Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education Motion for Leave to File Memo Amicus Curiae and Memo for Amicus Curiae the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
Public Court Documents
October 7, 1969
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education Motion for Leave to File Memo Amicus Curiae and Memo for Amicus Curiae the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 1969. cdb0ed8b-b79a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/f59028d6-c8b2-4e75-bbe4-51700e07f51e/alexander-v-holmes-county-board-of-education-motion-for-leave-to-file-memo-amicus-curiae-and-memo-for-amicus-curiae-the-lawyers-committee-for-civil-rights-under-law. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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I n t h e
0ttpmtu' (Emtrt at tip? United States
O ctober T e r m , 1969
No. 632
BEATRICE ALEXANDER, et al,
Petitioners,
HOLMES COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al,
Respondents.
------------------------♦------------------------
O n P e t it io n for W r it of Certio rari to t h e
U n it ed S tates C ourt of A ppea ls
F or t h e F if t h C ir c u it
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MEMORANDUM
AMICUS CURIAE AND FOR IMMEDIATE
CONSIDERATION THEREOF
AND
MEMORANDUM AMICUS CURIAE FOR THE
LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS UNDER LAW
J o h n W . D ouglas
George N. L indsay
Co-chairmen
B e t h u e l M. W ebster
C yrus R. V a n c e
A sa S okolow
J o h n S c h a fe r
L o u is F . O berdorfer
J o h n D oar
R ich a rd C. D in k e l s p ie l
A r t h u r H. D ea n
L loyd N. Cu tler
B ruce B rom ley
B erl I. B ern h a r d
1660 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae,
Lawyers’ Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law
Of Counsel:
T im o t h y B. D y k
M ic h a e l R. K l e in
D e a n n e C. S ie m e r
OrtnKpr 7 1 Q fiQ
I n t h e
©curt nt tip TUnxtvb
O ctober T e r m , 1969
No. 632
BEATRICE ALEXANDER, et al,
Petitioners,
v.
HOLMES COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Respondents.
--------------------------<.--------------------------
O n P e t it io n for W r it of Certio rari to t h e
U n it ed S tates C ourt of A ppea ls
F or t h e F if t h C ir c u it
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MEMORANDUM
AMICUS CURIAE AND FOR IMMEDIATE
CONSIDERATION THEREOF
The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
hereby respectfully moves for leave to file the attached
Memorandum Amicus Curiae in the above-entitled case.
Petitioners have consented to the filing of this memoran
dum. Respondent United States of America (a plaintiff
below) has also consented. Consents have been requested
from the respondents who are defendants below in the
fourteen cases, but as yet consents from these respondents
have not been received.
Since the responses in this case are due to be filed this
Wednesday, October 8, 1969, and since this Court may
consider this case at this week’s Conference, this motion
and the attached Memorandum Amicus Curiae cannot be
considered by the Court if the non-consenting respondents
are afforded time to respond to this motion under Rule
35(4). Moreover, we believe that their positions on the
merits may be adequately presented in their responses to
the petition for certiorari. Accordingly, applicant respect-
2
fully requests that this motion and the attached Memoran
dum Amicus Curiae be considered together with the pe
tition for certiorari and the responses to the petition, and
that, pursuant to Rule 35(4), consideration of this motion
and the attached Memorandum Amicus Curiae not be post
poned pending receipt of papers in opposition from the non
consenting respondents.
Applicant respectfully submits that the attached Mem
orandum Amicus Curiae will be of assistance to this Court.
The reasons that applicant believes its motion should be
granted are as follows:
The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
was organized on June 21, 1963, following a conference of
lawyers at the White House called by President John F.
Kennedy. The formal organization of the Lawyers’ Com
mittee for Civil Rights Under Law is that of a non-profit
private corporation whose principal purpose is to involve
private lawyers throughout the country in the struggle to
assure all citizens their civil rights. The membership of
the Committee includes eleven past presidents of the
American Bar Association and two former Attorneys
General.
Since 1964, the Committee has operated a law office in
Jackson, Mississippi, which has handled more than 2,000
civil rights cases. Over 150 attorneys from all parts of the
United States have served as unpaid volunteers in the Jack-
son office in aid of the permanent staff there. The Com
mittee’s national and local offices have actively engaged the
services of the private bar in addressing a range of legal
problems in such areas as education, housing, employment,
economic development, and the administration of justice.
In the field of education, both the national staff and the local
committees have undertaken well over a score of projects to
promote quality education and to assure its availability to
all citizens, regardless of income level or race. The Com
mittee has recently renewed its offer to assist the Depart
ment of Justice in carrying out national objectives in the
civil rights area.
3
In the two weeks which have passed since the filing of
the petition for certiorari, federal officials charged with
enforcement responsibilities in this field have placed in ques
tion the capacity of the federal government to enforce an
order for immediate desegregation. The Lawyers’ Com
mittee for Civil Rights Under Law, in the attached memo
randum, deals directly with this most relevant issue which
is not presented in the petition for certiorari. Moreover,
applicant deals with an additional question—not fully
treated in the petition—-whether community opposition is an
adequate ground for delay in enforcement.
Accordingly, the Committee respectfully requests that
this Court grant leave to file the attached Memorandum
Amicus Curiae, and consider this motion and the Memoran
dum together with the petition and responses.
Respectfully submitted,
J o h n W . D ouglas
George N. L indsay
Co-Chairmen
B e t i-iu e l M. W ebster
Cyrus R. V a n c e
A sa S okolow
J o h n S c h a fe r
L o u is F. O berdorfer
J o h n D oar
R ich ard C. D in k e l s p ie l
A r t h u r H. D ean
L loyd N. Cu tler
B ruce B rom ley
B erl I. B ern h a rd
1660 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Of Counsel:
T im o t h y B. D y k
M ic h a e l R. K l e in
D e a n n e C. S ie m e r
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae,
Lawyers’ Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law
October 7, 1969
I n t h e
OXrrurt of tljo H&txxtvb &t<xhss
O ctober T e r m , 1969
No. 632
BEATRICE ALEXANDER, et al,
Petitioners,
v.
HOLMES COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Respondents.
.---------- ---------- ♦------------------------
O n P e t it io n for W r it of Certio ra ri to t h e
U n it ed S tates Court of A ppeals
F or t h e F if t h C ir c u it
------------------------ * ---------------------- —
MEMORANDUM AMICUS CURIAE'
FOR THE LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether, fifteen years after this Court’s decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, enforcement of elementary
school desegregation in the State of Mississippi should be
further delayed.
INTEREST OF THE LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW
The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
was organized on June 21, 1963, following a conference of
lawyers at the White House called by President John F.
Kennedy. The formal organization of the Lawyers’ Com
mittee for Civil Rights Under Law is that of a non-profit
private corporation whose principal purpose is to involve
private lawyers throughout the country in the struggle to
assure all citizens of their civil rights. The membership of
the Committee includes eleven past presidents of the Amer
ican Bar Association and two former Attorneys General.
Since 1964, the Committee has operated a law office in
Jackson, Mississippi, which handled more than 2,000 civil
2
rights cases. Over 150 attorneys from all parts of the United
States have served as unpaid volunteers in the Jackson
office in aid of the permanent staff there. The Committee’s
national and local offices have actively engaged the services
of the private bar in addressing a range of legal problems in
such areas as education, housing, employment, economic
development, and the administration of justice. In the field
of education, both the national staff and the local com
mittees have, undertaken well over a score of projects to
promote quality education and to assure its availability to
all citizens, regardless of income level or race. The Com
mittee has recently renewed its offer to assist the Depart
ment of Justice in carrying out national objectives in the civil
rights area.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Time for Additional Delay in
School Desegregation Is At An End.
This is not the first time elements of the school system
of the State of Mississippi have appeared before the federal
courts in matters of school segregation. In the fifteen years
since the first Brown decision, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), at
least fourteen decisions involving- Mississippi school segre
gation have been rendered by federal courts.1 Nearly all
1United States v. Indianola Municipal Separate School Dist., 410
F. 2d 626 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Anthony v. Marshall County Bd. of
Educ., 409 F. 2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Henry v. Clarksdale Muni
cipal Separate School Dist., 409 F. 2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969) ; United
States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School Dist., 406 F. 2d
1086 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Adams v. Mathews, 403 F. 2d 181 (5th Cir.
1968) ; United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 402 F. 2d 926
(5th Cir. 1968) ; Singleton v. Jackson Muncipal Separate School
Dist., 348 F. 2d 729 ( 5th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Madison
County Bd. of Educ., 326 F. 2d 237 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 379
U. S. 929 (1964) ; Meredith v. Fair, 313 F. 2d 532 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert, denied, 372 U. S. 916 (1963) ; Meredith v. Fair, 313 F. 2d
534 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Coffey v. State Educational Finance Comm’n,
296 F. Supp. 1389 (S. D. Miss. 1969) ; Franklin v. Quitman County
Bd. of Educ., 288 F. Supp. 509 (N. D. Miss. 1968) ; United States
v. Natchez Special Municipal Separate School Dist., 267 F. Supp.
614 (S. D. Miss. 1966); United States v. Biloxi Municipal School
Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691 (S. D. Miss. 1963), aff’d, 326 F. 2d 237
(5th Cir.), cert, denied, 379 U. S. 929 (1964).
3
have issued the same unmistakable declarations: Segrega
tion must end, good faith compliance with this Court’s
decision in Brown—which as an interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment is “the supreme law of the land”2-—
is constitutionally required.
As the record painfully reveals, however, good faith
compliance h^notbegm forthcoming. Five thousand six
hundred and /days have passed since this Court’s
landmark decision in 1954. For those fifteen years the
school systems in Mississippi have failed to effect good
faith compliance. If one lesson has been learned during
these past fifteen years, it is that the ingenuity of the
officials of the Mississippi school system should not be
underestimated. Now, on the eve of the first meaningful
elementary school desegregation in the State’s history, the
defendants have apparently succeeded in convincing the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, who in turn,
has convinced the District Court, that further delay should
be afforded because:
“The administrative and logistical difficulties which
must be encountered and met in the terribly short
space of time remaining must surely . . . produce
chaos, confusion and catastrophic educational set
back___ ”3
The ring is familiar if the source is not.
The Secretary’s reference is to the defendant’s assertion
that the petitioners’ constitutional rights must await (1)
the redrawing of bus routes, (2) the reassignment of
teachers, (3) the conversion of classrooms and (4) a pro-
2Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 18 (1958).
3Letter of Secretary Finch to the Court of Appeals and the judges
of the District Court. Transcript of Record in the Court of Appeals,
Vol. IV, Document No. YY, Exhibit 2.
4
gram of preparation of the teachers and students involved.4
This fourth ground appears to be a euphemism for over
coming community resistance.
The supposed administrative and logistical difficulties
asserted in support of the request for a further delay are
wholly inadequate, particularly in the light of the long
delay already encountered.5 There is nothing in the record
to demonstrate that the redrawing of bus routes could take
more than a few days. Even assuming that the second and
third reasons (reassignment of teachers and the conversion
of classrooms) will involve difficulties of substance for the
school boards involved, it is scarcely credible that they out
weigh the long overdue promise of equality or that these
supposed difficulties cannot be adequately resolved after
desegregation has been achieved.
4Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the District Court
(Aug. 26, 1969), as reproduced by Petitioners in Appendix D at p. 65a
of their Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
BAs this Court noted in Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526, 529-30
(1963), in ordering immediate desegregation of the Memphis city
parks:
“In considering the appropriateness of the equitable decree
entered below inviting a plan calling for an even longer delay in
effecting desegregation, we cannot ignore the passage of a sub
stantial period of time since the original declaration of the
manifest unconstitutionality of racial practices such as are here
challenged, the repeated and numerous decisions giving notice of
such illegality, and the many intervening opportunities hereto
fore available to attain the equality of treatment which the Four
teenth Amendment commands the States to achieve. These
factors must inevitably and substantially temper the present
import of such broad policy considerations as may have
underlain, even in part, the form of decree ultimately framed
in the Brown case. Given the extended time which has
elapsed, it is far from clear that the mandate of the second
Broivn decision requiring that desegregation proceed with ‘all
deliberate speed’ would today be fully satisfied by types of plans
or programs for desegregation of public educational facilities
which eight years ago might have been deemed sufficient.
Brown never contemplated that the concept of ‘deliberate speed’
would countenance indefinite delay in elimination of racial bar
riers in schools. . . .”
5
Recent statements on behalf of the Department of Jus
tice, if accurately reported,6 would suggest that the request
of the United States for additional delay, which was con
vincing to the District Court, is based, in significant part,
upon the fourth ground—community resistance—and upon
an asserted lack of adequate manpower in the Civil Rights
Division to enforce immediate desegregation. The Depart
ment’s reliance on these factors is, in our view, unwarranted
since neither of these arguments is sufficient or even cogniz
able by the courts.
1. This Court Has Specifically Held That Desegregation Must
Not Be Delayed Because of Community Resistance.
From the beginning of the battle for equality of educa
tional opportunity this Court has made it clear that com
munity resistance is not an accepted basis for delay. As
early as 1917 this Court in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S.
60, 81, invalidating a zoning ordinance enforcing separa
tion of the races, held that the avoidance of “race conflicts”
was not an adequate reason for continued segregation. In
the second Brown decision itself, 349 U. S. 294, 300
(1955), this Court declared:
“ [I]t should go without saying that the vitality of
these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to
yield simply because of disagreement with them.”
Three years later, when faced with the spectre of co
ordinated state resistance to the enforcement of desegrega-
6“Nixon Aide Warns Quick Integration Can’t Be Enforced,”
The New York Times, p. 1, col. 3 (Sept. 30, 1969) ; “Leonard De
fends U. S. School Policy,” The New York Times, p. 25, col. 1
(Oct. 3, 1969). (The full text of these articles is set forth as
Appendix A to this Memorandum.) In a September 30, 1969, state
ment the Department conceded that, if the Supreme Court reversed
the decision below, the Department would enforce the order entered
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s mandate.
6
tion, the decision in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958),
was no less emphatic. Specifically rejected there was the
very concept upon which respondents’ contentions are, in
large part, premised: the capacity of opposition to create
practical difficulties in enforcement and then to successfully
offer those difficulties as proof of the prematurity of a decree
to desegregate now.7
2. The Alleged Inadequacy of the Enforcement Resources of
the United States Department of Justice Is No Ground for
Further Delay.
As we have noted, the United States Department of
Justice has publicly suggested that delay is in order because
the Department lacks adequate resources to enforce immedi
ate desegregation. But “it is an ‘inadmissible suggestion’
that action might be taken in disregard of a judicial deter
mination.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 549 n.
86 (1969).
“ [T]he Attorney General of the United States, has a
constitutional obligation to eliminate racial discrim
ination. . . . Failure on the part of any of these
Government officials to take legal action in the event
that racial discrimination does exist . . . would con
stitute dereliction of official duty.” United States v.
Fraser, 297 F. Supp. 319, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
Moreover, the Department’s contentions are without
factual foundation. The Department has great flexibility
in allocating resources. If, at any given time, there is an
insufficient number of attorneys in the Civil Rights Divi
sion, the Attorney General may delegate civil rights
functions to attorneys from other divisions within the
7See also Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526, 535-37 (1963);
Wright v. Georgia, 373 U. S. 284, 293 (1963) ; Taylor v. Louisiana,
370 U. S. 154 (1962) ; Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157 (1961) ;
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955).
7
Department. 28 U. S. C. § 510 (Supp. I l l 1965-67).
Should there be insufficient manpower within the Depart
ment, the Attorney General is authorized to specially
appoint any attorney to assist him in any proceedings, civil
or criminal, whether or not the attorney is a resident of the
district in which the proceeding is brought. 28 U. S. C.
§515 (Supp. I l l 1965-67). The Lawyers’ Committee stands
ready to assist in the recruitment of the services of as many
volunteer attorneys as may be needed by the Department for
the purpose of enforcement of desegregation orders in these
and other cases.8
8The Lawyers’ Committee volunteers would offer their services
without compensation, but token payment is required by statute. 31
U. S. C. § 665(b) (1964).
8
CONCLUSION
Certiorari should be granted; the order of the Court of
Appeals of August 28, 1969, should be summarily reversed;
the order of the Court of Appeals of July 3, 1969, should
be reinstated; and the case remanded for immediate appro
priate action in order that desegregation may be immedi
ately effected.
Respectfully submitted,
J o h n W . D ouglas
George N. L indsay
Co-chairmen
B e t h u e l M . W ebster
Cyrus R. V a n ce
A sa S okolow
J o h n S c h a fer
L o u is F . O berdorfer
J o h n D oar
R ich a rd C. D in k e l s p ie l
A r t h u r H. D ean
L loyd N. C u tler
B ruce B rom ley
B erl I. B ern h a rd
1660 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae,
Lawyers’ Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law
Of Counsel:
T im o t h y B. D y k
M ic h a e l R. K l e in
D e a n n e C. S ie m e r
October 7, 1969
A1
APPENDIX A
The New York Times, September 30, 1969NIXON AIDE WARNS QUICK INTEGRATION CAN’T BE ENFORCED
Rights Chief Says “Nothing Would Change”1
If Court Told South to Act Now
By F red P. Gr a h a m , Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 29—-The chief of the Justice
Department’s Civil Rights Division said today that if the
Supreme 'Court should rule in a pending case that schools
must integrate immediately throughout the South the order
could not be enforced.
Referring to an appeal that the Court has already agreed
to consider on an accelerated schedule, Jerris Leonard, an
Assistant Attorney General, declared that “if the Court
were to order instant integration nothing would change.
Somebody would have to enforce that order.”
“There just are not enough bodies and people” in the
Civil Rights Division “to enforce that kind of a decision,”
Mr. Leonard said at a news conference.
Appeal in Mississippi
The N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund
Inc. has asked the Supreme Court to discard its “all delib
erate speed” formula for school desegregation and to de
mand immediate abolition of racially identifiable schools
across the South.
The request was made in an appeal of a desegregation
delay that was granted to 30' Mississippi school districts at
the behest of the Nixon Administration.
A2
Mr. Leonard’s remarks raised the possibility that the
Supreme Court could find itself, for the first time since it
declared public school segregation unconstitutional in 1954,
in the position of issuing a school desegregation order with
out full expectation that it could or would be enforced by
the executive branch.
Mr. Leonard called the news conference to respond to a
group of dissident lawyers on his staff who have protested
that the Nixon Administration has softened civil rights
enforcement.
The dissident group released today the text of a state
ment of protest that they delivered last month to Mr.
Leonard, Attorney General John N. Mitchell and President
Nixon.
The statement charged that the Government’s action in
granting the Mississippi desegregation delay indicated “a
disposition on the part of responsible officials of the Federal
Government to subordinate clearly defined legal require
ments to nonlegal considerations when formulating the en
forcement policies of this division.”
The lawyers charged that by basing civil rights deci
sions on “other considerations” than the law, the Admin
istration “will seriously impair the ability of the Civil Rights
Division, and ultimately the judiciary, to attend to the
faithful execution of the Federal civil rights statutes.”
The statement reportedly bore the signatures of 65 of
the 74 nonsupervisory “line” attorneys in the Civil Rights
Division.
Seeks Court Compliance
Attorney General Mitchell was asked about the state
ment today at a news conference in Miami, where he is
attending the meeting of the International Association of
Chiefs of Police.
A3
He denied published reports that one of the “other con
siderations” that prompted the delay was a hint by Senator
John C. Stennis of Mississippi that he would not give the
Administration’s antiballistics missile project his full sup
port unless the delay were granted.
“That is completely false,” Mr. Mitchell said. He added
that “the objective of the Justice Department is to comply
with the Court decision and statutory requirements.”
Mr. Mitchell said he did not “presume that there would
be any need to take action” against the dissident lawyers.
Mr. Leonard said he had not been embarrassed by the
ferment within his division and said he was confident that
the line attorneys would cease their protests now that the
Government’s policy has been clarified.
Sources within the dissident group said that their state
ment was released today after having been kept secret for
a month because the group believed that Mr. Leonard had
not given assurances that the Justice Department would
push school desegregation vigorously. But the lawyers said
they did not know what further protest action, if any, their
group would take.
Request by Finch
Mr. Leonard stressed repeatedly throughout his 45-
minute news conference that the threat of school boycotts
and school-closings by diehard whites in the South could
retard the pace of school desegregation. The dissident at
torneys have charged that this official attitude could en
courage Southern whites to defy the law.
Mr. Leonard disclosed that Robert H. Finch, Secretary
of Health, Education and W elf are, asked the Federal
judges who had jurisdiction over the Mississippi case for
the delay last month without first consulting Mr. Leonard,
who had ultimate responsibility for the handling of the case.
A4
But Mr. Leonard agreed with Mr. Finch’s opinion that
the time was too short to implement the desegregation plans
in the few days that remained before the start of the school
year. The judges granted the delay, which would put off
major integration moves in the schools for at least a year.
If the delay had not been obtained, Mr. Leonard said,
“I think we would have been faced with massive litigation
efforts, school closings, and massive boycotting. It would
have taken years and years to bring these districts back into
line.”
He predicted that with a year in which to lay the ground
work for desegregation, it will be accomplished smoothly
in 1970.
In their appeal to the Supreme Court, the legal defense
fund’s lawyers contend that the possibility of delay has
encouraged Southern school officials to make no plans for
desegregation and then to plead at the last moment that
there is inadequate time to prepare for desegregation with
out disrupting the schools.
The defense fund asked the Justices to give the appeal
a speedy hearing and to order immediate desegregation of
all Southern schools. The Court promptly announced that
it will decide soon after the new Court term begins on
Oct. 6 whether or not it will hear the appeal.
In the past, when the Court has agreed to accelerate its
normal procedures, it has often developed that the justices
were impressed with the contentions of the party seeking
the speedy hearing.
A5
The New York Times, October 3, 1969LEONARD DEFENDS U. S. SCHOOL POLICY
Says Critics ©f Rights Stand
‘Run Off at the Mouth5
WASHINGTON, Oct. 2 (A P)—Assistant Attorney
General Jerris Leonard defended the Nixon Administra
tion’s school desegregation policy today, calling its critics
“a lot of people who are frankly running off at the mouth.”
Mr. Leonard, chief of the Justice Department’s Civil
Rights Division, also said he had no intention of quitting
because of dissension among his lawyers over Administra
tion policies.
Llis comments came at an impromptu news conference
after Garry J. Greenberg, who resigned yesterday at the re
quest of Mr. Leonard, said, he “would not and could not
defend the Government’s position.”
Insisting that there had been no slowdown in school
desegregation, Mr. Leonard said, “take the Mississippi
situation out and give me one example where we have not
vigorously enforced the civil rights laws.”
In order to accomplish what some critics propose, Mr.
Leonard said, “no one could make a statement that didn’t
advocate immediate, strict compliance with the law with
out regard to educational factors.”
“I reject that 1,000 per cent,” he said. “You cannot
desegregate a school district that is presided over by re
calcitrant school board members by simply issuing an
edict.”
Cites Times Editorial
Such a situation, he said, would put “school board mem
bers in the jail houses and kids in segregated schools.”
A6
Asked about statements by Federal judges who charged
that a July policy statement was “a red herring across the
path of progress toward desegregation,” Mr. Leonard said,
“I don’t care if its judges, lawyers, legislators or whoever
disagrees.”
He took particular issue with The New York Times,
saying an editorial yesterday was “picayunish and pusillani
mous and written by someone uninformed.
Asked about critical statements by the Commission on
Civil Rights and some Congressmen, Mr. Leonard re
marked, I think you’ve got a lot of people who are frankly
running off at the mouth who don’t know what the facts