Domar Electric, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, CA Brief Amicus Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and Southern California Coalition for Economic Equity in Support of Petitioner City of Los Angeles
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March 2, 1994

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Domar Electric, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, CA Brief Amicus Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and Southern California Coalition for Economic Equity in Support of Petitioner City of Los Angeles, 1994. e8d1fe06-b09a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/f9487750-08b5-4db4-8e34-be2dde73794f/domar-electric-inc-v-superior-court-of-los-angeles-county-ca-brief-amicus-curiae-of-the-naacp-legal-defense-and-educational-fund-inc-and-southern-california-coalition-for-economic-equity-in-support-of-petitioner-city-of-los-angeles. Accessed April 06, 2025.
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4 %9}::Supreme Court No: S036526; ' ^ Court o f Appea! • • ie , v ■ ' Respondent, ■ • . • , 4 t v ■ ^ Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BS 020805 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner. i BAILEY CONTROLS COMPANY, Intervenor. Los Angeles, CA^0010-1910 . f , 5a Bhe s g Y n - - KEVIN S. REED, Bar No. 147685 v, . , , ; , . v : - : -315 W. 9th Street, Suite 208 , Los Angeles, CA 90015 nc, ̂ L t r t . W APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY HON. ROBERT H. O’BRIEN, JUDGE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR ECONOMIC EQUITY IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER CITY OF LOS ANGELES '• v'vfljfk Vti- r JOSEPH S. AYILAi JBac No. 47409 , BILL LANN LEE, Bar No, 108452 5 ' 3435 Wilshire Boulevard. Suite 920 • >r CONSTANCE L. RICE, Bar No. 153372 Supreme Court No. S036526 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DOMAR ELECTRIC, INC., Respondent, vs. Court of Appeal 2nd Civ. No. B073387 Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BS 020805 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner. BAILEY CONTROLS COMPANY, Intervenor. APPEAL FROM SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY HON. ROBERT H. O’BRIEN, JUDGE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR ECONOMIC EQUITY IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER CITY OF LOS ANGELES JOSEPH S. AVILA, Bar No. 47409 BILL LANN LEE, Bar No. 108452 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 920 CONSTANCE L. RICE, Bar No. 153372 Los Angeles, CA 90010-1910 KEVIN S. REED, Bar No. 147685 315 W. 9th Street, Suite 208 Los Angeles, CA 90015 Attorneys for Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund , Inc. And Southern California Coalition For Economic Equity TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Interest of Amici Curiae ............................................................................ II. Statement of Facts........................................................................................ III. Argument ..................................................................................................... A. The Outreach Program is Consistent With Charter §386 Because The Program Prevents Discriminatory Exclusion ot Minority and Women-owned Businesses For Which Petitioner City May Be Liable.................................................................................................. B. The Outreach Program Is Consistent With Charter §386 As A Permissible Measure to Expand Subcontracting Opportunities for Minority and Women Owned Businesses...................................... IV. Conclusion ................................................................................................. 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Pages City of Inglewood - L.A. County Civic Center Authority v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 861, [103 Cal. Rptr. 689, 500 P.2d 601].................. 3 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (1989) 488 U.S. 469 ................................ 1, 4, 5 Domar Electric, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 857 ................2 Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal. 3d 65 [801 P.2d 373, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130].....................1 Taylor v. Crane (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 442, [155 Cal. Rptr. 695, 595 P. 2d 1 2 9 ])............3 Statutes: California Public Contract Code §2000 ................................................................... 2, 7 Los Angeles City Charter §386 .............................................................................. Passim Reynolds, "Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown," 93 Yale L.J. 995 (1984) ......................................................................................6 Reynolds, "The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights: Winning the War Against Discrimination,* 1986 U. TIL L. Rev. 1001 (1986) ........................................... 6 ii INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE I. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. ("NAACP LDF') is a nonprofit corporation formed to assist African American persons suffering injustice by reason of racial discrimination through the provision of legal services. Since its founding in 1940, amicus NAACP LDF has prosecuted numerous lawsuits in federal and state courts on behalf of African Americans seeking vindication of their constitutional and civil rights. NAACP LDF also has participated in significant civil rights cases before this Court as amicus curiae. (See, e.g., Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal. 3d 65 [801 P.2d 373, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130].) Amicus believes that its experience in civil rights matters may be of assistance to the Court in resolving the instant case. The Southern California Coalition for Economic Equity ("SCCEE") is a consortium of minority and women owned business enterprise organizations that assists the development and implementation of effective procurement policies for both private entities and government agencies. The membership of SCCEE includes thousands of minority and women-owned business enterprises located in Los Angeles and Southern California. Amicus believes that its experience in matters concerning women and minority owned business enterprises seeking public contracting opportunities may be of assistance to the Court in resolving the instant case. II. STATEMENT OF FACTS In 1989, the United States Supreme Court issued its ruling in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (1989) 488 U.S. 469, holding that a city could not set 1 aside thirty percent of the dollar amount of each contract exclusively for minority subcontractors unless there was a predicate showing of prior discrimination and the remedy was narrowly tailored to overcome the prior discrimination. (488 U.S. at 505-506.) Petitioner City of Los Angeles responded by issuing a mayoral directive clarifying that its ongoing efforts to encourage participation by minority and women- owned businesses in city contracting opportunities did not involve set asides, but only that bidders on city contracts engage in the specific activities to recruit and treat fairly minority and women businesses, as set forth in California Public Contract Code §2000, as part of a subcontractor outreach program. (See Domar Electric, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 857, 858 n. 4 and accompanying text.) Documentation of good faith subcontractor outreach measures taken by the bidder was made a part of the mandatory bid package. (See 23 Cal. Rptr. at 858-59.) This case arose when a city agency disqualified the lowest bidder on a contract from consideration after the bidder declined to submit documentation of its subcontractor outreach efforts. The court of appeals below held by a split opinion that the subcontractor outreach program violated §386 of the Los Angeles City Charter, which requires that petitioner City award its contracts to the "lowest and best regular responsible bidder." (23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862.) The majority was of the view that the subcontractor outreach program, which is not specifically enumerated by the Charter, was ultra vires and therefore void. The court below ignored, as the dissent points out, that the term "responsible" bidder has been given a broad construction, and that §386(c) of the Charter specifically contemplates that bidders may be required "to submit with their proposals detailed specifications of . . . other 2 appropriate factors." (Charter §386(c), quoted in 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863 (opinion ot Spence, J., dissenting).) III. ARGUMENT Following the dissent below, petitioner City’s brief argues that the outreach program is consistent with §386 because the subcontract outreach program and other requirements which "promote competition tend to lower bidding prices and enhance the quality of the product offered by qualified bidders," thus serving "the underlying purposes of the lowest - responsible - bidder provision." (23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864.) Amicus adopts the City’s argument to that effect, but additionally argues that the outreach program is consistent with §386 because the program seeks properly (a) to prevent discriminatory exclusion by bidders of potential minority and women subcontractors that exposes the City to potential liability, and (b) to expand subcontracting opportunities for minority and women-owned businesses without exposing petitioner City to reverse discrimination challenges. The term lowest "responsible" bidder "‘has reference to the quality, fitness and capacity of the low bidder to satisfactorily perform the proposed work’" (23 Cal Rptr. 2d at 864, quoting City o f Inglewood - L.A. County Civic Center Authority v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 861, 867, [103 Cal. Rptr. 689, 500 P.2d 601]), and is broadly construed. (23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863, citing Taylor v. Crane (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 442, 450- 51, [155 Cal. Rptr. 695, 595 P. 2d 129].) Charter §386(c), moreover, permits petitioner City to require bidders to submit "specifications of . . . other appropriate factors." The term "responsible," as used in Charter §386, therefore should be 3 construed broadly to give effect to state and federal civil rights protections that encourage nondiscrimination in -- as well as expansion of — subcontracting opportunities for minority and women-owned businesses. A. The Outreach Program is Consistent With Charter §386 Because The Program Prevents Discriminatory Exclusion of Minority and Women- owned Businesses For Which Petitioner City May Be Liable. In requiring that set aside programs be justified by a showing of prior discrimination and narrow tailoring, Croson did not intend to impair the ability ot petitioner City to take appropriate measures to assure that contractors are not excluding minority and women businesses from subcontracting opportunities. Justice O’Connor’s Croson opinion states that: Nothing we say today precludes a state or local entity from taking action to rectify the efforts of identified discrimination within its jurisdiction. If the City of Richmond had evidence before it that nonminority contractors were systematically excluded from subcontracting opportunities, it could take action to end the discriminatory exclusion. When there is a significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform a particular service and the number of such contractors actually engaged by the locality or the locality’s prime contractors, an inference of discriminatory exclusion could arise . . . Under such circumstances, the city could act to dismantle the closed business system by taking appropriate measures against those who 4 discriminate on the basis of race or other illegitimate criteria. (488 U.S. at 509 (citations omitted).) In order to ascertain whether bidders are excluding minority and women businesses for subcontracting opportunities, petitioner City is permitted to require its bidders to report on their good faith efforts to reach out to minority and women businesses. A bidder’s documentation of enumerated outreach efforts, absent fraud or misrepresentation, may preclude some of the more obvious forms of discriminatory exclusion to which minority and women-owned businesses have been subject. The court below enumerated the outreach program requirements at 23 Cal. Rptr. at 859 n. 4. They include advertising for, providing information about the project’s plans and specifications to, and negotiating in good faith with minority and women-owned businesses. The documentation requirement thus serves an objective similar to having the bidder sign a nondiscrimination statement, also a specification that petitioner City uses that is not enumerated by §386. (See 23 Cal. Rptr. at 863 (Spence, J., dissenting).) The Charter §386 requirement that a successful bidder be the lowest "responsible" bidder should be construed to permit the City to impose such requirements to assure nondiscrimination lest the City suffer liability as a participant, even an unwitting participant as suggested by Croson, in discriminatory exclusion of minority and women subcontractors by its bidders. Petitioner City may appropriately require that a "responsible" bidder not discriminate in its choice of subcontractors, thereby safeguarding the City against potential liability. 5 B. The Outreach Program Is Consistent With Charter §386 As A Permissible Measure to Expand Subcontracting Opportunities for Minority and Women Owned Businesses. Not only is the outreach program compatible with Charter §386 as a way for petitioner City to guard against discriminatory conduct by bidders, it is also consistent as a valid measure to expand subcontracting opportunities. The subcontracting outreach program to the extent it imposes positive duties is a form of voluntary affirmative action. Among the possible range of affirmative action remedies, outreach and recruitment are the least intrusive. They are techniques universally supported on a non-partisan basis. Even those, like William Bradford Reynolds, the former head of the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice in President Reagan’s Administration, who condemn the use of race conscious goals and set asides as unconstitutional and unwise, contend that outreach is acceptable in every respect. (See, e.g., Reynolds, "Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown," 93 Yale L. J. 995, 1004 (1984)("the only sensible policy is to expand recruitment, to reach out and include those minorities who were previously excluded, and to judge all applicants on their individual merits without discrimination"); Reynolds, "The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights: Winning the War Against Discrimination,” 1986 U. IU. L. Rev. 1001, 1020 (1986)("enhanced minority outreach, recruitment, and training programs" are "effective, less intrusive remedies," and "true affirmative action, such as outreach, recruitment and training programs designed to attract increased numbers of minorities to the applicant pool, will continue to be preferred").) Thus, outreach 6 should be that form of affirmative action that a city may undertake with the least risk of a reverse discrimination challenge. The lowest "responsible" bidder language of §386 should be read in light of Public Contract Code section 2000 as a permissible alternative to goal setting. Petitioner City’s outreach program in fact is derived from section 2000, which expressly permits a county or city to award a contract, "[notwithstanding any other provision of law requiring a local agency to award contracts to the lowest responsible bidder," to a bidder who either meets the subcontracting outreach requirements specified in the mayoral directive or meets bottom line participation goals. Petitioner City’s lowest "responsible" bidder Charter provision therefore should be construed in light of Public Contract Code section 2000 to permit the subcontracting outreach requirement of the mayoral directive. IV. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, the Court should vacate the judgment below, uphold the validity of the outreach program under Charter §386, and remand for further proceedings. Amici NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and the Southern California Coalition for Economic Equity submit that petitioner City of Los 'Arnicas believes that petitioner City is not restricted to the outreach program approach, but may pursue other legitimate affirmative action efforts that genuinely open participation to all minority and women businesses. 7 Angeles may permissibly pursue the outreach program to assure nondiscrimination in subcontracting and to promote the inclusion of minority and women-owned businesses as subcontractors, as well as to enhance competitive bidding. Dated: March 2, 1994 Respectfully submitted, Kevin S. Reed Bill Lann Lee, Bar No. 108452 Constance L. Rice, Bar No. 153372 Kevin S. Reed, Bar No. 147685 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. Joseph S. Avila, Bar No. 47409 3435 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 920 Los Angeles, CA 90010-1910 Attorney for Amicus Southern California Coalition for Economic Equity. 8 PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 315 West Ninth Street, Suite 208, Los Angeles, California 90015. On March 2, 1994, I served the foregoing document described as BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR ECONOMIC EQUITY IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER CITY OF LOS ANGELES, on all parties in this action by placing true copies thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as follows: JAMES K. HAHN, City Attorney PEDRO B. ECHEVERRIA CHRISTOPHER M. WESTOFF 1800 City Hall East 200 North Main Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 Attorneys for Petitioner CITY OF LOS ANGELES BERNARD KAMINE, Esq. KAMINE, STEINER & UNGERER 350 South Figueroa Street Suite 250 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Attorneys for Respondent DOMAR ELECTRIC, INC. GERALD PALMER, Esq. JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE 555 West Fifth Street Suite 4600 Los Angeles, CA 90013 Attorneys for Intervenor BAILEY CONTROLS COMPANY HON. ROBERT H. O’BRIEN, Judge LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT 111 North Hill Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 CLERK Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division One 300 South Spring Street Floor 2, "N" Tower Los Angeles, CA 90013 I am "readily familiar" with the firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in the affidavit. Executed on March 2, 1994, at Los Angeles, California. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the