Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, Florida Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund in Support of Respondent

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October 7, 2016
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, Florida Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund in Support of Respondent, 2016. 3ca50a66-be9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/f3de278f-fb13-4fd5-98eb-7bba46d31b52/bank-of-america-corp-v-city-of-miami-florida-brief-of-amicus-curiae-naacp-legal-defense-educational-fund-in-support-of-respondent. Accessed October 08, 2025.

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    Nos. 15-1111, 15-1112

In The

Supreme Court of tfje ®ntteb
Bank of America Corp., et al.,

Petitioners,
v.

City of Miami, Florida,
Respondent.

Wells Fargo & Co. and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
Petitioners,

v.
City of Miami, Florida,

Respondent.

On Writs of Certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL 
FUND, INC., IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

Sherrilyn Ifill 
Director- Counsel 

Janai Nelson 
Christina Swarns 
Liliana Zaragoza 
NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund, Inc. 
40 Rector Street, 5th Floor 
New York, NY 10006

Ajmel Quereshi *
J ohn Paul Schnapper- 

Casteras
NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund, Inc. 
1444 I Street, NW 
W ashington, DC 20005 
202-682-1300 
aquereshi@naacpldf.org

October 7, 2016 * Counsel of Record

mailto:aquereshi@naacpldf.org


TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF A U T H O R IT IE S..........................................iii

IN TER EST OF AM ICU S CU RIAE ...............................1

INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF A R G U M EN T..................................2

A R G U M EN T........................................................................5

I. D EFIN IN G  “AGGRIEVED” TO INCLUDE
M U N ICIPA LITIES ACCORDS W ITH THE 
FHA’S PLAIN M EANING AND THIS 
COURT’S PRECDENT, AND DOES NOT 
CREATE AN ABSURD R ESU LT............................5

II. PREDATORY LENDING SERIOUSLY
DAMAGED COM M UNITIES OF COLOR, 
INCLUDING IN  THE CITY OF M IAM I.............. 8

A. M odern H istory  of H ousing
D iscrim ination ........................................................ 9

B. M alfeasance, Exploitation, and the
Subprim e C r is is ...................................................12

C. H arm s to C om m unities of Color,
Including in  the  City of M iam i........................16

1. D estruction  of A frican-A m erican
W ea lth ...............................................................17

2. E n tren ch m en t of Segregation and
Economic Im m obility ................................... 20

3. The H um an  Cost of the  Foreclosure
C risis in  M iam i.................   22



ii

III.TH E ABSENCE OF M EANINGFUL 
R EL IEF FOR COM M UNITIES AND 
CITIES RAVAGED BY PREDATORY 
LEN D IN G  COM PELS A FAIR AND 
CO M PREH EN SIV E IN TERPRETATIO N
OF TH E FHA CO NSISTEN T W ITH ITS 
PLAIN TERM S........................................................... 24

A. Ind iv iduals and  C lasses Face Significant
O bstacles in  P u rsu in g  R elief from 
P reda to ry  L enders............................................... 24

B. C ities and  C ounties Are U niquely  
Positioned to Hold L enders Accountable
for D iscrim ination ................................................29

C O N C L U S IO N ................................................................. 35



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Barrett v. H  & R  Block, Inc.
No. 08-10157, 2011 WL 1100105
(D. M ass. 2011)................................................................ 29

Barrett v. Option One Mortg. Corp.
No. 12-8033, 2013 WL 7137776
(1st Cir. Feb. 07, 2013)..................................................29

Barrett v Option One Mortg. Corp.,
No. 08-10157, 2012 WL 4076465
(D. M ass. Sept. 18, 2012) .............................................29

Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Lowder Realty Co., 
236 F.3d 629 (11th Cir. 2000)..................................... 1

Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
No. CV 09-517, 2009 WL 3157160 (D. Ariz. Sept.
24, 2009), a ff’d , 656 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2 0 1 1 ).....26

Chiu v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP,
No. 2 :ll-cv-01400, 2012 WL 1902918
(D. Nev. M ay 25, 2 0 1 2 )................................................ 25

City o f Los Angeles v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
No. CV 13-9046, 2014 WL 2770083
(C.D. Cal. Ju n e  12, 2014).............................................30

City o f Los Angeles v. Citigroup, Inc . ,
24 F. Supp. 3d 940 (C.D. Cal. 2 0 1 4 ).........................26

City o f Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
22 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2014 )...................... 30

City o f M em phis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
No. 09-2857-STA, 2011 WL 1706756
(W.D. Tenn. M ay 4, 2011)............................................30

Comer v. Cisneros,
37 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1 9 9 4 ).............................................1



IV

Cty. o f Cook v. H SBC N. Am. Holdings Inc.,
136 F. Supp. 3d 952 (N.D. 111. 2015)......................... 30

Dekalb Cty. v. H SBC  N. Am . Holdings, Inc.,
No. 1:12-CV-03640-SCJ, 2013 WL 7874104 
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2 0 1 3 )...............................................30

Fleischmann Constr. Co. v. United States,
270 U.S. 349 (1926)......................................................5 , 6

Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91 (1979).....................................................  7 ; 32

Gordon v. First Franklin Fin. Corp.,
No. 15-CV-0775, 2016 WL 792412
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2 0 1 6 )................................................25

Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,
458 U.S. 564 (1982)............................................................5

Havens Really Corp. v. Coleman,
455 U.S. 363 (1982)............................................................7

Hawaii v. M ankichi,
190 U.S. 197 (1903)............................................................5

Holy Trinity Church v. United States,
143 U.S. 457 (1892)............................................................6

In  re Countrywide Fin. Mortg. Lending Practices 
Litig., No. 08—M D -1974, 2011 WL 4862174 
(W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2 0 1 1 )..........................................28-29

In  re Wells Fargo Residential Mortg. Lending  
Discrimination Litig.,
No. 08-M D —01930 MMC, 2011 WL 3903117 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 6 , 2 0 1 1 )................................................28

Johnson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
No. 09-49420, 2014 WL 4197001
(B ankr. E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2 0 1 4 ).......................... 25-26

Kennedy Park Homes A ss’n, Inc. v. City of
Lackawanna, 436 F .2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970)............... 1



V

Landstar Exp. Am ., Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Com m ’n,
569 F.3d 493 (D.C. Cir. 2 0 0 9 ).....................................34

Lau Ow Bew v. United States,
144 U.S. 47 (1892)..............................................................5

Mayor & City Council o f Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., No. JFM -08-62, 2011 WL 1557759 
(D. Md. Apr. 2 2 ,2 0 1 1 ).................................................... 30

McGhee v. Sipes,
334 U.S. 1 (1948)................................................................ 1

McKinney v. Citi Residential Lending Inc.,
No. 15-cv-307, 2015 WL 11822150
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 8 , 2 0 1 5 )......................................... 26, 27

M erritt v. D illard Paper Co.,
120 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 1997).............................. 33-34

NAACP v. Am . Fam ily Mut. Ins. Co.,
978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992)...........................................1

Ozawa u. United States,
260 U.S. 178 (1922)........................................................... 6

Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t o f Justice,
491 U.S. 440 (1989)........................................................... 6

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Westgate Partners, Ltd.,
937 F.2d 526 (10th Cir. 1991)...................................... 33

Rodriguez v. N a t’l City Bank,
No. 08-2059, 2011 WL 4018028
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 8 , 2011) ..................................................28

Rubin v. United States,
449 U.S. 4 2 4 (1 9 8 1 )........................................................... 5

Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948)................................................................ 1

Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435 (1932).........................................................34



VI

Steed v. EverHome Mortgage Co.,
477 F. App’x 722 (11th Cir. 2012)..............................27

Tex. Dep’t o f Hous. & Cmty. A ffairs v.
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015)......................................... 2, 8 , 32

Thompson v. North Am erican Stainless, L.P.,
562 U.S. 170 (2011)............................................2, 6 , 7 , 8

Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t o f Hous. & Urb. Dev.,
No. 95-309, 2006 WL 581260 (D. Md.
Ja n . 10, 2 0 0 6 )................................................................. . i

Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance,
409 U.S. 205 (1972)........................................................... 7

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235 (1989)........................................................... 5

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
564 U.S. 338 (2011)...........   28

Constitutional Provisions
A rticle I I I ..................................................................................7

Statues & Regulations
42 U.S.C.

§ 3605..................................................................................... 2
§ 3613(a)(1)(A)..................................................................25

114 Cong. Rec. 2993 (1968).............................................. 31

Other Authorities
A dopted R esolutions, The U.S. Conference of M ayors, 

81st A nnual M eeting (June 21-24, 2013),



vii

h ttp ://usm ayors.org/resolutions/81st_C onference/ 
reso lu tions-adopted .pdf......................................... 31, 33

A garw al, S um it e t al., Predatory lending and the 
subprime crisis, 113 J. Fin. Econ. 29 (2014).........  12

Am rom in, Gene e t al., Complex Mortgages, S tanford  
Inst, for Econ. Pol’y R esearch (May 2 0 1 2 ).............11

A ssociated Press, As Foreclosures Rise,
Squatters Lay Claims, Dec. 2 , 2 0 0 8 .........................23

B arr, M ichael S. e t al., Behaviorally Inform ed Home 
Mortgage Credit Regulation,
H arv ard  Univ. Jo in t C tr. for Hous.
S tudies (2008)..................................................................  19

Belsky, Eric S. & Ren S. Essene, Consumer and  
Mortgage Credit at a Crossroads: Preserving 
Expanded Access while Inform ing Choices and  
Protecting Consumers, H arv ard  Univ. Jo in t 
C tr. for Hous. S tudies (2008)......................................  13

Bianco, K a ta lin a  M., The Subprim e Lending Crisis: 
Causes and Effects o f the Mortgage Meltdown,
CCH M ortgage Compliance Guide & B ank 
D igest (2008)...................................................................  17

Blom quist, D aren, A  Record 28 M illion Properties 
Receive Foreclosure Notices in 2009, 
http://w w w .realtytrac.eom /landing/2009- 
year-end -fo rec lo su re-repo rt.h tm l............................... 17

Bocian, Debbie G runstein , Wei Li & C arolina Reid, 
C enter for Responsible Lending, Lost Ground,
2011: Disparities in Mortgage Lending and  
Foreclosure 8 (November 2 0 1 1 )...................................14

Boger, Jo h n  C harles & Ju d ith  W elch W egner, Race, 
Poverty, and Am erican Cities (Univ. ofN .C .
P ress 1996) 10

http://usmayors.org/resolutions/81st_Conference/
http://www.realtytrac.eom/landing/2009-year-end-foreclosure-report.html
http://www.realtytrac.eom/landing/2009-year-end-foreclosure-report.html


V l l l

Brooks, Rick & R u th  Simon, Subprim e Debacle Traps 
Even Very Credit-Worthy, W all S tree t J.,
Dec. 3, 2 0 0 7 ........................................................................12

Cave, D am ien, In  South Florida, Eviction Spares 
Few, N.Y. Tim es, Ju n e  4, 2 0 0 8 .............................22 , 23

City of M iam i, D ep’t  of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., About 
Us, http://w w w .ci.m iam i.fl.us/com m unity 
developm ent/pages/about_us/................................ 32-33

Dep’t  of H ousing & U rban  Developm ent, Subprim e 
Lending Report, Unequal Burden: Income and  
Racial Disparities in Subprim e Lending in America
(Apr. 2000), http ://archives.hud.gov/ 
reports/subprim e/subprim e.cfm ..................................14

Dickerson, M echele, Home Ownership and Am erica’s 
Financial Underclass: Flawed Premises, Broken 
Promises, New Prescriptions (2 0 1 4 )......................... 11

Donovan, S haun, Prepared Rem arks of Secretary 
Shaun Donovan D uring the Countrywide 
Settlement Press Conference, U.S. D ep’t  of Hous.
& U rban  Dev., P ress  Room (Dec. 21 , 2011)............18

Duitz, Jam ie, Battling Discriminatory Lending: 
Taking A  M ultidim ensional Approach Through 
Litigation, Mediation, and Legislation, 20 J. 
Affordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 101 (2 0 1 0 )......28

Engel, K ath leen  C. & P a tric ia  A. McCoy, A Tale of 
Three Markets: The Law and Economics of 
Predatory Lending, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1255 (2002)... 12

Engel, K ath leen  C. & P a tric ia  A. McCoy, The 
Subprim e Meltdown: Who Knew What When, 
F ederal Reserve of Boston, Fall 2010 ...................... 16

Fram e, W. Scott, Estim a ting the Effect o f Mortgage 
Foreclosures on Nearby Property Values: A  Critical 
Review o f the Literature, Econ. Rev., 2010 ....... 20-21

http://www.ci.miami.fl.us/community
http://archives.hud.gov/


IX

Goldstein, Ira, Bringing Subprim e Mortgages to 
M arket and the Effects on Lower-Income Borrowers 
22 , H arv ard  Univ. Jo in t C tr. for Hous.
S tudies (2004).................................................................. 20

G overnm ent A ccountability  Office, N onprim e 
M ortgages: A nalysis of Loan Perform ance, Factors 
A ssociated w ith  D efaults, and  D ata  Sources, R eport 
to the  Jo in t Economic Com m ittee, U nited  S ta tes
Congress (2010), http://www.gao.gov/ 
n ew .item s/d l0 8 0 5 .p d f...................................................15

H agerty, Jam es  R. & Joseph  T. H allinan , Blacks are 
M uch More Likely to Get Subprim e Mortgages,
W all S tree t J ., Apr. 11, 2 0 0 5 ......................................16

H anks, Douglas, Report: South Florida Area Am ong  
Hardest H it by Recession, Sun Sentinel, Ju n e  16,
2010 , h ttp ://articles.sunsentinel.com /2010-06- 
16/business/fl-south-florida-econom y-m h- 
20100616_l_south-florida-past-recessions- 
firs t-recess io n ....................................................................22

Howell, Benjam in, Exploiting Race and Space: 
Concentrated Subprim e Lending as Housing 
Discrimination, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 101 (2006)............9

Im m ergluck, D an & Geoff Sm ith, The External Costs 
of Foreclosure: The Im pact of Single-Family 
Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 
H ousing P o ly  D ebate 57 (2006).................................. 20

Jo in t C tr. for Hous. S tudies, H arv ard  Univ., The 
State o f the N ation’s Housing: 2015 (2015)............  19

Jou rda in -E arl, M aurice, The Demographic Impact of 
the Subprim e Mortgage Meltdown,
ComplianceTech, http://www.com pliance 
tech.com /files/Dem ographic% 20Im pact% 20of 
% 20the% 20Subprim e% 20M ortgage% 20 
M eltdow n.pdf................................................................... 15

http://www.gao.gov/
http://articles.sunsentinel.com/2010-06-16/business/fl-south-florida-economy-mh-20100616_l_south-florida-past-recessions-first-recession
http://articles.sunsentinel.com/2010-06-16/business/fl-south-florida-economy-mh-20100616_l_south-florida-past-recessions-first-recession
http://articles.sunsentinel.com/2010-06-16/business/fl-south-florida-economy-mh-20100616_l_south-florida-past-recessions-first-recession
http://articles.sunsentinel.com/2010-06-16/business/fl-south-florida-economy-mh-20100616_l_south-florida-past-recessions-first-recession
http://www.compliance


King, Jr ., Rev. M artin  L u ther, The Other America, 
Grosse Pointe H um an  R elations Council 
(M ar. 14, 1968)..................................................................31

Leonard, Tam m y & Jam es M urdoch, The 
Neighborhood Effects o f Foreclosure, 11 J . 
G eographical Sys. 317 (2 0 0 9 )...................................... 21

Lewis, M ichael, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday 
Machine (W.W. N orton & Co. 2011)...........................15

Lin, Zhenguo e t al., Spillover Effects o f Foreclosures 
on Neighborhood Property Values,
38 J . Real E st. Fin. & Econ. 387 (2 0 0 9 )..................21

Lopez, F rank , Using the Fair Housing Act to 
Combat Predatory Lending, 6 Geo. J . on 
Poverty L. & Pol’y 73 (1999).......................................  19

M assey, D ouglas S. & N ancy A. D enton, American  
Apartheid: Segregation and the 
M aking of the Underclass (1993)...................9, 10, 11

M assey, D ouglas S., Origins of Economic Disparities, 
in The Rising Costs for America  (Jam es H.
C arr & N adinee K. K u tty  eds., 2008).......................10

M iam i G overnm ent, Housing M arket Analysis,
http://w w w .m iam igov.com /com m unitydevelopm ent/
D ocs/Reports/M arket
A nalysisl2714D R A F T .pdf....................................23, 24

M orris, M onique W., NAACP, Discrimination and  
Mortgage Lending in America; A  Sum m ary of the 
Disparate Im pact o f Subprim e Mortgage Lending  
on African Americans (M arch 2009)...................13-14

Mui, Y lan Q., For Black Americans, Financial 
Damage from Subprim e Explosion Is Likely 
to Last, The W ash. Post, Ju ly  8 , 2 0 1 2 ..................... 21

NAACP Legal Defense an d  Educ. Fund, Inc. e t al.,
The Future of Fair Housing: Report on the

http://www.miamigov.com/communitydevelopment/


XI

National Commission o f Fair Housing and  
Equal Opportunity (Dec. 2008).....................................2

Nier III, C harles Lewis, The Shadow of Credit: The 
Historical Origins o f Racial Predatory Lending and  
its Im pact Upon African American Wealth 
Accumulation, 11 U. Pa. J.L . & Soc.
Change 131 (2 0 1 3 )..................................................19, 20

Oliver, M elvin L. & Thom as Shapiro, Black Wealth 
White Wealth: A  New Perspective on Racial 
Inequality  (1995)........................................................18-19

Oliver, M elvin L., Subprim e as a Black Catastrophe, 
The A m erican Prospect, Sept. 20, 2008, 
http://prospect.org/article/sub-prim e-black- 
c a ta s tro p h e .................................................................. 17-18

Powell, M ichael, Banks Accused of Pushing Mortgage 
Deals on Blacks, N.Y. Times, Ju n e  6 , 2009............ 14

Reid, C arolina & E lizabeth  Laderm an, The Untold 
Costs o f Su bprime Lending: Exam ining the Links 
among Higher-Priced Lending, Foreclosures and  
Race in California 7, Inst, for A ssets & Soc.
Pol’y, B randeis Univ. (2009).......................................  13

Reim an, Jo h n  P., Foreclosures, Integration, and  
the Future of the Fair Housing Act,
41 Ind. L. Rev. 629 (2008)................................... passim

Rheingold, Ira  e t al., From Redlining to Reverse 
Redlining: A  History of Obstacles for Minority 
Homeownership in America, 34 
C learinghouse Rev. 642 (2001) .............. 10-11, 12, 15

R othstein, R ichard, A Comment on Bank of 
Am erica/C ountryw ide’s Discriminatory Mortgage 
Lending and Its Implications for Racial 
Segregation, B riefing P aper No.
335 Econ. P o ly  Inst. 1 (Jan. 23 (2012).............. 21-22

http://prospect.org/article/sub-prime-black-catastrophe
http://prospect.org/article/sub-prime-black-catastrophe


xii
R othstein , R ichard, Race and Public Housing: 

Revisiting the Federal Role, 21 Poverty  & Race 
Res. Action Council 2 (Nov.-Dec. 2012)................... 10

R othstein , R ichard, Racial Segregation and Black 
Student Achievement, in Education, Justice and  
Democracy (Danielle A llen & Rob Reich eds.,
Univ. of Chi. P ress  2 0 1 3 )..............................................13

Rugh, Jacob S. & Douglas S. M assey, Racial 
Segregation and the American Foreclosure 
Crisis, 75 Am. Soc. Rev. 629 (2010)............  12, 17, 18

Schwemm, Robert G. & Jeffrey  L. T aren,
Discretionary Pricing, Mortgage Discrim ination, 
and the Fair Housing Act, 45 H arv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 375 (2010)................................................................  13

S ingletary , M ichelle, Subprim e Loan Epidem ic Preys 
On Poor, M inority Homeowners, S un  S en tinel (July 
3, 2000), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com /2000-07- 
03/business/0006300849_l_subprim e-consum er-
deb t-c red it-card .........................................................14-15

W alker, Steve, C ity of S eattle , Foreclosure 
Prevention, h ttp://w w w .Seattle.gov/ 
housing/hom eow ners/foreclosure-prevention (last 
v isited  Oct. 5, 2 0 1 6 ).......................................................33

W all S tree t and  the  F inancial Crisis: A natom y of a 
F inancia l Collapse: M ajority  and  M inority  S taff
Report, P e rm an en t Subcom m ittee on 
Investigations, U n ited  S ta te s  Senate  
(Apr. 13, 2011)................................................................ . 16

W hite, A lan M., Borrowing While Black: Applying  
Fair Lending Laws to Risk-Based Mortgage 
Pricing, 60 S.C. L. Rev. 677 (2009)...........................  14

W illiam s, A leatra  P., Lending Discrimination, the
Foreclosure Crisis and the Perpetuation of Racial

http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2000-07-03/business/0006300849_l_subprime-consumer-
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2000-07-03/business/0006300849_l_subprime-consumer-
http://www.Seattle.gov/


and Ethnic Disparities in Homeowner ship in the 
U.S., 6 Wm. & M ary Bus. L. Rev. 601 (2015).......  18

Wolff, S a rah  D., C en ter for Responsible Lending, The 
C um ulative Costs of P reda to ry  Practices (June 
2015), http://w w w .responsiblelending.org/state-of- 
lending/reports/13-C um  u la tiv e -Im p ac t.p d f...........16

Trzcinski, S tephen, The Economics of Redlining: A  
Classical Liberal Analysis, 44 Syracuse L. Rev.
1197 (1993) 10

http://www.responsiblelending.org/state-of-lending/reports/13-Cum
http://www.responsiblelending.org/state-of-lending/reports/13-Cum


1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

The NAACP Legal Defense & E ducational Fund, Inc. 
(“LD F”) is th e  n a tion ’s first and  forem ost civil righ ts 
legal organization. Through litigation, advocacy, 
public education, and  outreach, LDF strives to secure 
equal justice  under the  law  for all A m ericans, and  to 
b reak  down b a rrie rs  th a t  p reven t A frican A m ericans 
from rea liz ing  th e ir  basic civil and  hum an  righ ts.

T hroughout its  history, LDF has challenged policies 
th a t  deny housing  opportun ities to A frican A m ericans. 
See, e.g., McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) 
(companion case to Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948)) (racially restric tive  covenants); Cent. Ala. Fair 
Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Lowder Realty Co., 236 F,3d 629 
( llt .h  Cir. 2000) (racial steering); Comer v. Cisneros, 37 
F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994) (racial d iscrim ination  in  public 
housing an d  assistance program s); NAACP v. Am. 
Fam ily M ut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(redlining); Kennedy Park Homes A ss’n, Inc. v. City of 
Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970)
(exclusionary zoning); Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t o f Hous. 
& Urb. Dev., 2006 WL 581260 (D. Md. Jan . 10, 2006) 
(federal governm ent’s obligation to affirm atively  
fu rth e r fa ir housing); C onsent Decree, Byrd v. First 
Real Estate Corp. o f Ala., No. 95-CV-3087 (N.D. Ala. 
M ay 14, 1998) (racial steering); Com plaint,
Morningside, et al. v. Sabree, et al., No, 16-8807-CH 
(Mich. Cir. Ct., Ju ly  13, 2016) (discrim inatory 
foreclosures).

1 P u rsu an t to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for amicus 
curiae s ta te  th a t  no counsel for a party  authored th is brief in 
whole or in  p a r t and th a t no person other th an  amicus curiae, its 
members, or its  counsel made a m onetary contribution to the 
preparation or subm ission of th is brief. All parties have 
consented to the filing of this brief.



2
LDF h as  also advocated for the  fa ir and  

com prehensive in te rp re ta tio n  and  app lication  of the  
F a ir H ousing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (“FHA” or 
“F a ir H ousing Act”). See Tex. Dep’t o f Hous. & Cmty. 
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. C-t. 2507 
(2015) [here inafter Inclusive Communities Project]; see 
also NAACP Legal Defense and  Educ. Fund, Inc. e t al., 
The Future of Fair Housing: Report on the National 
Commission of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity 
(Dec. 2008).

INTRODUCTION AND 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The question  of w hether the  City of M iam i is an  
“aggrieved” person  under the  F a ir  H ousing Act has a 
s tra igh tfo rw ard  answ er. More th a n  four decades ago, 
the  C ourt resolved th a t  any  p a rty  “aggrieved” m ay 
advance a claim  under the  Act, as long as they  allege 
an  in ju ry  cognizable under A rticle III of the  U nited  
S ta te s  C onstitu tion . The C ourt h as  repeated ly  
affirm ed th a t  holding -  and  for good reason: It 
conforms w ith  w ell-accepted principles of s ta tu to ry  
in te rp re ta tio n  th a t  a  te rm ’s p la in  m eaning  
should control.

P e titioners  now boldly sum m on th is  C ourt to ignore 
the  FHA’s unam biguous language and effectively 
o v ertu rn  its  p receden t in  order to forbid  th e  C ity of 
M iam i and  the  Black and  L atino borrow ers th a t  live 
th e re in  from a ttem p tin g  to stop and  seek re lie f for 
b an k s’ deceptive, p reda to ry  lending  practices.

P e titioners  cite no new am endm ents to the  FHA or 
any  case law  under the  s ta tu te , b u t rely  en tire ly  on a 
decision of the  C ourt in  the  Title VII context, 
Thompson v. North American Stainless, L.P., 562 U.S. 
170 (2011). The lynchpin of P e titio n ers’ a rg u m en t is 
th a t  Thom psons  conclusion th a t  an  in te rp re ta tio n  of



3
Title VII th a t  would preserve s tan d in g  for all p lain tiffs 
who have suffered an  in ju ry  under A rticle III would 
lead to “ab su rd  consequences” binds th is  C ourt’s 
in te rp re ta tio n  of the  FHA, despite con trary  p recedent . 
B ank of A m erica’s Br. a t  22 [hereinafter BOA’s Br.]. 
Accordingly, P e titioners  argue th a t  the  Court should 
je ttiso n  the  City of M iam i’s claim s a t th is  p re lim inary  
stage in the  case. Id. a t 43.

There is no th ing  “absu rd ” about a city m easurab ly  
dam aged by d iscrim inatory  subprim e lending  and  
w aves of a tte n d a n t foreclosures p u rsu in g  re lief under 
the FHA. Indeed, cities have long had  a special stake  
and  role in  prom oting fa ir housing and  com bating 
discrim ination, as evidenced by the  FHA’s inception. 
However, it  would be absu rd  to refuse to apply the  
te rm  “aggrieved” to the  stra igh tfo rw ard  facts of th is  
case and  to bar M iam i from bringing  suit.

I t w ould be p a rticu la rly  unreasonab le  to dism iss th is  
case given th a t  the  underly ing  m alfeasance and  the 
resu ltin g  dam age to the  City of M iam i is not seriously 
disputed. As has been extensively docum ented, m any 
financial in stitu tions, including the  P etitioners in  th is  
case, utilized, encouraged, and  profited  from deceptive 
p redato ry  lend ing  practices ta rg e tin g  African- 
A m erican com m unities. For exam ple, by 2008, 55 
percen t of A frican-A m erican m ortgage holders 
nationw ide had  high-risk, subprim e loans, com pared 
w ith  only 17 percen t of w hite m ortgage holders.

As a resu lt, A frican-A m erican com m unities 
experienced specific and  concrete financial and  
com m unal harm s. Betw een 2005 and  2009, the  
m edian  household income in  com m unities of color 
decreased by tw o-th irds due in  significant p a r t to the  
subprim e lending  crisis. The sp ira ling  ra te s  of 
foreclosure and  w ealth  erosion fu rth e r en trenched



4
res id en tia l segregation an d  reduced economic m obility 
for persons living in  A frican-A m erican com m unities.

These p ractices had  p a rticu la rly  s ta rk  im pacts in  
M iam i, w hich w as decim ated by the  recession. The 
vicious cycle of foreclosures and  devaluation  continues 
to have a palpable effect on the  City, w h e th er in  the  
form of lost tax  revenue or costs re la ted  to the  
m ain tenance  and  reh ab ilita tio n  of abandoned housing. 
The C ity’s unique in itia tiv es  for prom oting  fair 
housing  have also been deprived of resources because 
of the  subprim e crisis.

Yet, m any of the  A frican A m ericans harm ed  have 
never been able to enjoin these  d iscrim inatory  
practices, m uch less ob ta in  re lie f un d er the  FHA from 
the  ban k s responsible for them . This is not because 
the  lenders did not engage in  m alfeasance and  
m ism anagem ent, w hich is not seriously in  doubt. Nor 
is it  because the  lenders won on the  m erits  or 
otherw ise convinced a factfinder of th e ir  
b lam elessness. R ather, lenders have been  able to 
defeat claim s for re lief due to a  v a rie ty  of p rocedural 
lim itations, w hich have allowed them  to tr im  back and  
te rm in a te  a ttem p ts  to seek justice  for the  dam age 
ind ispu tab ly  inflicted upon m inority  com m unities.

A gainst th is  backdrop, the  City of M iam i is engaging 
in  a  valuable effort to seek re lie f from the  m ost 
egregious offenders for h a rm  directly  a ttr ib u tab le  to 
th e ir  actions. A fter being deceived, foreclosed upon, 
and  forced from th e ir  hom es — som etim es w ith  no m ore 
th a n  a few tra sh  bags of belongings and  th e ir  children 
in  tow -  the  residen ts  of M iam i th ro u g h  th e ir  elected 
governm ent deserve the  chance to hold subprim e 
lenders responsible for the  n a tu ra l consequences of 
th e ir  m isconduct. In  th is  case, the  prom ise of justice 
boils down to a  basic p rocedural right: the  C ity’s 
s tan d in g  to pursue  an  action under the  FHA.



5
ARGUMENT

This C ourt has repeated ly  indicated th a t  a s ta tu te  
should generally  be in te rp re ted  according to its  p la in  
m eaning, unless doing so would create  an  absu rd  or 
u n just resu lt. P e titioners  suggest th a t  it would be 
“ab su rd ” to allow  “aggrieved” m unicipalities to sue 
under the  FHA. In  actuality , it  would be absu rd  to 
forbid  m unicipalities from seeking re lie f for p redatory  
lending practices, in  ligh t of estab lished  precedents, 
the  h isto ry  and  im pact of p reda to ry  practices, and the 
ways th a t  FHA actions have been h indered  in 
lower courts.

I. DEFINING “AGGRIEVED” TO 
INCLUDE MUNICIPALITIES
ACCORDS WITH THE FHA’S PLAIN 
MEANING AND THIS COURT’S 
PRECEDENT, AND DOES NOT 
CREATE AN ABSURD RESULT.

I t is axiom atic th a t  the  p la in  m eaning  of a s ta tu te  is 
generally  the  prim e s ta r tin g  po in t in  in te rp re tin g  and 
applying the  law. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair 
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989); Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982). If 
the  s ta tu to ry  te rm s are unam biguous, the  C ourt’s 
review generally  ends and  the  s ta tu te  is construed 
according to the  p la in  m eaning  of its  w ords. See Rubin  
v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981).

In  certa in  instances, the  Suprem e C ourt has 
recognized th a t  if  a p la in  m eaning  in te rp re ta tio n  
would re su lt in  “u n ju st or absu rd  consequences[,]” the 
Court m ay consider those ram ifications and  “if 
possible . . . avoid[j” them . Fleischmann Constr. Co. v. 
United States, 270 U.S. 349, 360 (1926): Hawaii v. 
M ankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 213 (1903); Lau Ow Bew v. 
United States, 144 U.S. 47, 59 (1892).



6
In  determ in ing  w hether a re su lt is u n ju s t or absurd , 

the  C ourt pays p a rticu la r a tten tio n  to C ongress’ in te n t 
in  enacting  the  legislation; specifically, w h e th er the  
in te rp re ta tio n  proposed would contravene the 
s ta tu te ’s purpose. See Fleischmann, 270 U.S. a t 360; 
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 
459 (1892); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 
(1922). As the  C ourt explained in  Public Citizen v. 
U.S. Dep’t. o f Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989);

[T]he w ords used, even in  th e ir  lite ra l sense, 
a re  the  prim ary , and  ord inarily  th e  m ost 
reliable, source of in te rp re tin g  the  m eaning  
of any w riting[.] [N ]evertheless[,] it is one of 
the  su re s t indexes of a m atu re  and  developed 
ju risp rudence  not to m ake a fo rtress out of 
the  d ictionary  . . . b u t to rem em ber th a t  
s ta tu te s  alw ays have some purpose or object 
to accom plish, whose sym pathetic  and 
im aginative discovery is the  su re s t guide to 
th e ir  m eaning.

Id. a t  454-55.

The C ourt applied  th is  canon in  Thompson v. North  
Am erican Stainless, w hen determ in ing  th a t  Title VII 
p ro tected  an  employee who w as fired a fte r his spouse 
filed a claim  w ith  the  E qual Em ploym ent O pportunity  
Com m ission ag a in s t th e ir  common em ployer. 562 U.S. 
a t 170. A lthough the  tex t of Title VII s ta te s  th a t  any 
“aggrieved” p a rty  m ay seek re lie f under the  Act, the  
C ourt concluded th a t  if  the  rig h t to sue extended to all 
persons who would otherw ise have s tan d in g  under 
A rticle III, “absu rd  consequences would follow.” Id. 
Accordingly, the  C ourt “conclude [d] th a t  the  term  
‘aggrieved’ m u st be construed  m ore narrow ly  th a n  the  
ou te r boundaries of A rticle III.” Id. a t 177. 
N onetheless, the  C ourt held th a t  the  employee fell



7
w ith in  the  s ta tu te ’s “zone of in te re s ts” and, thus, had  
stan d in g  as an  aggrieved party . Id. a t 176-77.

P e titioners  aim  to couch th is  case en tire ly  in  te rm s 
of the  lim ita tions of Thompson, in  the  hopes of 
cabining the  scope of the  te rm  “aggrieved” -  th is  tim e 
in the  context of s tand ing  under the  FHA. This 
argum en t m isses th ree  im p o rtan t points.

F irst, as the  C ourt in  Thompson explicitly 
acknowledged, the  Court has repeated ly  re ite ra ted  
th a t  s tan d in g  u nder the  FHA, unlike Title VII, reaches 
as far as A rticle III perm its. 562 U.S. a t 177. As the 
Court held in  Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life 
Insurance, Congress’ use of the  w ord “aggrieved” 
“showed ‘a congressional in ten tion  to define stand ing  
as broadly  as is p erm itted  by A rticle III of the 
C onstitu tion .’” 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). The Court 
affirm ed th is  holding in  Gladstone, Realtors v. Village 
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) and again  in  Havens 
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). 
Accordingly, to now hold otherw ise would not only 
conflict w ith  the  te rm ’s p la in  m eaning, b u t ru n  counter 
to th is  C ourt’s s ta ted  precedent.

Second, even if  th is  Court w ere to find th a t  the  FHA 
does not ex tend  to all p a rtie s  who have suffered an 
A rticle III injury, the  City of M iam i’s claim, in 
accordance w ith  Thompson, falls w ith in  the  FHA’s 
“zone of in te re s ts .” The F a ir  H ousing Act w as 
explicitly enacted  to address problem s p laguing  cities 
and provide re lie f for h arm s to com m unities of color in 
cities — the  type of h arm s a t issue in  th is  case. See 
infra  a t 32-33. T h a t lenders directly  ta rg e ted  African- 
A m erican com m unities in  cities for p redato ry  loans 
fu rth e r supports  th is  conclusion.

Third, unlike Thompson, an  absu rd  consequence 
would not re su lt from a p la in  m eaning  in te rp re ta tio n



8
of “aggrieved” party , since m ain ta in in g  the  C ity of 
M iam i’s ability  to pu rsu e  FHA violations is an  en tire ly  
appropria te  response to p reda to ry  lend ing  and  o ther 
deceptive and d iscrim inatory  practices, which caused 
grave h arm s to the  City. Infra  Section II. 
Com pounding m a tte rs , p reda to ry  lending  in  the  City 
often ta rg e ted  and  d isp ara te ly  im pacted  African- 
A m erican com m unities -  the  very group th a t  the  FHA 
w as in tended  to p ro tect and  benefit. See, e.g., Inclusive 
Communities Project, a t 2515-16. (recounting the  
h isto ry  of segregation  and  d iscrim ination  ag a in st 
Blacks in housing th a t  led to the  FHA’s passage).

M oreover, the  consequences of the  p la in  tex t, and 
M iam i’s action th e reu n d er, are perfectly  reasonable 
because cities have a special s take  in  and  role under 
the  FHA and  are  uniquely  positioned to req u est and  
im plem ent special form s of re lie f to com bat 
d iscrim ination  and  prom ote fa ir housing. The salience 
and  sensib ility  of m unicipal FHA claim s is fu rth e r 
s tren g th en ed  by the  fact th a t  the  victim s of p redato ry  
practices have been largely  unable to stop or obtain  
m eaningful rem edies, due p rim arily  to a  v a rie ty  of 
p rocedural b a rrie rs . This fu rth e r reaffirm s the 
im portance of adhering  to the  p la in  m eaning  of the 
FHA and  allow ing an  avenue for re lie f to rem ain  
in tac t. Infra  Section 3.

II. PREDATORY LENDING SERIOUSLY 
DAMAGED COMMUNITIES OF 
COLOR, INCLUDING IN THE CITY OF 
MIAMI.

As th is  C ourt analyzes the  m eaning  of the  FHA, and  
the  scope of the  in ju ries alleged here, it im p o rtan t to 
s itu a te  these  legal issues w ith in  the  unique h istorical 
context from w hich they  arose.



9
W hile the  devasta tion  of the  financial crisis of 2007 

and  2008 is a m a tte r  of public record and  common 
knowledge, it  bears  rep ea tin g  th a t  th is  w as no 
o rd inary  recession; nor w as it sim ply a cyclical dip in 
economic grow th. R ather, the  crisis w as in tegra lly  
in te rtw in ed  w ith  specific acts of m alfeasance by 
certa in  financial in s titu tions, bu ild ing  upon a legacy of 
endu ring  rac ial discrim ination, w hereby the  p riva te  
and  public sectors w orked h an d  in  hand  to fu rth e r 
re s id en tia l segregation and  th en  profit from it.

W hile P etitioners  advance an  unfounded 
in te rp re ta tio n  of the  law, as if  w riting  on a b lank  slate, 
see BOA’s Br. a t 6 , the  rea lity  is th a t  h isto ry  and  the 
C ourt’s p receden t in te rp re tin g  the  FHA m atte rs  here. 
As th is  C ourt applies the  estab lished  doctrine of FHA 
standing , LDF urges the  Court to carefully  consider 
(A) the  m odern h isto ry  th a t  led to the  foreclosure 
crisis; (B) the  record of m isconduct and  exploitation by 
certa in  financial in stitu tions; and  (C) the  severe, 
collective, and  m ulti-genera tiona l h a rm s to 
com m unities of color th a t  these  actions caused.

A. Modern History of Housing 
Discrimination

D uring  the  early  tw en tie th  century, federal, s ta te , 
and  local governm ents expressly  enforced and 
subsidized system ic de jure  rac ia l segregation. See 
generally, Douglas S. M assey & Nancy A. D enton, 
Am erican Apartheid: Segregation and the M aking of 
the Underclass (1993). Federal officials divided cities 
by race th rough  the  use of “red lin ing ,” id. a t 51-52, a 
process w here the  governm ent would lite ra lly  code 
p redom inan tly  A frican-A m erican a reas  on a m ap w ith  
red  ink  to indicate a reas  w here the  governm ent 
refused  to lend. B enjam in Howell, Exploiting Race 
and Space: Concentrated Subprim e Lending as 
Housing Discrimination, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 101, 107-08



10

(2006). The re su lt w as th a t  p roperties  in  m inority  and  
racially  m ixed neighborhoods w ere significantly  
undervalued . M assey & D enton, supra  a t 51-52.

The F edera l H ousing A dm in is tra tio n  also requ ired  
developers seeking  federal financing to include 
racially  restric tive  covenants in  th e ir  deeds, thereby  
p rev en ting  the  sale or re-sale  -  or forcing developers 
to p rev en t the  sale or re-sale  -  of new  hom es to B lacks 
See R ichard  R othstem , Race and Public Housing: 
Revisiting the Federal Role, 21 Poverty  & Race Res. 
Action Council 2 (Nov.-Dee. 2012).

In  tandem , the  p riva te  sector developed and  enforced 
a  varie ty  of d iscrim inatory  policies and  practices, 
re su ltin g  m  A frican-A m erican com m unities 
th ro u g h o u t the  country  being  denied conventional 
form s of cred it -  and  help ing  create  the  h ighly 
segregated  housing  p a tte rn s  th a t  rem ain  visible today. 
S tephen  Trzcinski, The Economics o f Redlining: A  
Classical Liberal Analysis, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 1197, 
1199 (1993). For exam ple, a lthough  governm ent 
agencies prom oted home build ing  and  g rea te r access 
to p riv a te  m ortgage loans, they  also used  race as a 
benchm ark  for housing  credit eligibility. See Jo h n  
C harles Boger & J u d ith  W elch W egner, Race, Poverty, 
and Am erican Cities 324 (Univ. of N.C. P ress  1996). 
As a  resu lt, B lacks w ere denied the  opportun ity  to 
secure financing  and  achieve hom eow nership. See 
D ouglas S. M assey, Origins o f Economic Disparities, in 

he R ising Costs for America  39 , 69 (Jam es H. C arr & 
N adinee K. K u tty  eds., 2008).

This com bination of racially  d iscrim inatory  
governm ent policies and  p riva te  sector prejudice 
obstructed  re s id en tia l m obility for B lacks and  allowed 
“segregation  [to] con tinue0 u n ab a ted ” th rough  the  
early  1960s. I ra  Rheingold e t al., From Redlining to 
Reverse Redlining: A  History of Obstacles for M inority



11
Homeowner ship in America, 34 C learinghouse Rev. 
642, 645 (2001). Thus, w hile the  overall
hom eow nership ra te  in  the  U nited  S ta tes  increased  
from 43.6 percen t in  1940 to 62 percen t in  1960, th a t  
increase in u red  exclusively to the  benefit of th e  w hite 
m iddle class. M echele D ickerson, Home Ownership 
and Am erica’s Financial Underclass: Flawed 
Premises, Broken Promises, New Prescriptions 181 
(2014). The re su lta n t “re s id en tia l sp a tia l segregation 
in  A m erica's cities has con tribu ted  to the  grow th of an  
African-Am erican underc lass th a t  th re a ten s  to m ake 
u rb an  poverty  and  rac ial in justice a p e rm an en t fix ture 
of A m erican society.” Jo h n  P. R eim an, Foreclosures, 
Integration, and the Future o f the Fair Housing Act, 41 
Ind. L. Rev. 629, 641 (2008) [here inafter Reim an, 
Foreclosures] (citing M assey & Denton, supra).

Following C ongress’ deregu lation  of the  m ortgage 
in d u stry  in  the  1980s,2 subprim e loans -  which, 
trad itiona lly , w ere ra re  financing options for high- 
income borrow ers3 — w ere repurposed  into p reda to ry  
loan p roducts4 to exploit the  m ark e t vacuum  created

2 “Among the s ta tu tes  th a t  deregulated the mortgage banking 
industry  were the Depository Institu tions and M onetary Control 
Act of 1980 . . .  and the A lternative M ortgage Transactions P arity  
Act of 1982[.]” Ira  Rheingold e t al., supra, a t  648 n.47 (citation 
omitted).

3 Gene Amromin et al., Complex Mortgages 1-2, Stanford Inst, 
for Econ. Pol’y Research (May 2012) (explaining how subprim e 
m ortgage loans can serve as “a security design th a t benefits 
sophisticated borrowers [,]” bu t acknowledging th a t these types of 
loans are also “pushed by financial institu tions to take advantage 
of naive households”).

4 Subprim e lending th a t is not targeted  towards specific groups 
can be a legitim ate practice th a t provides borrowers deemed 
ineligible for prim e financing the opportunity to achieve



12
by the  lack of financing opportun ities in  h istorically  
underserved  com m unities of color. R heingold e t al., 
supra  a t  648. In  short, the  move tow ards u n reg u la ted  
m ortgage lend ing  created  an  a ttra c tiv e  m ark e t ou t of 
form erly excluded com m unities of color, and  allowed 
housing  d iscrim ination  to sim ply sh ift “from the  
o u trig h t den ial of home loans to the  system atic  
m ark e tin g  of p reda to ry  loans to poor b lack and  
H ispanic households.” Jacob S. R ugh & D ouglas S. 
M assey, Racial Segregation and the Am erican  
Foreclosure Crisis, 75 Am. Soc. Rev. 629, 632 (2010).

B. Malfeasance, Exploitation, and the 
Subprime Crisis

O ut of th is  h istory , a num ber of m ajor lenders 
developed an d  aggressively p ushed  form s of “reverse 
red lin ing ,” w hich im perm issib ly  m ark e ted  high-risk, 
subprim e loans, “offering easie r and  fa s te r approvals” 
to unsuspec ting  borrow ers of color w hile dow nplaying 
the  ex o rb itan t costs th a t  would la te r  be exacted 
th ro u g h  in fla tab le  in te re s t ra te s , balloon paym ents, 
negative am ortiza tion  fea tu res, and/or s tric te r 
repaym en t te rm s. See Rick Brooks & R u th  Simon, 
Subprim e Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy, 
W all S tree t J ., Dec. 3, 2007, a t A l.

homeownership through higher-priced or otherw ise inferior loan 
products. K athleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A  Tale o f Three 
Markets: The Law and Economics o f Predatory Lending, 80 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1255, 1258 (2002). A predatory loan, on the o ther hand, is 
not simply higher-priced, bu t also contains abusive term s and 
conditions th a t predictably harm  the borrower or a class of 
borrowers — e.g., excessively high and inflatable in te rest rates, 
hidden fees, and undisclosed costs. Sum it Agarwal et al., 
Predatory lending and the subprime crisis, 113 J . Fin. Econ. 29, 
29 (2014). In  reality, predatory lending occurs m ost frequently in  
the subprim e mortgage m arket. Engel & McCoy, 80 Tex.L.Rev. 
supra, a t 1261.



13
I t  is w ell-docum ented th a t  several regional and  

n a tio n a l financial en titie s  engaged in  exploitative 
conduct and  rac ia l s tee rin g  in  the  p u rsu it of sh o rt
te rm  profits. In  the  la te  1990s and early  2000s, banks 
charged  Black hom ebuyers h igher in te re s t ra te s  th a n  
sim ilarly  s itu a ted  w hite  hom ebuyers. R ichard 
R othstein , Racial Segregation and. Black Student 
Achievement, in Education, Justice and Democracy 
187 (Danielle A llen & Rob Reich eds., Univ. of Chi. 
P ress  2013). By 2002, A frican A m ericans w ere th ree  
tim es as likely to receive a high-risk , subprim e loan 
th a n  sim ilarly-qualified  w hite  loan  applicants. Id. a t 
188. By 2008, 55 percen t of A frican-A m erican 
m ortgage holders nationw ide had  high-risk , subprim e 
loans, com pared w ith  only 17 percen t of w hite 
m ortgage holders. Id. a t  189; see also, Eric S. Belsky 
& Ren S. Essene, Consumer and Mortgage Credit at a 
Crossroads: Preserving Expanded Access while 
Inform ing Choices and Protecting Consumers 21—22, 
H arv ard  Univ. Jo in t C tr. for Hous. S tud ies (2008) 
(describing “a dual m a rk e t” w here m inority  
com m unities are served by different “in stitu tio n s , 
a rran g em en ts  and  products” th a n  w hite  areas).

S tudies th a t  control for income, credit score, and  
o ther risk  variab les  consisten tly  show th a t  borrow ers 
of color w ere and  continue to be d isproportionately  
s teered  in to  p reda to ry  h igh-risk  loans. See, e.g., 
R obert G. Schwem m  & Jeffrey  L. T aren, Discretionary 
Pricing, Mortgage Discrimination, and the Fair 
Housing Act, 45 H arv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 375, 399-400 
(2010); C arolina Reid & E lizabeth  L aderm an, The 
Untold Costs o f Subprim e Lending: Exam ining the 
Links among Higher-Priced Lending, Foreclosures 
and Race in California 7, Inst, for A ssets & Soc. Pol’y, 
B randeis Univ. (2009); M onique W. M orris, NAACP, 
Discrimination and Mortgage Lending in America; A



14

Sum m ary of the Disparate Im pact o f Subprim e  
Mortgage Lending on African Am ericans 
(M arch 2009).

Indeed, as one moves up the  income scale, the  rac ial 
d isp arity  becomes increasing ly  pronounced. See D ep’t  
of H ousing & U rb an  Dev., Subprim e L ending Report, 
Unequal Burden: Income and Racial Disparities in 
Subprim e Lending in Am erica  (Apr. 2000), 
h ttp ://arch ives.hud .gov/reports/subprim e/subprim e.cf 
m (last v isited  Oct. 6 , 2015); see also id. (“H om eow ners 
in  high-incom e black neighborhoods are  twice as likely 
as hom eow ners in  low-income w hite  neighborhoods to 
have subprim e lo an s .”).5 These s ta r tlin g  d isparities  
w ere certa in ly  no accident: L enders specifically 
“ta rg e te d ]  h istorically  d isadvan taged  com m unities 
w ith  high-cost an d  risky  loan  products.” Debbie 
G ru n ste in  Bocian, Wei Li & C arolina Reid, C en ter for 
Responsible Lending, Lost Ground, 2011: Disparities 
in Mortgage Lending and Foreclosure 8 
(Novem ber 2011).

A strong  u n d e rcu rren t of prejudice is u n m istak ab le  
in  these  p reda to ry  practices. According to a  loan 
officer’s affidavit, fellow loan officers used  rac ia l s lu rs 
in  charac te riz ing  subprim e loans to African 
A m ericans, who th ey  refe rred  to as “m ud people” 
receiving “ghetto  loans.” M ichael Powell, Banks  
Accused o f Pushing Mortgage Deals on Blacks, N.Y. 
Tim es, Ju n e  6 , 2009, a t 1. In  F lorida, for exam ple, 
th e re  w ere also accounts of “subprim e lenders 
b ragg ing  th a t  th e ir  ideal c lien t [wa]s an  elderly  widow

5 These disparities persist even after accounting for the 
characteristics of the applicant, loan, or property — w ith race 
providing the only plausible explanation. See, e . g Alan M. 
W hite, Borrowing While Black: A pplying Fair Lending Laws to 
Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing, 60 S.C. L. Rev. 677, 681 (2009).

http://archives.hud.gov/reports/subprime/subprime.cf


15
w ith  cred it problem s,” w hich they  referred  to as 
“g ranny  shopping.” M ichelle S ingletary , Subprim e 
Loan Epidemic Preys On Poor, M inority Homeowners, 
Sun S en tinel (July 3, 2000), h ttp ://articles.sun- 
sentinel.eom /2000-07-03/business/0006300849_.l_ 
subprim e-consum er-debt-credit-card .

These exploitative loans p ro liferated  exponentially . 
In  the  live years  betw een 1994 and  1999, the  subprim e 
m ortgage m ark e t expanded from $35 billion to $160 
b illion ,6 and  by 2007, to ta led  approxim ately  $650 
billion, “roughly 25 percen t of the  overall m ortgage 
m ark e t.” M aurice Jo u rda in -E arl, The Demographic 
Im pact o f the Subprim e Mortgage M eltdown  4, 
Com plianceTech, h ttp  ://www.com pliance
tech.com /files/Dem ographic% 20Im pact% 20of% 20the%  
20Subprim e% 20M ortgage% 20M eltdow n.pdf, The 
loans w ere fu rth e r fueled by highly questionable 
securitiza tion  and  u nderw riting  practices, which 
obscured the  quality  of the  underly ing  loans and  the  
chances of defau lt once those loans were packaged 
toge ther in to  novel financial products. See generally, 
M ichael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday 
M achine (W.W. N orton & Co. 2011). A t the  heigh t of 
the  boom, th e re  w ere upw ards of 4.58 m illion 
o u ts tan d in g  subprim e loans ,7 w hich becam e

6 Rheingold et al., supra, a t 651 (“If there is any question about 
where th is lending is taking place, it  has been answered by a 
series of recent studies, which supplied ample evidence th a t low- 
and moderate-income m inority com m unities are being targeted  
and devastated  by subprim e lenders.”).

7 Governm ent Accountability Office, Nonprime Mortgages: 
Analysis of Loan Performance, Factors Associated w ith  Defaults, 
and D ata Sources, Report to the Jo in t Economic Committee, 
United S tates Congress (2010), http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.item s/dl0805.pdf.

http://articles.sun-sentinel.eom/2000-07-03/business/0006300849_.l_
http://articles.sun-sentinel.eom/2000-07-03/business/0006300849_.l_
http://www.compliance
http://www.gao.gov/


16
increasing ly  likely to be de linquen t an d  often focused 
on neighborhoods w here payday  loan sto res w ere 
subsequen tly  s itu a te d .8

The exploitative n a tu re  of th ese  subprim e loans and  
the  h a rm s th a t  would flow from foreclosures w ere 
reasonab ly  foreseeable, p a rticu la rly  to senior bank  
officials who had  the  m ost know ledge about th e ir  own 
loans and  financial products. See generally, W all 
S tree t and  the  F inancia l Crisis: A natom y of a 
F inanc ia l Collapse: M ajority  and  M inority  S ta ff 
Report, P e rm an en t Subcom m ittee on Investigations, 
U n ited  S ta te s  S enate  50 (Apr. 13, 2011) (“[A] host of 
financial in s titu tio n s  . . . know ingly orig inated , sold, 
and  securitized  billions of dollars in  h igh  risk , poor 
qua lity  hom e loans . . . K ath leen  C. Engel & 
P a tric ia  A. McCoy, The Subprim e Meltdown: Who 
Knew What When, F edera l R eserve of Boston, Fall 
2010, a t 17 (describing w arn in g  signs and  how “[t]he 
p riv a te  m ortgage in d u stry  also knew  of th e  issues”); 
Jam es  R. H agerty  & Joseph  T. H allinan , Blacks are 
Much More Likely to Get Subprim e Mortgages, W all 
S tree t J ., Apr. 11, 2005.

C. Harms to Communities of Color, 
Including in the City of Miami

W hen these  p reda to ry  p ractices all came crash ing  
down, the  dam age w as pred ictab ly  severe for 
com m unities of color. The d isproportionate  im pact of 
the  lend ing  crisis w as “precisely because of the  illegal 
reverse red lin ing  practices of clearly  identifiable 
financial in s titu tio n s  who ta rg e ted  these  com m unities

8 S arah  D. Wolff, C enter for Responsible Lending, The 
Cum ulative Costs of P redatory Practices (June 2015), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/state-of-lending/reports/13- 
C um ulative-Im pact.pdf.

http://www.responsiblelending.org/state-of-lending/reports/13-Cumulative-Impact.pdf
http://www.responsiblelending.org/state-of-lending/reports/13-Cumulative-Impact.pdf


17
as a  m eans to m axim ize sho rt te rm  profits [.]” Reim an, 
Foreclosures, supra  a t 630.

This d isproportionate  im pact caused serious dam age 
along th ree  d im ensions th a t  are re lev an t to the  case a t 
bar: 1) a m assive reversa l of home ow nership ra te s  and  
an  erosion in  A frican-A m erican w ealth ; 2) an  
en tren ch m en t of re s id en tia l segregation and  reduction  
in  economic mobility; and  3) the  sheer h u m an  cost of 
foreclosures on children, fam ilies, and  the  elderly.

1. Destruction of African-American 
Wealth

F irst, the  subprim e loans and  the  foreclosure crisis 
they  triggered  caused a m assive reversa l in  m inority  
hom eow nership ra te s  and  an  erosion in  African- 
A m erican w ealth . As the  crisis unfolded, over 2.8 
m illion hom es w ere lost to foreclosure in  2009 alone -  
a  “120 percen t increase in  to ta l p roperties from 2007.” 
D aren  B lom quist, A  Record 28 M illion Properties 
Receive Foreclosure Notices in 2009, 
http://w w w .realtytrac.com /landing/2009-year-end- 
foreclosure-report.h tm l (last Oct. 6 , 2016); see also 
K ata lin a  M. Bianco, The Subprim e Lending Crisis: 
Causes and, Effects o f the Mortgage M eltdown, CCH 
M ortgage Com pliance G uide & B ank D igest 12 (2008) 
(“The prevalence of subprim e loans con tribu ted  to a 
31-percent spike in  foreclosure filings in  the  first h a lf  
of 2006.”). The m assive increase in  nationw ide 
foreclosure filings correla tes w ith  the  foreclosure ra te  
on subprim e loans, w hich soared “from 3.3 percen t in 
2005 to 15.6 percen t in  2009.” Rugh & M assey, supra 
a t 634. The financial consequences of these 
foreclosures have been devastating : H igh-risk  
subprim e loans o rig inated  betw een 1999 and  2007 
have cost borrow ers of color collectively “betw een $164 
billion and  $213 billion.” M elvin L. Oliver, Subprim e 
as a Black Catastrophe, The A m erican Prospect, Sept.

http://www.realtytrac.com/landing/2009-year-end-foreclosure-report.html
http://www.realtytrac.com/landing/2009-year-end-foreclosure-report.html


18
20 , 2008, h ttp ://prospect.org /article/sub-prim e-
black-catastrophe.

The re su lt w as s tark : “[T]he group w ith  the  sm allest 
percen tage of hom eow nership, A frican A m ericans, had  
the  g rea tes t dive in  hom eow nership ra te s .” A lea tra  P. 
W illiam s, Lending Discrimination, the Foreclosure 
Crisis and the Perpetuation of Racial and Ethnic  
Disparities i?i Homeownership in the U.S., 6 Wm. & 
M ary Bus. L. Rev. 601, 618 (2015).

This had  dev asta tin g  im plications for w ealth  
accum ulation. According to the  S ecre tary  of H ousing 
and  U rban  D evelopm ent, the  subprim e lend ing  crisis 
w as p a rticu la rly  dev asta tin g  to A frican-A m erican 
w ealth  accum ulation  nationw ide:

“[BJetween 2005 and  2009, fully tw o-th irds of 
m edian  household  w ealth  in  [com m unities of 
color] w as w iped out. From  Jam aica , Q ueens,
New York, to O akland, California, strong, 
m iddle class A frican A m erican
neighborhoods saw  n early  two decades of 
gains reversed  in  a  m a tte r  of not years  — b u t 
m onths.”

S h au n  Donovan, Prepared Rem arks of Secretary 
Shaun Donovan During the Countrywide Settlement 
Press Conference, U.S. D ep’t  of Hous. & U rb an  Dev., 
P ress  Room (Dec. 21, 2011). See also Rugh & M assey, 
supra  a t  633 (“[S eg reg a tio n  and  the  new face of 
u n equal lend ing  com bined to underm ine  black 
re s id en tia l stab ility  and  erode any
accum ulated  w ealth .”).

These p lum m eting  fo rtunes stem m ed from the  fact 
th a t  w ealth  accum ulation  and  home equ ity  are 
in trin sica lly  linked. “Home ow nership is w ithou t 
question  the  single m ost im p o rtan t m eans of 
accum ulating  [w ealth].” M elvin L. O liver & Thom as

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19
Shapiro, Black Wealth White Wealth: A  New  
Perspective on Racial Inequality  8 (1995). M oreover, 
home equ ity  “rep resen ts  a m uch la rg er share  of the  n e t 
w orth  of the  typical b lack or H ispanic hom eow ner (58 
percent) th a n  of the  typical w hite hom eow ner (37 
percent).” Jo in t C tr. for Hous. S tudies, H arv ard  Univ., 
The State o f the N ation’s Housing: 2015 17 (2015). Yet, 
w idening w ealth  d isparities  along rac ial lines are “a 
d irect consequence of d iscrim ination  in  cred it m arke ts  
w hich [act] to bo th  lim it m inorities’ access to home 
ow nership and  to increase the  cost of achieving home 
ow nership .” C harles Lewis N ier III, The Shadow of 
Credit: The Historical Origins of Racial Predatory 
Lending and its Im pact Upon African Am erican  
Wealth Accumulation, 11 U. Pa. J.L . & Soc. Change 
131, 194 (2013).

The foreclosure crisis also exacerbated  o ther 
financial p ressu res. Because people of color b ear a 
d isproportionate share  of the  subprim e debt burden, 
they  incur m uch h igher housing costs th a n  sim ilarly  
s itu a ted  fam ilies in  w hite neighborhoods. See M ichael 
S. B arr e t al., Behaviorally Inform ed Home Mortgage 
Credit Regulation  31, H arv ard  Univ. Jo in t C tr. for 
Hous. S tudies (2008). These h igher costs divest 
m inorities of w ealth  and  home equity, as they  often 
requ ire  fam ilies w ith  sm all incomes to scram ble to 
m eet h igher in te re s t ra te s  and  skyrocketing fees. See 
F ran k  Lopez, Using the Fair Housing Act to Combat 
Predatory Lending, 6 Geo. J . on Poverty  L. & Pol’y 73, 
76 (1999) (“[Rjeverse red lin ing  practices have m ilked 
the  la s t drops of w ealth  from m inority  neighborhoods .
. . .”). P redato ry  subprim e lending  th u s  forces “A frican 
A m ericans to devote m ore of th e ir  incom es to housing 
to the  d e trim en t of o ther basic necessities, including 
education, m edical care, food, clothing, home 
im provem ents and  recrea tion .” Nier, supra  a t 190.



20
2. Entrenchment of Segregation and 

Economic Immobility
Second, the  sp ira lin g  ra te s  of foreclosure and  w ealth  

erosion fu r th e r en trenched  re s id en tia l segregation  
and  reduced  economic m obility. This is precisely 
because foreclosures do not ju s t  affect an  indiv idual 
hom eow ner -  th ey  reduce nearby  p roperty  values. 
V arious s tud ies confirm  th a t  foreclosures impose 
financial and  social h a rm s on neighboring hom es 
w ith in  the  sam e com m unity, includ ing  declines in 
p roperty  values; large drops in  p roperty  tax  revenue; 
add itional costs for m unicipal services and  to process 
foreclosed p roperties; m assive d ra in s  of cap ita l and  
hom e equity; an d  w orsening  p a tte rn s  of en trenched  
rac ia l segregation. See R eim an, Foreclosures, supra  a t 
645-46; see also I ra  G oldstein, Bringing Subprim e  
Mortgages to M arket and the Effects on Lower-Income 
Borrowers 22, H arv ard  Univ. Jo in t C tr. for Hous. 
S tud ies (2004) (“E stim a tes  of the  im pact of a m ortgage 
foreclosure on su rro u n d in g  [property] values can be as 
m uch as 20%.”).

According to an o th er study, the  price of a  single- 
fam ily hom e decreases w ith  every nearby  foreclosure, 
on average, by 0.9 percent, and  declines stead ily  
fu r th e r w ith  each add itional foreclosure. D an 
Im m ergluck  & Geoff Sm ith, The External Costs of 
Foreclosure: The Im pact o f Single-Family Mortgage 
Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 H ousing Pol’y 
D ebate 57, 57 (2006) (estim ating  foreclosures in 
Chicago in  1997 an d  1998 “reduced nearby  p roperty  
values by m ore th a n  $598 million, for an  average of 
$159,000 p er foreclosure”); see also W. Scott Fram e, 
E stim ating the Effect o f Mortgage Foreclosures on 
Nearby Property Values: A  Critical Review of the 
Literature, Econ. Rev., no. 3, 2010, a t  6 (noting 
“p roperties  in  some stage of foreclosure depress sales



21

prices” of neighboring  non-foreclosed homes); Tam m y 
L eonard  & Jam es  M urdoch, The Neighborhood Effects 
of Foreclosure, 11 J . G eographical Sys. 317, 332 (2009) 
(finding a foreclosure w ith in  250 feet causes a 0.5 
decline in  th e  value of neighboring hom es in  D allas 
County, Texas); Zhenguo Lin e t al., Spillover Effects o f 
Foreclosures on Neighborhood, Property Values, 38 J . 
Real E st. Fin. & Econ. 387, 407 (2009) (finding a 
foreclosure can cause as h igh  as an  8.7 percen t drop in 
the  price of hom es located w ith in  ten  blocks of the 
foreclosed property).

A dditionally, the  subprim e foreclosure crisis has 
s tripped  th o u san d s of Black households of m uch 
needed equ ity  and  cap ita l th a t  “would allow them  to 
move out of poorer, segregated  neighborhoods” and  
into in teg ra ted  com m unities. R eim an, Foreclosures, 
supra  a t 650. M oreover, once a foreclosure occurs, it 
has la s tin g  co lla teral consequences upon cred it scores, 
fu rth e r lim iting  access to cap ita l and  the  ability  to 
bu ild  w ealth . See e,g., Y lan Q. Mui, For Black 
Americans, Financial Damage from Subprim e 
Explosion Is Likely to Last, The W ash. Post, Ju ly  8, 
2012 (“[C]redit scores of black A m ericans have been 
system atically  dam aged, h a u n tin g  th e ir  
financial fu tu res .”).

Perceptions associated  w ith  foreclosures have 
fu r th e r d e terred  re s id en tia l and  cap ita l in vestm en t in 
m inority  neighborhoods. Id. And, “an  epidem ic of 
foreclosures am ong A frican A m erican and  H ispanic 
hom eow ners . . . ex ace rb a tes] rac ia l segregation  as 
displaced fam ilies relocate to m ore racially  iso lated  
neighborhoods or suffer hom elessness.” R ichard 
R othstein , A  Comment on Bank of 
Am erica/C ountryw ide’s Discriminatory Mortgage 
Lending and, Its Implications for Racial Segregation,



22
Econ. Pol’y Inst., B riefing P ap er Bo. 335, Ja n . 23, 
2012, a t  1.

3. The Human Cost of the Foreclosure 
Crisis in Miami

In  cities like M iam i, the  foreclosure crisis h as  fallen  
p a rticu la rly  h a rd  on m inority  com m unities, w ith  
d is tressing  and  destructive  im pacts a t the  m ost basic 
h u m an  level. “In  p a s t recessions, M iam i w as h it fairly  
lightly . This tim e i t ’s been  decim ated .” Douglas 
H anks, Report: South Florida Area Am ong Hardest Hit 
by Recession, S un  S entinel, Ju n e  16, 2010,
h ttp ://articles.sunsentinel.com /2010-06-16/business/fl 
-south-florida-econom y-m h-20100616__l_south-florida 
-past-recessions-first-recession.

T his m ost recen t economic recession has had  rea l 
consequences for ind iv idual fam ilies, th e ir  ab ility  to 
live in  a hab itab le  dwelling, and  th e ir  in trin sic  dignity. 
The h u m an  face of foreclosures an d  evictions in  south  
F lorida is a young m other of th ree  “carry ing  large 
garbage bags out of a second-story a p a rtm en t,” 
because “she h ad  fallen  beh ind  in  pay ing  the  $1,450 a 
m onth  in  re n t and  her land lo rd  could no longer afford 
the  m ortgage and  condom inium  fees, push ing  the  
p roperty  tow ard  foreclosure.” D am ien  Cave, In  South  
Florida, Eviction Spares Few, N.Y. Tim es, Ju n e  4, 
2008. “The situ a tio n  is bad  for everyone — me [and] 
the  land lord ,” she noted, explain ing  th a t  she still had  
to tu rn  to re la tives for financial help. Id.

Also p u t in  an  u n ten ab le  position are law 
enforcem ent officers forced to conduct endless 
evictions and  fam ilies who sub let th e ir  hom es to m ake 
ends m eet. A M iam i-D ade police officer noted th a t  the  
h a rd e s t evictions involve older hom eow ners, since 
m any have been  victim ized by p reda to ry  loans or 
forged paperw ork  — “[i]t’s tough ,” he added, because

http://articles.sunsentinel.com/2010-06-16/business/fl


23
“fy]ou th in k  of them  as your g randm other or 
g ran d fa th e r.” Id. In  ano ther, all-to-common scene, a 
71-year H ispanic hom eow ner approached h er te n an ts  
who h ad  fallen  beh ind  on re n t and “begged for m ercy” 
as “te a rs  s tream ed  down” in  “a dark , sparse ly  
fu rn ished  living room.” The hom eow ner explained her 
own difficulty in  keeping up w ith  m ortgage paym ents  
as she too began  to cry before g ran tin g  yet an o th er 
m onth  extension, since “[w]e know these  are  h a rd  
tim es.” Id.

Blocks rep lete  w ith  em pty houses have also led some 
hom eless fam ilies to “sq u a t” in  foreclosed hom es. In  
one M iam i neighborhood, a m other who had  been  
“hom eless off and  on for a year, a fte r losing various 
jobs and  getting  evicted from several a p a rtm en ts ,” 
moved w ith  her todd ler into a vacan t house th a t  had  
been foreclosed upon. A ssociated P ress, As  
Foreclosures Rise, Squatters Lay Claims, Dec. 2, 2008. 
She described h er choice: “My h e a r t is heavy. I ’ve lived 
in  a lot of different shelters , a lot of bad  situ a tio n s  . . . 
In  my own home, I ’m free. I ’m a  h u m an  being 
now.” Id.

A lthough the  crisis officially subsided several years 
ago, the  vicious cycle of foreclosures and  devaluation  
continues to have a pa lpab le  effect in  M iam i. See 
generally, M iam i G overnm ent, Housing M arket 
Analysis, http://w w w .m iam igov.com /com m unity
de velopme nt/D ocs/R eports/M arket A naly sis 12714DRA 
FT.pdf. In  addition  to “grea t repercussions to the  city 
[in] te rm s of lost tax  revenue, [predatory lending  
inflicted new] cost[s] in  m a in ta in in g  abandoned 
properties, as well as o ther consequences th a t  come 
from the  destab ilization  of neighborhoods.” Id. a t 59. 
For exam ple, due to the  C ity’s d im inished revenues, it 
“is vu lnerab le  to ongoing losses of affordable housing 
stock, especially low -rent housing stock.” Id. a t 16.

http://www.miamigov.com/community


24
This h as  fru s tra te d  the  C ity’s in te re s ts  and  policies in 
severa l ways. Infra  section III.B.

D espite th is  w ell-docum ented h isto ry  of 
m alfeasance, precious few have been  able to enjoin or 
seek re lie f for these  practices. As d iscussed below, 
efforts to seek red ress  for such  acts u n d e r th e  FHA 
have been  largely  stym ied.

III. THE ABSENCE OF MEANINGFUL 
RELIEF FOR COMMUNITIES AND 
CITIES RAVAGED BY PREDATORY 
LENDING COMPELS A FAIR AND 
COMPREHENSIVE INTERPRETATION 
OF THE FHA CONSISTENT WITH ITS 
PLAIN TERMS.

In  ligh t of the  dev asta tin g  dam age th a t  p reda to ry  
lending  inflicted  upon m illions of A m ericans, 
p a rticu la rly  com m unities of color, th e re  have been  a 
num ber of actions b rough t under th e  FHA since the  
subprim e crisis. U nfortunately , n o tw ith stan d in g  
these  various a ttem p ts, p reda to ry  lenders have 
benefited  from significant p rocedural an d  substan tive  
obstacles th a t  have p reven ted  ind iv iduals and  classes 
from seeking  relief. G iven th is  h istory, as w ell as th e ir  
unique role, it  is not an  ab su rd  consequence to apply 
the  p la in  m ean ing  of the  s ta tu te  w hich clearly  confers 
s tan d in g  upon m unicipalities.

A. Individuals and Classes Face 
Significant Obstacles in Pursuing 
Relief from Predatory Lenders.

P etitioners  and  th e ir  amici allege th a t  w ere th is  case 
allowed to proceed p a s t the  m otion to dism iss stage, 
ban k s would somehow face “in fin ite” hypothetical 
liability , “stre tch in g  as far as the  im ag ination .” W ells 
Fargo Br. 42.



25
The a rg u m en t ignores the  significant procedural and  

su b stan tiv e  lim ita tions on liab ility  for banks for 
p reda to ry  conduct. In  reality , in  a varie ty  of cases 
across th e  country, financial in s titu tio n s  have 
m anaged  to defeat a whole host of claim s about 
p reda to ry  subprim e practices. A basic survey of two 
s tream s of litiga tion  not only dem onstra tes  th a t  
P e titio n ers’ a rgum en ts  are  m isguided, bu t also 
reaffirm s how difficult it  is for victim s to seek re lie f for 
p reda to ry  lending  practices. This fu r th e r confirm s the  
special in te re s t and  role of cities in  seeking m eaningful 
city-wide re lie f for violations of the  FHA.

F irst, ind iv iduals alleging th a t  a financial 
in s titu tio n  d iscrim inated  on the  basis  of race in  
v iolation of the  FHA regu larly  face significant 
p rocedural obstacles. In  p a rticu la r, un less indiv idual 
p la in tiffs possess concrete inform ation  th a t  th e ir  claim  
w as p a r t of a  la rg er d iscrim inatory  schem e, they  m ust 
file su it w ith in  two years of th e  d iscrim inatory  act. 42 
U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A).

Because a default or foreclosure can occur m any 
years  a fte r the  date a p la in tiff  en tered  in to  a 
d iscrim inatory  loan tran sac tio n , ind iv iduals can find 
th a t  by the  tim e of defau lt or foreclosure, th e ir  claim s 
are a lready  tim e-barred . See, e.g., Gordon u. First 
Franklin Fin. Corp., 2016 WL 792412, a t *9 (E.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 29, 2016) (“As the  alleged d iscrim inatory  practice 
occurred in  Sep tem ber 2006, [African-American] 
p la in tiffs  d iscrim ination  claim , asse rted  m ore th a n  
eigh t years  th e reafte r, is tim e-barred .”); Chiu v. BAC  
Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2012 WL 1902918, a t *5 
(D. Nev. M ay 25, 2012) (finding th a t  because Asian- 
A m erican w om an’s FHA “claim  [was] b a rred  by the 
s ta tu te  of lim itations, w hich is two years . . . the  claim  
m ust be dism issed w ithou t leave to am en d ’); Johnson  
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 4197001, a t *13



26
(B ankr. E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2014) (noting th a t  “the 
con tinu ing  violation doctrine is heavily  disfavored in 
the  Second C ircuit;” equ itab le  to lling  is a h igh  b a r  to 
m eet; an d  u ltim ate ly  finding  p la in tiffs  claim  w as 
tim e-barred  w hen  com m enced “m ore th a n  two years  
a fte r he en te red  in to  h is home loan”); Cervantes v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2009 WL 3157160, a t 
*6-*7 (D. Ariz. Sept. 24, 2009), aff'd, 656 F.3d 1034 
(9th  Cir. 2011) (finding th a t  because Latino 
“[pjlaintiffs obtained  th e ir  loans in  2006 and  b rough t 
th is  p re sen t action in  M arch 2009[,]” th e ir  “claim s fall 
outside the  tw o-year tim e lim ita tio n ”: “Even if  the  
C ourt assum ed  th a t  D efendan ts’ actions v io lated  the  
FHA, the  d iscrim inatory  act took place a t th e  tim e 
D efendan ts ex tended the  loan  to P la in tiffs .”).

As a resu lt, p la in tiffs often have no option b u t to 
u n d e rtak e  th e  difficult ta sk  of proving th a t  th e ir  
p red a to ry  loan w as p a r t  of a  la rg e r d iscrim inatory  
schem e. For exam ple, in  McKinney v. Citi Residential 
Lending Inc., 2015 WL 11822150 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 
2015), an  A frican-A m erican bishop alleged Citi 
L ending d iscrim inated  ag a in s t h im  on the  basis  of his 
race, inter alia, by giving him  a loan w ith  an  “in te re s t 
ra te  and  orig ination  fee th a t  w ere h igher th a n  u su a l.” 
C iti L ending moved to dism iss, s ta tin g  M cK inney’s 
action w as b a rred  by the  FHA w hich requ ires  claim s 
to be b rough t w ith in  “2 years  a fte r the  occurrence or 
te rm in a tio n  of an  alleged d iscrim inatory  housing 
practice ,” id. a t *9, unless “a p la in tiff  alleges a ‘p a tte rn  
or practice of d iscrim ination, [in w hich case] the  
s ta tu te  of lim ita tions ru n s  from the  la s t a sse rted  
occurrence.’” Id. (citing City o f Los Angeles v. 
Citigroup, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 3d 940, 951 
(C.D. Cal. 2014)).

Mr. M cK inney alleged th a t  h is 2008 loan w as p a r t  of 
a g rea te r schem e of d iscrim inatory  lending. 2015 WL



27
11822150 a t  *9; see also id. a t *9 n.16 (s itu a tin g  his 
loan  in  a g rea te r context by referencing  the  
contem poraneous litiga tion  ag a in s t C itiM ortgage, 
am ong others, in  neighboring Los Angeles). The 
d is tric t court, however, g ran ted  the  len d er’s m otion to 
d ism iss because the  loan in  question  occurred over 
seven y ears  before the  filing of the  com plaint, and  the  
p la in tiff  failed to dem onstrate  h is case w as p a r t of a 
la rg e r practice by the  specific defendan t in  the 
p a rtic u la r  county in  w hich Mr. M cKinney lived. Id.

In  add ition  to these  sorts of p rocedural hurd les, 
ind iv iduals face significant sub stan tiv e  obstacles in 
challenges to lenders.

For instance, in Steed v. EverHome Mortgage Co., 
477 F. App’x 722 (11th Cir. 2012), an  African- 
A m erican m an  sued h is m ortgage lender for various 
FHA violations following the  foreclosure of his home. 
The E leven th  C ircuit affirm ed the  lower court’s 
dism issal, finding th a t  the  p la in tiff failed to m ake a 
prim a facie case of race d iscrim ination . Id. a t 727. The 
C ourt of A ppeals reasoned  th a t  S teed’s own evidence 
p lus “th e  affidavits of th ree  o ther A frican-A m ericans” 
com plaining of the  sam e practices by the  sam e lender 
in  the  sam e neighborhood, could not prove “a p a tte rn  
of servicing practices th a t  ta rg e t A frican 
A m ericans . . .  or have a d isp ara te  im pact on African 
A m ericans.” Id. a t 726-27.

The E leven th  C ircuit’s ru lin g  only underscores th a t  
ind iv idual p laintiffs, s tan d in g  alone, can p resen t 
com pelling evidence of indiv idual in jury , bu t m ay still 
lack the  num bers, resources, or sophisticated



28
sta tis tica l d a ta  necessary  to show a system ic problem  
of discrim ination  on the  p a r t  of financial in s titu tio n s .9

In  the  class action context, p la in tiffs often find 
them selves s im ilarly  sh u t out from holding banks 
accountable for d iscrim inatory  lending, p a rticu la rly  
a fter Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 
(2011). In  recen t years, successfully b ring ing  class 
action litiga tion  under the  FHA ag a in s t financial 
in s titu tio n s  h a s  become a n ear-in su rm oun tab le  
h u rd le .10

9 Indeed, “the m ost common m ethod” used to establish  a 
discrim inatory p a tte rn  or practice or d isparate  im pact under the 
FHA “is to provide statistica l evidence th a t reveals disparities 
betw een the protected group and others.” Jam ie Duitz, B attling  
Discriminatory Lending: Taking A  M ultidim ensional Approach 
Through Litigation, M ediation, and Legislation, 20 J. Affordable 
Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 101, 114 (2010).

10 Since Wal-Mart, courts have denied class certification in 
several class action FHA cases. See, e.g., In  re Wells Fargo 
Residential Mortg. Lending D iscrim ination Litig., 2011 WL 
3903117, a t *2, *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) (finding where loan 
officers “who are afforded discretion exercise th a t discretion 
differently, commonality is not established” and citing to Wal- 
M art in  support of conclusion, in  case where plaintiffs alleged 
th a t the very “discretionary elem ents to Wells Fargo’s loan 
pricing have a w idespread discrim inatory im pact on m inority 
applicants for home mortgage loans”); Rodriguez v. N a t’l City 
Bank, 2011 WL 4018028, a t *5-7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2011) (finding 
class failed to establish  “commonality” and denying final approval 
of a settlem ent, where court had prelim inarily  approved a 
classwide settlem ent and final approval was pending w hen Wal- 
M art was decided); In  re Countrywide Fin. Mortg. Lending  
Practices Litig., 2011 WL 4862174 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2011) 
(denying class certification in  case by Black and Latino home- 
buyers challenging discretionary pricing policy, s tating  “[t]he 
W al-M art decision m akes clear that, absent a showing of a 
common direction or common method of exercising discretion,



29
For exam ple, in  Barrett v. Option One Mortgage 

Corp., the  court certified  a  class of A frican A m ericans 
who received hom e-m ortgage loans, only to reverse its 
decision the  following year. Compare Barrett v. H  & R  
Block, Inc., 2011 WL 1100105, a t *2 (D. M ass. 2011), 
with Barrett v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 2012 WL 
4076465 (D. M ass. Sept. 18, 2012).11 In itia lly , the  
d is tric t court found th a t  th e  p la in tiff c lass estab lished  
a  prim a facie case of d isp ara te  im pact based in  p a r t on 
an  expert repo rt show ing th a t  A frican-A m erican 
borrow ers paid  h igher in te re s t ra te s  th a n  sim ilarly  
s itu a ted  w hite  borrow ers. H  & R  Block, 2011 WL 
1100105, a t *2. B ut ju s t  one y ear la ter, in  ligh t of Wal- 
Mart, the  d is tric t court reconsidered class certification 
and  de term ined  th a t  the  expert d a ta  p resen ted  
regard ing  the  len d ers’ nationw ide p reda to ry  practice 
w as no longer sufficient to estab lish  com m onality. Id.

B. Cities and Counties Are Uniquely 
Positioned to Hold Lenders 
Accountable for Discrimination.

Viewed in  isolation, failed challenges in  the  lower 
courts m ay seem  legally justifiab le . B ut viewed 
together, the  n e t effect is th a t  it is very  difficult, if  not 
nearly  im possible, to reach  a judgm en t on the  m erits  
in  a case concerning claim s of rac ia l d iscrim ination  in  
subprim e lending. This aggregate outcome is h a rd  to 
justify  given the  w idespread  and  widely know n h arm s 
th a t  have been  p e rp e tu a ted  ag a in st com m unities of 
color and  the  cities th a t  house them .

This is precisely w hy efforts by m unicipalities, such 
as the  one the  City of M iam i advances here, are so

statistica l evidence of average disparities will not suffice to m eet 
Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirem ent”).

11 Leave to appeal denied in  Barrett v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 
2013 WL 7137776 (1st Cir. Feb. 07, 2013).



30
critical. In  the  w ake of th e  financial crisis and  its 
d ev as ta tin g  im pact on com m unities of color, A tlan ta- 
a re a  counties, Chicago-area counties, Los Angeles, and 
M em phis, have b rough t litiga tion  u n d er the  FHA 
alleging rac ial d iscrim ination  by financial in stitu tions. 
Several lower courts have recognized th a t  these  cities 
have in  fact suffered the  im pact of d iscrim inatory  
lend ing  in  the  form of reduced  p roperty  taxes, 
d im in ished  p roperty  values, an d  costs associated  w ith  
foreclosure, am ong o th er harm s. As a  resu lt, several 
low er courts have denied lenders’ m otions to dism iss, 
an d  found th a t  these  cities and  counties do indeed 
have s tan d in g  consisten t w ith  th e  p la in  m ean ing  of 
the  FH A .12

M unicipal s tan d in g  is bo th  legally correct and 
functionally  significant. M unicipal litiga tion  p resen ts  
a fin ite m eans of avoiding th e  p rocedural b a rrie rs  th a t 
p lague ind iv idual and  class actions in  th is  p a rticu la r 
area , and  balances the  need to have circum scribed, 
localized cases, w hile s till add ressing  troub ling  
instances of lending  d iscrim ination . See Resp.’s Br. 
(BOA), a t  11-12 (explaining th a t  th ro u g h  the  use of 
regression  analysis, M iam i “w as able to sep ara te  out 
the  effect of o ther p o ten tia l causes so th a t  its  claim s

12 See Dekalb Cty. v. H SB C  N. Am . Holdings, Inc., 2013 WL 
7874104, a t *17 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2013) (denying bank’s motion 
to dismiss); City o f Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., 22 F. Supp. 
3d 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (denying bank’s motion to dismiss); City 
of M emphis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2011 WL 1706756 (W.D. 
Tenn. May 4, 2011); City o f Los Angeles v. B ank o f Am. Corp., 
2014 WL 2770083, a t *13 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2014) (finding th a t 
a city has standing under FHA; denjdng lender’s motion to 
dismiss); Cty. o f Cook v. H SBC  N. Am . Holdings Inc., 136 F. Supp. 
3d 952 (N.D. 111. 2015) (denying bank’s m otion to dismiss); Mayor 
& City Council o f Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N .A., 2011 WL 
1557759, a t *1 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2011) (denying Wells Fargo's 
motion to dismiss).



31
w ere lim ited  to . . . the  h a rm s [discrim inatory 
loans] caused”).

M oreover, cities and  m unicipalities have long been  a 
special focus of the  FHA and  been tre a te d  as unique 
actors in  advancing fa ir housing  and  in teg ra tion  
th ro u g h  various m eans.

H istorically, problem s an d  solutions s itu a ted  in  
cities w ere a key im petus for enac ting  the  FHA.. Dr. 
M artin  L u th er King, Jr ., h igh ligh ted  how “[e]very city 
in  our country  h as  [a] k ind  of dualism , [a] 
schizophrenia, sp lit a t so m any pa rts , and  so every city 
ends up being two cities ra th e r  th a n  one.” Rev. M artin  
L u th er King, Jr ., The Other America, Grosse Pointe 
H um an  R elations Council (M ar. 14, 1968). In  the 
w ake of Dr. K ing’s trag ic  assassina tion , P residen t 
Lyndon Johnson  exhorted  the  House to pass  the  FHA 
as a  tr ib u te  to Dr. King. S enato r W alter M ondale, a 
p rinc ipal sponsor of the  legislation, specifically poin ted  
to the  h a rm s a t issue in  th is  case in  dem anding  federal 
legislation: D iscrim ination  in  cities w rought
“destruction  of our u rb a n  cen ters by . . .  a declining tax  
base, and  the  ru in  b rought by absen tee ow nership of 
p roperty .” 114 Cong. Rec. 2993 (1968).

Today, cities continue to have a special in te re s t in 
prom oting  non-discrim ination  and  fostering 
in teg ra tion . The U.S. Conference of M ayors,
rep resen tin g  over 1,400 cities across the  nation, 
recently  reaffirm ed “all cities have a stake  in  m aking  
non-discrim ination  in  . . . housing  a legislative prio rity  
to enhance productivity , economic developm ent, and  
h u m an  cap ita l.” See Adopted R esolutions, The U.S. 
Conference of M ayors, 81st A nnual M eeting (June 21- 
24, 2013) a t  33, h ttp ://usm ayors.org/
resolutions/81st_C onference/resolutions-adopted.pdf 
(here inafter “M ayors R esolutions 2013”).

http://usmayors.org/


32
Likewise, th is  C ourt h as  recognized cities’ unique 

underly ing  in te re s ts  here, exp lain ing  th a t  “‘th e re  can 
be no question  about the  im portance” to a  com m unity 
of “prom oting  stab le, racially  in teg ra ted  housing.” 
Gladstone, 441 LI.S. a t 111 (citation om itted); see also 
id. (explain ing th a t  w hen  FHA violations deprive a 
village “of its  racial[ly  in teg ra ted ] balance and 
stab ility , the  village h as  s tan d in g  to challenge the 
legality  of th a t  conduct.”). Id  a t 93.

Accordingly, w hen  housing  d iscrim ination  does 
occur, cities experience special in juries. Most 
recently, a group of 23 cities and  counties explained to 
th is  C ourt how p red a to ry  lending  d istinc tly  in jures 
m unicipalities. Am icus Br. of San  Francisco, et 
al., Inclusive Com munities Project, a t 26. The City of 
M iam i’s m erits  b rie f re ite ra te s  w hy these  unique 
h arm s are so problem atic  to com m unities in  south  
F lorida. See Resp. Br. (WF) a t 2 (dim inished tax  
revenues “d ivert[| law  enforcem ent, fire departm en t, 
and  build ing  an d  safety  efforts”); id. a t 22 (predatory  
lend ing  “directly  harm [s] the  C ity’s fa ir housing efforts 
and  deprive[s] it of the  benefits of an  in teg ra ted  
com m unity by b ligh ting  neighborhoods and 
discouraging an  influx of diverse re s id en ts .”).

C onsisten t w ith  th e ir  exceptional stake  in  fair 
housing, cities create  and  prom ote unique fa ir housing 
program s and  benefits. For exam ple, M iam i 
estab lished  a D ep artm en t of C om m unity and  
Economic D evelopm ent, w hich is responsible, inter 
alia , for “opera ting  the  C ity’s fa ir housing  program , 
reducing illegal housing d iscrim ination, [and] 
m onitoring and  investiga ting  fa ir housing  com plaints.
. . .” Resp. Br. (WF) a t 36 (citation om itted). See 
generally, C ity of M iam i, D ep’t  of Cm ty. & Econ. Dev., 
About Us, http://w w w .ci.m iam i.fl.us/
com m unitydevelopm ent/pages/about_us/ (last visited

http://www.ci.miami.fl.us/


33
Oct. 5, 2016). Through in itia tiv es  and  policies like 
these, “[c]ities across the  country  are engaged in  
com batting  d iscrim ination, resolving com plaints, 
rem ed ia tin g  neighborhoods.” Resp. Br. (WF) a t 2. 
These m easu res yield concrete dividends for the  local 
com m unity and  economy, since “all cities can benefit 
from a m ore stab le  economy flowing from . . . the  
housing  m ark e t.” M ayors R esolutions 2013 a t  33.

C ities can also seek and  im plem ent special form s of 
relief. Indeed, ju s t as a city governm ent can  provide 
prophylactic com m unity-w ide fa ir housing  program s 
and  services — th ey  are exceptionally positioned to 
offer pa llia tive  city-wide rem edies once discrim ination  
and  dam age have a lready  occurred. For exam ple, 
cities can offer foreclosure re lie f program s to a llev iate  
wide-scale problem s. See Steve W alker, C ity of 
S eattle , Foreclosure Prevention,
http://w w w .seattle.gov/housing/hom eow ners/foreclosu 
re-preven tion  (last v isited  Oct. 5, 2016). By b ring ing  
an  action under the  FFIA, cities are also able to obtain  
com pensatory or pun itive  dam ages th a t  can, in  tu rn , 
fund g ran ts, governm ent aid, investigations, or o ther 
system atic  efforts to red ress  housing  d iscrim ination.

A t bottom , P e titioners  cannot wipe the  s la te  clean of 
all the  significant factors bearin g  upon th is  case by 
sim ply invoking “absu rd  consequences.” W hile 
“absu rd  consequences” can be a re levan t factor, it  is 
not an  open inv ita tion  to in ject unm oored policy 
preferences or economic theories. R ather, the  “absu rd  
consequences” analysis, w here p e rtin en t, is directly  
linked  to legislative purpose. Supra  a t 6 .13

13 See also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Westgate Partners, Ltd., 937 
F.2d 526, 529 (10th Cir. 1991) (“The ‘absurdity’ exception to the 
plain language rule is a tool to be used to carry out Congress’ 
in ten t—not to override i t . . . .”); M erritt v. D illard Paper Co., 120

http://www.seattle.gov/housing/homeowners/foreclosu


34

A dditionally, “absu rd  consequences” is often 
in terw oven w ith  b roader considerations of justice  and  
fairness. See e.g., Sorrells v. United, States, 287 U.S. 
435, 450 (1932) (considering “ab su rd  or glaringly 
u n ju s t resu lts , foreign to the  leg islative purpose”); 
Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. a t 461 (considering 
“in justice, oppression, or . . . ab su rd  consequence[s]”).

There is no th ing  absu rd  about m a in ta in in g  the 
special s tak e  cities have in  com bating housing 
d iscrim ination , w hich Congress recognized in  enacting  
th e  FHA. In  a sense, it  is P e titio n ers’ position  th a t  is 
m ore “ab su rd ” here, since it would obstruct 
m unic ipalities’ unique in te re s ts  and  im p o rtan t efforts 
in  fa ir housing.

M oreover, th e re  is a  re a l r isk  of “glaringly  u n ju st 
re su lts” underly ing  th is  case, w ere P e titioners  to 
categorically  block cities from p u rsu in g  FHA 
violations. The n e t effect would be troubling: T h a t no 
p la in tiff  would be able to m eaningfully  seek re lie f from 
financial in s titu tio n s  for the  w ell-docum ented 
d iscrim ination  th a t  ravaged  the  M iam i housing 
m arke t. This would also send  an  om inous signal in 
te rm s of advancing  the  purposes of the  FHA and  
d e te rrin g  fu tu re  violations. U ltim ately , the  prom ise of 
accountability  rem ains critical, especially for A frican 
A m erican com m unities th a t  suffered serious and  
la s tin g  dam age due to p reda to ry  lending. The C ity of

F.3d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Though venerable, the 
[absuridity] principle is rarely  applied, because . . . [otherw ise, 
clearly expressed legislative decisions would be subject to the 
policy predilections of judges.”); Landstar Exp. Am ., Inc. v. Fed. 
Mar. C om m ’n, 569 F.3d 493, 498-99 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A statu to ry  
outcome is absurd if i t  defies rationality . . . . [and yields] an 
outcome so contrary to perceived social values th a t Congress 
could not have ‘in tended’ it”) (citation and in terna l quotations 
omitted).



35
M iam i and  o th er m unicipalities have opened a 
necessary  door for re lie f th a t  th is  C ourt should 
not shu t.

CONCLUSION
For the  foregoing reasons, the  C ourt should  affirm 

the  decisions of the  E leven th  C ircuit.

R espectfully subm itted ,

Sherrilyn Ifill 
Director- Counsel 

Janai Nelson 
Christina Swarns 
Liliana Zaragoza 
NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund, Inc. 
40 Rector Street, 5th Floor 
New York, NY 10006

Ajmel Quereshi *
J ohn Paul Schnapper- 

Casteras
NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational F und, Inc. 
1444 I S treet NW 
W ashington, DC 20005 
202-682-1300 
aquereshi@ naacpldf.org

October 7, 2016 * Counsel of Record

mailto:aquereshi@naacpldf.org
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Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, Florida Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund in Support of Respondent

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