Jackson v. City of Atlanta, TX Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

    I n  t h e

Intteft (Emtrt of Appeals
F ifth Circuit 

No. 19,475

J ames H. Meredith, on behalf of himself 
and others similarly situated,

A-ppellant,

Charles D ickson F air, President of the Board of Trustees 
of the State Institutions of Higher Learning, <$t al.,

Appellees,

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

Constance B aker Motley 
J ack Greenberg 
Derrick A. Bell, Jr.

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, New York

R. J ess Brown

1105^2 Washington Street 
Vicksburg, Mississippi

Attorneys for Appellant



I N D E X

Statement of the Case ........................................ .............  1

Statement of the Facts  .................................. ...............  6

1. Appellant’s Application ...................................... 6

2. Reasons for Denying Appellant’s Application
Prior to Trial ........................................................  8

A. The University’s Policy Regarding Trans­
fer Students From Non-Member Colleges
of Regional Accrediting Associations .......  9

B. The University’s Policy Regarding Trans­
fer of Credits From Non-Member Institu­
tions of Regional Accrediting Associations 11

3. Reasons For Denying Appellant’s Admission
After Commencement of Suit ............................  12

4. Mississippi’s Racial Policy Remains Un­
changed .........   17

Specification of Errors ....    23

A rgument.................................................................................  24

Appellant Has Been Denied Admission to the 
University of Mississippi Solely Because of His 
Race and Color and Pursuant to Rules and 
Regulations and Other Criteria Applicable Only 
to His Case .......................................    24

A . Appellant’s Race Precluded His Admission 
to the University by Reason of the Uni­
versity’s Unchanged Racial Policy ...........   24

PAGE



B. The Rules and Other Criteria Used to Bar 
Appellant’s Admission Were Applicable to 
His Case Alone ..................................................  31

Conclusion................................................................................ 35

Table op Cases

Booker v. State of Tenn. Bd. of Education, 240 F. 2d
689 (6th Cir. 1957) ; cert. den. 353 U. S. 965 ........... 25

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) ..5, 28

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958) ..............................  29

Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429, 434-435 
(1952) ................................................................ ............ ....................................... 34

Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U. S. 202 (1958) ..........................  34

Frazier v. Board of Trustees Univ. of N. C., 134 F. 
Supp. 589 (M. D. N. C. 1955), aff’d 350 U. S. 979 .... 25

G-ray v. Board of Trustees Univ. of Tenn., 342 U. S.
517 (1952) .........................................................................  25

Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, 347 U. S. 971 
(1955); 350 U. S. 413 (1956); 355 U. S. 839 (1957);
162 F. Supp. 851 (N. D. Fla. 1958) ..............................  25

Holmes v. Danner, 191 F. Supp. 394 (M. D. Ga. 1961) .... 25 
Hunt v. Arnold, 172 F. Supp. 847 (N. D. Ga. 1959) ..25, 34

Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N. D. Ala. 1955), 
aff’d 228 F. 2d 619 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. den. 351 
U. S. 931. See also 350 U. S. 1 (1955) ........................... 25

ii

PAGE



I l l

Ludley v. Board of Supervisors of L. S. U., 150 F. Supp.
900 (E. D. La. 1957), aff’d 252 F. 2d 372 (5th Cir. 
1958), cert. den. 358 U. S. 819 ................................... 25

McLaurin v. Board of Regents, 339 IT. S. 637 (1950) ....25, 29 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938) 25

Parker v. University of Delaware, 31 Del. Ch. 381, 75
A. 2d 225 (Del. Ch. 1950) ....... ...... ........................ .......  25

Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936) 
(Md.) .................'..................................................... ...........  25

Swanson v. University of Virginia, Civ. No. 30 (W. D.
Va. 1950). (Unreported) ..............................................  25

Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950) ...................... 25, 29

Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors of L. S. U., 116 F. 
Supp. 248 (E. D. La. 1953) rev’d 207 F. 2d 807 (5th 
Cir. 1953), vacated and remanded, 347 U. S. 971 
(1954), on remand 225 F. 2d 434 (5th Cir. 1955), 
on rehearing 228 F. 2d 895 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. den.
351 U. S. 924 ...................................................................  25

United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946) ............... 33

Wilson v. Board of Supervisors of L. S. U., 92 F. Supp.
986 (E. D. La. 1950) aff’d 340 U. S. 909 ....................... 25

Wilson v. City of Paducah, Ky., 100 F. Supp. 116 
(W. D. Ky. 1951) .......................................................... 25

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886) ................... 33

Other A uthorities

II Wigmore on Evidence, §437 (3d Ed. 1940) ............... 27

II Wigmore on Evidence, §1709 (3d Ed. 1940) ............. 33

PAGE



I n  t h e

llxnUb Status (Enurt at Appeals
F ifth Circuit 

No. 19,475

James H. Meredith, on behalf of himself 
and others similarly situated,

Appellant,

Charles D ickson F air, President of the Board of Trustees 
of the State Institutions of Higher Learning, et al.,

Appellees.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

Statement of the Case

This ease involves racial segregation in Mississippi’s 
institutions of higher learning.

The instant appeal is from a final judgment entered 
February 5, 1962 after a full trial on the merits denying 
appellant’s prayer for an injunction securing his admis­
sion to the undergraduate school of the University of 
Mississippi (R. Vol. Y, p. 732).

This action was originally instituted on May 31, 1961, 
when appellant filed his complaint in the court below alleg­
ing that the appellee Board of Trustees of State Institu­
tions of Higher Learning of the State of Mississippi and 
officials of the University, including the Registrar, have



2

pursued, and are presently pursuing, a state policy, state 
practice, state custom and state usage of maintaining and 
operating separate state institutions of higher learning for 
the white and Negro citizens of Mississippi pursuant to 
which appellant has been denied admission to the University 
of Mississippi solely because of race and color (R. Yol. I, 
p. 13). When the complaint was filed appellant sought a 
temporary restraining order without notice designed to 
secure his admission to the June 8, 1961 summer term of 
the University. This application was denied and the case 
set for a hearing on appellant’s motion for preliminary 
injunction, also filed with a complaint, on June 12, 1961, 
four days after commencement of the summer term.

The relief sought is, inter alia, an injunction enjoining 
appellees from: a) refusing to act expeditiously on the 
applications of appellant and members of his class for 
admission to the University of Mississippi or any other 
state institution of higher learning presently limited to 
white students; b) refusing to expeditiously advise ap­
pellant and members of his class of the status of their 
applications for admission and of the requirements for 
admission which they failed to meet; c) requiring appel­
lant or any member of his class to furnish certificates from 
alumni of the University of Mississippi; d) refusing to 
admit appellant and members of his class to the University 
of Mississippi or any other state institution of higher 
learning presently limited to white students upon the same 
terms and conditions applicable to white students; e) mak­
ing attendance or matriculation of appellant and members 
of his class in any state institution of higher learning condi­
tioned upon terms and conditions not applicable to white 
students similarly situated (R. Vol. I, pp. 15-16).

The motion for preliminary injunction, postponed sev­
eral times, was finally heard (PI. Exh. 16, Vols. I, II),



3

in August 1961 and denied on December 14, 1961 (R. Vol. 
II, p. 221).

On the same day, appellant filed notice of appeal to 
this Court (R. Vol. II, p. 221) and pursuant to motion of 
appellant the appeal was expedited and heard by this 
Court on January 9, 1962 (E. Vol. II, p. 225). Thereafter, 
on January 12, 1962 the denial of the motion for prelimi­
nary injunction was affirmed and the ease immediately re­
manded to the District Court for trial which had been set 
for January 15, 1962 (R. Vol. II, pp. 228-247).

In denying appellant’s motion for preliminary injunc­
tion the District Court had ruled: 1) Appellant was not 
denied admission to the University solely because of race 
and color; 2) Appellant had failed to present the required 
alumni certificates; 3) Appellant was denied admission to 
the February 8, 1961 term to which he first sought admis­
sion due to overcrowded conditions; 4) The University 
could not accept the credits which appellant sought to trans­
fer from Jackson State College because of the regulation 
adopted by the Committee on Admissions on May 15, 1961; 
5) Jackson State College, the college from which appellant 
sought to transfer, was not a member of the Southern As­
sociation of Colleges and Secondary Schools, therefore, 
appellant could not be accepted by the appellee Board on 
February 7, 1961, barring transfer students from institu­
tions whose programs are not approved by the University 
and the Board; 6) Appellant falsely swore to the Deputy 
Clerk of Hinds County that he was a resident of that 
county when, as a matter of fact, he is a citizen and resi­
dent of Attala County, Mississippi when appellant regis­
tered to vote in February 1961 (R. Vol. II, pp. 210-221).

In affirming the denial of the motion for preliminary 
injunction this Court ruled: 1) that the alumni certificate 
requirement was unconstitutional as applied to Negroes;



4

2) that this Court would take judicial notice of the fact 
that the State of Mississippi has a policy of maintaining 
separate institutions of higher learning for Negro and 
white students; 3) that both parties brought to the atten­
tion of the Court the fact that since the hearing of the 
motion for preliminary injunction, Jackson State College 
had been admitted to membership in the Southern Associ­
ation of Colleges and Secondary Schools; and, 4) in addi­
tion, while the Registrar indicated that the application was 
denied for “ other deficiencies” , the state of the record was 
such, due to the leniency allowed appellees with respect 
to proof and argument and restrictions placed on appellant 
with respect to same, that this Court was not able to deter­
mine whether the Registrar had, in fact, any other valid, 
non-racial reasons for excluding appellant from the Uni­
versity (R. Vol. II, pp. 228-245).

The trial of this case, set for January 15, 1962, did not 
commence until January 16, 1962. It was postponed at 
1:50 P.M. on that date until 3 o’clock P.M., January 17 
to give appellees’ counsel an opportunity to confer with 
the appellees (R. Vol. I ll, pp. 307-308). On January 17 
at 3:00 P.M. the District Court heard a motion by appel­
lees’ counsel for a continuance or postponement of the 
trial on account of the physical inability of appellees’ chief 
counsel, Dugas Shands, who had been hospitalized, and 
the unpreparedness of appellees’ other counsel, Charles 
Clark and Edward Cates, to proceed with trial (R. Vol. 
I ll , pp. 309-359). At the end of the hearing on this motion 
the court continued the trial until 2 o’clock, January 24, 
1962 (R. Vol. I ll , pp. 359-360).

At the conclusion of the trial the court finally denied 
all relief requested and dismissed the complaint (R. Vol. 
V, p. 732). In an opinion rendered on February 3, 1962, 
the court ruled: 1) That appellant failed to meet his bur­



5

den by a preponderance of the evidence that he was denied 
admission to the University of Mississippi solely because 
of his race; 2) Facts not known to the Registrar at the time 
the application was filed were not considered by the court 
in reaching its decision; 3) The proof shows conclusively 
that appellant was not denied admission because of his 
race since every witness called by appellant testified that 
the race of appellant was not discussed or considered at 
all in passing on his application for admission, and each 
member of the appellee Board who testified swore that the 
question of race was not at any time discussed with any 
of the other members of the Board concerning the admis­
sion of applicants to the University of Mississippi; 4) The 
proof shows, and the court found as a fact, that there is 
no custom or policy now, nor was there any at the time 
appellant’s application was rejected, which excluded quali­
fied Negroes from entering the University; 5) The proof 
shows, and the court found as a fact, that the University 
is not a racially segregated institution; 6) Prior to the 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 
U. S. 483 there was a custom of excluding qualified Negroes 
from the University which was required by the statutes of 
the State of Mississippi and the court takes judicial notice 
of that custom as outlined by the statutes prior to the 
Brown case (R. Vol. V, pp. 722-732).

Prior to the trial the court quashed that part of a sub­
poena served by appellant on the Registrar requiring him 
to produce at the trial student admission records at the 
University for the February 1961 term. The Registrar was 
required to produce only those records commencing with 
the first summer term to time of trial (R. Vol. I ll , p. 294).

On February 5, 1962, the day on which the final order 
was entered, appellant appealed to this Court (R. Vol. V, 
p. 733) and on the same date filed here a motion for pre­



6

liminary injunction pending appeal. This motion was heard 
on February 10, 1962 and denied on February 12, 1962 
(R. Vol. V, p. 734) (Chief Judge Tuttle dissenting). The 
injunction was sought on the ground that unless appellant 
was admitted to the University of Mississippi for the Feb­
ruary 1962 Term, the case would become moot since appel­
lant would have graduated from Jackson State College, 
which he is presently attending, in June 1962 before the 
appeal could be heard and determined in the normal course. 
The injunction was denied on the ground that appellant 
could avoid the mootness of his appeal by his non-atten­
dance at Jackson State College for one quarter of the 
school year or by being permitted to choose courses of 
study other than those leading to his graduation. Appel­
lant has pursued the latter course and is presently enrolled 
at Jackson State College.

Statement of the Facts

1. Appellant’s Application

The Registrar received appellant’s application on Feb­
ruary 1, 1961. On February 4, 1961 appellant received a 
telegram from the Registrar advising him that applica­
tions received after January 25, 1961 were not being con­
sidered. In its opinion denying the motion for preliminary 
injunction, the court below found as a fact that appellant 
had been denied admission to the February 1961 term due 
to overcrowded conditions (R. Vol. II, 215). On the trial 
however, the Director of Student Personnel testified that 
as of September 1961 there were approximately 3,000 male 
students on the University campus at Oxford (R. Vol. I ll , 
390). During the Summer of 1961 there wrere approximately 
1,000 or 1,200 male students on the campus (R. Vol. I ll, 
390). In February 1961, when appellant was allegedly



7

denied admission because of overcrowded conditions, there 
were only 2,500 or 2,600 male students on the campus (R. 
Yol. I ll , 390). In the preceding semester, September 1960, 
there were approximately 2,500 (R. Yol. I l l , 390-391). 
Appellant’s counsel have never been permitted to inspect 
the records of students admitted to the February 1961 term.

After receipt of the telegram, appellant requested the 
Registrar on February 20, 1961 to consider his applica­
tion a continuing one for the Summer Session 1961 (PL 
Exh. 16, Vol. I, 22) and later requested consideration of 
his application as a continuing one for the Summer and 
Fall Sessions, 1961 (PL Exh. 16, Vol. I, 27-28). How­
ever, after a series of letters to which the Registrar did not 
reply, appellant wrote the Dean of the College of Liberal 
Arts on April 12, 1961 complaining of the Registrar’s 
failure to reply and requesting assurance that race was 
not a factor in his inability to gain admission to the Uni­
versity (PL Exh. 16, Vol. I, 43). The Dean never replied 
to this letter, but on May 9, 1961 appellant received a let­
ter from the Registrar advising appellant that ‘ ‘under the 
standards of the University of Mississippi the maximum 
credit which would be allowed (appellant) is 48 semester 
hours” out of a total of 90 semester hours credit offered 
by appellant. (Transcripts from colleges previously at­
tended by appellant had been received by the Registrar 
at that point and each showed a certificate of honorable dis­
missal or certification of good standing—Pl. Exh. 16, Vol. 
I, 46-47.) Subsequently, however, by letter dated May 25, 
1961 the Registrar finally denied appellant’s application 
for admission on the following grounds:

1. “ The University cannot recognize the transfer of 
credits from the Institution which you are now at­
tending since it is not a member of the Southern As­
sociation of Colleges and Secondary Schools. Our



8

policy permits the transfer of credits only from mem­
ber institutions of regional associations.”

2. “ Furthermore, students may not be accepted by the 
University from those institutions whose programs 
are not recognized.”

3. “ Your letters of recommendation are not sufficient for 
either a resident or nonresident applicant.”

4. “ I see no need for mentioning any other deficiencies” 
(PI. Exh. 16, Vol. I, 54-55).

2. Reasons for Denying Appellant’s Application 
Prior to Trial

This Court, in its opinion affirming the denial of the mo­
tion for preliminary injunction, held the alumni certificate 
requirement unconstitutional as applied to Negroes.

The Court then pointed out that counsel for both parties 
had called to the attention of the Court, on oral argument, 
that since the hearing below Jackson State College had 
been approved by the Southern Association of Colleges 
and Secondary Schools, a fact having material bearing on 
appellant’s right to admission (R. Vol. II, 241).

This Court also concluded that it was not clear from the 
record whether the University gave any effect to appel­
lant’s credits from the Universities of Maryland, Kansas 
and Washburn and the 12 acceptable credits from Jack- 
son State College.

Finally, this Court was unable to determine from the rec­
ord whether the Registrar’s reference to Jackson State 
College indicates that appellant was rejected simply be­
cause he had attended that college or was rejected be­
cause the University could not accept all of Jackson State 
College’s credits (R. Vol. II, 241-242).



9

A. The University’s Policy Regarding Transfer 
Students From Non-Member Colleges of 
Regional Accrediting Associations

On February 7, 1961 (six days after appellant’s applica­
tion was received), the appellee Board adopted a motion 
“ that all state supported Institutions of Higher Learning 
may accept transfer students from other state supported 
Institutions of Higher Learning, private colleges or de­
nominational colleges only when the previous program 
of the transferring college is acceptable to the receiving 
Institution, and the program of studies completed by the 
student, and the quality of the student’s work in said trans­
ferring college is acceptable to the receiving Institution 
and to the Board of Trustees” (PI. Exh. 16, Yol. II, 383- 
384).

The Registrar advised appellant of this policy in denying 
his admission to the University on May 25, 1961:

“ Furthermore, students may not be accepted by the 
University from the Institutions whose programs are 
not recognized” (PL Exh. 16, Vol. I, 55).

On the trial, the Registrar testified that this meant that 
appellant could not transfer from Jackson State College 
because it was not a member of the Southern Association 
of Colleges and Secondary Schools (R. Vol. IV, 478-480). 
However, the Registrar acknowledged that in December 
1961, Jackson State College was admitted to membership 
in the Association (R. Vol. IV, 599) and testified that he 
would now admit a qualified student from Jackson State 
College (R. Vol. IV, 600).

Prior to December 1961, none of the three Negro in­
stitutions of higher learning under the jurisdiction of ap­
pellee Board was a member of the Southern Association 
of Colleges and Secondary Schools. They were on an ap­



10

proved list of Negro colleges maintained by the Association 
(PL Exh. 16, Vol. II, 454-455 and R. Vol. IV, 529-531).

Moreover, at the time appellant applied for admission, 
the University catalog (which was the only notice appel­
lant had) simply provided that transfer students might 
be accepted from another “approved Institution of Higher 
Learning” (PL Exh. 42, Vol. II, 284). Jackson State Col­
lege was approved at that time and still is by the Col­
lege Accrediting Commission of the State of Mississippi 
(Miss. Code, 1942, See. 6791.5). The Registrar testified that 
he knew of his own knowledge that Jackson State College 
was accredited by this Commission (Pl. Exh. 16, Vol. II, 
468).

The Registrar claimed that 25 or 30 students had been 
denied admission to the University as a result of the Feb­
ruary 7, 1961 rule, but no such applications were produced 
(R. Vol. IV, 593, 624).

At the trial, appellant’s counsel inspected 214 inactive 
files of students who sought admission to the Summer Ses­
sions 1961, the September Session 1961, and the February 
1962 Session (R. Vol. IV, 624-625). Of this group, ap­
pellant’s counsel found no student who, like appellant, had 
successfully attended accredited as well as non-accredited 
institutions and who had been denied admission to the 
University (R. Vol. IV, 624). Only six files of students who 
had been denied transfer to the University from non-ac­
credited institutions were found. Five of these had at­
tended only the one non-accredited school from which they 
sought to transfer. One had, in addition, attended an ac­
credited institution (Bucknell) but had done so poorly at 
the latter institution that he could not have transferred to 
the University of Mississippi from that institution for 
scholastic reasons (R. Vol. IV, 630-639, Defs. Exhs. 1-6).



11

In short, the records shows that the February 7, 1961 
rule operated to bar the admission of appellant although, 
unlike these six, he had successfully attended accredited as 
well as non-accredited institutions.

Moreover, as a practical matter, since the other students 
affected by this policy had attended only a non-member 
institution or had failed to receive passing grades at the 
member institution as well as the non-member institution, 
the policy really applied to them was the May 15th policy 
which precludes the transfer of unacceptable credits. Since 
these students had no credits to transfer, they could not 
enter the University as transfer students.

B. The University’s Policy Regarding Transfer 
of Credits From Non-Member Institutions of 
Regional Accrediting Associations

On May 9, 1961, the Registrar wrote appellant that if 
his application were accepted for admission to the Uni­
versity, he, the Registrar, had tentatively concluded that 
appellant would be entitled to 48 semester hours credit of 
the 90 semester hours credit appellant offered (PL Exh. 
16, Vol. I, 46). On the trial, the Registrar testified that 
by this statement he meant that he could give appellant 6 
semester hours credit for courses taken at the University 
of Kansas, 3 semester hours credit for the work at Wash­
burn University, and 24 semester hours credit for work 
taken at the University of Maryland (although he had taken 
more credits which could not be transferred under the Uni­
versity rule limiting transfer of extension credits to a total 
of 33), and could give appellant 12 semester hours credit 
for work taken at Jackson State College, making a total 
of 45 credits. The Registrar claimed that he could not 
account for the other 3 credits which he had originally 
advised appellant might be transferred (R. Yol. IV, 485- 
486).



12

However, the Registrar wrote appellant on May 25, 1961 
that the University could not recognize transfer of credits 
from the institution which appellant was then attending 
(Jackson State) since it was not a member of the Southern 
Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. This re­
sulted from the fact that on May 15, 1961 (six days after 
the Registrar had written appellant on May 9, 1961) the 
Committee on Admissions adopted a policy prohibiting the 
transfer of credits from institutions not members of their 
respective regional accrediting associations or recognized 
professional accrediting associations (PI. Exh. 16, Vol. II, 
447-450).

On the trial, the Registrar testified that this policy did 
not operate to preclude the acceptance of credits earned 
at the University of Kansas, the University of Maryland 
or Washburn University (R. Vol. IV, 583-586). It operated 
to preclude the acceptance of credits only from Jackson 
State College since it was not a member of its regional 
accrediting association (R. Vol. IV, 587). The Registrar 
testified that the May 15th policy means simply that he 
could not “ accept the credits from institutions that are 
not members of a regional accrediting association or a 
recognized professional association” (R. Vol. IV, 587-588).

3. Reasons for Denying Appellant’s Admission 
After Commencement of Suit

After this action was commenced in May 1961, the Regis­
trar proposed bars to appellant’s admission to the Uni­
versity on a number of other grounds.

A. First, the Registrar claimed, that appellant falsely 
swore that he was a resident of Hinds County as a result of 
which he procured his registration as a voter in that county 
whereas he was in fact a resident of Attala County, Missis­
sippi, as found by the court below. On the hearing of his



13

motion for preliminary injunction, appellant testified that 
lie knew at the time that he registered to vote that he was 
not a resident of Hinds County and explained this to the 
clerk who nevertheless registered him. (PL Exh. 16, Yol. 
I, 84, 86). Appellant answered in the affirmative to the ques­
tion, “ You knew it was untrue” , when he swore on his poll 
tax exemption receipt that he was qualified to vote in Hinds 
County (PI. Exh. 16, Vol. I, 86). This receipt was given 
to appellant when he explained to the clerk that he had 
been in the service. However, the confusion was clarified 
by the testimony of the Deputy Clerk of Hinds County who 
testified that appellant was qualified to vote in that County 
as he had swore on his poll tax exemption receipt since “he 
had stayed there past the general election on Tuesday after 
the first Monday of November which put him past one 
general election, and then he would have lived there a 
year before the next ensuing general election which would 
be Tuesday after the first Monday in November of ’61” 
(PL Exh. 16, Vol. II, 352-353). Appellant had never voted in 
Hinds County he had only registered to vote (PL Exh. 16, 
Vol. I, 223). Moreover, appellant’s application to register 
as a voter shows conclusively that he did not falsely rep­
resent his residence or the length of time he had been in 
Hinds County (Pl. Exh. 29). He stated on his application 
that he had lived in Hinds County beginning September 
1960.

B. Secondly, the Registrar testified that he would not 
now admit appellant to the University of Mississippi be­
cause: “ From the deposition that was taken of Meredith, 
I am convinced that he is a man that was trying to make 
trouble simply because he was a Negro. From the records 
which we received from the United States Air Force, there 
is an indication that the man does have psychological prob­
lems in connection with his race. I have seen some of the 
material to which he testified that he had knowledge and



14

that he participated in the publication, which indicates to 
me a man that is not trying to be a student for the sake 
of learning a profession or getting an education, but a man 
who has got a mission in life to correct all of the ills of the 
world; so I am convinced that this man is a trouble maker 
and I think he would be a very bad influence at my In­
stitution” (R. Vol. V. 682-683). (Emphasis added.)

Early in August of 1961 when the hearing on appellant’s 
motion for preliminary injunction had been recessed, 
Charles Clark, one of the counsel for appellees secured, with 
appellant’s permission, part of appellant’s Army record 
(PL Exh. 16, Vol. II, 325). Excerpts from this record, 
which on the whole is very good and qualified appellant 
for an honorable discharge from the Air Force, were seized 
upon by the Registrar as his basis for the claim that ap­
pellant should be barred from the University because he 
was obsessed with the question of race (R. Vol. V, 684). 
However, the Registrar admitted that appellant is the only 
student that he sought to bar from the University because 
he believed him to be obsessed with race. White students 
who may be obsessed with the question of race were not 
subject to a similar bar (R. Vol. V, 684). The Registrar 
also admitted that veterans are not investigated prior to 
admission (unless an unusual case is brought to his atten­
tion by the Veterans Administration) to determine whether 
they have Army records indicating psychological prob­
lems (R. Vol. V, 684-685). The Registrar could recall only 
one case of a veteran who had a health record indicating 
some psychological problem, the record having been sent 
to him by the Veterans Administration (R. Vol. V, 686-687). 
In one other case of a non-veteran, the Registrar remem­
bered that there was a student who had a serious brain 
injury rendering him psychologically unfit and for this 
reason was not admitted (R. Vol. V, 686-688).



15

C. Thirdly, the Registrar claimed that he could not now 
admit appellant to the University because he had received 
a letter from the Attorney General of the State of Missis­
sippi, dated January 16, 1962 (the date on which the trial 
commenced), transmitting affidavits dated January 15, 1962 
(the date on which the trial was to commence) from the 
five Negro residents of Attala County who had signed cer­
tificates of good moral character for appellant recommend­
ing his admission to the University. In these affidavits four 
affiants stated, in substance, that they did not know that 
they were signing the certificates for the admission of ap­
pellant to the University and did not know anything about 
appellant’s good moral character since they had not seen 
him much during the time he was in the Air Force (R. Vol. 
V, 662-669). One of the affiants refused to sign the affidavit 
(R. Vol. V, 708-709) which reads as follows (R. Vol. V, 
669):

State of M ississippi 
Cotthty of A ttala

AFFIDAVIT

Personally appeared before me Lannie Meredith, 
who after being duly sworn states on oath that the 
following is true and correct:

That on 29 January, 1961, James Howard Meredith 
who is my first cousin, came to see me with a pre­
pared certificate certifying to his moral character 
which certificate I executed.

James Howard Meredith later came to see me on 26 
March, 1961, with a prepared statement and requested 
me to sign this statement; at the time of the signing 
of this statement I knew full well and was aware of the 
purpose for which such certificate was to be executed.

I am not now nor have I ever been in any serious 
trouble or convicted of any crime or misdemeanor.



16

In Witness Whereof I set my hand and seal, this 
the 15th day of January, 1962.

Notary Public

Sworn to and Subscribed before me this January 15, 
1962.

My commission expires on 
.....  day of ......... .............  19....

Seal

These affidavits were secured by one of the attorneys 
for appellees, Edward L. Cates, Assistant Attorney Gen­
eral of Mississippi. The affiants did not approach this 
official or any other person to volunteer the information 
given in the affidavits. All of these affiants are Negroes 
living in a rural Mississippi County. These affiants were ap­
proached (the day before the trial) by appellee’s counsel 
(who was then as now representing the State in opposing 
appellant’s admission to the University) and another at­
torney by the name of John Clark Love, a Mississippi 
State Senator and former member of the State Sovereign 
Commission (Mississippi’s official pro-segregation agency). 
The affidavits were drawn by appellee’s counsel and pre­
sented to affiants for signature (R. Yol. V, 706-714). None 
of the affidavits alleges that appellant is a person of bad 
moral character. Two of the affiants claimed that appel­
lant represented to them that he needed the certificate to 
help him secure a job (R. Vol. V, 663-664, 666-667). One of 
the affiants claimed that he did not read the certificate (R. 
Vol. V, 665). However, the attorney who secured the affi­
davits testified that the affiants could read (R. Vol. V, 
710).



17

The Registrar admitted that normally an application is 
not questioned with respect to certificates of good moral 
character. “ It is only when there is some occasion to check 
into it that we do” (R. Vol. V, 684). “ And offhand, I don’t 
know of any that we have checked into recently” (R. Yol. V, 
684). The Registrar, of course, did not check these cer­
tificates. He had no reason to.

Appellees’ counsel then sought to introduce in evidence 
additional affidavits signed by these same affiants on Janu­
ary 20, 1962 (during a period when the trial was in recess 
from January 17th to January 24th, 1962) which were 
obviously intended to contradict any assertion which might 
have been made by appellant’s counsel that the affiants 
had been coerced into signing the January 15th affidavits. 
However, the trial court would not permit these affidavits 
to be put in evidence. These affidavits are copied at pages 
699 to 704 of Volume V of the Transcript of the Trial.

4. Mississippi’s Racial Policy Remains Unchanged

Upon the prior appeal, this Court ruled that the state 
of the record was such that it was unable to determine 
whether Mississippi’s segregation policy operated in this 
case to exclude appellant from the University (R. Vol. II, 
240). This Court took judicial notice of the State’s policy of 
operating separate institutions of higher learning for Negro 
and white students (R. Vol. II, 238). The District Court, 
however, construed this Court’s decision as holding merely 
that the State had such a policy prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in the Brown case in 1954 and appellant 
had the burden of showing that this policy has been in 
effect since 1954 (R. Vol. IV, 514-515).

On the trial, appellant’s counsel examined nine members 
of the appellee Board and its Executive Secretary and 
established conclusively that the policy has not changed



18

since 1954. The Executive Secretary’s testimony was 
candid and unequivocal.

“ Q. After the Supreme Court’s decision in 1954, 
did the Board take any action with regard to the ad­
mission of Negroes to the University of Mississippi? 
A. No” (R. Vol. IV, 515).

This salient fact was corroborated by the Board mem­
bers who testified that the Board has never even discussed 
the admission of Negroes generally to the University (R. 
Vol. IV, 497, 504, 506, 533-534, 545-546, 551-552, 552-553, 
555-556, 557). And after appellant applied for admission, 
the Board did not even discuss his application (R. Vol. IV, 
496, 504, 505, 513, 533-534, 544-545, 549, 556, 558). The 
Board members neither discussed appellant’s application 
with the Registrar (R. Vol. IV, 488-489) nor any other ad­
ministrative official of the University (R. Vol. IV, 499- 
500, 504, 509, 534-535, 546, 550, 556). The Board did not 
discuss the admission of Negroes generally or the applica­
tion of appellant despite the fact that appellant’s applica­
tion led to front page newspaper reports to the effect that a 
Negro was seeking admission to the University and trouble 
was expected (R. Vol. IV, 538-539, 559-563; PI. Exhs. for 
Identification 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27).

In the wake of all this publicity, a member of the Uni­
versity’s Committee on Admissions claimed that this Com­
mittee neither discussed appellant’s application (R. Vol. 
I ll, 373) nor the admissions of Negroes generally (R. Vol. 
I ll, 375) at any committee meeting or with any other Uni­
versity officials (R. Vol. I ll , 379-380). Moreover, the Com­
mittee never received any memorandum or any other writ­
ing from any official of the University regarding appellant’s 
application or the admission of Negroes generally (R. Vol. 
I ll , 380).



19

Appellant’s counsel was consistently prevented from 
asking University officials their understanding of the Uni­

versity’s policy with regard to the admission of Negroes (R. 
Yol. I l l ,  380, 403, 428; Vol. VI, 522-523).

Officials who testified, in addition to Board members, 
were the Dean of Women (R. Vol. I ll , 370), the Dean of 
the Division of Student Personnel (R. Vol. I ll , 389), the 
Dean of the School of Law (R. Vol. I ll , 411), the Chancellor 
of the University (R. Vol. IV, 524), the Vice-Chancellor 
(R. Vol. I ll, 423), the Dean of the College of Liberal Arts 
to which appellant sought admission (R. Vol. IV, 520), and, 
of course, the Registrar (R. Vol. I ll , 433).

The Dean of Women is a member of the Committee on 
Admissions (R. Vol. I ll, 372). She testified that appellant’s 
application was never discussed at any meeting of Uni­
versity officials (R. Vol. I ll, 371-373), and that she has 
never received any memorandum or other writing from any 
officials of the University regarding the admission of 
Negroes, generally, or this applicant (R. Vol. I ll, 380).

The Dean of the Division of Student Personnel testified 
that he talked with officials in general about the application 
but never with regard to its merits (R. Vol. I l l , 394). He 
discussed it casually with the Dean of the College of Liberal 
Arts (R. Vol. I ll, 396) and with the Chancellor (R. Vol. I ll, 
396-397) but did not discuss the application with any mem­
ber of the Board (R. Vol. I ll , 398). He also has neither 
received any written communication from the Board or 
discussed with it the admission of Negroes generally (R. 
Vol. I ll, 399). He has been on the University campus in 
his present position since 1949 (R. Vol. I ll, 401).

The Dean of the Law School testified that he discussed 
the application with the Chancellor and the Provost and 
talked to each member of the law faculty (R. Vol. I ll ,



20

411-412). He discussed the application with the President 
of the Board of Trustees and Mr. Tubb, a Board Member, 
in a casual manner, but not the merits. The casual talk 
consisted of a discussion of the latest news regarding the 
application (R. Vol. I ll , 415). This official of the University 
testified that in 1952 a Negro by the name of Charles Dubra 
applied for admission to the Law School and at that time 
he discussed the admission of Negroes generally at a Board 
meeting. However, the court below prevented any further 
examination of this witness with respect to this discussion 
with the Board on the ground that it occurred prior to 
1954 (R. Vol. I ll, 417-418). Appellant’s counsel was also 
prevented from asking this witness what his instructions 
are with regard to the admission of Negroes (R. Vol. I ll , 
419). This official confirmed the fact that appellant’s ap­
plication was widely publicized in February 1961 when the 
application was filed (R. Vol. I ll , 420). And this witness’ 
testimony made clear what the policy is ; no Negro has been 
admitted since his connection with the University beginning 
in 1926 (R. Vol. I ll , 421).

The Vice-Chancellor learned of appellant’s application 
from the newspapers (R. Vol. I l l ,  426) and the Chancellor 
told him the application was being handled as all other 
applications (R. Vol. I ll , 425), but he has never received 
any oral or written instruction from the Board or other 
official of the University regarding admission of a Negro 
(R. Vol. I ll , 428).

The Registrar discussed appellant’s application with Mr. 
Hugh Clegg when he became “ convinced” appellant was go­
ing to “ face the University with a lawsuit” (R. Vol. IV, 
490-491). Mr. Clegg, the Director of Development and an 
assistant to the Chancellor agreed with the Registrar’s 
conclusion (R. Vol. IV, 490-491). The Registrar also dis­
cussed the application with the Attorney General’s office



21

before the suit was instituted (E. Yol. IV, 491). On two 
occasions he discussed the application with the Dean of the 
College of Liberal Arts. First, he consulted with the Dean 
on an evaluation of appellant’s credits. The Dean did not 
corroborate this. He also talked to the Dean “ on the 
telephone”, when the Dean received a letter from appel­
lant complaining of the Registrar’s failure to reply to ap­
plicant’s many letters regarding his application (R. Vol. IV, 
492). The Dean could not remember this (R. Vol. IV, 521). 
In addition to testifying that he had never discussed ap­
pellant’s application with the Board (PI. Exh. 16, Vol. II, 
323), the Registrar testified that he has never received any 
instructions from the Board regarding the admission of 
Negroes and has never discussed with the Board the ad­
mission of Negroes generally (R. Vol. IV, 493). He has 
never discussed the admission of Negroes generally with 
the Chancellor (R. Vol. IV, 493), or the Dean of the Col­
lege of Liberal Arts (R. Vol. IV, 493) or with the staff 
in the Registrar’s office (R. Vol. IV, 493).

When the Dean of the College of Liberal Arts received 
appellant’s letter dated April 12, 1961 (PI. Exh. 16, Vol. 
I, 43) he forwarded the letter to the Registrar without 
a word (R. Vol. IV. 521). The Dean was asked:

“Q. What else did you do? A. That closed the mat­
ter. so far as I was concerned” (R. Vol. IV, 521).

He sent no memorandum or other letter with appellant’s 
letter to the Registrar (R. Vol. IV, 521) and could not re­
call even discussing the letter with the Registrar over the 
telephone. He testified that he called the Chancellor’s Secre­
tary and asked her whether he should handle this letter in 
the usual manner and she replied “ Yes” (R. Vol. IV, 521- 
522), but he never discussed the application with the Chan­
cellor himself or any member of the Board (R. Vol. IV, 
522). When appellant wrote the Dean, he asked the Dean



22

to give Mm “ some assurance that [his] race and color are 
not the basis for [his] failure to gain admission to the Uni­
versity” (PI. Exh. 16, Yol. I, 43). The Dean never replied 
to this letter.

The Chancellor has been in his position since 1946, 
long prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 1954 outlaw­
ing segregation in the public schools. He testified that he 
had never seen appellant’s application until it was ex­
hibited to him by appellant’s counsel on the trial (R. Vol. 
IY, 526). The Chancellor was asked:

“ Q. Have you ever discussed the admission of 
Negroes generally with the Board of Trustees? A. 
Never have” (R, Vol. IV, 524).

In addition, he was asked:

“ Q. Do you know of any action taken by the Board 
since the Supreme Court’s decision in 1954 with re­
gard to the admission of Negroes to the University 
of Mississippi? A. I do not know of any” (R. Vol. IV, 
525).

He testified that he discussed the application, he believed, 
with Dean Love (R. Vol. IV, 525), and “ indicated” to him 
that since he was head of the Division of Student Person­
nel, this application should be handled as all other applica­
tions are handled at the University of Mississippi, but ad­
mitted that he did not tell Dean Love that Negroes are 
admitted to the University just as anyone else (R. Vol. 
IV, 527). On cross-examination, he claimed that to the best 
of his knowledge, no official of the University has the au­
thority to deny the application of a qualified applicant 
for admission to the University on the basis of race or color 
(R. Vol. IV, 527) but then admitted that nobody has ever 
even discussed the question (R. Vol. IV, 528).



23

Specification of Errors

I. The court below erred in finding as a fact that 
appellant had not been denied admission to the 
University solely because of race and color.

II. The court below erred in concluding that appellant 
had failed to show by a preponderance of the evi­
dence that the University now has a policy of ex­
cluding qualified Negro applicants which operated 
in this case to bar the appellant.

III. The court below erred in limiting proof of racial 
discrimination to the University of Mississippi, only 
one of several institutions of higher learning under 
the jurisdiction, management and control of the 
appellee Board.

IV. The court below erred in denying the detailed in­
junctive relief prayed for and in dismissing the 
complaint on this record.



24

ARGUMENT

Appellant lias been denied admission to the University 
of Mississippi solely because of his race and color and 
pursuant to rules and regulations and other criteria 
applicable only to his case.

A. Appellant’s Race Precluded His Admission to 
the University By Reason of the University’s 
Unchanged Racial Policy

From the outset of this case, appellant has contended 
that when the University of Mississippi received his ap­
plication for admission with the word “ Negro” placed in 
the blank beside the query “Race,” with his photograph 
attached to the application, and with a letter stating “ I am 
an American-Mississippi Negro citizen” (PL Exh. 3, Vol. I, 
17), appellees invoked their unwritten but firmly fixed 
policy of excluding all Negro applicants, and the denial of 
his application four months later followed inevitably.

Now, the events of those intervening months, and the 
subsequent history of this case documented in the 1341 
pages of the record and summarized in the preceding sec­
tions of appellant’s brief, show, beyond any doubt, that 
the policy of excluding Negroes from the University, so 
much a matter of common and historical knowledge that 
this Court has taken judicial notice of it (R. Yol. II, 238) 
was indeed the principle factor in the denial of appellant’s 
application.

No lengthy discussion of the cases which have led to the 
admission of Negroes to state institutions of higher learning 
throughout the South is required to show that appellant’s 
exclusion by reason of race from the University of Mis­
sissippi violated his rights under the equal protection clause



25

of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Suffice to say that these 
cases hold Constitutional rights are no less infringed when 
the racial policy of excluding Negroes is not expressly set 
forth in any statute, Board resolution, or other writing. 
Holmes v. Danner, 191 F. Supp. 394, 402 (M. D. Ga. 1961); 
Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N. D. Ala. 1955), aff’d. 
228 F. 2d 619 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. den. 351 U. S. 931. See 
also 350 U. S. 1 (1955). The District Court in the Lucy 
case found:

“ There is no written policy or rule excluding prospec­
tive students from admission to the University on ac­
count of race or color. However, there is a tacit policy 
to that effect.” 134 F. Sirpp. at 239.

Here, as in Alabama at the time of the Lucy case, the 
policy of excluding Negroes from the University of Mis­

1 Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936) (M d.); 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938) ; Sweatt 
v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950) (Texas); McLaurin v. Board of 
Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950) (Okla.) ; Wilson v. Board of Su­
pervisors of L. S. V., 92 F. Supp. 986 (E. D. La. 1950) aff’d 
340 U. S. 909; Parker v. University of Delaware, 31 Del. Ch. 381, 
75 A. 2d 225 (Del. Ch. 1950) ; Swanson v. University of Virginia, 
Civ. No. 30 (W. D. Va. 1950) (Unreported); Wilson v. City of 
Paducah, Ky., 100 F. Supp. 116 (W. D. Ky. 1951) ; Gray v. Board 
of Trustees TJniv. of Tenn., 342 U. S. 517 (1952) ; Tureaud v. 
Board of Supervisors of L. S. 77., 116 F. Supp. 248 (E. D. La. 
1953) rev’d 207 F. 2d 807 (5th Cir. 1953) vacated and remanded 
347 U. S. 971 (1954) on remand 225 F. 2d 434 (5th Cir. 1955) 
on rehearing 228 F. 2d 895 (5th Cir. 1956) cert. den. 351 IJ. S. 
924; Lucy v. Adams, supra, (Ala.) ; Frazier v. Board of Trustees 
Univ. of N. C., 134 F. Supp. 589 (M. D. N. C. 1955), aff’d 350 
U. S. 979; Ludley v. Board of Supervisors of L. S. 77., 150 F. Supp. 
900 (E. D. La. 1957), aff’d 252 F. 2d 372 (5th Cir. 1958), cert, 
den. 358 U. S. 819; Booker v. State of Tenn. Bd. of Education, 
240 F. 2d 689 (6th Cir. 1957) ; cert. den. 353 U. S. 965; Hawkins 
v. Board of Control of Florida, 347 U. S. 971 (1955); 350 U. S. 
413 (1956) ; 355 U. S. 839 (1957) 162 F. Supp. 851 (N. D. Fla. 
1958); Hunt v. Arnold, 172 F. Supp. 847 (N. D. Ga. 1959) 
(Georgia) ; Holmes v. Danner, 191 F. Supp. 394 (M. D. Ga. 1961) 
(Georgia).



26

sissippi is unwritten. Indeed, it was the uniform testimony 
of members of the appellee Board and University officials 
that since 1954, when the policy of excluding Negroes was 
acknowledged, the Board has taken no action with regard 
to the admission of Negroes (R. IY, 515). The Board, ac­
cording to appellees, has not even discussed such admis­
sions (R. Vol. IV, 497, 504, 533-534, 545-546, 551-552, 552-553, 
555-556, 557).

But whether discussed or not, the effectiveness of the 
policy is reflected in the continued total absence of Negro 
students or alumni from the leading University of a state 
with a substantial Negro population. University officials, 
most of whom have been connected with the University 
for many years, could not recall even one student or alumnus 
of the University whom they personally knew to be a Negro 
(Vol. I l l , 380-381, 421, 426-427), and in all the files of 
transfer students accepted at the University from the 1961 
Summer term until the February 1962 Semester, not one 
student gave his race as Negro.

As to appellant’s application, members of the appellee 
Board report that they took no action on it (R. Vol. IV, 
496, 504, 505, 513, 533-534, 544-545, 549, 556, 558), and while 
the application received wide publicity (R. Vol. IV, 538- 
539, 559-563, PI. Exhs. for identification 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 
24, 25, 26, 27), most officials testified that they had not even 
discussed it with the Registrar (R. Vol. IV, 558-559), or 
any other administrative official of the University (R. Vol. 
IV, 499-500, 504, 509, 534-535, 546, 550, 556). Even the 
University’s Committee on Admissions reportedly never 
discussed appellant’s efforts to enter the University (R. 
Vol. I ll, 373), and received no memorandum or other writ­
ing from any official of the University regarding his ap­
plication or the admission of Negroes generally (R. Vol. 
I l l , 380). In the light of all such testimony by appellees



27

the only logical conclusion is that the pre-1954 policy of 
excluding Negroes from the University remains unchanged, 
and when the appellant indicated his membership in the 
Negro race, the policy was applied to him.2

But appellant need not rely on the rules of syllogistic 
reasoning to prove that the University’s policy of excluding 
Negroes was applied to him. He has the very substantial 
record in this case.

First, the University application required appellant to 
indicate his race and the Registrar testified that this ques­
tion is asked for “ informational and statistical purposes” 
although he admitted that no statistics are maintained on 
the subject (PI. Exh. 16, Vol. II, 397-398).

Next, the appellant had the problem of furnishing letters 
of recommendation from University alumni wThich this 
Court found to exert so great a burden as to render the 
requirement unconstitutional as applied to Negro appli­
cants. Significantly, as this Court has noted, the Uni­
versity adopted this requirement in late 1954, a fewT months 
after Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka- was decided.

After appellant submitted his application, it was not 
considered for the February 1961 term because of over­
crowded conditions (PL Exh. 16, Vol. II, 403-404; R. Vol. II, 
214). However, the Director of Student Personnel later 
testified that there were for the September 1961 term ap­
proximately 3,000 male students on the Oxford Campus, 
and only 2,500 or 2,600 male students for the February 1961 
term when appellant’s application was submitted and not 
considered (R. Vol. I ll , 390). Further, this official testified 
at R. Vol. I ll , 391:

2 See Generally, II Wigmore on Evidence, §437 (3d ed. 1940).



“ Q. Did you turn any students away in February 
1961 on the ground you didn’t have housing for them? 
A. Not to the best of my knowledge.”

When after a determined series of letters from appel­
lant, the University finally decided that he was not eligible 
for admission, the exclusion was based on the appellant’s 
inability to comply with the invalid alumni certificate re­
quirement, various undisclosed reasons, and two new rules 
governing the admission of transfer students, both of which 
were applied to appellant’s application notwithstanding the 
fact that they were adopted after he filed for admission.

Appellees maintain that both the February 7, 1961 rule 
providing that state colleges need accept only transfer 
students from colleges approved by their Regional Ac­
crediting Associations (R. Vol. IV, 590-591), and the May 
15, 1961 rule preventing the recognition of credits earned 
by transfer students at unaccredited schools (R. Vol. IV, 
582-583), were adopted solely to improve the scholastic 
calibre of transfer students admitted to the University.

While neither rule is now a bar to appellant’s applica­
tion because Jackson State College is now a member of the 
Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools 
(R. Vol. IV, 528-529), when adopted, both rules had the 
effect of barring not only appellant’s application, but the 
transfer of students from any of the public colleges for 
Negroes in Mississippi, none of which at that time were 
members of the Southern Association. As a result, Negro 
college students attending unaccredited Negro state schools 
were effectively barred from obtaining the advantages of 
the accredited education offered white students at the Uni­
versity of Mississippi, and were thereby clearly denied 
rights to which they were entitled even prior to the Brown



29

decision of 1954. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950); 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 (1950).

Thus, the University policy of excluding Negro students 
which, according to the testimony of University officials, 
has not even been, seriously discussed since 1954, continues 
effective through recently adopted rules and requirements 
which, while not referring to race, have the effect of dis­
qualifying appellant and other members of his race.

As indicated above, such procedures are as violative of 
appellant’s rights as the direct application of the “No 
Negroes” policy because the Fourteenth Amendment pre­
vents appellees from denying appellant’s rights by devices 
both “ ingenious and ingenuous.” Cooper v. Aaron, 358 
U. S. 1.

After commencement of this suit and the taking of ap­
pellant’s deposition, which occupies over 100 pages of this 
record (Def. Exh. 7), appellees announced several additional 
reasons for denying appellant’s application, all of which 
contained a strong resemblance to the no longer discussed 
policy with regard to the admission of Negroes. A few 
sheafs of plain surplus Army stationery used by appellant, 
a veteran of nine years in the United States Air Force, 
caused appellees to raise questions as to his honesty, led 
to inquiries as to other government property in his pos­
session and required his production of the serial number 
of a typewriter purchased subsequent to his discharge. 

A In addition, reasonable confusion as to the appellant’s 
county of residence when he registered to vote, confusion 
easily clarified by appellant’s counsel’s cross-examination 

: of the Deputy Clerk (PI. Exh. 16, Vol. II, 355-358), was 
I interpreted by appellees as intentional misrepresentation. 

AUnervous stomach which an Air Force psychiatrist diag­
nosed as due in part to appellant’s concern over racial 
incidents in this country and elsewhere, and for which he



30

determined no treatment necessary, was deemed by appel­
lees sufficient reason to rule appellant too unstable to be 
a student.

The Registrar testified that it was his opinion that the 
appellant was trying to make trouble simply because he is 
a Negro and would not be a good influence at the University. 
The Registrar also reported at the end of the trial that 
the Board’s requirement that students have good moral 
character made necessary the denial of appellant’s ap­
plication in view of the affidavits obtained by state officials 
from the persons who had signed letters of recommenda­
tions for the appellant (R. Yol. Y, 670). Yet these affidavits 
do not allege that appellant is a person of bad moral char­
acter, and considering the circumstances under which they 
were obtained, utterly fail to contradict the brief, simple 
letters which these persons originally signed at the ap­
pellant’s request.

Indeed it is submitted that the after-the-fact reasons 
appellees offered to justify appellant’s exclusion from the 
University only served to highlight the great disparity be­
tween the liberal admission standards applied to white 
applicants, and the rigorous demands made on the ap­
pellant.3

3 White transfer students for the Summer Sessions are permitted 
to attend classes pending the receipt of all transcripts and alumni 
certificates (PI. Exh. 16, Vol. II, 299-302). But the Registrar 
concluded that appellant had failed to meet requirements for ad­
mission because, inter alia, he “had not bothered to keep us sup­
plied or to supply us with a completed record of his credits at 
Jackson State College.”

Plaintiffs Exh. 54 (PI. Exh. 16, Vol. II, 314) is the file of a 
student admitted with a scholastic record so poor that he was not 
eligible for readmission at the school from which he transferred. 
Nevertheless, he was admitted to the University, albeit on a pro­
visional basis.



31

B. The Rules and Other Criteria Used to Bar 
Appellant’s Admission Were Applicable 
to His Case Alone

The record is replete with evidence that appellant’s ap­
plication was subjected to rules and standards which would 
not have been applied to similar applications from white 
students. For example, the Board rule of February 7, 
1961, restricting transfer admissions to students coming 
from accredited schools was allegedly intended to improve 
the scholastic caliber of transfer admissions. However, 
a review of approximately 214 inactive files of college stu­
dents who unsuccessfully have sought transfers to the 
University since the rule went into effect revealed that 
none had successfully attended both accredited and unac­
credited colleges as had the appellant (R. Yol. IV, 624). 
Six students from nonaccredited institutions had been de­
nied transfer to the University under the February 7th 
rule, but five of these had attended only the one non- 
aecredited school from which they sought to transfer, and 
the sixth student, who had attended an accredited insti­
tution, was ineligible for readmission by reason of a poor 
scholastic record (R. Vol. IV, 630-639, Defs. Exhs. 1-6). 
Two of the six white students denied admission under the 
February 7th policy were invited to reapply after com­
pleting a year’s work at a Mississippi junior college. The 
other four files exhibited little evidence that the applicants 
would be able to successfully do college work, and it is 
likely that their applications would have been denied even 
in absence of the February 7th rule.

It appears, then, that the February 7th rule, while hardly 
necessary to deny applications of white transfer students 
with poor academic records, served to bar appellant and 
perhaps other Negro applicants in his situation who have



32

attended and done well in accredited institutions, but by 
reason of situations such as that existing for so long in 
his home state, found it necessary to enter a nonaccredited 
institution prior to submitting an application to the Uni­
versity. As indicated above, only one of 214 unsuccessful 
applications for transfer to the University was made by 
a white student who had gone from accredited to non­
accredited institutions before applying to the University. 
This student had done poorly at the accredited school and 
did no better at the nonaccredited institution. The ap­
pellant, on the other hand, had done better than average 
work at each of the institutions he has attended. His 
attendance at four different colleges prior to filing his 
application with the University of Mississippi was due to 
the necessity of fulfilling his military obligations rather 
than an inability to perform the work offered at each of 
the schools. Clearly the February 7, 1961, rule served to 
bar the application of the appellant with no indication that 
it would pose similar handicaps to white students. Indeed, 
a similar conclusion may be reached as to the May 15th 
policy since white applicants seeking transfer from non­
accredited schools would likely have attended only the 
nonaccredited institution and thus would not be forced to 
sacrifice nonaccredited school credits to gain admission as 
required by this rule.

Thus, both the February 7th and May 15th rules, adopted 
by appellees after appellant filed his application with the 
University, placed serious barriers in the path of appel­
lant’s admission, but would not likely affect the admission 
of any other transfer applicant with a scholastic record 
similar to the appellant’s. Acts of Congress which infringed 
upon the rights of citizens in a manner similar to the 
February 7th and May 15th rules have been invalidated



33

as in the nature of Bills of Attainder. United States v. 
Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946). Such rules when promulgated 
by public officials such as appellees should be cause for close 
judicial scrutiny. Especially is this so when such rules are 
drawn so as to affect only a single individual or class. 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).

Certainly, the principle of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra, 
was seriously strained by the appellees’ administrative 
handling of the appellant’s application. The Registrar, for 
example, admitted that the certificates of good moral char­
acter accompanying an application are not generally inves­
tigated unless there is some reason to do so (R. Vol. V, 
684). In this case, the Registrar did not have reason to 
check the certificates, but a special investigation was made 
by the State Attorney General, and affidavits were secured 
by representatives of the state from Negroes under circum­
stances raising serious questions of duress. That appellees 
were cognizant of this is shown by their attempt to intro­
duce a second set of affidavits devoted to disclaiming any 
duress in the taking of the first set (Defs. Exh. 9, Vol. V, 
699-704). A far more effective method of ruling out duress, 
and one more in line with the traditional rules for the 
admission of evidence, would have required appellees to 
produce the affidavits in court and obtain their testimony 
under circumstances permitting the court to observe their 
demeanor on the stand, and giving appellant’s counsel the 
right to cross-examination. See, 6 Wigmore on Evidence, 
§1709 (3d Ed., 1940).

The Registrar also admitted that veterans are not in­
vestigated prior to admission to determine whether they 
have Army records indicating psychological problems (R. 
Vol. V, 684-685), and certainly there is no precedent for this 
case where appellant was requested to give his written per­
mission to appellees who sent one of their attorneys on a



34

special trip to St. Louis, Missouri, to review and have copies 
made of large portions of appellant’s service record. As 
with other aspects of the appellees’ investigation of appel­
lant’s background, emphasis was placed not on the obtaining 
of all information, but on the gathering of unfavorable 
facts which could be used to justify his exclusion from the 
University.

The Registrar and the other appellees have stoutly denied 
that appellant’s application was denied because he is a 
Negro. Appellant submits that the record in this case leads 
to the opposite conclusion. In any event, the myriad of 
reasons for rejecting appellant’s application have dwindled 
during the course of this litigation to one. Appellees state 
that appellant’s application for admission to the Liiiversity 
of Mississippi indicates that he is trying to make trouble 
simply because he is a Negro, and is not sincerely interested 
in obtaining an education (R. Vol. IV, 482; V, 682-683). 
A  similar conclusion could be reached as to any Negro 
who attempts to breach the racial barrier at the University 
of Mississippi. Legally, the appellant’s motives are not 
crucial to this case. Dor emus v. Board of Education, 342 
U. S. 429, 434-435 (1952); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U. S. 202 
(1958); Hunt v. Arnold, 172 F. Supp. 847, 857 (N. D. Ga. 
1959). Factually, appellant’s motives have been accurately 
set forth by this Court: “ James H. Meredith is a Mis­
sissippi Negro in search of an education” (R. Vol. II, 228). 
He submits that on the record and the law, he should be 
admitted to the University of Mississippi.



35

CONCLUSION

W herefore, appellant respectfully submits that the judg­
ment of the Court below should be reversed with orders 
to enjoin the appellees from denying appellant the right 
to enter the University of Mississippi as a transfer student 
at the first Summer Session 1962, on terms and conditions 
no different than those applied to white students similarly 
situated. Appellant prays that such order will enjoin ap­
pellees from interfering with the right of plaintiff and the 
members of his class to register and attend the University 
of Mississippi or any other state institution of higher learn­
ing presently limited to white students, and will grant what­
ever other relief including costs which in this Court’s 
opinion is deemed appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

Constance B aker Motley
Jack Greenberg
D errick A. B ell, J r.

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, New York

R, J ess Brown
1105% Washington Street 
Vicksburg, Mississippi

Attorneys for Appellant



â mgfen 3 8

.