Bates v. Batte Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and Brief in Support Thereof and Appendix

    IN  TH E

Supreme Court of the United States
O ctober Term, 1950

No,

G ladys N oel B ates and R ichard  J ess B ro w n , Individually 
and on Behalf of the Negro Teachers and Principals in 
the Jackson Separate School District,

Petitioners,
vs.

J o h n  C. B a tte , President; R. M. H edekm an , J r ., Secretary; 
R. \Y. N a ef , W . R. N e w m a n , J r,, and W . I). M cCa in , 
Constituting the Board of Trustees of Jackson Separate 
School District and K. P. W a lk er , Superintendent of 
Jackson Separate Schools,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 

FIFTH  CIRCUIT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF AND APPENDIX.

R obert L. Carter ,

T htjrgood M arshall ,
20 West 40th Street,
New York 18, New York, 

Attorneys for Petitioners.
J ames A. B u r n s ,
C onstance  B aker  M otley ,

Of Counsel.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
P etitio n  for  W r it  op Certiorari

Summary Statement of the Matter Involved______ 2
Statement of F acts_________________________  5
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals___________ 6
Jurisdiction ______________________________  7
Questions Presented_________________________ 7
Reasons Relied Upon for Allowance of Writ-------  8
Conclusion ________________________________  19

B r ie f  in  S u ppo rt  T h er eo f

Opinion of the Courts Below---------------------------- 21
Jurisdiction ______________-________________  22
Statement of the Case______________________  22
Statement of the Facts_______________________ 22
Errors Relied Upon________________________  22

A r g u m en t

I. The rule of exhaustion of administrative rem­
edies was improperly applied to this case
A. It was not the intent of Congress that an 

administrative agency have primary and
exclusive jurisdiction_______________  23

B. The question to be decided is not one 
which is within the peculiar competence
of an established administrative agency— 26

C. No jurisdictional prerequisites were pre­
scribed by Congress________________  27



11

PAGE

D. Exhaustion of the state administrative
remedies is not mandatory___________  28

E. The state administrative agencies are
without authority and lack the power of 
remedy___________________________  28

II. This case is not governed by Cook v. Davis
(C. A. 5), 178 F. (2d) 595 (1949), cert, denied
340 U. 8. 811
A. The material facts in the Cook case____  33
B. The material facts in the instant case____ 34

Conclusion________________________________  37

Statutory A u th orities

U nited  S tates C ode

Title 8, Section 43______________2, 8, 9,10,11,13,14,
15,16,17,18, 25, 29, 36

Title 28, Section 1254 ______________________ 7, 22
Title 28, Section 1343(3)____________ 2,8,9,10,11,15,

16,17,18, 25, 36

G eorgia C ode A nnotated

32-613 ____________________________________ 11

M is s issippi C ode (1942)
Section 6219 ______________________________  34
Section 6234 ___________________________ 18, 29, 35
Section 6240-07 ____________________________  35
Section 6261 ----------------------------------------- 18,29,35
Section 6423 _________________________    35



Ill

O ther A u th orities
PAGE

Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 
Yale L. J. 981 (1939)_______________________  23

Congressional Globe, 42nd Congress, 1871, First Session, 
Part 1, and Part 2, Appendix________________ 14, 25

Davis, Administrative Law Doctrines of Exhaustion of 
Remedies, Ripeness for Review, and Primary Jur­
isdiction, 28 Texas L. Rev. 168, 376 (1949)______23, 26

C aces C ited

Aaron, et al. v. Cook, U. S. D. C., N. D., Ga__________ 16
Aircraft & D. Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752

(1947) ___________________________________ 8,24
Alston v. School Board (C. A. 4), 112 F. (2d) 992

(1940), cert, denied 311 IT. S. 693_____________ 15, 32
Armour & Co. v. Alton R. R., 312 U. S. 195 (1941)

10,13, 24, 27

Bates & Batte (C. A. 5), 187 F. (2d) 142 (1951)______ 6
Board of Railroad Com’rs v. Great N. Ry., 281 IT. S.

412 (1930) __________________________ 10,13, 24, 27
Bottone v. Lindsley (C. A. 10), 170 F. (2d) 705 (1948)

10,14,15, 27
Briggs v. Elliott, U. S. D. C., E. D., S. C____________  16
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, U. S, D. C.,

F. D., Kansas_____________________________ 16
Burt v. City of New York (C. A. 2), 156 F. (2d) 791 

(1945) ___________ 14,16,17,25,27

Carter et al. v. School Board (C. A. 4), 182 F. (2d)
531 (1950) _____________________________16,17,27

Clark et al. v. Bd. of Trustees, 117 Miss. 234 (1918)......18, 28



IV

PAGE

Cook v. Davis (C. A. 5), 178 F. (2d) 595 (1949), cert.
den. 340 U. S. 811 (1950) ___ 3, 5, 6,11,12,13,16,17, 23,

33, 34, 35, 36
Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943)______10,15, 27

Federal Power Commission v. Arkansas Power & Light
Co., 330 U. S. 802 (1947)_____________________8, 24

Federal Power Commission v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe
Line Co., 337 U. 8. 496 (1949) _______________ 19, 29

First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal
Power Commission, 328 TJ. S. 152 (1946)______9,18, 28

First National Bank v. Albright, 208 U. S. 548 (1908)_ 23 
Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U. S. 147 (1948)_______________ 17

Georgia v. Penn. R. B. Co., 324 U. S. 439 (1945)_____9,15,
19 24 26 29 39

Glicker v. Michigan (C. C. A. 6), 160 F. (2d) 96 (1947)
10 15 27

Great N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 H. 8. 285,
290 (1922) -------------------------------------- 10,13,24,27

Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U. S. 496 (1939)__10,14,15, 25, 27, 29
Heard v. Ouachita Parish School Board (D. C. La.),

94 F. Supp. 897 (1951)________________________ 16, 27
Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620 (1946)._19, 24, 29
Hobbs v. Germany, 94 Miss. 469 (1909)______________ 18, 28

Johnson v. Board of Trustees (D. C. Ky.), 83 F. Supp.
707 (1949) _______________________________ _ 16

Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 (1939)______________  11
Cf. Levers v. Anderson, 326 U. 8. 219 (1945)______ 18, 28
Lopez v. Secumbe (D.C. Col.), 71 F. Supp. 769 (1944)_„_. 16

Maeauley v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 327 U. S.
540 (1946) ________________________________ 8, 24

Manchester v. Leiby, 117 F. (2d) 661 (1941) (C. C.
A. 1st) ------------------------------------------------10,16, 27



V
PAGE

Mitchell v. Wright (C. A. 5), 154 F. (2d) 924, cert. den.
329 U. S. 733 (1945) ________________________  10

Moreau v. Grandich, 114 Miss. 5160 (1917)________ 18, 28
Moore v. Illinois Central Railway, 312 U. S. 630

(1941)__________________ _________________18, 28
Morris v. Williams, 149 F. (2d) 703 (1945)________ 14,15
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding, 303 U. S. 41 (1938)

8,10,13, 23, 24, 27

Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S. 300
(1938) ___________________________________  23

Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927)___________  14

Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U. S. 561 
(1946) _____   8,24

Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 300 (1934)_ 23 
Picking v. Penn. R. Co. (C. A. 3), 151 F. (2d) 240

(1945) ________________ „_________________14,29
Prendergast v. N. Y., 262 U. S. 43 (1923)__________ 18, 28
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 TJ. S. 210 (1908) 23
Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491________  23

Rice v. Elmore (C. C. A. 4), 165 F. (2d) 387 (1947)__14,15
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218 (1947)_8, 24
Robert v. Lowndes, TJ. S. 1). C. List. Md_______ ___ 16
Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 222 TJ. S. 506 

(1912) ______________ ______________ 10,13,24,27

Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945)________  14
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Otis, 338 TJ. S.

843 (1949) ________________________________ 8, 24
Shannahan v. United States, 303 U. S. 296 (1938)____  23
Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948)______________ 26
Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Oklahoma, 332 U. S.

631 (1948) _______________________________  17
Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co.,

339 U. S. 239 (1950) _______________ 10,13, 26, 27
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944)___ 10,14,15, 27, 29



VI

PAGE

State ex rel. Plunkett v. Miller, 162 Miss. 149 (1931) 18, 28 
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville E. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192

(1944) ___________________________________  9

Texas & P. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S.
426 (1907) ----------------------------------------10,13,24,28

Thomas v. Gray, U. S. D. C., M. D., N. C .__________  16
Thomas v. Hibbitts (D. C. Tenn.), 46 F. Supp. 368

(1942)------------------------------------------------------- 16
Thompson v. Gibbes (D. C. S. C.), 60 F. Supp. 872

(1945) ----------------------- ,----------------------------- 16,27
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and

Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210 (1944) _____________  9

United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947) 9
United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1944)_______ 14
United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161 (1904)__ 8, 23, 24
United States Alkali Export Ass’n Inc. v. United 

States, 325 U. S. 196 (1945)______9,18,19, 24, 28, 29, 32

Vandalia Railroad Co. v. Public Service Comm., 242 
U. S. 255 (1916) ___________________________  23

Westminster School District v. Mendez (C.C.A. 9), 161
F. (2d) 774 (1947) ________________________14,15

Whitmyer v. Lincoln Parish School Bd. (D. C. La.), 75
F. Supp. 686 (1948) ________________________  16

Wrighten v. Board of Trustees (D.C.S. C.), 72 F. Supp.
948 (1947) 16



Vll

A p p en d ix

Mississippi Code, 1942 and 1948 Supplement
Section 6217 
Section 6218 
Section 6219 
Section 6232.11 
Section 6232.12 
Section 6232.13 
Section 6232.14 
Section 6232.15 
Section 6234 
Section 6235 
Section 6236 
Section 6237 
Section 6238 
Section 6245.01 
Section 6245.02 
Section 6245.03 
Section 6245.04 
Section 6411 
Section 6416 
Section 6418 
Section 6245.05 
Section 6245.07 
Section 6245.08 
Section 6258 
Section 6259 
Section 6260 
Section 6261 
Section 6262 
Section 6263 
Section 6264.5 
Section 6281 
Section 6282 
Section 6283 
Section 6284 
Section 6290

PAGE

.38, 81



Vlll

PAGE

Mississippi Code, 1942 and 1948 Supplement______38, 81
Section 6295 
Section 6422 
Section 6423 
Section 6527 
Section 6528 
Section 6541 
Section 6542 
Section 6543 
Section 6558 
Section 6569 
Section 6570 
Section 6571 
Section 6572 
Section 6574

Mississippi Senate Bill No. 500__________________  82

Mississippi Senate Bill No. 501__________________  84

Georgia Code Annotated
Section 32-613 _____________________________ 90



IN' THE

Supreme Court of the United States
O ctober T erm , 1950

No.

G ladys N oel B ates and R ichard  J ess 
B row n , Individually and on Behalf of 
the Negro Teachers and Principals in 
the Jackson Separate School District,

Petitioners,
vs.

J o h n  C. B atte , President; R. M. H eder- 
m a n , J r ., Secretary; R. W . N a ef , W . R. 
N e w m a n , J r ., and W . D. M cCa in , Con­
stituting the Board of Trustees of 
Jackson Separate School District and 
K. P. W alker , Superintendent of Jack- 
son Separate Schools,

Respondents.

PETITIO N  FO R W R IT OF CERTIORARI TO 
TH E UNITED STATES COURT OF A PPEALS 

FOR TH E FIFTH  CIRCUIT.
To the Honorable, the Chief Justice of the United States 

and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of 
the United States:

Petitioners respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari 
issue to review the judgment of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirming the judgment of 
the District Court of the United States for the Southern



2

District of Mississippi dismissing this action on the ground 
that petitioners had failed to exhaust administrative reme­
dies provided by the laws of the State of Mississippi.

Summary Statement of the Matter Involved.
This suit was filed in the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi on March 4, 1948. 
The suit was originally brought by Gladys Noel Bates, 
individually, and on behalf of the Negro teachers and prin­
cipals in the Jackson Separate School District. The grava­
men of her complaint was that the respondents were dis­
criminating against her and all other Negro teachers and 
principals similarly situated in the fixing and payment of 
teachers’ salaries solely because of race and color in viola­
tion of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution (R. 3-15).

This suit was brought pursuant to the provisions of 
Title 8, United States Code, Section 43, and the jurisdiction 
of the District Court was invoked pursuant to the pro­
visions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 1343(3) 
(R. 3-4).

On February 7, 1948, prior to filing suit in the District 
Court, petitioner Gladys Noel Bates filed a petition with 
the respondents on behalf of herself and other Negro 
teachers and principals in the public school system of Jack- 
son, Mississippi, alleging unconstitutional discrimination 
in the fixing and payment of teachers ’ salaries and petition­
ing for an abandonment and cessation of such practices (R. 
66-67). Respondents in reply to this petition advised the 
original plaintiff by letter that they had no knowledge of 
any such discrimination (R. 89).

On May 5, 1948, the respondents, defendants in the Dis­
trict Court, moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground,



3

inter alia, that the plaintiff, petitioner Gladys Noel Bates, 
had failed to exhaust administrative remedies provided by 
the laws of the State of Mississippi (R. 16-17). This mo­
tion was denied on December 20, 1948 (R. 18). On Febru­
ary 15, 1949, respondents filed their answer (R. 19-38) and 
moved for summary judgment (R. 19), which motion was 
denied on July 15, 1949 (R. 61).

In the interim, respondents refused to renew their con­
tract with Mrs. Bates because of her participation in this 
suit (R. 163, 244). On May 9,1949, petitioner Richard Jess 
Brown filed a motion to intervene as party-plaintiff in the 
District Court which was granted on December 12, 1949 
(R. 66).

This cause came to trial on December 12, 1949. Before 
proceeding with the taking of testimony, the trial court 
again ruled that the defense of failure to exhaust adminis­
trative remedies was insufficient in law, that the adminis­
trative remedies provided were inadequate and had ref­
erence only to those controversies arising under the school 
laws of the State of Mississippi; that this controversy arose 
not under the school laws of Mississippi, but under the 
Constitution of the United States and that, therefore, the 
statutory provisions on which respondents relied need not 
have been pursued before bringing this action (R. 63-64).

After trial, but before judgment, the United States Court, 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, decided the case of Cook 
v. Davis, 178 F. (2d) 595 (1949), cert, denied, 340 U. S. 
811 (1950). In that case, the court below reversed a judg­
ment of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia, which had entered judgment enjoining 
and restraining the defendants from paying to the plaintiff 
and other Negro teachers and principals in the public 
schools of Atlanta, Georgia, less salaries than was paid to



4

white teachers and principals of equal qualifications and 
experiences and performing substantially the same duties 
solely because of race and color in violation of the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, on the 
ground that state administrative remedies had not been 
exhausted.

On February 22, 1950, the District Court rendered an 
opinion dismissing the complaint herein without prejudice 
on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust ad­
ministrative remedies (R. 253, 256). The trial court stated 
that it did so reluctantly but felt that it was bound by the de­
cision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit in the Co oh case. The trial court stated that it was 
still of the opinion that the administrative remedies pro­
vided by the laws of the State of Mississippi were inade­
quate (R. 253), and made findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in its opinion in order that the appellate court might 
have before it the whole case (E. 253).

It found that the wide differential between the salaries 
paid to Negro teachers and principals and those paid to 
white teachers and principals could only have resulted from 
racial discrimination in violation of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (E. 248). It further 
found that as to petitioners Gladys Noel Bates and Richard 
Jess Brown less salary was being paid to them than was 
being paid to white teachers of equal qualification and ex­
perience and performing substantially the same functions 
(R. 247). The trial court held, however, that the failure of 
respondents to renew the contract of Mrs. Bates was not 
illegal (R. 256-257) in spite of the fact that evidence was 
produced at the trial to show that Mrs. Bates had not been 
reemployed solely because of her participation in this ac­
tion (R. 136, 137, 159, 162, 163, 164). Final judgment was



5

entered March 22, 1950. Notice of Appeal was filed on 
March 20, 1950 (R. 258).

The argument before the United States Court of Ap­
peals took place on January 24, 1951 (R. 296). That court 
affirmed the judgment of dismissal of the District Court on 
February 15, 1951. In affirming the judgment of the Dis­
trict Court, it ruled that this case was governed by Cook v. 
Davis, supra (R. 298). Whereupon, petitioners bring the 
cause here by this petition for writ of certiorari.

Statem ent of Facts.

Petitioners do not set forth a detailed statement of the 
factual evidence produced at the trial showing the existence 
of discrimination in the payment of teachers salaries. The 
inclusion of this matter petitioners deem immaterial for the 
reason that that issue is not before this court. Howrever, a 
brief resume of the essential facts follows in order to give 
this Court a more complete picture of the entire case.

The respondents, upon the trial, freely admitted that 
Negro teachers were paid less salary than white teachers 
(R. 69, 79, 106, 208, 210, 212). Witnesses for respondents 
testified that as to character, professional qualifications and 
academic training, there was no difference between Negro 
and white teachers (R. 113-114). In summary, the respon­
dents attempted to justify the higher pay to white teachers 
on the ground that such teachers were better able to use 
their training and organize their work and were further 
advanced culturally than were the Negro teachers and prin­
cipals (R. 100-154).

Petitioners engaged the services of a professional statis­
tician who made a statistical analysis of all of the records 
of the respondents with respect to salaries. This analysis 
is contained in Exhibit #9  which has been transmitted to



6

this court in its original form as a part of the record. This 
study shows that although Negro teachers and principals 
compared favorably with white teachers and principals in 
training and experience and types of certificates held, their 
rate of compensation was far below that of white teachers 
and principals in every category and at every level in the 
public school system. For example, as between white prin­
cipals and Negro principals at the senior high school level, 
there was a salary differential of 110 percent (R, 187); at 
the .junior high school level, 111.54 percent (R. 187); at the 
elementary school level, 81.32 percent (R. 187). As between 
white and Negro teachers at the senior high school level, 
the differential was 57.65 percent (R. 187); at the junior 
high school level, 46.40 percent (R. 187); and at the elemen­
tary school level, 53.30 percent (R. 187). These facts were 
not disputed by appellees.

The trial court found that petitioners and other Negro 
teachers and principals were being discriminated against 
in the payment of salaries and, except for the decision in 
Cook v. Davis, would have entered judgment for petitioners.

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir­
cuit in affirming the judgment of the trial court relied on 
its own decision in the case of Cook v. Davis, supra (R. 
298). Without going into the similarities and dissimilari­
ties between the Georgia and Mississippi statutes, the Court 
simply stated that “ the statutes of the two states are suffi­
ciently alike to make the decision in Cook’s case dispositive 
of the appeal.” The Court affirmed the judgment of dis­
missal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The 
opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported. Bates v. 
Batte, 187 Fed. (2d) 142 (1951) (Adv. Op.).



7

Jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to the 

provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 1254. 
This is a case arising under the Constitution and laws of 
the United States and involves rights secured by the Four­
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and was 
brought to enforce a right conferred by act of Congress.

In the original complaint filed by petitioner Gladys Noel 
Bates and in the complaint filed by the intervenor-plaintiff, 
Bichard Jess Brown, and throughout the entire proceed­
ings, petitioners have maintained that the action of re­
spondents in paying them and the other Negro teachers 
and principals in the Jackson, Mississippi, Separate School 
District less salaries than is paid to white teachers and 
principals of equal qualifications and experience is a denial 
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Four­
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

Questions Presented.

I.

Whether the rule which requires that administrative 
remedies be exhausted before seeking relief from a federal 
court is properly invoked in an action brought pursuant to 
Act of Congress where the Congress has not conferred on 
an administrative agency primary exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear and determine such cases?

II.

Whether the rule which requires that administrative 
remedies be exhausted before seeking relief from a federal 
court is properly invoked in an action in a federal district 
court which has been brought to redress the deprivation



8
under color of state statute, regulation, custom and usage 
of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Consti­
tution and laws of the United States as provided by Title 
8 U. S. C. § 43 and Title 28 U. S. C. § 1343(3) ?

III.

Whether the State of Mississippi has provided an ad­
ministrative remedy which must be pursued by a teacher 
complaining of unconstitutional discrimination in the fixing 
and payment of teachers’ salaries before seeking the aid 
of a federal district court to enjoin such discrimination in 
accordance with the provisions of Title 8 U. S. C. § 43 and 
Title 28 U. S. C. §1343(3)?

Reasons Relied Upon for Allowance of Writ.

I.

The rule which requires that administrative remedies 
be exhausted prior to resorting to a federal court for relief 
is a rule which is applied by this Court in cases involving 
Acts of Congress only where there is clearly expressed or 
implied a legislative intent or design to confer on an ad­
ministrative agency, whether state or federal, primary 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine certain mat­
ters, with express power to remedy, Securities & Exchange 
Commission v. Otis, 338 U. S. 843 (1949), Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U. 8. 218 (1947), Aircraft <& D. Equip­
ment Corp. v. Eirsch, 331 U. S. 752 (1947), Federal Power 
Commission v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 330 U. S. 802 
(1947), Macauley v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 327 U. S. 
540 (1946), Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 
U. S. 561 (1946), Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 
303 U. S. 41 (1938), United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 
161 (1904); and when this Court has found no such Con-



9

gressional intent or design or agency power, pleas for 
application of the rule have been denied. United Public 
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 XL S. 75 (1947), First Iowa Hydro- 
Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission, 328 
U. 8. 152 (1946), Georgia v. Penn. R. R. Co., 324 U. S. 439 
(1945), United States Alkali Export Ass’n Inc. v. United 
States, 325 XJ. 8. 196 (1945), Tunstall v. Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 XI. S. 210 (1944), 
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 323 XT. 8. 192 
(1944).

In providing by Title 8 XT. S. C. §43 for the right of 
redress, in law or equity or other proper proceeding, 
against “ Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or 
Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected a citizen of 
the XTnited States, or other persons within the jurisdiction 
thereof, to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”, the 
Congress of the XTnited States did not, either expressly or 
impliedly, confer on an administrative agency, whether 
state or federal, primary exclusive jurisdiction to hear and 
determine whether such deprivation had occurred, with 
power to remedy, but conferred upon the district courts of 
the XTnited States, by the express provisions of Title 28 
XT. 8. C. §1343(3), original jurisdiction in such cases with­
out attaching thereto any jurisdictional prerequisites.1

1 Title 28 U. S. C. § 1343(3) provides:
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 

action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
* * *
“ (3) To redress the deprivation under color of any State law, 

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privi­
lege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States 
or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or 
of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” (June 
25, 1948, c. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 932.)



10

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944), Douglas v. Jean­
nette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943), Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496 
(1939), Bottone v. Lindsley (C. A. 10), 170 F. (2d) 705 
(1948), Glicker v. Michigan (C. A. 6), 160 F. (2d) 96 (1947), 
City of Manchester v. Leihy (C. A. 1), 117 F. (2d) 661 
(1941).

The decision of the court below is, therefore, not in ac­
cord with the decisions of this Court in cases involving 
Acts of Congress.

II.

The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies was 
applied for the first time by a federal court of appeals in 
a case of this kind, as far as counsel for petitioners have 
been able to ascertain, in Cook v. Davis (C. A. 5), 178 F. 
(2d) 595 (1949), cert, denied 340 U. S. 811, a case decided 
after trial in the instant case but just prior to the district 
court’s decision herein and relied on by the district court 
and the court below in dismissing this action. A jurisdic­
tional prerequisite to bringing a case pursuant to Title 8 
U. S. C. § 43 and Title 28 U. S. C. § 1343(3) has thus been 
added by judicial fiat. cf. Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawana & 
Western R. Co., 339 U. S. 239 (1950), Armour & Co. v. 
Alton R. R., 312 IT. S. 195 (1941), Myers v. Bethlehem 
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 52 (1938), Board of Rail­
road Com’rs v. Great, N. Ry., 281 U. S. 412 (1930), Great 
N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285, 290 (1922), 
Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 222 U. S. 506 
(1912), Texas <& P. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. 8. 
426 (1907).

Thus the judgment of the court below, affirming the 
judgment of the district court reluctantly rendered after 
petitioners succeeded on the merits, that this action must



11

be dismissed for failure of petitioners to exhaust state 
administrative remedies is not in accord with the intent 
of Congress that the district courts of the United States 
have original jurisdiction of civil actions brought to en­
force the right conferred by Title 8 U. S. C. §43.

III.

This Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in 
the Cook case, Davis v. Cook, cert, denied 340 U. S. 811 
(1950), but the petition therein did not present for con­
sideration the questions here presented—the major one 
being whether the rule of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is properly invoked in an action brought pursuant 
to Title 8 U. S. C. §43 in a district court of the United 
States pursuant to Title 28 U. S. C. §1343(3). Therefore, 
the main question here presented is squarely before this 
Court for the first time. See, Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 
268, 274 (1939); Mitchell v. Wright (C. A. 5), 154 F. (2d) 
924, 928, cert, denied 329 U. S. 733 (1945).

IV.

The facts in this case are materially different from the 
facts in the Cook case. In the latter case, the defendant 
local Board of Education, after the institution of the action 
in the federal court, adopted a new salary schedule. The 
court below was of the opinion that unconstitutional dis­
crimination had been eliminated from the new schedule 
and that the discrimination which still existed resulted 
from the dual salary schedule established by the State 
Board of Ediication. The State Board in that case had the 
power, Georgia Code Ann. 32-613, to fix a schedule of 
minimum salaries to be paid to teachers out of the public 
school funds of the state, and although the local boards 
could supplement this salary, they were bound to pay



12

every teacher this minimum. In addition, the State Board in 
Georgia was empowered to determine the minimum number 
of teachers which each local board might employ and to 
classify such teachers. It disbursed school funds to the 
various local boards on the basis of the minimum stand­
ards which it established. The State Board was not made 
a party defendant, although it was an indispensable party 
to the action because of the power it exercised with respect 
to teachers ’ salaries. Without having jurisdiction over the 
State Board, the issue of salary discrimination could not 
have been completely determined by the court in the Cook 
case.

In the instant case, the State Board has no power to fix 
teachers’ salaries. The trial court found that it was the 
exclusive duty of the respondent board to select teachers 
and fix their salaries (R. 249, 250). The State Board has 
only general supervisory powers over the schools and dis­
perses the school funds on a per capita basis. It does not 
even have power to determine what portion of the funds 
so dispersed may be used for teachers’ salaries. There­
fore, the determination as to salaries made by the respon­
dent board in this case is final. The State Board in this 
case was therefore not a necessary defendant or a proper 
agency to which to appeal. Even if petitioner appealed to 
the State Board, that agency could take no action deter­
minative of the issues herein presented.

The court below did not direct the district court to re­
tain jurisdiction of this cause until the alleged administra­
tive remedies had been exhausted, as was done in the Cook 
case. Instead, the court below affirmed the judgment of 
dismissal, thus indicating that the district court had no 
jurisdiction until the alleged remedies had been exhausted.

The material and controlling facts in the Cook case are 
therefore entirely different from those in the instant case



13

and, therefore, the Cook decision, contrary to the decision 
of the court below, cannot govern the disposition of this 
case.

V .

On motion for rehearing which was denied, the court 
below in the Cook case held that the rule of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies “ is a rule of self-restraint formu­
lated by the federal courts and is not influenced by state 
practice”. This reasoning was relied on by the district 
court in the instant case. In cases arising under Acts of 
Congress, this Court has looked to the statute passed by 
the Congress to determine whether the Congress intended 
exhaustion of administrative remedies to be a jurisdic­
tional prerequisite. Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna & 
Western R. Co., supra; Armour & Co. v. Alton R. R., supra; 
Roard of Railroad Com’rs v. Great N. Ry., supra; Great N. 
Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., supra; Myers v. Bethlehem 
Shipbuilding Corp., supra; Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad, supra; Texas P. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 
supra. Therefore, with respect to cases involving Acts of 
Congress, as in the instant case, the rule of exhaustion of 
administrative remedy is not applied by this Court as a 
matter of judicial self-restraint, especially when Congress 
has indicated specifically that jurisdiction is in federal 
courts, but is applied only where there is clearly expressed 
or implied a legislative intent or design to confer on an 
administrative agency, whether state or federal, primary 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine certain matters 
before invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court.

VI.
Title 8 U. S. C. §43 is one of the Civil Eights Acts 

passed by the Congress immediately after adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution pursu-



14

ant to the provisions of Section 5 of the Amendment which 
specifically empowered the Congress “ to enforce, by ap­
propriate legislation” the provisions of the Amendment.2 
This Act granted “a right of action sounding in tort to 
every individual whose federal rights are trespassed upon 
by an officer acting under pretense of state law” .8 In other 
words, “a field was created upon which a state officer could 
not tread without being guilty of trespass and liable in 
damages” 4 in action at law, Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 
536 (1927); Smith v. Allwright, supra; see, United States 
v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 323-324 (1941) and Screws v. 
United States, 325 U. S. 91, 99 (1945); Picking v. Penn. R. 
Co. (C. A. 3), 151 F. (2d) 240 (1945); Burt v. City of New 
York (C. A. 2), 156 F. (2d) 791; Bottone v. Lindsley, supra; 
or without subjecting himself to an injunction in a suit in 
equity, Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496 (1939); Morris v. 
Williams (C. A. 8), 149 F. (2d) 703 (1945); Westminster 
School District, etc. v. Mendez (C. A. 9), 161 F. (2d) 774 
(1947); Rice v. Elmore (C. A. 4), 165 F. (2d) 387 (1947).

Title 8 IT. S. C. § 43 therefore conferred a right. It 
conferred a right to bring an action either in law or in 
equity to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, 
custom, or usage, of rights, privileges, and immunities se-

2 The legislative history of this act is found in Congressional 
Globe 42nd Congress, 1871, First Session, Part 1, report on H.R. 
No. 320, p. 317 and debate pp. 385, 395, 461 and 495, and Part 2, 
Appendix, pp. 86, 113, 209 and 217, 217.

The Act provides: “Every person who, under color of any stat­
ute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” Act of April 20, 
1871, Chap. 22, 17 Stat. at L. 13, Revised Statutes, § 1979.

3 Picking v. Penn R. Co. (C. A. 3), 151 F. (2d) 240, 249 (1945).
4 Ibid.



15

cured by the Federal Constitution. The right not to have 
race discrimination play a part in the fixing and payment 
of teachers’ salaries is a right secured by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Alston v. School 
Board (C. A. 4), 112 F. (2d) 992 (1940), cert, denied 311 
U. S. 693. Protection of this right does not involve a de­
termination of the salary which should be paid to an indi­
vidual teacher or even a class of teachers. Alston v. School 
Board, supra; Morris v. Williams (C. A. 8), 149 F. (2d) 703. 
An action such as this, which is brought in equity to pro­
tect this right with respect to the future, is thus not an 
action which requires that the court be substituted for an 
administrative agency—it is one brought to eliminate from 
the administrative determination unconstitutional discrimi­
nation in the future, cf. Georgia v. Penn. R. R., 324 IT. S. 
439 (1945). The right to bring such an action initially in 
a federal court is specifically authorized by Act of Con­
gress. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1343(3).

Once these rights are established, the whole concept of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable for 
the simple reason that no administrative determination is 
involved.

VII.
Since the enactment of Title 8 U. S. C. § 43, numer­

ous actions have been successfully brought via Title 28 
IT. S. C. §1343(3) in the federal district courts without 
the necessity of meeting any jurisdictional prerequisites 
other than those set forth in said statutes. Smith v. 
Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 
IT. S. 157 (1943); Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 IT. S. 496 (1939); 
Bottone v. Lindsley (C. A. 10), 170 F. (2d) 705 (1948); 
Glicker v. Michigan (C. A. 6), 160 F. (2d) 96 (1947); West­
minster School District v. Mendez (C. A. 9), 161 F. (2d) 
774 (1947); Rice v. Elmore (C. A. 4), 165 F. (2d) 387 
(1947); Morris v. Williams (C. A. 8), 149 F. (2d) 703



16

(1945); City of Manchester v. Leiby (0. A. 1), 117 F. (2d) 
661 (1941); Johnson v. Board of Trustees, (D. C.-Ky.), 83 
F. Supp. 707 (1949); Whitmyer v. Lincoln Parish School 
Bd. (D. C.-La.), 75 F. Supp. 686 (1948); Wrighten v. Board 
of Trustees (D. C.-S. C.), 72 F. Supp. 948 (1947); Thompson 
v. Gibbes (D. C.-S. C.), 60 F. Supp. 872 (1945); Lopes v. 
Seccombe (D. C.-Col.), 71 F. Supp. 769 (1944); Thomas v. 
Hibbitts (D. C.-Tenn.), 46 F. Supp. 368 (1942). This prac­
tice and the authority of district courts to proceed in these 
cases without prior resort to other remedies, Carter v. 
School Board (C. A. 4), 182 F. (2d) 531 (1950); Burt v. 
City of New York (C. A. 2), 156 F. (2d) 791, semble; 
Thompson v. Gibbes, supra; see Heard v. Ouachita Parish 
School Board (D. C.-La.), 94 F. Supp. 897 (1951), is thus 
firmly established in our jurisprudence.

Several cases brought to enforce the right conferred by 
Title 8 U. S. C. § 43 pursuant to Title 28 U. S. C. § 1343(3) 
are presently pending in federal district courts throughout 
the United States.5 In several of these cases the defendant 
state officers have already raised the objection that plain­
tiffs have failed to exhaust administrative remedies, rely­
ing on Cook v. Davis (C. A. 5), 178 F. (2d) 595 (1949), 
cert, denied 340 U. S. 811.8 These cases involve not only 
complaints of unconstitutional discrimination in the fixing 
and payment of teachers’ salaries but involve cases com­
plaining of unconstitutional discrimination in providing 
public education. In the latter kind of case, this Court has 
already rejected the plea that a prior demand must first be

5 E. g. Briggs v. Elliott, U. S. D. C., E. D., S. C .; Aaron v. Cook, 
U. S. D. C., N. D., Ga.; Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
U. S. D. C., First Dist., Kansas; Roberts v. Lowndes, U. S. D. C., 
Dist. M d.; Thomas v. Gray, U. S. D. C., M. D., N. C .; Heard v. 
Ouachita Parish School Bd. (U. S. D. C., W. D., La.), 947 F. Supp. 
897 (1951).

6 Briggs v. Elliott, supra, note 5; Aaron v. Cook, supra, note 5.



17

made on state officials before relief can be sought in the 
courts, Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Okla­
homa, 332 U. S. 631 (1948); Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U. S. 147 
(1948).

For the foregoing reasons, and for the reason that the 
rights which were intended to be granted or secured by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, for 
the infringement of which the Congress has provided a 
right of action, are presently subject to such infringement 
by persons acting under color of state law in open and ex­
press defiance of recent decisions of this Court,7 this peti­
tion should be granted in order to put an end to the uncer­
tainty which now exists with respect to the intent of Con­
gress in enacting Title 8 U. S. C. § 43 and Title 28 U. S. C. 
§1343(3) and to the uncertainty for both litigants and 
federal courts which ensues since Cook v. Davis, supra,

VIII.
The judgment of the court below is in conflict with the 

judgment of other circuits, Carter, et al. v. School Board 
(C. A. 4), 182 F. (2d) 531 (1950) and Burt v. City of New 
York (C. A. 2), 156 F. (2d) 791 (1945), semble, cases

7 In February, 1951, the Georgia Legislature passed a bill author­
izing withdrawal of school funds from any white school to which a 
court might order a Negro admitted. See N. Y. Times for February 
11, 15, 18, 1951.

On September 28, 1950, the N. Y. Times reported that Gov. 
Herman Talmadge of Georgia had asserted that the United States 
does not have enough troops or police to enforce a court order for 
Negro and white students to sit in the same class rooms.

On May 11, 1951, the N. Y. Times reported that the legislature of 
the State of Florida was contemplating legislation similar to that 
passed by the State of Georgia.

On January 25, 1951, and on March 17 and 19, 1951 the New 
York Times reported that Gov. James Bums of South Carolina 
threatened action similar to that taken in Georgia and generally 
threatened to defy anti-segregation rulings.



18

brought to enforce the right conferred by Title 8 U. S. C. 
§ 43 pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U. 8. C. 
§1343(3).

IX.

Even if this Court should decide that the rule requiring 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is properly invoked 
in an action in a federal district court to redress the depri­
vation under color of state law of a right secured by the 
federal constitution, the State of Mississippi has not pro­
vided an administrative remedy which must be exhausted 
by a teacher complaining of unconstitutional discrimination 
in the fixing and payment of teachers’ salaries since ex­
haustion of this remedy is not mandatory, cf. First Iowa 
Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission, 
328 U. S. 152 (1946); United States Alkali Export Assn. Inc. 
v. United States, 325 IT. S. 196 (1945), cf. Levers v. Ander­
son, 326 U. 8. 219 (1945) and Prendergast v. New York, 
262 U. S. 43 (1923), Moore v. Illinois Central Railway, 312 
U. 8. 630 (1941), having been so construed by the highest 
court of the State of Mississippi, State ex rel. Plunkett 
v. Miller, 162 Miss. 149 (1931), Clark, et al. v. Board of 
Trustees, 117 Miss. 234 (1918), Moreau v. Grandich, 114 
Miss. 560 (1917), Hobbs v. Germany, 94 Miss. 469 (1909).

In addition, the agencies to which petitioners might 
have appealed are without the authority or power to 
remedy the discrimination. The sole power and authority 
of the county superintendent is to render a decision and 
give advice in all controversies arising under the school 
law. Miss. Code (1942) § 6261. The sole power and author­
ity of the State Board is to render a decision on a written 
statement of facts in appeals from the decisions of the 
county superintendent or the state superintendent. Miss. 
Code (1942) §6234. Neither agency has power to enforce



19

its decisions, cf. Federal Power Commission v. Panhandle 
Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337 U. S. 496 (1949); Hillsborough 
v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620 (1946); Georgia v. Penn. R. R. 
Co., 324 U. S. 439 (1945); United States Alkali Export 
Assn., Inc. v. United States, supra.

The judgment of the Court below is thus not in accord 
with the decisions of this Court in cases where the admin­
istrative remedy has been found to be not mandatory and 
in cases where it was found that the administrative agency 
lacked the power of remedy.

Conclusion.
W h er efo r e , it is respectfully submitted that this peti­

tion for writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit should be granted.

R obert L. Carter,

T hurgood M arshall ,
20 West 40th Street, 
New York 18, New7 York, 

Attorneys for Petitioners.
J am es A. B u r n s ,
C onstance  B aker  M otley ,

Of Counsel.

Dated: May 15, 1951.





1ST T H E

Supreme Court of the United States
O ctober T erm , 1950

No.

G ladys N oel B ates and R ichabd  J ess 
B row n , Individually and on Behalf of 
the Negro Teachers and Principals in 
the Jackson Separate School District,

Petitioners,
vs.

J ohn C. B atte , President; R. M. H edeb- 
m a n , J b., Secretary; R. W. N aee, W. R. 
N ew m a n , J b., and W. D. M cCa in , Con­
stituting the Board of Trustees of 
Jackson Separate School District and 
K. P. W alk eb , Superintendent of Jack- 
son Separate Schools,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT 

OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

Opinion of the Courts Below.
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Fifth Circuit is found on page 296 of the record in this 
ease. The opinion is officially reported in the advanced 
opinions of the Federal Reporter, Second Series, Bates v.

21



22

Batte, 187 F. (2d) 142 (1951). The opinion of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Missis­
sippi may he found on page 245 of the record. That opin­
ion is not officially reported.

Jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 

the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 
1254. The United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Mississippi entered a final judgment in this 
cause dismissing the action for failure to exhaust state 
administrative remedies on March 22, 1950. That judg­
ment was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit on February 15, 1951. This is a case 
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States. In this action petitioners have consistently main­
tained that rights secured to them by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution have been violated.

Statement of the Case.
The Statement of the Case is contained in the Summary 

Statement of the Matter Involved in the Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari herein.

Statement of the Facts.
A brief statement of the facts is made in the Petition 

for Writ of Certiorari and therefore will not be repeated 
here.

Errors Relied Upon.

The Court below erred in applying the rule of ex­
haustion of administrative rem edies to this case.



23

The Court below erred in affirming the judgment 
of dismissal on the ground that state administrative
remedies had not been exhausted.

The Court below erred in holding that this case is 
governed by Cook v. Davis (C. A. 5 ), 178 F. (2d) 595 
(1949), cert, denied 340 U. S. 811.

A R G U M E N T .
I.

The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies 
was improperly applied to this case.
A . It w a s not th e  in ten t o f  C ongress th a t an  adm in istrative

a g en cy  h a v e  prim ary and exc lu sive  jurisd iction .

The rule which requires that administrative remedies 
be exhausted before invoking the jurisdiction of a federal 
court is unusually broad in its scope.1 Its application to 
varying circumstances2 has been so wide that it now ap­
pears that the rule is not one rule but an unconscious 
assimilation of several ancillary rules or rules having a 
similar effect in application.3 Nevertheless, whenever a

1 Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 Yale L. T. 
981 (1939).

2E. g. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1908); 
United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. 8. 161 (1904); First National 
Bank v. Albright, 208 U. S. 548 (1908) ; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Seattle, 291 U. S. 300 (1934) ; Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 
302 U. S. 300 (1938) ; Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491 
(1923); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 
(1938) ; Vandalia Railroad Company v. Public Service Commission, 
242 U. S. 255 (1916); Shannahan v. United States, 303 U. S. 296 
(1938).

8 Davis, Administrative Law Doctrines of Exhaustion of Reme­
dies, Ripeness for Review, and Primary Jurisdiction, 28 Texas L. 
Rev. 168, 376 (1949). Professor Davis intimates that courts have, 
in applying this rule, assimilated the equity rule of not lending its 
aid where there was an adequate remedy at law, the rule that a court 
should not intervene until the matter is ripe for judicial review, the 
rule of primary jurisdiction.



24

ease has come before this Court which is the subject of 
Congressional legislation, this Court has looked at the 
statute passed by the Congress to determine whether the 
Congress has conferred on an administrative agency pri­
mary exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine certain 
matters before providing for judicial review. Securities 
& Exchange Commission v. Otis, 338 U. S. 843 (1949); Rice 
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 IT. S. 218 (1947); Aircraft 
& D. Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 IT. S. 752 (1947); 
Federal Power Commission v. Arkansas Power & Light 
Co., 330 IT. S. 802 (1947); Macauley v. Waterman Steam­
ship Corp., 327 IT. S. 540 (1946); Order of Railway Con­
ductors v. Pitney, 326 IT. S. 561 (1946); Myers v. Bethlehem 
Shipbuilding Corp., supra; United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 
U. S. 161 (1904). In other words, this Court must find 
that the Congress intended that certain matters should be 
first determined by an administrative tribunal as a pre­
requisite to the court’s jurisdiction. Armour <& Co. v. 
Alton R. R., 312 IT. 8. 195 (1941); Myers v. Bethlehem Ship­
building Corp., supra; Board of Railroad Com’rs. v. Great 
N. Ry., 281 U. 8. 412 (1930); Great N. Ry. v. Merchants 
Elevator Co., 259 IT. S. 285, 290 (1922); Robinson v. Balti­
more & Ohio Railroad, 222 IT. 8. 506 (1912); Texas <& P. 
Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 IT. S. 426 (1907).

In addition, this Court must find that the administrative 
agency has been granted the power of remedy and has the 
authority to act. Federal Power Commission v. Panhandle 
Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337 IT. S. 496 (1949); Hillsborough 
v. Cromwell, 326 IT. S. 620 (1946); Georgia v. Penn. R. R. 
Co., 324 IT. S. 439 (1945); United States Alkali Export 
Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 325 IT. S. 196 (1945).

In providing that there shall be a right of redress 
against every person who, acting under color of state stat­
ute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, subjects or



25

causes to be subjected a citizen of the United States, or 
other persons within the jurisdiction thereof, to the depri­
vation of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the 
Constitution and laws,4 the Congress of the United States 
did not confer on an administrative agency primary exclu­
sive jurisdiction to hear and determne certain matters 
before the matter might be reviewed by the courts. On the 
contrary, it expressly conferred original jurisdiction in such 
cases on the district courts of the United States.5 The rea­
sons for so doing are obvious. The purpose of the legis­
lation wTas to curb the acts of state officers6—including the 
judiciary, see, Burt v. City of New York (C. A. 2), 156 P. 
(2d) 791 (1945). The fact that the southern states had 
passed discriminatory legislation directed at the ex-slaves 
and that officials of these states were openly depriving the 
new citizens of their rights—especially those which the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution was 
designed to protect—and the impossibility of receiving 
adequate protection within the state from such acts, was 
placed squarely before the Congress at the time that this 
legislation was before it for consideration.7 The Congress 
therefore conferred original jurisdiction on the federal dis­
trict courts to hear and determine these cases.8 Other­
wise the very purpose of the legislation would have been 
defeated.

Title 8 U. S. C. § 43 in and of itself conferred a right. 
It conferred a right to bring an action. This Court must 
therefore look at the statutes to see whether the Congress

4 Title 8 U. S. C. § 43, Revised Statutes, § 1979.
5 Title 28 U. S. C. § 1343(3).
6 Congressional Globe, 42nd Congress, 1871, First Session, Part 1, 

report on H.R. No. 320, p. 317 and debate pp. 385, 395, 461 and 495, 
and part 2, Appendix, pp. 86, 113, 209, and 216, 217.

7 Ibid.
8 Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 508-510 (1939).



26

intended to confer primary exclusive jurisdiction on an 
administrative agency, whether state or federal, before 
bringing such action. In answer to this, the Court will 
find that at the time that Congress conferred this right it 
expressly provided that the federal courts should have 
original jurisdiction in such cases.9 The jurisdiction of 
district courts was then as now very limited.10 The Con­
gress therefore made such action a special exception or a 
special case for district court jurisdiction. It is therefore 
clear that the Congress did not intend that a state adminis­
trative agency should have primary jurisdiction in these 
cases.

B. T h e  question  to be d ec id ed  is not one w h ich  is w ith in
th e  p ecu liar  co m p eten ce o f  an estab lish ed  ad m in istra­
tive agen cy .

The question to be decided in these cases is not one which 
is peculiarly susceptible of administrative determination.11 
cf. Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co., 339 
U. S. 239 (1950). This is an action in which the relief 
sought is a declaratory judgment and injunction (E. 13-14). 
The question to be decided by the trial court in the instant 
case, and which was decided by it in favor of these peti­
tioners, is whether there is unconstitutional discrimination 
in the salary fixing process which must be enjoined as to the 
future, cf. Georgia v. Penn. R. Co., supra. This is a ques­
tion which this Court has held is within the special com­
petence of federal courts. Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U. S. 1 
(1948).

The entire doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is thus inapplicable to this case.

9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Davis, supra, note 3 at 402.



27

C. N o ju risd iction a l p rereq u isites w ere  p rescribed  by
C ongress.

In providing that the district courts of the United States 
shall have original jurisdiction in such cases, the Congress 
did not attach thereto the usual jurisdictional prerequisites 
for invoking the jurisdiction of district courts. Smith v. 
Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 
U. S. 157 (1943); Hague v. C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 496 (1939); 
Bottone v. Lindsley (C. A. 10), 170 F. (2d) 705 (1948); 
Glicker v. Michigan (C. A. 6), 160 P. (2d) 96 (1947); City 
of Manchester v. Leiby (C. A. 1), 117 P. (2d) 661 (1941). 
Neither did it provide for preliminary administrative de­
termination of certain matters with subsequent review by 
the federal district courts. Carter v. School Board (C. A. 
4), 182 P. (2d) 531 (1950); Burt v. City of New York, 
supra, semble; Thompson v. Gibbes (D. C.-S. C.), 60 P. 
Supp. 872 (1945); see, Heard v. Ouachita Parish School 
Board (D. C.-La.), 94 P. Supp. 897 (1951). By requiring 
that this action be dismissed and that administrative reme­
dies be exhausted before resorting to a federal district 
court, the court below prescribed a jurisdictional require­
ment which has not been decreed by the Congress in a 
matter about which Congress has legislated and a matter 
which it has expressly brought within the original juris­
diction of the district courts. When the Congress intends 
exhaustion of administrative remedies as a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to invoking the jurisdiction of federal courts, 
this intention is clearly expressed or it may be readily 
inferred. Slocum v. Deleware, Lackawanna & Western R. 
Co., 339 U. S. 239 (1950); Armour & Co. v. Alton R. R., 
312 U. 8. 195 (1941); Board of Railroad Com’rs v. Great N. 
Ry., 281 U. S. 412 (1930); Great N. Ry. v. Merchants Eleva­
tor Co., 259 U. S. 285, 290 (1922); Myers v. Bethlehem Ship­
building Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 52 (1938); Robinson v. Balti-



28

more & Ohio Railroad, 222 U. S. 506 (1912); Texas <& P. Ry. 
v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426 (1907).

D. E xhaustion  o f th e  sta te  ad m in istrative rem ed ies is not 
m andatory.

The state statutory provisions on which respondents 
and the courts below relied are set forth in the Appendix 
to this brief.

The highest court in the State of Mississippi has con­
strued these statutes. That court has consistently held 
that the remedies provided are not exclusive but alterna­
tive, and need not in any case be exhausted before resort 
to the courts. State ex rel. Plunkett v. Miller, 162 Miss. 149 
(1931); Clark, et al. v. Roard of Trustees, 117 Miss. 234 
(1918); Moreau v. Grandich, 114 Miss. 560 (1917); Hobbs 
v. Germany, 94 Miss. 469 (1909).

Whenever this Court has found that exhaustion of the 
administrative remedy was not mandatory, application of 
the rule has been denied. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Co­
operative v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U. S. 152 
(1946); United States Alkali Export Ass’n, Inc. v. United 
States, 325 U. S. 196 (1945); Moore v. Illinois Central Rail­
way, 312 U. 8. 630 (1941); cf. Levers v. Anderson, 326 U. S. 
219 (1945) and Prendergast v. New York, 262 U. S. 43 
(1923).

E. T h e  sta te  ad m in istrative agen cies are w ith ou t authority  
and lack  th e  p ow er o f  rem edy.

A reading of the state statutes reveals that the adminis­
trative agencies to which petitioners might have appealed, 
i. e., the county superintendent and the State Board of 
Education, are without authority or power to decide the 
question decided by the district court in favor of these 
petitioners. They are not empowered to decide federal



29

constitutional law questions, cf. Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 
supra. They are empowered to decide only questions of 
school law. The State Board of Education has only the 
power to render a decision in an appeal from a decision 
of the county superintendent or the state superintendent. 
Miss. Code (1942) § 6234. Decisions rendered by this Board 
are final, but the Board has not been granted any power to 
enforce its decisions, cf. United States Alkali Export 
Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, supra. The county superin­
tendent has similar limited authority. Miss. Code (1942) 
§ 6261. These agencies are not granted the power to award 
damages against school officials for unlawful or tortious 
acts and are not granted power to enjoin unlawful conduct, 
even when such conduct is violative of the school laws of 
the state, cf. Federal Power Commission v. Panhandle 
Eastern Pipe Line Co., supra; Georgia v. Penn. R. Co., 
supra. The right to bring a tort action is conferred by 
Title 8 U. S. C. § 43. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649
(1944) ; Picking v. Penn. R. Co. (C. A. 3), 151 F. (2d) 240
(1945) , as well as the right to bring an action for an in­
junction, Hague v. C. I. 0., supra.

Georgia v. Penn. R. R. Co., supra, presents a case closely 
analogous to the instant case. In that case, the plaintiff 
was the State of Georgia. The defendants were some 
twenty railroad companies. The complaint charged a con­
spiracy among defendants in restraint of trade and com­
merce among the states—alleging that defendants had fixed 
arbitrary and noncompetitive rates and charges for trans­
portation of freight by railroads to and from Georgia so 
as to prefer the ports of other States over the ports of 
Georgia. The complaint alleged that Georgia had no ad­
ministrative remedy, the I. C. C. having no power to afford 
relief against such a conspiracy. The prayer was for dam­
ages and for injunctive relief.



30

Defendants, in their return to the rule to show cause 
why Georgia should not be permitted to file its bill of com­
plaint, alleged failure to state a cause of action because no 
prior resort to I. C. C.

The Court held:
(1) “ This is a suit in which Georgia asserts claims 

arising out of Federal laws—the gravamen of which run 
far beyond the claim of damage to individual shippers 
(452).

(2) “ Georgia does not seek in this action to enjoin 
any tariff or to have any tariff provision cancelled. She 
merely asks that the alleged rate-fixing combination and 
conspiracy among the defendant-carriers be enjoined. 
As we shall see, that is a matter over which the Com­
mission has no jurisdiction (455). Congress has not 
given the Commission * * * authority to remove rate­
fixing combinations from the prohibitions contained in 
the anti-trust laws (456). It has not placed these com­
binations under the control and supervision of the Com­
mission. Nor has it empowered the Commission to 
proceed against such combinations and through cease 
and desist orders or otherwise to put an end to their 
activities.

(3) “ The present bill does not seek to have the 
Court act in the place of the Commission. It seeks to 
remove from the field of rate-making the influence of 
a combination which exceeds the limits of the collabo­
ration authorized for the fixing of joint through rates 
(459). It seeks to put an end to discriminatory and 
coercive practices. The aim is to make it possible for 
individual carriers to perform their duty under the Act, 
so that whatever tariffs may be continued in effect or 
superseded by new ones may be tariffs which are free



31

from the restrictive, discriminatory, and coercive in­
fluences of the combination. That is not to undercut 
or impair the primary jurisdiction of the Commisson 
over rates. It is to free the rate-making function of the 
influences of a conspiracy over which the Commission 
has no authority but which if proven to exist can only 
hinder the Commission in the tasks with which it is 
confronted (460).

“ What we have said disposes for the most part of 
the argument that recognized principles of equity pre­
vent us from granting the relief which is asked (460).

(4) “ Georgia alleges, ‘No administrative proceeding 
directed against a particular schedule of rates would 
afford relief to the State of Georgia so long as the 
defendants remain free to promulgate rates by col­
lusive agreement. Until the conspiracy is ended, the 
corrosion of new schedules, established by the collusive 
power of the defendant carriers acting in concert would 
frustrate any action sought to be taken by adminis­
trative process to redress the grievances from which 
the State of Georgia suffers.’ Eate-making is a con­
tinuous process. Georgia is seeking a decree which will 
prevent in the future the kind of harmful conduct which 
has occurred in the past. Take the case of coercion. 
If it is shown that the alleged combination exists and 
uses coercion in the fixing of joint through rates, only 
an injunction aimed at future conduct of that character 
can give adequate relief. Indeed, so long as the col­
laboration which exists exceeds lawful limits and con­
tinues in operation, the only effective remedy lies in 
dissolving the combination or in confining it within 
legitimate boundaries. Any decree which is entered 
would look to the future and would free tomorrow’s



32

rate-making from the coercive and collusive influence 
alleged to exist. It cannot of course be determined in 
advance what rates may be lawfully established. But 
coercion can be enjoined. And so can a combination 
which has as its purpose an invidious discrimination 
against a region or locality (461-462).

“ * * * There is no administrative control over the 
combination. And no adequate or effective remedy 
other than this suit is suggested which Georgia can em­
ploy to eliminate from rate-making the influences of 
the unlawful conspiracy alleged to exist here” (462).

In this case, the petitioners do not deny the power of 
the respondent Board of Trustees to fix teachers’ salaries. 
The trial court found that exclusive power to fix teachers’ 
salaries in the Jackson Separate School District is vested 
in respondent Board of Trustees (R. 249, 250). As in 
the case of Georgia v. Penn. R. Co., supra, the petitioners 
do not seek to substitute the court for the Board of 
Trustees. What they seek is to have unconstitutional 
discrimination eliminated from the salary fixing process 
in the future. Alston v. School Board (C. A. 4), 112 
F. (2d) 992 (1940), cert, denied 311 U. S. 693. The 
State Board in this case could not enjoin future discrimi­
nation. Its only function is to render an opinion on a 
written statement of facts. At best it has only the power 
to recommend. In the words of this Court in United States 
Alkali Export Ass’n v. United States, supra, at 210: “ It 
can give no remedy. It can make no controlling findings of 
law or fact. Its recommendations need not be followed by 
any court or administrative or executive officer.”



33

II.
This case is not governed by Cook v. Davis (C. A. 5 ),

178 F. (2d) 595 (1949), cert, denied 340 U. S. 811.

A . T h e  m a te r ia l  f a c ts  in  th e  C o o k  ca se .

As pointed out in the petition for writ of certiorari 
herein, the facts in this case are materially different from 
the controlling facts in the Cook case. The crucial fact in 
the Cook case was the role played by the State Board. 
There the State Board, unlike the State Board in the in­
stant case, had the power to fix teachers’ salaries, deter­
mine the number of teachers to be employed by a local 
board, and to classify all teachers. The local board was 
compelled to pay the teachers employed by it the minimum 
salary fixed in the State schedule and with the money paid 
to it for that purpose by the State Board. The State Board 
in that case had two schedules, one for Negro teachers and 
one for white teachers. The schedule adopted by said 
Board for Negro teachers had uniformly lower rates of pay 
than the schedule adopted for white teachers.

The local board could supplement the salaries fixed by 
the State Board. This was done by the local board in adopt­
ing a new salary schedule after the suit was instituted in 
that case. The new schedule was one of the most com­
plicated teacher salary schedules ever devised. It estab­
lished four categories of teachers. In each category there 
were three to four so-called “ Tracks”. On each “ Track” 
there were sixteen to nineteen steps. The system could not 
even be explained with sufficient clarity by those who de­
vised it. Despite this, however, the new schedule, in the 
opinion of the court below, was free of the unconstitutional 
discrimination which previously existed under a supple­
mentary dual schedule. The court below was therefore of



34

the opinion that the discrimination which existed at the 
time the district court issued its decree resulted from the 
discrimination by the State Board which was not a party 
to the proceeding.

After the new schedule was adopted in the Cook case, 
a procedure was instituted whereby a teacher aggrieved by 
the action of the Superintendent in placing such teacher on 
a particular “ Track” could appeal to the local board and 
then to the State Board. This procedure had specific refer­
ence to grievances concerning the new schedule. The plain­
tiff in the Cook case had been placed on a “ Track” by the 
superintendent. He did not allege that he was aggrieved 
thereby, nor did he appeal to the local board or the State 
Board. It therefore appeared that that particular plain­
tiff had no cause to complain. And since the remaining 
general discrimination against the other members of the 
class which the plaintiff represented resulted from the 
action of the State Board, the court below was of the opin­
ion that the district court should retain jurisdiction until 
the State Board had been asked to cease its discriminatory 
practice or until the State Board would be brought in as 
a party defendant for refusing to do so.

B. T h e  m a te r ia l  f a c ts  in  th e  in s ta n t  case .

In this case, the State Board of Education gives to the 
local board a sum determined on a per capita basis. Miss. 
Code (1942) § 6219. This applies also to the appropriations 
made in 1950 to help equalize Negro teachers’ salaries (Ap­
pendix, pp. 84-90). Once this amount has been transmitted, 
the State Board has no authority to say what portion shall 
be paid in salaries. The State Board, with respect to the 
respondent Board, has no power with respect to the teacher 
salary scale and had no salary schedule of its own applicable 
to the Separate School District involved in this suit. The



35

exclusive power to determine teachers ’ salaries is vested in 
the respondent local board and the trial court so found 
(E. 249).

The statutes on which respondents rely are, by their 
own terms, inapplicable. The appeal to the State Board, 
Miss. Code (1942) § 6234, is from the decision of the county 
superintendent or the state superintendent. The county 
superintendent, however, has no control over the school 
matters of a separate school district, such districts being 
autonomous, especially with respect to the teachers it em­
ploys and the salaries fixed. Miss. Code (1942) § 6423. 
Therefore, the provision relating to appeals to the county 
superintendent would not be available to petitioners. Miss. 
Code (1942) §6261. The provision relating to the advise 
of the state superintendent may be invoked only by the 
county superintendent. Miss. Code § 6240-07. And, unlike 
the Cook case, there is no appeal procedure which is spe­
cifically applicable to teacher salary disputes.

After this suit was instituted, the respondent local board 
did not adopt a new salary schedule. The salary schedule 
which was then in existence was a very simple one in opera­
tion. A stipulated salary was usually recommended by the 
respondent Superintendent of Schools along with his gen­
eral recommendation to the respondent board. Both recom­
mendations were generally approved by the respondent 
board (E. 250).

When a teacher was dissatisfied with the salary recom­
mended by the Superintendent or approved by the board, 
there was no appeal procedure which was specifically ap­
plicable to teacher salary grievances. The reason for this 
was, undoubtedly, that the decision of the board was final. 
A teacher who felt that the salary offered was insufficient 
could decline to enter into the contract.



36

Before commencing the instant suit, petitioner Gladys 
Noel Bates, petitioned the respondent board on behalf of 
herself and all other Negro teachers and principals in the 
Jackson Separate School District who were similarly situ­
ated (R. 89), In reply, the respondent board said that no 
such discrimination existed. An appeal was therefore 
taken to the only administrative agency which had juris­
diction with respect to the salaries of teachers in the Jack- 
son Separate School District. And since the action of this 
board is final, petitioner could only resort to a court for 
relief. Petitioner chose to resort to the federal district 
court to enforce the right conferred on her by Title 8 
U. S. C. § 43 inasmuch as her complaint was not one limited 
to her individual salary, but a complaint of unconstitutional 
discrimination against a class of teachers of which she was 
a member. The right to bring an action to enjoin such 
discrimination initially in a federal district court is spe­
cifically and unequivocally provided by Title 28 U. S. C. 
§1343(3).

In affirming the judgment of dismissal, the court below 
did not direct the district court to retain jurisdiction as was 
done in the Cook case, until the alleged administrative 
remedy had been exhausted, thus indicating that the district 
court was without jurisdiction until the so-called adminis­
trative remedies had been exhausted.

The Cook case, contrary to the decision of the court 
below, is not “ dispositive” of this case, the material and 
controlling facts being substantially different.



37

Conclusion.
"Wh er efo r e , i t  is  re s p e c tfu lly  su b m itte d  th a t  th is  p e t i ­

t io n  f o r  w r i t  o f  c e r t io r a r i  to  re v ie w  th e  ju d g m e n t o f  th e  
c o u r t  be low  sh o u ld  be  g ra n te d .

R obert L. Carter,

T hxjrgood M arshall ,
20 Wrest 40th Street, 
New York 18, New York,

Attorneys for Petitioners.

J am es A. B u r n s , 
C onstance  B aker  M otley , 

Of Counsel.

Dated: May 15, 1951.



38

APPENDIX

M ississippi C ode, 1942  

and

1948 Supplem ent

§ 6217. Curriculum.—(a) The common free schools shall 
consist of a grammar school of eight grades, viz: First to 
eighth grades inclusive. The curriculum of the common free 
school shall consist of: Spelling, reading, arithmetic, 
geography, English grammar, composition, literature, 
United States history, history of Mississippi, elements of 
agriculture, civil government with special reference to local 
and State government, physiology and hygiene with special 
reference to the effect of alcohol and narcotics on the human 
system, home and community sanitation, general science and 
elementary algebra, and such other subjects as may be 
added by the State Board of Education.

(b) The public high school shall consist of a high school 
of four grades, viz: Ninth to twelfth grades, inclusive. The 
curriculum of the public high schools shall consist of: Math­
ematics, English, history and social science, pure and ap­
plied science, including agriculture, home economics and 
manual arts, safety on the highways, and such other sub­
jects as may be added by the State Board of Education.

S o u r c es : Laws, 1930, ch. 278; 1936, 2nd Ex. ch. 2; 1938, 
ch. 238.

§ 6218. Scholastic year.—The scholastic year shall be the 
same as the State fiscal year as is fixed by the amendment 
to Section 115 of the Constitution of 1890, and shall begin 
on the first day of July and end on the thirtieth day of June 
of each year.



39

Appendix

S o u r c es : Laws, 1930, eh. 278; 1936, 2nd Ex. ch. 2; 
1938, ch. 238.

§ 6219. Common school fund.—(a) It shall be the im­
perative duty of the legislature to appropriate a State com­
mon school fund to be taken from the general fund in the 
State Treasury, which, together with the poll tax collected 
by and retained in each county, and an ad valorem tax levied 
by each county or separate school district, shall be sufficient 
to maintain the common free schools as defined herein for 
a term of not less than four months in each scholastic year. 
The common school fund so appropriated shall be dis­
tributed among the several counties and separate school dis­
tricts in proportion to the number of educable children in 
each, to be determined as is now or may hereafter be pro­
vided by law.

(b) The legislature shall appropriate from the general 
funds in the State Treasury additional funds to be known 
as “ an equalizing fund,” and such fund shall be used for 
equalizing the educational advantages of the different coun­
ties by maintaining public high schools, and for the exten­
sion of common free schools beyond the four months’ term 
hereinbefore provided for, said funds to be distributed to 
the various counties and school districts as is now or may 
hereafter be provided for by law.

(c) The counties outside the separate school district, the 
separate school districts, and other school districts, may 
levy a tax as is now or may hereafter be provided for by 
law, for the purpose of maintaining the public high schools, 
for extending the term of the common free schools beyond 
the four months herein provided for, and for other school 
expenses not provided for by State appropriations.



40

Appendix

§ 6232-11, State aid for construction of school buildings 
—application to state building commission.—Any county 
consolidated school district, special consolidated school dis­
trict, municipal separate school district, rural separate 
school district, or other school districts, desiring to obtain 
state aid for the construction of school buildings out of 
funds appropriated therefor by the legislature, shall file 
written application with the state building commission for 
an allocation of grant of state funds to be used in helping to 
defray the cost of constructing such school buildings. Such 
application shall be made upon forms approved by the state 
building commission, and shall contain accurate information 
concerning the needs for such additional buildings or facili­
ties, the type of building or buildings to be constructed, the 
school area to be served by such new buildings, the location 
of the school house or school houses in the area to be served, 
and adjoining areas, the uses to be made of the buildings to 
be erected and the total cost of the buildings to be erected, 
and the amount of local funds to be provided for the con­
struction of such building or buildings. Upon the filing of 
such application, it shall be the duty of the state building 
commission to refer the same to the state department of 
education for examination and investigation of the need for 
the construction of such building or buildings. The state 
department of education shall thereupon cause a survey to 
be made of the school building facilities in the area to be 
served by such new building or buildings, for the purpose 
of determining whether such building program should be 
carried out. Such survey shall include a careful study of 
the school district organization in the area to be served, the 
location of the school house or school houses, the need for 
the additional building facilities, and the utilitarian value 
of such additional building facilities in reducing the cost



41

Appendix

and improving the efficiency of the public school system in 
the area to be affected. And the state department of educa­
tion shall file its written report with the state building com­
mission, with recommendations as to the need for the con­
struction of such new building or buildings, the type of 
building or buildings which should be provided and the esti­
mated cost of same. [Amends Laws 1946, ch. 250, § 1.]

S ources : Laws, 1946, ch. 250, § 1; 1948, ch. 301, § 1.
§ 6232-12. Grant of funds.—The state building commis­

sion, after receiving the report from the state department 
of education as to the need for the construction of such 
school building or buildings, may require such additional 
information as the commission may desire as to the long­
term need for such additional school buildings and facilities, 
and as to the manner in which the county’s or district’s 
part of the construction funds is to be provided. If it shall 
then appear to the state building commission that the pro­
posed new buildings are needed, and that said buildings will 
be useful in serving the long-term needs of the county, or 
school district, as the case may be, the state building com­
mission shall be authorized to grant funds to such county 
or district, to aid in the construction of such school building 
or buildings. The amount of such state aid shall in no case 
exceed the sum of two thousand dollars for each class room 
to be provided in such new building or buildings; and in no 
event shall the amount of such state aid exceed fifty per­
cent of the total cost of such school building or buildings.

The state building commission shall be authorized to 
grant funds under the provisions of this act to aid in the 
construction of new buildings or for the construction of ad­
ditions to buildings which have already been constructed.

S ources : Laws, 1946, ch. 250, § 2.



42

Appendix

§ 6232-13. Allocation and disbursement of funds.—The
funds thus allocated by the state building commission to 
any county or school district shall be paid in to the county 
depository, and shall be used and expended by the county 
school board of the county, in case such funds are allocated 
to the county, or by the board of trustees of the school dis­
trict, in case such funds are allocated to a school district, 
and shall be paid out upon certificates issued by the county 
superintendent of education, upon orders of the county 
school board, or the board of trustees of such school district, 
as the case may be. In case such grant be made to a munic­
ipal separate school district such fund shall be paid into the 
municipal separate school district depository, and shall be 
paid out upon the order of the board of trustees of such 
municipal separate school district.

S ources : Laws, 1946, ch. 250, § 3.
§ 6232-14. Regulation of expenditures—approval of 

plans and specifications.—The state building commission 
is hereby authorized to prescribe such reasonable rules and 
regulations as the state building commission may deem 
proper to safeguard the expenditure of funds granted to 
counties and school districts for the construction of school 
buildings under the provisions of this act. The state build­
ing commission shall be authorized, if the commission shall 
deem the same necessary, to require that the county’s part 
or the district’s part of the construction funds required to 
complete the construction of such school buildings be made 
actually available before ordering the payment of the state’s 
part of such funds into the county or district depository. 
And the state building commission shall be authorized to 
require that plans and specifications for the construction 
of any such school building shall be submitted to and ap-



43

Appendix

proved by the state building commission before contracts 
are let for the construction of same.

S ources : Laws, 1946, ch. 250, §4.
§ 6232-15. Purpose of Act.—It is hereby declared to be 

the purpose and intention of this act to provide a program 
of state aid for the construction of school buildings in areas 
where the existing school facilities are inadequate to meet 
the needs of the school children, and to promote the con­
solidation of high school facilities, so that better educa­
tional opportunities may be provided for high school chil­
dren at reasonable expense.

S ources : Laws, 1946, ch. 250, § 5.
§ 6234. To decide appeals.—The board of education 

shall decide all appeals from the decisions of the county 
superintendents, or from the decisions of the state superin­
tendent; but all matters relating to appeals shall be pre­
sented in writing, and the decision of the board shall be 
final.

S ources : Codes, 1930, § 6549; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
ch. 278.

§ 6235. To remove county superintendents in certain 
cases.—For continued neglect of duty, drunkenness, incom­
petency or official misconduct, the state board of education 
may remove a county superintendent; but before the re­
moval, the officer shall have ten days’ notice of the charge, 
and be allowed opportunity to make defense. The members 
of the board are authorized to administer oaths and to take 
or cause depositions to be taken, and have the powers of a 
court to compel witnesses to attend and testify in all mat­
ters of investigation by the board.

S o u r c es : Codes, 1930, § 6550; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930; 
ch. 278.



44

Appendix

§ 6238. Disburse equalizing fund.—In addition to the 
regular per capita appropriation for common schools the 
legislature shall provide an equalizing fund, which shall be 
disbursed by the state board of education in such manner 
as may be provided by the legislature of the state of Missis­
sippi.

S ources : Codes, 1930, § 6551; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
eh. 278.

§ 6237. To audit claims.—The board of education shall 
audit all claims against the common school fund, and allow 
so much as may be justly due, not to exceed the amount al­
lowed by law. The board shall have authority, and it shall 
be their duty, to hear and pass upon all appeals by trustees 
of public schools from the decision of the county superin­
tendent of education, as to the amount of money that shall 
be allowed for the payment of teachers’ salaries and other 
expenses allowed by law to any county public school, not a 
separate school district, from the funds received by the 
county from the county school fund, from the state common 
school fund and from county levies for the public schools. 
All appeals shall be made in writing and the decision of the 
board shall be final.

S ources : Codes, 1930, § 6552; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
ch. 278.

§ 6238. Course of study—administration.—The Board of 
Education shall adopt a course of study to be used in the 
public schools of the state and shall regulate all matters 
arising in the practical administration of the school system, 
not otherwise provided for.

S ources : Codes, 1930, § 6553; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
ch. 278.



45

Appendix 

ARTICLE 3
[New] S tate D e pa r tm en t  oe E ducation

§§ 6245-6248. Repealed.—Laws 1946, ch. 297, infra, § 6245- 
14.

§ 6245-01. State department of education—organiza­
tion.—There shall be a state department of education, which 
shall consist of a state superintendent of education, an as­
sistant state superintendent of education, a director of the 
division of finance and administration, a director of the di­
vision of instruction, a director of the division of school 
building and transportation services, a director of the di­
vision of Vocational education, a director of the division of 
vocational rehabilitation, a director of the division of crip­
pled children, and such supervisors, assistants, or employees 
as may be necessary for the proper functioning of the 
above-named divisions.

S ources : Laws, 1946, ch. 297, § 1.
§ 6245-02. Administration.—The state department of 

education is hereby charged with the execution of all laws 
relating to the administrative, supervisory and consultative 
services to the public schools, agricultural high schools, and 
junior colleges of the state of Mississippi. The offices of the 
state department of education shall be in the city of Jackson, 
Mississippi, and the secretary of state shall provide suitable 
quarters therefor. Subject to the direction of the state 
board of education as provided by law, the administration, 
management and control of the department is hereby vested 
in the superintendent of public education, who shall be 
directly responsible for the rightful functioning thereof.

S ources : Laws, 1946, ch. 297, § 2.



46

Appendix

§ 6245-03. State superintendent—term of office—bond.—
The state superintendent of public education shall be elected 
for a term of four (4) years at the same time and in the 
same manner as the governor is elected. He shall remain 
in office until his successor shall be elected and qualified, 
and shall be responsible for the general supervision of the 
common schools and educational interests of the state, and 
he shall perform such other duties as shall be prescribed by 
law. He shall give bond in the penalty of twenty-five thou­
sand dollars ($25,000.00), with sureties to be approved by 
the governor, conditioned according to law; and said bond 
when approved shall be filed and recorded in the office of 
the secretary of state. [Supersedes § 6245, Code of 1942.]

S ources : Code, 1942, § 6245; Laws, 1946, ch. 297, § 3.
§ 6245-04. Assistant superintendent, directors and em­

ployees.—The assistant state superintendent of public edu­
cation, the directors, supervisors, clerical assistants, and 
employees shall be selected by, and hold office subject to, 
the will of the state superintendent, except as provided in 
section 6 [§ 6245-06] of this act. The assistant state super­
intendent may be authorized to act in the absence or dis­
ability of the state superintendent and shall perform such 
other duties as may be assigned to him by the state superin­
tendent. The state superintendent shall have the power to 
assign to any division such clerical help as he may deem 
necessary and to discharge such clerical help among the di­
visions at any time necessity requires, except as provided 
in section 6 [§ 6245-06] of this act.

S ources : Laws, 1946, ch. 297, § 4.
§ 6245-05. Salaries and expenses.—The state superin- 

intendent, assistant state superintendent, and the director



47

Appendix

of each division, except the directors provided for in section 
6 [§ 6245-06] of this act, shall receive such salary as shall 
be fixed by the legislature. The state superintendent shall 
fix the amount of compensation of all supervisors, clerical 
assistants, or employees of the state department of educa­
tion and the traveling expenses or other expenses of any of 
the personnel of the department, except as provided for in 
section 6 [§ 6245-06] of this act. All such salaries, compen­
sation or expenses shall be paid upon the requisition of the 
state superintendent of public education and warrant issued 
thereunder by the state auditor out of funds appropriated 
by the legislature in a lump sum upon the basis of budge­
tary requirements submitted by the superintendent of edu­
cation or out of funds otherwise made available. The entire 
expense of administering the department shall never exceed 
the amount appropriated therefor plus funds received from 
sources other than state appropriations and for a violation 
of this provision, the superintendent shall be liable and he 
and the sureties on his bond shall be required to restore any 
such excess.

S ottbces : Laws, 1946, ch. 297, § 5.
§ 6245-07. Duties of superintendent.—The superinten­

dent of public education shall have the power and it shall be 
his duty:

1. To supervise in the manner herein provided the pub­
lic free schools, agricultural high schools, and junior col­
leges of the state and to prescribe such rules and regula­
tions for the efficient organization and conduct of same, as 
he may deem necessary.

2. To preside over all meetings of the state board of 
education.



48

Appendix

3. To collect data for determining the proper distribu­
tion of the state common school funds.

4. To have bound and preserved in his office, as the 
property of the state, all such school documents from other 
states and governments, books, or pamphlets on educational 
subjects, school books, apparatus, maps, charts, and the 
like, as shall be or have been purchased or donated for the 
use of his office.

5. To keep a complete record of all his official acts and 
the acts of the state board of education.

6. To prepare, have printed, and furnish all officers 
charged with the administration of the laws pertaining to 
the public schools, such blank forms and books as may be 
necessary to the proper discharge of their duties, and all 
of this printing shall be paid for out of funds provided by 
the legislature.

7. To have printed in pamphlet form the laws pertain­
ing to the public schools and publish therein forms for con­
ducting school business, the rules and regulations for the 
government of schools, that he, or the board of education 
may recommend and such other matters as may be deemed 
worthy of public interest pertaining to the public schools, 
and all of this printing shall be paid for out of funds pro­
vided by the legislature.

8. To meet the county superintendents annually at such 
time and place as he shall appoint, for the purpose of ac­
cumulating facts relative to schools, to review the educa­
tional progress made in the various sections of the state, to 
compare views, discuss problems, hear discussions and 
suggestions relative to examinations and qualifications of



49

Appendix

teachers, methods of instruction, text books, summer schools 
for teachers, visitation of schools, consolidation of schools, 
health work in the schools, vocational education, and other 
matters pertaining to the public school system.

9. To advise the county superintendents upon all mat­
ters involving the welfare of the schools, and at the request 
of any county superintendent to give his opinion upon a 
written statement of facts on all questions and contro­
versies arising out of the interpretation and construction 
of the school laws, in regard to rights, powers and duties 
of school officers and county superintendents, and to keep a 
record of all such decisions. Before giving any opinion, 
the superintendent may submit the statement of facts to 
the attorney general for his advice thereon, and it shall he 
the duty of the attorney general forthwith to examine such 
statement, and suggest the proper decision to be made upon 
such facts.

10. To require annually, and as often as he may deem 
proper, of county superintendents, detailed reports on the 
educational business of the various counties.

11. To make reports, concerning agricultural high 
schools and serve on various committees and boards as 
provided by law.

12. On or before the tenth day of January in each year 
in which the legislature meets in regular sessions, to pre­
pare, and have printed a biennial report to the legislature 
showing:

(a) The receipts and disbursements of all school funds 
officially handled by him;



50

Appendix

(b) The number of school districts, school teachers em­
ployed, the number of pupils taught therein, and the at­
tendance of pupils.

(c) County and district levies for common schools, high 
schools, agricultural high schools, consolidated schools, and 
junior colleges;

(d) The conditions of vocational education in the state 
of Mississippi, a list of schools to which federal and state 
aid has been given, and a detailed statement of the expendi­
tures of federal funds and the state funds that may be 
provided.

(e) Such general matters, information, and recommen­
dations as relate in his opinion, to the educational interests 
of the state.

13. To perform such other duties in the administration 
of the public schools as may be required by law. [Super­
sedes § 6247, Code of 1942.]

S o u r c e s : Code, 1942, § 6247; Laws, 1946, ch. 297, § 7.
§ 6245-08. Duties of division directors.—(a) The direc­

tor of the division of administration and finance shall have 
charge of and be responsible for, (1) the apportionment of 
state funds as directed by the state board of education; (2) 
budgetary control; (3) educational and financial records, 
reports and research; (4) fiscal and business management; 
and (5) departmental bookkeeping.

(b) The director of the division of instruction shall have 
charge of and be responsible for the supervision of, (1) 
teacher training, certification and placement; (2) elemen­
tary education; (3) secondary education; (4) junior colleges 
and agricultural high schools; (5) health education, includ-



51

Appendix

ing instruction concerning the effects of intoxicating alco­
holic beverages on the physical well-being and moral char­
acter of the people; (6) audio-visual education; (7) music 
education; (8) negro education and teacher training place­
ment; and (9) curriculum services.

The director of the division of instruction shall take the 
place of the director and executive secretary of teacher cer­
tification provided for in chapter 157, laws of Mississippi, 
1944 [§§6249-6251], and shall have charge of and be re­
sponsible for the program of teacher certification provided 
for in said act, and shall be responsible for the proper ad­
ministration of said act, including collection of fees for 
certification provided for in said act; and any provisions of 
said act to the contrary are hereby repealed.

The director of the division of instruction shall take the 
place of the supervisor of alcohol and narcotics teaching 
provided for in chapter 166, laws of Mississippi, 1938 
[§§ 6685-6688, Code of 1942], and shall have charge of and 
be responsible for the supervision of the program of alco­
hol and narcotics teaching provided for in said act, and 
shall be responsible for the proper administration of said 
act; and any provisions of said act to the contrary are 
hereby repealed.

(c) The director of the division of school building and 
transportation services shall have charge of and be respon­
sible for, (1) school plant planning and construction; (2) 
school building inspection services, and (3) school trans­
portation services.

(d) The director of the division of vocational education 
shall have charge of and be responsible for vocational edu­
cation training in (1) agriculture; (2) home economics;



Appendix

(3) trades and industry; (4) distributive education; (5) 
adult education; and (6) teacher training and supervision.

(e) The director of the division of vocational rehabili­
tation shall have charge of and be responsible for the voca­
tional rehabilitation of crippled adults.

(f) The director of the division of crippled children’s 
services shall have charge of and be responsible for the 
physical restoration of crippled children. [Amends Laws 
1946, ch. 297, § 8.]

S o u r c es : Laws, 1946, ch. 297; § 8 ; 1948, ch. 294, § 1.
§ 6258. Shall keep records.—The county superintendent 

shall keep a record of all his official acts, in the manner and 
form prescribed by law, and conform the manner of its 
keeping to the recommendations and directions of the state 
superintendent of education.

S ources : Codes, 1930, § 6569; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
ch. 278.

§ 6259. Duties generally.—It shall be the duty of the 
county superintendents:
(1) To employ for each school under his supervision, such 
teacher or teachers, as may be recommended by the local 
trustees, provided such teacher or teachers shall be recom­
mended on or before June 15th of each year; but the teacher 
shall hold his certificate of proper date and grade, to exe­
cute the required contract.
(2) To allow assistant teachers as specified by law.
(3) To fix salaries of teachers and to make contracts with 
them except as otherwise specified by law.



53

Appendix

(4) To enforce the course of study adopted by the board of 
education, and the uniform textbooks adopted for the 
county.
(5) To enforce the law and rules and regulations in refer­
ence to the examination of teachers.
(6) To administer oaths in all cases of teachers, trustees, 
and others relating to the schools, and to take testimony in 
appeal cases under the school law.
(7) To examine the monthly reports of teachers and require 
the signatures of a majority of the ti-ustees certifying to 
the accuracy of the report, and upon the report thus cer­
tified, to issue a pay certificate showing the amount of sal­
ary due, and the scholastic month for which it is issued. 
The pay certificate must be in the form prescribed by the 
board of education, and a stub duplicate made out and pre­
served in his office.
(8) To carefully preserve all reports of school officers and 
teachers, and when he resigns, vacates, is removed, or goes 
out of office, within ten days thereafter, to deliver to his 
successor or to the clerk of the chancery court for him, all 
money, property, books, effects, or papers remaining in his 
hands.
(9) To make annually, on or before the first day of August, 
a written report to the board of supervisors and mayor 
and board of aldermen of the municipality constituting a 
separate school district, showing names, sex and color of 
the teachers employed during the preceding scholastic year, 
the number of months taught by each, and the aggregate 
amounts of pay certificates issued to each and all. The re­
port shall be filed in the office of the chancery clerk or the



54

Appendix

municipal clerk, as the case may be, and be compared by 
said officer with the pay certificates of the comity superin­
tendent for the period embraced in the report.
(10) To file with the chancery and municipal clerk, before 
issuing any pay certificates for the current term, lists of 
the teachers employer, and the monthly salary of each, as 
shown by the contract, and to add to the list any teachers 
subsequently employed.
(11) To keep in his office and carefully preserve the public 
school record provided; to enter therein the proceedings of 
the county school board, the decisions of appeal cases, and 
other official acts; a list of the teachers examined, licensed 
and employed; and within ten days after they are rendered, 
to record the data required from the monthly and term 
reports of teachers, and the annual reports of the county 
and separate school district treasurers; and from the sum­
maries of records thus kept to render on or before the first 
of September, an annual report to the state superintendent 
in the form and containing the particulars required. If a 
county superintendent fails to make report to the state 
superintendent by the fifteenth day of September, he shall 
forfeit fifty dollars out of his salary; and the board of 
supervisors, upon receiving from the state superintendent 
of education notice of such failure, must deduct the amount 
forfeited from his salary.
(12) To prepare on township blanks, an outline map, show­
ing the number of the sections embraced in each school 
district, and to paste the same in the school register for the 
district before delivering it to the teacher thereof.
(13) To make a record of the names of trustees, showing 
the districts in which they were elected, and the post office



55

Appendix

of each. He shall in due time deliver to the trustees or 
teachers of each district, such blanks as they will need for 
the coming school year; and give them such information 
with regard to their duties as may be required. He shall 
address all official correspondence to the trustees. Notice 
to them shall be regarded as notice to the people of the dis­
trict, and it shall be the duty of the trustees to notify the 
people.
(14) To make to the board of supervisors and mayor and 
board of aldermen or other governing body of a municipal­
ity constituting a separate school district, reports for each 
scholastic month, which shall show the amount of pay cer- 
ticates issued for that month, together with statement 
showing the schools visited, date of visitation, and time he 
spent in each school during his visit. It shall be unlawful 
to allow the salary of the superintendent until said report 
be on file.
(15) To distribute promptly all reports, laws, forms, cir­
culars, and instructions which he may receive for the use 
of school officers and teachers, from the state superintendent 
of public education.
(16) To keep on file and preserve in his office the biennial 
report of the state superintendent of public education, and 
all circular letters sent out by him and a copy of the school 
law.
(17) To visit the schools and require teachers to perform 
all their duties. On his first visit, he shall, in the county 
schools, correct any deficiencies which may exist in the 
classification of the pupils or the government of the schools; 
and in the separate school districts he shall call the atten­
tion of the trustees to such deficiencies for correction by



56

Appendix

them. He shall note down the condition and value of the 
buildings and lot and of the furniture, the methods of in­
struction, the branches taught, and his estimate of the abil­
ity of the teacher to conduct the school. He shall give such 
direction and make such recommendation as he deems ex­
pedient and needful to secure the best results in the instruc­
tion of the pupils, and shall examine the classes to see that 
thorough work is done. He shall urge patrons to provide 
their children with comfortable and well furnished school- 
houses. For every school not so visited, the board of super­
visors, must, on proof thereof, deduct ten dollars from his 
salary unless the superintendent be excused for cause.
(18) To call meetings of the county school board as pre­
scribed by law.
(19) To call annually on the first Friday in May a meet­
ing of the trustees of the county for the election of the 
county school board and for the purpose of discussing with 
them ways and means of conducting the schools of the 
county.
(20) To observe such instructions and regulations as the 
state board of education may, from time to time, prescribe, 
and to make special reports to these officials, whenever re­
quired.
(21) To be at the county seat on Saturdays of each scho­
lastic month of the term to receive monthly reports, issue 
pay certificates, and attend to other official duties. If absent, 
without leave previously granted by the board of super­
visors, the board shall deduct from his salary ten dollars 
for each day’s absence, unless prevented by illness or other 
unavoidable cause. And when there are two judicial dis­
tricts in his county, the superintendent shall alternate, go­
ing to the courthouse of the districts alternately.



57

Appendix

(22) To make an enumeration of the educable children in 
his county every two years as prescribed by law.
(23) To perform such other duties as may be required of 
him by law or by rules and regulations of the state board of 
education. In no case shall he receipt for a teacher’s war­
rant or collect money on the same.
(24) At the end of each scholastic year make a report to the 
department of education of all moneys spent in the county 
for public education, including the expenses in municipali­
ties, so as to ascertain the amount spent on each school 
child in the state.

S o u r c e s : Codes, 1930, § 6570; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
ch. 278.

§ 6260. Monthly salaries to be proportionate to the 
whole school fund.—Superintendents shall fix the salaries 
of teachers so that the amount to be paid in salaries and 
other expenses for maintaining all the schools for one month 
shall not exceed that fractional part of the whole school fund 
which one month is of the whole number of months the 
schools are taught.

S o u r c es : Codes, 1930, § 6571; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
ch. 278.

§6261. To settle disputes in schools.—In all contro­
versies arising under the school law, the opinion and ad­
vice of the county superintendent shall first be sought. 
From his decision an appeal may be taken to the state board 
of education upon a written statement of the facts, certified 
by the county superintendent or by the secretary of the 
board of trustees.

S o u r c es : Codes, 1930, §6572; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
ch. 278.



58

Appendix

§ 6262. May suspend or remove teacher or trustee and 
fill vacancies.—For incompetency, neglect of duty, immoral 
conduct, or other disqualifications, the county superintend- 
dent may suspend or remove any teacher or trustee from 
office in any school district. For the purpose of conducting 
inquiries and trials, the superintendent has the same power 
as a justice of the peace to issue subpoenas for witnesses 
and to compel their attendance and the giving of evidence 
by them. Appeals may be had as provided in the following 
section on revoking teachers’ license. When from such 
cause, or from death, resignation, or other cause, a vacancy 
in either of the above named offices occurs, it shall be the 
duty of the county superintendent, within ten days after the 
vacancy occurs, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, to 
supply the same by appointment.

S ources : Codes, 1930, § 6573; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
ch. 278.

§ 6263. May revoke teacher’s license.—For intemper­
ance, immoral conduct, brutal treatment of a pupil, or other 
good cause, the county superintendent may revoke the li­
cense, state or county, of a teacher; but the teacher or those 
opposed to the teacher shall be allowed an appeal to the 
state board of education, to whom statements, under oath, 
of the acts may be made by the county superintendent and 
other interested parties. The teachers must be notified of 
the charges ten days before the trial, by the county super­
intendent.

S ources : Codes, 1930, § 6574; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
ch. 278.

§ 6264.5. Special report as to teachers.—Within fifteen 
(15) days after the close of the first month of school each



59

Appendix

year, each county school superintendent and each separate 
district school superintendent shall file with the director of 
administration and finance in the department of education 
a special report, showing for each school in the county or 
separate district the name of the school, the name, sex, 
training, experience, salary and any other information 
deemed necessary by the state board of education, of each 
teacher in the school. These special reports shall be sub­
mitted on forms prepared and furnished by the state board 
of education. [Effective from and after July 1, 1948.]

S ources : Laws, 1948, ch. 292, § 1.
§ 6281. Rules, etc.—The State Board of Education is 

hereby authorized and empowered to set up rules and regu­
lations for the issuance of the certificates provided for in 
this Act and such other certificates as may be required, and 
to administer said rules and regulations through the State 
Board of Examiners, which latter Board shall perform such 
duties in connection therewith as the State Board of Educa­
tion may require, but said rules and regulations shall not 
be changed without giving a minimum notice of one year.

The State Board of Education is hereby authorized and 
empowered to arrange for the examination of applicants to 
teach in any county when so requested by the county super­
intendent of education, said examination to include all of 
the subjects in the common school curriculum. The examina­
tion questions shall be properly adjusted to the kind and 
grade of certificate applied for. One teacher, but not more 
than two teachers, shall conduct said examination, each to 
receive five ($5.00) dollars for each day of actual service 
in holding the examination and twenty-five cents additional 
for grading the papers of each applicant, to be paid out of



60

Appendix

the county school fund in the same manner as teachers’ 
salaries are paid.

The State Board of Examiners is authorized to grant 
teachers’ professional certificate of the highest grade to 
graduates of the University of Mississippi, Mississippi 
State College, the Mississippi State College for Women, the 
State Teachers’ College, the Delta State Teachers’ College, 
the Alcorn A. & M. College, and such other institutions of 
higher learning in this State as may maintain a standard 
four-year college course, approved by the State Board of 
Education; provided, that certificate shall be issued only to 
such graduates of the different institutions as have success­
fully passed nine session hours of college work in education 
designated and approved by the State Board of Education.

S o u r c e s  : Laws, 1 9 3 8 ,  Ex. c h .  4 4 .

§ 6282. Outstanding licenses.—No license or certificate 
to teach in the public schools of the State which is valid at 
the time this Act takes effect shall be invalidated by the 
passage of this Act, but all such licenses and certificates 
shall remain valid and in effect during the time and for the 
purpose for which they were originally issued.

S ources : Laws, 1938, Ex. ch. 44.

T e a c h e r s’ S alaries

§ 6283. Contracts with teachers.—It shall be the duty 
of the superintendent to make a contract in the form pre­
scribed by the board of education with every licensed 
teacher who has been selected by the trustees according to 
law, or appointed by himself. The contract shall be signed 
in duplicate by the superintendent and by the teacher, each 
retaining one copy. The contract shall show the name of



61

Appendix

the school, the position of the teacher, whether a principal 
or assistant, and the monthly salary. In addition to the 
fixed salary, there shall be stated in the contract two suc­
cessively smaller amounts which shall be the salary in case 
the attendance decreases to a number for which the con­
ditional amounts would be the fixed salary. Contracts shall 
be valid for the number of months the school is to be taught 
during the scholastic year, and the following scholastic year, 
in the discretion of the board of trustees at the time of the 
making of the contract, it being the purpose hereof to au­
thorize the board of trustees to elect a teacher, if it so de­
sires, for two scholastic years, and authorize contracts there­
for, and it shall be unlawful to issue a certificate for ser­
vices rendered before the contract is made and signed; 
provided, that in years when the state appropriation is 
made after the beginning of the fall school term, that it 
shall be lawful for the county superintendent of education 
to cause the schools to be taught without contract until he 
shall have officially ascertained the amount of the common 
school fund that will be distributed to his county for that 
scholastic year; provided, further, that where contracts 
have been made before the amount of the school fund to be 
distributed to his county is known, the same may be changed 
when he ascertains the amount his county will receive, the 
teachers agreeing thereto; but the county superintendent 
shall have the right after the expiration of the four months 
required by the constitution, to make new contracts with 
teachers in counties making a special levy to carry on the 
schools for a longer term than four months, and all such 
contracts shall be made as the law provides, so that the 
amounts to be paid in salaries for maintaining all the 
schools one month shall not exceed that fractional part of 
the whole school fund, as provided by such special levy,



62

Appendix

which one month is of the whole number of months the 
schools are to be taught.

S ources : Codes, 1930, § 6610; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
ch. 278; 1940, ch. 174.

§ 6284. County superintendents authorized to contract 
with teachers.—County superintendents of education are 
hereby authorized to contract with teachers in the public 
schools in accordance with the following limitations in ref­
erence to salaries:

(a) Third grade teachers between twenty dollars and 
forty dollars a month inclusive.

(b) Second grade teachers between thirty dollars and 
fifty dollars a month inclusive.

(c) First grade teachers between thirty dollars and two 
hundred dollars a month inclusive.

The salaries of principal and assistant teachers of sepa­
rate school districts shall be fixed by the trustees, and the 
salaries of principals and assistant teachers of consolidated 
districts having a local levy, by the trustees and county 
superintendents of education.

§ 6290. General rules for teachers.—Every teacher in a 
public school must, before taking charge of a school and 
one week before closing a term, notify the county superin­
tendent of the fact, naming the day of opening or closing, 
must enforce the course of study, the use of text books, and 
the rules and regulations prescribed for schools; and must 
hold pupils to a strict account for disorderly conduct on 
the way to and from school, on the playgrounds, or during 
recess, suspend for good cause any pupil from the school, 
and report such suspension to the board of trustees for re-



63

Appendix

view. If Ms action be not sustained by the board, the 
teacher may appeal to the county superintendent, whose de­
cision shall be final.

S ources : Codes, 1930, § 6617; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
ch. 278.

T ru stees

§ 6295. School districts classified and defined.—There 
may be five Mnds of school districts as follows:

1. Common school district; an ordinary rural district 
organized by the county school board.

2. Consolidated district; one that is formed by consoli­
dating two or more districts or parts of districts or one 
district and one or more parts of districts and contains an 
area of not less than ten square miles and in which authority 
to transport pupils is granted.

3. Special consolidated district; a consolidated district 
in which more than one school has been granted and located 
by the county school board for operation by the trustees of 
the district and which shall contain not less than twenty- 
five square miles of territory and not fewer than two hun­
dred and fifty pupils.

4. Municipal separate district; one composed of the 
corporate limits of a municipality or the corporate limits 
of the municipality and added territory.

5. Rural separate district; any unincorporated district 
with an assessed valuation of not less than $200,000 or any 
unincorporated district of not less than sixteen square miles 
organized by the county school board in which a free public 
school is maintained for at least seven months with an 
average of not less than twenty-five children.

S o u r c e s : Codes, 1930, §6622; Laws, 1930, ch. 278.



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Appendix

S eparate  S chool  D istr ic ts

§ 6411. Separate school districts.—Any municipality, by 
an ordinance of the mayor and board of aldermen or other 
governing body thereof, may be declared a municipal sepa­
rate school district. Any school district, not being a mu­
nicipal school district, with an assessed tax valuation of 
not less than two hundred thousand ($200,000) dollars or 
any such district of not less than sixteen square miles may 
be declared a separate school district by the county school 
board, or boards, on a petition of a majority of the qualified 
electors therein or as provided by Section 6584 [Code of 
1930; § 6274, Code of 1942], but shall not be entitled to the 
rights and privileges of a separate school district unless a 
free public school shall be maintained therein for a term of 
at least seven months in each scholastic year; and provided 
that there shall be at least an average attendance of as 
many as twenty-five pupils. Before the county school 
board, or boards, can declare any school district a separate 
school district as provided herein it must have abolished the 
said school district as provided in Section 6584, Section 
6585 [Code of 1930; §§6274, 6275, Code of 1942], providing 
for outstanding obligations of dissolved districts, shall ap­
ply to such dissolved districts.

S o u r c e s  : Codes, 1930, § 6657; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
ch. 278; 1934, ch. 263.

§ 6416. Municipal separate districts—tax levy—bond 
issues.—The mayor and board of aldermen or other govern­
ing body of a municipality constituting a separate school 
district, whether such district is composed of the corporate 
limits or the corporate limits and added territory, shall an­
nually levy a tax on the entire separate district sufficient to



65

Appendix

pay for fuel and other necessities for the public schools of 
the district, also for maintaining the school after the four 
months term provided by the State, or to supplement during 
said four months, said items being included in the annual 
budget submitted by the board of trustees, and if said items 
are included in the annual budget submitted by the board 
of trustees, the mayor and board of aldermen shall make 
a levy sufficient to cover the budget, or in lieu thereof, must 
call an election to determine the question of the levy; said 
election to be called upon a petition of twenty per cent, of 
the qualified electors of the district. The mayor and board 
of aldermen or commissioner of such municipality may also 
levy a tax on the entire school district, including added 
territory, to erect, repair and equip school buildings in­
cluding teachers’ homes, and may issue bonds of the sepa­
rate district for that purpose in the manner provided by 
law. The taxable property of such added territory to such 
municipality shall be assessed and the tax collected for all 
school purposes, including bond issues for schools (whether 
issued in the name of the municipality or of such school 
district), in the same manner as on the property within the 
corporate limits, unless the governing body of such munici­
pality shall by resolution spread upon its minutes and a 
certified copy thereof transmitted to the tax collector of the 
county in which such municipality is located, directing the 
tax collector of the county to collect the school tax upon the 
property added to such school district and lying outside the 
corporate limits of such municipality, stating to such tax 
collector the amount of the levy on such property of such 
district, and such tax collector shall receive as compen­
sation for collecting such tax the same amount he may be 
entitled to receive for the collection of county taxes, and 
shall report to the governing body of such municipality his



66

Appendix

collection of such school tax at the same time as he is re­
quired to report the collection of county taxes; on the ques­
tion of levy for school and of issuance of school bonds 
provided for in this section the qualified electors and the 
taxpayers have the same rights and benefits as those within 
the corporate limits of such municipality. For the pur­
pose of an election on a question pertaining to schools, such 
municipality shall cause the qualified electors in such added 
territory to be registered in like manner as those within the 
corporate limits, and governed by the same laws as far as 
applicable. And every municipality being a separate school 
district, may in like manner, levy and collect poll taxes for 
the maintenance of schools.

S ources : Codes, 1930, § 6662; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
eh, 278; 1934, ch. 260.

§ 6422. Trustees of separate school districts.—Separate 
school districts are of three classes, municipal, rural and 
line. The schools of a separate district shall be under the 
control of five trustees, each to be chosen for a term of five 
years, but so chosen that one will be elected each year. All 
terms shall date from date of election on the first Saturday 
of March, except municipal trustees whose terms shall date 
from January 1st.

To be eligible to the office of trustee of a separate dis­
trict, a person must possess the following qualifications:

1. Must be a bona fide resident of the district.
2. Must be a qualified elector.
A member of the board of aldermen, county school 

board, trustees of a private or sectarian school or college 
in the same separate school district shall not be eligible to 
the office of trustee.



Appendix

a. Municipal.
The trustees of a municipal district shall be elected by 

the mayor and board of aldermen or other governing body 
at the first regular meeting in January. All vacancies for 
the unexpired part of a term shall be filled by selection of 
the mayor and board of aldermen.

b. Rural.
The trustees of a rural separate district shall be elected. 

On the first Saturday of March of each year the qualified 
electors of each rural separate school district shall meet at 
the schoolhouse in said district at 2 o’clock p. m., organize 
by electing a chairman and a secretary of said meeting; 
then elect by ballot one trustee who shall assume the duties 
of his office as soon as elected for a term of five years. At 
each such meeting the trustees, whose terms do not expire 
in that year, shall have prepared and present a list of names 
of the qualified electors of such district who are entitled to 
vote for trustees . It shall be the duty of the county super­
intendent of education to obtain said list of qualified electors 
from the circuit clerks’ office and furnish same to each 
school district trustees in advance of the election. No 
proxies shall be allowed. The chairman and secretary shall 
forthwith certify the result of the election to the county 
superintendent, if he shall not have been present at said 
election, and cause the certificate thereof to be delivered 
to him within five days following said election. The county 
superintendent of education shall cause a notice of said 
election to be posted in three public places in the school 
district, one of which places shall be the front door of the 
school building, one week prior to said election and the 
principal teacher shall, in addition thereto, announce the



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date and purpose of the election to the pupils three times 
during said week.

c. Line.
For line rural separate school district, the same manner 

of procedure shall govern the selection of trustees in all 
line school districts as is outlined in subsection (b), for 
rural separate schools except the five trustees shall be ap­
portioned amongst the counties as follows:

The territory in the county in which the school building 
is located shall never have less than three (3) trustees on 
the board, and where only two counties are involved, the 
territory in the county in which the school building is not 
located shall have two (2) trustees on the board, provided 
said territory furnishes as many as one hundred pupils and 
where it furnishes less than one hundred pupils it shall 
have one trustee on the board and the county in which the 
school building is located, shall, in that case, have four
(4) trustees.

Where three (3) counties are involved then in that case 
the territory in each one of the counties in which the school 
building is not located shall have one trustee on the board, 
and in all cases the trustee shall be selected by the qualified 
electors of the territory which he or she will represent on 
the board, and notice of said selection shall be given to the 
county superintendent of the county in which the school 
building is located in case he be not present at the election.

The powers and duties of trustees under the general law 
shall apply to the trustees of separate school districts and 
they shall be subject to the same penalties. The board of 
trustees shall notify the mayor and board of aldermen in a 
municipal district of a vacancy from any cause and shall



69

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notify the county superintendent of any vacancy in a rural 
separate district.

§ 6423. Trustees of separate school districts—powers— 
duties.—The powers and duties of separate school district 
trustees are as follows:

(1) To prescribe and enforce rules, not inconsistent with 
law or those prescribed by the state board of education, for 
their own government and government of schools, and to 
transact their business at regular and special meetings 
called for such purpose, notice of which shall be given each 
member.

(2) To designate a custodian or custodians of the school 
building, grounds, and property of the school district, and 
to make all needful rules and regulations concerning the 
duties and powers of such custodian or custodians; to au­
thorize the use of the school buildings and grounds for the 
holding of public meetings or gatherings of the people, 
under such rules and regulations as said board of trustees 
may prescribe; to have full charge of the erection, repair­
ing, or equipping of school buildings; and to employ 
janitors.

(3) To appoint librarians, and to enforce the rules pre­
scribed for the government of school libraries.

(4) To exclude from the schools and school libraries all 
books or papers of a sectarian, partisan, denominational, 
or immoral character.

(5) To visit every school in their district at least once 
in each month, and examine carefully into its management, 
condition and wants.



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Appendix

(6) To maintain all the schools under their control for 
an equal length of time during the year; and to provide 
schools for Indian children living within the district in the 
manner and under the same regulations as schools are pro­
vided for the children of other races.

(7) To furnish blackboards and other necessary fur­
niture, books, equipment, and apparatus for the use of the 
schools; to provide transportation when necessary for the 
children in their respective districts who live two miles or 
more from the schoolhouse, and pay for same out of the 
school funds of the district, as teachers’ salaries are paid.

(8) To elect a superintendent, if one be required, and 
a principal for each of the schools, and prescribe their 
powers and duties.

(9) To elect teachers, fix salaries, terms of service, con­
tract with them and impose fines, penalties for neglect of 
duty, but they cannot contract with a principal or a teacher 
who does not hold a license or certificate from the county 
superintendent or state board of examiners. In fixing sal­
aries, boards of trustees shall take into consideration the 
character, academic and professional training, executive 
ability, and teaching capacity of the teacher.

(10) To contract with superintendents, principals and 
teachers, for a term of years not exceeding three years, 
said salaries at the option of the board to be made pay­
able monthly, twelve months in the year; to pay teachers for 
the time lost on account of closing of schools by county or 
state health officers, or by boards of trustees in emergency 
eases; provided, such action is approved by the state board 
of education. The amount to be paid shall be determined by 
the board of trustees.



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Appendix

(11) To require the principal of each school to keep the 
records thereof in such a manner as to show, by age, race, 
grade, and sex, the educable children who attend the school, 
the enrollment and the average attendance, and at the end 
of the term to make complete term report to the trustees, 
showing the above statistics and such others as may be re­
quired of the county superintendent for his annual report 
to the state board of education. The secretary of the trus­
tees shall, within ten days after the close of the term, trans­
mit their report to the county superintendent; and it shall 
be unlawful for the superintendent to issue pay certificates 
for the last months’ attendance of county pupils until said 
report is filed with him.

(12) To enforce in schools the course of study and the 
use of textbooks prescribed and adopted by the proper 
authorities; to add the high school department; to charge 
tuition in said department, at their discretion; and, in co­
operation with the principal of the school, to prescribe the 
course of study for the high school department.

(13) To determine annually the amount of money re­
quired for the support of the public schools and for carry­
ing into effect all the provisions of the law in reference 
thereto; and in pursuance of this provision the trustees 
shall, on or before the fifteenth of July, of each year, sub­
mit in writing to the mayor and board of aldermen or other 
governing body an itemized estimate of the expenditures 
for the next scholastic fiscal year and of the whole amount 
of money to be received from the state and county and the 
amount required from the municipality for the above pur­
poses ; to be responsible for all expenditures for school pur­
poses ; and to write orders to the clerk of the municipality



72

Appendix

or to the county superintendent to issue warrants or pay 
certificates on any available school funds of such districts,

(14) To make report to the county superintendent of all 
expenses in the district for educational purposes for the 
year, to conform to the financial report required of the 
county superintendent by the state board of education.

(15) To have authority, and it shall be their duty, to 
suspend or dismiss pupils, when the best interests of the 
schools make it necessary.

(16) To employ physical instructors and visiting nurses, 
and to provide for medical inspection of school children, 
acting either separately or jointly with other boards of 
trustees.

(17) In districts containing a municipality with a pop­
ulation of not less than ten thousand according to the most 
recent federal census, to employ one or more truant officers 
for the enforcement of the state compulsory school law; to 
fix the duties and salary of such officer and to exact of him 
such reports as they may deem necessary. Said officer, 
when appointed, shall be the executive agent under the 
board of the compulsory law in lieu of the county super­
intendent. The compensation of such truant officer shall 
be paid out of the school fund.

S ources : Codes, 1930, § 6665; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
ch. 278.

§ 6527. How common school fund to be distributed in 
counties.—The county common school fund (poll tax) shall 
be divided between the separate school districts of the 
county and that portion of the county not included in the 
separate school districts. Within thirty days after every



73

Appendix

legal enrollment of the edueable children of the state, and 
within thirty days after the organization of the separate 
school district, or a change has been made in the limits of 
one already organized in the county, the county superin­
tendent of education shall certify to the clerk of the board 
of supervisors the number of edueable children, to be deter­
mined from the official roll of the edueable children on file 
in the chancery clerk’s office, in each separate school dis­
trict in the county, and the number of edueable children out­
side the limits of the separate school districts. At each 
regular meeting of the board of supervisors it shall be the 
duty of the clerk of the board of supervisors to apportion 
the amount of undivided county school fund (poll tax) in 
the county treasury among the separate school districts of 
the county and schools of the county outside of the separate 
school districts, on the basis of the number of edueable chil­
dren in each, as furnished by the county superintendent of 
education and to certify the said apportionment to the board 
of supervisors, who, if the apportionment is found to be 
correct, shall order that a warrant be issued in favor of the 
treasurer of each separate school district for the amount 
due each district.

S o ukoes: Codes, 1930, §6733; Laws, 1924, ch. 283; 1930, 
ch. 278.

§ 6528. Balances—how and when used—funds not 
loaned.—If there shall remain a balance in the treasury to 
the credit of the school fund of the several counties and 
separate school districts, on the thirtieth day of June in any 
year, the board of supervisors and trustees of separate 
school districts, respectively, during the month of July fol­
lowing may apply such balance to the building, repairing or 
furnishing with school furniture or apparatus such school-



74

Appendix

houses which belong to the county or separate school dis­
tricts, not appropriating to any school located in the county 
or separate school district an amount greater than one hun­
dred and fifty dollars, unless an amount equal to any excess 
of this sum, to be appropriated by the county, be contrib­
uted and paid into the county treasury by the patrons of 
the public schools making such application and receiving 
such appropriation. All balances not so appropriated shall 
be carried forward to the school fund for the next scholastic 
year; and this shall apply to any fund that may have been 
levied by the county to carry on the schools for a longer 
term than four months. It shall be unlawful to loan any 
portion of the school fund.

S o u r c es : Codes, 1930, § 6734; Laws, 1930, ch. 278.
§ 6541. Municipal separate districts—budgets.—It shall 

likewise be the duty of the board of trustees of each munic­
ipal separate school district, on or before the fifteenth day 
of July of each year, to prepare and file with the State 
Superintendent of Education a budget of expenditures for 
the support, maintenance and operation of the public schools 
of such separate school district during the fiscal year com­
mencing on the first day of such July. Such budget shall 
contain a detailed statement of the estimated amounts to be 
expended for teachers’ salaries, transportation, if any, and 
other expenses to be incurred in the operation of the sepa­
rate school district school, or schools, during the year. Such 
budget shall also show the number of months for which 
funds will be available for the operation of the separate 
school district school, or schools, during the school session, 
and the estimated cost of operation for each month.

S o u r c es : Laws, 1936, eh. 255.



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Appendix

§ 6542. Same—revenues.—It shall also be the duty of 
the board of trustes of each municipal separate school dis­
trict at the same time to prepare and file with the State 
Superintendent of Education a detailed statement of the 
revenues which will be available for the support and main­
tenance of the separate school district school, or schools, 
during the fiscal year. Such statement shall show in sepa­
rate items the amount to be received from the State com­
mon school fund and the State equalizing school fund, if any, 
and the estimated amounts to be received from the separate 
school district tax levy, or levies, or any other sources which 
may be available for the support and maintenance of the 
separate school district school, or schools, during the fiscal 
year, and also the balance of money on hand to the credit 
of the separate school district on the first day of July, and 
the total amount of funds which will be available for the 
support and maintenance of the separate school district 
school, or schools, during the fiscal year.

S ources : Laws, 1936, ch. 255.
§ 6543. Approval of budgets—disapproval.—The State 

Superintendent of Education shall carefully examine the 
county school budgets and the separate school district bud­
gets filed under the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of this 
Act [§§6537-6542, supra] for the purpose of determining 
whether or not the revenues to be made available during 
the fiscal year will be sufficient to meet the expenditures 
provided for in such budgets. If the State Superintendent 
of Education shall find that the budget of expenditures will 
not exceed the amount of revenues to be made available for 
the support and maintenance of the public schools during 
the fiscal year, he shall approve the same in writing, and 
shall certify his approval of such budget to the county su-



76

Appendix

perintendent of education, or the board of trustees of such 
separate school district, as the case may be. If, in the opin­
ion of the State Superintendent of Education, the revenues 
to be made available for the support and maintenance of the 
public schools of the county, or separate school district, as 
the case may be, during the fiscal year will be insufficient to 
meet the expenditures provided for in such budget, the State 
Superintendent of Education shall return such budget to 
the county superintendent, or the board of trustees of such 
separate school district, as the case may be, for revision 
and shall require the county superintendent, or the board of 
trustees of such separate school district, to revise such 
budget by reducing the estimated expenditures in such 
amount as may be necessary to balance the expenditures 
against the estimated receipts.

S ources : Laws, 1936, ch. 255.
§ 6558. Same—municipal separate districts.—The mayor 

and board of aldermen, or other governing authority, of any 
municipality constituting a municipal separate school dis­
trict, whether such municipal separate school district be 
restricted to such municipality or include added territory, 
which on the date of the approval of this Act may have any 
valid and undisputed school tax anticipation notes, teachers ’ 
pay certificates, or other obligations outstanding, for the 
payment of which there are insufficient funds on hand and 
which cannot be paid out of the school funds made available 
for the current fiscal year ending June 30, 1936, is hereby 
authorized and empowered to borrow money in an amount 
sufficient to pay such valid and undisputed obligations, and 
to issue interest bearing negotiable notes or certificates of 
indebtedness therefor. The proceeds derived from the sale 
of such notes or certificates of indebtedness shall be applied



77

Appendix

to the payment of such valid and undisputed obligations 
outstanding.

Such notes or certificates of indebtedness shall bear in­
terest at a rate not to exceed six (6%) per cent, per annum, 
interest payable annually, and shall mature serially within 
three years from the date of their issuance, and not less 
than one-third part of the principal thereof shall mature 
each year until all of said notes or certificates are paid. 
Such notes or certificates of indebtedness shall be signed by 
the mayor and shall be countersigned by the municipal clerk, 
who shall impress the seal of his office upon each such note 
or certificate of indebtedness as it is issued; and each such 
note or certificate of indebtedness shall be registered by the 
clerk in a book kept by him in his office. Such notes or certifi­
cates of indebtedness shall constitute the valid obligations of 
such municipal separate school district and shall be payable 
out of a special tax to be levied by the mayor and board of 
aldermen, or other governing authority of such munici­
pality, upon all the taxable property of such municipal 
separate school district. It shall be the duty of the mayor 
and board of aldermen, or other governing authority of such 
municipality, to levy annually, at the time other municipal 
and separate school district taxes are levied, a special tax 
upon all the taxable property of such municipal separate 
school district sufficient in amount to pay the principal and 
interest of such notes or certificates of indebtedness when 
and as the same shall become due. Such notes or certi­
ficates of indebtedness may be issued with interest coupons 
attached and such interest coupons shall bear the facsimile 
signatures of the mayor and clerk. If, however, no interest 
coupons are attached, the interest payments on each such 
note or certificate of indebtedness shall be properly credited



78

Appendix

on the back of such note or certificate of indebtedness at the 
time such interest payments are made.

In the event the mayor and board of aldermen, or other 
governing authority of such municipality, shall be unable 
to borrow money for the payment of such valid and undis­
puted obligations of such separate school district outstand­
ing on the date of the approval of this Act, the mayor and 
board of aldermen, or other governing authority of such 
municipality, is hereby authorized and empowered, in their 
discretion, to levy a special tax upon all the taxable prop­
erty of such separate school district sufficient in amount 
to pay such outstanding obligations, such tax to be levied 
at the time other municipal and separate school district 
taxes are levied. If the amount of the tax levy required to 
retire such obligations shall exceed two mils on the dollar 
on all the taxable property of such separate school district, 
the mayor and board of aldermen, or other governing au­
thority of such municipality, may levy such tax at a rate 
not to exceed two mills annually over a period of years until 
all such valid and undisputed obligations shall have been 
paid.

The funds derived from the special tax, levied under the 
provisions of this section, shall be kept separate from all 
other funds of such municipal separate school district and 
shall be used for the purpose herein stated and for no 
other purpose.

S ources : Laws, 1936, ch. 255.
§ 6569. Separate school districts.—In the event a sepa­

rate school district shall levy a ten-mill tax for the support 
and maintenance of the separate school district schools to 
be used in the payment of teachers’ salaries, transporta­
tion and necessary expenses of administration, and the



79

Appendix

school fund of such district, including its share of the State 
per capita distribution, its share of the county poll tax and 
transfer tuition, shall be insufficient to pay teachers sal­
aries, transportation, and transfer tuition charges of such 
separate school district for a term of eight months in each 
scholastic year under the terms and conditions imposed in 
this Act, such separate school district shall be eligible to 
participate in the distribution of the State equalizing fund 
upon the terms and conditions provided in Section 3 hereof 
[§ 6566, supra] for the county; and the amount of funds to 
be allotted to such separate school district shall be deter­
mined on the same basis as is provided in said Section 3 
[§6566, supra] for the county.

S o u r c e s : Laws, 1936, 2nd Ex. ch. 1.
§ 8570. Emergency expense fund.—The State Board of 

Education shall be authorized to reserve the sum of 
$25,000.00 out of the State equalizing fund each year for 
the purpose of meeting special conditions and emergency 
situations in any counties or school districts in the State, 
which cannot be provided for otherwise under the provi­
sions of this Act, and said funds may be allotted by the 
State Board of Education in such manner as it may deem 
best having in mind the purposes for which the State equal­
izing fund is appropriated. The State Board of Education 
shall be required to furnish an itemized account of any 
expenditures from this fund, and report same to the next 
regular session of the legislature.

S o u r c es : Laws, 1936, 2nd Ex. ch. 1.
§ 6571. Regulation of expenditures.—It shall be the 

duty of the State Board of Education to prescribe rules 
and regulations governing the expenditure of the public



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Appendix

school funds of the county by the county superintendents 
of education and the expenditure of the separate school 
district funds by the trustees of the separate school dis­
tricts for administration and office expenses in those 
counties and separate school districts whose schools are 
maintained in part by appropriations out of the State 
equalizing fund. The State Board of Education shall be 
authorized to impose limitations, in addition to the limi­
tations already imposed by law, upon the amounts expended 
by the county superintendents for office help and supplies. 
But in no event shall such expenditures exceed the amounts 
authorized by law.

S ottbces: Laws, 1936, 2nd Ex. ch. 1.
§ 6572. Regulation of salaries—violations.—The State 

Board of Education is hereby authorized, and it shall be its 
duty, to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations for the 
fixing of salaries of teachers in those counties, separate 
school districts, consolidated school districts, and other 
school districts, whose schools are maintained in part by 
appropriation out of the State equalizing fund. The average 
monthly salaries to be paid to teachers in counties, separate 
school districts, and other school districts, which levy a tax 
of ten mills for maintenance purposes shall be so limited in 
amount as to permit the operation of the public schools in 
the county, or separate school district, or other school dis­
trict, as the ease may be, for a term of eight months in each 
scholastic year.

And no county, or separate school district, or other 
school district, participating in the benefits of the State 
equalizing fund, which levies a tax of ten mills, shall be per­
mitted to pay to teachers monthly salaries in excess of ap­
proximately one-eighth of the amount fixed in the county



81

Appendix

or school district budget for the payment of teachers’ sala­
ries during the school year. The average monthly salaries 
to he paid to teachers in counties and school districts par­
ticipating in the benefits of the State equalizing fund, which 
levy a tax of less than ten mills for maintenance purposes 
and in which the public school term is less than eight months 
in any scholastic year shall not exceed the average monthly 
salaries paid to teachers in counties which maintain an 
eight months’ term: Provided, however, that in counties 
having a ten-mill tax levy for the maintenance of the public 
schools of the county any school district having a separate 
tax levy may supplement the salaries of teachers out of the 
funds derived from such district tax levy; and provided, 
further, that in counties which are eligible to participate in 
the benefits of the State equalizing fund, but which have a 
county-wide tax levy for school maintenance which is less 
than ten mills on the dollar, any school district, which has a 
special district tax levy for maintenance purposes in excess 
of the amount required to maintain an eight months’ term 
may supplement the salaries of teachers out of the funds 
from such excess district tax levy.

S ottbces: Laws, 1936, 2nd Ex. ch. 1.
§ 6574. Teachers.—The State Board of Education is 

hereby authorized to prescribe rules and regulations impos­
ing additional restrictions upon the number of teachers who 
may be employed in counties which participate in the bene­
fits of the State equalizing fund, whose salaries are to be 
paid out of the public school fund of the county, and the 
number of teachers who may be employed in school districts 
whose public school funds are made up in part by appro­
priations out of the State equalizing fund, and may make 
special allowance for additional teachers who may



APPENDIX
SENATE BILL NO. 500

AN ACT MAKING AN APPROPRIATION FOR THE
SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE COM­
MON SCHOOLS OF MISSISSIPPI FOR THE FIS­
CAL YEARS 1950 AND 1951.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF 

THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI:
SECTION 1. That the following sums, or so much 

thereof as may be necessary, be and the same are hereby 
appropriated out of any money in the state treasury not 
otherwise appropriated, for the support and maintenance 
of the common schools of Mississippi for the fiscal years 
1950 and 1951, beginning July 1, 1950 and ending June 30, 
1952, as follows:

For the support and maintenance of the common 
schools for the fiscal year 1950 for the per capita fund 

_______________________ $8,750,000.00.
An additional sum known as the equalizing fund to be 

disbursed by the State Board of Education in the manner of 
equalizing public school terms throughout the state, which 
shall be used exclusively for equalization of the school 
terms, teachers’ salaries and other expenses necessary in 
the maintenance of such schools, and no part of the same 
shall be used for salaries or other compensation of any 
kind except in the payment of such amounts as are specifi­
cally authorized by law --------------- $8,750,000.00.

For the support and maintenance of the common
schools for the fiscal year 1951 for the per capita fund
_____________________________________ $8,750,000.00.

An additional sum known as the equalizing fund to be 
disbursed by the State Board of Education in the manner of-



83

Appendix

equalizing public school terms throughout the state, which 
shall be used exclusively for equalization of the school 
terms, teachers’ salaries and other expenses necessary in 
the maintenance of such schools, and no part of the same 
shall be used for salaries or other compensation of any kind 
except in the payment of such amounts as are specifically 
authorized by law _____________________$8,750,000.00.

As an additional supplemental appropriation to be used 
for increasing the salaries of teachers in the colored schools, 
and to help equalize the salaries of teachers in the colored 
schools, to be disbursed by the State Board of Education in 
the manner provided in Senate Bill No. 501, Laws of Mis­
sissippi, 1950, for the fiscal year 1950 ______$1,500,000.00.

As an additional supplemental appropriation to be used 
to help defray the expenses of school transportation for 
colored schools, to be disbursed by the State Board of Edu­
cation in the manner provided in Senate Bill No. 501, Laws 
of Mississippi, 1950, for the fiscal year 1950___ $500,000.00.

As an additional supplemental appropriation to be used 
for increasing the salaries of teachers in the colored schools, 
and to help equalize the salaries of teachers in the colored 
schools, to be disbursed by the State Board of Education, 
in the manner provided in Senate Bill No. 501, Laws of Mis­
sissippi, 1950, for the fiscal year 1951______ $1,500,000.00.

As an additional supplemental appropriation to be used 
to help defray the expenses of school transportation for col­
ored schools, to be disbursed by the State Board of Educa­
tion in the manner provided in Senate Bill No. 501, Laws of 
Mississippi, 1950, for the fiscal year 1951_____$500,000.00

That none of additional funds shall be used in increas­
ing supervisory or administrative costs above the July 1, 
1948-June 1950 costs of same.



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Appendix

SECTION 2. That this act take effect and be in force 
from and after its passage.

SENATE BILL NO. 501

AN ACT TO PROVIDE AND SPECIFY HOW THE 
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS MADE BY 
SENATE BILL NO. 500 OF THE REGULAR 1950 
SESSION FOR INCREASING THE SALARIES OF 
TEACHERS IN THE COLORED SCHOOLS AND 
FOR DEFRAYING THE EXPENSES OF SCHOOL 
TRANSPORTATION FOR COLORED SCHOOLS 
SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE COUNTIES 
AND SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICTS AND TO 
REGULATE THE EXPENDITURES THEREOF.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF 

THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI:
SECTION 1. That the additional supplemental appro­

priation made by Senate Bill No. 500 of the Regular Session 
of 1950 for increasing the salaries of teachers in the colored 
schools and for assisting in the equalization of such salaries 
with the salaries of teachers in the white schools for the 
fiscal years of 1950 and 1951 shall be disbursed and dis­
tributed by the State Board of Education to the respective 
counties and separate school districts upon the basis which 
the number of teacher units in the colored schools of each 
county and separate school district shall bear to the total 
number of teacher units in all of the colored schools of this 
state. The number of teacher units in the colored schools 
for the purposes of this act shall be ascertained by dividing 
by thirty (30) the number of colored pupils in average 
daily attendance for each county and separate school dis-



85

Appendix

trict during the preceding school year as shown by the 
official reports filed with the State Board of Education. 
Distribution of the amounts to which each county and sep­
arate school district shall be entitled shall be made quar­
terly and at the same time as other school funds are dis­
tributed by the State Board of Education.

SECTION 2. It is the purpose of this act to insure 
that the entire amount of the additional supplemental ap­
propriation referred to in Section 1 hereof shall be used 
solely and exclusively for the purpose of increasing the 
salaries of the teachers in the colored schools and for aid­
ing and assisting in equalizing such salaries with the sal­
aries of teachers in the white schools. For such purpose it 
shall be mandatory that for the school years 1950-1951 and 
1951-1952 each county and separate school district shall 
allot, budget and expend for the payment of salaries of 
teachers in the colored schools from all other available 
school funds, exclusive of the additional supplemental ap­
propriation above referred to, an amount which shall not 
be less in the aggregate than the amount expended for such 
purpose during the 1949-1950 school year and it shall also 
be mandatory that the average annual salaries paid to 
teachers in the colored schools in each such county and 
separate school district during the school years of 1950- 
1951 and 1951-1952 which are paid from school funds other 
than the additional supplemental appropriation shall not be 
less than the average annual salary paid to teachers in the 
colored schools during the school year 1949-1950. Provided, 
however, that nothing contained in this act shall be con­
strued to permit the payment of salaries to teachers in 
the colored schools of any salaries in excess of the average 
annual salary paid to teachers holding the same type of 
certificate in the white schools.



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Provided, however, that after the salaries of teachers 
in the colored schools in any county or separate school dis­
trict have been equalized with the salaries of teachers in the 
white schools holding the same type of certificate, and that 
fact has been determined by the State Board of Education, 
any balance, if any, remaining in the additional supple­
mental appropriation made by Senate Bill No. 500 of the 
Regular Session of 1950 and distributed to such county or 
separate school district for increasing the salaries of 
teachers in the colored schools and for assisting in the 
equalization of such salaries with the salaries of teachers 
in the white schools may, with the approval of the State 
Board of Education, be transferred to the general county 
school fund or separate school district fund, as the case 
may be.

SECTION 3. On or before June 1 of each year the 
State Board of Education shall give tentative notice to 
each county and separate school district of the amount of 
funds to which such county or separate school district shall 
be entitled from the additional supplemental appropriation 
referred to in Section 1 hereof for the ensuing fiscal year, 
and on or before July 1, said State Board of Education 
shall give final notice to each such county and separate 
school district of the amount to which the same is so en­
titled. Within fifteen days after the close of the first school 
month the county superintendent of education of each 
county and the board of trustees of each separate school 
district shall file with the State Board of Education a re­
port showing the total number of teachers in the colored 
schools employed for that year, the amount of salary to be 
paid each such teacher and the total salaries to be paid 
such teachers during such school year, together with like



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information for the 1949-1950 school year, which report 
shall contain a statement to the effect that the terms and 
provisions of this act are being fully complied with. If 
such report should not be filed or if such report should 
show that the terms and provisions of this act are not being 
complied with, then the State Board of Education shall 
suspend all further payments under this act to such county 
or separate school district, as the case may be, until the 
necessary report is filed showing full compliance with the 
provisions hereof. Such reports shall be filed on forms 
prescribed and furnished by the State Board of Education 
and the said State Board of Education shall have full 
authority to require such information in addition to that 
prescribed herein as it may deem necessary and proper for 
the purpose of carrying out the purposes of this act.

SECTION 4. That the additional supplemental appro­
priation made by Senate Bill No. 500 of the Regular Session 
of 1950 for the purpose of helping in defraying the ex­
penses of school transportation for colored schools for the 
fiscal years of 1950 and 1951 shall be disbursed and distrib­
uted by the State Board of Education to the respective 
counties and separate school districts upon the basis which 
the number of colored pupils in average daily attendance 
for each county and separate school district for the pre­
ceding fiscal year as is shown by the official reports filed 
with the State Board of Education shall bear to the total 
number of colored pupils in average daily attendance in 
all of the colored schools of this state; provided, however, 
that in determining the average daily attendance under the 
provisions of this section there shall be excluded therefrom 
the pupils in the colored schools of the separate school dis­
tricts who reside within the limits of an incorporated mu­
nicipality. Distribution of the amounts to which eaeh



88

Appendix

county and separate school district shall be entitled under 
the provisions of this section shall be made quarterly and 
at the same time as other school funds are distributed by 
the State Board of Education.

SECTION 5. To insure that the entire amount of the 
additional supplemental appropriation referred to in Sec­
tion 4 shall be expended solely and exclusively for the pur­
pose of defraying the expenses of school transportation for 
colored schools, the State Board of Education shall have 
the power and authority to require reports from county 
superintendents of education and boards of trustees of 
separate school districts as may be necessary for the pur­
poses of the administration of this act, including specifically 
the authority to require from the trustees of separate school 
districts a report as to the number of colored pupils in 
average daily attendance in such separate school districts 
during the preceding fiscal year who resided within such 
separate school districts but outside of the corporate limits 
of the municipality.

SECTION 6. On June 1 of each year the State Board 
of Education shall give tentative notice to each county and 
separate school district of the amount of funds to which 
such county or separate school district shall be entitled from 
the additional supplemental appropriation referred to in 
Section 4 for the ensuing year, and on July 1 the said State 
Board of Education shall give final notice to each such 
county and separate school district of the amount to which 
same is entitled. If any county or separate school district 
should fail to comply with the provisions of this act relative 
to the additional supplemental appropriation to defray the 
expenses of transportation to public schools, the State 
Board of Education shall suspend all payments to such



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county or separate school district out of such appropriation 
until the terms and provisions of this act with regard 
thereto are fully complied with by such county or separate 
school district.

SECTION 7. That this act shall take effect and be in 
force from and after its passage.

M ISSISSIPPI LA W S 1948, C H A PT E R  279  

H ouse B ill No. 469

AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION 6281, MISSISSIPPI 
CODE OF 1942, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 158, 
LAWS OF 1944, SO AS TO AUTHORIZE THE 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, TO SET UP 
RULES AND REGULAIONS GOVERNING THE 
ISSUANCE OF ALL TEACHERS’ CERTIFICATES, 
TO ELIMINATE PROVISION GOVERNING EX­
AMINATION, AND TO ELIMINATE PROVISION 
FOR GRANTING PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATES 
TO GRADUATES OF CERTAIN INSTITUTIONS OF 
HIGHER LEARNING, AND TO REPEAL SECTION 
6249, 6250, 6251, 6280, 6674, 6675, 6676, 6677, 6728 AND 
6734, MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1942, AND CHAPTER 
157, LAWS OF 1944.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE 
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI.
Section 1. That section 6281, Mississippi code of 1942, 

as amended by chapter 158, laws of 1944, be and the same is 
hereby amended to read as follows:

6281. Rules, etc.—The state board of education is 
hereby authorized empowered, and directed to set up, as



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soon as practicable after the passage of this act, rules and 
regulations governing the issuance of all teachers’ certifi­
cates, and to administer said rules and regulations. Such 
rules and regulations shall not be changed without giving 
a minimum notice of one year to all holders of teaching 
certificates affected by this act.

Section 2. That Sections 6249, 6250, 6251, 6280, 6674, 
6675, 6676, 6677, 6728, and 6734, Mississippi code of 1942, 
and chapter 157, laws of 1944, be and the same are hereby 
repealed.

Section 3. That this act shall take effect and be in 
force from and after July 1, 1948.

Approved March 29th, 1948.

G eorgia  C ode A n n otated .

32-613. Schedules of minimum salaries.—The State 
Board of Education shall annually fix a schedule of the 
minimum salaries which shall be paid to the teachers of 
the various classes prescribed by them out of the public 
school funds of the State, which salary schedule shall be 
uniform for each of the classes of teachers fixed by the 
State Board of Education: Provided, however, that the 
State Board of Education, in its discretion, may authorize 
or provide for variations from such schedules whenever, 
in its discretion, such variations may be necessary. (Acts 
1937, pp. 882, 886.)



L awyers P ress, I nc., 165 William St., N. Y . C. 7 ;  ’Phone: BEekman 3-2300