Pacific Legal Foundation v. Kayfetz Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae

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April 1, 1993

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Pacific Legal Foundation v. Kayfetz Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae of Mountain States Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner

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  • Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Pacific Legal Foundation v. Kayfetz Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae, 1993. 3aabfc81-c09a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/efa8be74-1c0d-4326-9660-af59e4af7be8/pacific-legal-foundation-v-kayfetz-motion-and-brief-amicus-curiae. Accessed October 09, 2025.

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No. 92-1544

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1992

--------------- «--------------- -
PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION,

Petitioner, 
v.

PAUL KAYFETZ; VICTOR AMOROSO; DIANA 
LOPEZ FARNSWORTH; DORIS ELAINE LEMIEUX; 

JACK BOWEN McLELLAN; WILLIAM NIMAN;
ORVILLE SCHELL; MARGUERITTE HARRIS; 

JUDITH WESTON; and BOLINAS COMMUNITY 
PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT,

Respondents.
---------------«---------------

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari 
To The United States Court Of Appeals 

For The Ninth Circuit

MOTION AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE 
OF MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION 

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
-------------- -♦---------------

W il l ia m  P erry P e n d l e y *
‘Counsel of Record 

Pa u l  M. Seby

M o u n t a in  S tates L e g a l  Fo u n d a t io n  
1660 Lincoln Street, Suite 2300 
Denver, Colorado 80264 
Telephone: (303) 861-0244
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
Mountain States Legal Foundation

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (SOOI 225 «%4 
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342 2«3l



1

No. 92-1544
-------♦-------

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1992

--------------- ♦---------------

PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION,
Petitioner,

v.

PAUL KAYFETZ; VICTOR AMOROSO; DIANA 
LOPEZ FARNSWORTH; DORIS ELAINE LEMIEUX; 

JACK BOWEN McLELLAN; WILLIAM NIMAN;
ORVILLE SCHELL; MARGUERITTE HARRIS; 

JUDITH WESTON; and BO LI NAS COMMUNITY 
PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT,

Respondents.

♦

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari 
To The United States Court Of Appeals 

For The Ninth Circuit

--------------- ♦---------------

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF 
AMICUS CURIAE ON BEHALF OF 

MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

--------------- ♦---------------

Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF) respect­
fully petitions to file the annexed brief amicus curiae pur­
suant to Supreme Court Rule 37. Petitioner has given its



consent to MSLF for the filing of an amicus brief. How­
ever, Respondents have denied consent. A copy of Peti­
tioner's consent has been provided to the Clerk of the 
Court.

--------------- ♦---------------

IDENTITY AND INTERESTS OF AMICUS

Mountain States Legal Foundation is a non-profit, 
membership, public interest law foundation organized 
pursuant to the laws of the State of Colorado and dedi­
cated to bringing before the courts those issues vital to 
the defense and preservation of individual liberties, the 
right to own and use property, limited government, and 
the free enterprise system.

MSLF members include businesses and individuals 
who live and work in nearly every state in the country. 
Large numbers of MSLF's members work in businesses 
involved in the utilization and development of natural 
resources and, as a result, are actively involved in many 
environmental issues. In addition, MSLF is active on 
behalf of its members and the public interest in seeking 
an equitable balance between economic and environmen­
tal objectives in the management of the public lands.

The interests of Petitioner and Respondents are with 
the impact of the decision below on each of them individ­
ually. MSLF believes that there are broader public policy 
concerns which will not be addressed adequately if the 
arguments set forth herein are not heard by this Honor­
able Court.

111

MSLF has participated in numerous cases before this 
Honorable Court either as an amicus, as attorney for one 
of the parties, or as an intervenor, most recently in Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. __ , 111 L.Ed.2d
695 (1990) and Mountain States Legal Foundation v. National 
Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 111 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990).

MSLF's interest in the outcome of this lawsuit is 
directly tied to its ability to support the public's interest 
in environmentally sound resource development. MSLF 
has serious concerns that the Ninth Circuit's decision 
below will have a particularly chilling effect on cases 
involving novel legal theories.

WHEREFORE, Mountain States Legal Foundation 
respectfully requests the permission of this Honorable 
Court to participate in this case as amicus curiae and to file 
the attached brief amicus curiae in support of Petitioner.

Respectfully submitted,

W il l ia m  P ekky  P e n d l e y  *
’Counsel of Record 

Pa u l  M. S euy

M o u n t a in  States  L e c a l  Fo u n d a t io n  

1660 Lincoln Street, Suite 2300 
Denver, Colorado 80264 
Telephone: (303) 861-0244

April 1993



1
I V

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE.................................  2

OPINIONS BELOW, JURISDICTION, STATUTES 
INVOLVED AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE... 3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT...............................  3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE W R IT ...................  4

A. The Decision Below Is An Important And Recurring
Issue That Demands Resolution By This Court. . .  4

B. An Intolerable Conflict Exist Between The Deci­
sion Below And Decisions By This C ourt.......... 5

1. The Decision Below Is In Conflict With The 
Decisions Of This Court Which Seek To Prop­
erly Define The Bounds Of The Inherent 
Powers Doctrine Of Federal District Courts 5

2. The Decision Below Is In Conflict With The
Decisions Of This Court Which Require 
Exhaustion Of Express Sanctioning Provi­
sions ......................................................................... 6

C. A Direct And Irreconcilable Conflict Exists
Between The Decision Below And A Decision 
Rendered By Another Court Of Appeals..................  9

D. The Decision Below Significantly Complicates The
Delicate Balance Of Duty A Public-Interest Attor­
ney Owes To The Client And To The Court . . . .  11

E. Public Interest Organizations Have Made Signifi­
cant Contributions To The Development Of The 
Law And To The Public Good.................................. 12

CONCLUSION....................................................................  13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page

C ases

Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240 (1975)...............................................................7, 12

Blue v. Department of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th 
Cir. 1990).............................................................................  10

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)........ 12

Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communication
Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. ___, 112 L.Ed.2d 1140
(1991)........................................................................................ 7

Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., I l l  S.Ct. 2123 (1991) . . . .  6, 7, 8

Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).............. 9

Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494
U.S. 827 (1990).......................................................................7

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. __ ,
111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)......................................................... 3

Mountain States Legal Foundation v. National Wild­
life Federation, 497 U.S. ___, 111  L.Ed.2d 775
(1990).................................................................................3, 12

Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 484 U.S. 825
(1987)..................................................................................... 12

Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959)......................9

Pavclic & LeFIore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,
493 U.S. 120 (1989)...............................................................7

Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)..................... 9

Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990)..................7

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Education, 402
U.S. 1 (1971).........................................................................12



1 VI

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -  Continued
Page

Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481
I U.S. 787 (1987).....................................................................6

\ Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952)................................................................................ 5

I

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1927.............................................................4, 7, 9

R ules

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11............................... 4, 7

Colorado's Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.7................................................................................. 11

Rule 1 .9 .................................................................................11

Rule 1.13............................................................................... 11

t

No. 92-1544 
-------♦-------

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1992

♦

PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION,
Petitioner,

v.

PAUL KAYFETZ; VICTOR AMOROSO; DIANA 
LOPEZ FARNSWORTH; DORIS ELAINE LEMIEUX; 

JACK BOWEN McLELLAN; WILLIAM NIMAN;
ORVILLE SCHELL; MARGUER1TTE HARRIS; 

JUDITH WESTON; and BOI INAS COMMUNITY 
PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT,

Respondents

♦

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari 
To The United States Court Of Appeals 

For The Ninth Circuit

---------------♦---------------

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAL ON BEHALF OF 
MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION 

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

♦

1



2

Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF) respect­
fully submits this brief amicus curiae in support of Pacific 
Legal Foundation, the Petitioner for certiorari.'

-------------- ♦--------------

INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE

Mountain States Legal Foundation is a non-profit, 
membership public interest law foundation dedicated to 
bringing before the courts those issues vital to the 
defense and preservation of individual liberties, the right 
to own and use property, limited government and the free 
enterprise system.

MSLF members include businesses and individuals 
who live and work in nearly every state in the country. 
Large numbers of MSLF's members work in businesses 
involved in the utilization and development of natural 
resources and, as a result, are actively involved in many 
environmental issues. In addition, MSLF is active on 
behalf of its members and the public interest in seeking 
an equitable balance between economic and environmen­
tal objectives in the management of the public lands.

The interests of Petitioner and Respondents are with 
the impact of the decision below on each of them individ­
ually. MSLF believes that there are broader public policy 
concerns which will not be addressed adequately if the

1 Amicus has obtained the written consent of Petitioner. The 
written consent of Petitioner has been provided to the Clerk of 
the Court. Respondents have declined to give consent. In accor­
dance with Supreme Court Rule 37, a Motion for Leave To File 
Brief Amicus Curiae is provided herewith.

3

arguments set forth herein are not heard by this Honor­
able Court.

MSLF has participated in numerous cases before this 
Honorable Court either as an amicus, as attorney for one 
of the parties, or as an intervenor, most recently in Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. ___, 111 L.Ed.2d
695 (1990) and Mountain States Legal Foundation v. National 
Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. ___,111 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990).

MSLF's interest in the outcome of this lawsuit is 
directly tied to its ability to support the public's interest 
in environmentally sound resource development. MSLF 
has serious concerns that the Ninth Circuit's decision 
below will have a particularly chilling effect on cases 
involving novel legal theories.

--------------♦---------------

OPINIONS BELOW, JURISDICTION, STATUTES
INVOLVED AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Amicus curiae, Mountain States Legal Foundation, 
hereby adopts petitioner's statement and description of 
the opinions below, jurisdiction, statutes involved, and 
statement of the case.

-------------- ♦---------------

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals improperly 
expanded the "inherent power" of Article III Courts to 
impose fee-shifting sanctions on a non-profit, public 
interest organization which was not a party to any litiga­
tion before the district court. The Ninth Circuit's decision



4

unduly burdens the ability of public interest organiza­
tions to continue the valuable contribution which they 
make to this Nation's legal system.

-------------- «--------------

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
A. The Decision Below Is An Important And Recur­

ring Issue That Demands Resolution By This Court

This is one of the most important and far-reaching 
cases affecting public interest legal organizations to come 
out of the Ninth Circuit in years. It is not only deeply 
disturbing for those organizations with public interest 
litigation programs similar to that of amicus, but to all 
other public interest organizations.

It seems so fundamental and beyond dispute that 
public interest attorneys feel compelled to practice law 
cautiously, knowing full well that their conduct is gov­
erned by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927, and ethical rules. However, if this decision is 
allowed to stand, such caution and precision is useless. A 
district court will be able to sanction public interest legal 
foundations instead of any responsible attorney, and 
thereby deter the activity of organizations which have 
brought so much to this nation's legal tradition and its 
respect for individu.il freedoms.

The opinion by the Ninth Circuit poses a direct finan­
cial threat to any non-profit organization that lends sup­
port to public interest litigation. The opinion also creates 
the uncomfortable dilemma for non-profit organizations

5

and their attorneys in that ethical rules generally prohibit 
attorneys from allowing third parties (including attor­
neys' employers, if different from the client) from inter­
fering in the attorney-client relationship.

Thus, the goal sought by our Founding Fathers, free 
and open legal discourse on issues of public concern, will 
be thwarted. In light of the exceptional importance of this 
matter, involving as it does the continued vitality of 
public interest legal organizations, it is critical that this 
Honorable Court grant certiorari.

B. An Intolerable Conflict Exists Between The Deci­
sion Below And Decisions Rendered By This Court.

1. The Decision Below Is In Conflict With The 
Decisions Of This Court Which Seek To Prop­
erly Define The Bounds Of The Inherent 
Powers Doctrine Of Federal District Courts.

This Court has properly recognized that a court must 
have certain inherent powers in order to function and 
maintain its stature. Similarly, this Court has also been 
extremely careful in defining the scope of these inherent 
powers. This Court has recognized the dangers present 
by the misapplication of inherent powers and the signifi­
cant risk these powers pose not only to litigants, but to 
our federal system of government.

During this Court's current opportunity to re-evalu- 
ate the inherent powers doctrine, the words of Justice 
Frankfurter, concurring in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co.



6

v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952), may prove to be a 
valuable reminder:

[t]he accretion of dangerous power does not 
come in a day. It does come, however slowly, 
from the generative force of unchecked disre­
gard of the restrictions that fence in even the 
most disinterested assertion of authority.

Thus, this Court and a number of courts of appeals have 
articulated specific limitations on attempts to expand a 
federal court's inherent powers.

Recently, in Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., I l l  S.Ct. 2123, 
2132 (1991), this Court held that a district court may not 
invoke inherent power absent a determination that the 
exercise of such power is necessary to the court's opera­
tion. To ensure adherence to this "rule of necessity," a 
district court must not invoke its inherent power without 
first attempting to exhaust whatever powers are available 
to it under existing statutes or procedural rules. Chambers 
at 2141-42 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Young v. United States 
ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987). The Ninth 
Circuit transgressed these limitations by permitting the 
district court to ignore the application of adequate avail­
able means to protect its authority.

2. The Decision Below Is In Conflict With The 
Decisions Of This Court Which Require Exhaus­
tion Of Express Sanctioning Provisions.

The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is 
directly contrary to this Court's decisions which require

7

district courts to "exercise the least possible power ade­
quate to the end proposed." Spallone v. United States, 493 
U.S. 265, 280 (1990) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted.)

In an attorney sanctioning context, individual justices 
of this Court have strongly stated that a district court 
must turn to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 before 
invoking inherent power. Chambers, 111 S.Ct. at 2141 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) and Id. at 2141 (Scalia, )., dis­
senting). These statements appropriately stem from con­
cerns about the proper relationship between the judiciary 
and the legislative branch.

The "rule of necessity" in the inherent powers doc­
trine underscores the importance of avoiding unnecess­
ary j udi c i a l  e n c r o a c h me n t s  upon l egi t i mat e  
Congressional authority. As Justice Kennedy observed in 
Chambers, "the American Rule recognizes that the legisla­
ture, not the judiciary, possesses constitutional respon­
sibility for defining sanctions and fees. . . . "  Chambers, 
111 S.Ct. at 2142 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), see Kaiser Alu­
minum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990); 
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communication Enter­
prises, Inc., 498 U.S. ___, 112 L.Ed.2d 1140, 111 S.Ct. 940
(1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); and Alyeska Pipeline Serv. 
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 262 (1975).

In the instant case, Congress has expressly made the 
judgment that attorneys should be held personally liable 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 when their conduct so warrants. 
See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 
U.S. 120 (1989). Further, Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1927



8

again made the judgment that a district court could sanc­
tion, as in the Rule 11 context, any attorney admitted to 
practice in a federal court for improper behavior which 
detracts from the power of the court to protect litigants 
from frivolous claims.

The instant case therefore presents this Court with an 
opportunity to speak with a united voice concerning the 
limits of inherent judicial power, a subject which engen­
dered a 5-to-4 split in the recent case of Chambers v. Nasco, 
Inc., I l l  S.Ct. 2123 (1991). The majority in Chambers ruled 
that the scheme of statutes and rules provided by Con­
gress to target bad-faith conduct had not "displace[d] the 
inherent power to impose sanctions" for such activity. Id. 
at 2134. Although on the facts of the case the majority did 
not perceive "that the District Court's reliance on the 
inherent power thwarted the purposes of other sanction­
ing mechanisms," Id. at 2136, the majority reaffirmed that 
"[bjecause of their very potency, inherent powers must be 
exercised with restraint and discretion," Id. at 2132, and 
that "the exercise of the inherent power of lower federal 
courts can be limited by statute and rule, for '[tjhese 
courts were created by act of Congress.'" Id. at 2137.

Justice Kennedy, in dissent, also emphasized that 
"(ijnherent powers are the exception, not the rule, and 
their assertion requires special justification in each case," 
and that the lower federal courts must not be permitted 
"to ignore express Rules and statutes on point." Id. at 
2143 (Kennedy,J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Souter, J., 
dissenting). Justice Scalia also voiced serious concerns, 
arguing among other things that "Congress may pre­
scribe the means by which the courts may protect the 
integrity of their proceedings," and that "[a] court must

9

use the prescribed means unless for some reason they are 
inadequate." Id. at 2140-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

The Ninth Circuit has refused to recognize that its 
power to impose sanctions pursuant to its inherent power 
has been displaced by enactment of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Such disrespect 
provides common ground for the majority and dissenting 
justices in Chambers and presents an important oppor­
tunity for this Court to underscore for the lower federal 
courts the basic axioms regarding the limits of judicial 
power.

The power of the federal courts "to prescribe rules of 
procedure and evidence for the federal courts exists only 
in the absence of a relevant Act of Congress." Palermo n 
United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.ll (1959). Congress 
possesses the authority under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause "to enact laws carrying into execution the powers 
vested in other departments of the Federal Government," 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1979), 
including an "undoubted power to regulate the practice 
and procedure of federal courts." Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 
312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941).

C. A Direct And Irreconcilable Conflict Exists 
Between The Decision Below And A Decision Ren­
dered By Another Court Of Appeals.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion imposed 
sanctions, not on the attorneys who were before the 
court, but on their non-party employer, a non-profit, pub­
lic interest organization. In this instance, the Ninth Cir­
cuit not only ignored Supreme Court precedent regarding



10

limitations on inherent power, but has also placed itself in 
direct conflict with the decision of the Fourth Circuit in
Blue v. Department of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990).

In Blue, the Fourth Circuit held that district courts 
have no power to make distributional judgments between 
the attorneys who committed the alleged misconduct and 
the organization which financed the litigation. In that 
case the district court had imposed sanctions against 
several individual attorneys, one of whom was employed 
by the National Association for the Advancement of Col­
ored People Legal Defense Fund. The lower court ordered 
the Legal Defense Fund not to pay any of the sanctions 
imposed on the attorneys. Id. at 549. The Fourth Circuit 
reversed, ruling that the district court had no power to 
control the Legal Defense Fund's allocation of its 
resources.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to ignore the holding 
of the Fourth Circuit in Blue. Yet, that is what the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has done. In the instant case, the 
district court made the very kind of distributional judg­
ment that the Fourth Circuit held was beyond a district 
court's inherent power. Instead of pursuing sanctions 
against any attorney alleged to have committed litigation 
misconduct, the district court required the petitioner, a 
non-party to the litigation, to bear the financial respon­
sibility of its employee's behavior.

Because the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals is in direct conflict with the decision of the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the petition should be 
granted.

11

D. The Decision Below Significantly Complicates The 
Delicate Balance Of Duty A Public-Interest Attor­
ney Owes To The Client And To The Court.

The Ninth Circuit opinion significantly complicates 
the already complicated relationship among the attorney, 
the court, and the client. Amicus vividly recalls many 
instances where the multi-faceted duty was placed in 
conflict, demanding close and ethical scrutiny for proper 
resolution.

The Ninth Circuit opinion unnecessarily meddles in 
the attorney-client relationship in litigation funded by 
non-profit organizations such as Amicus. Because any 
non-party organization financing litigation may now be 
sanctioned based on the conduct of individual attorneys, 
Amicus would be forced financially to take an active and 
direct role in the conduct of litigation. This presents a 
direct and intrusive interference with the attorney-client 
relationship.

This presents an unfortunate dilemma for non-profit 
organizations and their attorneys. Ethics rules prohibit 
attorneys from allowing third parties (including attor­
neys' employers, if different from the client) from inter­
fering with their professional judgment or otherwise 
interfering in the attorney-client relationship. In Colo­
rado, for example, Rules 1.7, 1.9 and 1.13 of Colorado's 
Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit interference with 
the attorney's professional judgment or independence. 
The Colorado rules also prohibit participation in an orga­
nization furnishing legal services if the organization 
interferes with the attorney-client relationship. Yet, the 
Ninth Circuit's opinion effectively forces an organization



12

to interfere and micro-manage any litigation the organi­
zation funds or otherwise supports for fear of exposure to 
the types of liability at issue in the present case.

E. Public Interest Organizations Have Made Signifi­
cant Contributions To The Development Of The
Law And To The Public Good.

It is difficult to imagine a greater burden placed upon 
the shoulders of public interest organizations than that 
placed by the Court below. The Ninth Circuit decision 
will undoubtedly discourage a great deal of future cases 
if left undisturbed. The mere prospect of financial lia­
bility will deter public interest organizations from sup­
porting litigation at all. Organizations which have in the 
past contributed so much to the public good by providing 
financial and logistical support will now be forced to 
question their involvement.

This Court need not be reminded of the fact that a 
number of this Court's landmark decisions were spawned 
by advocacy provided by public interest organizations. 
E.g., Brozvn v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 
Swann v. Charlolte-Mecklenbcrg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 1 
(1971); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 
U.S. 240 (1975); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 484 
U.S. 825 (1987); Mountain States Legal Foundation v.
National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S.__ (1990). Like many
other non-profit organizations, Amicus Mountain States 
Legal Foundation does not charge fees for representation. 
In fact, MSLF provides attorneys to represent parties who 
could not otherwise afford to present their claims in 
court. It would be a sad occasion if justice in this country

13

now comes only from cases where individuals or organi­
zations could afford to advance their causes.

---------------«----------------

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Amicus Mountain States Legal 
Foundation urges this Court to grant this petition for writ 
of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

W il l ia m  P erry P e n d l e y  *

"Counsel of Record 
Pa u l  M . Seby

M o u n t a in  States  L e c a l  Fo u n d a t io n  

1660 Lincoln Street, Suite 2300 
Denver, Colorado 80264 
Telephone: (303) 861-0244

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
Mountain States Legal Foundation

April 1993

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