Pacific Legal Foundation v. Kayfetz Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae
Public Court Documents
April 1, 1993
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Pacific Legal Foundation v. Kayfetz Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae, 1993. 3aabfc81-c09a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/efa8be74-1c0d-4326-9660-af59e4af7be8/pacific-legal-foundation-v-kayfetz-motion-and-brief-amicus-curiae. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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No. 92-1544
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1992
--------------- «--------------- -
PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION,
Petitioner,
v.
PAUL KAYFETZ; VICTOR AMOROSO; DIANA
LOPEZ FARNSWORTH; DORIS ELAINE LEMIEUX;
JACK BOWEN McLELLAN; WILLIAM NIMAN;
ORVILLE SCHELL; MARGUERITTE HARRIS;
JUDITH WESTON; and BOLINAS COMMUNITY
PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT,
Respondents.
---------------«---------------
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
MOTION AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
OF MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
-------------- -♦---------------
W il l ia m P erry P e n d l e y *
‘Counsel of Record
Pa u l M. Seby
M o u n t a in S tates L e g a l Fo u n d a t io n
1660 Lincoln Street, Suite 2300
Denver, Colorado 80264
Telephone: (303) 861-0244
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Mountain States Legal Foundation
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (SOOI 225 «%4
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342 2«3l
1
No. 92-1544
-------♦-------
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1992
--------------- ♦---------------
PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION,
Petitioner,
v.
PAUL KAYFETZ; VICTOR AMOROSO; DIANA
LOPEZ FARNSWORTH; DORIS ELAINE LEMIEUX;
JACK BOWEN McLELLAN; WILLIAM NIMAN;
ORVILLE SCHELL; MARGUERITTE HARRIS;
JUDITH WESTON; and BO LI NAS COMMUNITY
PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT,
Respondents.
♦
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
--------------- ♦---------------
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF
AMICUS CURIAE ON BEHALF OF
MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
--------------- ♦---------------
Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF) respect
fully petitions to file the annexed brief amicus curiae pur
suant to Supreme Court Rule 37. Petitioner has given its
consent to MSLF for the filing of an amicus brief. How
ever, Respondents have denied consent. A copy of Peti
tioner's consent has been provided to the Clerk of the
Court.
--------------- ♦---------------
IDENTITY AND INTERESTS OF AMICUS
Mountain States Legal Foundation is a non-profit,
membership, public interest law foundation organized
pursuant to the laws of the State of Colorado and dedi
cated to bringing before the courts those issues vital to
the defense and preservation of individual liberties, the
right to own and use property, limited government, and
the free enterprise system.
MSLF members include businesses and individuals
who live and work in nearly every state in the country.
Large numbers of MSLF's members work in businesses
involved in the utilization and development of natural
resources and, as a result, are actively involved in many
environmental issues. In addition, MSLF is active on
behalf of its members and the public interest in seeking
an equitable balance between economic and environmen
tal objectives in the management of the public lands.
The interests of Petitioner and Respondents are with
the impact of the decision below on each of them individ
ually. MSLF believes that there are broader public policy
concerns which will not be addressed adequately if the
arguments set forth herein are not heard by this Honor
able Court.
111
MSLF has participated in numerous cases before this
Honorable Court either as an amicus, as attorney for one
of the parties, or as an intervenor, most recently in Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. __ , 111 L.Ed.2d
695 (1990) and Mountain States Legal Foundation v. National
Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 111 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990).
MSLF's interest in the outcome of this lawsuit is
directly tied to its ability to support the public's interest
in environmentally sound resource development. MSLF
has serious concerns that the Ninth Circuit's decision
below will have a particularly chilling effect on cases
involving novel legal theories.
WHEREFORE, Mountain States Legal Foundation
respectfully requests the permission of this Honorable
Court to participate in this case as amicus curiae and to file
the attached brief amicus curiae in support of Petitioner.
Respectfully submitted,
W il l ia m P ekky P e n d l e y *
’Counsel of Record
Pa u l M. S euy
M o u n t a in States L e c a l Fo u n d a t io n
1660 Lincoln Street, Suite 2300
Denver, Colorado 80264
Telephone: (303) 861-0244
April 1993
1
I V
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE................................. 2
OPINIONS BELOW, JURISDICTION, STATUTES
INVOLVED AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE... 3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT............................... 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE W R IT ................... 4
A. The Decision Below Is An Important And Recurring
Issue That Demands Resolution By This Court. . . 4
B. An Intolerable Conflict Exist Between The Deci
sion Below And Decisions By This C ourt.......... 5
1. The Decision Below Is In Conflict With The
Decisions Of This Court Which Seek To Prop
erly Define The Bounds Of The Inherent
Powers Doctrine Of Federal District Courts 5
2. The Decision Below Is In Conflict With The
Decisions Of This Court Which Require
Exhaustion Of Express Sanctioning Provi
sions ......................................................................... 6
C. A Direct And Irreconcilable Conflict Exists
Between The Decision Below And A Decision
Rendered By Another Court Of Appeals.................. 9
D. The Decision Below Significantly Complicates The
Delicate Balance Of Duty A Public-Interest Attor
ney Owes To The Client And To The Court . . . . 11
E. Public Interest Organizations Have Made Signifi
cant Contributions To The Development Of The
Law And To The Public Good.................................. 12
CONCLUSION.................................................................... 13
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
C ases
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240 (1975)...............................................................7, 12
Blue v. Department of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th
Cir. 1990)............................................................................. 10
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)........ 12
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communication
Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. ___, 112 L.Ed.2d 1140
(1991)........................................................................................ 7
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., I l l S.Ct. 2123 (1991) . . . . 6, 7, 8
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).............. 9
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494
U.S. 827 (1990).......................................................................7
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. __ ,
111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)......................................................... 3
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. National Wild
life Federation, 497 U.S. ___, 111 L.Ed.2d 775
(1990).................................................................................3, 12
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 484 U.S. 825
(1987)..................................................................................... 12
Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959)......................9
Pavclic & LeFIore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,
493 U.S. 120 (1989)...............................................................7
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)..................... 9
Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990)..................7
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Education, 402
U.S. 1 (1971).........................................................................12
1 VI
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481
I U.S. 787 (1987).....................................................................6
\ Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952)................................................................................ 5
I
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1927.............................................................4, 7, 9
R ules
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11............................... 4, 7
Colorado's Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.7................................................................................. 11
Rule 1 .9 .................................................................................11
Rule 1.13............................................................................... 11
t
No. 92-1544
-------♦-------
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1992
♦
PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION,
Petitioner,
v.
PAUL KAYFETZ; VICTOR AMOROSO; DIANA
LOPEZ FARNSWORTH; DORIS ELAINE LEMIEUX;
JACK BOWEN McLELLAN; WILLIAM NIMAN;
ORVILLE SCHELL; MARGUER1TTE HARRIS;
JUDITH WESTON; and BOI INAS COMMUNITY
PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT,
Respondents
♦
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
---------------♦---------------
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAL ON BEHALF OF
MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
♦
1
2
Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF) respect
fully submits this brief amicus curiae in support of Pacific
Legal Foundation, the Petitioner for certiorari.'
-------------- ♦--------------
INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE
Mountain States Legal Foundation is a non-profit,
membership public interest law foundation dedicated to
bringing before the courts those issues vital to the
defense and preservation of individual liberties, the right
to own and use property, limited government and the free
enterprise system.
MSLF members include businesses and individuals
who live and work in nearly every state in the country.
Large numbers of MSLF's members work in businesses
involved in the utilization and development of natural
resources and, as a result, are actively involved in many
environmental issues. In addition, MSLF is active on
behalf of its members and the public interest in seeking
an equitable balance between economic and environmen
tal objectives in the management of the public lands.
The interests of Petitioner and Respondents are with
the impact of the decision below on each of them individ
ually. MSLF believes that there are broader public policy
concerns which will not be addressed adequately if the
1 Amicus has obtained the written consent of Petitioner. The
written consent of Petitioner has been provided to the Clerk of
the Court. Respondents have declined to give consent. In accor
dance with Supreme Court Rule 37, a Motion for Leave To File
Brief Amicus Curiae is provided herewith.
3
arguments set forth herein are not heard by this Honor
able Court.
MSLF has participated in numerous cases before this
Honorable Court either as an amicus, as attorney for one
of the parties, or as an intervenor, most recently in Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. ___, 111 L.Ed.2d
695 (1990) and Mountain States Legal Foundation v. National
Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. ___,111 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990).
MSLF's interest in the outcome of this lawsuit is
directly tied to its ability to support the public's interest
in environmentally sound resource development. MSLF
has serious concerns that the Ninth Circuit's decision
below will have a particularly chilling effect on cases
involving novel legal theories.
--------------♦---------------
OPINIONS BELOW, JURISDICTION, STATUTES
INVOLVED AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Amicus curiae, Mountain States Legal Foundation,
hereby adopts petitioner's statement and description of
the opinions below, jurisdiction, statutes involved, and
statement of the case.
-------------- ♦---------------
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals improperly
expanded the "inherent power" of Article III Courts to
impose fee-shifting sanctions on a non-profit, public
interest organization which was not a party to any litiga
tion before the district court. The Ninth Circuit's decision
4
unduly burdens the ability of public interest organiza
tions to continue the valuable contribution which they
make to this Nation's legal system.
-------------- «--------------
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
A. The Decision Below Is An Important And Recur
ring Issue That Demands Resolution By This Court
This is one of the most important and far-reaching
cases affecting public interest legal organizations to come
out of the Ninth Circuit in years. It is not only deeply
disturbing for those organizations with public interest
litigation programs similar to that of amicus, but to all
other public interest organizations.
It seems so fundamental and beyond dispute that
public interest attorneys feel compelled to practice law
cautiously, knowing full well that their conduct is gov
erned by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, and ethical rules. However, if this decision is
allowed to stand, such caution and precision is useless. A
district court will be able to sanction public interest legal
foundations instead of any responsible attorney, and
thereby deter the activity of organizations which have
brought so much to this nation's legal tradition and its
respect for individu.il freedoms.
The opinion by the Ninth Circuit poses a direct finan
cial threat to any non-profit organization that lends sup
port to public interest litigation. The opinion also creates
the uncomfortable dilemma for non-profit organizations
5
and their attorneys in that ethical rules generally prohibit
attorneys from allowing third parties (including attor
neys' employers, if different from the client) from inter
fering in the attorney-client relationship.
Thus, the goal sought by our Founding Fathers, free
and open legal discourse on issues of public concern, will
be thwarted. In light of the exceptional importance of this
matter, involving as it does the continued vitality of
public interest legal organizations, it is critical that this
Honorable Court grant certiorari.
B. An Intolerable Conflict Exists Between The Deci
sion Below And Decisions Rendered By This Court.
1. The Decision Below Is In Conflict With The
Decisions Of This Court Which Seek To Prop
erly Define The Bounds Of The Inherent
Powers Doctrine Of Federal District Courts.
This Court has properly recognized that a court must
have certain inherent powers in order to function and
maintain its stature. Similarly, this Court has also been
extremely careful in defining the scope of these inherent
powers. This Court has recognized the dangers present
by the misapplication of inherent powers and the signifi
cant risk these powers pose not only to litigants, but to
our federal system of government.
During this Court's current opportunity to re-evalu-
ate the inherent powers doctrine, the words of Justice
Frankfurter, concurring in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co.
6
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952), may prove to be a
valuable reminder:
[t]he accretion of dangerous power does not
come in a day. It does come, however slowly,
from the generative force of unchecked disre
gard of the restrictions that fence in even the
most disinterested assertion of authority.
Thus, this Court and a number of courts of appeals have
articulated specific limitations on attempts to expand a
federal court's inherent powers.
Recently, in Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., I l l S.Ct. 2123,
2132 (1991), this Court held that a district court may not
invoke inherent power absent a determination that the
exercise of such power is necessary to the court's opera
tion. To ensure adherence to this "rule of necessity," a
district court must not invoke its inherent power without
first attempting to exhaust whatever powers are available
to it under existing statutes or procedural rules. Chambers
at 2141-42 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Young v. United States
ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987). The Ninth
Circuit transgressed these limitations by permitting the
district court to ignore the application of adequate avail
able means to protect its authority.
2. The Decision Below Is In Conflict With The
Decisions Of This Court Which Require Exhaus
tion Of Express Sanctioning Provisions.
The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is
directly contrary to this Court's decisions which require
7
district courts to "exercise the least possible power ade
quate to the end proposed." Spallone v. United States, 493
U.S. 265, 280 (1990) (internal quotations and citations
omitted.)
In an attorney sanctioning context, individual justices
of this Court have strongly stated that a district court
must turn to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 before
invoking inherent power. Chambers, 111 S.Ct. at 2141
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) and Id. at 2141 (Scalia, )., dis
senting). These statements appropriately stem from con
cerns about the proper relationship between the judiciary
and the legislative branch.
The "rule of necessity" in the inherent powers doc
trine underscores the importance of avoiding unnecess
ary j udi c i a l e n c r o a c h me n t s upon l egi t i mat e
Congressional authority. As Justice Kennedy observed in
Chambers, "the American Rule recognizes that the legisla
ture, not the judiciary, possesses constitutional respon
sibility for defining sanctions and fees. . . . " Chambers,
111 S.Ct. at 2142 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), see Kaiser Alu
minum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990);
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communication Enter
prises, Inc., 498 U.S. ___, 112 L.Ed.2d 1140, 111 S.Ct. 940
(1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); and Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 262 (1975).
In the instant case, Congress has expressly made the
judgment that attorneys should be held personally liable
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 when their conduct so warrants.
See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493
U.S. 120 (1989). Further, Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1927
8
again made the judgment that a district court could sanc
tion, as in the Rule 11 context, any attorney admitted to
practice in a federal court for improper behavior which
detracts from the power of the court to protect litigants
from frivolous claims.
The instant case therefore presents this Court with an
opportunity to speak with a united voice concerning the
limits of inherent judicial power, a subject which engen
dered a 5-to-4 split in the recent case of Chambers v. Nasco,
Inc., I l l S.Ct. 2123 (1991). The majority in Chambers ruled
that the scheme of statutes and rules provided by Con
gress to target bad-faith conduct had not "displace[d] the
inherent power to impose sanctions" for such activity. Id.
at 2134. Although on the facts of the case the majority did
not perceive "that the District Court's reliance on the
inherent power thwarted the purposes of other sanction
ing mechanisms," Id. at 2136, the majority reaffirmed that
"[bjecause of their very potency, inherent powers must be
exercised with restraint and discretion," Id. at 2132, and
that "the exercise of the inherent power of lower federal
courts can be limited by statute and rule, for '[tjhese
courts were created by act of Congress.'" Id. at 2137.
Justice Kennedy, in dissent, also emphasized that
"(ijnherent powers are the exception, not the rule, and
their assertion requires special justification in each case,"
and that the lower federal courts must not be permitted
"to ignore express Rules and statutes on point." Id. at
2143 (Kennedy,J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Souter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia also voiced serious concerns,
arguing among other things that "Congress may pre
scribe the means by which the courts may protect the
integrity of their proceedings," and that "[a] court must
9
use the prescribed means unless for some reason they are
inadequate." Id. at 2140-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The Ninth Circuit has refused to recognize that its
power to impose sanctions pursuant to its inherent power
has been displaced by enactment of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Such disrespect
provides common ground for the majority and dissenting
justices in Chambers and presents an important oppor
tunity for this Court to underscore for the lower federal
courts the basic axioms regarding the limits of judicial
power.
The power of the federal courts "to prescribe rules of
procedure and evidence for the federal courts exists only
in the absence of a relevant Act of Congress." Palermo n
United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.ll (1959). Congress
possesses the authority under the Necessary and Proper
Clause "to enact laws carrying into execution the powers
vested in other departments of the Federal Government,"
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1979),
including an "undoubted power to regulate the practice
and procedure of federal courts." Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941).
C. A Direct And Irreconcilable Conflict Exists
Between The Decision Below And A Decision Ren
dered By Another Court Of Appeals.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion imposed
sanctions, not on the attorneys who were before the
court, but on their non-party employer, a non-profit, pub
lic interest organization. In this instance, the Ninth Cir
cuit not only ignored Supreme Court precedent regarding
10
limitations on inherent power, but has also placed itself in
direct conflict with the decision of the Fourth Circuit in
Blue v. Department of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990).
In Blue, the Fourth Circuit held that district courts
have no power to make distributional judgments between
the attorneys who committed the alleged misconduct and
the organization which financed the litigation. In that
case the district court had imposed sanctions against
several individual attorneys, one of whom was employed
by the National Association for the Advancement of Col
ored People Legal Defense Fund. The lower court ordered
the Legal Defense Fund not to pay any of the sanctions
imposed on the attorneys. Id. at 549. The Fourth Circuit
reversed, ruling that the district court had no power to
control the Legal Defense Fund's allocation of its
resources.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to ignore the holding
of the Fourth Circuit in Blue. Yet, that is what the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has done. In the instant case, the
district court made the very kind of distributional judg
ment that the Fourth Circuit held was beyond a district
court's inherent power. Instead of pursuing sanctions
against any attorney alleged to have committed litigation
misconduct, the district court required the petitioner, a
non-party to the litigation, to bear the financial respon
sibility of its employee's behavior.
Because the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals is in direct conflict with the decision of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the petition should be
granted.
11
D. The Decision Below Significantly Complicates The
Delicate Balance Of Duty A Public-Interest Attor
ney Owes To The Client And To The Court.
The Ninth Circuit opinion significantly complicates
the already complicated relationship among the attorney,
the court, and the client. Amicus vividly recalls many
instances where the multi-faceted duty was placed in
conflict, demanding close and ethical scrutiny for proper
resolution.
The Ninth Circuit opinion unnecessarily meddles in
the attorney-client relationship in litigation funded by
non-profit organizations such as Amicus. Because any
non-party organization financing litigation may now be
sanctioned based on the conduct of individual attorneys,
Amicus would be forced financially to take an active and
direct role in the conduct of litigation. This presents a
direct and intrusive interference with the attorney-client
relationship.
This presents an unfortunate dilemma for non-profit
organizations and their attorneys. Ethics rules prohibit
attorneys from allowing third parties (including attor
neys' employers, if different from the client) from inter
fering with their professional judgment or otherwise
interfering in the attorney-client relationship. In Colo
rado, for example, Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.13 of Colorado's
Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit interference with
the attorney's professional judgment or independence.
The Colorado rules also prohibit participation in an orga
nization furnishing legal services if the organization
interferes with the attorney-client relationship. Yet, the
Ninth Circuit's opinion effectively forces an organization
12
to interfere and micro-manage any litigation the organi
zation funds or otherwise supports for fear of exposure to
the types of liability at issue in the present case.
E. Public Interest Organizations Have Made Signifi
cant Contributions To The Development Of The
Law And To The Public Good.
It is difficult to imagine a greater burden placed upon
the shoulders of public interest organizations than that
placed by the Court below. The Ninth Circuit decision
will undoubtedly discourage a great deal of future cases
if left undisturbed. The mere prospect of financial lia
bility will deter public interest organizations from sup
porting litigation at all. Organizations which have in the
past contributed so much to the public good by providing
financial and logistical support will now be forced to
question their involvement.
This Court need not be reminded of the fact that a
number of this Court's landmark decisions were spawned
by advocacy provided by public interest organizations.
E.g., Brozvn v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954);
Swann v. Charlolte-Mecklenbcrg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 1
(1971); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240 (1975); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 484
U.S. 825 (1987); Mountain States Legal Foundation v.
National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S.__ (1990). Like many
other non-profit organizations, Amicus Mountain States
Legal Foundation does not charge fees for representation.
In fact, MSLF provides attorneys to represent parties who
could not otherwise afford to present their claims in
court. It would be a sad occasion if justice in this country
13
now comes only from cases where individuals or organi
zations could afford to advance their causes.
---------------«----------------
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Amicus Mountain States Legal
Foundation urges this Court to grant this petition for writ
of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
W il l ia m P erry P e n d l e y *
"Counsel of Record
Pa u l M . Seby
M o u n t a in States L e c a l Fo u n d a t io n
1660 Lincoln Street, Suite 2300
Denver, Colorado 80264
Telephone: (303) 861-0244
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Mountain States Legal Foundation
April 1993