Leake v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center Motion for Leave to File and Brief Amicus Curiae

    ORIGINAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

ROBERT LEAKE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

-V-

LONG ISLAND JEWISH MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court 
Eastern District of New York

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE 
FOR THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.

Julius LeVonne Chambers 
Charles Stephen Ralston 

99 Hudson St.,
16th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10013 
(212) 219-1900

Attorneys for Amicus 
Curiae NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund. Inc.



TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................ i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...................................... i
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE ..............  1
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...............................  1
STATEMENT OF THE C A S E ....................................  1
ARGUMENT ..................................................  x

THE CIVIL RIGHTS RESTORATION ACT OF 1988 SHOULD BE 
APPLIED TO CASES PENDING AT THE TIME OF ITS ENACTMENT ......................................  !

CONCLUSION ................................................  6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ....................................  7

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases! Page:

American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council,257 U.S. 184 (1921).................................... ...
Bennet v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632 (1985) .................. 5
Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974) . 2, 3,

5
Carpenter v. Wabash Railway Co., 309 U.S. 23 (1940) ........  2
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) .............. 3
Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1963)................ 5
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) ............ 4
Johnson v. United States, 163 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1908) . . . .  3
Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443 (1934) ..............  3

1



Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969) . 2, 5
United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960) ..............  2
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801)

2
Vanderbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Company, 311 U.S. 538 (1941)

2
Ziffrin v. United States, 318 U.S. 73 (1943) ................  2

Statutes:
Age Discrimination A c t ...................................... ...
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 ......................  1, 5
Rehabilitation Act ......................................  5
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ................ ...
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .................... ...

Other Authorities:
134 Cong. Rec. H583 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988)................ ...
Senate Report No. 100-64, P. 6 (100th Cong., 1987) ..........  4



Docket No. 88-7815

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

ROBERT LEAKE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

-V-

LONG ISLAND JEWISH MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court 
Eastern District of New York

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE 
FOR THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.

The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., moves 
the Court for leave to file the attached Brief Amicus Curiae in 
support of the plaintiff-appellee in this case. In support of 
this motion movant would show the following.

1. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 
(LDF) is a not-for-profit corporation established under the laws 
of New York as a legal aid society. Its principle purpose is to 
secure the civil and constitutional rights of Black persons 
through litigation and education. For nearly fifty years, its 
attorneys have represented parties or amicus c u r i a e  in thousands 
of civil rights cases presenting a variety of significant issues.

2. LDF handled the cases that established the law 
concerning the application of new statutes or regulations to



pending civil rights cases. Bradley v. School Board of Richmond. 
416 U.S. 696 (1974); Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of 
Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969). Thus, its interest and expertise
encompasses both the effectiveness of the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1988 and the proper standards for deciding 
whether a newly-enacted statute should be applied to a pending 
case.

For the foregoing reasons, we believe that our views will be 
of assistance to the Court and pray that leave be granted to file 
the attached brief amicus curiae.

Respectfully submitted,

s:Julius LeVonne Champers 
Charles Stephen Ralston

99 Hudson St., 16th Floor New York, N.Y. 10013 
(212)-219-1900

Attorneys for Movant NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.

2



Docket No. 88-7815

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

ROBERT LEAKE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

-V-

LONG ISLAND JEWISH MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court 
Eastern District of New York

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE FOR THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE 
AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Amicus adopts the statement of Plaintiff-Appellee of the 

Issue Presented For Review.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

£micus adopts the Statement of the Case of Plaintiff- 
Appellee .

ARGUMENT
THE CIVIL RIGHTS RESTORATION ACT OF 1988 
SHOULD BE APPLIED TO CASES PENDING AT THE 

TIME OF ITS ENACTMENT
the court below framed the question presented by 

this case as whether the newly-enacted Civil Rights Restoration 
Act of 1987 should be applied "retroactively", retroactivity in



its technical meaning is not the issue. Rather, the issue is 
whether the long-standing rule that a federal court must apply 
the law as it exists at the time of decision, unless special 
circumstances exist so as to make such a result unjust, should be 
followed here. See Bradley v. School Board of Richmond. 416 U.S. 
696, 710-711 (1974).

The rule was first established by the United States Supreme 
Court in United States v. Schooner Peaav. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 
(1801). There, Chief Justice Marshall stated, "if, subsequent to 
the judgment, and before the decision of the appellate court, a 
law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the 
law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied." id. at 106.

The Supreme Court has applied this rule under a wide variety 
of circumstances. For example, in Thorpe v. Housing Authority of 
Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969), after the plaintiff public housing
authority had won an eviction order in state courts, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development altered the 
procedural prerequisites to such evictions. The Court held that 
the defendant could not be evicted unless the new procedures were 
followed. 393 U.S. at 281. See also, United States v, Alabama. 
362 U.S. 602, 604 (1960)(newly enacted 1960 Civil Rights Act 
authorizing suits against a state applied on appeal); Ziffrin v. 
United— States, 318 U.S. 73, 78 (194 3) (amendment to Interstate
Commerce Act defeating petitioner's claim applied to pending
case) ; Vanderbark—v_._Owens-Illinois Glass Company. 311 U.S. 538
(1941); Carpenter v. Wabash Railway Co.. 309 U.S. 23, 27 (1940),

2



and cases cited; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-Citv Cent.
Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 201 (1921); Reynolds v. United
States. 292 U.S. 443, 449 (1934).

Except where the statute involved expressly purports to be 
of exclusively prospective application, see, e.g. . Goldstein v. 
California, 412 U.S. 546, 552 (1973), the Supreme Court has
routinely applied new laws to all pending cases without reference 
to legislative history and without reguiring express statutory 
language that they be so applied. When Congress has concluded 
that greater justice would be done if a new legal principle were 
applied to some recurring circumstances, Congress must be
presumed to have intended that that new standard and the more 
equitable result entailed be applied to all cases, including 
those pending at the time the statute was enacted. Compare
Johnson v. United States, 163 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908)(Holmes, 
J. ) .

The principle that a court is to apply the law as of the 
time it decides the case was discussed at length by the Supreme
Court in Bradley__v._School Board of Richmond. 416 U.S. 696
(1974). In Bradley, as noted by the court below, the Supreme 
Court rejected the argument that a new law should be applied to a 
pending case only when it was the "clear and stated intention of 
the legislature." Id. at 715. Rather, the rule is the opposite; 
new law will be applied unless a contrary intent is made clear by 
Congress or its application would result in "manifest injustice." 
Id. at 711. Neither exception is applicable here.

3



With regard to Congressional intent, to the extent the 
legislative history indicates anything, it is that the statute 
was to apply to pending cases since its purpose was to restore 
the law to what it was before the Supreme Court decided Grove 
City College v. Bell. 465 U.S. 555 (1984). See, Senate Report 
No. 100-64, P. 6 (100th Cong., 1987). Thus, the Act did not

new rights, but rather returned the law to conform to 
Congress7 original intent and to the consistent administrative 
practice and court decisions that existed before the Supreme 
Court7 s new and restrictive reading of the federal funding 
statutes. Id. at 6-13.

That Congress7 intent was that the 1987 Act apply to pending 
cases is strongly suggested by the discussion of the urgent need 
for the Act in the Senate Report at pp. 13-18. The report speaks
of cases in the formal enforcement stage that "are still in
jeopardy," and of "clear violations of federal law [that] go
uncorrected.77 id. at 13. And, as the court below noted, the
only express statement in the legislative history expresses the 
intent that the Act "applies to all pending cases." Remarks of 
Cong. Edwards, 134 Cong. Rec. H583 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988)

With regard to whether it would be unjust to apply the law 
to a pending case, it is similarly clear that it would be unjust 
not to. The purpose of the Civil Rights Restoration Act was to 
restore the law to what it was before Grove City; thus, the 
statute restored rights that had existed before that decision. 
In contrast, those cases in which the Supreme Court has refused

4



to give effect to new law are ones in which the result would be 
to defeat existing rights. Thus, for example, as explained by 
the Court in Thorpe (393 U.S. at 282), in Greene v. United 
States, 376 U.S. 149 (1963) the Court refused to apply new and 
more strenuous administrative procedures for obtaining 
remuneration to a claimant who had already obtained a "final" and 
favorable determination under the old procedures. More recently, 
in Bennet v. New Jersey. 470 U.S. 632 (1985), the Court refused 
to apply statutory changes in the requirements for federal grants 
to a pending case in the absence of clear congressional intent to 
do so because such a result would be unjust, and distinguished 
Bradley on that basis.

Amicus urges that it is imperative that the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987 be applied in all cases brought or 
pending at or after the time of its enactment. The statute is 
remedial and seeks to correct an interpretation of the law by the 
Supreme Court that Congress believed had had deleterious effects 
on the enforcement of the civil rights laws and, therefore, on 
the substantive rights of those the laws sought to protect. 
Failure to hold that existing programs that receive federal aid 
are subject to the obligations of the Act will result in the 
continuing and future denial of the civil rights of thousands of 
persons for whose benefit the Rehabilitation Act, Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972, the Age Discrimination Act, and 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were enacted.

5



CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district 

court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

Julius LeVonne Chambers Charles Stephen Ralston
99 Hudson St., 16th Floor New York, N.Y. 10013
(212)-219-1900

6



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have served copies on the foregoing 

brief amicus curiae on the parties by depositing the same in the
United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed as
follows:

L. DONALD PRUTZMAN, JR., ESQ.
JOSIAH GREENBERG, ESQ.
STECHER JAGLOM & PRUTZMAN 
900 Third Avenue 
New York, N.Y. 10022

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
DAVID H. DIAMOND, ESQ.
SUMMIT ROVINS & FELDESMAN445 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
Done this day of December, 19”"

'̂Charles Stephen Ralston
Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.

7



RECE IV ED
ES8 DEC 21 AM O  03



I n  th e

H’nitrmr dmtri of %  Imtpf* Staffs
October Term, 1978 

No. 78-..............

Nora Lewis, et al.,

v.
Petitioners,

P hilip Morris, I nc., et al.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

J ack Greenberg 
0. Peter Sherwood 
E rio Schnapper 

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

Henry L. Marsh, III 
W illiam H. Bass, III 
J ohn W. Scott, J r.
Randall G. J ohnson 

Hill, Tucker & Marsh 
214 East Clay Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23261

Barry L. Goldstein 
Suite 940
806 15th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006

Counsel for Petitioners



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions Below ..................................................................  1

Jurisdiction ........................ -............................... ................  2

Questions Presented ................................... -.....................  2

Statutory Provisions Involved ......   3

Statement of the Case .................... ........... ......................  4

R easons F oe Granting the W rit—

I. Certiorari Should Be Granted to Resolve a Conflict 
Among the Circuits Regarding the Effect of an 
Interlocutory Appeal on the Jurisdiction of a Dis­
trict Court ................. ......... — .................................-  6

II. The Court of Appeals’ Finding of Non-Discrimina­
tion Is In Conflict With Furnco Construction 
Corp. v. Waters, 57 L.Ed 2d 957 (1978) ...............  15

Conclusion........ .....................................................      20

A ppendix—

Opinion of the District Court, July 7, 1976 .......... la

Order of the District Court, September 2, 1976 .... 39a 

Order of the District Court, November 17, 1976 .... 55a 

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, May 10, 1978 .— 57a 

Order of the Court of Appeals, July 26, 1978 .......  95a

PAGE



Cases:
T a b l e  o p  A u t h o r it ie s

page

Armstrong v. O’Connell, 416 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Wis.
1976) ............................................................ ....... .............  9

Aune v. Rynders, 344 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1965) ........... 8,13

Babcock do Wilcox v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 54 F.R.D.
474 (I).X.J. 1971) ........ ........................ ............... ...........  9

Carpenter Brothers, Inc. v. Duval Sales Corp., 440
F. Supp. 1150 (E.D. Wis. 1977) ............... ........ ..........  9

Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) ...... ............  17
Champlin Bef. Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286

U.S. 210 (1932) ............................ .......... .................... . 12
Chicago Housing Tenants Organisation v. Chicago

Housing Authority, 512 F.2d 19 (7th Cir. 1975) ____ 7
Control Data Corp. v. International Business Machine 

Corp., 421 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1970) ..........................  7

Dempsey v. Guaranty Trust Co., 131 F.2d 103 (7th
Cir. 1942) ........ ..... .............. ..... ............. ....................... 7,10

De Pinto v. Provident Security Life Insurance Co., 374
F.2d 50 (9th Cir. 1967) .......... ........ ..................... ........ . 7

District 2, Marine Engineers v. Falcon Carriers, 374 
F. Supp. 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ............... ..... ........ .....9,10

East Carroll Parish v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636
(1976) .................................... .................................. ...7,12,13

E.E.O.C. v. Locals 14 and 15, I.U.O.E., 438 F. Supp.
876 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ............................................... ......  9

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 348
F. Supp. 638 (W.D. Mo. 1970) .... ........................ .........  9

Ex parte National Enameling £  Stamping Co., 201 
U.S. 156 (1906) .... .............. ...... .................. ................. 11,15



Ill

Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1961) ...........  8
Fernow v. Liberty Royalties Corp., 146 F.2d 396 (10th

Cir. 1944) ................................-..... -............ -..... .............. - 8
Foote v. Parsons Non-Skid Co., 196 F. 951 (6th Cir.

1914) ..................................................................................  7
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 

(1978) .................................................................. 15,17,18,20

Hamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1966) .......  8
Hawkins v. Lindsley, 327 F.2d. 356 (2d Cir. 1964) .......  11
Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S.

299 (1977) ..................................... -.......... -.......................  18
Hoffman, etc. v. Beer Drivers & Salesmen’s, etc., 536

F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1976) ........ ............ ......................... 7,11
Human Resources Management v. Weaver, 422 F. 

Supp. 241 (D.D.C. 1978) .......................     9

Ideal Toy Corp. v. Sayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623 (2d
Cir. 1962) ............................... ........................ -................. 8,10

In re Woodruff, 121 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1941) ..... .........  7

Jago v. United States District Court, 570 F.2d 618 (6th
Cir. 1978) ..................... .................... ............. ................. 7,10

Janousek v. Doyle, 313 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1963) ...........  7

L.A. Concrete Pumping v. Majich, 18 Fed. Rules Serv.
2d 45 (C.D. Cal. 1973) .......................................... .......  9

Macon v. Bailar, 428 F. Supp. 182 (EJD. Ya. 1977) .... 9
McLeod v. National Maritime Union, 329 F. Supp. 151

(S.D.N.Y. 1971) ......................... :.................................... 13
Morning Telegraph v. Powers, 450 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 

1971)

PAGE

8



IV

Nalco Chemical Co. v. Hall, 347 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1965) 8

O’Brien v. Avco Corp., 309 F. Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969) ........................................................................... ...... 9,10

Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall,
265 U.S. 196 (1924) ......................................................  12

Petuskey v. Hampton, 431 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1970) ....8,11 
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998

(5th Cir. 1969) ....................    7
Phelan v. Taitano, 233 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1956) .......  7
Plaquemines Parish Commission Council v. United

States, 416 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1969) ........................... 8
Ruby v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 360 F.2d 

690 (2d Cir. 1966) ............................ ............................. g, 11

SCRAP v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 317 (D.D.C.
1973) ..................................................................................  9

S.E.C. v. Okin, 137 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1943) ........ .......... 8,11
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920) ........................... 12
Smith v. American Shipbuilding, 22 Fed. Buies Serv.

2d 538 (N.D. Ohio 1976) ..............................................  9
Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U S  587

(1926) ................................      12
A.O. Smith Corp. v, F.T.C., 396 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Del.

1975) .................................................................................. 9
Society for Animal Rights, Inc. v. Schlesinger, 512 F.2d

915 (D.C.Cir. 1975) ..................................'......................  7
Standard Oil Company v. United States, 429 U S 17

(1976) ................................ ...................... .............. J .....  13
State of New York v. Nuclear Reg. Com’n, 550 F.2d 745

(2d Cir. 1977) ..............................................................  8,10
St ell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Ed., 333 

F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1963)

PAGE

8



V

Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932) ................... 12
PAGE

Turner v. IIMH Publishing Co., 328 F.2d 136 (5th Cir.
1964) ................................................................ ................. 7,11

United States v. Articles of Food and Drug, 444
F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Wise. 1978) ....................... ..........  9

United States v. Board of School Commissioners of
Indianapolis, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974) ..............  7

United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th
Cir. 1977) ................... ........ ......... ......... ........... .............  7,9

United States v. City of Chicago, 534 F.2d 708 (7th
Cir. 1976) .............    7

United States v. City of Chicago, 411 F. Supp. 218
(N.D. 111. 1976) ..............................................................  7,9

United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1951) .......  7

Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D.
Cal. 1973) .......      9

Western Electric Co. v. Cinema Supplies, Inc., 80 F.2d 
111 (8th Cir. 1935) ....................................... ............. ...7,10

Zimmer v. McKeithen, 467 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1972) ..7,12

Statutes:

28 TJ.S.C. § 1254(1) ............................................................  2

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) ............................................2, 3, 5, 6, 9

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) ......................................... ..................  7

28 U.S.C. §1343(3) ...................................... .....................  4

29 U.S.C. § 151 ....................      4

42 U.S.C. § 1981 ........................................       4

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) ...................................................... 3,4



VI

Other Authorities:

Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
v. 3A ............ ............. ........ ...... .................. .....................  lo

7 Moore, Federal Practice, 60.30[2]   ................... lo

9 Moore, Federal Practice, If 203.11 ........... ......... ...... . 10

C. Wright, et ah, Federal Practice and Procedure, v. 16,
§ 3921 ................................ ....... ........... .............................  io

PAGE



I n  t h e

Supreme (Emtrt nf tl|T UrntTls
October T erm, 1978 

No. 78-...............

Nora L ewis, et ail.,
Petitioners,

v.

P hilip Morris, I nc., et al.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Petitioners Nora Lewis, et al., respectfully pray that a 
Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir­
cuit entered in this proceeding on May 10, 1978.

Opinions Below

The July 7,1976, opinion of the district court is reported 
at 419 F.Supp. 345 and is set- out in the Appendix hereto, 
pp. la-38a. The order of the district court of September 2, 
1976, which is not officially reported, is reprinted at 13 EPD 
H 11,350, and is set out in the Appendix hereto, pp. 39a-54a. 
The order of the district court of November 17, 1976, which 
is not officially reported, is set out in the Appendix hereto, 
pp. 55a-56a. The May 10, 1978, opinion of the court of ap­
peals is reported at 577 F.2d 1135, and is set out in the



2
Appendix hereto, pp. 57a-96a. The July 26, 1978, order of 
the court of appeals denying rehearing and rehearing en 
banc, which is not officially reported, is set out in the Appen­
dix hereto, p. 95a.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on 
May 10, 1978. Petitioners filed a timely Petition for Re­
hearing and Rehearing En Banc, which was denied on July 
26, 1978. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1254(1).

Questions Presented

1. Does the filing of an interlocutory appeal1 under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) divest a district court of jurisdiction 
over part or all of the action involved?

2. Did the court of appeals err in directing the dis­
missal of plaintiffs’ claim of unlawful racial discrimi­
nation in employment, where both courts below found there 
was an unrebutted prima facie ease of discrimination and 
the record showed, inter alia, that from 1965 to 1971 the 
defendant company had assigned newly hired workers 
among its departments in the following manner:

1 Petitioners maintained below that the order which was the 
subject of the attempted interlocutory appeal in this case did not 
grant injunctive relief, but merely described what the district 
judge intended to include in any subsequent injunction. We there­
fore urged below that the interlocutory appeal was improper, and 
would so urge in this Court were certiorari granted. See App. 63a 
This question presented is intended to comprise whether an im­
proper interlocutory appeal would affect the district court’s juris­
diction, as well as whether or not the instant interlocutory appeal 
was proper.



3

Fabrication
Ware-
house

Pre-
Fabrication Stemmery Total

White
Employees 75% (3602) 7% (313) 5% (251) 13% (624) 100% (4793)

Black
Employees 30% (1052) 1% (40) 8% (287) 61% (2133) 100% (3512)

Statutory Provisions Involved

Section 703 of Title V II of the Civil Eights Act of 1964 
(42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)) provides:

(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any in­

dividual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which 
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities or otherwise ad­
versely affect his status as an employee, because 
of such individual’s'race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.

Section 1292(a), 28 U.S.C., provides in pertinent part:

(a) The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of ap­
peals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the 

United States, the United States District Court 
for the District of the Canal Zone, the District 
Court of Guam, and the District Court of the



4
Virgin Islands, or of the. judges thereof, grant­
ing, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolv­
ing injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify 
injunctions, except where a direct review may 
be had in the Supreme Court.

Statement of the Case

Five black female employees brought this action on Sep­
tember 9, 1973, in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that they were the 
victims of discrimination in employment on the basis of 
race and sex by Philip Morris, Incorporated, the Tobacco 
Workers’ International Union, and its Local 203. Plaintiffs 
alleged that the discrimination violated Title V II of the 
Civil Eights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981, and 29 U.S.C. § 151. Jurisdiction was asserted, inter 
alia, under 28 U.S.C. §1343(3).

The district court certified the case as a class action on 
October 7, 1974, and defined the class to include all blacks 
and women who had been employed in the company’s stem- 
mery on or after July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title 
VII. Certain issues were resolved by a consent decree en­
tered on June 6, 1975.

The case was tried in April of 1975. Plaintiffs offered 
evidence of a number of different discriminatory practices, 
the most important of which was an alleged practice of 
assigning most newly hired blacks to two traditionally black 
departments in its Richmond operations, pre-fabrication 
and the stemmery, assigning most newly hired whites to two 
traditionally white departments, fabrication and ware­
house, and excluding newly hired female employees from 
the pre-fabrication and warehouse departments. On July 7, 
1976, the district court entered a Memorandum Opinion and



5

Order holding the company and both unions liable for dis­
crimination on the basis of race and sex. App. la-38a. The 
parties were directed to file briefs on the appropriate 
method o f framing and implementing relief. App. 38a.

On September 2, 1976, the district court entered an order 
“ adopting plaintiffs’ back pay and injunctive relief guide­
lines.” App. 39a-57a. These Guidelines had been proposed 
by plaintiffs to set standards for identifying victims of dis­
crimination, for calculating back pay, and for framing a 
detailed injunctive decree. The court’s order provided that 
“ [a]ll Stage II [remedy] proceedings shall be governed by 
and consistent with these guidelines.” App. 40a.

On September 14, 1976, the defendant unions moved for 
reconsideration of the Guidelines, a request that was later 
joined in by the company. On September 29, 1976, while the 
motion for reconsideration was still pending, the defen­
dants, apparently concerned that the Guidelines themselves 
constituted an injunction and that the 30 days for an inter­
locutory appeal were about to end, filed a notice of appeal. 
On November 17,1976, the district court granted the motion 
for reconsideration and vacated its previous order adopting 
the Guidelines. App. 55a.

In the court of appeals, however, the company and unions 
contended that the district court lost jurisdiction to grant 
their pending motion for reconsideration when they filed 
their notice of appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 
The court of appeals on May 10, 1978, held that the district 
court did lack jurisdiction to vacate, its September 2, 1976, 
order, that the Guidelines were thus still in effect, and that 
the Guidelines contained provisions which were injunctions 
appealable under § 1292(a)(1). App. 63a-69a. The court 
of appeals therefore proceeded to reach the merits of the 
appeal; it reversed the finding of racial discrimination,



6

directed that that claim be dismissed, and vacated and 
remanded the finding of discrimination on the basis of sex. 
App. 72a-96a. The court of appeals noted that the defen­
dants had asserted unsuccessfully in the district court that 
certain aspects of this case were foreclosed as res judicata, 
but did not reach that issue itself. App. 70a-72a.

On June 5, 1978,2 petitioners filed a timely Petition for 
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc. The 
court of appeals denied that Petition on July 26, 1978.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

Certiorari Should Be Granted to Resolve a Conflict 
Among the Circuits Regarding the Effect of an Inter­
locutory Appeal on the Jurisdiction of a District Court.

Although 42 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) authorizes interlocutory 
appeals from any order granting or denying an injunction, 
it does not expressly indicate the effect, if any, of such an 
interlocutory appeal on the continued jurisdiction of the 
district court which granted or denied that injunction. The 
effect of such an appeal on the jurisdiction of the district 
courts is a matter o f substantial importance, since a sub­
stantial number of appeals are taken each year under sec­
tion 1292(a)(1).3

,2 On May 19, 1978, the court of appeals extended the time for 
filing a Petition for rehearing. 8

8 The Administrative Office of the United States Courts does 
not collect statistics on these appeals. An informal survey of re­
cently published appellate decisions indicates that the number 
of § 1292(a) (1) appeals each year is in the order of magnitude of



7
A  serious conflict exists among the circuits on this issue. 

The Sixth,4 Seventh,6 Eighth,6 and District of Columbia7 8 
circuits have held that the taking of such an interlocutory 
appeal in no way affects the jurisdiction of the district 
court. The Ninth Circuit rule is that the district court loses 
jurisdiction as to the matter involved in the appeal, but 
may modify the order appealed from or take other action 
based on new developments.8 The Fifth9 Circuit has con-

4 Jago v. United States District Court, 570 F.2d 618, 622-23 (6tli 
Cir. 1978); Foote v. Parsons Non-Skid Co., 196 F. 951, 954 (6th 
Cir. 1912).

5 United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977), 
aff’g 411 F. Supp. 218, 246-47 (N.D. 111. 1976); United States v. 
City of Chicago, 534 F.2d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 1976); Chicago Hous­
ing Tenants Organization v. Chicago Housing Authority, 512 F.2d 
19, 22 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Board of School Com­
missioners of Indianapolis, 503 F.2d 68, 81-82 (7th Cir. 1974) ; 
Dempsey v. Guaranty Trust Co., 131 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1942).

6 Janousek v. Doyle, 313 F.2d 916, 920-22 (8th Cir. 1963); 
United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 8 (8th Cir. 1951); Western 
Electric Co. v. Cinema Supplies, Inc., 80 F.2d 111, 112 (8th Cir. 
1935); cf. Control Data Corp. v. International Business Machine 
Corp., 421 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir. 1970) (an interlocutory appeal 
pending under 28 TJ.S.C. § 1292(b) when the district court dis­
missed part of the complaint). Janousek is the leading appellate 
case on this issue.

7 Society For Animal Bights, Inc. v. Schlesinger, 512 F.2d 915, 
918 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

8 Hoffman, etc. v. Beer Drivers <0 Salesmen’s etc., 536 F.2d 1268, 
1276 (9th. Cir. 1976) ; DePinto v. Provident Security Life In­
surance Co., 374 F.2d 50, 51, n.2 (9th Cir. 1967); Phelan v. Tai- 
tano, 233 F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1956); In re Woodruff, 121 F.2d 
152, 153-54 (9th Cir. 1941).

9 This is the position taken in the most recent Fifth Circuit deci­
sion. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 467 F.2d 1381, 1382 (5th Cir. 1972) 
rev’d 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. 
East Carroll Parish v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); see 
also Turner v. HMH Publishing Co., 328 F.2d 136, 137 (5th 
Cir. 1964). Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 
F.2d 998, 1003, n.8 (5th Cir. 1969) held more broadly that juris­
diction was lost over “ those matters involved in the appeal.” But 
earlier Fifth Circuit opinions had followed the majority view that



8

eluded that such an appeal divests the district court of juris­
diction to modify or vacate the order being appealed, except 
to stay its operation pending appeal. The Tenth Circuit10 
has adopted a more restrictive rule, which divests the dis­
trict court of all jurisdiction over the ease during the pen­
dency of the interlocutory appeal. The Second Circuit is 
divided on this question; since 1961 panels of that cirerdt 
have held that the district court loses jurisdiction to modify 
the order being appealed,11 does not lose such jurisdiction,12 
may modify the order if it thinks it incorrect but not based 
on new evidence,13 and may moot the interlocutory appeal 
by trying the case on the merits and entering a final injunc­
tion.14 The Fourth Circuit decision in the instant case holds 
that the district court lost jurisdiction to vacate its order 
of September 2, 1976, once that order was made the subject

the district court’s jurisdiction is not affected by the pendency of 
an interlocutory appeal. Plaquemines Parish Commission Council 
v. United States, 416 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Hamer v. 
Camphell, 358 F.2d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Nalco Chemical Co. 
v. Hall, 347 F.2d 90, 92 (5th Cir. 1965); Stell v. Savannah- 
Chatham County Board of Ed., 333 F.2d 55, 60 (5th Cir. 1964) 
(approves district court order “which involves the same question” 
as that on appeal); see also United States v. Lund, 321 F.2d 26, 28, 
n.l (5th Cir. 1963).

10Petuskey v. Hampton, 431 F.2d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1970), 
relying on Aune v. Bynders, 344 F.2d 835, 841 (10th Cir. 1965). 
Anne, a bankruptcy decision, appears to be inconsistent with an 
earlier Tenth Circuit decision in Pernow v. Liberty Royalties Corn., 
146 F.2d 396, 397 (10th Cir. 1944).

11 Morning Telegraph v. Powers, 450 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1971); 
Ideal Toy Corp. v. Sayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623, 625 (2d Cir. 
1962).

12 Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665, 675 (2d Cir. 1961).
13 State of New York v. Nuclear Beg. Com’n, 550 F.2d 745, 758- 

59, n.7 (2d Cir. 1977).
u Ruby v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 360 F.2d 690, 

691-92 (2d Cir. 1966); see also S.E.C. v. Olein, 137 F.2d 862, 863 
(2d Cir. 1943).



9

of a section 1292(a)(1) appeal, App. 65a-67a; whether the 
Fourth Circuit has adopted the broad prohibition of the 
Tenth Circuit, or only the rule of the Fifth Circuit and 
some Second Circuit panels barring modification of the 
order appealed from, is unclear.

The numerous district court decisions on this issue are 
similarly divided. Nine opinions hold that the jurisdiction 
of a district court is not affected by the pendency of an 
interlocutory appeal.15 Two decisions adopt the Fifth and 
Second Circuits’ “ same order” rule.16 Five courts follow 
the Ninth Circuit rule regarding “matters involved in the 
appeal,” 17 but the district courts are in disagreement as to 
the meaning of the standard.18 * The opinions of these district 
courts bear no consistent relation to the appellate decisions

16 Human Resources Management v. Weaver, 422 F. Supp. 241 
(D.D.C. 1978); Carpenter Brothers, Inc. v. Duval Sales Corp., 440 
F. Supp. 1150, 1151 (E.D. Wis. 1977) ; Macon v. Bailar, 428 F. 
Supp. 182, 183-87 (E.D. Va. 1977); United States v. City of Chi­
cago, 411 F. Supp. 218, 247 (N.D. 111. 1976), aff’d 549 F.2d 41.5 
(7th Cir. 1977) ; A.O. Smith Corp. v. F.T.C., 396 F. Supp. 1125, 
1137-38, n. 8 (D. Del. 1975) ; District 2, Marine Engineers v. Fal­
con Carriers, 374 F. Supp. 1342, 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ; SCRAP v. 
United States, 353 F. Supp. 317, 320, n.2 (D.D.C. 1973), rev’d on 
other grounds 412 U.S. 669 (1973) ; L.A. Concrete Pumping v. 
Majich, 18 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 45, 47-48 (C.D. Cal. 1973); O’Brien 
v. Avco Corp., 309 F. Supp. 703, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

16 Smith v. American Shipbuilding, 22 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 538, 
539 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. 
Froehlke, 348 F. Supp. 338, 366 (W.D. Mo. 1972).

17 United States v. Articles of Food and Drug, 444 F. Supp. 266, 
275 (E.D. Wise. 1978); E.E.O.C. v. Locals 14 and 15, I.U.O.E., 
438 F. Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ;  Armstrong v. O’Connell, 
416 F. Supp. 1325, 1329 (E.D. Wis. 1976) ; Van Hoomissen v. 
Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829, 831, n. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Bab­
cock & Wilcox Co. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 54 F.R.D. 474, 476 
(D.N.J. 1971).

18 Compare Armstrong v. O’Connell, supra, n. 17, with United
States v. Articles of Food and Drug, supra, n. 17.



10
in the circuits where they are located.19 Leading commen­
tators are also divided on this issue.20

Although this issue arises under vaiying circumstances, 
the conflict exists even when those differences are taken into 
account. The instant decision, the Fifth Circuit,21 and two 
panels of the Second Circuit,22 squarely hold a district court 
cannot modify an order which is the subject of a pending- 
interlocutory appeal; such modifications have been express­
ly upheld by decisions in the Seventh,28 Eighth,24 and 
Ninth25 circuits. If such a modification is sought, the Second 
Circuit holds that new evidence may not be considered26 * but

19 District courts have adopted the “matter involved in the ap­
peal” rule in the Second and Seventh Circuits, although the ap­
pellate decisions in those circuits approve different standards. None 
of the district court decisions in New York rely on Second Circuit 
decisions; although the conflicting decisions of that circuit take a 
generally restrictive view of the scope of district court jurisdiction, 
District 2, Marine Engineers and O’Brien rely on more liberal 
Eighth and Ninth Circuit decisions in holding their jurisdiction is 
not affected by the pendency of an interlocutory appeal.

20 The most detailed discussion is in C. Wright, et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure, v. 16, § 3921, pp. 25-28. Professor Wright 
expressly disapproves the “same order” rule. Id., p. 28. See also 
Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, v. 3A, 1971 
Pocket Part, § 1558, p. 33. Professor Moore apparently suggests 
the “same order” rule in the text of 9 Moore, Federal Practice,

203.11, p. 738, but suggests in the 1977-78 Supplement use of the 
“matter involved in the appeal” standard. This may be based, how­
ever, on Moore’s approval of the now discredited appellate leave 
procedure. 7 Moore, Federal Practice, ft 60.30 [2], p. 429, n. 27.

21 See note 9, supra.
22 See note 11, supra.
23 Dempsey v. Guaranty Trust Go., supra n. 5.
24 Western Electric Co. v. Cinema Supplies, supra n. 6.
26 Hoffman, etc. v. Beer Drivers and Salesmen’s etc., supra n. 8; 

see also Jago v. United States District Court, supra n. 4.
26 Ideal Toy Corp. v. Sayco Doll Corp,, supra n. 11; State of

New York v. Nuclear Reg. Com’n, supra n. 13.



11
the Ninth Circuit holds that it may.27 If, while a prelim­
inary injunction is awaiting review in the court of appeals, 
the district court conducts a trial on the merits and enters 
a permanent injunction, the Tenth Circuit will overturn the 
permanent injunction on the ground the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to enter it,28 but the Second Circuit will dismiss 
as moot the appeal of the preliminary injunction and con­
sider only the appeal of the permanent injunction.29 If, 
after a district court has granted or denied an injunction, a 
party moves for reconsideration but then appeals before 
the motion is ruled on, a district court can decide the mo­
tion in the Second Circuit30 but not in the Fourth or Fifth.31

These conflicts reflect disagreement among the lower 
courts as to the meaning and vitality of decisions of this 
Court. Most of the lower court opinions holding that dis­
trict court jurisdiction is unaffected by the pendency of an 
interlocutory appeal rely on this Court’s decision in Ex 
parte National Enameling <& Stamping Co., 201 U.S. 156 
(1906). National Enameling held, with regard to the statute 
authorizing interlocutory appeals:

Obviously that which is contemplated is a review of 
the interlocutory order, and of that only. It was not 
intended that the cause as a whole should be trans­
ferred to the appellate court prior to the final decree. 
The case, except for the hearing on the appeal from the 
interlocutory order, is to proceed in the lower court as 
though no such appeal had been taken, unless otherwise 
specially ordered. 201 TT.S. at 162.

27 Hoffman, etc. v. Beer Drivers & Salesmen’s etc., supra n. 8.
28 Petuskey v. Bampton, supra n. 10.
29 Ruby v. Pan American Airways, Inc., supra n. 14; S.E.C. v. 

Okin, supra n. 14.
30 See Hawkins v. Lindsley, 327 F.2d 356, 359 (2d Cir. 1964).
31 Turner v. HMH Publishing Co., supra note 9.



12

Consistent with this view, this Court has repeatedly held 
that a district court may enter a final injunction during the 
pendency of an interlocutory appeal from a preliminary in­
junction, and that if it does so the interlocutory appeal will 
be dismissed.32

The Fourth Circuit in this case, however, concluded that 
a different rule was established by East Carroll Parish 
School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). In that case 
the district court had entered on August 2, 1971, a final 
injunction fully disposing of the case, and an appeal was 
duly taken; seven months later, while that appeal was still 
pending, the district court, on the motion of one of the 
parties, vacated its order of August 2, 1971 and entered a 
different injunction. The Fifth Circuit held the district 
court was “ without jurisdiction” to enter the new order.33 
In this Court the district court’s authority to enter the 
second injunction was briefed,34 but the Court did not have 
to reach that issue since it concluded that the original in­
junction violated clearly established constitutional prin­
ciples. 424 U.S. at 639. The Court’s opinion explained in a 
footnote the procedural history of the case:

During pendency of the appeal in the court below, 
the District Court purported to withdraw its order 
approving the at-large plan and to substitute in its 
stead a complex redistricting plan submitted by inter- 
venor Marshall. The Court of Appeals vacated the 
order on the ground that when the appeal was filed,

32 Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 386 (1932); Champlin 
Ref. Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 224 (1932); 
Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U.S. 587, 589 (1926); 
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196, 
205 (1924) ; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 44 (1920).

33 Zimmer v. McKeithen, 467 F.2cl 1381, 1382 (5th Cir. 1972).
34 Brief for Respondent, No. 73-861, pp. 27-30.



13

the District Court lost jurisdiction over the case. 424 
U.S. at 638, n.4.

The Fourth Circuit in the instant case held that this foot­
note approved the action of the Fifth Circuit and was in­
tended to “ at least tacitly acknowledg[e] that a district 
court loses jurisdiction to amend or vacate its order after 
the notice of appeal had been filed. . . .” App. 66a.

We submit that the issue in East Carroll was whether a 
district court can modify a final judgment wthen it is pend­
ing on appeal, and that even that issue was not there de­
cided by this Court. Any decision that a district court 
could not modify an injunction that was pending on appeal 
would be inconsistent with this Court’s decision, seven 
months after East Carroll, in Standard Oil Company v. 
United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976). Standard Oil held that, 
even where a case had been decided on appeal, the district 
court had the authority to modify on the ground of “ pos­
sible later events” the judgment directed by the mandate 
of the appellate court. 429 U.8. at 18-19. Certainly the 
district court should have the same authority to modify its 
own orders prior to an appellate decision; the contrary 
rule would require a court of appeals to pass on the correct­
ness of an order which faced inevitable modification on 
remand and would thus waste “ the increasingly scarce time 
of the federal appellate courts.”  429 U.S. at 19. Several 
decisions which hold that an interlocutory appeal ousts the 
district court of some or all of its jurisdiction suggest that 
the solution is for the party seeking district court action 
first to obtain leave to do so in the court of appeals ;35 36 that 
is precisely the cumbersome procedure disapproved in 
Standard Oil.

35 Aune v. Bynders, supra n. 10; McLeod v. National Maritime
Union, 329 F. Supp. 151, 159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).



14
The unworkability of the rule adopted by the Fourth, 

Fifth and Tenth Circuits is well illustrated by the circum­
stances of this case. On September 2, 1976, the district 
court adopted plaintiffs’ proposed Guidelines for the fash­
ioning of monetary and injunctive relief. On September 14, 
1976, the defendant unions filed a motion for reconsidera­
tion of the September 2 order. On October 20, 1976, the 
defendant company renewed its earlier unsuccessful request 
for an evidentiary hearing on the Guidelines, a request 
which was also directed at obtaining a change or vacation 
of the September 2 order. In the meanwhile, however, 
apparently concerned that the 30-day time period for ap­
pealing an injunction was about to expire, the parties had 
on September 29 filed notices of appeal from the September 
2 Guidelines. When these two motions were argued on 
November 3, 1976, the district court expressed “ second 
thoughts on the guidelines” but had doubts as to whether 
it had jurisdiction to alter them.36 Counsel for the defen­
dant company urged the district court to vacate the Guide­
lines, arguing “ this Court probably would have an inherent 
power to review determinations which it has made, even 
those which have led to an immediate appeal,” 37 and as­
sured the court that, if the Guidelines were vacated or 
stayed, “we would probably withdraw our appeal.” 38 Per­
suaded by these assertions the district court on November 
17, 1976, did vacate its September 2 order. Counsel for the 
company, however, changed its mind, and successfully 
urged in the court of appeals that the district judge lacked 
jurisdiction to grant the defendants’ motions.

36 Transcript of Proceedings of November 3, 1976, pp. 22, 27, 
29, 32.

37 Id. p. 27.
38 Id. p. 33.



15
At the least the Fourth Circuit rule strips a district court 

of its usual power to reconsider and modify its orders dur­
ing the course of a case whenever a party takes an inter­
locutory appeal under section 1292(a)(1). In a case such 
as this the scarce resources of the federal appellate courts 
are thus lavished on matters no longer in controversy, since 
the defendants oppose the Guidelines, the district court 
wishes to withdraw them, and plaintiffs do not seek to 
appeal that withdrawal. Under the broader rule adopted 
by the Tenth Circuit the granting of preliminary injunctive 
relief, if followed by an interlocutory appeal, precludes the 
district court from even going forward with the merits of 
the case. Such results are clearly inconsistent with the 
efficient administration of justice. Certiorari should be 
granted to resolve this conflict and to reaffirm the rule in 
Ex parte National Enameling.

II.

The Court of Appeals’ Finding of Non-Discrimination 
Is In Conflict With Furnco Construction C orp. v. W aters, 
57 L.Ed. 2d 957 (1978).

The central substantive issue in this compels employment 
discrimination case is whether the defendant company as­
signed newly hired employees on the basis of race and sex. 
The company conceded that prior to 1965 workers were 
employed “ on a segregated basis” 39 and the district court 
so found. App. 22a. As a result, in 1965 the company em­
ployees were distributed among the company’s four depart­
ments in the following manner:

39 Court of Appeals Appendix (hereinafter cited as “Appendix” ) 
p. 63. The imion conceded this as well. Id. p. 86.



16

Total Workforce: 1965M

Fabrication
Ware­
house

Pre-
Fabrication Stemmery Total

White Male 84% 5% 7% 4% 100%
White Female 94% 0% 1% 5% 100%
Black Male 26% 4% 60% 10% 100%
Black Female 34% 0% 27% 39% 100%

Between 1965 and 1971 new employees were assigned in a 
manner which, mirrored41 the pattern of discrimination 
which had grown np prior to the adoption of the 1964 Civil 
Bights A ct :

Assignment of New Employees: 1965-1971.42

Ware­ Pre-
Fabrication house Fabrication Stemmery Total

White
Male 71% (2584) 9% (313) 7% (251) 13% (461) 100% (3609)
White
Female 86% (1018) 0% (0) 1% (3) 14% (163) 100% (1184)
Black
Male 29% (790) 1% (40) 11% (287) 59% (1604) 100% (2721)
Black
Female 33% (262) 0% (0) 0% (0) 67% (529) 100% (791)

All o f these assignments were made hy the company’s Assis­
tant Personnel Manager.43 Because of the large number 
of employees involved in these assignments, the odds 
against such a pattern of assignments occurring by chance

40 Id. pp. 496-501.
41 The most important change is a substantial increase in the 

proportion of black males assigned to work in the stemmery, the 
worst job in the company.

42 Id., pp. 588-591. The E.B.O.C. charges on which the Title VII 
claim is grounded date from March, 1970. App. 9a.

48 Appendix pp. 687-88. Two people, both white males, held this 
position between 1965 and 1971.



17
were overwhelming. The number of blacks assigned to 
fabrication differs from, the expected number by 21 stan­
dard deviations; detailed calculations show that the likeli­
hood of this occurring by chance is less than 1 in 1097. See 
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496, n.17 (1977).

The department to which an employee was assigned was 
important for two reasons. First, the hourly wage rates 
were very different; as of 1974 the top hourly wage was 
$4.94 in fabrication, $4.47 in the warehouse, $3.47 in pre­
fabrication, and $2.70 in the stemmery.44 45 Second, although 
work in the other departments is year round, employment 
in the stemmery is seasonal, averaging only 9 months a 
year.46 Thus as of 1971 the average annual wage in fabrica­
tion, to which 75% of all whites were assigned, was over 
$8,000, while the average annual wage in the stemmery, to 
which 61% of all blacks were assigned, was under $4,000.46

On this basis the district court held that “ [t]he statistics 
. . . establish a prima facie ease of racial and sexual dis­
crimination.” App. 20a. The district court also rejected as 
unsupported by the record a variety of defenses alleged by 
the defendants. App. 27a-30a. It specifically held that there 
was no evidence that black applicants were less qualified 
than white applicants. App. 30a, 45a. The district court 
thus concluded that the defendants’ practices violated Title 
V II and held that injunctive relief and back pay were 
required. App. 38a.

On appeal the Fourth Circuit did not question the district 
court’s finding of a prima facie case. This Court’s opinion 
in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 57 L.Ed. 2d 957

44 Id. pp. 416-19.
45 Id. p. 93; App. 4a.
46 The average hourly wage in fabrication is about $3.94, Ap­

pendix p. 636, or $8,195 per year for fifty-two 40 hour weeks. The 
average hourly wage at the stemmery is about $2.21, Appendix 
pp. 586, 629, or $3,447 per year for thirty-nine 40 hour weeks.



18

(1978), decided a month after the Fourth Circuit decision 
in this ease, requires an appellate court in such a situation 
to consider whether the employer has met his burden of 
rebutting the prima facie case by “proving that he based 
his employment decision” , here some 8,000 assignments, “ on 
a legitimate consideration” , 57 L.Ed. 2d at 968. If the em­
ployer does not meet that burden the court of appeals must 
find that there was intentional racial discrimination; the 
fact that the district court failed to make such a finding 
does not relieve the appellate court of its responsibility to 
do so. Id.

The Fourth Circuit, however, did not make the factual 
inquiry required by Furnco. Instead, it restricted itself to 
considering whether the district court had applied the cor­
rect legal standard in analyzing the evidence. The appellate 
court noted that the district judge had not found present 
purposeful discrimination “by the Company” , but had rea­
soned somewhat opaquely that the company’s “past acts of 
discrimination” , coupled with a failure to inform applicants 
that those policies had ended, had created “a set of circum­
stances that has continued to place blacks at a disadvantage 
when seeking employment at Phillip Morris.” App. 32a. 
The court of appeals believed that the district court had 
held that employers must maintain a racially balanced work 
force, a requirement the Fourth Circuit thought erroneous. 
App. 74a-76a. Having concluded that the district court’s 
theory of liability was incorrect, the Fourth Circuit should 
either have remanded the case for application of the proper 
standards, Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 
U.S. 299, 309, 312 (1977), or analyzed the evidence itself in 
light of those standards. Furnco• Construction Corp. v. 
Waters, supra. Instead the court of appeals simply, and 
inexplicably, directed dismissal of the race claim. This dis­
position is particularly difficult to understand in view of 
the fact that the court of appeals followed the correct proce-



19

dure with regard to the sex claims; reversing the district 
court finding of sexual discrimination in part because it was 
based on “ the same” erroneous assumption that the em­
ployer had to proclaim a policy of non-discrimination in 
order to encourage racial balance, App. 90a, the court of 
appeals remanded the sex claim for additional findings and 
evidentiary hearings. App. 93a.

The court of appeals’ peculiar disposition of the race 
claim appears to have been influenced by the assumption 
that the pattern of assignments between 1965 and 1973 
might have been due to the fact that from 1971-73 hiring 
for the stemmery was conducted at a different time or loca­
tion than hiring for the traditionally white departments. 
App. 78a. The Fourth Circuit apparently believed that 
blacks preferred to work at the stemmery, and thus ex­
cluded themselves for consideration for fabrication jobs by 
applying only for poorly paid seasonal positions at the 
stemmery. In fact, however, the segregation of the hiring 
procedures had no such impact, for 81% of all blacks chose 
to apply for permanent jobs rather than for work at the 
stemmery.47 Given a choice between applying for perma­
nent work or seasonal stemmery jobs, blacks overwhelm­
ingly sought the former, most of them in the fabrication 
department, even though, consistent with its past practice, 
the company hired 33% of all blacks who applied for the 
stemmery48 but only 16% of all blacks seeking permanent 
jobs.49 Thus following the introduction of separate hiring 
procedures, which for the first time gave black applicants 
a method of avoiding assignment to the stemmery, the pro-

47 Of 9795 black applicants in 1973 only 1790 applied for work 
at the stemmery. Appendix 493, 626.

48 In 1973 the company hired 583 of the 1790 blacks who applied 
for work at the stemmery. Appendix, pp. 591, 626.

49 In 1973 the company hired 1250 of the 8005 blacks who ap­
plied for pemanent jobs. Appendix, pp. 493, 587, 626.



20

portion of blacks, among employees hired into fabrication 
did not decrease, as the court of appeals assumed, but ac­
tually rose from 18% in 1970 to 41% in 1972.60 That change 
graphically illustrates the discriminatory nature of the 
assignment practices which were particularly effective prior 
to 1971.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons a Writ of Certiorari should issue 
to review the judgment and opinion of the court of appeals; 
in the alternative, Certiorari should be granted and the case 
remanded to the Fourth Circuit for reconsideration in light 
of Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters.

Respectfully submitted,

J ack Greenberg 
0 . Peter Sherwood 
E ric S chnapper 

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

H enry L. Marsh, III 
W illiam H. B ass, III 
J ohn W . Scott, J r.
R andall G. J ohnson

Hill, Tucker & Marsh 
214 East Clay Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23261

Barry L. Goldstein 
Suite 940
806 15th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006

Counsel for Petitioners

60 Appendix p. 588.



APPENDIX



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 

RICHMOND DIVISON 

Civ. A. No. 73-0488-R.

July 7, 1976.

NORA LEWIS, et  a l , ,

P l a i n t i f f s  

-  vs -

PHILIP MORRIS, INC., et  a l . ,

Defendants .

MEMORANDUM

HERfilGE, D i s t r i c t  Judge.

T h is  c l a s s  a c t i o n  i s  b r o u g h t  f o r  a l l e g e d  

d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  a g a i n s t  f e m a le s  in  employment 

matters  in v i o l a t i o n  o f  T i t l e  VII o f  the C i v i l  

Rights Act o f  1964-, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000 (e ) ,  

et s e q . ,  f o r  a l l e g e d  d i c r im in a t i o n  against  b lacks  

in employment matters in v i o l a t i o n  o f  both T i t l e



2a -

V II ,  supra , and the C i v i l  Rights Act o f  1866, as 

amended, 42 U . S . C .  §1 9 8 1 ,  and f o r  an a l l e g e d  

b r e a c h  o f  a u n i o n ' s  s t a t u t o r y  du ty  to  f a i r l y  

r e p r e s e n t  a l l  o f  i t s  members.  S e c t i o n  9 ( a )  

o f  the Nat iona l  Labort R e la t io n s  Act ,  as amended, 

29 U.SA.C. § 1 5 9 ( a ) ;  see Vaca v .  S i p t e , 386 U.S. 

171, 87 S. Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1 9 6 7 ) .  The 

named p l a i n t i f f s ,  Nora Lewis,  E l izabeth  B ul lo ck ,  

Mary C arter ,  Betty  Johnson, and Gertrude Moody, 

are a l l  b la c k  female c i t i z e n s  o f  the United States  

r e s i d i n g  in  the C i ty  o f  Richmond, V i r g i n i a .  They 

are e m ployed  by P h i l i p  M o r r i s ,  I n c . ,  at  i t s  

f a c i l i t i e s  in Richmond, V i r g i n i a  and are members 

o f  Local  203 o f  the Tobacco Workers'  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  

Union.

Defendant P h i l i p  Morr is ,  I n c . ,  ( h e r e i n a f t e r  

" P h i l i p  M orr is "  or "Company") i s  a c o r p o r a t i o n  
organized  under the laws o f  the State  o f  V i r g in in a  

and engaged in  the bus iness  o f  manufacturing and 

marketing consumer goods that t r a v e l  in i n t e r s t a t e  

and f o r e i g n  commerce. I t  has se v e ra l  c i g a r e t t e  

m a n u f a c t u r i n g  p l a n t s  in  t h e  C i t y  o f  Richmond,  

V i r g i n i a .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the  d e f e n d a n t  P h i l i p  

Morris  i s  an employer in the industry  a f f e c t i n g  

commerce w i t h i n  th e  meaning o f  § 7 0 1 ( b )  o f  the 

C i v i l  Rights Act o f  1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b ) ,



3a -

and i s  s u b j e c t  t o  th e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  42 U .S .C .  

§1981. See Johnson v.  Railway Express Agency, 421 

U.S. 454, 459 60, 95 S.Ct.  1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 

(1975 ) ;  Ti llman v ,  Wheaton-Haven Recreat ion  A s s ' n , 

410 U.S. 431, 439-40,  93 S.Ct.  1090, 34 L.Ed.2d 

403 (1 9 7 3 ) ;  c f .  Jones v .  A l f r e d  H. Mayer Co. ,  392 

U.S. 409,  88 S.Ct.  2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968 ) .  

D e fen dan t  L o c a l  203 o f  the  T o b a c c o  W o r k e r s '  

I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Union ( h e r e i n a f t e r  " L o c a l  2 0 3 " )  

i s  an u n i n c o r p o r a t e d  a s s o c i a t i o n  and a l a b o r  

union,  duly des ignated  and e l e c t e d  as the rep­

r e s e n t a t i v e  fo r  the purpose o f  c o l l e c t i v e  barg a in ­

ing o f  approximately  5,300 hour ly  paid employees 

o f  P h i l i p  Morris  in i t s  f a c i l i t i e s  in  Richmond, 

V i r g i n i a .  Defendant Tobacco Workers'  In terna ­

t i o n a l  Union ( h e r e i n a f t e r  " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Union")  

i s  an un incorporated  a s s o c i a t i o n  and labor  union 

headquartered in Washington, D .C . ;  Local  203 and a 

number o f  o ther  l o c a l  unions are a f f i l i a t e d  with 

I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Union.  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  d e f e n d a n t s  

Local  203 and I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Union are both labor 

o r g a n iz a t i o n s  engaged in an industry  a f f e c t i n g  

commerce w i t h i n  the  meaning  o f  § 701 ( d ) o f  the 

C i v i l  Rights Act o f  1964, 42 U.S.C.  2000e(d)  and 

( e ) ,  and are  s u b j e c t  t o  the  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  42 

U . S .C .  §1981 .  See Johnson  v .  R a i lw ay  E xpress



-  4a -

Agency, su p r a ; Ti l lman v .  Wheaton-Haven Recreat ion  

A s s ' n , su p ra .
This Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n  over the c laims 

r a i s e d  i n  th e  i n s t a n t  a c t i o n  p u r s u a n t  t o  42 

U.S.C.  § 2 0 0 0 e - 5 ( f ) ,  28 U.S.C.  § 1343 (4 ) ,  and 28

U.S.C.  §1337
The Company 's  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  o p e r a t i o n s  in  

Richmond are  d e p a r t m e n t a l i z e d  as f o l l o w s :  ( 1 )

Warehouse, Shipping and Rece iv in g  ( h e r e i n a f t e r  

( " WSR") ;  ( 2 )  t h e  Green L e a f  Stemmery ( h e r e i n ­

a f t e r  ( " S t e mmery")  —  where the then current crop 

o f  t o bacco  i s  p rocessed  f o r  s t o r a g e ;  (3 )  P r e f a b r i ­

c a t i o n  —  where tobacco  in bulk is  processed  f o r  

c i g a r e t t e  m a n u f a c t u r e ;  and ( 4 )  F a b r i c a t i o n  

where the c i g a r e t t e s  are manufactured.  A l l  the 

Richmond employees o f  P h i l i p  Morris except  the 

Stemmery employees are employed on a year round 

b a s i s ;  the Stemmery employees,  with the e x c e p t i o n  

o f  a s m a l l  h o u s e k e e p i n g  s t a f f ,  a re  employed  

s e a s o n a l l y  f o r  the  p e r i o d  o f  J u l y  to  March.

1/ E . g . ,  Munford v.  G l o v e r , 503 F . 2d 878, 883 
T5th C i r .  1 9 7 4 ) ;  Retana v .  L o c a l  1 4 , 453 F .2d 
1018, 1021-22 (9th  C ir .  1972) .



5a -

The e m plo y e e s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by d e f e n d a n t  

Local  203 in c lu d e  both the seasonal  employees o f  

P h i l i p  Morris  who work at the Stemmery, and the 

permanent h o u r ly - p a id  employees who work at the 

o th er  Company manufacturing l o c a t i o n s .  Rates o f  

pay, j o b  p r o g r e s s i o n ,  t r a n s f e r  and s e n i o r i t y  o f  

e m p l o y e e s ,  w o r k in g  c o n d i t i o n s ,  and em ployee  

b e n e f i t s  are covered by two c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining  

agreements between the Company and Local  203. One 

agreement —  the "main c o n t r a c t "  —  covers  the 

permanent employees, and the o ther  —  the " su p p le ­

mental c o n t r a c t "  covers  the seasonal  employees. 

The c o n t r a c t s  p r e s e n t ly  in f o r c e  were n e g o t ia t e d  

in January 1974, and took e f f e c t  February 1, 1974 

f o r  a three  year pe r io d  to  ex p i r e  on January 31, 

1977. The c o n t r a c t s  f o l l o w  the pat tern  set  by 

p r i o r  c o n t r a c t s  between the Company and Local  203, 
commencing with those neog ia ted  in the f a l l  o f  

1964 which became e f f e c t i v e  on February 1, 1965.
Named p l a i n t i f f  E l izabeth  Bul lo ck  was f i r s t  

employed by the Company in November 1966; p l a i n ­

t i f f  Gertrude Moody was f i r s t  employed in  October 

1966 ;  p l a i n t i f f s  Nora L e w is ,  Mary C a r t e r ,  and 

B e t t y  Johnson  were f i r s t  employed  in  December 

1968.  Each o f  the named p l a i n t i f f s  was f i r s t



6a

employed in the Stemmery, and remained there  u n t i l  

A p r i l  25, 1972 when they were t r a n s f e r r e d  to  the 

F a b r i c a t i o n  Department. Upon t h e i r  t r a n s f e r ,  they 

acqu ired  t r a n s f e r  date s e n i o r i t y  in  accordance 

with the s e n i o r i t y  system se t  f o r t h  in the then 

c u r r e n t  1971 c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g  a g r e e m e n t .  

Each was i n t i t a l l y  ass igned  to  the entry  l e v e l  

"m i s c e l la n e o u s "  j o b  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  in the f a b r i c a ­

t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  which  r e q u i r e d  them t o  p e r f o r m  

the arduous task o f  hanging o f  t ray s .  The hanging 

o f  trays re qu ire d  l i f t i n g  up s i x  t rays  per minute, 

each weighing up to  f o r t y  pounds, to  a h e igh t  o f  

over  s i x  f e e t .
By o r d e r  o f  O c t o b e r  7, 1974 ,  the  Court  

d e t e r m i n e d  t h a t  the  a c t i o n  be m a i n t a i n e d  as a 

c l a s s  a c t i o n  pursuant to  Rule 2 3 ( b ) ( 2 )  o f  the Fed. 

R. C i v .  P . ,  s e e  e . g . ,  R o b in s o n  v .  L o r i l l a r d  

C orporat ion ,  444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th C ir .  1971) ,  on 

b e h a l f  o f  a c l a s s  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  the named p l a i n ­

t i f f s  and a l l  females and b lack  males,  whether 

c u r r e n t ly  employed or  no longer  employed f o r  any 

reason,  who were employees o f  the defendant P h i l i p  

M o r r i s ' s  Green Leaf Stemmery on or  a f t e r  July 2, 

1965.  See P a t t e r s o n ,  e t  a l .  v .  The American  

Tobacco Company, C .A . ,  535 F.2d 257, at 262 (4th

Cir .  1976) .  The c l a s s  c o n s i s t s  o f  approximately



7a

3,130 persons .  N o t i c e ,  pursuant to  Rule 2 3 ( b ) ( 2 )  

o f  the  Fed .  R. C i v .  P . ,  was g i v e n  by m a i l  to  

each o f  the c l a s s  members on October 8 and or  11, 

1974, and n o t i c e s  o f  the pendency o f  the a c t i o n  

were posted at s e v e r a l  l o c a t i o n s  on the premises 

o f  P h i l i p  Morr is .
The p l a i n t i f f s  i n i t i a l y  contended that the 

Company, with the assent and c o o p e r a t i o n  o f  the 

defendant unions,  d i s c r im in a te d  against  female 

members o f  the  c l a s s  on t h e  g rounds  o f  t h e i r  

sex and against  b la c k  members o f  the c l a s s  on the 

grounds o f  t h e i r  r a c e ,  and a d d i t i o n a l l y ,  that the 

defendant Unions f a i l e d  to  press g r ievances  o f  

females or b la c k  males with the same d i l i g e n c e  as 

t h o s e  o f  w h i t e  m a l e s .  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  the 

complaint  a l l e g e s  that d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  was per ­

petuated by: (1 )  i n t i a l l y  ass ign in g  females and 

b l a c k  e m p lo y e e s  to  s e a s o n a l  Stemmery j o b s  in 

numbers d i s p o r p o r t i o n a t e l y  large  as compared to 

the i n i t i a l  assignment o f  white  males to Stemmery 

j o b s ;  (2 )  paying female Stemmery and b lack  Stem­

mery e m p lo y e e s  l e s s  than w h i t e  male Stemmery 

employess fo r  comparable work; (3)  maintaining 

u n l a w f u l  s e n i o r i t y  and t r a n s f e r  p o l i c e s  which  

r e s t r i c t e d  female Stemmery and b lack  male Stemmery



8a -

employees from t r a n s f e r r i n g  to  o ther  p l a n t s ;  (4)  

p r o m o t i n g  and t r a n s f e r r i n g  j u n i o r  w h i t e  male 

Stemmery employees over se n io r  Stemmery females;  

(5 )  s e g r e g a t in g  female Stemmery employees i n to  

separate  " fem ale "  j o b s ;  (6)  a ss ig n in g  b la c k  female 

employees t r a n s f e r r e d  from Stemmery to  the most 

arduous jobs  in the F a b r i c a t i o n  Department for  

d i s p o r p o r t i o n a t e l y  l o n g  p e r i o d s  o f  t i m e ;  ( 7 )  

passing  over  females and b la c k  male employees with 

g r e a t e r  e x p e r i e n ce ,  s k i l l  and s e n i o r i t y  than white 

males ( i )  in the s e l e c t i o n  o f  su p e r v iso r y  person­

n e l ,  and ( i i )  in p r o v id in g  t r a i n i n g  f o r  and ac cess  

to  s k i l l e d  and c r a f t  p o s i t i o n s ;  (8 )  la y in g  o f f  

s e n io r  females and b lack  males b e f o r e  ju n i o r  white 

males in r e d u c t i o n  o f  f o r c e ;  and (9 )  maintaining 

d i s a b i l i t y  l e a v e  p o l i c i e s  wh ich  d i s c r i m i n a t e  
aga inst  maternity  l e ave .

Short ly  b e f o r e  t r i a l ,  however,  the p a r t i e s  

entered in t o  an agreement f o r  a p a r t i a l  s e t t l e ­

ment, which prov ided i n t e r  a l i a  that t r i a l  would 

be l im i te d  to the f o l l o w i n g  i s s u e s :  (1 )  whether 

the  members o f  the  c l a s s  were h i r e d  i n t o  the  

Stemmery ra th e r  than in t o  permanent employment as 

a r e s u l t  o f  r a c i a l  or  sexual  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ;  (2 )  

whether the t r a n s f e r ,  promotion,  s e n i o r i t y ,  i n t i a l



9a

job  assignment and wage ra te  p o l i c i e s  d i s c r i m i ­

nated aga inst  c l a s s  members on the b a s is  o f  race  

or sex,  except  in the s e l e c t i o n  o f  su p erv isory  

and c r a f t  pe rs o n n e l ;  (3 )  i f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  in any 

o f  the f o r e g o in g  were found, whether i n j u n c t i v e  

r e l i e f  i s  app ropr ia te  and what amount o f  back pay, 

i f  any, should be awarded c l a s s  members; and (4)  

what c o s t s ,  expenses and a t to rn e y  fees  should be 

awarded. A l l  c la ims f o r  a f f i r m a t i v e  r e l i e f  sought 

on the ba s is  o f  a l l e g e d  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  working 

or d i s c i p l i n a r y  c o n d i t i o n s  were withdrawn. The 

m a t e r n i t y  l e a v e  i s s u e  was e x p r e s s l y  r e s e r v e d .  

The p a r t i a l  se tt lement agreement was approved by 

the  Court  on June 6 , 1975 a f t e r  a p p r o p r i a t e  

n o t i c e  o f  the agreement was g iven a l l  members o f  

the  c l a s s ,  pu r s u a n t  t o  th e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  Rule 

23 (e )  o f  the Fed. R. Civ. P.

On o r  a b o u t  March 16 ,  1 9 7 0 ,  t h e  named 

p l a i n t i f f s  Mary C a r t e r ,  E l i z a b e t h  B u l l o c k ,  

and Gertrude Moody, along with t h i r t y - s i x  o th er  

b l a c k  f e m a le  e m p lo y e e s  at the  Company, f i l e d  

c h a r g e s  w i t h  the  Equal  Employment O p p o r t u n i t y  

Commission ( h e r e i n a f t e r  "EEOC") a l l e g i n g  v i o l a t i o n  

o f  t h e i r  r i g h t s  under  T i t l e  V I I  o f  the C i v i l  

Rights Act o f  1964. On or about October 29, 1972,



10a

named p l a i n t i f f s  Nora Lewis and B e t t y  Johnson  

f i l e d  s i m i l a r  c h a r g e s  w i t h  the  EEOC. On t h a t  

same day, p l a i n t i f f s  Carte r ,  B u l lo ck  and Moody 

f i l e d  a d d i t i o n a l  charges with the EEOC a l l e g i n g  

v i o l a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  r i g h t s  under the C i v i l  Rights 

Act .  The compla ints  f i l e d  with the EEOC, taken 

t o g e t h e r ,  e x p r e s s ly  l i s t  a l l  the defendants as 

o f f e n d i n g  p a r t i e s .  In l e t t e r s  d a t e d  J u l y  25,  

1973, the EEOC advised  a l l  o f  the named p l a i n t i f f s  

o f  t h e i r  r i g h t  to i n s t i t u t e  an a c t i o n  in fe d e r a l  

c o u r t .  In l e t t e r s  dated August 21, 1973, the EEOC 

advised  p l a i n t i f f s  Mary Carter ,  E l izabeth  B ul lo ck ,  

and Gertrude Moody o f  t h e i r  r i g h t  to  sue on t h e i r  

amended charges .  The instant  a c t i o n  was f i l e d  on 

September 9, 1973 w i th in  the 90-day per iod  s p e c i ­

f i e d  in 42 U.S.C. § 2 0 0 0 e - 5 ( f ) .

The defendant In t e r n a t i o n a l  Union contends 

that  i t  was not served with n o t i c e  o f  the EEOC 

charges ,  nor approached by the EEOC in " c o n c i l i a ­

t i o n  n e g o t i a t i o n ,  and argues,  t h e r e f o r e ,  that i t  

s h o u l d  be d i s m i s s e d  as a p a r t y  d e f e n d a n t .  

The United Sta te s Court o f  Appeals f o r  the Fourth 

C i r c u i t  has h e ld ,  however,  that the Commission's 

f a i l u r e  to  attempt c o n c i l i a t i o n  or  serve n o t i c e  on 

defendants o f  f i l e d  charges i s  not a j u r i s d i c ­



11 a  -

t i o n a l  bar to  an employee 's  a c t i o n  i f  the employee 

has p r o p e r ly  f i l e d  h i s  compla int .  An employee 

cannot be charged with the Commission 's f a i l u r e  to  

execute  i t s  s t a t u t o r y  d u t i e s .  R u sse l l  v .  American 

Tobacco Company, 528 F.2d 357 at 365 (4th Cir .  

1 9 7 5 ) .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the  Court  c o n c l u d e s  that  

In t e r n a t i o n a l  Union i s  p r o p e r ly  b e f o r e  i t  as a 

party de fendant.
Before turning  to  the fa c t u a l  f i n d i n g s ,  the 

Comany's co n t e n t i o n  that th is  C o u r t ' s  previous 

d e c i s i o n  o f  Quarles v .  P h i l i p  M orr is ,  I n c . , 279 

F .S u p p .  505 (E .D .  Va. 1 9 6 8 ) ,  i s  d i s p o s i t i v e  

o f  the race  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  c laims asser ted  in the 

in s tan t  a c t i o n  on the grounds o f  res  ju d i c a t a ,  

c o l l a t e r a l  e s t o p p e l ,  or s ta r e  d e c i s i s ,  must be 

a d d r e s s e d .  In  Q u a r l e s , a b l a c k  e m ploy ee  o f  

P h i l i p  Morris  brought a c l a s s  a c t i o n  agains the 

Company, L o c a l  203 and the  L o c a l ' s  P r e s i d e n t  

on b e h a l f  o f  a l l  b la cks  employed there in  a l l e g i n g  

r a c i a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  in v i o l a t i o n  o f  T i t l e  VII o f  

the  C i v i l  R i g h t s  Act  o f  1964.  The Court  h e l d  

in t e r  a l i a  that  "The company has not engaged in 

d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  h i r i n g  p r a c t i c e s  s ince  January 1, 

1966,  and c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  the p l a i n i f f s  are  no t  

e n t i t l e d  to  r e l i e f  on th is  i s s u e . "  I t  a l s o  he ld



12a -

that  Stemmery employees were not d i s c r im in ate d  

against  by the advancement, t r a n s f e r ,  and s e n i o r ­

i t y  p o l i c i e s  o f  the Company.

" In  fash io n in g  a remedy the court  must f i r s t  

d e t e r m i n e  the  c l a s s  o f  e m p lo y e e s  t o  which  i t  

is  a p p l i c a b l e .  . . Employees o f  the stemmery are 

no t  i n c l u d e d  i n  the  c l a s s .  They are  s e a s o n a l  

employees h i r e d  on a temporary b a s is  on ly .  They 

do n o t  a t t a i n  permanent  employment s e n i o r i t y  

u n l e s s  t h e y  are  h i r e d  as r e g u l a r  e m p l o y e e s  in  

a n o t h e r  d e p a r t m e n t .  The c o m p a n y ' s  e x p e r i e n c e  

with the g e n e r a l l y  poor q u a l i t y  o f  labor  a v a i la b l e  

on a seasonal  b a s is  prov ides  a r a t i o n a l  c l a s s i f i ­

c a t i o n  that  d i s t i n g u is h e s  season al  employees from 

permanent em ployees ."  279 F.Supp. at 519.

I f  the d e c i s i o n  i s  deemed to  be c o n t o l l i n g  

o v e r  the  i n s t a n t  c o n t r o v e r s y ,  i t  would  bar 

those members o f  the c l a s s  who were members o f  the 

Quarles c l a s s  from r e l i e f  on the grounds o f  res 

j u d i c a t a ,  and i t  would serve as a s t rong  precedent 

aga inst  those members o f  the present c l a s s  not 

p a r t i e s  o f  the c l a s s  in Quarles on the grounds o f  

s tare  d e c i s i s  — unless  the p l a i n t i f f s  can show a 

s i g n i f i c a n t  change in  the fa c t u a l  c i rcumstances 

f rom t h o s e  o f  t h e  Q u a r le s  c a s e ,  t h a t  d e c i s i o n  

would c o n t r o l .  However, the Court conc ludes  on



13a -

the b a s is  o f  e i t h e r  o f  two r a t i o n a l e s  that Quarels 

does not so c o n t r o l ,  f o r  the c l a s s  in Quarles did 

not  adequately  represent  the c laims o f  the c l a s s  

in the in s tan t  case .
A l t h o u g h  the  c l a s s  in  Q u a r le s  d i d  i n c l u d e  

Stemmery employees,  indeed the named p l a i n t i f f s  in 

that  case were former stemmery employees who had 

t r a n s f e r r e d  to  the P r e f a b r i c a t i o n  Department, the 

c laims o f  the Stemmery employees were seemingly 

l o s t  in the breadth and ambition o f  the c l a s s  s 

o v e r a l l  i n t e r e s t .  Q u ar les , which was one o f  the 

e a r l y  r e s o l u t i o n s  o f  a T i t l e  V I I  c o n t r o v e r s y ,  
r e f l e c t s  in i t s  op in io n  and documents conta ined in 

the case f i l e  that  the p l a i n t i f f s  th e re in  were, in 

p a r t ,  seeking to  secure  equal  b e n e f i t  f o r  what 

r e a d i l y  appeared to  be a deserv ing  c l a s s  —  the 

b la ck  permanent employees o f  the Company. For 

example, in the C o u rt ' s  f in d in gs  that the Company 

had not engaged in  d i s c r im in a t o r y  h i r i n g  p r a c t i c e s  

a f t e r  January 1, 1966, the Court based i t s  c o n c lu ­

s ion  on the f a c t  that  the percentage o f  b lacks  in 

F a b r i c a t i o n  and WRS had been s u b s t a n t i a l l y  in ­

creased .  I t  a l so  note d ,  with l e s s  emphasis, that 

the  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  b l a c k s  in  the  Stemmery and 

P r e f a b r i c a t  i o n , " w h i l e  s t i l l  l a r g e ,  had been



14a

reduced .  The C o u r t ' s  f in d in g s  that b la c k s  were 

not d i s c r im in a t e d  aga inst  in payment s c a l e s  was 

based on a c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  the r a te s  o f  compar­

a b l e  j o b s  i n  the  permen en t d e p a r t m e n t s ,  even 

though jobs  e x i s t e d  in the seasonal  departments 

t h a t  c o u l d  be compared t o  s i m i l a r  j o b s  i n  the  

permanent departments.  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  the Court 

summarily excluded  the Stemmery employees from any 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  promotion or  t r a n s f e r  d i s c r i m i n a ­

t i o n ,  while  grant in g  r e l i e f  to  b la cks  in one o f  

the Company's permanent departments. The Quarles 

o p i n i o n ,  author ized  by now United States C i r c u i t  

Judge John D. B u t z n e r ,  was and i s  one o f  the  

monumental d e c i s i o n s  in the area o f  T i t l e  VII law 

f o r  i t s  a s tu te  r e a l i z a t i o n  that  p r a c t i c e s  that are 

c u r r e n t l y  n e u t r a l  may, i n  e f f e c t ,  p e r p e t u a t e  

p a s t  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  p r a c t i c e s .  I t  s u f f e r s ,  

however,  from the p l a i n t i f f s '  attempt to  in c lu de  

a broad c l a s s  o f  l i t i g a n t s  and yet  prepare and 

a d v o c a t e  w i t h  f o r c e  the  c l a i m s  o f  some c l a s s  

members to  the  d e t r i m e n t  o f  a d i s t i n c t  and 

aggr ieved  a l t e r n a t e  p o r t i o n  o f  the c l a s s .

As Mr. J u s t i c e  Harlan observed :  "The judgment 

in a c l a s s  a c t i o n  w i l l  bind on ly  those members o f  

the c l a s s  whose i n t e r e s t s  have been adequately



15a -

represented  by e x i s t i n g  p a r t i e s  to  the l i t i g a t i o n . "  

Sam Fox Pub l is h in g  Co. v .  United S t a t e s , 366 U.S. 

683, 81 S.Ct.  1309, 1314, 6 L.Ed.2d 604 (1961) .  

See Wetzel  v .  L ib e r t y  Mutual Insurance Co. , 508

F . 2d 239 (3d C ir .  1975) ;  Gonzales v .  C a ss id y , 474 

F . 2d 67, 74-75 (5th C ir .  1973) ;  M. Frankel ,  Some 

P r e l in i n a r y  Observations Concerning C i v i l  Rule 23, 

43 F.R.D. 39 (1867 ) .  See a l s o  Hansberry v .  Lee , 

311 U.S. 32, 61 S.Ct.  115, 85 L.Ed. 22 (1940 ) .

The g e n e r a l l y  accepted standard to be employed f o r  

d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e th e r  the  c l a s s  was a d e q u a t e l y  

r e p r e s e n t e d  in  Q u a r le s  i s  w h eth er  the  c l a s s  

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  through t h e i r  co u n se l ,  v i g o r o u s l y  

and te n a c i o u s l y  p r o t e c t e d  the i n t e r e s t s  o f  the 

e n t i r e  c l a s s .  See Gonzales v .  C ass id y , supra.

Viewing the e n t i r e  Quarles record  and the C ou rt ' s  

f in d in g  in  that case ,  the Court now conc ludes that 

the i n t e r e s t s  o f  the seasonal  employees o f  P h i l i p  

M o r r i s  were not  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  advan ced  and 

l i t i g a t e d .

The s i t u a t i o n  o f  the seasonal  employees was 

exacerbated by the f a i l u r e  to  n o t i f y  the members 

o f  the c l a s s  o f  the pendency o f  the l i t i g a t i o n .  

Although Rule 23 does not mandate n o t i c e  f o r  ( b ) ( 2 )  

a c t i o n s  such as the in s tan t  one, the Federal  Rules 

o f  C i v i l  Procedure must g ive  way to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l



16a -

im pera t ives .  In the t y p i c a l  ( b ) ( 2 )  c l a s s  a c t i o n ,  

n o t i c e  would not appear t o  be n e c e ssa ry ;  the c l a s s  

i s  t y p i c a l l y  homogenous without major c o n f l i c t i n g  

i n t e r e s t s  between members, and o f t e n  i t  i s  small 

in number. In most ( b ) ( 2 )  c a se s ,  " [ n ] o t i c e  would 

add l i t t l e  or  n o t h i n g . "  3B J.  M oore ,  F e d e r a l  

P r a c t i c e  123 .07 [1 ]  (2d ed.  1974) at 1152. How­

ev e r ,  most r a c i a l  and/or  sexual  d i s c r im in a t io n  

c a s e s  s i m p l y  do n o t  f i t  t h i s  s t e r o t y p e .  They 

are l a r g e  and o f t e n  encompass a v a r i e d  s e t  o f  

su bc lasse s  — t h i s  c a se ,  f o r  example, inc ludes 

both b lacks  and females.  Indeed re ce n t  Fourth 

C i r c u i t  d e c i s i o n s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  i t  s h o u l d  be 

the p o l i c y  o f  the f e d e r a l  co u r ts  to  be r e c e p t i v e  

to  large  c l a s s e s  in d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  s u i t s  so as to 

e f f e c t i v e l y  f i n a l i z e  the c o n t r o v e r s y  with r e sp e ct  

to  the defendants and t o ,  by economics o f  s c a l e ,  

r e d u c e  the  p l a i n t i f f s '  and d e f e n d a n t s '  t r i a l  

c o s t s .  See B a r n e t t  v .  W.T. Grant C o . , 518 

F . 2d 543, 548 (4th C ir .  1975) .  See a l s o  Long v . 

Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 43 (5th C ir .  1974) ;  Parham v . 

Southwestern B e l l  Telephone Co. ,  443 F.2d 421 (8th 

C ir .  1970) ;  Rich v.  Martin M ar ie t ta  Corp. , 522 

F . 2d 333,  341 ( 1 0 t h  C i r .  1 9 7 5 ) .  B i n d i n g  a l l  

c l a s s  l i t i g a n t s  to  a judgment when they have had 

no n o t i c e  to the a c t i o n  served on them, runs a



17a -

s u b s t a n t i a l  r i s k  that the c l a s s  members may in 

fa c t  be p r e ju d i c e d  without be ing  heard or  without 

having the o pp o r tu n ity  to a s s e s s ,  f o r  themselves,  

the adequacy o f  t h e i r  purported r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  

As was noted  by Mr. J u s t i c e  Jackson in  Mullane v . 

Central  Hanover Bank & Trust Co■, 339 U.S. 306, 

314, 70 S.Ct.  652, 657, 94 L.Ed.2d 865 (1950 ) ,  

" [ t ] h i s  r i g h t  ot  be heard has l i t t l e  r e a l i t y  or  

worth unless one i s  informed that the matter  i s  

p e n d in g  and can c h o o s e  f o r  h i m s e l f  w h e th e r  t o  

appear or d e f a u l t ,  a cqu iesce  or  c o n t e s t . "

The counter arguments, (1 )  that  the d i s t r i c t  

judge can a c c u r a t e l y  assess  the re p r e se n t a t iv e n e ss  

o f  the named p l a i n t i f f s  and (2 )  that  aggr ieved 

c l a s s  members can c o l l a t e r a l l y  attack  the ju dg ­

ment, assume much in an area o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  

s i g n i f i c a n c e  t h a t  t y p i c a l l y  w i l l  t o l e r a t e  few 

assumptions.  The f i r s t  argument assumes that the 

d i s t r i c t  ju d g e  can f o r e s e e  a l l  the  p o t e n t i a l  

c l a i m s  t h a t  may be r a i s e d  by c l a s s  members in 

c o n t e s t i n g  the adequacy o f  the c l a s s  re p r e se n ta ­

t i v e s  and r e s o l v e  them, perhaps without s p e c i f i ­

c a l l y  po inted argument, in a fav orab le  manner. 

This burden becomes more weighty as the c l a s s  s i z e  

and d i v e r s i t y  o f  c l a s s  membership i n c re a se .  The



18a -

second argument i s  a smoke sc reen  f o r  j u s t i f y i n g  

the b la ta n t  r e a l i z a t i o n  that some l i t i g a n t s  have 

not been or may not  be a f f o r d e d  due process  under 

the procedures fo lowed in the f i r s t  case .  I t  i s ,  

o f  c o u r s e ,  f a r  b e t t e r  t o  u t i l i z e  a p p r o p r i a t e  

procedures at the f i r s t  t r i a l ,  than to  throw the 

burden upon the l i t i g a n t s  who, in the face  o f  a 

seemingly v a l i d  judgment d i r e c t l y  on the matter  in 

c o n t r o v e r s y ,  must attempt to  regroup as a subc lass  

and a r g u e ,  a f t e r - t h e - f a c t ,  th a t  t h e y  were n o t  

adequately  re p r e se n te d .  Furthermore, a l low in g  

o r  e n c o u r a g i n g  l i b e r a l  c o l l a t e r a l  a t t a c k s  on 

( b ) ( 2 )  c l a s s  a c t i o n s ,  d e fe a t s  one o f  the prominant 

purposes o f  c l a s s  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  —  that o f  a c h ie v ­

in g  a f i n a l i t y  o f  c l a i m s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  the  

de fendants .  Again,  the p o t e n t i a l  and the need 

fo r  c o l l a t e r a l  a t tacks  on the f i r s t  judgment is  

augmented as the c l a s s  s i z e  and d i v e r s i t y  o f  i t s  

membership i n c r e a s e s .  There i s  a po in t  at which 

j u d i c i a l  paternal ism i s  simply in o p e r a b le ,  and 

the c l a s s  members must be g iven  the a b i l i t y  and 

the o pp o r tu n ity  to  assess  the adequacy o f  t h e i r  

r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s  themselves by be ing served with a 

proper n o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the proceed ing  and th e i r  

op t ion s  t h e r e in .  That po int  was surpassed in the



19a -

Quarles c a se .  See Schrader v .  S e l e c t i v e  Serv ice  

System Local  Board No. 76 , 470 F.2d 73 (7 th  Cir .  

1972) ;  Z e i l s t r a  v .  T a r r , 466 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.  

1972) ;  Eisen v .  C a r l i s l e  & J a c q u e l i n , 391 F.2d 

555, 564-65 (2d C ir .  1968) ( d i c t a ) ,  r e v ' d  on other  

grou nds, Eisen v .  C a r l i s l e  & J a c q u e l i n , 417 U.S. 

156, 94 S.Ct.  2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1 9 6 8 ) ;  Hoston 

v.  United Sta te s  Gypsum Co. 67 F.R.D.  650 (E.D. 

La. 1975) ;  Newman v .  Avco Corp. , 380 F.Supp. 1282 

(M.D. Tenn. 1 9 7 4 ) ;  McCarthy v .  D i r e c t o r  o f  

S e l e c t i v e  Se rv i ce  System, 322 F.Supp. 1032 (E.D. 

Wis. 1970) ,  a f f ' d  per curuam on o th er  grounds, 460 

F .2 d  1089 ( 7 t h  C i r .  1 9 7 2 ) .  But se e  W e t ze l  v . 

L ib e r t y  Mutual Insurance Co. ,  508 F.2d 239 (3d 

C i r .  1 9 7 5 ) ;  G o n z a le s  v .  C a s s i d y , s u p r a . In 

Quarles the c l a s s  was large  and subsumed severa l  

d i s t i n c t  s u b c l a s s e s ;  the dan g e r  o f  f a i l i n g  t o  

adequately  co n s id e r  the p l i g h t  o f  one or  more o f  

these su bc lass e s  was r e a d i l y  apparent.  Under the 

c i rcum stances ,  an order  d i r e c t i n g  that a l l  c l a s s  

members be n o t i f i e d  o f  the a c t i o n  so they could  

champion  t h e i r  own i n t e r e s t s  s h o u l d  have been 

r e q u e s t e d  and e n t e r e d .  The f a i l u r e  t o  so do 

r e q u i r e s  the court  to  now h o ld ,  c o n s i s t e n t  with 

the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  demands o f  the  due p r o c e s s



-  20a -

c lau se  o f  the Fourteenth Amendment, that  the c l a s s  

members o f  the i n s t a n t  s u i t  —- th e  Stemmery 

employees were not p a r t i e s  in any meaningful  

sense to  the Quarles a c t i o n  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  are 

not bound by i t s  decree  under the p r i n c i p l e s  o f  

res  j u d i c a t a .  Nor are they bound by the p r i n c i ­

p les  o f  s ta r e  d e c i s i s ,  f o r  the i s su e s  p e r t i n e n t  in 

t h i s  a c t i o n  were not f u l l y  and f a i r l y  r e s o lv e d  in 
the prev ious  one.

R e ce n t  c a s e  law i n d i c a t e s  th a t  a prima 

f a c i e  case o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  may be demonstrated 

by s t a t i s t i c a l  ev id ence  that  b lacks  and/or  females 

r e c e i v e  d i s p a r a t e  treatment from that a f fo rded  

whites  and/or  males at the hands o f  the de fe n ­

dants .  e . g . ,  Barnett v .  W.T, Grant Co. ,  518 F .2d 

543 (4th C ir .  1975) ;  and that  burden s h i f t s  to  the 

defendants to  come forward with ev id ence  to  rebut 

the p l a i n t i f f s '  cause .  E . g . ,  McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. v .  Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03,  93 S.Ct.  

1817,  36 L . E d . 2 d  668 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ;  U n i te d  S t a t e s  v .  

Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. ,  471 F.2d 582 (4th 

C i r .  1 9 7 2 ) ;  s ee  a l s o  U n ite d  S t a t e s  v .  Hayes 

In t e r n a t i o n a l  Corp. ,  456 F.2d 112, 120 (5th Cir .  

1972) ;  United Sta te s v .  Ironworkers Local  86, 443

F .2d  544 ,  550 ( 9 t h  C i r .  1 9 7 1 ) .  C f .  A l b e m a r l e



21a-

Paper Co. v .  Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425, 95 S.Ct.
2362, 45 L . Ed.2d at 280 (1975) .

The s t a t i s t i c s  gathered by the p l a i n t i f f s  and 

submitted in ev id ence  e s t a b l i s h  a prima f a c i e  case 

o f  r a c i a l  and s e x u a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  P h i l i p  

Morris  ass igned  over f i f t y  percent o f  a l l  b lacks  

i n i t i a l l y  h i r e d  from 1965 to  1974 to  the seasonal  

Stemmery j o b s ,  as compared with the assignment o f  

on ly  e leven  and f i v e - t e n t h s  o f  a l l  whites  h i r e d  in 

the  same p e r i o d  t o  th e  Stemmery. These p e r ­

centages  r e v e a l  a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  assignment o f  

newly h i r e d  b la c k s  to the Stemmery where the work 

i s  temporary and l e s s  f i n a n c i a l l y  remunerative.  

As a consequence,  during the 1965 to  1974 pe r i o d ,  

an average o f  seventy -n in e  and f i v e - t e n t h s  precent 

o f  a l l  the h i r e s  in the Stemmery were b lack  as 

compared with an average percentage o f  blacks  in

the Richmond work f o r c e  o f  about t w e n t y - f o u r
2 /p e r c e n t . — The heavy  ass ign m en t  o f  b l a c k s  to

2/  The Standard M etropo l i tan  S t a t i s t i c a l  Area 
TSMSA) f o r  Richmond as de f ined  by the Bureau o f  
the Census f o r  1960 inc luded  the City  o f  Richmond 
and the  C o u n t i e s  o f  C h e s t e r f i e l d  and H e n r i c o .  
The 1960 census r e p o r t s  that the c i v i l i a n  labor 
f o r c e  was 169,554,  o f  which 42,942 (25.3%) were 
blacks  and 82,142 (48.4%) were females.



-  22a -

o f  b lacks  to  the Stemmery has caused i t  t o  be a 

predominately b la ck  department;  during  the 1965 

to  1974 pe r io d  the average percentage  o f  b lacks  

in the Stemmery work f o r c e  was e i g h t y - f o u r  and 

t h r e e - t e n t h s  p e r c e n t .  These  s t a t i s t i c s  are 

p a r t i c u l a r l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  in l i g h t  o f  the Stem- 

m e r y ' s  h i s t o r y ;  s i n c e  i t s  i n c e p t i o n  in  the 

1 9 3 0 ' s and u n t i l  the e a r ly  1960 's ,  the Stemmery 

o p e r a t i o n  has been manned almost e x c l u s i v e l y  by 

b l a c k s  in  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  a r a c i a l l y  d e f i n e d

2/ Cont ' d

The Standard M etropo l i tan  S t a t i s t i c a l  area 
(SMSA) f o r  Richmond as d e f i n e d  by th e  Bureau 
o f  the  Census f o r  1970 i n c l u d e d  the  C i t y  o f  
Richmond and the Counties  o f  C h e s t e r f i e l d ,  Henrico 
and Hanover. The 1970 census r e po r ts  that the 
c i v i l i a n  labor  f o r c e  over age 16 in the Richmond 
SMSA was 225,007,  o f  which 52,409 (23.3%) were
b lacks  and 93,937 (41.7%) were females.

On A p r i l  27,  1973 ,  the  Richmond Sta nd ard
M etropo l i tan  S t a t i s t i c a l  Area (SMSA) was r e v is e d  
to  inc lude  three a d d i t i o n a l  c o u n t i e s .  Charles 
C i ty ,  Goochland and Powhatan. The 1973 Richmond 
SMSA i n c l u d e d  the  C i t y  o f  Richmond and the 
C o u n t i e s  o f  C h e s t e r f i e l d ,  henr i c o , H a n o v e r , 
Charles C i ty ,  Goochland and Powhatan. In 1973, 
the  c i v i l i a n  l a b o r  f o r c e  o v e r  age 16 i n  the 
Richmond SMSA was 233 ,068,  o f  which 56,090 (24%) 
were b lacks  and 96,775 (42%) were females.



23a

departmental  system.— Whites were h i r e d  i n to  and 

employed in the F a b r i c a t i o n  op e r a t i o n s  and the WSR 

o p e r a t i o n ,  w h i l e  b l a c k s  were h i r e d  i n t o  the 

Stemmery and P r e f a b r i c a t i o n  o p e r a t i o n s .  At f i r s t  

g l a n c e ,  the  d a t a  seems t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  the 

r a c i a l l y  d e f i n e d  sy s te m  i s  b e i n g  m a i n t a i n e d .

T r a n s f e r s  f rom th e  Stemmery were l a r g e l y  

l im i t e d  to  openings in the P r e f a b r i c a t i o n  Depart­

ment u n t i l  the ru le s  governing the t r a n s f e r s  o f  

season al  employees to  permanent employment were 

changed  in  the  1974 l a b o r  c o n t r a c t  t o  a l l o w  

seasonal  workers to f i l l  entr y  l e v e l  v acanc ie s  in 

a l l  areas o f  permenent employment during per iods 

o f  Stemmery shutdown.  P r e f a b r i c a t i o n , a l s o  

h i s t o r i c a l l y  a b lack  department,  continues to  be 

populated l a r g e l y  by b la c k s .  The 1974 c o n t r a c t ,

3 /

2/  Cont ' d .

The 1970-73 V i r g i n i a  Employment Commission 
e s t i m a t e s  o f  the  p e r c e n t  o f  the  t o t a l  work 
f o r c e  which i s  comprised o f  b lacks  and females in  
the Ricghmond SMSA i s  as f o l l o w s :

M inori ty  ( b l a c k )  23.6% o f  the t o t a l
work f o r c e .  Female 41.0% o f  the t o t a l
work f o r c e .

3/  So as to comply with e x e c u t iv e  orders then 
i ssued ,  the Company, on May 1, 1961, e s t a b l i s h e d
a " F a c t o r i e s  Employment P o l i c y "  which  sought  
to  employ and promote employees without regard 
to ra c e .



-  24a

however, prov ides  permanent department employees 

t r a n s f e r r i n g  f rom one permanent d e p ar tm e n t  t o  

a n o t h e r  w i t h  s e n i o r i t y  f rom th e  d a t e  on which  

th e y  were f i r s t  p e r m a n e n t l y  h i r e d ,  w h i l e  i t  

p r o v i d e s  Stemmery e m p lo y e e s  who t r a n s f e r  w i t h  

s e n i o r i t y  on ly  from the date they f i r s t  t ran s ­

f e r r e d  to  permanent employment. A c c o r d in g ly ,  a 

Stemmery employee w i l l  always be ju n i o r  in subse­

quent t r a n s f e r s  to  an employee h i r e d  in to  one o f  

the permanent departments although both were h i r e d  

on the same day.
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  the p l a i n t i f f s  have produced 

ev id ence  that  se v e r a l  company job  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  

w ith in  each department are predominately "White"  

or  " b l a c k " ,  and " m a l e "  o r  " f e m a l e . "  In the 

Stemmery, the female jobs  have been in  the " l i g h t  

l a b o r "  c a t e g o r y ,  and the male jobs  have been in 

the  " h e a v y  l a b o r "  c a t e g o r y .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  the 

h igher  or der  or "key"  jobs have a l s o  been s e x u a l ly  

s t e r o t y p e d ;  there are female tag meter o p e r a t o r s ,  

male l i n e - o u t  and press o p e r a t o r s ,  male fork  l i f t  

o p e r a t o r s ,  and a predominately male sk e le t o n  crew 

t h a t  works d u r i n g  the  shutdown p e r i o d  at  the 

Stemmery. I n d i v i d u a l s  t r a n s f e r r i n g  from the



25a

Stemmery to  o ther  departments were a l s o  greeted 

with job  s t e r o t y p i n g .  The P r e f a b r i c a t i o n  Depart­

ment a l s o  maintained a " l i g h t  l a b o r "  and "heavy 

l a b o r "  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ;  in F a b r i c a t i o n  the jobs  o f  

h e a d - f i x e r  and f i x e r  are male,  and the jobs  o f  

c a t ch e r  attendant,  examiner,  and in s p e c t o r  are 

female;  there has never been a female t r a n s fe r  

from the Stemmery to  WSR. With resp ect  to the 

c laims o f  r a c i a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  there have never 

been any b lacks  in the h igh e s t  paying f a b r i c a t i o n  

jobs  o f  " h e a d - f i x e r " ,  stockroom c l e r k ,  or  watch­

man. Several  j o b s  in a l l  o f  the departments have 

been t o t a l l y  or  predominately f i l l e d  by one race 

or sex.

In r e s p o n s e  t o  the  p l a i n t i f f s '  c l a i m s  o f  

h i r i n g  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  the defendants have pro ­

duced ev idence i n d i c a t i n g  that b lacks  are more 

w i l l i n g  t o  a c c e p t  employment at the  s e a s o n a l  

f a c i l i t y ,  and t h a t  F a b r i c a t i o n  and WSR, the 

h i s t o r i c a l l y  white  departments,  have a s u b s t a n t ia l  

p r o p o r t io n  o f  b lack  workers.

P r i o r  to  1971, a l l  o f  the h i r i n g  o f  hour ly  

employees was done at the 20th Street  f a c i l i t y .  

In 1971, a separate  h i r i n g  o f f i c e  was opened in 

the Westab B ui ld in g  on Commerce Road. At Westab,



-  26a -

one day a week was assigned e x c l u s i v e l y  to  the 

h i r i n g  o f  seasonal  employees,  and the remaining 

f o u r  days a s s i g n e d  t o  the  h i r i n g  o f  permanent 

employees.  App l i can ts  f o r  permanent or  seasonal  

employment a p p l y i n g  on an u n a p p r o p r i a t e  day 

were i n s t r u c t e d  where and when to  reapp ly .  Westab 

was in turn c l o s e d  at the end o f  1972, and sepa­

r a t e  h i r i n g  o f f i c e s  were e s t a b l i s h e d  at separate  

l o c a t i o n s  f o r  permanent  and s e a s o n a l  h i r i n g .  

The defendants in troduced  ev id ence  that o f  3,005 

a p p l i c a n t s  f o r  employment who a p p e a r e d  at the 

seasonal  employment o f f i c e  seeking  work in the 

p e r i o d  from 1973 to  1974, on ly  177, or  f i v e  and 

f i v e - t e n t h s  p e r c e n t ,  were white .  H ir ing  proved to  

be p r o p o r t i o n a t e  to  the a p p l i can t  r a t i o ;  out o f  a 

t o t a l  o f  992 Stemmery h i r e e s  in that p e r i o d ,  50, 

or f i v e  percent were white .  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  the 

defendants demonstrated that the a t t r i t i o n  rate  

among b l a c k  Stemmery e m plo y e e s  has a v e r a g e d  

f o r t y - o n e  and o n e - ten th  percent over the l a s t  ten

y e ar s ,  whereas the white  average a t t r i t i o n  rate
4 /

was f o r t y - f o u r  and on e - te n th  p e r c e n t . — In c o n -

4 /  The a t t r i t i o n  r a t e  i s  measured by the r a t i o  
be tw e e n  the  number whose employment w i th  the 
Company terminated during a g iven  p e r i o d ,  e x c lu d ­
in g  t h o s e  e m p lo y e e s  t r a n s f e r r i n g  t o  permanent 
employment, to the t o t a l  number who worked in the



27a

e l u s i o n ,  the d e f e n d a n t s  c o n t e n d  t h a t  b l a c k s  

work in the Stemmery because they p r e f e r  to  work 

t h e r e ,  whi le  whites  are u n w i l l in g  to  accept  the 
work .

The argument has three p o s s i b l e  components: 

F i r s t ,  i t  may be based on the p r o p o s i t i o n  that o f  

those peop le  that  are in f a c t  q u a l i f i e d  on ly  to 

perform Stemmery work, on ly  the b lack  p o r t i o n  o f  

the group app l ie s  to  the p lants  o f  P h i l i p  Morris  

f o r  work and i s  w i l l i n g  to  accep t  Stemmery work. 

This i s  another way o f  saying  that  b lacks  that 

apply to  P h i l i p  Morris  f a c i l i t i e s  are on the whole 

l e s s  q u a l i f i e d  than w h i t e s  t h a t  a p p l y  t o  the 

same f a c i l i t i e s .  No ev idence was introduced  at 

t r i a l  in  support o f  such a p r o p o s i t i o n  and i t  may 

be and i s  r e j e c t e d  out o f  hand. Second, i t  may be 

based on the p r o p o s i t i o n  that ,  although whites 

and b lacks  are h i r e d  in appropr ia te  r a t i o s  in a l l  

the permanent departments,  once the d e c i s i o n  i s  

advanced to  the app l i can t  that a permanent job  is

4 /  Cont ' d .

Department d u r i n g  t h a t  p e r i o d .  However ,  the 
e v id e n t ia r y  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  the data i s  diminished 
by the f a c t  that  both the white  and b lack  a t t r i ­
t i o n  ra te s  are s u b s t a n t i a l l y  h igher  than the ra tes  
in any o f  the permanent departments.



28a

not a v a i l a b l e ,  (because  o f  r a c i a l l y  n e u tr a l  h i r i n g  

c y c l e s  or  a l a c k  o f  s u i t a b l e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s )  

w h i t e s  r e f u s e  to  work and b l a c k s  a c c e p t  i t .  

Third,  i t  may be based on the p r o p o s i t i o n  that 

b lacks  p r e f e r  to  work in the Stemmery, even though 

g iven the c h o i c e  o f  apply ing  f o r  permanent employ­

ment .

The s e c o n d  p r o p o s t i o n  i s  p o t e n t i a l l y  su p ­

ported  by in f e r e n c e  from the de fendants '  ev idence  

that  the Company's two t r a d i t i o n a l l y  white  d e p ar t ­

ments now have a s u b s t a n t i a l  pop u la t ion  o f  b lack  

workers.  As o f  December 31, 1974, both F a b r i c a ­

t i o n  and WSR had a b la c k  po p u la t io n  that r e p r e ­

se n t  a r e a s o n a b l e  d e g r e e  o f  i n t e g r a t i o n .  As 

compared to  the number o f  b lacks  in the Richmond 

work f o r c e ,  approximately  tw enty - four  percent ,  

F a b r i c a t i o n  has approximate ly  f o r t y - o n e  percent  

b lacks  in i t s  work pe rs o n n e l ,  and WSR has app rox i ­

mately tw en ty -e igh t  p e r c e n t .  From January 1, 1965 

to  December 31, 1974, t h i r t y - t w o  percent o f  a l l  

p e r s o n n e l  h i r e d  i n t o  F a b r i c a t i o n  and s i x t e e n  

p e r c e n t  o f  a l l  p e r s o n n e l  h i r e d  i n t o  WSR were 

b l a c k .  Such d a t a  seems t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  when 

p o s i t i o n s  are a v a i l a b l e  in these two departments,  

h i r i n g  i s  n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i n g .  I f  the t h i r d



-  29a

permanent department,  P r e f a b r i c a t i o n ,  is s im i la r  

in com pos i t i on ,  i t  would support  an i n fe r e n c e  that 

a l l  permanent p o s i t i o n s  are f i l l e d  n o n d i s c r i m i -  

n a t e ly  and that b lacks  are w i l l i n g  to  accept  the 

s e a s o n a l  p o s i t i o n s  w i t h  more f r e q u e n c y  than 

w hites .  However, two unexplained f a c t o r s  de s t ro y  

the i n f e r e n c e .  F i r s t ,  P r e f a b r i c a t i o n ,  h i s t o r i ­

c a l l y  b l a c k ,  c o n t i n u e s  to  be p o p u l a t e d  by an 

a p p r o x i m a t e l y  e i g h t y - f i v e  p e r c e n t  b l a c k  work 

f o r c e  [as  o f  1974]  . From January  1, 1965 t o

December 31, 1974, o f  a l l  the personnel  h i r e d  in to  

P r e f a b r i c a t i o n  s i x t y - t h r e e  percent  were b lack .  

S i x t y - t h r e e  percent o f  a l l  b la cks  h ired  between 

1965 and 1974 were e i t h e r  ass igned  to  the stemmery 

or P r e f a b r i c a t i o n ;  almost two out o f  every three 

b lacks  h i r e d .  Yet on ly  e ighteen  and e i g h t - t e n t h s  

p e r c e n t  o f  the  w h i t e s  h i r e d  d u r i n g  the  same 

p e r i o d  were i n i t i a l l y  a s s i g n e d  t o  t h e s e  two 

departments;  almost one out o f  every f i v e  whites  

h i r e d .  A d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een  permanent and 

nonpermanent h i r i n g  i s  not borne out by the f a c t s .  

Instead  the argument i s  f o r c e d  in t o  the form that 

most whites  d e s i r e  on ly  p o s i t i o n s  in the WSR and 

F a b r i c a t i o n  Departments, which are f i l l e d  n o n d is -



30a -

c r i m i n a t e l y , and once denied these  p o s i t i o n s  they 

w i l l  not accept  employment in e i t h e r  P r e f a b r i c a ­

t i o n  or the Stemmery. In such a form i t  merely 

begs the q u e s t i o n  o f  why, p e r c e n ta g e -w ise ,  so many 

more b lacks  than whites  are ass igned to  s p e c i f i e d  

d e p a r t m e n t s . —^ F u r t h e r m o r e , and t h i s  r e a s o n i n g  

app l ie d  with equal  f o r c e  aga inst  the t h i r d  compo­

nent h e r e t o f o r e  n oted ,  no reason  has been advanced 

as to  why b la c k s ,  as opposed to  w h i t e s ,  are so 

i n c l i n e d  t o  a c c e p t  o r  p r e f e r  the  s e a s o n a l  and 

lower paying jobs  o f  the Stemmery. I t  is  c l e a r  

from the ev id ence  that  b lacks  are q u a l i f i e d  and do 

f i l l  the  permanent p o s i t i o n s  in  the  WSR and 

F a b r i c a t i o n  Departments. The defendants do not 

c l a i m ,  as has been  t h e r e t o f o r e ,  n o t e d ,  th at  

the b la ck  a p p l i c a n t s  are ,  on the average,  l e s s

5 /  The ev id ence  o f  white  unw i l l ingness  to work 
in  the  Stemmery i s  a l s o  somewhat q u e s t i o n a b l e  
in l i g h t  o f  the  1965 s t a t i s t i c s .  In 1965 the  
Company h i r e d  on ly  68 b la cks  in t o  the Stemmery as 
opposed to  186 w h i tes ,  f o r  a percentage  o f  b lack  
h i r e s  o f  on ly  26 .8  pe rce n t .  That year represented  
a co n ce r te d  e f f o r t  to  h i r e  whites  i n to  Stemmery 
work. For a l l  the o ther  years f o r  which the Court 
has been prov ided  data,  the percentage o f  b lack  
h i r e s  ran from 73 to 98 percen t .



-  31a -

able  and q u a l i f i e d  than white a p p l i c a n t s .  What 

perverseness  makes b la cks  as opposed to  whites  

more w i l l i n g  t o  a c c e p t  what app ear  t o  be l e s s  
d e s i r a b l e  j o bs?

The answer in the C o u rt ' s  view l i e s  in  the 

test imony o f  the p l a i n t i f f s '  witness  that " i f  you 

want to  get h i r e d ,  you know, be ing  b la c k ,  your 

be s t  chance would be to  go through the Stemmery 

and then t r a n s f e r  to  permanent employment l a t e r . "  

P h i l i p  M o r r i s '  h i s t o r y  o f  segregated  departments,  

and t h e  c o n t i n u e d  dom inance o f  b l a c k s  in  the  

t r a d i t i o n a l l y  b lack  departments,  has led a sub­

s t a n t i a l  number o f  the b lacks  applying to  P h i l i p  

Morris f o r  work to the understanding that  t h e i r  

most l i k e l y  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  employment would 

be in the Stemmery. It  is  not s u r p r i s i n g  that 

the  l i n e s  t o  the  Stemmery h i r i n g  o f f i c e  are 

populated with a sp ir in g  b lack  workers,  nor is  i t  

s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  b l a c k s  may, in i n t e r v i e w i n g ,  

e x h i b i t  a p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  Stemmery work .  I t  

appears to a su b s t a n t i a l  number o f  b lack  a p p l i ­

cants that  they e i t h e r  take a Stemmery j o b  or look  

f o r  work w i th  a n o t h e r  e m p l o y e r .  G iven  t h i s  

background, any n ot ion  o f  " p r e f e r e n c e "  i s  meaning­

l e s s ;  to p r e f e r  one a l t e r n a t i v e  to  another,  one 

must b e l i e v e  that  both a l t e r n a t i v e s  are a v a i l a b l e .



32a -

The Court i s  unable to  f in d ,  however,  on the 

ba s is  o f  the rec o r d  b e f o r e  i t  that  the e x c e s s i v e  

assignment o f  b lacks  to  the Stemmery was purpose ­

f u l l y  u n d e r t a k e n  by t h e  Company t o  c o v e r t l y  

c o n t i n u e  i t s  h i s t o r i c a l  sy s te m  o f  s e g r e g a t e d  

departments.  What has been e s t a b l i s h e d  i s  that 

the Company, although l i b e r a l l y  proc la im in g  that 

i t  ass igns new h i r e s  without regard to  t h e i r  race ,  

has u n f o r t u n a t e l y  done n o t h i n g  t o  d i s p e l  the  

b e l i e f ,  founded in  i t s  past a c ts  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  

and he ld  by a s u b s t a n t i a l  number o f  b lack  a p p l i ­

c a n t s ,  t h a t  i t  s t i l l  a s s i g n s  new e m p lo y e e s  t o  

departments on the b a s i s  o f  race .  Such a b e l i e f  

has t r a n s l a t e d  i t s e l f  i n to  a se t  o f  c ircumstances 

that had continued to  p lace  b la cks  at a d isadvan ­

tage when seeking  employment at P h i l i p  Morr is .  

The Company's p r o f e s s e d  n e u t r a l i t y ,  i s ,  in f a c t ,  

not  n e u t r a l ,  f o r  p a s t  a c t s  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  

continue to  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  modern p r a c t i c e .  

"Under the A ct ,  p r a c t i c e s ,  procedures ,  or  t e s t  

n e u t r a l  on t h e i r  f a c e ,  and even  n e u t r a l  in 

terms o f  i n t e n t ,  c a n n o t  be m a i n t a i n e d  i f  th e y  

o p r e a t e  t o  ' f r e e z e '  the  s t a t u s  quo o f  p r i o r  

d i s c r im in a t o r y  employment p r a c t i c e s . "  Griggs v .



-  33a -

Duke Power Co. ,  401 U.S.C.  424, 430, 91 S.Ct.  849, 

853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971 ) .  See a l s o  Quarles v . 

P h i l i p  M orr is ,  I n c . , supra . The Company, in  order  

to r e a s s e r t  a ba lance ,  should have informed a l l  

a p p l i c a n t s  f o r  hou r ly  p o s i t i o n s  at the beg inning  

o f  any in terv iew  (1 )  o f  the p o s i t i o n s  c u r r e n t ly  

a v a i l a b l e  in each o f  the four  departments with an 

a p p r o p r i a t e  j o b  d e s c r i p t i o n ,  and ( 2 )  t h a t  i t  

ass igns and h i r e s  new workers without r e f e r e n c e  to  

r a c e .  A l l  those  c l a s s  members that were not so 

informed when they were h i r e d  in to  the Stemmery, 

and that b e l i e v e d  that t h e i r  race  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  

l im i t e d  t h e i r  i n t i a l  employment to  the Stemmery 

are e n t i t l e d  to  r e c o v e r  f o r  t h e i r  l o s s e s .  "What 

is  requ ired  o f  Congrtess is  the removal o f  a r t i f i ­

c i a l ,  a r b i t r a r y ,  and u n n e c e s s a r y  b a r r i e r s  to  

employment when the b a r r i e r s  operate  i n v i d i o u s l y  

to d i s c r im in a t e  on the b a s is  o f  r a c i a l  or  o th er  

i m p e r m i s s i b l e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . "  G r i g g s  v .  Duke 

Power C o . ,  401 U.S .  at 431 ,  91 S . C t .  at 853,  

(Emphasis added) Cf. Barnett v .  W.T. Grant Co. ,  

supra, 518 F.2d at 547; Lea v .  Cone M i l l s  Corp. ,

301 F.Supp. 97, 102 (M.D. N.C. 1969)

p a r t ,  438 F.2d 86 (4th C ir .  1971) .

a f f ' d  in



-  34a -

With re sp e c t  to  the p l a i n t i f f s '  c laims that 

the  Company c o n t i n u e s  t o  m a i n t a i n  " m a l e "  and 

" fem ale"  job  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  w i th in  the Stemmery, 

and that  t r a n s f e r s  from the Stemmery face  "male"  

and " f e m a l e " ,  and "w h i t e ” and " b l a c k "  j o b  c l a s s ­

i f i c a t i o n s  w i th in  the permanent departments,  the 

argument i s  s i m i l a r .  The Company answers the  

a l l e g a t i o n s  with the c o n t e n t i o n  th a t ,  although in 

the past  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  pat terns  with regard to 

race  or sex did  e x i s t ,  jobs  are now a v a i l a b l e  to  

a l l  races  and both sexes when openings are created  

by r e t i r e m e n t ,  t r a n s f e r ,  or  expanded  c a p a c i t y  

demands. A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  i t  has in troduced  ev id ence  

o f  average pay l e v e l s  to prove that  the Company 

does not d i s c r im in a t e  with r e s p e c t  to  pay between 

the v a r i o u s  j o b  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  

to race or sex.  F i n a l l y ,  the defendants asser t  

that males tend to  avoid j o b  c a t e g o r i e s  in which 

females predominate,  and that females are r e l u c ­

t a n t  t o  q u a l i f y  f o r  j o b s  w hich  r e q u i r e  a h i g h  

d e g r e e  o f  m e c h a n i c a l  s k i l l .  In l i g h t  o f  the 

s tr ong  ev idence  o f  past acts  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  

and the ev idence o f  present se g r e g a t io n  among job  

c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  i t  is  the duty and the burden o f



-  35a -

the defendants to  inform a l l  p o t e n t i a l  app l i c a n ts  

f o r  the v a r io u s  openings o f  sa id  openings as they 

dev elop  and that these  openings would be f i l l e d  

without regard to  sex or  r a c e .  Those a p p l i can ts  

in the c l a s s  that were not so informed and that  

would  have  a p p l i e d  f o r  any such o p e n i n g s  i f  

informed,  are e n t i t l e d  to  re c o v e r y .
The p l a i n t i f f s '  a t ta c k  the labor  p r o v i s i o n s  

governing  s e n i o r i t y ,  t r a n s f e r  and promotion o f  

seasonal  employees on the grounds that they l o ck  

seasonal  employees i n to  season al  p o s i t i o n s .  These 

p r o v i s i o n s  are d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  on r a c i a l  or  sexual  

g rou nd s  o n l y  i f  c l a s s  members are a s s i g n e d  to  

seasonal  p o s i t i o n s  on r a c i a l  or  sexual  c r i t e r i a .  

Since  the Court has concluded that c l a s s  members 

are o f t e n  led to seek employment in the Stemmery 

on the bas is  o f  past r a c i a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  i t  

must a l s o  con c lude that the labor p r o v i s i o n s  that 

r e s t r i c t  the s e n i o r i t y ,  t r a n s f e r  and promotional  

r i g h t s  o f  a s e a s o n a l  em ployee  so  s i t u a t e d  are 

l ik e w is e  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y .  However, such a f in d in g  

does not re q u i r e  a r e d r a f t i n g  o f  the s e n i o r i t y ,  

t r a n s f e r ,  or  promotion r u l e s ;  i t  is the i n i t i a l  

assignment p o l i c i e s  that ta in t  the system. The 

f a c t  that  Stemmery employees are more r e s t r i c t e d  

in t h e i r  t r a n s f e r  r i g h t s  than permanent employees,



-  36a

without ev id ence  o f  impermissible  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  

would represent  a j u s t i f i a b l e  p o l i c y .  Seasonal  

employees are adjudged to be poorer  workers on the 

whole and must prove themselves in a permanent 

c a p a c i t y  b e f o r e  th e y  are  g i v e n  the  r i g h t s  and 

b e n e f i t s  o f  permanent workers.  See S e c t i o n  703(h)  
o f  T i t l e  VII ,  42 U.S.C.  § 2000e -2 (h ) .

The d e f e n d a n t  u n i o n s  are  l i a b l e  w i t h  the 

Company to these  c l a s s  members that  are ab le  to 

r e c o v e r  under  the  t h e o r i e s  h e r e t o f o r e  n o t e d ,  

f o r  the Union a l s o  has a checkered p a s t .—^Along 

with the r a c i a l l y  segregated  departments o f  P h i l i p  

M orr is ,  there a l s o  e x i s t e d  r a c i a l l y  segregated 

l o c a l  unions.  Local  209 o f  the Tobacco Workers'  

I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Union represente d  only  b la cks  in 

P r e f a b r i c a t  i o n , Stemmery,  and the  j a n i t o r i a l

6/  The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Union, due to  i t s  heavy 
involvement in Local  2 0 3 ' s a c t i v i t i e s ,  i s  j o i n t l y  
r e s p o n s i b l e  with the Local  f o r  the Union 's  f a i l u r e  
to  f u l f i l l  i t s  du t ies  to  the union membership. 
See  P a t t e r s o n  v ,  A m e r i c a n  T o b a c c o  Company, 
supra , at 270-271. In t e r n a t i o n a l  was an a c t i v e  
a d v i s o r  t o  the L o c a l ,  and sa t  in  on most o f  
the  L o c a l ' s  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  the  Company f o r  
c o l l e c t i v e - b a r g a i n i n g  agreements.



-  37a -

s t a f f .  Local  203 o f  the Tobacco Workers'  In tern a ­

t i o n a l  Union represented  on ly  whites  in F a b r i c a ­

t i o n  and WSR. While separate  unions e x i s t e d ,  the 

Company and the unions n e g o t ia t e d  uneuqal wages 

f o r  the same work with b la cks  g e n e r a l l y  r e c e i v i n g  

the  l o w e r  w ag e s .  In 1963,  in  r e s p o n s e  t o  a 

P r e s i d e n t i a l  Executive  Order,  Local  209 and Local  

203 m e r g e d ;  L o c a l  203 became the  s u r v i v i n g  

e n t i t y .  Since the u n io n 's  past  i n d i c a t e s  that i t  

f a c i l i t a t e d  the Company's t r a d i t i o n  o f  segregated  

departments, i t  a l s o  must share the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  

f o r  in forming  i t s  members that a l l  j o bs  are open 

in a l l  departments without regard to  race  or  sex 

so as to  m o l l i f y  members' present understanding as 

based on past h i s t o r y .  I t s  f a i l u r e  to  perform 

t h i s  f u n c t io n  makes i t  j o i n t l y  l i a b l e  with the 

Company to  those  p l a i n t i f f s  e n t i t l e d  to  r e c o v e r .

The Court f i n d s ,  however,  that there i s  no 

ev id ence  o f  a r b i t r a r y  a c t i o n  or bad f a i t h  conduct 

on the part  o f  the defendant unions towards the 

c l a s s  members in  the  h a n d l i n g  o f  c l a s s  member 

g r ie v a n c e s ,  see G r i f f i n  v .  In t e r n a t i o n a l  Union, 

United Automobile ,  A & A I W, 469 F,2d 181 (4th

C i r .  1 9 7 2 ) ,  o r  in  r e p r e s e n t i n g  the  s e a s o n a l  

employees in the n e g o t i a t i o n  process  with P h i l i p



-  38a

M orris .  A cc o r d in g ly ,  the Unions were not  g u i l t y  

o f  b r e a c h  o f  t h e i r  s t a t u t o r t y  d u t y  o f  f a i r  

represent at i o n .
Counsel w i l l  be d i r e c t e d  to  meet and b r i e f  

the Court on the app ropr ia te  procedure  f o r  a s c e r ­

t a in in g  the r e l i e f  that should be made a v a i l a b l e  

to  those c l a s s  members e n t i t l e d  to  r e c o v e r  in  th is  

cause.  See g e n e r a l l y , Franks v .  Bowman Transp orta ­

t i o n  Company, I n c . ,  et  a l . ,  42 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct.  

1251, 47 L .Ed. 2d 444, 44 U.S.L.W. 4356 (1976 ) ;  

A l b e m a r l e  Paper Co v .  M o o dy , 422 U .S .  4 0 5 ,  95 

S .Ct.  2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975 ) .

An a pp ro pr ia te  order  w i l l  i s s u e .



-  39a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 

RICHMOND DIVISON 

Civ. A. No. 73-0488-R.  

September 2, 1976

NORA LEWIS, et  a l . ,

P l a i n t i f f s  

-  vs -

PHILIP MORRIS, INC., et  a l . ,

Defendants .

ORDER ADOPTING PLAINTIFFS' BACK PAY AND 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF GUIDELINES

MERHIGE. D . J . :  A l l  c o u n s e l  h a v i n g  r e p ­

r e s e n t e d  memoranda on s u g g e s t e d  p r o c e d u r e s  to  

f a c i l i t a t e  an award o f  r e l i e f  in t h i s  case which 

have been f u l l y  c o n s id e r e d ;  and
This Court be ing  persuaded that  the adopt ion 

and e n t r y  o f  Back Pay and I n j u n c t i v e  R e l i e f



40a

Gu idel ines  i s  necessary  and app ropr ia te  t o  c l a r i f y ,  

s i m p l i f y ,  and e xped i te  the " S t a t e  I I "  p r o c e e d in g s ;  

and that  the Guidel ines  proposed by p l a i n i t f f s  are 

c o n s i s t e n t  with and re qu ire d  by a p p l i c a b l e  law 

in c lu d in g  the C o u rt ' s  memorandum op in io n  h e r e i n ;

Now, t h e r e f o r e ,  i t  i s  hereby Ordered that the 

Court adopts and enters  the Back Pay and In ju n c ­

t i v e  R e l i e f  Guide l ines  at tached h e r e t o  and in ­

c o r p o r a t e d  by r e f e r e n c e  h e r e i n .  A l l  S t a g e  I I  

p r o c e e d i n g s  h e r e i n  s h a l l  be g o v e r n e d  by and 

c o n s i s t e n t  with these G u ide l in es .

So Ordered.
Back Pay Gu ide l ines

Guidel ine  1. Present Posture o f  the Case;

Cer ta in  i ssu es  p r e v i o u s l y  disputed in th is  

case are now f o r e c l o s e d  by the C o u r t ' s  memorandum 

o p in io n .  The test imony and documentary ev idence  

already  admitted s h a l l  not be d u p l i c a t e d  in  the 

back pay de term inat ions ,  except  as to  the extent 

permitted h e r e in ,  and any defenses app ropr ia te  to  

the l i a b i l i t y  stage o f  the case are now prec luded  

and s h a l l  not be l i t i g a t e d  in the back pay d e t e r ­

minat ions .  English v .  Seaboard C o a s t l in e  R.R. Co. ,



-  41a -

12 F . E . P .  Cases 9D ( S . D .  Ga. 1 9 7 5 ) .  And in  

accordance with the e a r l i e r  memorandum o p in io n ,  

t h i s  C ourt  makes the  f o l l o w i n g  f i n d i n g s  and 

c o n c l u s i o n s  which  are  no t  s u b j e c t  t o  f u r t h e r  

l i t i g a t i o n  by the p a r t i e s .

( a )  The d e f e n d a n t s  d id  n o t h i n g  t o  i n f o r m  

B l a c k s  or  t o  d i s p e l  t h e i r  b e l i e f s  b a s e d  upon 

past a c ts  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  and he ld  by a sub­

s t a n t i a l  number o f  a p p l i c a n t s ,  that the Company 

s t i l l  a s s i g n s  new h i r e s  t o  d e p a r t m e n t s  on the 

b a s is  o f  r a c e .  Such a p r a c t i c e  though neutra l  on 

i t s  f a c e ,  and probably  even n e u tra l  in  terms o f  

i n t e n t ,  operated  to  " f r e e e z e "  the s ta tus  quo o f  

p r i o r  d i s c r im in a t o r y  employment p r a c t i c e s ,  thus 

v i o l a t i n g  the Congression al  mandate that employers 

remove a r t i f i c i a l ,  a r b i t r a r y ,  and u n n e c e s s a r y  

b a r r i e r s  to  employment which operate  i n v i d i o u s l y  

t o  d i s c r i m i n a t e  on the  b a s i s  o f  r a c e  o r  o t h e r  

impermiss ib le  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s .  S i m i la r l y ,  with 

re sp e c t  t o  se g r e g a t io n  among jo b  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s ,  

because o f  the de fendants '  f a i l u r e  to  take s u f ­

f i c i e n t  a f f i r m a t i v e  a c t i o n s  to  desegregate  "male"



42a

and " fe m ale "  and " b l a c k "  and "w h i te "  j o b s ,  there 

i s  unlawful  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  in v i o l a t i o n  o f  T i t l e

v i i .-/

(b )  Because o f  the aforementioned f in d in g s  

o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  a l l  a f f e c t e d  members o f  the 

p l a i n t i f f  c l a s s  are e n t i t l e d  to  r e c o v e r  f o r  t h e i r  

l o s s e s  t h r o u g h  back pay  and i n j u n c t i v e  r e l i e f .

( c )  The s o l e  ba c k  pay i s s u e s  now p e n d in g

b e f o r e  the  C ourt  a r e :  ( 1 )  which  c l a s s  members

w i l l  r e c e i v e  back pay; and (2 )  how much w i l l  each

in d i v i d u a l  r e c o v e r ?  A l l  de fenses  advanced with

regard to  the determinati on  o f  a c l a s s - w i d e  r i g h t

to  back pay, and a l l  de fenses  to  i n d i v i d u a l  back

pay based on arguments a p p l i c a b l e  to the c l a s s  as

a whole which have been r e j e c t e d  by the C o u rt ' s

d e c i s i o n  s h a l l  no t  be used as d e f e n s e s  in  any
2/second stage  p r o c e e d in g s .—

1/  C o u r t ' s  Memorandum O p i n i o n ,  pp.  2 1 -2 3
(entered  July 7, 1976) .

2 /  Among the  d e f e n s e s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n c l u d e d  
w ith in  the p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  t h i s  paragraph are the 
f o l l o w i n g :

(a )  The f a i l u r e  o f  any c l a s s  member to  apply 
for  or  seek t r a n s f e r  from the Stemmery 
to o th er  permanent departments; Hairston



-  43a -

Gu ide l ine  2. Back Pay Per iod :

The p e r i o d  f o r  which  p l a i n t i f f s  and c l a s s

members may r e c o v e r  awards o f  back pay in th is

case i s  from March 16, 1968, to  at  l e a s t  the date

o f  entr y  o f  the f i n a l  decree in t h i s  a c t i o n ,  with

e i t h e r  e x te n s io n  o f  the pe r io d  or  supplementation

o f  the award f o r  those c l iamants  who have not yet

a t ta in e d  t h e i r  " r i g h t f u l  p l a c e "  by the date o f  the

f i n a l  judgment. Patterson  v .  American Tobacco

Co . , _____  F . 2d _____  12 F . E . P .  Cases 314 ,  323

(4th C ir .  1976) ;  and see 42 U.S.C. §2 0 0 0 e ~ 5 (g ) .

Guidel ine 3. E l i g i b l e  Back Pay Class 
Members:

The named p l a i n t i f f s  and a l l  f e m a l e s  and 

b l a c k  m a l e s ,  w h eth er  c u r r e n t l y  em ployed  or  no

2 /  Cont ' d

v.  McLean Trucking C o . ,  520 F .2d 226, 
232 (4th  C ir .  1975) .

(b )  The good or bad f a i t h  o f  defendants or 
lack  t h e r e o f .  Albemarle Paper Co. v . 
Moody, supra , 45 L.Ed.2d at 299.

( c )  The f a c t  that there may have been l e s s  
a v a i la b l e  v acanc ie s  than q u a l i f i e d  
c la s s  members to f i l l  them. Pet tway, 
supra, 494 F.2d at 260.



-  44a

longer employed f o r  any reason ,  who were employees 

o f  the GLS on or  a f t e r  July  2, 1965 are e l i g i b l e  

f o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  f o r  a back pay award. Persons 

p r e s e n t ly  r e t i r e d ,  d i s a b l e d ,  or  o therw ise  t e rm i ­

nated from the company are not th ereby  excluded 

from the back pay c l a s s .  In the case o f  deceased 

p e r s o n s  w i t h i n  the  c l a s s  d e f i n e d  f o r  back  pay 

e l i g i b i l i t y ,  c laims may be maintained on t h e i r  

b e h a l f  and any awards to  such  p e r s o n s  w i l l  

a c c r u e  t o  th e  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  as d e s i g n a t e d  on 

d e fe n d a n t ' s  insurance or  p a y r o l l  r e c o r d s .

Guidel ine  4. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  Back Pay
Class Members:

Within f i f t e e n  (15)  days a f t e r  entry  o f  these 

g u i d e l i n e s ,  the company, using  i t s  employment and 

p a y r o l l  re cords  and o th er  r e so u rce s  a v a i l a b l e  to  

i t ,  w i l l  supply to  p l a i n t i f f s '  counse l  and the 

Court a l i s t  showing the name, address or  l a s t  

known a d d r e s s ,  employment and s e n i o r i t y  d a t e ,  

s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  number and income by month and 

year ,  o f  every in d i v i d u a l  e l i g i b l e  f o r  back pay as 

s p e c i f i e d  in No. 3 above.



-  45a -

Guidel ine 5. Proof  Required For Recovery 
o f  Back Pay:

P l a i n t i f f s  have a lready  shown (a )  the e x i s ­

ten ce o f  c o n s i s t e n t  and s u b s t a n t i a l  d i s p a r i t i e s  in 

income and income o p p o r t u n i t i e s  between members o f  

the  c l a s s  and w h i t e  males h i r e d  d i r e c t l y  i n t o  

permanent departments; (b )  that  most members o f  

the c l a s s  earned s u b s t a n t i a l l y  and c o n s i s t e n t l y  

l e s s  than t h e i r  white male permanent department 

counterparts  o f  l ik e  h i r e  da t e s ;  ( c )  that  c l a s s  

members were e f f e c t i v e l y  excluded  from the higher  

p a y i n g  j o b s  and were l i m i t e d  in  p r o m o t i o n a l  

o p p r t u n i t i e s  and (d)  that b lack  and female a p p l i ­

cants are as w e l l  q u a l i f i e d  as white  male a p p l i ­

c a n t s .  In l i g h t  o f  t h e s e  f i n d i n g s ,  the  p r o o f  

requ ired  to  e s t a b l i s h  a c l a s s  member's prima f a c i e  

ent i t lem ent  to  b lack  pay w i l l  be determined under 

the f o l l o w i n g  p r i n c i p l e s :
a.  A l l  p e r s o n s  who are membeers o f  the 

c l a s s  as d e f i n e d  in  number ( 3 )  a b o v e ,  w i th  

with the e x c e p t i o n  o f  those who have knowingly and 

v o l u n t a r i l y  "o pted  o u t ” , sh a l l  be deemed e l i g i b l e  

f o r  back pay by way o f  the company's employment 

and p a y r o l l  r e c o r d s ;  and



-  46a

b.  Counsel  f o r  p l a i n t i f f s  may e s t a b l i s h  by 

use o f  employment and p a y r o l l  r e co rds  that each 

in d i v i d u a l  c l a im a n t ' s  income was and/or  i s  l e ss  

than that o f  the average o f  those white males with 

the same or c l o s e s t  s e n i o r i t y  date who were h i r e d  

d i r e c t l y  i n to  f a b r i c a t i o n  ( h e r e i n a f t e r  " th e  white  

a v e r a g e " ) .  C a l c u la t i o n s  o f  back pay s h a l l  be made 

on a y e a r ly  ba s is  (or  f r a c t i o n  t h e r e o f )  and no 

deductions s h a l l  be made f o r  any y e a r ' s  earnings 

in excess  o f  the white  average.

c .  Each i n d i v i d u a l  c laimant may e s t a b l i s h  

that he was not informed o f  p o s i t i o n s  in d e p a r t ­

ments o t h e r  than  the  GLS ; no t  g i v e n  d e s c r i p ­

t i o n s  o f  such j o b s ;  not informed that the company 

ass igns new h i r e s  without regard to  race  or  sex 

and t h a t  i f  he had be e n  s o i n f o r m e d  he would 

have app l ied  f o r  permanent employment.

d. Each in d i v i d u a l  c laimant who i s  s h o w  to  

have  met the  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  5 ( a )  th r o u g h  ( c )  

above s h a l l  a l s o  have met h i s  or  her burden o f  

e s t a b l i s h i n g  a prima f a c i e  e n t i t lem en t  t o  back 

pay.

Guidel ine  6. Proof  Required to Defeat or
Limit Recovery:

a. Defendants may attempt to  prove that any 

p a r t i c u l a r  c l a s s  member i s  not e n t i t l e d  t o  r e -



-  47a

covery  o f  back pay by showing the f o l l o w i n g : —

( i )  He was informed,  at the beg inning  

o f  the employment in te r v ie w ,  o f  p o s i t i o n s  c u r ­

r e n t l y  a v a i l a b l e  in each o f  the four  departments;  

and

( i i )  He was g i v e n  a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  

the  j o b s  i n  each  o f  the  f o u r  d e p a r t m e n t s ;  and

( i i i )  He was informed that  the company 

ass igns the h i r e s  new workers without r e f e r e n c e  to  

race or sex ;  and

( i v )  A l t h o u g h  he was in f o r m e d  o f  ( i )  

t h r o u g h  ( i i i )  above  th a t  he made a f r e e  and 

vo lu n tary  d e c i s i o n  to  f o r e g o  permanent employment 

o p p o r t u n i t i e s  or was not q u a l i f i e d  f o r  permanent 

employment by the same standards app l ied  to  white 

male employees, and t h e r e f o r e  was not a c t u a l ly  

i n j u r e d  in  an e c o n o m i c  s e n s e  by any u n l a w f u l  

employment p r a c t i c e s .

3/

3 /  See Johnson  v .  G oodyear  T i r e  & Rubber
Co. , 491 F.2d 1364, 1380 (5th  C ir .  1974) ;  Baxter 
v .  Savannah Sugar R e f in in g  Corp. ,  495 F.2d 437, 
445;  Hairston v .  McLean Trucking Co. ,  520 F.2d 
226, 232 (4th Cir .  1975) ;  Pat terson v .  American
Tobacco Co. , _____  F . 2d _____  (4th C ir .  Feb. 23,
1 9 7 6 ) ,  S l i p .  op .  at 25 ;  and Franks v .  Bowman
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  C o . , _____  U.S .  _____  46 U.S .  Law
Week 4356 ,  4363 ,  S l i p .  op .  at 2 3 - 2 4  ( 1 9 7 6 ) .



-  48a -

b.  Any such p r o o f  s h a l l  be an a f f i r m a t i v e
4 /d e f e n s e  by c l e a r  and c o n v i n c i n g  e v i d e n c e . — 

Gu ide l ine  7. Elements o f  Back Pay 

L i a b i l i t y :

Any award o f  back pay to  any c laimant s h a l l  

inc lude  compensation f o r  a l l  e lements o f  f i n a n c i a l  

l o s s ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y :

(1 )  i n t e r e s t  on a l l  back pay amounts at the

l e g a l  ra te  o f  i n t e r e s t  compunded from the time

when such income l o s s e s  o c cu rred  u n t i l  the time o f

payment; (2 )  r e t i r e m e n t ,  d i s a b i l i t y ,  overtime and

s h i f t  d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  v a c a t i o n  and s i c k  pay ,

i n s u r a n c e  and p r o f i t  s h a r i n g  p l a n  a d j u s t m e n t s

c o m p e n s a t i n g  f o r  p r e v i o u s  r e d u c t i o n s  due t o

reduced income; (3 )  an " i n f l a t i o n  f a c t o r "  on a l l

awards to  assure payment in " co n stan t  d o l l a r s , "

e . g . ,  the  same p r e s e n t  v a l u e  as the v a l u e  o f

income p r e v i o u s l y  l o s t  due to past d i s c r i m i n a t i o n

c a l c u l a t e d  accord in g  to  U.S. Department o f  Labor

average c o s t - o f - l i v i n g  data.

Guidel ine  8. Procedure fo r  A s s e r t i o n  o f  
Back Pay Claims:

a. P l a i n t i f f s  w i l l  be al lowed  a reasonable  

p e r i o d  f o r  d i s c o v e r y  o f  e v i d e n c e  p e r t i n e n t  t o  

the c l a i m s .  To the  e x t e n t  p r a c t i c a b l e ,  t h i s



-  49a -

d i s c o v e r y  s h a l l  be conducted in f o r m a l l y ,

b .  F o l l o w i n g  c o m p e l t i o n  o f  d i s c o v e r y ,  

p l a i n t i f f s  sh a l l  perform the necessary  c a l c u l a ­

t i o n s  o f  back pay and f r o n t  pay f o r  each c la im  and 

s h a l l  f i l e  w r i t t e n  a s s e r t i o n s  o f  a l l  c l a i m s  

to be advanced on b e h a l f  o f  c l a s s  members.

c .  D e f e n d a n t s  s h a l l  r e s p o n d  in  w r i r i n g ,  

s t a t i n g  with r e sp e ct  to each claimant f o r  whom 

a c l a i m  i s  a s s e r t e d ,  w h eth er  t h e y  c o n t e s t  the 

c la im  in  whole or  in p a r t ,  to  what exte nt ( i f  any) 

th e y  would  be a g r e e a b l e  t o  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  the 

c l a i m ,  and the  b a s i s  f o r  t h e i r  c o n t e s t  o f  the 

c la im.

d. I f  f o l l o w i n g  responses  to  the c laims by 

d e f e n d a n t s  f u r t h e r  d i s c o v e r y  i s  n e c e s s a r y ,  i t  

s h a l l  be conducted and the p a r t i e s  s h a l l  again 

attempt informal r e s o l u t i o n  o f  a l l  c la im s .

e .  Only t h o s e  c l a i m s  wh ich  ca n n o t  be 

r e s o l v e d  between the p a r t i e s  s h a l l  be l i t i g a t e d .

Guidel ine  9 . Notices  to Class Members.

A l l  n o t i c e s  sent to  c l a s s  members and s t a t in g  

that  forms should be f i l l e d  out s h a l l  a l so  s t a t e  

t h a t  c o u n s e l  f o r  p l a i n t i f f s  are  a v a i l a b l e  at 

des ignate d  times and p laces  to  he lp  them under­

stand and comply with the requirements.



50a

Guidel ine  10. Hearing and Determination 
o f  Disupted Back Pay:

Fo l low ing  completi on  o f  the procedures o u t ­

l in e d  in  No. 8 above,  the p a r t i e s  s h a l l  j o i n t l y  

c e r t i f y  to the Court l i s t s  o f  a l l  c l a s s  members 

whose back  pay c l a i m s  have been  r e s o l v e d  by 

agreement and whose c laims are d i su p te d .  Eviden­

t i a r y  p r o c e e d i n g s  w i l l  be h e l d  t o  r e s o l v e  t h e  
d ispute d  c la im s .

Gu ide l ine  11. C a l c u la t i o n  o f  Forward or  
"Front Pay":

Each member o f  the c l a s s  who i s  determined by

the procedures se t  f o r t h  above to  be e n t i t l e d  to

back pay, who i s  s t i l l  employed by the company,
5 /and who has not a t ta in e d  h i s  " r i g h t f u l  p l a c e " — 

s h a l l  be paid in a d d i t i o n  to  h i s  reg u lar  pay rate  

o f  per -hour  or  per -day  pe r io d  equ iva len t  o f  h is  

back pay share — ( h e r e i n a f t e r  " a d ju s t e d  r a t e " )

_5/  " r i g h t f u l  p l a c e "  f o r  purposes o f  back pay and 
f r o n t  pay i s  de f in e d  as the current whi te  average 
pay r a t e .

6/  "back pay share"  i s  de f in e d  as the d i f f e r e n c e  
between a c l a s s  member's current earnings  (as  o f  
the date o f  the Decree)  and the app ropr ia te  white 
a v e r a g e  e a r n i n g s ,  e . g . ,  i f  a c l a s s  member i s  
earning $5.00 per hour and the white  average i s  
$5 .25 ,  the "ad ju ste d  r a t e "  o f  the c l a s s  member 
would a l s o  be $5 .25.



51a

u n t i l  such time that  he i s  p la ce d  in a j o b  or i s  

e l i g i b l e  f o r  a j o b ,  which  he r e f u s e s ,  th a t  

has a pay rate  equal  t o  the then e x i s t i n g  white 

average.  Each c l a s s  member s h a l l  be g iven oppor ­

t u n i t i e s  to  accept  or r e f u s e  at l e a s t  two d i f ­

f e r e n t  p o s i t i o n s  b e f o r e  l o s i n g  th e  " a d j u s t e d  

r a t e " .  Adequate records  sh a l l  be kept o f  such 

v acan c ie s  and r e j e c t i o n s .

Guidel ine 12. Costs ,  Expenses,  A t t o r n e y 's
Fees and A l l o c a t i o n  o f  L i a b i l i t y :

( a )  D e fe n d a n t s  s h a l l  pay to  p l a i n t i f f s '  

counse l  on a current b a s i s ,  reasonable  a t t o r n e y ' s  

f e e s ,  e x p e n s e s  and c o s t s  o f  bo th  th e  o r i g i n a l  

l i a b i l i t y  proceed ings and the back pay and in ju n c ­

t i v e  r e l i e f  p roceed in g s .

(b )  The defendants s h a l l  be made j o i n t l y  and 

s e e r a l l y  l i a b l e  f o r  c o s t s ,  expenses,  a t t o r n e y ' s  

fees  and the judgment fo r  back pay in favor  o f  

c l a s s  members. The r e s o l u t i o n  o f  any c laims for  

in d e m n i f i c a t i o n  between var ious  defendants sh a l l  

not prec lude  or  de lay  the entry o f  the judgment 

o f ,  nor  the  payments f o r ,  back  pay l i a b i l i t y .



52a

In j u n c t i v e  R e l i e f  G uide l in es
Guidel ine  1. Present Posture o f  Case:

The la n g u a g e  used  in  number one ( 1 )  o f  

the Back Pay g u id e l i n e s  i s  in c o rp o r a t e d  by 

r e f e r e n c e  h e r e i n  w i th  r e s p e c t  t o  i n j u n c t i v e  
r e l i e f .

Gu ide l ine  2. The Per iod  o f  L im it a t io n s
on S e n i o r i t y  Adjustment:

C l a s s  members who were  e m ployed  in the  

GLS on or  a f t e r  J u l y  2,  1965 who are  now or

w i l l  in  the  f u t u r e  be e m ployed  in  permanent 

departments and who meet a l l  o f  the e l i g i b i l i t y  

requirements f o r  back pay (with the e x c e p t i o n  o f  

e a r n i n g  l e s s  than t h e  w h i t e  a v e r a g e )  s h a l l  be 

awarded r e t r o a c t i v e  s e n i o r i t y  in such permanent 

departments f o r  the time spent in the GLS.

Guidel ine  3. D e f i n i t i o n  o f  " R e t r o a c t i v e "
S e n i o r i t y :

In c a l c u l a t i n g  r e t r o a c t i v e  s e n i o r i t y  f o r  

c l a s s  members,  such s e n i o r i t y  s h a l l  i n c l u d e  

time l o s t  during the GLS o f f  season un less  de fe n ­

d a n t s  show by c l e a r  and c o n v i n c i n g  e v i d e n c e  

that an in d iv id u a l  was o f f e r e d  an o pp o r tu n ity  to  

work in the o f f  season and f r e e l y  and v o l u n t a r i l y



-  53a -

d e c l i n e d  i t .  The f a c t  that  there may have been 

l e s s  a v a i l a b l e  v a c a n c i e s  than  q u a l i f i e d  c l a s s  

members t o  f i l l  them s h a l l  n o t  be a d e f e n s e .

Gu ide l ine  4. Stemmery Transfer
P o l i c i e s :

Defendants s h a l l  not  l im i t  or  r e s t r i c t  the 

number o f  seasonal  employees who may t r a n s f e r  to  

permanent employment at  the  end o f  each GLS 
s e a s o n .

Guide l ine  5. Future Hir ing :

Defendants s h a l l  develop w r i t t e n  jo b  d e s c r i p ­

t i o n s  f o r  a l l  entr y  l e v e l  j o b s  in a i l  departments 

which s h a l l  be g iven to  a l l  a p p l i c a n t s .  These 

s h a l l  in c lu de  o b j e c t i v e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  s e l e c t i o n  o f  

new h i r e s .  App l i can ts  s h a l l  a l s o  be g iven the 

h o u r ly  ra te s  o f  each j o b .  Hir ing  o f  a p p l i can ts  
f o r  hou r ly  j obs  both permanent and seasonal  sh a l l  

be c o n d u c t e d  at  each  employment o f f i c e ;  a l l  

a p p l i c a n t s  s h a l l  be advised o f  a l l  h i r e s  without 

regard to  race  or  sex.  The company sh a l l  keep 

a p p l i c a t i o n s  a c t i v e  and on f i l e  f o r  a p e r i o d  o f  no 

l e s s  than one year .

Guide l ine 5. Proo f  Required to  Defeat or
Limit In j u n c t i v e  R e l i e f :

D e f e n d a n t s  may a t te m p t  t o  p r o v e  t h a t  any 

p a r t i c u l a r  c l a s s  member i s  not e n t i t l e d  to  s e n i o r ­



-  54a -

i t y  r e l i e f  by the same type o f  ev id ence  requ ired  

t o  d e f e a t  o r  l i m i t  b a c k  pay ,  and i n  t h e  same 

manner as r e q u i r e d  i n  No, 6 o f  the ba c k  pay 

g u i d e l i n e s .  The f a i l u r e  o f  any c l a s s  member to 

seek or accept  a t r a n s f e r  from GLS to  a permanent 
department s h a l l  not be a de fense .

G u i d e l i n e  7. R e c o r d  K e e p in g  an R e p o r t i n g :  

Defendants s h a l l  submit a re p o r t  to  the Court 

w i t h  c o p i e s  t o  p l a i n t i f f s '  c o u n s e l ,  a n n u a l l y ,  

beg inning  one year from the date o f  the Decree,  

and t h e r e a f t e r  f o r  the next  two y e ar s ,  showing the 

percentage o f  new h i r e s  by race  and sex f o r  each 

department,  the percentage o f  the t o t a l  hour ly  

work f o r c e  com pos it ion  and each h o u r ly  j o b  c l a s s -  

i f i c t i o n  com pos i t i on ,  by race  and sex ,  f o r  each 

department l o c a t i o n ;  and the current l o c a t i o n  by 

j o b  and departm ent  o f  each  GLS e m p lo y e e  who 

t r a n s f e r r e d  w i th in  the one year pe r i o d .

Guidel ine 8. A t to rn e y s '  Fees and Expenses:  

Defendants s h a l l  pay to counse l  f o r  p l a i n ­

t i f f s  a l l  a t t o r n e y ' s  f e e s ,  expenses,  and c o s t s  o f  

the o r i g i n a l  proceed ings on l i a b i l i t y .  For the 

s e c o n d  s t a g e  p r o c e e d i n g s ,  p l a i n t i f f s ' c o u n s e 1



5 4 a - l

s h a l l  submit q u a r t e r ly  statements o f  a t t o r n e y ' s  

f e e s  expenses,  and c o s t s ,  to  be paid w i th in  20 

days a f t e r  r e c e i p t  by de fendants .

So Ordered.



55a -

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 

RICHMOND DIVISON 

Civ. A. No. 73-G488-R. 

November 17, 1976

NORA LEWIS, et a l .  ,

P l a i n t i f f s

- VS “

PHILIP MORRIS, INC. , et  a l . ,

Defendants .

O R D E R

Deeming i t  proper  so to  do,  i t  i s  ADJUDGED 

AND ORDERED that th is  C o u r t ' s  Order o f  September 

2, 1976 a d o p t i n g  g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  back  pay and 

i n j u n c t i v e  r e l i e f  b e ,  and the  same i s  h e r e b y ,  

v a c a t e d .

The g u id e l i n e s  f o r  back pay and i n ju n c t i v e  

r e l i e f  w i l l  be fu r th er  cons idered  by the Court,  

i f  n e ce ssa ry ,  at the c o n c lu s io n  o f  the p l a i n t i f f s '  

present a p p e l la t e  a c t i o n .



56a -

Let the Clerk send c o p i e s  o f  t h i s  Order to  

a l l  counse l  o f  r e c o r d ,  as w e l l  as c o p ie s  o f  the 

C o u r t ' s  Order f i l e d  October 12, 1976.

United States D i s t r i c t  Judge



57a -

IN UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 76-1998-1999 
76-2199

NORA LEWIS, et  a l . ,

A p p e l l e e s ,

-  vs -

PHILIP MORRIS, INCORPORATED, et  a l . ,

A p p e l l a n t s .

On Appeal From The United States D i s t r i c t  Court,  
Eastern D i s t r i c t  o f  V i r g i n i a ,  Richmond D iv i s i o n

Before R u s s e l l ,  Widener, and H al l ,  C i r c u i t  
Judges .

W id e n e r ,  C . J . :  P h i l i p  M o r r i s ,  I n c . ,  the

Tobacco Workers In t e r n a t i o n a l  Union, and Local  No. 

25 o f  the  T o b a c c o  Workers I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Union 

appeal  from a judgment f i n d i n g  them l i a b l e  f o r  a 

v i o l a t i o n  o f  T i t l e  VII o f  the C i v i l  Rights Act o f  

1964, 42 U.S.C.  § § 2000e e t s e q .



58a -

Th is  s u i t  i s  a c l a s s  a c t i o n - ^ b r o u g h t  by 

f i v e  b lack  employees o f  P h i l i p  M orr is .  I t  i s  the 

s e c o n d  such s u i t  in r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  r e p e a t i n g  

many o f  the a s s e r t i o n s  made in  Quarles v .  P h i l i p  

M orr is ,  I n c . ,  279 F.Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) .  

The p l a i n t i f f s '  c l a i m  i n v o l v e s  t h e  a l l e g a t i o n  

that the company, through d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  i n i t i a l  

j o b  ass ig n m e n t  p o l i c i e s ,  s e g r e g a t e s  w o r k e rs  

in t o  b la ck  and whi te  departments.
2 /There  are  f o u r  d e p a r t m e n t s — at t h e  P h i l i p  

Morris  plant  in Richmond, V i r g i n i a ,  three o f  which 

have permanent j o b s ,  w h i l e  a t  the  r e m a i n in g  

department the work i s  season a l .  The most a t t r a c ­

t i v e  and s k i l l e d  j o b s ,  p r o v id in g  the best  pay and 

the b r i g h t e s t  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  advancement, are 

in the f a b r i c a t i o n  department,  where c i g a r e t t e s  

are a c t u a l l y  manufactured.  Employees in f a b r i c a -

j J  The c l a s s  c o n s i s t s  o f  the  named p l a i n ­
t i f f s  and a l l  female and b lack  male employees,  
whether c u r r e n t ly  employed or no longer  employed 
f o r  any reason ,  who were employees o f  the de fe n ­
dant P h i l i p  M o r r i s '  Green L e a f  Stemraery on or  
a f t e r  July  2, 1965.

2/  We speak o f  four departments throughout th is  
o p in ion  merely fo r  convenience .  A c t u a l ly ,  the 
fourth  department,  the stemmery, i s  a separate 
plant  and i s  not an i n t e g r a l  part o f  the manufac­
tu r in g  process  at the Richmond, V i r g i n i a  c i g a r e t t e  
p l a n t .



59a -

t i o n  are 41.1% b la c k .  The p r e f a b r i c a t i o n  d e p ar t ­

ment, second ranked in pay and d e s i r a b i l i t y  and 

which in v o lv e s  l a r g e l y  u n s k i l l e d  and c o n s i d e r a b l e  

heavy l a b o r ,  i s  where the bulk tobacco  i s  p r o ­

cessed  in t o  cut f i l l e r  f o r  use in the manufactur­

i n g  o f  c i g a r e t t e s .  I t s  e m p lo y e e s  a r e  85.2% 

b l a c k .  WSR, th e  w a r e h o u se  d e p a r t m e n t ,  t h i r d  

ranked in pay and which a l s o  in vo lv e d  heavy labo r ,  

l a r g e l y  u n s k i l l e d ,  has 27.8% b lack  employees.  A l l  

o f  t h e s e  t h r e e  d e p a r t m e n t s  have pe rm an e n t ,  as 

opposed to  season a l ,  j o b s .  The fourth  department 

is  the stemmery. I t  is  the lowest  paying d e p a r t ­

ment, almost w hol ly  u n s k i l l e d ,  and employment is  

seasonal  ra ther  than permanent, and i t  has 95.4% 

b lack  employees.

The seasonal  work i s  in the stemmery, where 

the curent crop o f  tobacco  i s  processed  f o r  aging 

and s t o r a g e .  H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  the stemmery has been 

p r e d o m i n a n t l y  b l a c k ,  and i t  remains  s o .  The 

gravamen o f  the p l a i n t i f f s '  complaint  i s  that the 

company and the unions purpose ly  assigned b lack  

e m p lo y e e s  t o  t h e  stemmery,  which was the  most
3unfavorable  department in the company's o p e r a t i o n .—1

3 /  B e f o r e  t r i a l ,  the  p l a i n t i f f s  and P h i l i p  
Morris  s t i p u l a t e d  that  the f o l l o w i n g  were the only  
i ssu es  to be t r i e d :



60a

The c o u r t ,  although f i n d i n g  a v i o l a t i o n  o f  

T i t l e  VII f o r  another reason ,  was unable to  f ind  

that "t he  e x c e s s i v e  assignment o f  b la cks  to the 

stemmery was p u r p o s e f u l l y  u n d e r t a k e n  by the  

company t o  c o v e r t l y  c o n t i n u e  i t s  h i s t o r i c a l  

system o f  segregated  departm ents ."  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  
the cou rt  abso lved the unions o f  any charges that 

they v i o l a t e d  t h e i r  duty o f  f a i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .

However, in s p i t e  o f  the absence o f  purpose ­

f u l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  by the company or  the la ck  o f  

f a i r  r e p r e s e n t a t io n  by the unions,  the d i s t r i c t  

c o u r t  fou nd the  b l a c k  e m p lo y e e s  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  * 2 3 4

3/ C ont 'd .

" ( 1 )  whether the members o f  the c l a s s  were 
h i r e d  i n t o  the  stemmery r a t h e r  than i n t o  
permanent employment as a r e s u l t  o f  r a c i a l  
or sexual  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ;
( 2 )  w h e t h e r  t h e  t r a n s f e r ,  p r o m o t i o n ,  
s e n i o r i t y ,  i n i t i a l  job  assignmens and wage 
r a t e  p o l i c i e s  d i s c r i m i n a t e d  a g a i n s t  c l a s s  
members on the  b a s i s  o f  r a c e ,  and s e x ,  
e x c e p t  in the s e l e c t i o n  o f  s u p e r v i s o r y  
p e r s o n n e l ;
(3 )  i f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  in any o f  the f o r e ­
going were found, whether i n j u n c t i v e  r e l i e f  
is  appropr ia te  and what amount o f  back pay, 
i f  any,  s h o u ld  be awarded c l a s s  members;
( 4 )  what c o s t s ,  e x p e n s e s  and a t t o r n e y s '  
fees  should be awarded."



-  6 1 a -

the company d i s c r im in a t e d  aga inst  members o f  t h e i r  

r a c e  in  th e  ass ig n m e n t  o f  j o b s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  

i t  h e ld  that  the company was l i a b l e  because i t  did 

not inform " a l l  a p p l i c a n t s  f o r  hou r ly  p o s i t i o n s  

at the  b e g i n n i n g  o f  any i n t e r v i e w  ( 1 )  o f  the  

p o s i t i o n s  c u r r e n t ly  a v a i la b l e  in  each o f  the four 

departments with an app ropr ia te  job  d e s c r i p t i o n ,  

and ( 2 )  t h a t  i t  a s s i g n s  and h i r e s  new w o r k e rs  

w i t h o u t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  r a c e . "—^ A c c o r d i n g l y , i t

3 /  Cont 1 d .

The p l a i n t i f f s  c h a r g e d  the u n i o n s  w i th  
c o m p l i c i t y  in a l l e g e d  purpose fu l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  
and with a v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  duty o f  f a i r  r e p r e ­
se n t a t i o n  as imposed by f e d e r a l  labor  law.

The f o i l  lowing f i n d i n g  from the memorandum 
o p in io n  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t .

"The Court i s  unable to  f i n d ,  however,  on the 
b a s i s  o f  the  r e c o r d  b e f o r e  i t  t h a t  the 
e x c e s s i v e  assignment o f  b lacks  to the stem- 
mery was p u r p o s e f u l l y  u n d e r t a k e n  by the 
company to  c o v e r t l y  continue  i t s  h i s t o r i c a l  
system o f  segregated  departments.  What has 
been  e s t a b l i s h e d  i s  t h a t  th e  Company, a l ­
though l i b e r a l l y  p roc la im in g  that  i t  assigns 
new h i r e s  without regard to  t h e i r  r a c e ,  has 
u n f o r t u m a t e l y  done n o t h i n g  t o  d i s p e l  the  
b e l i e f ,  founded on i t s  past acts  o f  d i s c r i m ­
i n a t i o n ,  and h e l d  by a s u b s t a n t i a l  number 
o f  b lack  app l i c a n ts  that i t  s t i l l  ass igns to



62a

ordered re c o v e r y  o f  damages to  c l a s s  members who 

were not  so advised  and " b e l i e v e d  that  t h e i r  race 

s u b s t a n t i a l l y  l im i t e d  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  employment."

We are  o f  o p i n i o n  t h a t  the  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  

e r r e d  in  g i v i n g  r e l i e f  t o  c e r t a i n  members o f  

the p l a i n t i f f  c l a s s  through the fo rm ulat ion  o f  a 

duty which T i t l e  VII  does not r e q u i r e .

4 /  Cont ' d

d e p a r t m e n t s  new h i r e s  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  
ra c e .  Such a b e l i e f  has t r a n s l a t e d  i t s e l f  
i n t o  a s e t  o f  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t h a t  has c o n ­
t inued to  p lace  b lacks  at a disadvantage  when 
s e e k i n g  employment at  P h i l i p  M o r r i s .  The 
Company's p r o f e s s e d  n e u t r a l i t y  i s ,  in  f a c t ,  
not n e u t r a l ,  f o r  past ac ts  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  
c o n t i n u e  t o  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  modern 
p r a c t i c e .  'Under the Act ,  p r a c t i c e s ,  p r o c e ­
dures ,  or  t e s t s  n eu tra l  on t h e i r  f a c e ,  and 
even neutra l  in terms o f  i n t e n t ,  cannot be 
maintained i f  they operate  to  " f r e e z e "  the 

, status  quo o f  p r i o r  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  employment 
p r a c t i c e s . '  G r i g g s  v .  Duke Power C o . ,  401 
U.S. 424, 430 (1971 ) ,  see a l s o  Quarles v .
P h i l i p  Morr is ,  I n c . ,  supra . The Company, in 
o r d e r  t o  r e a s s e r t  a b a l a n c e ,  s h o u l d  have 
informed a l l  ap p l i c a n ts  f o r  hou r ly  p o s i t i o n s  
at the beginning  o f  any in te rv ie w  (1 )  o f  the 
p o s i t i o n s  c u r r e n t ly  a v a i l a b l e  in each o f  the 
f o u r  d e p a r t m e n t s  w i t h  an a p p r o p r i a t e  j o b  
d e s c r i p t i o n ,  and ( 2 )  t h a t  i t  a s s i g n s  and 
h i r e s  new workers without r e f e r e n c e  t o  race .



-  63a

1. I n i t i a l l y ,  we d i sp o se  o f  a procedura l  

po int  r a i s e d  by the a p p e l l e e s ,  who have moved fo r  

d i sm iss a l  o f  t h i s  appeal  on the ground that the 

order appealed from i s  not f i n a l  order  granting  

r e l i e f ,  c i t i n g  L ib e r t y  Mutual v .  W e t z e l , 424 U.S. 

737 (1976 ) .  That o r d e r ,  entered on September 2, 

1976-^ a d o p t e d  t o  t h e  l e t t e r  t h e  p l a i n t i f f s '  

proposed g u id e l i n e s  f o r  r e l i e f .  While the gu ide ­

l in e s  c o n s i s t  in part  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  f in d in g s  o f  

f a c t  and c o n c l u s i o n s  o f  law,  th ey  r e q u i r e  the  

de fen dants ,  among o th er  th in g s ,  to  supply a l i s t

4 /  C o n t ' d .

A l l  t h o s e  c l a s s  members t h a t  were not  so 
in f o r m e d  when th ey  were h i r e d  i n t o  the 
stemmery, and that b e l i e v e d  that t h e i r  race 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  l im i t e d  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  employ­
ment to  the stemmery are e n t i t l e d  to  recover  
fo r  t h e i r  l o s s e s . "

5 /  The p a r t i e s  do not c o n t e s t  that an e a r l i e r  
July 7, 1976 order  is  not an appea lab le  o rder .  
That order  merely found f o r  the p l a i n t i f f s  on the 
i s s u e  o f  l i a b i l i t y ,  and d i d  n o t  r e q u i r e  the 
defendants to  take any a c t i o n .  I t  only  required  
" c o u n s e l "  to  " forward to  the court  . . . suggested 
procedure a pp ro pr ia te  to  f a c i l i t a t e  an award o f  
r e l i e f  pursuant to  the memorandum f i l e d  h e r e i n . "  
For a s i m i la r  o r d e r ,  see L ibe r ty  Mutual.



64a

o f  a l l  members o f  the c l a s s  e l i g i b l e  f o r  back pay, 

to pay inter im a t t o r n e y s '  f e e s ,  to develop  job  

d e s c r i p t i o n s ,  not to  l i m i t  t r a n s f e r  o f  employees 

from the stemmery at s e a s o n 's  end, to h i r e  both 

permanent and season al  employees at each employ­

ment o f f i c e ,  t o  a d v i s e  a l l  e m p l o y e e s  o f  a l l  

v a c a n c ie s ,  and to  keep a p p l i c a t i o n s  a c t i v e  and on 

f i l e  f o r  a p e r i o d  o f  no l e s s  than one y e a r .

In determining  whether an order  i s  or i s  not 

an i n j u n c t i o n ,  we l ook  to  the substance ,  ra ther  

than the form, o f  an o r d e r .  E t t e l s o n  v .  Metro­

p o l i t a n  L i f e  Insurance Co. ,  317 U.S. 188 (1942 ) .  

We b e l i e v e  the g u i d e l i n e s ,  r e q u i r in g  the de fe n ­

dants to  act in some in s tan ces  and f o r b i d d i n g  them 

to  a c t  in  o t h e r s ,  t o  be an i n j u n c t i o n ^ W e  do

6_/ A f u r t h e r  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  the  d i s t r i c t  
court  understood i t s  own order  to  r e q u i r e  imme­
d i a t e  a c t i o n s  o f  the  d e f e n d a n t s  i s  t h a t ,  on 
October 12, 1976, the court  granted a s tay  o f  the 
order pending appeal .  Had the order  not  contem­
p la ted  present ac ts  from, or  r e s t r a i n t  on, the 
de fendants ,  such a stay would have been super ­
f l u o u s .  M o r e o v e r ,  in  o p p o s i n g  th e  s t a y ,  th e  
p l a i n t i f f s  at that time took the p o s i t i o n  that the 
order placed present requirements on the d e f e n ­
dants and argued that  the e qu i ty  o f  r e l i e v i n g  them 
o f  the burden o f  complying with the o rder  during 
the pendency o f  the appeal .



-  65a

not agree with the p l a i n t i f f s '  p o s i t i o n  that  the 

g u i d e l i n e s ,  although r e q u i r in g  present a f f i r m a t i v e  

a c t i o n  or  r e s t r a i n t ,  are yet  unappea lable .  Nor 

does i t  gain support  from L ib e r t y  Mutual , supra , 

f o r  there the court  merely had found a v i o l a t i o n  

o f  the act  and had not ordered  the defendants to  

t a k e ,  o r ,  r e f r a i n  f rom ,  any a c t i o n  or  t o  pay 

a t t o r n e y s '  f e e s .  See 424 U.S. at 742.

But the p l a i n t i f f s  say, assuming the law to 

be as we have  j u s t  r e c i t e d ,  the  a p p e a l  must 

n e v e r t h e le s s  be d ism issed  because the d i s t r i c t  

c o u r t ,  by or der  o f  November 17, 1976, vacated  the 

order  o f  September 2, 1976 from which t h i s  appeal  

has been  t a k e n .  W hi le  the  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  d i d  

attempt,  through the order  o f  November 17, 1976, 

t o  v a c a t e  the  o r d e r  a p p e a l e d  f rom ,  i t  had no 

power, a f t e r  the n o t i c e s  o f  appeal were f i l e d ,  to 

e n t e r  such  an o r d e r .  In t h i s ,  t h e  p l a i n t i f f s  

are not aided by the power given to  the d i s t r i c t  

cou rt  through FRCP 6 2 ( c )  which only app l ie s  to 

a l low  the d i s t r i c t  court  to make p r o v i s i o n  f o r  the 

" s e c u r i t y  o f  the r i g h t s  o f  the adverse p a r t y . "  

Although the proceed ings  in the d i s t r i c t  court  are 

not stayed  by an a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  an i n t e r l o c u t o r y



-  66a -

appeal  under 28 U.S.C.  § 1292 (b ) ,  t h i s  i s  an appeal  

from the granting  o f  an i n j u n c t i o n  under § 1292 (a ) ,  

and the d i s t r i c t  court  l o s t  i t s  power to  vacate  

the or der  when the n o t i c e s  o f  appeal  were f i l e d .  

In t h i s  sense ,  th is  case i s  s i m i la r  to  Zimmer v.  

McKeithen, 467 F.2d 1382 (5th C ir .  1973) ,  where, 

a f t e r  the n o t i c e  o f  appeal  from a r e a p p o r t i o n ­

ment order  was f i l e d ,  the d i s t r i c t  court  attempted 

to  change the order  to  encompass an a l t e r n a t i v e  

apportionment plan .  A panel  o f  the F i f t h  C i r c u i t  

r e f u s e d  t o  c o n s i d e r  the  l a t t e r  o r d e r ,  c a l l i n g  

i t  a n u l l i t y .  The 'panel  d e c i s i o n  was reversed  on 

i t s  t r e a t m e n t  o f  the m e r i t s  o f  the  d i s t r i c t  

c o u r t ' s  f i r s t  order  by an en banc c o u r t ,  485 F.2d 

1297 (5th C ir .  1973) ,  and the en banc co u r t  was 

a f f i rm ed by the Supreme Court,  which a l s o  examined 

only  the o r i g i n a l  o rder  f o r  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ,  

noting  without c r i t i c i s m  the p a n e l ' s  r e f u s a l  to 

co n s ide r  the second o r d e r .  Opinion s t y l e d  East 
C a r r o l l  Parrish School  Board v .  M a r sh a l l , 424 U.S. 

636, at p. 638, n . 4  (1976 ) .  S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  the en 

banc c o u r t ,  as a f f i r m e d  by th e  Supreme C o u r t ,  

reversed  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ,  a r e s u l t  which might 

have been obv ia ted  by the c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  the 

s e c o n d  o r d e r ,  which would have  r e p l a c e d  the



- 6 7 a

o f f e n s i v e  elements o f  the f i r s t  o r d e r .  Hence, we 

b e l i e v e  the Supreme Court has at l e a s t  t a c i t l y  

acknowledged that  a d i s t r i c t  court  l o s e s  j u r i s d i c ­

t i o n  t o  amend o r  v a c a t e  i t s  o r d e r  a f t e r  the  

n o t i c e  o f  appeal  has been f i l e d ,  which we h o ld .  

See a l s o  Sumida v .  Yumen, 409 F .2 d  654 ( 9 t h  

C ir .  1969) ,  c e r t  ■ de n . , 404 U.S. 964, reh .  d e n . ,  

405 U.S 1048 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ;  Aune v .  Reynders, 344 F.2d 

835 (10th C i r .  1965) ;  Idea l  Toy Corp. v .  Sayco

Dol l  C orp . ,  302 F.2d 623 (2d C ir .  1962 ) ;  D i s t r i c t  

65,  D i s t r i b u t i v e ,  P r o c e s s in g  and O f f i c e  Workers 

Union v.  McKague, 216 F.2d 153 (3d C ir .  1954) ;

M i l l e r  v .  United S t a t e s , 114 F.2d 267 (7th Cir .  

1940) .
I I .  As noted above,  t h i s  case  i s  an ex te n ­

s i o n  o f ,  o r  t h e  same, c o n t r o v e r s y  d e c i d e d  t e n  

years ago. In the d i s t r i c t  court  in that  c a se ,  

Quarles v .  P h i l i p  M o r r i s , I n c . ,  279 F.Supp. 505 

(E.D. Va. 1968) ,  two b lack  employees brought a 

s u i t  on b e h a l f  o f  a l l  b la ck  employees o f  P h i l i p  

M orr is ,  a l l e g i n g  " th at  the defendants by t h e i r  

employment p r a c t i c e s  and c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining  

agreement re fu se d  to  h i r e ,  promote to  su p erv isory  

p o s i t i o n s ,  pay, advance and t r a n s f e r  Negro employ­



- 68 -

e es  on t h e  same b a s i s  as w h i t e  e m p l o y e e s . "  

279 F.Supp. at 507.
While f i n d i n g  that the company had d i s c r i m i ­

nated aga inst  two Negroes with r e s p e c t  to  pay and 

a g a i n s t  the  named p l a i n t i f f  Q u a r le s  and the  

Negroes h i r e d  in  the p r e f a b r i c a t i o n  department 

b e f o r e  January 1, 1966 with r e s p e c t  t o  advance­

ment, t r a n s f e r ,  and s e n i o r i t y ,  the Quarles court  

e x p r e s s ly  found that P h i l i p  Morris  had not  engaged 

in d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  h i r i n g  p r a c t i c e s  s i n c e  January 

1, 1966 and that  the company's p o l i c y  f o r  a s s ig n ­

ment o f  workers to  the stemmery did  not v i o l a t e  

T i t l e  V I I .  — B ecau se  o f  the s i m i l a r i t y  o f  the

7/  The f in d in gs  o f  the court  in c lu ded :

" I .  The company has n o t  engaged  i n  d i s ­
c r i m i n a t o r y  h i r i n g  p r a c t i c e s  s i n c e  January  1, 
1966, and consequent ly ,  the p l a i n t i f f s  are not 
e n t i t l e d  to  r e l i e f  on th is  i s su e .

" I I .  The company has not d i s c r im in a te d  on 
r a c i a l  grou nds w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  employment and 
promotion o f  su p ervs iory  person ne l .

" I I I .  The company has d i s c r i m i n a t e d  on 
grounds o f  race  with re sp e c t  to  the pay o f  two 
e m p l o y e e s ,  Ephriam B r i g g s  and Mrs. L i l l i e  J. 
Oatney; the p l a i n t i f f s  have f a i l e d  to  e s t a b l i s h  
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  against  Negroes with re sp e c t  to
pay-

" I V .  The d e f e n d a n t s  have d i s c r i m i n a t e d  
against  Douglas R. Quarles and the c l a s s  c o n s i s t ­
in g  o f  Newgro e m p lo y e e s  who were h i r e d  i n  the



69a

co n te n t i o n s  presented  in  Quarles with those  made 

in the presen t c a se ,  the i n c l u s i o n  o f  the present 

seasonal  c l a s s  members ( b l a c k  stemmery employees)  

in the Quarles c l a s s  ( a l l  b la c k  employees ) ,  and 

the a c tu a l  membership in  the Quarles c l a s s  by two 

o f  t h i s  s u i t ' s  named p l a i n t i f f s  who were employed 

by P h i l i p  M o r r i s  at the  t ime o f  the  Q u a r le s  

judgment, the defendants have contended at a l l  

s t a g e s  o f  t h i s  l i t i g a t i o n  t h a t  th e  d o c t r i n e s  

o f  res  j u d i c a t a  and s tare  d e c i s i s  should apply to 

the present c o n t r o v e r s y .
The court  below r c o gn iz e d  that the a p p l i c a ­

t i o n  o f  res  ju d i c a t a ,  or  even s t a r e  d e c i s i s ,  would 

be h i g h l y  damaging to  the p l a i n t i f f s '  c a s e ;  the 

v i n d i c a t i o n ,  in  1968,  o f  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  h i r i n g  

p r a c t i c e s  and stemmery assignment p r a c t i c e s  would 

bind,  i n s o f a r  as the court  found th at ,  up the time 

o f  the 1968 judgment, the h i r i n g  p r a c t i c e s  were 

not r a c i a l l y  m otiva ted,  the b lack  female p l a i n -

7/  Gont ' d .

p r e f a b r i c a t i o n  department b e f o r e  January 1, 1966,
with r e s p e c t  to  advancement, t r a n s f e r ,  and s e n i o r ­
i t y .  The p l a i n t i f f s  are e n t i t l e d  t o  r e l i e f  
c o r r e c t i n g  t h i s  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . "  279 F.Supp. at 
p . 507 .



-70a -

t i f f s  and the b la ck  male p l a i n t i f f s  on the ques ­

t i o n  o f  r a c i a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  The d i s t r i c t  

court  re fused  to  implement res  ju d i c a t a  on the 

ground that the members o f  the Quarles c l a s s  could  

not be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  bound by that d e c i s i o n

because the c l a s s  members had not been n o t i f i e d  o f
8 /the pendency o f  the s u i t . —

Thus, a d e c i s i o n  as to  the a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  

the ru le  o f  res  j u d i c a t a  would n e c e s s a r i l y  requ ire  

a determinati on  o f  the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y ,  f a c i a l l y  

or as a p p l ie d ,  o f  the p r o v i s i o n  in FRCP 23 making 

a judgment b ind ing  on a member o f  a FRCP 2 3 ( b ) ( 2 )  

c l a s s  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  w h e th e r  the  i n d i v i d u a l  

was n o t i f i e d  o f  the  s u i t .  B ecau se  we a r e  o f  

op in ion  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  judgment should be 

reversed  on grounds independent o f  the binding  

e f f e c t  o f  the  Q u a r le s  ju d gm e n t ,  we d e c l i n e  t o  

co n s ide r  that  i s s u e .  Ashwander v .  TVA, 297 U.S. 

288 ,  341 ( 1 9 3 6 )  ( B r a n d e i s ,  J . ,  c o n c u r r i n g ) .

I I I .  We now turn to  the merits  o f  the 

a p p e a l .  The i s s u e s  i n  the  l i t i g a t i o n ,  a g r e e d

8/  The d i s t r i c t  court  a l s o  s ta t e d  that i t  be ­
l i e v e d  the  i n t e r e s t s  o f  the  stemmery w o r k e r s  
were not adequately  represented in the Quarles 
a c t i o n .



71a

t o  p r i o r  t o  t r i a l  by t h e  p l a i n t i f f s  and the  

company,  a r e  ( 1 )  w h e t h e r  t h e  members o f  the  

c l a s s  were h i r e d  in t o  the stemmery ra th e r  than 

i n to  permanent employment as a r e s u l t  o f  r a c i a l  or  

sexual  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  and (2 )  whether the t r a n s ­

f e r ,  promotion,  s e n i o r i t y ,  i n i t i a l  j o b  assighment,  

and wage r a t e  p o l i c i e s  d i s c r i m i n a t e  a g a i n s t  

c l a s s  members on the b a s is  o f  race  or  sex ,  except  

in the s e l e c t i o n  o f  su p erv isory  and c r a f t  person ­

n e l .  A l l  c laims f o r  a f f i r m a t iv e  r e l i e f  on the 

b a s is  o f  a l l e g e d  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  working or  d i s c i ­

p l i n a r y  c o n d i t i o n s  were withdrawn by the p l a i n ­

t i f f s .
In i t s  o p in io n ,  the d i s t r i c t  court  found that 

the e x c e s s i v e  assignment o f  b la ck  employees to 

the  stemmery was not  m o t i v a t e d  by a r a c i a l l y  

d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  animus. I t  made no f in d i n g  that 

female employees were assigned to  the stemmery 

because o f  t h e i r  sex .  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  the court  

found t h a t  the  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  th e  c o l l e c t i v e  

barga in in g  agreement governing t r a n s f e r ,  promo­

t i o n ,  and s e n i o r i t y  were n ondiscr im in atory  and 

would not have to  be changed, but that d i s c r i m i n a ­

t i o n  e x i s t e d  in  t r a n s f e r ,  promotion,  and s e n i o r i t y  

b e c a u s e  o f  i n i t i a l  a s s i g n m e n t ,  as we d i s c u s s  

l a t e r .



72a -

With these and o th er  h o ld in g s  l a t e r  mentioned 

the d i s t r i c t  court  he ld  both the company and the 

unions to  l i a b i l i t y .  While the o p in ion  i s  not 

c l e a r  on the p r e c i s e  grounds on which i t  r e s t s ,  i t  

can o n l y  be on one o f  two.  F i r s t ,  t h a t  t h e  

company and the unions had "u n f o r t u n a t e l y  done 

noth ing to  d i s p e l  the b e l i e f ,  founded on . . . 

[ the company's]  past acts  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  and 

he ld  by a s u b s t a n t i a l  number o f  b la ck  a p p l i can ts  

that i t  s t i l l  ass igns to  departments new h i r e s  on 

the ba s is  o f  r a c e . "  Second, that  the company " i n  

order  to  r e a s s e r t  a ba lance ,  should have informed 

a l l  a p p l i c a n t s  f o r  h o u r l y  p o s i t i o n s  at  th e  

beginning  o f  any in terv iew  (1 )  o f  the p o s i t i o n s  

c u r r e n t ly  a v a i la b l e  in each o f  the four depar t ­

ments w i th  an a p p r o p r i a t e  j o b  d e s c r i p t i o n ,  

and ( 2 )  t h a t  i t  a s s i g n s  and h i r e s  new w o r k e rs  

without r e f e r e n c e  to  r a c e . "

A. So f a r  as the  o p i n i o n  o f  the  c o u r t  

b e l o w  may be s a i d  t o  have  been  b a s e d  on the  

d e f e n d a n t s '  f a i l u r e  " t o  r e a s s e r t  a b a l a n c e "  

in  i t s  work f o r c e ,  the  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  e r r e d  

in  i t s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  demands o f  T i t l e



73a -

V I I .  T i t l e  V II  does  not  r e q u i r e  a r a c i a l l y  

ba lanced work f o r c e ,  f o r  such a c o n c lu s i o n  i s ,  

in  the words o f  the Supreme Court,  an "erroneous 

t h e o r y . "  Teamsters v .  United S t a t e s , 431 U.S. 

324, 339-40,  n.20 (1977 ) .  Moreover, the problem 

i s  e x p l i c i t l y  d e a l t  with by the s t a t u t e .

Se c t io n  703( j ) o f  the Act ,  42 U.S.C.  §2000e-  

2 ( j ) ,  makes c l e a r  that employer l i a b i l i t y  may not 

be based s o l e l y  on the e x i s t e n c e  o f  a r a c i a l  im­

balance  among employees,  when the d i s t r i c t  court  

had found the absence o f  pu rp ose fu l  d i s c r i m i n a ­

t i o n .  As e x p l a i n e d  by S e n a t o r  Humphrey, the  

p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n  i s  t o  i n d i c a t e  the 

absence from the s t a t u t e  o f  any requ ired  r a c i a l  

b a l a n c e :
A new su b s e c t io n  703( j ) i s  added to  deal  with 
the problem o f  r a c i a l  ba lance  among employees.  
The proponents o f  t h i s  b i l l  have c a r e f u l l y  
s ta t ed  on numerous o c c a s i o n s  that T i t l e  VII 
does not r equ ire  an employer to  achieve  any 
so r t  o f  r a c i a l  balance in  h i s  work f o r c e  by 
g iv in g  p r e f e r e n t i a l  treatment to  any i n d i ­
v id u a l  or  group.

L e g i s l a t i v e  H istory  o f  T i t l e  VII and IX o f  the 

C i v i l  R i g h t s  Act  o f  1964,  Equal  Employment 

Opportunity Commission, Superintendent o f  Docu-



74a -

merits,  p .  3005 .  Thus,  § 7 0 3 ( j  )— f o r b i d s  c o u r t  

ordered p r e f e r e n t i a l  treatment designed s o l e l y  to 

achieve  a r a c i a l  ba lan ce ,  as w e l l  as the formula­

t i o n  o f  l i a b i l i t y  b a s e d  m e r e l y  on t h e  l a c k  o f  

r a c i a l  ba lance  . - ^ 'A s  fa r  as the op in io n  o f  the 

c o u r t  b e l o w  f o u n de d  l i a b i l i t y  s o l e l y  on t h e  

company's f a i l u r e  to  " r e a s s e r t  a r a c i a l  b a l a n c e , "  

even  though th e  d e f e n d a n t s  were  n o t  p r e s e n t l y  

d i s c r i m i n a t in g ,  i t  i s  in e r r o r .

9 /

9 /  42 U . S . C .  § 2 0 Q 0 e - 2 ( j )  p r o v i d e s  in  p a r t :

" N o t h i n g  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h i s  s u b c h a p t e r  
s h a l l  be i n t e r p r e t e d  to  r e q u i r e  any employer 
. . . [ o r ]  labor  o r g a n iz a t i o n  . . .  to  grant 
p r e f e r e n t i a l  treatment to  any i n d i v i d u a l  or  
any group because o f  race  . . . [ o r ]  sex . .
. o f  such i n d i v i d u a l  o r  g ro u p  on a c c o u n t  
o f  an imbalance which may e x i s t  with re sp e c t  
to  the t o t a l  number or  percentage  o f  persons 
o f  any race  . . . [ o r ]  sex . . . employed by 
an employer. . . . "

10 /  We are  n o t  u n m in d fu l  t h a t  the  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  a r a c i a l l y  u n b a l a n c e d  work f o r c e  might 
support an i n fe r e n c e  o f  pu rp ose fu l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  
See Teamsters , 340, n .2 0 .  In the face  o f  the 
d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  f i n d i n g  t h a t  the  d e f e n d a n t  
did  not p u r p o s e f u l ly  d i s c r im in a t e  against  b lack  
e m l o y e e s ,  t h a t  i n f e r e n c e  s h o u l d  n o t  be drawn.



75a

B. The an a ly s i s  o f  the second ground o f  the 

d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  i s  no t  so b r i e f  but  

leads to  the same c o n c lu s i o n .

The d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  c o n s i d e r e d  s t a t i s t i c a l  

ev id ence  that  from 1965 t o  1974 63% o f  a l l  b lack  

e m p lo y e e s  h i r e d  were  e i t h e r  a s s i g n e d  t o  the  

stemmery or p r e f a b r i c a t i o n ,  w h i le ,  during the same 

p e r i o d ,  on ly  18.2% o f  the white  employees were 

so ass igned  to  th ese  two departments.  50% o f  the 

b la c k  employees i n i t i a l l y  h i red  during the per iod  

went i n to  the stemmery, compared t o  11.5% o f  the
i

white  employees h i r e d  in the same p e r i o d .  During 

those y e ar s ,  an average o f  79.5% o f  the employees 

h i r e d  i n t o  the  stemmery were b l a c k ,  and the 

a v e r a g e  p e r c e n g a g e  o f  b l a c k  e m p lo y e e s  i n  the  

stemmery work f o r c e  was 84 .3 % . The a v e r a g e  

percentage o f  b lack  people  in the Richmond work 

f o r c e  during that per iod  was about 24%. The court  

con s idered  that the company had p r e v i o u s l y  main­

t a i n e d  s e g r e g a t e d  d e p a r t m e n t s  u n t i l  the  e a r l y  

1960s and was o f  o p in ion  the p l a i n t i f f s  had made 

out a prima f a c i e  case .  I t  appeared however that 

in f a b r i c a t i o n ,  the most d e s i r a b l e  department in 

the company, the r e s p e c t i v e  numbers o f  b lack  and



76a

w h i t e  e m p lo y e e s  was not  d i f f e e n t  enough from 

the make-up o f  the work f o r c e  in the area t o  draw 

any i n f e r e n c e  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  there from , and 

the same app l ied  to  the warehouse, the t h i r d  most 

d e s i r a b l e  d e p a r t m e n t .  In  p r e f a b r i c a t i o n ,  the  

second most d e s i r a b l e  department,  b la ck  employees 

predominated. I t  a l so  appeared th a t ,  commencing 

i n  1971,  s e a s o n a l  employment was c o n d u c t e d  on 

s e p a r a t e  days  or  at  s e p a r a t e  l o c a t i o n s ,  and 

fo r  the two years immediately past on ly  5.3% o f  

the a p p l i c a n t s  f o r  s e a s o n a l  employment were 

white .  The h i r i n g  o f  b la ck  and white  employees 

i n t o  the  stemmery d u r i n g  t h o s e  p a s t  two y e a r s  

was p r o p o r t io n a l  to  the a p p l i c a t i o n s  r e c e iv e d .

The d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  i t  was 

"unable to  f i n d "  " th at  the e x c e s s i v e  assignment o f  

b lacks  to  the stemmery was p u r p o s e f u l l y  undertaken 

by the company to  c o v e r t l y  cont inue  i t s  h i s t o r i c a l  

system o f  segregated  depar tm ents ."  Consider ing  

that Teamsters has made i t  c l e a r  that s t a t i s t i c a l  

an a lys i s  serves as important r o l e  in cases con­

cern in g  employment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  and s t a t i s t i c s  

are competent p r o o f  o f  such, but that ,  l i k e  any 

o th er  kind o f  ev idence ,  t h e i r  u se fu ln ess  depends



77a -

on a l l  the surronding f a c t s  and c i r cu m stan ces ,  the 

statement o f  the Court that  s t a t i s t i c s  showing 

r a c i a l  or  e t h n i c  imbalance were p r o b a t iv e  in that 

c a s e  " o n l y  b e c a u s e  such im b a l a n c e  was o f t e n  a 

t e l l t a l e  s i g n  o f  p u r p o s e f u l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , "  

Teamsters, n .2 0 ,  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  with the r u l i n g  o f  

the d i s t r i c t  court  here th at ,  d e s p i t e  the prima 

f a c i e  s t a t i s t i c a l  c a se ,  pu rp ose fu l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  

was not shown. I t  is  thus c l e a r  th at ,  although 

the d i s t r i c t  court  con s idered  whether or  not to  

ba s e  i t s  f i n d i n g  on a prima f a c i e  s t a t i s t i c a l  

c a se ,  i t  dec ided  not  t o ,  rath er  f in d i n g  that  the 

s t a t i s t i c a l  case did  not support the c o n c lu s i o n  o f  

pu rp ose fu l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .

In stead ,  the d i s t r i c t  court  found that "t he  

answer in  the c o u r t ' s  view l i e s  in the test imony 

o f  the p l a i n t i f f ' s  witness  that ' i f  you want to  

get h i r e d  you know be ing  b lack  your be s t  chance 

would  be t o  go t h r o u g h  the stemmery and then  
t r a n s f e r  to  permenent employment l a t e r . ' "  The 

reasoning  behind t h i s  statement by the d i s t r i c t  

cou rt  was r e i t e r a t e d  in var iou s  ways throughout 

the o p in io n .  For example, i t  prov ided  f o r  r e ­

c o v e r y  f o r  t h o s e  c l a s s  members who were  not



-  78a -

informed by the company when they were h i r e d  that  

the company did  not d i s c r i m i n a t e  and about a l l  job  

o p e n i n g s ,  and " t h a t  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e i r  r a c e  

s u b s t a n t i a l l y  l im i t e d  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  employment to  

the  s t e m m e r y . "  I t  f u r t h e r  s t a t e d  t h a t  i t  had 

"conc luded  that c l a s s  members are o f t e n  lead to  

seek  employment in  t h e  stemmery on t h e  b a s i s  

o f  past r a c i a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . "  I t  found that th 

c o l l e c t i v e  barga in in g  c o n t r a c t  p r o v i s i o n s  co n c e r n ­

ing s e n i o r i t y ,  t r a n s f e r ,  and promotion did not 

have to be changed, and l i k e  the Quarles c o u r t ,  i t  

found seasonal  employees to  be poorer  workers on 

the whole who had to  prove themselves b e f o r e  given 

the r i g h t s  and b e n e f i t s  o f  permanent employees.

We do not think a f a i l u r e  o f  the company to  

announce i n n o c e n c e  i s  a v i o l a t i o n  o f  T i t l e  

V I I .  N e i t h e r  do we t h i n k  the  f a i l u r e  o f  the 

company to adv ise  b lack  a p p l i can ts  f o r  stemmery 

jobs  o f  promotions a v a i la b l e  in  the o ther  d e p ar t ­

ments i s  a v i o l a t i o n  o f  T i t l e  V I I ,  when the 

company t rea ted  a l l  a p p l i c a n t s ,  b la ck  and white ,  

the same. This i s  e s p e c i a l l y  true when we con ­

s i d e r  t h a t  the  f i r s t  and t h i r d  d e p a r t m e n t s  in  

o r d e r  o f  d e s i r a b i l i t y  were n o t  even found  by



79a -

the d i s t r i c t  court  to  be s t a t i s t i c a l l y  r a c i a l l y  

im per fec t  in make-up or  h i r i n g ,  and, in the second 

most d e s i r a b l e  department o f  the company, b lack  

e m p lo y e e s  p r e d o m in a t e d  b o t h  in  numbers and in  

h i r i n g s .

Nor i s  i t  p e r m is s ib l e  to  base r e c o v e r y  on the 

s u b j e c t i v e  b e l i e f  o f  c l a s s  members " th at  t h e i r  race 

s u b s t a n t i a l l y  l im i t e d  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  employment to  

the Stemmery." Basing re c o ve r y  on that f a c t  i s  an 

improper c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  The qu e st io n  i s  whether 

or not the company did in f a c t  d i s c r i m i n a t e ,  not 

whether or not the employee did  in f a c t  b e l i e v e  the 

company had d i s c r im in a t e d .  I t  is  at once apparent 

t h a t  the  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  two q u e s t i o n s
• n 11/i s  e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t . —

The d i s t r i c t  court  found that the company's 

h i s t o r y  o f  segregated  departments and the con­

t inued dominance o f  b lack  employees in the stem­

mery and p r e f a b r i c a t  i o n  d e p a r t m e n t s  had l e d  a 

s u b s t a n t i a l  number o f  b lack  a p p l i can ts  f o r  employ­

ment to  understand that  t h e i r  most l i k e l y  opp or -  

tunuty f o r  employment would be in the stemmery.



80a

The cou rt  made t h i s  f i n d i n g  on the test imony o f  

one w i tn e ss ,  a b la c k  female.  She had app l ied  f o r  

work in  the  f a b r i c a t i n g  d e p a r t m e n t ,  had been  

turned down, and a shor t  while  l a t e r  app l ied  f o r  

work in  t h e  stemmery and was a c c e p t e d .  I t  

was she who t e s t i f i e d  that  i f  a b la c k  app l i c a n t  

wanted to  get h i r e d  h i s  best  chance would be to  go 

through the stemmery and then t r a n s f e r  to  perma­

nent employment l a t e r .  She had down ju s t  t h i s .

Basing i t s  e n t i r e  h o ld in g  on the test imony o f  

th is  witness i s  e r r o r  f o r  two reasons .

F i r s t .  The w i t n e s s  h e r s e l f  had n o t  been  

d i s c o u r a g e d  from a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  work in the  

f a b r i c a t i o n ,  f o r  she had in f a c t  a p p l ie d ,  so the 

ac ts  o f  the witness  as opposed to  her test imony 

could  not cause a n egat ive  i n f e r e n c e  to  be taken 

against  the company to  prove the po in t  the court  

wanted to  make; that  b lack  ap p l i c a n ts  b e l i e v e d  

th e y  would  n o t  be h i r e d  i n t o  the permanent 

d e p a r t m e r n t s  so t h e y  a p p l i e d  t o  th e  stemmery 

instead  o f  f o r  permanent employment. Not only  

the d i s t r i c t  court  f a i l  to  f ind  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  in 

h i r i n g  in the f a b r i c a t i o n  department,  as might be 

l o g i c a l  from the test imony,  not a s i g n a l  other



81a -

witn ess  t e s t i f i e d  that  he had been d iscouraged  

by b e l i e f  or o th erw ise  from apply ing  f o r  work in 

one o f  the permanent departments,  so the test imony 

o f  the one witness stands a lone,  and her own acts  

b e l i e  h e r  w o r d s .  S e c o n d ,  and e q u a l l y  as im­

p o r t a n t ,  in  the  y e a r s  from 1965 th r o u g h  1974,  

there was a t o t a l  o f  3388 b la c k  employees h i red  

i n to  permanent departments. This number i t s e l f  i s  

t e l l i n g  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  none o f  them were  d i s ­

couraged from app ly ing  f o r  work in the permanent 

departments. A lso  during those  years there were 

3484 b lack  employees h i r e d  in t o  the stemmery. Not 

one o f  them t e s t i f i e d  that  he had been d iscouraged  

from seek ing  employment in one o f  the permanent 

d e p a r t m e n t s ,  nor  t h a t  he even  had t h e  b e l i e f  

that he would have been accorded  equal  c o n s i d e r a ­

t i o n  had he made a p p l i c a t i o n .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  we 

are o f  op in io n  that on the record  b e f o r e  us th is  

f i n d i n g  o f  f a c t  by the d i s t r i c t  court  i s  c l e a r l y  

erroneous.  FRCP 5 2 ( a ) .
At t h i s  po int  we should say th at ,  had e i t h e r  

the d o c t r i n e s  o f  res  ju d i c a t a  or s ta r e  d e c i s i s  

been a p p l ie d ,  those par ts  o f  th is  op in io n  d i s ­

cu ss in g  r a c i a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  in h i r i n g  in to  the



-  82a -

stemmery w ou ld  have  be e n  i n a p p r o p r i a t e ,  o r  at  

l e a s t  l a r g e l y  so ,  f o r  the p l a i n t i f f s  would have 

been bound by the e a r l i e r  d e c i s i o n  in Q u a r le s . We 

have so h e ld  in a case  i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  on i t s  

f a c t s ,  Griggs v .  Duke Power Co. ,  515 F.2d 86 (4th 

C ir .  1975) ,  and the d i s t r i c t  c ourt  re c o gn iz e d  th is  

in i t s  op in io n  as i t  r e c i t e d  ( o b v io u s ly  r e f e r r i n g  

to the s i t u a i o n  at hand) that  the p l a i n t i f f s  were 

l i t i g a t i n g  " in  t h e  f a c e  o f  a s e e m i n g l y  v a l i d  

judgment d i r e c t l y  on the matter  in c o n t r o v e r s y . " 

( I t a l i c s  are the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s )  Sven c o n s i d e r ­

ing that our c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  ju s t  above o f  the 

import o f  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  language may be 

i n c o r r e c t ,  in Quarles the court  h e l d ,  on page 508, 

that  " . . .  s in ce  January 1, 1966, the company had 

not d i s c r im in ate d  on the grounds o f  race  in i t s  

h i r i n g  p o l i c y .  The court  c on c lu d es ,  r e g a r d le ss  o f  

p r a c t i c e s  b e f o r e  January 1, 1966, r e l i e f  on th is

i s s u e  i s  no t  now a p p r i p r i a t e . "  Th is  f i n d i n g
12/adverse to  the p l a i n t i f f s  was not appea led .—  In

12/  The Quarles order  prov ides  in i t s  f i r s t  para 
graph:

1. The p l a i n t i f f s '  prayer f o r  an i n ju n c t i o n  
r e q u i r in g  P h i l i p  Morr is ,  I n c . ,  to  modify  i t s  current 
h i r i n g  p r a c t i c e s  i s  denied.



83a

the case b e f o r e  us now, the p l a i n t i f f s  o b v io u s ly  

r e a l i z e d  that  t h i s  h o ld in g  in  Quarles had to  be 

c ircumvented in  some way or o t h e r ,  and the d e c i ­

s i o n  o f  th e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  t h a t  t h e  Quar l e  s_ 

p l a i n t i f f s  did not p r o p e r ly  represent the c l a s s  

and that  the a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  FRCP 2 3 ( b ) ( 2 )  t o  the 

Quarles c l a s s  p l a i n t i f f s  was in v i o l a t i o n  o f  the 

Fourteenth Amendment ( o b v io u s ly  meaning the F i f t h  

Amendment) i s  the  r e s u l t .  T h is  u n d o u b t e d l y  

accounts  f o r  the f a i l u r e  o f  the p l a i n t i f f s  to  t ry  

the present case  on the theory  that d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  

t o o k  p l a c e  a f t e r  the  judgment o f  the  d i s t r i c t  

c o u r t  in  Q u a r le s  and t o  a t t e m p t  t o  p r o v e  any 

such d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  as a separate  i tem from any 

d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  which may have taken p la c e  b e f o r e  

t h a t  ju d gm e n t ,  See G r i g g s , p.  88.  W h i le  an 

examination o f  the s t a t i s t i c a l  ev iden ce  b e f o r e  

and a f t e r  the judgment in Quarles may not seem to  

d i s c l o s e  any d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  advantage 

t o  the  p l a i n t i f f s ,  t h i s  c a s e  has n e i t h e r  been 

t r i e d  nor appealed on that  ground. B e l i e v i n g  that 

we should not u n n e c e s s a r i l y  approach the qu e st io n  

o f  the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  v a l i d i t y ,  f a c i a l l y  or in 

a p p l i c a t i o n ,  o f  FRCP 2 3 ( b ) ( 2 ) ,  s ee  Wright on



-  84a

Federal  Courts ,  3d Ed. §72, t o  th ese  c l a s s  p l a i n ­

t i f f s ,  s in c e  the case may be dec ided  on another 

ground, we e x p r e s s ly  do not  intimate  any op in ion  

as t o  the  c o r r e c t n e s s  o f  the  h o l d i n g s  o f  the 

d i s t r i c t  cou rt  in that  r e s p e c t  and a l s o  in  r e sp e ct  

t o  the  m a t t e r  o f  the  c l a s s  b e i n g  i n a d e q u a t e l y  

represented  in  the Quarles case .  The same r e s e r ­

v a t i o n  a p p l i e s  t o  the  r u l i n g  o f  t h e  d i s t r i c t  

cou rt  r e f u s i n g  to  apply s ta r e  d i e c i s i s .

A c c o r d i n g l y ,  we a r e  o f  o p i n i o n  t h a t  t h o s e  

par ts  o f  the complaint a l l e g i n g  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  

by the company based on race should be d i sm issed .

C. The d i s t r i c t  court  he ld  the unions to 

l i a b i l i t y  on much the  same t h e o r y  i t  h e l d  the 

comp any.
I t  fou nd the  u n i o n s  had had a " c h e c k e r e d  

p a s t , "  f o r  u n t i l  1963 t h e  l o c a l  u n i o n s  were 

s e g r e g a t e d .  The c o u r t  found  t h a t  t h e i r  pas t  

i n d i c a t e d  t h e y  had f a c i l i t a t e d  th e  c o m p a n y ' s  

t r a d i t o n  o f  segreg ated  departments and that they 

s h o u l d  sh a r e  the  c o m p a n y ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  

informing  t h e i r  "members that a l l  j obs  are open in 

a l l  departments wi thout regard to  race  or  sex so 

as to  m o l l i f y  members' present understandings as



-  85a -

based on past  h i s t o r y . "  The ir  " f a i l u r e  to  perforin 

t h i s  f u n c t io n  makes . . . [them] j o i n t l y  l i a b l e  with 

the  company t o  t h o s e  p l a i n t i f f s  e n t i t l e d  t o  

r e c o v e r . "

The o n l y  t h i n g  i n  the  r e c o r d  wh ich  would 

j u s t i f y  the c o u r t ' s  f i n d i n g  o f  members' present 

u n d e r s t a n d i n g  b a s e d  on p a s t  h i s t o r y  was the 

t e s t i m o n y  o f  t h e  b l a c k  fe m a le  w i t n e s s  we have 

above  r e f e r r e d  t o  and the  f i n d i n g  b a s e d  on i t  

which we h e ld  to  be c l e a r l y  erroneous.  Applying 

t h i s  f in d i n g  t o  the unions i s  even more tenuous 

than t o  the company because the unions had noth ing 

to do with h i r i n g .

Because no member's present understanding has

been proved in t h i s  case ,  f i n d i n g  such a present
13/understanding i s  c l e a r l y  erroneous .  FCRP 5 2 ( a ) . — ■

We are thus o f  o p i n i o n  t h o s e  p a r t s  o f  the  

complaint  a l l e g i n g  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  by the unions 

based on race  should be d ism issed .

13/  We do not  intimate 
t h e o r y  o f  h o l d i n g  the  
c o r r e c t .  I t  i s  simply 
address the p o in t .

that  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  
u n io n s  t o  l i a b i l i t y  i s  
not necessary  f o r  us to



-  86a

D. The case o f  the c l a s s  p l a i n t i f f s  c la im ­

in g  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  on a c c o u n t  o f  t h e i r  f e m a le  

sex i s  d i f f e r e n t  from that o f  the c l a s s  p l a i n t i f f s  

c la im ing  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  based on ra c e .

R e fe r r in g  back,  the agreed i ssu e s  to  be t r i e d  

in t h i s  con tex t  were (1 )  whether women were h i r e d  

in t o  the stemmery on account o f  t h e i r  sex ,  and (2)  

whether the t r a n s f e r ,  promotion,  s e n i o r i t y ,  i n t i a l  

job  assignment,  and wage ra te  p o l i c i e s  d i s c r i m i n ­

a t e d  a g a i n s t  them on the  b a s i s  o f  s e x .  A l l  

c la ims f o r  a f f i r m a t i v e  r e l i e f  sought on the b a s is  

o f  a leged d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  working or d i s c i p l i n a r y  

c o n d i t i o n s  were w ith drawn by t h e  p l a i t i f f s .
The court  r e c i t e d  ev iden ce  and may have found 

t h a t  the company d i d  n o t  d i s c r i m i n a t e  w i th  

r e sp e c t  to  pay between the v a r io u s  jo b  c l s s i f i c a -  

t i o n s  with re sp e c t  to  race or  sex.  As p r e v i o u s l y  

r e c i t e d ,  i t  found that  the s e n i o r i t y ,  t r a n s f e r ,  

and promotional  ru le s  did not have to  be changed. 

But i t  found that  !' [ i ] t  i s  the i n i t i a l  assignment 

p o l i c i e s  that t a i n t  the sys tem ,"  and ho ld  that 

s e n i o r i t y ,  t r a n s f e r ,  and pormotional  r e s t r i c t i o n s  

o f  seasonal  employees were d i s c r i m i n a t o r y ,  a l ­

though the h o ld in g  d id  "not  re q u i r e  a r e d r a f t i n g



-  87a -

o f  t h o s e  p r o v i s i o n s . "  What we make o f  t h e s e  

s e e m i n g l y  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  r u l i n g s  i s  t h a t  i f  an 

i n t i a l  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  assignment a f f e c t e d  l a t e r  

r i g h t s ,  the empoloyee might r e c o v e r .

Remarkably, the d i s t r i c t  court  did  not make 

any f in d i n g  as to  whether or  not women employees 

were assigned to  the stemmery because o f  t h e i r  

sex ,  although we should have thought th is  was the 

p r i n c i p a l  i s s u e  in the c a se .  Perhaps the reason 

was that  i t s  examination o f  the ev id ence  agrees 

w i t h  our own a d m i t t e d l y  b r i e f  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  

o f  some o f  the s t a t i s t i c a l  ev id ence  which shows 

that  about the same percentage o f  women were h i r e d  

in t o  the stemmery as in t o  permanent emplyment. 

27.6% o f  the stemmery i n i t i a l  h i r e s  were female,  

while  25.3% o f  the employees whose i n i t i a l  h i r i n g  

was i n t o  permanent de p a r tm e n ts  were f e m a l e .

Since  we w i l l  not assume that sexual  d i s c r i m i ­

n a t i o n  e x i s t e d  by reason o f  i n i t i a l  assignment to 

the stemmery, the p r i n c i p a l  i s su e  l e f t  open, and 

upon wh ich  the  w h o le  c a s e  l a r g e l y  d e p e n d s ,  i s  

whether, upon h i r i n g ,  the i n i t i a l  assignments o f  

f e m a le  e m p lo y e e s  t o  j o b s ,  w h e th e r  w i t h i n  the



-  88a

stemmery or w i th in  a permanent department,—  were 

d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  on account o f  sex.

The d i s t r i c t  court  r e c i t e d  that  the p l a i n ­

t i f f s  produced ev id ence  that  se v e r a l  j o b  c l a s s i f i ­

c a t i o n s  w ith in  v ar io u s  departments were predomi­

n a n t l y  male or  f e m a l e .  I t  found t h a t  i n  the  

stemmery f e m a le  j o b s  have been  in  t h e  l i g h t  

c a t e g o r y ,  while  male j o b s  have been in  the heavy 

c a t e g o r y ,  and that c e r t a i n  h igher  order  or  key 

jobs  were s e x u a l ly  s te r o ty p e d .  I t  r e c i t e d  the 

p l a i n t i f f s '  c la im  that  the company maintains male 

and fe m ale  j o b  c 1a s s i f i c a t  in s  w i t h i n  b o t h  the 

stemmery and the permanent departments.  I t  found 

that  there are female tag meter o p e r a t o r s ,  male 

l i n - o u t  and press  o p e r a t o r s ,  and f o r k l i f t  opera ­

t o r s ,  and a predominantly male sk e le to n  crew that 

works during the shutdown per iod  o f  the stemmery. 

I t  f ou n d  t h a t  the  p r e f a b r i c a t i o n  depar tm en t  

maintained l i g h t  labor  and heavy labor  c l a s s i f i c a ­

t i o n s  and that  in the f a b r i c a t i o n  department the

14/

14/ The rec o r d  suggests  very  few i n i t i a l  h i r e s  
i n to  permanent departments were l a t e r  employed in 
the stemmery.



-  89a

jobs  o f  h e a d - f i x e r  and f i x e r  are male,  whi le  the 

j o b s  o f  c a t c h e r ,  a ttendant,  examiner, and i n s p e c ­

t o r  are female.  I t  a l s o  found that there  has never 

been a female t r a n s f e r  from the stemmery to  the 

w a r e h o u s e ,  but  a p p a r e n t l y  d i d  n o t  a t t a c h  any 

s i g n i f i c a n c e  to  the f a c t  there  has on ly  been one 

female h i r e d  d i r e c t l y  in t o  the warehouse. How or 

why such c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  were d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  the 

d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  did  not say.
The p l a i n t i f f s  po in t  out ,  in  a d d i t i o n ,  that 

in one instance  there was evidence  which tended to  

show that the company di scou raged  a female em­

p l o y e e  f rom t r a n s f e r r i n g  t o  a j o b  as f o r k l i f t  

o p e r a t o r .
The company i n s i s t s  that  there was no e v i ­

dence that  any c l a s s  member ever a p l i e d  f o r  and 

was denied promotion to  any job  which her s e n i o r ­

i t y  w ould  have  e n t i t l e d  h e r  t o  h o l d .  I t  a l s o  

i n s i s t s  that where was no ev idence  that in any 

s i g n i f i c a n t  number o f  c a se s ,  females app l ied  f o r  

j o b s  but were t u r n e d  down in  f a v o r  o f  j u n i o r  

maeles.  I t  po in ts  out that in one p a r t i c u l a r  job  

c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  which the  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  had 

c a t e g o r i z e d  as f e m a l e ,  more than 100 fem ale



-  90a

employees ju n i o r  to  th ose  in that c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  

had b id  f o r  and been accepted  in jobs  paying more 

than t h o s e  o f  the  c a t e g o r i z e d  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  

without a bid  by those  w i th in  the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  

which ev id ence  tends to  i n d i c a t e ,  o f  c o u r se ,  that 

any c a t e g o r i z a t i o n  o f  th e  j o b  as f e m a le  had 

nothing  to  do with the company, ra ther  with the 

em ployee 's  p r e f e r e n c e ,  about which the company 

cou ld  no noth in g .  The company further  i n s i s t s ,  

without r e p l y ,  that from 1966 u n t i l  1974 t r a n s f e r s  

were governed by a job  p r e f r e n c e  system and from 

1974 on by jo b  p o s t in g  and b id d in g ,  and that  no 

n e f a r i o u s  o p e r a t i o n  o f  e i t h e r  sy s te m  by the  

company or the union has been pleaded or  proved.  

The d i s t r i c t  c ourt  did  not address these  matters .

The d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  made few, i f  any, s t a t i s ­

t i c a l  f in d in gs  with r e s p e c t  to sexual  d i s c r i m i n a ­

t i o n .  I t  d i d  n o t  d i s c u s s  the  t h e o r y  t h a t  an 

employee who had sought a j o b  by pr e fe r e n c e  was 

not d i s c r im in a te d  aga inst  by the company. Much in 

the same manner as i t  approached the qu e st io n  o f  

race d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  i t  found that  i t  was "the 

duty and the burden o f  the defendants to  inform 

a l l  p o t e n t i a l  a p p l i c a n t s  f o r  the v a r io u s  openings



-  91a -

f o r  sa id  openings as they dev e lop ,  and that  these 

openings would be f i l l e d  withour regard to  s e x . . . .  

" I t  h e ld  that  " t h o s e  a p p l i c a n t s  in the c l a s s  that 

were not so informed and would have app l ied  fo r  

any such o p e n i n g s  i f  i n f o r m e d  are  e n t i t l e d  to  

r e c o e r . "

We have not  a t t e m p t e d  h e r e  any d e t a i l e d  

a n a ly s i s  o f  the ev id ence  with r e sp e c t  to  sexual  

d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  p r i n c i p a l l y  because the d i s t r i c t  

court  attempted none. I f  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  

f in d in g s  and r e c i t a l s  are t ru e ,  there may w e l l  be 

a case o f  sexual  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  On the o th er  

hand ,  i f  the  c o m p a n y ' s  c o n t e n t i o n s ,  which  i t  

maintains are unre futed ,  are tr ue ,  there may wel l  

not  be.

We are  o f  o p i n i o n  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a c a s e  in  

which "the  f in d in g s  o f  f a c t ,  on which the judgment 

was g r a n t e d ,  were p h r a s e d  in  b r o a d  c o n c l u s o r y  

terms and did  not inc lu de  any su b s id ia ry  f in d in gs  

which  would  g i v e  a p p r o p r i a t e  s u p p o r t  t o  the  

c o u r t ' s  c on c lu sory  f i n d i n g s . "  United States v . 

Commonwealth o f  V i r g i n i a  No. 77 -1683 , 569 F.2d 

1300 ( 4 t h  C i r .  1 9 7 8 ) .  As in EEOC v .  U nited

V i r g i n i a  Bank-Seaboard N at iona l ,  555 F.2d 403 (4th



92a

C i r .  1 9 7 7 ) ,  th e  c o u r t  made no a n a l y s i s  o f  the  

s t a t i s t i c a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  o r  t h e  w e i g h t  t o  be 

a c c o r d e d  i t  un der  t h e  f a c t s  advanced  by t h e  

de fendants .  There i s  here as there as absence o f  

an c r i t i c a l  rev iew o f  the r e l e va n t  f a c t s  cu lminat ­

in g  i n  a c o h e r e n t  body  o f  f a c t u a l  f i n d i n g s  

which i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  c a l l e d  f o r  in a d i s c r i m i n a ­

t i o n  case .  For example, the company i n s i s t s  that 

upon employment in to  the stemmery female employees 

were advised  o f  the heavy labor  and l i g h t  labor  

c a t e g o r i e s ,  and the wages t h e r e f o r ,  and g iven  a 

chance to  i n d i c a t e  a p r e fe r e n c e  f o r  each.  This is  

not taken account o f  by the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ,  as was 

n o t ,  as p r e v i o u s l y  r e c i t e d ,  the f a c t  that f o r  a 

great  number o f  years the company had apparently  

o p e r a t e d  i t s  t r a n s f e r  sy s t e m  e i t h e r  by main­

tenance o f  a j o b  p e r f e r e n c e  f i l e  or  by job  po s t in g  

and b id d in g .  The mere f a c t  that a company or  a 

union may have d is c r im in ate d  on account o f  sex 

b e f o r e  the C i v i l  Rights Act is  not enough upon 

which to  base a f i n d i n g  o f  l i a b i l i t y  i f  present 

d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  i s  not shown, see Hazelwood School

D i s t r i c t  v .  United S ta te s ,  433 U.S 299 (1 9 7 7 ) ,  and



93a

as with the matter  o f  r a c i a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  the 

f a i l u r e  to  proc la im  innocence i s  no ground to  base 

l i a b i l i t y  upon.
W h i le  i t  may be t h o u g h t  from what we have  

sa id  that the f a i l u r e  o f  the d i s t r i c t  court  to  

make the key f in d in gs  o f  whether or  not women were 

h i r e d  in to  the stemmery because o f  t h e i r  sex ,  and 

whether t h e i r  i n t i a l  job  assignments upon h i r i n g  

were d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  on account o f  sex ,  would lead 

to  a d i s m is s a l  o f  c laims o f  the c l a s s  f o r  f a i l u r e  

o f  p r o o f ,  we do n o t  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i s  a p r o p e r  

d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  the case .  There i s  enough in the 

c o n e l u s o r y  f i n d i n g s  o f  the  d i s g r i c t  c o u r t  t o  

c r e a t e  a l e g i t i m a t e  doubt as to  whether or  not 

d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  on account o f  sex e x i s t e d  under the 

i s su e s  which were agreed to  be t r i e d .  See Dothard 

v.  Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977 ) .
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the  judgment  o f  the  d i s t r i c t  

court  with re sp e c t  to  sexual  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  is 

v a c a t e d  and remanded f o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  by the  

d i s t r i c t  c o u r t .  On remand,  the  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  

may co n s id e r  the record  b e f o r e  i t ,  and may, wi th in  

i t s  d i s c r e t i o n ,  take a d d i t i o n a l  ev id ence  i f  i t  be 

so adv ised .



-  94a -

SUMMARY

The j u d g m e n t  o f  t h e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  i s  
vacated ,  and the case  i s  remanded.

On remand, the d i s t r i c t  court  w i l l  dismiss  

the a l l e g a t i o n s  o f  the complaint  based on employ­

ment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  on a c c o u n t  o f  r a c e ;  t h o s e  

a l l e g a t i o n s  o f  the  c o m p l a i n t  ba s e d  on s e x u a l  

d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  w i l l  be the s u b je c t  o f  r e c o n s i d e r a ­

t i o n  not i n c o n s i s t e n t  with t h i s  o p in io n .

While the op in io n  o f  the d i s t r i c t  c ourt  found 

f o r  the unions on the i s su e  o f  whether they had 

f a i r l y  represented  t h e i r  members, see 29 U.S.C. 

5195 (a ) ,  no order  has been entered  g iv i n g  e f f e c t  

to  that part  o f  the o p in io n .  We presume an order 

wi t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h i s  i s s u e  w i l l  be e n t e r e d  on 
remand.

Fol lowing  r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  the case ,  the 

d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  w i l l  r e c o n s i d e r  i t s  award o f  
a t t o r n e y ' s  f e e s .

Vacated and Remanded.



IN UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 76-1998-1999 
76-2199

-  95a -

NORA LEWIS, et al.,

Appellees, 

- vs -

PHILIP MORRIS, INCORPORATED, et al.,

Appellants.

O R D E R

No request for a poll of the court on the 
suggestion for rehearing en banc having been made, 
rehearing en banc shall be, and hereby is, denied.

The panel has considered the petition for re­
hearing and is of opinion it is without merit.

It is accordingly ADJUDGED, and ORDERED that 
the petition for rehearing shall be, and the same 
hereby is, denied.

With the concurrences of Judge Russell and 
Judge Hall.

/s/H.E. Widener 
For The Court

F i le d :  July 26, 1978



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