NAACP v. St. Louis-San Francisco RY. Co. Brief Amicus Curiae

    B E F O R E  T H E

Interstate Commerce Commission

Docket No. 31423

N a t io n a l  A s s o c ia t io n  f o r  t h e  A d v a n c e m e n t  of  
C o lo re d  P e o p l e ,  e t  a l ., c o m p l a in a n t s

v.

S t . L o u is - S a n  F r a n c is c o  R a i l w a y  C o m p a n y , e t  a l

d e f e n d a n t s

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AS AMICUS CURIAE

H E R B E R T  B R O W N E L L , JR.,
Attorney General. 

S T A N L E Y  N. B A R N E S ,
Assistant Attorney General.

C H A R L E S  H . W E S T O N .
L A W R E N C E  G O C H B E R G ,

Special Assistants to the
Attorney General.



Statement of Tacts

I N D E X
Page

2

Argument:
I. The railroads’ regulations and practices requiring racial 

segregation of interstate passengers violate Section 3(1) 
of the Interstate Commerce A ct...........................................  4

A. Section 3(1) prohibits any form of discrimination
between interstate passengers the basis of which 
is race ......................................................................  4

B. Requiring Negro interstate passengers to occupy
coaches or portions of coaches set apart solely for 
them is a discrimination prohibited by Section
3(1) .........................................  5

C. No prior Supreme Court decision is controlling on
the question of the validity under the Interstate 
Commerce Act of the carriers’ segregation rules 
and practices ........................................................ 8

D. The segregation regulations offend against the due
process requirements of the Fifth Amendment,
and thereby violate Section 3(1) of the A ct...........  11

II. The carriers’ practices in imposing segregation constitute a
forbidden interference with interstate commerce................ 12

Conclusion ..............................................................................................  16

Cases:
CITATIONS

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Chance, 341 U.S. 941.................  15
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497..................................................... 11
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483................................  6, 7,10
Carolina Coach Co. v. Williams, 207 F. 2d 408 (C.A. 4 ) .......... 15
Chance v. Lambeth, 186 F. 2d 879 (C.A. 4 ) .................................. 14-15
Chiles V. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 218 U.S. 71.............8, 9,11,15
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 ........................................................  12
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485..........................................................  8,13
Henderson V. Southern Ry. Co., 284 I.C.C. 161.........................  16
Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816....................................5, 9,12
Holcombe v. Beal, 347 U.S. 974..................................................... 10
Housing Authority of San Francisco v. Banks, 347 U.S. 974. . . 10
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637.................  6
Missouri v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337.................................................  6
Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80......................................4, 5, 7, 9
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373................................................... 13,14
Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U.S. 971.............  10
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537........................................  7, 8, 9,10,16
Public Utilities Commission v. Poliak, 343 U.S. 451...................  12
Shelley v. Kracmer, 334 U.S. 1 ..................................................... 12

(i)



Cases— Continued
ii

Page
Solomon v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 96 F.Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y.) 15
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629..................................................
The Shreveport Case, 234 U.S. 324...............................................
United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 323 U.S. 612...................  16
Whiteside v. Southern Bus Lines, 177 F. 2d 949 (C.A. 6 ) .......... 15

Miscellaneous:
Executive Order 10479,18 F.R. 4899 ........................................... 2
H. Rept. No. 2480, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2 ...............................  9
Official Guide of the Railways, August 1954, pp. 510-511, 576, 

632-633, 938-939 ........................................................................  13

CO



BEFORE THE

Interstate Commerce Commission

Docket No. 31423

N a t io n a l  A s s o c ia t io n  f o r  t h e  A d v a n c e m e n t  o f  
C o lo re d  P e o p l e , e t  a l ., c o m p l a in a n t s

v.

S t . L o u is - S a n  F r a n c is c o  R a i l w a y  C o m p a n y , e t  a l .,
DEFENDANTS

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AS AMICUS CURIAE

The United States, through its Attorney General, con­
siders it appropriate to file this brief as amicus curiae 
because of the national importance of the questions of 
federal law raised in this proceeding. These questions 
deal with the right of a group of American citizens, 
Negroes, to travel on trains in interstate commerce 
free from the restraints now placed on such movement. 
These rights consist of nothing more and nothing less 
than those now enjoyed by all other interstate rail pas­
sengers, citizen or non-citizen.

This proceeding against twelve rail carriers is not 
merely local in scope and significance. The transpor­
tation systems of the twelve railroads before this Com­
mission link the South to the rest of the Nation. They

(1)



o

run from New York to Florida; from Illinois to Lou­
isiana; from Georgia to California. In thus linking 
North to South and East to West, they impose a sys­
tem of segregation which arbitrarily creates for pur­
poses of interstate rail travel two classes of citizens— 
“ W hite”  and “ Colored” .

It is the policy of the Federal Government, within the 
limits of power vested in it, to put an end to racial seg­
regation. The President has stated:

W e have used the power of the Federal Govern­
ment, wherever it clearly extends, to combat and 
erase racial discrimination and segregation— so 
that no man of any color or creed will ever be able 
to cry, “ This is not a free land.”  1

The United States contends that the practice of divid­
ing passengers into two classes based solely on race 
violates the Interstate Commerce Act. It is also the 
position of the United States that segregation of this 
kind, under and pursuant to this Commission’s sanction, 
violates the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

S T A T E M E N T  O F  FA C T S

This is a proceeding against twelve rail carriers insti­
tuted by the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People, a non-profit corporation, and a num­
ber of individual complainants. The amended com­
plaint alleges that the defendant carriers require segre­

1 “ Report to the Nation,” a radio address delivered from the 
White House on August 6, 1953.

See also, the President’s Executive Order 10479, August, 1953, 
18 F.R. 4899, establishing a Government Contract Committee to 
eliminate racial discrimination in concerns working under Govern­
ment contract.



3

gation of Negro interstate passengers from other in­
terstate passengers solely on the basis of color or race; 
and that by virtue of such practice, complainants have 
been “ subjected to discriminatory and unequal treat­
ment and to embarrassment and humiliation solely be­
cause of race and color * * * ”  (pars. 7, 8). Numerous 
specific instances of the imposition of this system of seg­
regation are cited. It is further alleged that the prac­
tices, rules, or regulations under which the defendants 
require segregation violate Sections 1(5), 2, and 3(1) 
of the Interstate Commerce Act, the commerce clause 
of the Constitution, and the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments (pars. 28-32).

The answers filed by the defendant carriers generally 
deny any violation of the foregoing statutory and con­
stitutional provisions. As to five of the defendants, an 
evidentiary hearing was held to determine the nature of 
their practices. As to the other seven defendants,2 
separate stipulations of fact were entered into with 
the complainants. These stipulations all set forth sub­
stantially the following:

(1) Each carrier, as to certain or all of its trains 
operating in interstate and intrastate commerce, desig­
nates, assigns and sets aside specific coaches or portions 
of coaches for exclusive occupancy by Negro pas­
sengers.

(2) The coaches or portions thereof designated for 
occupancy by Negro passengers are “ substantially

2 The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co.; Atlantic 
Coast Line Railroad Co.; Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co.; 
Kansas City Southern Railway Co.; Louisville and Nashville Rail­
road Co.; St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.; and Southern Rail­
way Co.



4

equal”  to those designated for occupancy by passengers 
not of the Negro race.

(3) The rates and fares charged Negro passengers 
are the same as those charged all other passengers.

(4) The carrier’s practice of segregating Negro pas­
sengers has existed continuously for more than fifty 
years, pursuant to the public opinion, customs and 
usages of some or all of the states through which the 
carrier operates.

(5) All facts relevant to the Commission’s decision 
are set forth in the stipulation.

Since the interest of the United States is in the broad 
question of the legality of segregation rather than in 
whether any specific defendant practices segregation, 
this brief will deal with the legal issues as framed by 
the stipulated facts.

A R G U M E N T

I
The Railroads’ Regulations and Practices Requiring Racial

Segregation of Interstate Passengers Violate Section 3 ( 1 )
ol' the Interstate Commerce Act

A. Section 3(1) Prohibits any Form of Discrimination 
between Interstate Passengers the Basis of Which 
is Race

Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 
U. S. C. 3 (1 ), declares that it shall be unlawful for any 
common carrier subject to the Act “ to subject any par­
ticular person * * * to any undue or unreasonable preju­
dice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.”  It is 
settled that this prohibition, which embraces all dis­
criminations “ which it was within the power of Con­
gress to condemn”  ( The Shreveport Case, 234 U. S. 342, 
356), bans any kind of discriminations the basis of 
which is the race of the passenger. Mitchell v. United



5

States, 313 U. S. 80, 94-95; Henderson v. United States, 
339 U. S. 816, 823. Indeed, this Commission from its 
inception has recognized that the section applies to dis­
crimination between white and Negro passengers. See 
cases cited in Henderson case, supra, p. 823.

The equality of treatment required hy Section 3(1) 
creates a right personal to the individual passenger. 
Invasion of this right is not condoned by the fact that 
disadvantages imposed on Negro passengers may be 
likewise imposed on white passengers; and it is equally 
unavailing that a disadvantage imposed by reason of 
race may not adversely affect every passenger of that 
race. Henderson case, supra, pp. 824-825; Mitchell case, 
supra, p. 97.

B. Requiring Negro Interstate Passengers to Occupy 
Coaches or Portions of Coaches Set Apart Solely 
For Them is a Discrimination Prohibited by Sec­
tion 3(1)

In the cases in which the Supreme Court has found 
that discriminations based on race violate Section 3(1) 
of the Interstate Commerce Act it was unnecessary to 
decide more than that denial to one race of accommoda­
tions available to the other ( Mitchell case), or postpon­
ing for members of one race service currently aATailable 
to members of the other (Henderson case), constitutes 
undue “ prejudice”  or “ disadvantage”  within the mean­
ing of Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act. 
Here, where it is stipulated that the physical character­
istics of the coaches to which Negro passengers are as­
signed are substantially equal to those designated ex­
clusively for non-Negro passengers, the issue is pre­
sented whether enforced separation of the races is of 
itself a prohibited discrimination.



6

The evolution of decision in the Supreme Court cases 
dealing with segregation in the field of public education 
is of great significance. First, it was held that to provide 
for Negroes opportunity for education availalfle only 
in an institution beyond the borders of a State, when 
white students could attend an institution within the 
State, offended against the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Missouri v. Canada, 305 
U. S. 337. Later it was held that, as to a professional 
school, factors “ incapable of objective measurement” , 
such as reputation of the faculty, position and influence 
of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions 
and prestige, must be taken into consideration in deter­
mining whether substantial equality in educational op­
portunity is afforded. Siveatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629. 
Likewise it wTas held that equal protection is denied to a 
Negro, who, although admitted to the same university as 
wdiite students and accorded the same instruction and 
physical facilities, is required to sit apart from others 
in classroom, library and cafeteria. McLaurin v. Ok­
lahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637. Finally, it was 
held in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495, 
that “ in the field of public education, the doctrine of 
1 separate but equal ’ has no place. Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.”  Enforced separa­
tion of white children and colored children in grade and 
high schools was held to be inherently unequal pri­
marily because such separation “ generates [in the lat­
ter] a feeling o f inferiority as to their status in the 
community”  or, as stated in a district court finding 
adopted by the Supreme Court, “ the policy of separat­
ing the races is usually interpreted as denoting the in­
feriority of the negro group.”  Id., p. 494. And the Court



7

expressly rejected any language in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U. S. 537, contrary to such finding. Id. 494-495.

The Court in the Brown case was dealing with the 
effect on colored children of segregated public schools. 
But the factors which make such segregation “ inher­
ently unequal”  for them—that they understand segre­
gation to signify their inferior status and are adversely 
affected by being thus stigmatized—make segregation 
in public transportation inherently unequal. In the 
Brown case the Court relied upon psychological knowl­
edge, as “ amply supported by modern authority,”  for 
the findings which were made the basis of decision. 347 
U. S. at 494. Under the authorities which the Court 
cited (id., fn. 11), it cannot be disputed that Negro rail 
passengers are seriously and deeply affected when they 
are separated from others solely because of their race, 
and deem it a badge of inferiority when they are rele­
gated to what have long been invidiously known as 
“ Jim Crow”  accommodations.

The “ separate but equal”  doctrine having now been 
repudiated in the field of public education, we submit 
that this doctrine no longer retains vitality or authority 
in the field of public transportation. By the same token 
that segregation in schools, under the command of a 
state, is a denial of the “ equal”  protection of the laws 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, segregation 
in interstate travel is a denial of the “ equality of treat­
ment”  required by Section 3(1) of the Interstate Com­
merce A ct.3

3 In the Mitchell case the Court said that Section 3(1) requires 
“ equality of treatment,” and that a person denied such equality 
because of his race is subjected to “ unreasonable prejudice or dis­
advantage” within “ the purview of the sweeping prohibitions” of 
Section 3(1). 313 U.S. at 94-95.



8

C. No prior Supreme Court Decision is Controlling on 
the Question of the Validity under the Interstate 
Commerce Act of the Carriers’ Segregation Rules 
and Practices

Three Supreme Court adjudications are usually cited 
in support o f the legality o f carrier rules providing for 
segregation in interstate commerce. They are: Hall v. 
DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537; 
and Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 218 U. S. 71. 
None of them dealt specifically with the Interstate Com­
merce Act, and the two former involved only constitu­
tional questions. The holding in Hall v. DeCuir w7as 
that a state statute outlawing segregation of interstate 
passengers infringes on federal commerce power, and 
in Plessy what the Court held was that a state statute 
providing for segregation in intrastate transportation 
is not invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Chiles case held that, in the absence of congres­
sional legislation dealing with segregation in interstate 
transportation, a carrier could lawfully require racial 
segregation of interstate passengers. Although the Su­
preme Court decided the case after the adoption of the 
Interstate Commerce Act, the Court’s opinion does not 
mention the Act and the briefs filed by the parties do 
not even refer to Section 3 of the Act. Indeed, the 
Court’s conclusion as to “ the inaction of Congress”  re­
specting segregation was rested upon its holding in 
Hall v. DeCuir, 4 a case which was decided some ten 
years before the enactment of the Interstate Commerce 4

4 The Court said (218 U.S. at 77): “ We have seen that it was 
decided in Hall v. DeCuir that the inaction of Congress was 
equivalent to the declaration that a carrier could by regulations 
separate colored and white interstate passengers.”



9

Act. Therefore, whatever else the Chiles case deter­
mined, it leaves undetermined the scope and effect of 
Section 3. And the premise of decision in that case, 
complete absence of federal legislation touching on seg­
regation in interstate travel, has now been swept aside; 
the later Mitchell and Henderson cases establish that 
Section 3 does apply to and does ban any form of dis­
crimination on the basis of race.5

W e submit, therefore, that the Chiles case is neither 
controlling nor pertinent on the question now submitted 
to this Commission, the effect and scope o f Section 3(1) 
of the Interstate Commerce Act. W e submit further 
that, even on the basis on which Chiles was decided, an 
essential ground of decision has been undermined.

In Chiles the Court held (1) that, if  Congress has not 
spoken in the matter, an interstate carrier is free to 
adopt regulations for the government of its business 
provided such regulations are “ reasonable” , and (2) 
that, in view of the holding in the Plessy case that it 
is a reasonable exercise of a state’s police power to re­
quire railroads to provide separate accommodations for 
the white and colored races, regulations of a carrier

5 The recent congressional action regarding various bills designed 
to make segregation in interestate travel illegal does not suggest 
that segregation is not already illegal under the Interstate Com­
merce Act. For the House Committee Report, which approved 
a bill designed to outlaw segregation in interstate travel, states:

“ This bill does not establish a new policy but simply re­
affirms and clarifies the general policy already adopted by Con­
gress in several statutes, and implicit in common law, against 
discrimination with respect to travel on common carriers operat­
ing in interstate transportation.

“ This general congressional nondiscrimination policy con­
cerning interstate transportation is present in section 3 (1) 
of the Interstate Commerce Act * * *.”  H. Rept. No. 2480, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2.



10

which so provide “ cannot be said to be unreasonable.”
218 U. S. at 76-77. But the bolding in Plessy which was 
thus relied upon was bottomed upon the proposition 
that laws requiring separation of the white and colored 
races do not “ imply the inferiority of either race”  (163 
XL S. at 544). The Court there further emphasized this 
point by saying (id., at 551) :

We consider the underlying fallacy of the plain­
t iff ’s argument to consist in the assumption that the 
enforced separation of the two races stamps the 
colored race with the badge of inferiority.

This cornerstone of the Plessy decision has now been 
swept aside. In the recent school segregation cases the 
Court held that to separate colored children from white 
solely because of race “ generates a feeling of inferiority 
as to their status in the community” ; found that “ the 
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as 
denoting the inferiority of the negro group” ; and “ re­
jected”  any “ contrary”  language in Plessy. 6 347 U. S. 
at 494-495. Clearly carrier regulations, such as those 
o f the present defendants, which denote the inferiority 
of a racial group and serve no legitimate transporta­

6 The Supreme Court’s rulings immediately following its decision 
in the school segregation cases make it clear that the principles 
there applied are not confined solely to segregation in public edu­
cation, but must be given consideration when segregation is en­
forced in other fields. The Court vacated a judgment upholding 
segregation in a privately-operated municipal amphitheater and 
remanded the case “ for consideration in the light of the Segrega­
tion Cases” (Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U.S. 
971); denied certiorari to review a judgment striking down segre­
gation in public housing (Housing Authority of San Francisco v. 
Ba,vks, 347 U.S. 974); and denied certiorari to review a judgment 
prohibiting exclusion of Negroes from a municipal golf course (Hol­
combe v. Beal, 347 U.S. 974).



11

tion purpose, cannot be deemed “ reasonable”  regula­
tions. They thus can claim no sanction under the 
Court’s holding in Chiles.

D. The Segregation Regulations Offend Against the 
Due Process Requirements of the Fifth Amend­
ment, and Thereby Violate Section 3(1) of the Act

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, held that to refuse 
to admit Negro children, solely because o f their race, 
to public schools in the District of Columbia attended 
by white children is a denial of the due process of law 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The Court said 
(p. 499) that “ discrimination may be so unjustifiable 
as to be violative of due process,”  and that “ [C la ssi­
fications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with 
particular care, since they are contrary to our tradi­
tions and hence constitutionally suspect.”  The Court 
further declared (p. 500) :

Segregation in public education is not reasonably 
related to any proper governmental objective, and 
thus it imposes on Negro children of the District 
o f Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary 
deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due 
Process Clause.

Segregation in public transportation, that is, by com­
mon carriers under duty both at common law and by 
Federal statute to serve all persons without discrimina­
tion, “ is not reasonably related to any proper govern­
mental objective.”  It follows that the segregation 
which the defendant carriers impose on Negro pas­
sengers “ constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their 
liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.”



12

While the Fifth Amendment interdicts only action 
by the Federal Government, the regulations of the de­
fendant carriers are not exclusively the acts of private 
parties. These regulations, now under challenge before 
this Commission, can be maintained only with its sanc­
tion. Henderson x. United States, 339 U. S. 816. Con­
gress has clothed the Commission with wide regulatory 
authority over the defendant carriers, and if the Com­
mission should uphold the challenged regulations, this 
would amount to action by the Federal Government 
sufficient to make applicable the prohibitions of the 
Fifth Amendment. See Public Utilities Commission v. 
Poliak, 343 IT. S. 451, 462-463. It is settled that the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies to “ State action of 
every kind,”  including state authority manifested by 
“ judicial or executive proceedings.”  Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 14; Civil Fights Cases, 109 IT. S. 
3,11,17. Certainly no narrower test is to be applied in 
determining what constitutes Federal action for the 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.

Obviously, any segregation which operates to in­
fringe constitutional rights subjects the persons whose 
rights are infringed to “ undue or unreasonable prej­
udice or disadvantage” , in violation o f Section 3(1) of 
the Interstate Commerce Act.

I I
The Carriers’ Practices in Imposing Segregation Constitute a 

Forbidden Interference With Interstate Commerce

The carriers involved in this proceeding do not rep­
resent small local lines. They represent an entire sys­
tem of transportation linking the South with the rest 
of the country. The Atlantic Coast Line has a total



13

of 5,353 miles of track linking the East Coast to the 
South and F lorida.7 The Southern Railway runs 
through Ohio, Virginia, District of Columbia, Ken­
tucky, and other Southern states.8 The Santa Fe op­
erates in California, Arizona, New Mexico, Illinois, 
Kansas, Colorado, and also Texas and Oklahoma.9 The 
Gulf, Mobile and Ohio operates, inter alia, in Missouri, 
Illinois, as well as Alabama and Louisiana.10 In short, 
these carriers operate in states which by law require 
segregation, others which by law forbid segregation, 
and still others which have no laws on the subject. Cf. 
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, 382.

It is settled that a state may not either enforce or 
forbid segregation for interstate passengers. In Hall 
v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, which dealt with a state statute 
requiring public carriers to accord accommodations to 
passengers “ without distinction or discrimination on 
account of race,”  the Court said (p. 489) that such a 
statute would be “ productive of great inconvenience 
and unnecessary hardship”  since it would mean that, 
under divergent state laws, ‘ ‘ on one side of a State line 
its [the carrier’s] passengers, both white and colored, 
must be permitted to occupy the same cabin, and on 
the other be kept separate.”  In Morgan v. Virginia, 
328 U. S. 373, which involved a state statute requiring 
the separation of white and colored passengers, the 
Court said (p. 385) that the statute “ so burdens inter­
state commerce or so infringes the requirements of na­

7 Official Guide of the Railways, August, 1954, p. 576.
8 Id. (map), pp. 510-511.
9 Id. (map), pp. 938-939.
10Id. (map), pp. 632-633.



14

tional uniformity as to be invalid.”  It also said (p. 
386) :

It seems clear to us that seating arrangements 
for the different races in interstate motor travel 
require a single, uniform rule to promote and pro­
tect national travel.

With one exception,11 each of the stipulations filed 
in this proceeding states that the segregation enforced 
by the carrier is pursuant to the public opinion, cus­
toms or laws of one or more of the states through which 
its trains operate. The effect is that, with reference 
to the coaches or portions thereof which they may 
occupy, interstate passengers are subjected to the local 
mores or laws of the states through which they travel. 
In short, as stated in Justice Frankfurter’s concurring 
opinion in the Morgan case (328 U. S. at 388), inter­
state commerce is unreasonably burdened by the “ im­
position upon national systems of transportation of a 
crazy-quilt of State laws,”  some prohibiting and some 
requiring racial segregation.

There is the same burden on interstate commerce, and 
the same interferences with the Federal Government’s 
paramount power over such commerce, whether en­
forced separation of the races in interstate travel is 
state-required or carrier-required. Indeed, it would be 
a curious result i f  private carriers were free to com­
mand what a state, in the exercise of its broad police 
power, is powerless to command. In fact, carrier rules 
requiring segregation have been held invalid as applied 
to interstate passengers, upon the ground that they un­
reasonably interfere with interstate commerce. Chance

11 Louisville & Nashville Railroad’s stipulation.



15

v. Lambeth, 186 F. 2d 879 (C.A. 4), certiorari denied, 
sub. nom., Atlantic Coast Lines, 341 U. S. 941; White- 
side v. Southern Bus Lines, 177 F. 2d 949 (C.A. 6 ) ; 
Carolina Coach Co. v. Williams, 207 F. 2d 408 (C.A. 4 ) ;  
Solomon v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 96 F. Supp. 709 (S.D. 
N .Y .). In the Chance case Judge Soper, speaking for 
the court, said (186 F. 2d at 883) :

It is true that the regulation of the carrier was not 
enacted by state authority, although the power of 
the state is customarily invoked to enforce i t ; but 
we know of no principle of law which requires the 
courts to strike down a state statute which inter­
feres with interstate commerce but to uphold a 
railroad regulation which is infected with the 
same vice.

A  carrier’s power to promulgate regulations for the 
carrying on of its business is limited to regulations 
which are reasonable. Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio 
Railway, 218 U. S. 71, 76. The defendant carriers’ 
regulations cannot be deemed reasonable since they de­
stroy the uniformity held to be essential for the promo­
tion and protection of interstate travel.

The defendants’ segregation regulations, being ob­
structive of freedom of interstate travel, do not promote 
“ efficient service.”  But under the National Transpor­
tation Policy declared by Congress this Commission is 
required to administer the Interstate Commerce Act so 
as to promote “ efficient service”  in interstate transpor­
tation. 12 Therefore, even apart from the requirements 
of Section 3(1) of the Act, the Commission, in further­
ance of the national policy which it is directed to en-

12 54 Stat. 899, 49 U.S.C., note preceding Section 1.



16

force, should strike down the segregation regulations. 
Cf. United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 323 IT. S. 612, 
616-617.

C O N C L U S IO N

The United States is of the view that “ the race of a 
passenger may not legally constitute a basis for any d if­
ferentiation or segregation in the course of interstate 
travel upon a carrier subject to the provisions of the 
Interstate Commerce A ct.” 13

As the Supreme Court has so recently ruled, enforced 
separation of the white from the colored is generally 
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the latter. 
Just as our “ Constitution is color-blind, and neither 
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,”  14 so too 
is the Interstate Commerce Act. The time has come 
for this Commission, in administering that Act, to de­
clare unequivocally that a Negro passenger is free to 
travel the length and breadth of this country in the 
same manner as any other passenger.

H e r b e r t  B r o w n e l l , J r .,
Attorney General.

S t a n l e y  N. B a r n e s ,
Assistant Attorney General.

C h a r l e s  H .  W e s t o n ,
L a w r e n c e  G o c h b e r g ,

Special Assistants to 
the Attorney General.

13 Commissioners Aitchison, Cross, Lee and Mahaffie dissenting 
in Henderson v. Southern Ry. Co., 284 I.C.C. 161, 165.

14 Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537, 559.

☆  U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICEt I9B4 S 17515 411



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