighty-five thousand dollars ($12,185,000).
14 (c) For the purposes of subdivisions (b) and (c) of
15 Section 64454) 6445.13, amounts which shall be made
16 available for expenditure as follows:
17 (1) For the 1973-1974 fiscal year, six million five
18 hundred sixty-six thousand five hundred thirty-seven
19 dollars ($6,566,537).
20 (2) For the 1974-1975 fiscal year, fifteen million three
21 hundred twenty-one thousand nine hundred twenty
22 dollars ($15,321,920).
23 (3) For" the 1975-1976 fiscal year, twenty-four million
24 seventy-seven thousand three hundred three dollars
25 ($24,077,303).
26 (4) For the 1976-1977 fiscal year, thirty-two million
27 eight hundred thirty-two thousand six hundred eighty-six
28 dollars ($32,832,686).
29 (5) For the 1977-1978 fiscal year, forty-three million
30 seven hundred seventy-six thousand nine hundred
31 fifteen dollars ($43,776,915).
32 (d) The sum of five hundred thousand dollars
33 ($500,000) for the administration by the State
34 Department of Education of the provisions of Chapter 6.1
35 (commencing with Section 6445) of Division 6 of ♦the
36 Education Code.
37 Any moneys made available for expenditure under this
38 section in any such fiscal year which are not expended
39 may be carried over into the next succeeding fiscal year,
40 and shall be available for expenditure in such fiscal year
— 21 — SB 1302
1 in addition to those funds otherwise made available by
2 this section for such year.
3 Sfier 40 Se c . 1 2 . A master plan for early childhood
4 education shall provide that to the extent feasible, funds
5 allocated to the district pursuant to Chapter 6.10
6 (commencing with Section 6499.230) of Division 6 of the
7 Education Code, as added by Assembly Bill No. / /
8 1 2 8 3 , shall be for purposes of Chapter 6.1 (commencing
9 with Section 6445) of Division 6 of the Education Code.
10 This section shall become operative only if Chapter 6.10
11 (commencing with Section 6499.230) is added to Division
12 6 of the Education Code by Assembly Bill No. / / 1283
13 of the 1972 Regular Session.
O
Service of the within and receipt o f a copy thereof
is hereby admitted this..,,...._............day o f July, A.D.,
1972.