Smith v Hampton Training School for Nurses Appellants Brief
Public Court Documents
May 25, 1964

39 pages
Cite this item
-
Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Copeland v. Martinez Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, 1979. 29d9854e-ae9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/499d746b-f497-40f4-a63a-624774fb6634/copeland-v-martinez-petition-for-a-writ-of-certiorari-to-the-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-dc-circuit. Accessed July 15, 2025.
Copied!
I f th e i>uprm£ (tort nf % TUnxtvb BUUb October Term, 1979 No. 79-........... B arbara N. C opeland , y. Petitioner, S a m u e l R . M a r tin e z , Director Community Services Administration. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT J ack Greenberg J am es M . N abrit , I I I C harles S te p h e n R alston B il l L a n n L ee Suite 2030 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 A lexander G. P ark 910 17th Street N.W. Suite 812 Washington, D.C. 20006 Attorneys for Petitioner INDEX Page Opinions Below .............................................................. 1 J u r i s d i c t i o n ................................................................... 2 Question Presented ................................................ 2 Statutory Provisions Involved ............................. 2 Statement o f the Case ............................................... 4 Reasons for Granting the Writ ............................. 6 I. The Decision o f the Court Below C o n f l i c t s With This Court 's Decision in Brown v. General Services Administration and Other Decisions o f This Court ........................... 6 I I . This Case Presents An Issue o f Substantial National Importance , Involving The Enforcement o f the C iv i l Rights Acts ...................................... 14 CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 22 APPENDIX ............................................................................ la l TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page Cases Bel l v. School Board o f Powhatan County, 321 F . 2d 494 (4th Cir . 1963) .................... 20 Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976) ...................... . .......... . . 6 , 7 , 8 , 10,18 Cannon v. University o f Chicago, U.S. , 60 L.Ed. 2d 560 (1979) ........................................................ Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976) ................................................................ 8 ,10 ,15 Christiansburg Garment Co. v . EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) ............................... . . . . 11,20 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) ............. 7 Fleischmann D i s t i l l i n g Corp. v . Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967) ____ . . 9,10 Gnotta v. United States, 415 F,2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969) ............................................ 7 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973) .................... . . 9,16 Jaspers v. Alexander, 15 FEP Cases 1234 (D.D.C. 1977) ...................................... 18 Kennedy v. Rabinowitz, 318 F .2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1963), a f f ' d on other grounds, 376 U.S. 605 (1964) ................ 7 - n - Page Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens C o . , 267 U.S. 364 (1924) ................. 10 McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir . 1971) ............................................................ 7 Manhattan Bronx Postal Union v. Gronowski, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ....................................................................... 7 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises , 309 U.S. 400 (1968) ........ 11 Parker v. Cali fano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ............................................... 20 Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918 (3rd Cir . 1977) ................................................. 7 R i t te r v. Morton, 513 F .2d 942 (9th Cir . 1975) ............................................................ 7 Sierra Club v. Hickel , 467 F.2d 1048 (6th Cir. 1972) ................................................. 7 Simons v. Vinson, 394 F .2d 732 (5th Cir . 1968) ............................................................ 7 Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S 191 (1967) ......................... 9 - i i i - Page S tatu tes : 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ........................................................... 12,14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) ............................................ passim 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) ....................... 2 ,4 , 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) ............................................ 3 Other Authorit ies Assistant Attorney General, C iv i l D iv is ion Memorandum to A l l General Counsels and A l l United States Attorneys , Apri l 14, 1978 ........................... 18 110 Cong. Rec. 1640 (1964) ................................... 21 122 Cong. Rec. H. 12152 (d a i ly ed. ( Oct. 1, 1976) ...................................................... 13,14 Subcommittee on labor o f the Senate Comm, on Labor and Public Welfare, L eg is la t iv e History o f the Equal Employment Opportunity Act o f 1972 (Comm. Print 1972) ................ 16,17 - iv - IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1979 No. 79- BARBARA N. COPELAND, P et i t ion er , v. SAMUEL R. MARTINEZ, Director Community Services Administration PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT The p e t i t i o n e r , Barbara N. Copeland, re s p e c t f u l l y prays that a Writ o f C e r t i o r a r i issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court o f Appeals for the D is t r i c t o f Columbia C ircu it entered in th is proceeding on July 24, 1979. Opinions Below The opinion o f the Court o f Appeals is unre — ported and is set out in the Appendix hereto , pp. la-22a. The opinion o f the D i s t r i c t Court is r e 2 ported at 435 F. Supp. 1178 (D.D.C. 1977), and is set out in the Appendix hereto , pp. 23a-34a. The order o f the D i s t r i c t Court awarding counsel fees , the order that is at issue here, is unreported and is set out in the Appendix hereto at pp. 372-38a. Ju r is d i c t i o n The judgment o f the Court o f Appeals was entered on July 24, 1979. J u r i s d i c t i o n of th is Court i s invoked under 28 U .S .C . § 1 2 5 4 ( a ) . Question Presented < May a D i s t r i c t Court award counsel fees to the United States when i t is a p reva i l ing defen dant in an act ion under T i t l e VII o f the C iv i l Rights Act of 1964 under any circumstances in the face of § 706 o f that s tatute which proh ib i ts such an award to the United States? Statutory Provisions Involved Sect ion 717(c) o f T i t l e VII o f the 1964 C iv i l Rights Act , as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) , p r o v id e s : 3 Within t h i r t y days o f r e c e ip t o f not ice o f f i n a l a c t i o n taken by a department, agency, or unit re fe r re d to in subsect ion (a) o f t h i s s e c t i o n , o r by the C i v i l S e r v i c e Commission upon an appeal from a d e c i s io n or order of such department, agency, or unit on a complaint o f d iscr im inat ion based on race, c o l o r , r e l i g i o n , s e x , o r n a t i o n a l o r i g i n , brought pursuant to subsect ion (a) o f this s e c t io n , Executive Order 11478 or any suc c e e d in g E x e c u t iv e o r d e r s , o r a f t e r one hundred and eighty days from the f i l i n g o f the i n i t i a l charge with the department, agency , o r u n i t or w ith the C i v i l S e r v i c e Commission on appeal from a d e c i s io n or order o f such departm ent , agency , o r u n i t u n t i l such time as f in a l ac t ion may be taken by a department, agency, or unit , an employee or applicant for employment, i f aggrieved by the f in a l d i s p o s i t i o n o f h is complaint, or by the f a i l u r e t o take f i n a l a c t i o n on h i s complaint, may f i l e a c i v i l act ion as pro vided in s e c t io n 2000e-5 o f this t i t l e , in which c i v i l ac t ion the head o f the depart ment, agency, or unit , as appropriate, shal l be the defendant. S e c t i o n 717 (d ) o f T i t l e VII o f the 1964 C iv i l Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 16(d) , provides: The p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 2 0 0 0 e - 5 ( f ) through (k ) o f t h i s t i t l e , as a p p l i c a b l e , sha l l govern c i v i l act ions brought hereunder. Section 706(k) o f T i t l e VII o f the 1964 C iv i l R ights A c t , 42 U .S .C . § 2 0 0 0 e - 5 ( k ) , p r o v i d e s : In any act ion or proceeding under this subchapter the court , in i t s d i s c r e t io n , may al low the p reva i l ing party, other than the - 4 - Commission or the United S ta tes , a reasonable a t to rney 's fee as part o f the cos ts , and the Commission and the United S ta te s s h a l l be l i a b l e fo r cos ts the same as a private person (Emphasis suppl ied ) . Pub. L. 88-352, T i t l e VII, § 706, July 2, 1964, 78 Stat . 259; Pub. L. 92-261, §§ 4, 11, Mar. 24, 1972, 86 Stat. 104. Statement o f the Case This i s an a c t i o n brought pursuant t o 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) o f T i t l e VII o f the C iv i l R ights Act o f 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Act of 1972. It was brought on behalf o f a Black woman employed by an agenpy o f the federal government, the Community Services Ad m in is tra t ion , as a GS-11 Program S p ec ia l i s t in the O f f i c e of Human Rights. In her complaint, p la in t i f f , p e t i t i o n e r here , a l leged that she had been denied promotion to grade GS-12 because o f her race (Black) and sex ( female) . F o l l o w in g the t r i a l , the D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d an o p i n i o n and o rd er on August 23, 1977, awarding judgment t o the de fendant and dismissing the act ion . (Appendix pp. 23a-34a). In i t s d e c i s io n , the court found that the act ion was without merit and was brought fo r the purpose o f harassment and in bad fa i th . The court found no cred ib le evidence that the p l a i n t i f f had been 5 discriminated against, or had su f fered harassment or r e p r i s a l f o r hav ing f i l e d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n complaints. The court also found that both the p l a i n t i f f and one o f her witnesses were biased against th e i r immediate supervisor and that the ir t e s t im o n y was not c r e d i b l e . The tes t im ony o f d e f e n d a n t ' s w i t n e s s e s , on the o th e r hand, was found t o be c r e d i b l e and t o be supported by documentary evidence. The Court c o n c lu d e d that " p l a i n t i f f a c ted v e x a t i o u s l y , m a l i c i o u s l y , and in bad f a i t h in b r i n g i n g and m a in ta in in g t h i s a c t i o n and has i n t e n t i o n a l l y abused the j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s . " (Appendix, p. 30a . ) < As a resu lt o f these findings the d i s t r i c t court awarded costs and a t torneys ' fees in favor o f the defendant and against the p l a i n t i f f (pp. 31a-33a). Subsequently, on the basis o f a submis s ion made by the United States Attorney, judgment was issued on October 7, 1977 in a t o t a l amount o f $3,520.89 which included attorneys ' fees in the amount o f $ 3 ,1 9 2 .4 0 ( 3 8 a . ) P l a i n t i f f f i l e d a t im e ly n o t i c e o f appeal l i m i t e d to the award o f counsel fees against her. On July 24, 1979, the c o u r t o f appeals affirmed the d i s t r i c t court . I t held, despite the language o f 42 U.S.C. § 2000e_5(k) p roh ib it ing the award of counsel fees on behalf o f the govern ment, and despite the hold ing o f this Court in 6 Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976) that T i t l e VII was the exc lus ive remedy f o r employment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n by government a g e n c i e s and that i t s p r o v i s i o n s governed the award of counsel f e e s , that there remained in the d i s t r i c t c o u r t a r e s i d u a l common law power to award fees under an exception to the "American r u l e " in c a s e s where s u i t s were brought v e x a - t i o u s ly or f o r harassment (Appendix, pp. la -22a ) . This p e t i t i o n for a writ o f c e r t i o r a r i to review that d e c i s i o n fo l lowed. Reasons for Granting The Writ I . The D e c i s i o n o f The Court Below C o n f l i c t s with This C o u r t ' s D e c i s i o n in Brown v . General S e r v i c e s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n And Other Decisions o f This Court. In Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976) , the government argued and t h i s Court h e ld that when the 1972 amendments to T i t l e VII extended i t s coverage t o the federal government, . . . the congressional intent in 1972 was to create an exc lu s ive , preemptive administra t iv e and ju d i c i a l scheme fo r the redress of f ederal employment discr imination. 425 U.S. at 829. Therefore, th is Court held that the prov is ions o f T i t l e VII, and s p e c i f i c a l l y 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), 7 govern such issues as venue, the appointment of attorneys , a t t o r n e y s 1 fees , and the scope o f r e l i e f . 425 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added). Sect ion 2000e-5(k) , provides that: In any a c t i o n or p r o c e e d in g under t h i s subchapter the court , in i t s d i s c r e t io n , may al low the p reva i l ing party, other than the Commission or the United S ta tes , a reasonable a t t o r n e y ' s f e e as p ar t o f the c o s t s . . . . (Emphasis added.) Despite the holding in Brown that the lan guage o f § 2000e-5(k) is exc lus ive and pre-emptive and despite the e x p l i c i t p roh ib i t ion in that s e c - 1 /t i o n against fee awards to the United S tates ,— both c o u r t s below n e v e r t h e l e s s h e ld ( that the government retained a residual common-law r ight 1 / The f a c t that the nominal de fendant in a federa l T i t l e VII ac t ion is the agency head does not change the fa c t that the act ion is against the United States and that any counsel fee award inures to the bene f i t of the government. See, Richerson v. Jones , 551 F.2d 918, 925 (3rd C i r . 1977); Gnotta v. United S ta tes , 415 F.2d 1271, 1277 (8th Cir. 1969), and cases there c i t e d ; Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 ( 1 9 6 3 ) ; Manhattan Bronx Postal Union v. Gronowski, 350 F .2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Kennedy v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir . 1963), a f f ' d on other~~grounds, 376 U.S. 605 (1964); McQueary v. La ird , 449 F .2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971); R i t te r v. Morton, 513 F . 2d 942 (9th Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. H icke l , 467 F.2d 1048 (6th Cir . 1972); Simons v. Vinson, 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir . 1968). 8 to rece ive fee awards under the "American r u l e . " Pet i t ioner urges that the dec is ion below is in d i r e c t c o n f l i c t with Brown v. General Administra- t ion , supra, and with a long line o f dec is ions that h o l d that s t a t u t e s are to be g iven t h e i r p la in meaning. See, e . g . , Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 848 (1976). In Brown v . G .S . A . the s p e c i f i c i s s u e was whether Con gress , when i t made the remedies provided by T i t l e VII appl icable to the federal government, intended those remedies to be exc lu s ive . P e t i t ioner argued that there was no such intent , and that federal employees had avai lable a range o f a l t e r n a t i v e s t o c o r r e c t employment d iscr imination . The government argued that T i t l e VII pre-empted a l l other j u d i c i a l remedies, urged in i t s b r i e f that T i t l e VII "de f ines the scope o f the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s rem edia l a u t h o r i t y " , and pointed out that: S e c t i o n 706 (k ) g iv e s the d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i s c r e t i o n to a l low the com pla inant , i f he p r e v a i l s , a reasonable a t to rney 's fee as part o f the cos ts . Br ie f for Respondents, Brown v. General Services Administration, No. 74-768, p. 18. This Court agreed with the governm ent 's p o s i t i o n . It f i r s t noted that d iscr imination by the federal government had been prohibited both by the Const itut ion and by statute p r io r to the 1972 amendments to T i t l e VII. The existence o f 9 a j u d i c i a l remedy f o r such d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , on the o th e r hand, was at b e s t p r o b l e m a t i c a l . 425 U.S. at 825-27. Thus, the ent ire purpose o f the 1972 Act was to es ta b l i sh and define jud ica l remedies, and the intent o f Congress was: to create an exc lus ive , pre-emptive adminis t ra t ive and j u d i c i a l scheme for the redress o f federal employment d iscr imination . 425 U.S. at 829. Moreover, that scheme governed "such issues as . . . a t torneys ' f e e s . " I d . at 832. The d e c i s i o n in Br own br in g s t h i s case squarely within dec is ions such as Fleischmann D i s t i l l i n g Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. , 386 U.S. 714 (1967). There, th is Court held that since Congress had, "meticulously deta i led the remedies a v a i l a b l e , " in trademark infringement cases , the in t e n t was that those remedies be e x c l u s i v e . Therefore, the courts were without power to award c o u n s e l f ees even under one o f the r e c o g n i z e d 2 /e x c e p t i o n s to the American r u l e . — 386 U.S. 719 -21 . See a l s o , Hall v. C o l e , 412 U.S 1, 9 -10 ( 1 9 7 3 ) , in which the Court noted that 2/ Contrast, Wyandotte Transportation Co. v . United S t a t e s , 389 U.S 191 ( 1 9 6 7 ) , where t h i s Court held that since the Rivers and Habors Act o f 1899 was not intended t o p ro v id e e x c l u s i v e remedies and procedures, the United States could r e c o v e r expenses o f removing s h ip s that were blocking passages. 10 Congress has the power to circumscribe fee s h i f t - ing, c i t i n g Fleischmann as an example o f where that had been done by the enactment o f a statute that deta i led the remedies ava i lab le . In the present case, the government abandoned the p o s i t i o n i t had su cce s s fu l ly urged in Brown, and argued (without c i t i n g or d iscussing Brown) that T i t l e VII did not e x c lu s ive ly govern r e l i e f . Rather, there remained in the courts a residual power t o award co u n s e l f e e s independent o f § 2000e-5(k). The Court o f Appeals accepted that argument by d ist inguish ing Fleischmann and without d i s c u s s i n g the language in Brown quoted above which held that the sect ion governs "such issues as . . . a t torneys ' f e e s . " < In reaching i t s dec is ion the court below held that fees could be awarded despite the language p roh ib i t ing awards in favor o f the United States. That dec is ion is squarely in c o n f l i c t with numer ous dec is ions of th is Court upholding the f i r s t and most basic canon o f s tatutory construct ion that : The p la in , obvious, and rat iona l meaning o f a s t a t u t e i s always t o be p r e f e r r e d to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the e x ig e n c y o f a hard case and the ingenuity and study o f an acute and powerful i n t e l l e c t would d iscover . Lynch v, Alworth-Stephens Co. , 267 U.S 364, 370 (1924); Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S 840, 848 (1976). 11 P e t i t i o n e r ' s p o s i t i o n is simple: the statute means p re c i s e ly what i t says. Under no circum stances is the government to rece ive counsel fees . When a private p l a i n t i f f prevai ls he w i l l rece ive f e e s as a matter o f c o u rse e x c e p t under very l i m i t e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s , ( Newman v . P i g g i e Park Enterpr ises , 390 U.S. 400 (1968 ) ) . A private , or state or l o c a l government, employer may rece ive fees when an act ion has been brought to harass or v e x a t i o u s ly ( Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978 ) ) . But the United States may n o t . It is c lear that Congress be l iev es that that is what the language o f the statute means*. During the debate over the C iv i l Rights Attorneys ' Fees Act o f 1976, a statute designed to bring about uniformity in the various c i v i l r ights statutes with regard to attorneys ' fees , the question of the circumstances under which defendants could 3/rece ive fees was was ra ise d .— In two co l loquys _3/ This Court has r e l i e d on the l e g i s l a t i v e h is to ry o f the 1976 Act in interpret ing T i t l e IX o f the Education Amendments o f 1972, as well as T i t l e VI o f the C i v i l R ights Act o f 1964. In Cannon v. University o f Chicago, U.S. , 60 L . Ed. 2d 560, 569 n . 7 ( 1979TT I t was noted t h a t : 12 involv ing Rep. Drinan, the f l o o r leader for the b i l l in the House o f Reprsentat ives , i t was made c le a r that language id e n t ica l to that found in § 2000e-5(k)— was intended to be a "proh ib i t ion against the United States recover ing attorneys f e e s " , "under any thes is or under any hypothe s i s . " — Thus, not only does the d ec is ion o f the 3/ c o n t ' d . Although we cannot a c c o r d these remarks the weight o f contemporary l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y , we would be remiss i f we ignored these author itat ive expressions concerning the scope and purpose o f T i t l e IX and i t s place within "the c i v i l r ights enforcement scheme" that s u c c e s s i v e Congresses have created over the past 110 years. 4 / 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides, in pertinent part, t h a t : . . . In any ac t ion or proceeding to enforce a p r o v i s i o n o f s e c t i o n s 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 o f th is t i t l e . . . or T i t l e VI o f the C i v i l R ights Act o f 1964, the court , in i t s d i s c r e t io n , may allow the pre va i l in g party, other than the United States, a reasonable a t to rney 's fee as part o f the c o s t s . 5 / MR. McCLORY. * * * * It is my understanding that the Senate b i l l provides fo r the allowance o f fees to attorneys who p re va i l , for the p l a i n t i f f i f the p l a i n t i f f prevai ls in court, or for the defendant i f the defendant preva i ls , or with 13 - court below f l y in the face o f c l e a r statutory language, but i t resu lts in curious anomaly. I f the United States i s sued pursuant to T i t l e VI o f the C iv i l Rights Act o f 1964, the award o f counsel 5 / cont ' d . respect to su its which are brought involving the Internal Revenue Code, i f the defendant preva i ls and can show that such act ion was f i l e d in bad f a i t h . In o th e r words, the United S ta te s i s e x c lu d e d from any a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s under any t h e s i s or under any hypothesis that we might present with regard to th is l e g i s l a t i o n . * * * * * There i s a p r o h i b i t i o n ag a in s t the United S ta te s r e c o v e r i n g a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s e i ther in a c i v i l r ights case or in income tax matters. MR. DRINAN. That is pervasive in the whole United States Code. 122 Cong. Rec. H .12152 ( d a i ly ed. Oct. 1, 1976). MR. WHITE . . . . Does th is act we are attempting t o pass now supersede the court d e c is io n s . In other words, would the defendant get an equal oppor tunity to rece ive attorneys fees , or i s the defendant who prevai ls going to be l imited as to whether or not there is a su it brought m alic ious ly or in harassment or with other qual i fy ing features? 14 - fees is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The l e g i s la t iv e h i s t o r y o f that statute (see fn. 5, supra) makes i t c l e a r that the government may not have counsel fees awarded even in a case found to be brought m a l i c i o u s l y . I f the United S ta te s is sued pursuant to T i t l e VII o f the same a c t , a c c o r d i n g to the co u r t be low , i t may r e c e i v e counsel fees under the same circumstances. I t is d i f f i c u l t t o b e l i e v e that Congress co u ld have intended such a resu l t . I I . This Case Presents An Issue o f Substantial National Importance Involving The Enforcement o f The C iv i l Rights Acts Faced with the language o f the s t a t u t e , Congressional intent in enacting the 1972 amend- 5/ c o n t ' d . MR. DRINAN. I f the gentlemen w i l l y i e ld , I w i l l state that the U.S. Government may not hav e a t t o r n e y f e e s a w a r d e d . In o t h e r cases, i t belongs in the proper d is c r e t io n o f the judge. I f the suit is o f a vexatious and h a r a s s in g n a tu re , the defendant o b v i o u s l y should be given his reasonable attorney fees . I think i t is a l l c a r e fu l ly regulated by a body o f law which goes back at l e a s t 50 years. (Emphasis added. ) 122 Cong. Rec. H. 12155 (da i ly ed. Oct. 1, 1976). 15 - ments, and Congress' understanding that the United S ta te s may not r e c e i v e co u n s e l f e e s in c i v i l r ights cases under any circumstances, the court below rested i t s dec is ion on i t s view as to the appropriate p o l i cy considerat ions in determining whether fees should go to the government. In the c o u r t ' s view, the p o l i cy o f deterr ing baseless lawsuits should apply to cases brought against the government. P e t i t io n e r urges f i r s t , that for the court to subst i tu te i t s judgment as to proper p o l i c y fo r that c l e a r l y expressed by Congress, is in c o n f l i c t with th is Court 's d e c i s io n in Chandler v. Roude- bush_, 425 U.S 840 (1976). There, the government argued that d e s p i t e the c l e a r language o f the s tatute , a f ederal employee should not rece ive a t r i a l de_ novo in a T i t l e VII ac t ion , because such t r i a l s would defeat the underlying p o l i c i e s of the statute . This Court r e je c te d the argument on the ground that , "Congress has made the choice , and i t is not for us to disturb i t . " 425 U.S. at 863-64. Similarly here, Congress has chosen to deny the United States the r ight to counsel fees , and that c h o i c e i s b in d in g on the c o u r t s . —̂ 6/ In a rather c ryp t i c footnote the court below suggests that there might be some c o n s t i tu t io n a l impediment to Congress ' denying counsel fees to the government. See, App. , P. 22a, n.69. How- 16 Second, p e t i t i o n e r urges that the court below improperly balanced the p o l i c y in teres ts involved and ignored those considerat ions which support the Congressional choice to deny fees to the govern ment. When i t passed the 1972 amendment to T i t l e VII, Congress was acutely aware o f the necess i ty for c o r rec t in g entrenched discr imination in the federal s e rv ice . The Senate Committee Report on S. 2515, the Senate vers ion o f the 1972 Act, em phasized the spec ia l importance o f moving against discr imination in Federal Employment:—̂ The Federal government, with 2 .6 m i l l i o n employees, is the single largest employer in the Nation. It a lso comprises the central policymaking and administrative network for the N at ion . C on sequ ent ly , i t s p o l i c i e s , ac t ions , and programs strongly inf luence the 6/ c o n t 'd . ever, th is Court has already made i t c lear that Congress has the power to c i r c u m s c r i b e " f e e - s h i f t i n g " even where i t "would be a p p r o p r ia te as a matter o f e q u i t y . " Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9 (1973). JJ The l e g i s l a t i v e h is to ry o f the 1972 amend ments o f T i t l e VII has been compiled in Sub Com. on Labor o f the Senate Comm, on Labor and Public Welfare, Leg is la t ive History o f the Equal Employ ment Opportunity Act o f 1972 (Comm. Print 1972) (here inafter "Leg is la t ive H istory " ) . 17 a c t i v i t i e s o f a l l other enterpr ises , organ iza t ions and groups. In no area is govern ment a c t i o n more important thatn in the area o f c i v i l r ig h t . 8/ During the debates and in the House and Senate reports , excerpts were taken from a study released by the C iv i l Service Commission, Minority Group Employment in the F e d e ra l Government, ( 1 9 7 0 ) , which showed that m inor it ies represented 19.4% o f the t o t a l employment in the federal government, but that they were heavi ly concentrated in the lower grade l e v e l s . — In view o f these s t a t i s t i c s , the Senate Committee Report explained that there was a p ar t i cu lar need not only to improve the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e s s f o r d e a l i n g with d iscr imination , but also to ensure free access to the courts . The provis ions adopted by the committee w i l l enable the Commission to grant f u l l r e l i e f to aggrieved employees, or appl icants , including back pay and immediate advancement as appro p r i a t e . . . . The b i l l . . . e n ab les the aggr i eved Federal employee (or applicant fo r employment) to f i l e an act ion in the appro p r i a t e U.S. d i s t r i c t c o u r t . . . . 10/ 8/ L eg is la t ive History at 421. 2J i d . at 422. 43.4% o f the workers in the lowest 8 o f the 18 GS (General Schedule) grades were minority. S im ilar ly , 76.7% o f women employ ees were in grades GS-1 through GS-6. 10/ Id. at 425. 18 See, Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. at 827-28. Congress be l ieved , then, that the need for aggrieved federal employees to bring T i t l e VII su its was e s p e c ia l ly great ; there fore , the de terrent o f the prospect o f l i a b i l i t y for fees i f the employee l o s e s , would be p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e . I t must a l s o be assumed that Congress was aware that there were other deter rents t o the bringing o f baseless lawsuits. Any p l a i n t i f f i s f a c e d , in such l i t i g a t i o n , with taking on the government and i t s vast resources o f attorneys, funds, and support personnel. I f the suit is l o s t , the p l a i n t i f f w i l l be l i a b le for c o s t s , which can be substantial in a T i t l e VII s u i t , and which the government is not prohibited from recovering by § 2000e-5 (k ) .— ̂ Thus, i t was 11/ The Department o f Just ice has adopted the p o l i c y o f seeking cos ts in T i t l e VII su its only where the p l a i n t i f f brought the a c t i o n in bad f a i t h , the s u i t was pursued in a h a r a s s in g or v e x a t i o u s manner, or a c la im was l i t i g a t e d that was patent ly goundless or f r iv o lo u s . Mem orandum To A l l General Counsels and A l l United S ta te s A t to r n e y s from the A s s i s t a n t A ttorney General, C iv i l D iv is ion , Apri l 14, 1978. See, Jaspers v. Alexander, 15 FEP Cases 1234 (D.D.C. 1977) . The Department o f J u s t i c e memorandum states that "motions for costs are intended to deter baseless or unreasonable c la im s . " 19 reasonable for Congress to decide to exclude the additonal threat o f a counsel fee award. When one l o o k s to the en forcem ent scheme e s t a b l i s h e d by T i t l e V I I , i t i s apparent that there i s a c l e a r b a s i s f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e tween the f e d e r a l government and o ther d e f e n dant employers when i t comes t o a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . The f e d e r a l government has s u b s t a n t i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r e n f o r c i n g the p r o v i s i o n s o f T i t l e VII against private and state and l o ca l government employers. The r e s p o n s ib i l i t y goes beyond administrative enforcement since the EEOC and the Department o f Just ice have the authority both to bring o r i g i n a l l y , and to intervene in, court act ions . Because a major ro le enforcement o f the Act l i e s with the public attorney general, i t was reasonable for Congress to decide that not a l l act ions by would-be private attorneys general should be encouraged . Thus, c o u n s e l fees are obtainable by a private or state or l o ca l govern ment employer in cases that are found to have been unfounded and vexatious . On the other hand, the sole means of court en forcem ent o f T i t l e VII ag a in s t the f e d e r a l government l i e s with private persons. There is no publ ic attorney general who can bring such law 20 su i t s . Given this f a c t , and given the great imbalance o f resources already e x is t in g between a single federal employee on the one hand, and the federal government on the other, i t was wholly r e a s o n a b le f o r Congress to d e c id e that the in terrorem e f f e c t o f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f an award of counsel fees under any circumstances would s e r i ously in h ib i t the enforcement o f the Act. Indeed, Congress made p re c i s e ly this judgment when i t , in 1964, barred awards o f counsel fees in behalf o f the government as a p l a i n t i f f . To our knowledge , the United S ta te s has never sought counsel fees under the American rule when i t was . . 1 3 / 'the p l a i n t i f f in a T i t l e VII a c t i o n .— However, i t is poss ib le for a defendant to l i t i g a t e a case in bad f a i t h and w ith "o bd u ra te o b s t i n a n c e " ; counsel fees have indeed been awarded to p r e v a i l ing p l a i n t i f f s under such circumstances. See, e - g •, Bell v. School Board o f Powhatan County, 321 F. 2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963). The p o l i c y cons idera t ions underlying T i t l e VII — the e f f e c t i v e and 12/ See, Parker v. Ca l i fano , 561 F.2d 320, 331 (D.C. Cir . 1977). 13/ Indeed , in the b r i e f f i l e d by the United States in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, No. 76-1383, i t was acknowledged that under § 2000e- 5 (k ) , " . . . the Commission cannot recover a t t o r ney 's fees as p l a i n t i f f . " Brie f for Respondent, p . 24. 21 speedy ending o f employment d iscr im inat ion— would be served by allowing the United States counsel fees where a defendant employer has l i t i g a t e d in bad fa i th and for delay. Nevertheless, Congress c l e a r ly declined to allow them, again because o f the imbalance o f resources when the United States . . 14/is a l i t i g a n t — . Congress has con s is te n t ly determined to keep from the government the weapon o f a t t o r n e y ' s fees because o f the oppressive impact i t s threat could have on the other l i t i g a n t . The dec is ion o f the court below thus has broad implicat ions . By permitt ing counsel fees to the government when i t is the defendant employer the dec is ion creates a dissymemtry in the congress iona l ly mandated scheme that is without j u s t i f i c a t i o n , i s contrary to the p o l i c i e s o f T i t l e VII, and could have a s ig n i f i c a n t impact on c i v i l r i g h t s enforcement a c r o s s the nat ion. lb_/ See, e . g . , the remarks of Rep. Senner at 110 Cong. Rec. 1640 (1964), d iscuss ing the attorneys ' f e e s p r o v i s i o n in T i t l e I I o f the 1964 Act . After pointing out that under the sect ion , the language o f which is id e n t ica l to that enacted in T i t l e VII, private p l a i n t i f f s and defendants could get attorneys ' fees as part of the costs , Rep. Senner s tated , "The United States, however, could not r e c o v e r any amount f o r a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s i f i t won . . . . " 22 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons the p e t i t i o n for a w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i shou ld be granted and the d e c i s io n o f the court below reversed. Respect fu l ly submitted, JACK GREENBERG JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON BILL LANN LEE Suite 2030 10 Columbus Circ le New York, New York 10019 ALEXANDER G. PARK 910 17th Street N.W. Suite 812 Washington, D.C. 10006 Attorneys for Pet i t ioner APPENDIX Decisions of the Courts Below. * B* la N o ti« : This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication ̂ e“ er^L Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested notify the Clerk o f any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. IlntfrZi States (Ernst uf Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 77-2059 Barbara N. Copeland, appellant v. Sam uel R. Martinez, Director Community Services Administration No. 77-2060 Barbara N. Copeland, appellan t v. Sam uel R. Martinez, Director Community Services Administration Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. Civil 76-1156) C°sts bf filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out of time. Argued 16 November 1978 Decided 24 July 1979 Charles Stephen Ralston with whom Alexander G. Park and BUI Lann Lee were on the brief, for appellant. Alice L. Mattice, Attorney, Department of Justice, a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of Massa chusetts pro hac vice by special leave of Court with whom Earl J. Silbert, United States Attorney, Barbara Allen Babcock, Assistant Attorney General and Robert E. Kopp, Attorney, Department of Justice, were on the brief, for appellee. Charles E. Hill and Douglas L. Parker were on the brief, for Amicus Curiae, urging reversal. _ -AJso Paul Blankenstein, Attorney, Department of Jus tice entered an appearance, for appellee. Before: W right, Chief Judge, M cGow an and W ilkey , Circuit Judges Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit-Judge W ilkey . W ilk ey , Circuit Judge: The sole question in this ap peal is whether the District Court may award attorneys' fees to the United States in a case where it has been sued “vexatiously and in bad faith” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Appellant maintains that such an award is barred by the plain language of the provision for attorneys' fees contained in the Act. We disagree. In light of the Act’s legislative history and underlying purposes, we think that it left undisturbed the equitable principles which historically have permitted a court discretion^0 award attorneys’ fees in circumstances like those of this case. Accordingly, we affirm the judg ment of the district court.1 judgment entered this date 1 *[û ge Pratt’s opinion is reported at 435 F. Supp. 1178 (D.D.C. 1977). I. Facts The facts of this case, as they were found by the trial court, are not disputed and may be recounted briefly. Plaintiff-appellant, Ms. Copeland, is a black woman em ployed by the Community Services Administration. Since 1974 she has worked as a program specialist of grade GS-11 in the Office of Human Rights, previously she held other positions with the CSA and its predecessor agency, the Office of Equal Opportunity. Plaintiff’s two most recent promotions were the result of filing grievances unrelated to racial or sex discrimination. From April 1975 through December 1976 plaintiff’s supervisor was Carlos Ruiz, the Associate Director for Human Rights at CSA, against whom plaintiff filed un successfully some nine grievances and Equal Employ ment Opportunity (EEO) complaints. A complaint filed with the CSA on 27 June 1975 is the subject of this suit. It alleged, inter alia., that plaintiff was denied career ladder promotions and merit promotions, was denied the opportunity for training, and was harassed by her super visors, all because of her race and sex. m -After a trial the district court found that plaintiff had “ failed to establish even a prima facie case of discrimi nation.” 2 The court observed that at all relevant times blacks comprised 80 percent of the staff of the Office of Human Rights, that women outnumbered men by a ratio of two to one, and that Ruiz had “promoted mostly black females.” 3 The court specifically found that plaintiff had proffered “no credible evidence” to substantiate her al legations. Rather, the evidence showed that the promo tions in question had been denied for wholly objective and permissible reasons. 3 a 2 Id. at 1181. 3 Id. at 1179. Finding, moreover, that the plaintiff had “ acted vexa- tiously, maliciously, and in bad faith” 4 in maintaining the suit, and in so doing had “ intentionally abused the judicial process,” 5 the district court awarded the govern ment reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of its costs. The court found specifically that plaintiff had presented “no evidence” of discrimination “ other than her bald, ab stract, and repetitive allegations.” 6 Both of plaintiff’s witnesses “were shown to be intensely biased” against Mr. Ruiz; and one admitted to “hav[ing] designs” on Mr. Ruiz’s job.T Plaintiff and this witness were “ completely incredible” and were found to be “conduct [ing] a ven detta” against Mr. Ruiz and others in the CSA manage ment, “harassing them by virtually every means avail able including use of the EEO process to bring baseless charges of discrimination.” 8 The instant suit, the court concluded, was the “culmination of a long series of in tentionally vindictive and abusive actions taken to harass [plaintiff’s] superiors.” 9 The district court relied, in making the award, on traditional equitable principles, “ separate and apart from [Title V II] ,” 10 permitting an award of fees to a litigant if the losing party has acted in bad faith. Plaintiff, not disputing the district court’s finding of bad faith, brought this appeal solely to review the legal question whether the attorneys’ fee provision of Title VII permits an award to a government defendant “under any circumstances.” 11 * Id. at 1181. *Id. • Id. at 1180. 'Id. 8 Id. at 1180-81. •Id. 10 Id. at 1181 n.3. 11 Brief for Plaintiff at 4. 5a II. A n a l y sis A. The American Rule and Its Exception in Cases of Bad Faith Although it is the general rule in the United States that in the absence of a statute “ or enforceable con tract12 13 providing otherwise, each litigant pays his own attorneys’ fees,14 15 16 there exist certain well-settled excep tions permitting an award of fees in particular situations. Thus a court may permit a party preserving or recover ing a fund, benefiting others in the same manner as himself, to recover his costs, including attorneys’ fees, out of the fund or directly from the other parties enjoy ing the benefit.13 Also, “ a court may assess attorneys’ fees for the ‘willful disobedience of a court order . . . as part of the fine to be levied on the defendant . . . . ’ ” 18 Finally, and at issue in this case, a party ordinarily may be permitted his attorneys’ fees “when the losing party has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantoply, or for oppressive reasons . . . . ’ ” 17 12 See note 28 infra. 13 See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. V. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). 14 See Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415 (1978) ; Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. V. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975). 15 See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257-58; Hall V. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1973) ; Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970) ; Sprague V. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) ; Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882). 16 Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258 (quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 386 U.S. at 718 (citing Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923))). 17 Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258-59 (quoting F. D. Rich Co. V. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 6a The rationale for “ fee-shifting” in instances of bad faith is essentially punitive.18 It is contemplated that the assessment of fees in such cases will deter abusive litiga tion in the future, thereby avoiding harassment and protecting the integrity of the judicial process. Of course, recovery of fees incidentally compensates the prevailing party for costs which should not have been incurred, and to that extent it is not inconsistent with the presumption underlying the general rule disfavoring fee awards, that the parties act in good faith, although not with perfect knowledge of the merits of their claims. Relying upon this exception, courts have assessed attorneys’ fees against both plaintiffs and defendants shown to have acted in bad faith.19 In the instant case it is not disputed that plaintiff acted in bad faith in bringing her Title VII suit, nor is it disputed that factually this case falls well within the equitable exception permitting an award of fees when compelled by “ overriding considerations' of jus tice.” 20 That is, of course, not an end to the matter, “ for even where ‘fee-shifting5 would be appropriate as a matter of equity, Congress has the power to circum scribe such relief.” 21 Although “ Congress has not re pudiated the judicially fashionable exceptions to the gen- (1974); Newman V. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968) ; Vaughn V. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962) ; Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951); 6 J. M oore, Federal Practice, 54.77 (2), at 1709 (2d ed. 1972) ; see generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 H arv. L. R ev. 849, 889-95 (1975). M Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. at 5. 19 See Dawson, supra note 17, at 890 nn.155-56 (citing cases). 20 Fleischmann Corp., 386 U.S. at 718. 81 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. at 9. eral rule against allowing substantial attorneys’ fees,” 22 still, as the Supreme Court restated in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, “ the circumstances under which attorneys’ fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making those awards [in suits brought under federal law] are matters for Congress to determine.” 23 Plaintiff contends that Congress in this case has fore closed an award of fees to the United States “under any circumstances.” 24 The putatively preemptive language is contained in § 706 (k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,25 which was made applicable to employment discrimination suits against the federal government in 1972 by the addition to Title VII of § 717(d).26 Section 706(k) pro vides as follows: In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the [Equal Employment Oppor tunity] Commission or the United States, a reason able attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.27 Title VII is thus one of numerous statutes “granting or protecting various federal rights” 28 which contain ex press exceptions to the general rule against recovery of 22 Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260. 23 Id. at 262. 24 Brief for Plaintiff at 6. 28 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) (1976). 28 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, sec. 11, § 717, 86 Stat. 103, 111, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 16(d) (1976). 27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) (1976). 28 Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260 & nn.33-35 (collecting statutes) ; Christianburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 415-16 nn.5-7 (col lecting statutes). attorneys’ fees. Much of the law governing fee awards under § 706 (k) is settled. Thus, an individual prevailing as a plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit, in cluding one brought against the federal government, “ or dinarily is to be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances.” 29 Also, the provision has been construed to permit an award of fees to a private employer who prevails, upon a finding that a suit, including one brought by the United States, was “ frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” 30 Plaintiff naturally concedes that had her suit been one against a private employer, the award of attorneys’ fees would have been appropriate. Plaintiff argues rather plausibly, however, that the language of § 706 (k), allow ing fees to prevailing parties “ other than the Commission or the United States” 31 may fairly be read as a general prohibition of awards in favor of the federal government. We do not find the statutory language so unambiguous, however. Moreover, nothing in the concededly sparse legislative history evinces any intent to extinguish, in suits involving the federal government, the historic power of equity courts to assess attorneys’ fees against a party who has acted in bad faith.32 And we decline to infer such an intent, especially when to do so would plainly contradict one of the acknowledged purposes of § 706 (k) — “to ‘deter the bringing of lawsuits without founda tion.’ ” 33 39 Id. at 417 (footnote omitted); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975) ; see also Northcross V. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973). 30 Christianburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421. 3142 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k) (1976) (emphasis added). 32 See notes 40-48 and accompanying text infra. 33 Christianburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 420 (quoting remarks of Senator Lausche, 110 Co n g. R ec. 13668 (1964)). B. Congressional Intent Governing § 706 (k) The parties have fashioned predictably differing argu ments from four sorts of evidence of what Congress may be supposed to have intended. We review in turn (1) the language of § 706(k), (2) its legislative history and that of comparable provisions, (3) probable inferences from the structure of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and (4) the apparent purposes underlying the fee provision. 1. Statutory Language Until Title VII was amended by the Equal Employ ment Opportunity Act of 1972, it did not permit employ ment discrimination suits against the federal government. Consequently, prior to the amendments, the United States (or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) could appear in a Title VII suit only as a plaintiff, bring ing or intervening in a suit on behalf of a private or non- federal government employee.34 These were the only in stances to which the language affecting fee recovery by the U.S. could apply. And in these instances, if the United States or the Commission prevailed in the suit, it clearly could not recover attorneys’ fees under § 706 (k) in the same manner as other prevailing plaintiffs could. Federal employment discrimination was proscribed by § 717 added to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 35 by a 1972 amendment.38 Section 717(c)37 permits an aggrieved em ployee to file a civil action in a federal court seeking 34 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 706, 707, 78 Stat. 259, 261 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-6 (1976)). 35 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976). 36 See note 26 supra. 37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1976). review of his claim of employment discrimination after relief has been denied in the agency which is alleged to have discriminated. Section 706(f) through (k), gov erning various precedural matters, were incorporated by § 717(d)38 “ as applicable” to suits by federal employees. Section 706 (k) is, of course, the attorneys’ fees provision with which we are concerned. Plaintiff, somewhat indifferent to the manner in which the various provisions were accreted, argues that their intended operation is apparent. Plaintiff supposes ini tially that the United States was prevented by § 706 (k) from recovering fees as a plaintiff “under any circum stances.” From this plaintiff concludes that § 706 (k) , made applicable to suits against the federal government by § 717 (d ) , likewise forecloses an award on behalf of the United States as a defendant in all cases. We have al ready noted that plaintiff’s construction is linguistically plausible. It is not, however, the only sensible reading of the statute; nor is it the one we suppose most har monious with the purposes of the Act. The government, of course, takes a quite different posi tion. It suggests that the language prohibiting awards to the United States may apply only where the government is a plaintiff, the circumstance contemplated when the language was composed in 1964. Thus the government opines that § 706 (k) may in fact affirmatively authorize the award of attorneys’ fees to the United States as a defendant in the same manner as it authorizes the award of fees to a prevailing defendant in the private sector. Whether the language of § 706 (k) may be parsed in the somewhat extraordinary manner suggested by the gov ernment, the instant case does not require us to decide. We hold only, as the government alternatively argues, that § 706 (k) does not preclude a court from awarding 88 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (d) (1976). 11 a the United States its attorneys’ fees when it has been sued in bad faith. We think the excepting language, supposing it ap plicable to the federal government as a defendant, was meant to exclude the United States only from the sta tu tory allowance of fees, governed by the expansive “pre vailing party” standard, and to leave undisturbed the narrow equitable exception in cases of bad faith.39 This construction appears to us both unstrained and ultimately more consistent with the purposes of § 706 (k) than that advanced by plaintiff. 39 Although it might have been rational for Congress in 1972 to have concluded that the United States as a defendant should be entitled to its attorneys’ fees in the same manner as other defendants, it is improbable that it would have chosen to do so through the language of §§ 717(d) and 706(k). Section 717(d) incorporates § 706 (k) “as applicable” to suits against the federal government. It js undisputed that § 706 (k) applies to such suits at least insofar as it per mits awards to prevailing plaintiffs. We think it fairly im plausible that Congress intended through § 717 (d) to incor porate all of § 706(k) save for the phrase “other than the . . . United States.” Rather, a more sensible reading of the sections is that when the federal government is a defend ant, it is a “party” within § 706 (k) and as such is excluded from the statutory recovery of fees just as it is as a plaintiff. We are especially hesitant to reach a contrary construction which, having no warrant in the text, is not compelled by an unambiguous Congressional purpose. No such purpose is apparent. Finally, it may be argued that if the same standard applies to the federal government, whether a plaintiff or defendant, it should in both cases preclude recovery on equitable grounds. Although in some circumstances we might conclude that a statutory provision for attorneys’ fees had preempted pre existing equitable grounds, see Christianburg Garm ent Co., 434 U.S. at 419 n.13; cf. B yram Concretanks, Inc. v. W arren Concrete Prods. Co., 374 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1967), we do not think that is this case, see pp. 15-17 infra. 12 a The parties are in agreement that pertinent legisla tive history is sparse and fairly unenlightening. Some what relevant is a colloquy between Senator Dominick and Senator Javits in the course of debate on the 1972 amendments. Senator Dominick had submitted an amend ment to the pending Senate bill which, inter alia, would have struck the provision which became § 717(d), in corporating § 706(k). Senator Javits, in turn, intro duced an amendment striking that portion of the Domi nick amendment, which Senator Dominick accepted.*0 It *° Senator Javits, offering the amendment to strike, said: If you refer to those provisions, insofar as they are applicable, you find that the main point is that where the complainant is suing in court, you have arrived at the stage of the proceeding where he has that remedy, and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for the complainant and authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or security. Mr. President, that is a very important right for the individual, just as it is a very important right for a Gov ernment employee, for the individuals involved are not, in the main, high salaried, in that those who would be likely to sue in these equal employment opportunity cases are fairly modest people. So I see no reason, Mr. President, why in the one case, to wit, that of the normal complainant who is not a Gov ernment employee with a remedy in court, that com plainant shall be the beneficiary of a court-appointed lawyer, and not have to pay these costs or securities, and why this provision should be stricken out when it comes to a Federal Government employee who has to sue and is also a person, because that is the generality of the cases, of modest means. So the motion which I make is to strike out the pro vision of the Dominick amendment which would withdraw that opportunity from a Government employee. I do not see how we can very well make that distinction. [Continued] 2. Legislative H istory appears from the exchange, as we observed in Parker V. Califano,41 that both Senators were concerned that federal employees be assured certain assistance afforded private litigants, including the customary award of at torneys’ fees to the prevailing party. That Congress in tended to permit prevailing federal employees to recover their attorneys’ fees is unexceptionable. The colloquy sheds little light, however, on the matter sub judice, ex cept insofar as the Senators, aware that § 706 (k) ap plied to suits against the federal government, may be charged with intending one or another somewhat probable construction of the statutory language. Thus we are again remitted to linguistic argument, and we have already concluded that the text is not dispositive. In sum, we think it fair to say that the 1972 legislative history is 40 [Continued] 118 Cong. Rec. at 954 (1972). Senator Dominick accepted the amendment and stated: Mr. President, I want to say for the record that this particular amendment language was included, as the spe cific provisions of the bill deal only with Federal em ployees for whom we had a different procedure. They go through their own agencies and then they have the right as a Federal employee to go to the civil service board or to go through the Federal court system. The amendment to strike the language was included because the language to be struck was thought to be inappropriate to the specialized grievance procedures adopted in com mittee for Federal employees. A closer reading of sec. 706(g) through (w) [the provisions that would have been stricken by the proposed Dominick amendment] does indicate that language for providing attorney’s fees and waiving court costs are applicable. Therefore, I have no objection to the Senator’s amend ment, and if he would want to withdraw his yea and nay request, that would be fine with me, and we can accept the amendment. 118 Cong. Rec. 956 (1972). 41561 F.2d 320, 335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1977). unilluminating. We observe merely that our construc tion is not inconsistent with what little history there is.4* More helpful to plaintiff’s argument are portions of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976.42 43 The Act permits the courts to award attorneys’ fees to the “prevailing party, other than the United States” in suits brought under a number of statutes,44 at least one of which contemplates suits against the United States.45 46 The Senate Report states that the Act “ follows the language of Title II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” and that “ [i]t is intended that the standards for awarding fees be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.” 48 Moreover, the bill’s sponsors in the House of Representatives apparently thought not only that the rule in the 1976 statute was the same as that in the earlier acts, but also that under that rule, “ the United States is excluded from any attorneys’ fees under any thesis or under any hypothesis.” 47 42 For a review of such legislative history as exists, see P arker V. Califano, 561 F.2d at 333-39. 43 Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 44 The Act permits an award of attorney’s fees to the “pre vailing party” in actions brought under seven specific sections of the United States Code: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982,1983, 1985, 1986, & 2000 d. et seq .; and 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) ; H. Rep. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976). . 48 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 d. et seq. (1976); Adam s V. Rich ardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 46 S. R ep. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 4 (1976). 47 122 Co n g. Rec. H12152 (daily ed. 1 Oct. 1976) (remarks of Congressman McClory) ; see also id. at H12155 (remarks of Congressman Drinan). 14a Although the cited passages from the legislative his tory of the 1976 Act deserve some weight “ ‘as a sec ondarily authoritative expression of expert opinion,’ ” 48 they are not nearly as persuasive as would be statements made contemporaneously with the enactment of the statute we are construing. Consequently although the question is not free of difficulty, we are not convinced by these casual subsequent remarks that Congress, acting in 1972, intended to foreclose an award of attorneys’ fees to the United States in such cases as this. 3. Inferences from the Structure of Title VII Plaintiff advances a second, somewhat different theory of preemption relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co/'3 In Fleischmann the Supreme Court held that § 35 of the Lanham A ct40 precluded an award of attorneys’ fees as a separate element of recovery in a suit for trademark infringement. The Court reasoned that, since § 35 “meticulously detailed the remedies available to a plaintiff who proves that his valid trademark has been infringed,” Congress must have intended the express remedial pro visions of § 35 “ to mark the boundaries of the power to award monetary relief in cases arising under the Act.” 41 Plaintiff contends that, whether or not the legislative his tory expressly discloses any relevant intent, the reason ing of Fleischmann dictates a similar result in this case. Recalling for her minor premise that the Supreme Court in Brown v. General Services Administration said that Title VII’s “ careful blend of administrative and judicial ‘a Parker V. Califano, 561 F.2d at 339 (quoting Bobsee Corp. V. United States, 411 F.2d 231, 237 n. 18 (5th Cir. 1969)). "386 U.S. 714 (1967). 50 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976). n Fleischmann Corp., 386 U.S. at 719, 721. 15a lfc enforcement powers” 52 were intended to be “ exclusive and pre-emptive,” 53 plaintiff concludes that the question of attorneys’ fees is governed exclusively by § 706 (k). Plaintiff’s reliance on Fleischmann appears somewhat curious. At issue in Fleischmann was the judge-made rule permitting an award of attorneys’ fees upon a show ing that a trademark had been infringed deliberately or willfully. The practice, though supported by some ju dicial authority, was not among the customary exceptions to the American rule. The Supreme Court held merely that it would not find an implied exception under a statute which, containing no attorneys’ fees provision whatsoever, otherwise exhaustively prescribed the in tended relief. The instant controversy is quite different. We are required to decide not whether to create a novel exception, but rather whether Congress intended to abro gate a thoroughly settled one. Setting to one side the effect of § 706(k), we are most reluctant to find that Congress has by implication eliminated sound preexisting grounds for an award of attorneys’ fees.54 Moreover, not only is Title VII’s open-ended provision for any “other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate” 55 unlike the “meticulously detail [ed]” remedies under the Lanham Act,58 but we doubt that even precisely detailed affirma tive relief logically implies anything at all about the court’s inherent power to award fees to a harassed defendant. “ 425 U.S. 820, 833 (1976). 53 Id. at 829. 54 Our reluctance is akin to the presumption against con struing statutes to have abrogated by implication common law rights. See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Co. V. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) ; St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 218 (1961); See generally, 3 J. Su t h e r l a n d, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 61.01, at 41-42 (4th ed., Sands, ed. 1974). “ 42U.S.C. §2000e-5(g) (1976). See also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. at 10; Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. at 391. The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC confirms our view that, at least apart from the prohibition which plaintiff finds in the language of § 706 (k) , the remedial scheme of Title VII did not preempt the customary exceptions to the Ameri can rule. There the Court said: It seems clear, in short, that in enacting § 706 (10 Congress did not intend to permit the award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant only in a situation where the plaintiff was motivated by bad faith in bringing the action. As pointed out in Piggie Park [390 U.S. 400 (1968)], if that had been the intent of Congress, no statutory provision would have been necessary, for it has long been established that even under the American common- law rule attorney’s fees may be awarded against a party who has proceeded in bad faith.57 Thus plaintiff’s preemption argument derives no support from Fleischmann, and we are once again thrown back upon the language of § 706(k), which we find incon clusive. 4. The Purposes of § 706 (k) Finally, we believe an award of attorneys’ fees in this case is wholly consistent with the purposes of § 706 (k). The Supreme Court had occasion in Christianburg to re view those purposes, which are vaguely disclosed by what little history there is from 1964. It said: The only specific reference to § 706 (k) in the leg islative debates indicates that the fee provision was included to “make it easier for a plaintiff of lim ited means to bring a meritorious suit.” [5S] During the Senate floor discussions of the almost identical * 58 ” 434 U.S. at 419. 58 Remarks of Senator Humphrey, 110 Cong. Rec. 12724 (1964). attorney’s fee provision of Title II, however, several Senators explained that its allowance of awards to defendants would serve “to deter the bringing of law suits ‘without foundation,” [89J “ to discourage friv- lous suits,” (6°! and “ to diminish the likelihood of unjustified suits being brought.” [61) If anything can be gleaned from these fragments of legislative his tory, it is that while Congress wanted to clear the way for suits to be brought under the Act, it also wanted to protect defendants from burdensome liti gation having no legal or factual basis.83 Of course, the Court in Christianburg was not constru ing the language which is here alleged to foreclose a recovery by the government. Christianburg dealt with the content of the “prevailing party” standard whose purposes are less directly relevant to this case than the purposes, were they discernible, of the alleged exception for the federal government. Still, inasmuch as the lan guage and history of the exception are inconclusive, it is sensible that the policies framing the section generally should inform as well the construction of its exceptions. The possibility of tension between the purposes de scribed in Christianburg is apparent. The policy ques tion in this case is, simply stated, whether the social benefits of deterring vexatious suits against the govern ment outweigh the social costs arising from the risk that some meritorious suits will be discouraged as well. Plain tiff argues that the Congress in 1972, acutely aware of both the pervasiveness of discrimination in federal em ployment and inadequacy of existing remedies, could not 48 Remarks of Senator Lausche, id., at 13668. 40 Remarks of Senator Pastore, id., at 14214. 41 Remarks of Senator Humphrey, id., at 6534. 42 Christianburg Garm ent Co., 434 U.S. at 420 (original notes renumbered and reproduced as notes 58-61 supra). have intended to create the “deterrent of the prospect of liability for fees if the employee loses.” 63 Such a deter rent is said to be particularly inappropriate inasmuch as the whole initiative for judicial enforcement of Title VII against the federal government lies with the private in dividual. The EEOC and the attorney general are not permitted to proceed against the government as they are against other employers.64 Thus the possibility that the prosecution of meritorious claims might be “chilled” by the likelihood of their being mischaracterized as in bad faith is thought especially pernicious. We think plaintiff’s arguments are largely overdrawn. The alleged chill on potentially valid litigation would occur only if government employees with meritorious Title VII suits believed that courts were likely so to mischaracterize those suits as to find them not only with out merit, but wholly vexatious as well. We do not be lieve either that courts are likely so thoroughly to mis apprehend the character of claims or that prospective plaintiffs are likely to expect such errors. The Supreme Court in Christianburg apparently did not suppose there would be an unacceptable chill if prevailing defendants in the private sector were permitted to recover attorneys’ fees upon a far lesser showing than bad faith (i.e., that the suit was “ frivolous, unreasonable or without founda tion.” )65 Plainly, that possibility is considerably more remote here. Of course, a court must still be wary of indulging post hoc characterizations which neglect the apparent prospects of a claim before trial. The cautionary language of the Court in Christianburg pertains a fortiori in such cases as this: 83 Brief for Plaintiff at 21. 64 Com pare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) w ith 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5 (f). 65 Christianburg Garm ent Co., 434 U.S. at 421. 20a In applying these criteria, it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his ac tion must have been unreasonable or without founda tion. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how honest one’s belief that he has been the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one’s claim may appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable. Decisive facts may not emerge until discovery or trial. The law may change or clarify in the midst of litigation. Even when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an en tirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.66 Thus we contemplate that courts will be appropriately circumspect in finding a party to have acted in bad faith. We doubt that such a finding may be supported without some proof of malice entirely apart from inferences arising from the possibly frivolous character of< a par ticular claim. Only in this manner would we assure a sensible distinction between the contents of the equitable and statutory exceptions to the American rule. If, as seems probable, Congress chose to exclude the United States from the statutory “prevailing party” recovery in all cases, we are obliged to observe closely such a dis tinction. Satisfied, then, that a recovery by the United States in this case will not embarrass the policy of enforce ment, we are naturally more certain that it will help to discourage those few suits whose only motivation is harassment. The Court recognized in Christianburg that though Congress intended that individuals would fully vindicate the antidiscrimination policy of Title VII, still “ 434 U.S. at 421-22. 21a “ it is equally certain that Congress entrusted the ulti mate effectuation of that policy to the adversary judicial process.” 67 It is the need to preserve the integrity of the judicial process which ultimately, in the face of inconclusive statu tory language and legislative history, convinces us that Congress would not have wished to foreclose recovery here. Litigation brought merely to harass is a wholly unredeemed burden and affront to the judiciary. While its unfairness when the defendant is the United States is somewhat more diffuse than the imposition on a pri vate defendant in the same circumstances, it is not more sufferable. We think it unlikely, in light of the purposes of the “bad faith” exception,68 that Congress intended through § 706 (k) to remove the court’s discretion to award attorneys’ fees in such circumstances as these. When, as here, there is a solidly grounded finding by the w Id . at 419. 88 We are somewhat persuaded in our view by the analogous grounds for recovery of fees contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Rule 37 authorizes a court in certain circum stances to assess attorneys’ fees against a party who has abused the discovery process. The theory is essentially the same as that in this case. Fair and liberal discovery is ele mentary to civil litigation. To maintain the process, the award of fees operates as a sanction, deterring abusive prac tices and incidentally compensating the aggrieved party for unnecessary costs. We doubt it would be argued seriously that § 706(k) preempts a recovery of fees under Rule 37. Such a construction would not appear sensible. Rule 37 has a narrow purpose which can be accommodated easily within the framework of §706(k). Moreover, one would expect Congress intended as much. Likewise, we think it unlikely that Congress intended through § 706 (k) to foreclose an award of fees in the exceptional case in which the whole suit is pursued in bad faith. As with Rule 37 it is probable, in light of the purposes of the exception, Congress would have left it alone when it adopted § 706 (k ). trial court of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, a fact finding which this court has no reason to upset, we have no intention of sanctioning bad faith in judicial proceed ings by denying the defendant government its established right to recover attorneys’ fees as a deterrent to bad faith litigants.69 Affirmed. 88 Sufficient abuse of the judicial process could overwhelm the courts and destroy the judicial system as an effective branch of government. This, and any discernible degree there of, such as the bad faith litigation found here, the courts have a constitutional duty to prevent. By our interpretation of the statute involved we have found here no intent of Congress to permit any abuse of the judicial process. 23a OPINION OF THE DISTRICT COURT, AUGUST 22, 1977. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA No. 76-1156 BARBARA N. COPELAND, P l a i n t i f f , v. SAMUEL R. MARTINEZ, Defendant. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW This matter came on f o r t r i a l b e f o r e t h i s Court on June 27, 1977. Having considered a l l the evidence, both test imonial and documentary, the Court enters the fo l lowing Findings o f Fact and Conclusions o f Law. Findings o f Fact 1. P l a i n t i f f is a black female c i t i z e n of the United States who resides in the D is t r i c t o f Columbia. - 24a - 2. Defendant i s the D i r e c t o r and c h i e f e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r o f the Community S e r v i c e s Administration (CSA), an agency o f the Federal Government. 3. P l a i n t i f f is employed as a GS-11 Program S p e c ia l i s t in the O f f i c e o f Human Rights (OHR) o f the CSA. 4. P l a i n t i f f is not a c o l le ge graduate and h o ld s no degree from an i n s t i t u t i o n o f h ig h e r education, although she has a number o f co l lege c r e d i t s . 5. OHR i s the CSA component which dea ls with Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) programs, both within and outs ide the CSA. 6. From Apri l 1, 1975, through the end o f c a le n d a r year 1976, C a r los Ruiz was A s s o c i a t e Director for Human Rights o f the CSA. In that capac ity , Mr. Ruiz administered OHR and served as p l a i n t i f f ' s supervisor. 7. P l a i n t i f f began her term o f f e d e r a l employment as a GS-5 C lerk T y p is t in February 1969 with the O f f i c e o f Equal Opportunity, the p r e d e c e s s o r agency o f CSA. In February 1970, p l a i n t i f f was promoted to Secretary Typist GS-6. P l a i n t i f f was promoted to Administrative Assistant GS-7 in Apri l 1971. In January 1975, p l a i n t i f f was r e t r o a c t iv e ly promoted to Program Assistant GS-9 e f f e c t i v e July 1973 and to Program S pec ia l i s t 25a- GS-11 e f f e c t i v e July 1974, the p o s i t i o n she now h o ld s . 8. P l a i n t i f f ' s las t two grade promotions resu lted from her f i l i n g a grievance and complaint not involv ing race or sex d iscr imination. 9. P l a i n t i f f f i l e d no l e s s than nine grievances and EEO complaints against Carlos Ruiz when he was her superv isor . 10. Throughout her employment w ith the Federal Government, p l a i n t i f f had f i l e d numerous grievances and EEO complaints in addit ion to the one presently before th is Court. 11. P l a i n t i f f has cons is ten t ly used gr iev an ces , t h r e a t s o f f i l i n g g r i e v a n c e s , 'EEO com p l a i n t s , t h r e a t s o f EEO c o m p la in t s , and the EEO process in general to harass her supervisors and to improperly further her career and enhance her o f f i c e status. 12. During the e n t i r e p e r i o d r e l e v a n t t o th is case, blacks comprised 80 percent o f the OHR s t a f f and females outnumbered males by a r a t i o o f two to one. 13. While he headed OHR, Carlos Ruiz pro moted mostly black females. 14a. There i s no c r e d i b l e e v id e n c e that C ar los Ruiz denied p l a i n t i f f a c a r e e r ladder promotion to Program S p ec ia l i s t GS-12 because o f her race a n d /o r sex or as a r e p r i s a l f o r her f i l i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n com pla in ts p r e v i o u s l y . 26a Rather, the e v id e n c e shows that Mr. Ru iz , o b j e c t i v e l y and without regard to i l l e g a l considera t io n s , concluded that the career ladder fo r p la in t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n ended at the GS-11 l e v e l , a conc lusion which was la ter supported by the CSA Director o f Personnel based on an o b je c t iv e and independent desk audit of p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t io n . b. The audit o f p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n was independent of OHR and t o t a l l y in accordance with p ro ce d u re s e s t a b l i s h e d by the C i v i l S e r v i c e Commission. 15. There i s no c r e d i b l e e v id e n c e that C a r los Ruiz den ied p l a i n t i f f the f i r s t merit promotion o f which she complains because o f her race or sex or as a r e p r i s a l for f i l i n g d is c r im i nation complaints previous ly . Rather, the merit promotion announcement resulted in no s e le c t i o n when Mr. Ruiz, o b j e c t i v e l y and without regard to i l l e g a l cons iderat ions , asked fo r a wider search f o r c a n d id a t e s because the q u a l i f i e d l i s t , on which p l a i n t i f f was rated lower than the other candidates, contained only two names, a pract ice that was common when q u a l i f i e d l i s t s contained less than three names. 16a. There i s no c r e d i b l e e v id e n c e that C ar los Ruiz denied p l a i n t i f f the second merit promotion o f which she complains because o f her race or sex or as a r e p r i s a l f o r her f i l i n g d iscr imination complaints previous ly . Rather, Mr. - 27a Ruiz se le c ted a white female because she was rated highest on the q u a l i f i e d l i s t on which p l a i n t i f f was rated lowest. b. With respect to the second merit promo t io n o f which p l a i n t i f f complains, Mr. Ruiz, in the supervisory evaluation which was factored into the q u a l i f i e d l i s t r a t i n g , had r a t e d a b la c k female higher than the success fu l white female. 17. There i s no c r e d i b l e e v id e n c e that C ar loz Ruiz d en ied p l a i n t i f f the t h i r d merit promotion o f which she complains because o f her ra ce or sex or as a r e p r i s a l f o r her f i l i n g d iscr imination complaints previously . Rather, Mr. Ruiz se le c ted a black female because she was rated highest on the qua l i f i e d l i s t on which p l a i n t i f f was rated lowest. 18. Carlos R u i z ' d e c i s i o n r e g a r d in g each meri t promotion o f which p l a i n t i f f complains was b lind as to race , sex, and p l a i n t i f f ' s h is to ry o f f i l i n g complaints and gr ievances; when Mr. Ruiz made a s e le c t i o n , he se lected the highest rated o f the q u a l i f i e d c a n d id a te s s o l e l y because the candidate was rated highest , fo l lowing h is un err ing p rac t i ce and i r resp ec t ive o f his personal v ie w s ; when he asked f o r a wider search , he f o l l o w e d a common p r a c t i c e w i thout regard to i l l e g a l cons iderat ions . - 28a 19a. A b l a c k female e x p e r i e n c e d p e rso n n e l o f f i c i a l compiled the q u a l i f i e d l i s t s on which C a r los Ruiz based h i s d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g the merit promotions of which p l a i n t i f f complains. She gave each candidate scores in various ca te g o r i e s based on her rev iew o f the c a n d i d a t e ' s f ederal employment app l icat ion (Standard Form 171) and superv isor 's evaluat ion. The superv isor 's evaluation counted for a maximum o f 15 points out o f 100 po ints . b. Carlos Ruiz was the supervisor of each candidate rated by the personnel o f f i c i a l . c . Carlos Ruiz rated p l a i n t i f f "not ready" for promotion in his supervisory evaluation of h e r . 20. There is no cred ib le evidence to support p l a i n t i f f ' s a l l e g a t i o n s that she was denied t r a i n i n g because o f her ra ce or sex o r as a re p r i s a l f o r her f i l i n g d iscr iminat ion complaints previous ly . Rather, p l a i n t i f f was denied training because o f the heavy workload of ORR, because o f her c a p a b i l i t i e s or lack thereo f , because of her att i tude toward her work and supervisors , because o f budget l im ita t ion s , or because a l l requests for indiv idual training were being denied, without regard to i l l e g a l cons iderat ions . 21. There is no c red ib le evidence to support p l a i n t i f f ' s a l legat ions that she was denied the opportunity to perform at her f u l l potent ia l and - 29a - harassed by her supervisors because o f her race and sex or as a rep r isa l fo r her f i l i n g d i s c r im i nation complaints previous ly . 22. P l a i n t i f f ' s t e s t im ony c o n t a in e d no e v id e n c e o f i l l e g a l d i s c r i m i n a t o r y treatment o t h e r than her b a ld , a b s t r a c t , and r e p e t i t i v e a l leg a t ions of the same. 23. The testimony o f p l a i n t i f f ' s two w i t nesses other than h e r s e l f contained absolutely no evidence of sex d iscr im inat ion ; one witness spoke in a b s t r a c t terms o f r e p r i s a l , and both spoke o f r a c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in such terms. 24. Both o f p l a i n t i f f ' s nonparty witnesses were shown to be intensely biased against Carlos Ruiz. Both had f i l e d several individual g r i e v ances and EEO complaints against Ruiz. One, 0. Marion Jones , was shown to have d es ig n s on Ruiz' job as Associate Director , a fac t he f i r s t denied but la ter admitted. 25. The tes t im ony o f p l a i n t i f f and Mr. Jones , t h e i r demeanor on the stand , and the documentary evidence submitted by both p l a i n t i f f and defendant demonstrated that both were com p l e t e l y i n c r e d i b l e as w i t n e s s e s . One f a c t o r a f f e c t i n g the Court 's assessment o f the ir c r e d i b i l i t y was the showing and admission by p l a i n t i f f and Mr. Jones that they had fabr icated and sub mitted a supervisory rat ing o f p l a i n t i f f by Mr. Jones m i s r e p r e s e n t i n g that Mr. Jones was her 30a superv isor and that p l a i n t i f f had misrepresented on a Standard Form 171 that Jones, rather than Carlos Ruiz, was her superv isor . 26. To the e x te n t that the tes t im ony o f p l a i n t i f f ' s nonparty w i tn e ss o t h e r than Mr. Jones was re levant, i t was not c red ib le . 27. The testimony o f defendant 's witnesses was en t i re ly c red ib le and supported, complemented, and corroborated by the testimony o f other w i t nesses and by documentary evidence. 28. The evidence demonstrates conc lus ive ly that p l a i n t i f f and Mr. Jones in tent iona l ly con ducted a v e n d e t t a ag a in s t Mr. Ruiz and o th e r members o f the CSA management, h a r a s s in g them by v i r t u a l l y every means avai lab le including use o f the EEO p r o c e s s to b r in g b a s e l e s s charges o f d iscr imination. 29. This c i v i l act ion is an integral part of p l a i n t i f f ' s vendetta against Mr. Ruiz and the CSA management; i t is the culmination o f a long ser ies o f in ten t iona l ly v in d i c t iv e and abusive act ions taken to harass her superv isors . 30. P l a i n t i f f ' s a l legat ions of d iscr imina t ion are baseless and f r iv o lo u s . 31. P l a i n t i f f a c ted v e x a t i o u s l y , m a l i c i o u s ly , and in bad fa ith in bringing and main tain ing th is act ion and has in tent iona l ly abused the j u d i c i a l process . - 31a- CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. P l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h even a prima fa c ie case of d iscr iminat ion based on sex a n d /o r r a c e or as to r e p r i s a l . The de fendant amply demonstrated that no d iscr imination because o f race or sex and no rep r isa l were involved in the treatment o f p l a i n t i f f . As a r e su l t , the case must be dismissed with judgment for the defendant. See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) ; Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 2. Moreover, the Court having found that p l a i n t i f f has brought this act ion in bad fa i th , with an in t e n t to harass her s u p e r v i s o r s and general ly vex the defendant through her abusive c o n d u c t , and that such a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s an i n t e n t i o n a l abuse o f the j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s by p l a i n t i f f , the Court awards defendant his costs of th is l i t i g a t i o n including reasonable attorneys ' f ees . The Court recognizes that attorneys ' fees are not o r d i n a r i l y r e c o v e r a b l e by p r e v a i l i n g part ies in American l i t i g a t i o n . —̂ However, the the instant case f a l l s well within the h i s t o r i c a l l y es tab l ished exception to the American Rule 1/ Alyeska Pipel ine Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc 'y , 421 U.S. 240, 247, 262 (1975); Fleischman D i s t i l l i n g Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. , 386 U.S. 714 (1967). - 32a in that "the los ing party [here] has 'acted in bad fa i t h , vexa t ious ly , wantonly [and] for oppressive r e a s o n s ' . " See Alyeska P i p e l i n e Serv. Co. v . Wilderness S o c ' y , 221 U.S. 240, 259 (1975), quot ing F. D. Rich Co. Inc. v. United States ex r e l 2 /Indus. Lumber Co. , 417 U.S. 166, 129 (1974) .— Further, the Court notes that th is same standard has been applied (and fees awarded thereunder) to an ap p l i ca t ion fo r a t to rney 's fees o f a preva i l ing t i t l e VII defendant in the private sector . See Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ. , 535 F.2d 722 (2nd Cir. 197 6 ) ; U.S. S t e e l Corp. v . U . S . , 517 F.2d 359 (3rd Cir. 1975). T i t l e VII applies equally to the publ ic se c tor as the pr ivate se c to r ; the .rights o f the part ies are the same whether the act ion stems from a s t i t u a t i o n in f e d r a l employment or in employment in other sectors o f the economy. See Chandler v . Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 ( 1 9 7 6 ) . Therefore, th is Court, applying the same standards for attorneys ' fees awards in the instant case as have been previously es tab l ish ed , awards defendant his reasonable attorneys ' fees upon proof o f the 2_/ See a l s o Burgess v . Hampton, C i v i l No. 76-0836 (D.D.C. Jan. VT, 1977); 6 Moore's Federal Practice 1 54 .77 (2 ) , at 7109 (1976). 333- same within a reasonable 3/time.— 3/ In awarding reasonable a ttorneys ' fees to the Government, the Court expressly r e l i e s on e q u i t a b le c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , i m p l i c i t in the American ru le , separate and apart from the statute . T i t l e VII e x p l i c i t l y allows courts in the ir d i s c r e t io n to grant a ttorneys ' fees to "the p rev ia l ing party, o t h e r than the Commission (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) or the United S ta te s . " 42 U.S.C. § 2Q00e-5(k). This s ec t ion was part o f the 1964 C iv i l Rights Act which outlawed private em ployment d iscr iminat ion . I t was then incorporated by re ference in the 1972 amendments to the Act, which extended t i t l e V I I ' s pro tect ions to federal employees. I t seems c lear that an agency o f the federa l government act ing as a party .defendant in a t i t l e VII suit must be e n t i t l e d to at least the same n o n s t a t u t o r y t r a d i t i o n a l remedies avai lable to private employers in the same circum stances. See d iscuss ion o f l e g i s l a t i v e h is to ry in Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 976 & n. 15 (D.C. C i r . 1976). The l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y o f the 1972 amendments is completely s i l e n t as to any intent of such amendments to ban or to allow awards of at torneys ' fees for prevai l ing governmental agency defendants. Therefore, without e x p l i c i t congres sional act ion to the contrary, the customary fee r u l e s o u t l i n e d in A l y e s k a , s u p r a , a p p ly , and defendant in the instant case is e n t i t l e d to fees under that r u l e . See C a rr ion v . Yesh iva Uni v e r s i t y , supra; Burgess v. Hampton, supra; U.S. Stee l Co. v. United States, 519 F .2d 359 (3rd Cir. 1975). 34a 3. The Court awards defendant such costs as he may have expended in l i t i g a t i n g th is act ion upon proof o f same. See, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) . An Order cons istent with the foregoing has been entered th is day. John H. Pratt United States D is t r i c t Judge August 22 1977 - 35a - ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT, AUGUST 22, 1977. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA No. 76-1156 BARBARA N. COPELAND, P l a i n t i f f , v. SAMUEL R. MARTINEZ, Defendant. O R D E R C o n s i s t e n t with the F ind ings o f Fact and Conclusions o f Law entered herein i t is by the Court th is 22nd day o f August, 1977, ORDERED: ( 1 ) Judgment is hereby awarded to defendant and p l a i n t i f f ' s act ion is dismissed with p r e ju d i c e ; ( 2 ) Defendant i s hereby awarded the c o s t s o f t h i s l i t i g a t i o n i n c l u d i n g r e a s o n a b le attorneys ' f ees ; (3) Defendant within twenty (20) days s h a l l make a p p l i c a t i o n t o the Court f o r s a id a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s , s a i d a p p l i c a t i o n to be a c companied by a l l n e c e s s a r y s u p p o r t in g d o cu mentation. John H. Pratt United States D is t r i c t Judge 37a ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT, OCTOBER 7, 1977. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA No. 76-1156 BARBARA N. COPELAND, P l a i n t i f f , v. SAMUEL R. MARTINEZ, De fendant. O R D E R The Court has considered defendant 's Appl ica t i o n For Award o f Costs In c l u d i n g Resonable Attorneys ' Fees, Memorandum in Support thereo f , and the a f f id a v i t s attached thereto . Said Appl i c a t i o n was subm itted pursuant to our Order o f Dismissal of August 22, 1977. Although served with the same on September 16, 1977, n e i t h e r p l a i n t i f f nor her a t t o n r e y o f r e c o r d has made As a resu lt o f i t s cons iderat ion , theresponse. Court f inds that the costs applied for are rea sonable and f u l l y supported by the documentation accompanying the A p p l i c a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y , i t is this 7th day o f October, ORDERED, that: (1) Defendant is awarded costs in the to ta l amount of $3,520.89, including attorneys ' fees in the amount of $3,193.40; (2 ) Defendant is granted judgment against p l a i n t i f f in the f o r e g o i n g t o t a l amount o f $3,520.89. I John H. Pratt United States D is t r i c t Judge MEILEN PRESS !NC. — N. Y. C. 219