NAACP v. St. Louis-San Francisco RY. Co. Brief Amicus Curiae
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1954

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. NAACP v. St. Louis-San Francisco RY. Co. Brief Amicus Curiae, 1954. ac9f8946-bf9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/f85ca4e3-093e-4019-a776-21822665c8f0/naacp-v-st-louis-san-francisco-ry-co-brief-amicus-curiae. Accessed August 01, 2025.
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B E F O R E T H E Interstate Commerce Commission Docket No. 31423 N a t io n a l A s s o c ia t io n f o r t h e A d v a n c e m e n t of C o lo re d P e o p l e , e t a l ., c o m p l a in a n t s v. S t . L o u is - S a n F r a n c is c o R a i l w a y C o m p a n y , e t a l d e f e n d a n t s BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS AMICUS CURIAE H E R B E R T B R O W N E L L , JR., Attorney General. S T A N L E Y N. B A R N E S , Assistant Attorney General. C H A R L E S H . W E S T O N . L A W R E N C E G O C H B E R G , Special Assistants to the Attorney General. Statement of Tacts I N D E X Page 2 Argument: I. The railroads’ regulations and practices requiring racial segregation of interstate passengers violate Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce A ct........................................... 4 A. Section 3(1) prohibits any form of discrimination between interstate passengers the basis of which is race ...................................................................... 4 B. Requiring Negro interstate passengers to occupy coaches or portions of coaches set apart solely for them is a discrimination prohibited by Section 3(1) ......................................... 5 C. No prior Supreme Court decision is controlling on the question of the validity under the Interstate Commerce Act of the carriers’ segregation rules and practices ........................................................ 8 D. The segregation regulations offend against the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment, and thereby violate Section 3(1) of the A ct........... 11 II. The carriers’ practices in imposing segregation constitute a forbidden interference with interstate commerce................ 12 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 16 Cases: CITATIONS Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Chance, 341 U.S. 941................. 15 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497..................................................... 11 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483................................ 6, 7,10 Carolina Coach Co. v. Williams, 207 F. 2d 408 (C.A. 4 ) .......... 15 Chance v. Lambeth, 186 F. 2d 879 (C.A. 4 ) .................................. 14-15 Chiles V. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 218 U.S. 71.............8, 9,11,15 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 ........................................................ 12 Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485.......................................................... 8,13 Henderson V. Southern Ry. Co., 284 I.C.C. 161......................... 16 Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816....................................5, 9,12 Holcombe v. Beal, 347 U.S. 974..................................................... 10 Housing Authority of San Francisco v. Banks, 347 U.S. 974. . . 10 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637................. 6 Missouri v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337................................................. 6 Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80......................................4, 5, 7, 9 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373................................................... 13,14 Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U.S. 971............. 10 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537........................................ 7, 8, 9,10,16 Public Utilities Commission v. Poliak, 343 U.S. 451................... 12 Shelley v. Kracmer, 334 U.S. 1 ..................................................... 12 (i) Cases— Continued ii Page Solomon v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 96 F.Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y.) 15 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629.................................................. The Shreveport Case, 234 U.S. 324............................................... United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 323 U.S. 612................... 16 Whiteside v. Southern Bus Lines, 177 F. 2d 949 (C.A. 6 ) .......... 15 Miscellaneous: Executive Order 10479,18 F.R. 4899 ........................................... 2 H. Rept. No. 2480, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2 ............................... 9 Official Guide of the Railways, August 1954, pp. 510-511, 576, 632-633, 938-939 ........................................................................ 13 CO BEFORE THE Interstate Commerce Commission Docket No. 31423 N a t io n a l A s s o c ia t io n f o r t h e A d v a n c e m e n t o f C o lo re d P e o p l e , e t a l ., c o m p l a in a n t s v. S t . L o u is - S a n F r a n c is c o R a i l w a y C o m p a n y , e t a l ., DEFENDANTS BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS AMICUS CURIAE The United States, through its Attorney General, con siders it appropriate to file this brief as amicus curiae because of the national importance of the questions of federal law raised in this proceeding. These questions deal with the right of a group of American citizens, Negroes, to travel on trains in interstate commerce free from the restraints now placed on such movement. These rights consist of nothing more and nothing less than those now enjoyed by all other interstate rail pas sengers, citizen or non-citizen. This proceeding against twelve rail carriers is not merely local in scope and significance. The transpor tation systems of the twelve railroads before this Com mission link the South to the rest of the Nation. They (1) o run from New York to Florida; from Illinois to Lou isiana; from Georgia to California. In thus linking North to South and East to West, they impose a sys tem of segregation which arbitrarily creates for pur poses of interstate rail travel two classes of citizens— “ W hite” and “ Colored” . It is the policy of the Federal Government, within the limits of power vested in it, to put an end to racial seg regation. The President has stated: W e have used the power of the Federal Govern ment, wherever it clearly extends, to combat and erase racial discrimination and segregation— so that no man of any color or creed will ever be able to cry, “ This is not a free land.” 1 The United States contends that the practice of divid ing passengers into two classes based solely on race violates the Interstate Commerce Act. It is also the position of the United States that segregation of this kind, under and pursuant to this Commission’s sanction, violates the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. S T A T E M E N T O F FA C T S This is a proceeding against twelve rail carriers insti tuted by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, a non-profit corporation, and a num ber of individual complainants. The amended com plaint alleges that the defendant carriers require segre 1 “ Report to the Nation,” a radio address delivered from the White House on August 6, 1953. See also, the President’s Executive Order 10479, August, 1953, 18 F.R. 4899, establishing a Government Contract Committee to eliminate racial discrimination in concerns working under Govern ment contract. 3 gation of Negro interstate passengers from other in terstate passengers solely on the basis of color or race; and that by virtue of such practice, complainants have been “ subjected to discriminatory and unequal treat ment and to embarrassment and humiliation solely be cause of race and color * * * ” (pars. 7, 8). Numerous specific instances of the imposition of this system of seg regation are cited. It is further alleged that the prac tices, rules, or regulations under which the defendants require segregation violate Sections 1(5), 2, and 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, the commerce clause of the Constitution, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (pars. 28-32). The answers filed by the defendant carriers generally deny any violation of the foregoing statutory and con stitutional provisions. As to five of the defendants, an evidentiary hearing was held to determine the nature of their practices. As to the other seven defendants,2 separate stipulations of fact were entered into with the complainants. These stipulations all set forth sub stantially the following: (1) Each carrier, as to certain or all of its trains operating in interstate and intrastate commerce, desig nates, assigns and sets aside specific coaches or portions of coaches for exclusive occupancy by Negro pas sengers. (2) The coaches or portions thereof designated for occupancy by Negro passengers are “ substantially 2 The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co.; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.; Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co.; Kansas City Southern Railway Co.; Louisville and Nashville Rail road Co.; St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.; and Southern Rail way Co. 4 equal” to those designated for occupancy by passengers not of the Negro race. (3) The rates and fares charged Negro passengers are the same as those charged all other passengers. (4) The carrier’s practice of segregating Negro pas sengers has existed continuously for more than fifty years, pursuant to the public opinion, customs and usages of some or all of the states through which the carrier operates. (5) All facts relevant to the Commission’s decision are set forth in the stipulation. Since the interest of the United States is in the broad question of the legality of segregation rather than in whether any specific defendant practices segregation, this brief will deal with the legal issues as framed by the stipulated facts. A R G U M E N T I The Railroads’ Regulations and Practices Requiring Racial Segregation of Interstate Passengers Violate Section 3 ( 1 ) ol' the Interstate Commerce Act A. Section 3(1) Prohibits any Form of Discrimination between Interstate Passengers the Basis of Which is Race Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. 3 (1 ), declares that it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the Act “ to subject any par ticular person * * * to any undue or unreasonable preju dice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.” It is settled that this prohibition, which embraces all dis criminations “ which it was within the power of Con gress to condemn” ( The Shreveport Case, 234 U. S. 342, 356), bans any kind of discriminations the basis of which is the race of the passenger. Mitchell v. United 5 States, 313 U. S. 80, 94-95; Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S. 816, 823. Indeed, this Commission from its inception has recognized that the section applies to dis crimination between white and Negro passengers. See cases cited in Henderson case, supra, p. 823. The equality of treatment required hy Section 3(1) creates a right personal to the individual passenger. Invasion of this right is not condoned by the fact that disadvantages imposed on Negro passengers may be likewise imposed on white passengers; and it is equally unavailing that a disadvantage imposed by reason of race may not adversely affect every passenger of that race. Henderson case, supra, pp. 824-825; Mitchell case, supra, p. 97. B. Requiring Negro Interstate Passengers to Occupy Coaches or Portions of Coaches Set Apart Solely For Them is a Discrimination Prohibited by Sec tion 3(1) In the cases in which the Supreme Court has found that discriminations based on race violate Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act it was unnecessary to decide more than that denial to one race of accommoda tions available to the other ( Mitchell case), or postpon ing for members of one race service currently aATailable to members of the other (Henderson case), constitutes undue “ prejudice” or “ disadvantage” within the mean ing of Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Here, where it is stipulated that the physical character istics of the coaches to which Negro passengers are as signed are substantially equal to those designated ex clusively for non-Negro passengers, the issue is pre sented whether enforced separation of the races is of itself a prohibited discrimination. 6 The evolution of decision in the Supreme Court cases dealing with segregation in the field of public education is of great significance. First, it was held that to provide for Negroes opportunity for education availalfle only in an institution beyond the borders of a State, when white students could attend an institution within the State, offended against the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Missouri v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337. Later it was held that, as to a professional school, factors “ incapable of objective measurement” , such as reputation of the faculty, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige, must be taken into consideration in deter mining whether substantial equality in educational op portunity is afforded. Siveatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629. Likewise it wTas held that equal protection is denied to a Negro, who, although admitted to the same university as wdiite students and accorded the same instruction and physical facilities, is required to sit apart from others in classroom, library and cafeteria. McLaurin v. Ok lahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637. Finally, it was held in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495, that “ in the field of public education, the doctrine of 1 separate but equal ’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” Enforced separa tion of white children and colored children in grade and high schools was held to be inherently unequal pri marily because such separation “ generates [in the lat ter] a feeling o f inferiority as to their status in the community” or, as stated in a district court finding adopted by the Supreme Court, “ the policy of separat ing the races is usually interpreted as denoting the in feriority of the negro group.” Id., p. 494. And the Court 7 expressly rejected any language in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, contrary to such finding. Id. 494-495. The Court in the Brown case was dealing with the effect on colored children of segregated public schools. But the factors which make such segregation “ inher ently unequal” for them—that they understand segre gation to signify their inferior status and are adversely affected by being thus stigmatized—make segregation in public transportation inherently unequal. In the Brown case the Court relied upon psychological knowl edge, as “ amply supported by modern authority,” for the findings which were made the basis of decision. 347 U. S. at 494. Under the authorities which the Court cited (id., fn. 11), it cannot be disputed that Negro rail passengers are seriously and deeply affected when they are separated from others solely because of their race, and deem it a badge of inferiority when they are rele gated to what have long been invidiously known as “ Jim Crow” accommodations. The “ separate but equal” doctrine having now been repudiated in the field of public education, we submit that this doctrine no longer retains vitality or authority in the field of public transportation. By the same token that segregation in schools, under the command of a state, is a denial of the “ equal” protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, segregation in interstate travel is a denial of the “ equality of treat ment” required by Section 3(1) of the Interstate Com merce A ct.3 3 In the Mitchell case the Court said that Section 3(1) requires “ equality of treatment,” and that a person denied such equality because of his race is subjected to “ unreasonable prejudice or dis advantage” within “ the purview of the sweeping prohibitions” of Section 3(1). 313 U.S. at 94-95. 8 C. No prior Supreme Court Decision is Controlling on the Question of the Validity under the Interstate Commerce Act of the Carriers’ Segregation Rules and Practices Three Supreme Court adjudications are usually cited in support o f the legality o f carrier rules providing for segregation in interstate commerce. They are: Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537; and Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 218 U. S. 71. None of them dealt specifically with the Interstate Com merce Act, and the two former involved only constitu tional questions. The holding in Hall v. DeCuir w7as that a state statute outlawing segregation of interstate passengers infringes on federal commerce power, and in Plessy what the Court held was that a state statute providing for segregation in intrastate transportation is not invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Chiles case held that, in the absence of congres sional legislation dealing with segregation in interstate transportation, a carrier could lawfully require racial segregation of interstate passengers. Although the Su preme Court decided the case after the adoption of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Court’s opinion does not mention the Act and the briefs filed by the parties do not even refer to Section 3 of the Act. Indeed, the Court’s conclusion as to “ the inaction of Congress” re specting segregation was rested upon its holding in Hall v. DeCuir, 4 a case which was decided some ten years before the enactment of the Interstate Commerce 4 4 The Court said (218 U.S. at 77): “ We have seen that it was decided in Hall v. DeCuir that the inaction of Congress was equivalent to the declaration that a carrier could by regulations separate colored and white interstate passengers.” 9 Act. Therefore, whatever else the Chiles case deter mined, it leaves undetermined the scope and effect of Section 3. And the premise of decision in that case, complete absence of federal legislation touching on seg regation in interstate travel, has now been swept aside; the later Mitchell and Henderson cases establish that Section 3 does apply to and does ban any form of dis crimination on the basis of race.5 W e submit, therefore, that the Chiles case is neither controlling nor pertinent on the question now submitted to this Commission, the effect and scope o f Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act. W e submit further that, even on the basis on which Chiles was decided, an essential ground of decision has been undermined. In Chiles the Court held (1) that, if Congress has not spoken in the matter, an interstate carrier is free to adopt regulations for the government of its business provided such regulations are “ reasonable” , and (2) that, in view of the holding in the Plessy case that it is a reasonable exercise of a state’s police power to re quire railroads to provide separate accommodations for the white and colored races, regulations of a carrier 5 The recent congressional action regarding various bills designed to make segregation in interestate travel illegal does not suggest that segregation is not already illegal under the Interstate Com merce Act. For the House Committee Report, which approved a bill designed to outlaw segregation in interstate travel, states: “ This bill does not establish a new policy but simply re affirms and clarifies the general policy already adopted by Con gress in several statutes, and implicit in common law, against discrimination with respect to travel on common carriers operat ing in interstate transportation. “ This general congressional nondiscrimination policy con cerning interstate transportation is present in section 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act * * *.” H. Rept. No. 2480, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2. 10 which so provide “ cannot be said to be unreasonable.” 218 U. S. at 76-77. But the bolding in Plessy which was thus relied upon was bottomed upon the proposition that laws requiring separation of the white and colored races do not “ imply the inferiority of either race” (163 XL S. at 544). The Court there further emphasized this point by saying (id., at 551) : We consider the underlying fallacy of the plain t iff ’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with the badge of inferiority. This cornerstone of the Plessy decision has now been swept aside. In the recent school segregation cases the Court held that to separate colored children from white solely because of race “ generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community” ; found that “ the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group” ; and “ re jected” any “ contrary” language in Plessy. 6 347 U. S. at 494-495. Clearly carrier regulations, such as those o f the present defendants, which denote the inferiority of a racial group and serve no legitimate transporta 6 The Supreme Court’s rulings immediately following its decision in the school segregation cases make it clear that the principles there applied are not confined solely to segregation in public edu cation, but must be given consideration when segregation is en forced in other fields. The Court vacated a judgment upholding segregation in a privately-operated municipal amphitheater and remanded the case “ for consideration in the light of the Segrega tion Cases” (Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U.S. 971); denied certiorari to review a judgment striking down segre gation in public housing (Housing Authority of San Francisco v. Ba,vks, 347 U.S. 974); and denied certiorari to review a judgment prohibiting exclusion of Negroes from a municipal golf course (Hol combe v. Beal, 347 U.S. 974). 11 tion purpose, cannot be deemed “ reasonable” regula tions. They thus can claim no sanction under the Court’s holding in Chiles. D. The Segregation Regulations Offend Against the Due Process Requirements of the Fifth Amend ment, and Thereby Violate Section 3(1) of the Act Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, held that to refuse to admit Negro children, solely because o f their race, to public schools in the District of Columbia attended by white children is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The Court said (p. 499) that “ discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process,” and that “ [C la ssi fications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our tradi tions and hence constitutionally suspect.” The Court further declared (p. 500) : Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District o f Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. Segregation in public transportation, that is, by com mon carriers under duty both at common law and by Federal statute to serve all persons without discrimina tion, “ is not reasonably related to any proper govern mental objective.” It follows that the segregation which the defendant carriers impose on Negro pas sengers “ constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.” 12 While the Fifth Amendment interdicts only action by the Federal Government, the regulations of the de fendant carriers are not exclusively the acts of private parties. These regulations, now under challenge before this Commission, can be maintained only with its sanc tion. Henderson x. United States, 339 U. S. 816. Con gress has clothed the Commission with wide regulatory authority over the defendant carriers, and if the Com mission should uphold the challenged regulations, this would amount to action by the Federal Government sufficient to make applicable the prohibitions of the Fifth Amendment. See Public Utilities Commission v. Poliak, 343 IT. S. 451, 462-463. It is settled that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to “ State action of every kind,” including state authority manifested by “ judicial or executive proceedings.” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 14; Civil Fights Cases, 109 IT. S. 3,11,17. Certainly no narrower test is to be applied in determining what constitutes Federal action for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment. Obviously, any segregation which operates to in fringe constitutional rights subjects the persons whose rights are infringed to “ undue or unreasonable prej udice or disadvantage” , in violation o f Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act. I I The Carriers’ Practices in Imposing Segregation Constitute a Forbidden Interference With Interstate Commerce The carriers involved in this proceeding do not rep resent small local lines. They represent an entire sys tem of transportation linking the South with the rest of the country. The Atlantic Coast Line has a total 13 of 5,353 miles of track linking the East Coast to the South and F lorida.7 The Southern Railway runs through Ohio, Virginia, District of Columbia, Ken tucky, and other Southern states.8 The Santa Fe op erates in California, Arizona, New Mexico, Illinois, Kansas, Colorado, and also Texas and Oklahoma.9 The Gulf, Mobile and Ohio operates, inter alia, in Missouri, Illinois, as well as Alabama and Louisiana.10 In short, these carriers operate in states which by law require segregation, others which by law forbid segregation, and still others which have no laws on the subject. Cf. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, 382. It is settled that a state may not either enforce or forbid segregation for interstate passengers. In Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, which dealt with a state statute requiring public carriers to accord accommodations to passengers “ without distinction or discrimination on account of race,” the Court said (p. 489) that such a statute would be “ productive of great inconvenience and unnecessary hardship” since it would mean that, under divergent state laws, ‘ ‘ on one side of a State line its [the carrier’s] passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy the same cabin, and on the other be kept separate.” In Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, which involved a state statute requiring the separation of white and colored passengers, the Court said (p. 385) that the statute “ so burdens inter state commerce or so infringes the requirements of na 7 Official Guide of the Railways, August, 1954, p. 576. 8 Id. (map), pp. 510-511. 9 Id. (map), pp. 938-939. 10Id. (map), pp. 632-633. 14 tional uniformity as to be invalid.” It also said (p. 386) : It seems clear to us that seating arrangements for the different races in interstate motor travel require a single, uniform rule to promote and pro tect national travel. With one exception,11 each of the stipulations filed in this proceeding states that the segregation enforced by the carrier is pursuant to the public opinion, cus toms or laws of one or more of the states through which its trains operate. The effect is that, with reference to the coaches or portions thereof which they may occupy, interstate passengers are subjected to the local mores or laws of the states through which they travel. In short, as stated in Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in the Morgan case (328 U. S. at 388), inter state commerce is unreasonably burdened by the “ im position upon national systems of transportation of a crazy-quilt of State laws,” some prohibiting and some requiring racial segregation. There is the same burden on interstate commerce, and the same interferences with the Federal Government’s paramount power over such commerce, whether en forced separation of the races in interstate travel is state-required or carrier-required. Indeed, it would be a curious result i f private carriers were free to com mand what a state, in the exercise of its broad police power, is powerless to command. In fact, carrier rules requiring segregation have been held invalid as applied to interstate passengers, upon the ground that they un reasonably interfere with interstate commerce. Chance 11 Louisville & Nashville Railroad’s stipulation. 15 v. Lambeth, 186 F. 2d 879 (C.A. 4), certiorari denied, sub. nom., Atlantic Coast Lines, 341 U. S. 941; White- side v. Southern Bus Lines, 177 F. 2d 949 (C.A. 6 ) ; Carolina Coach Co. v. Williams, 207 F. 2d 408 (C.A. 4 ) ; Solomon v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 96 F. Supp. 709 (S.D. N .Y .). In the Chance case Judge Soper, speaking for the court, said (186 F. 2d at 883) : It is true that the regulation of the carrier was not enacted by state authority, although the power of the state is customarily invoked to enforce i t ; but we know of no principle of law which requires the courts to strike down a state statute which inter feres with interstate commerce but to uphold a railroad regulation which is infected with the same vice. A carrier’s power to promulgate regulations for the carrying on of its business is limited to regulations which are reasonable. Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 218 U. S. 71, 76. The defendant carriers’ regulations cannot be deemed reasonable since they de stroy the uniformity held to be essential for the promo tion and protection of interstate travel. The defendants’ segregation regulations, being ob structive of freedom of interstate travel, do not promote “ efficient service.” But under the National Transpor tation Policy declared by Congress this Commission is required to administer the Interstate Commerce Act so as to promote “ efficient service” in interstate transpor tation. 12 Therefore, even apart from the requirements of Section 3(1) of the Act, the Commission, in further ance of the national policy which it is directed to en- 12 54 Stat. 899, 49 U.S.C., note preceding Section 1. 16 force, should strike down the segregation regulations. Cf. United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 323 IT. S. 612, 616-617. C O N C L U S IO N The United States is of the view that “ the race of a passenger may not legally constitute a basis for any d if ferentiation or segregation in the course of interstate travel upon a carrier subject to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce A ct.” 13 As the Supreme Court has so recently ruled, enforced separation of the white from the colored is generally interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the latter. Just as our “ Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,” 14 so too is the Interstate Commerce Act. The time has come for this Commission, in administering that Act, to de clare unequivocally that a Negro passenger is free to travel the length and breadth of this country in the same manner as any other passenger. H e r b e r t B r o w n e l l , J r ., Attorney General. S t a n l e y N. B a r n e s , Assistant Attorney General. C h a r l e s H . W e s t o n , L a w r e n c e G o c h b e r g , Special Assistants to the Attorney General. 13 Commissioners Aitchison, Cross, Lee and Mahaffie dissenting in Henderson v. Southern Ry. Co., 284 I.C.C. 161, 165. 14 Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559. ☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICEt I9B4 S 17515 411 '