United States v. H.K. Porter Company Brief Amici Curiae
Public Court Documents
November 28, 1969

Cite this item
-
Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Mapp v Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga TN Brief Collection, 1962. dc07c259-ca9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/3364871e-81e5-440f-87d2-4007a28ecf79/mapp-v-board-of-education-of-the-city-of-chattanooga-tn-brief-collection. Accessed July 01, 2025.
Copied!
MM? I i . B0A1UJ3; OF EDUCATION I)#, ,1 IHATOKOOG .. . . .. In t h e Imtefr States (Emtri ni Appeals F oe t h e S ix t h C ircuit Nos. 15,038-039 (_ t ■'£ - n --------------------- ------------------------ J ames J o n ath an M app , et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, —v.— T h e B oard op E ducation op th e C it y op C hattanooga, H am ilton Co u n ty , T ennessee , et al., Defendants-Appellees. J am es J on ath an M app , et al., Plaintiffs-Cr oss-Appellees, —v.— T h e B oard of E ducation of th e C it y op Chattanooga, H am ilto n Co u n ty , T ennessee, et al., Defendants-Cross-Appellants. BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS AND PLAINTIFFS-CROSS-APPELLEES Constance B aker M otley J ack Greenberg L eroy D . Clark 10 Columbus Circle New York 19, New York A von N. W illiam s , J r . Z. A lexander L ooby 327 Charlotte Avenue Nashville 3, Tennessee B ruce B oynton 431 East Ninth Street Chattanooga 2, Tennessee Attorneys for Appellants Statement of Questions Involved on Plaintiffs’ Appeal 1. Whether the court below erred in sustaining the motion of the defendants-appellees to strike from the complaint allegations with respect to the assignment of teachers, principals, and other professional school per sonnel on the basis of race, and portions of the prayer of the complaint seeking to enjoin racial personnel as signments ? The District Court answered this question “No”. The Plaintiffs-Appellants contend the answer should be “Yes”. 2. Whether the court below erred in refusing to require immediate desegregation of the Chattanooga Technical Institute, a two-year course beyond the high school level, and the Kirkman High School, the City’s only technical high school, both of which are limited to white students. The District Court answered this question “No” . The Plaintiffs-Appellants contend the answer should be “Yes” . n Counterstatement of Questions Involved on Defendants’ Cross-Appeal 1. Whether the court below erred in disapproving that provision of the Desegregation Plan which provides for the continued operation of dual school zones throughout the entire period of transition to single school zones and disapproving that provision which requires parents to notify the board of their intention to have their children continue to attend the segregated school to which they were previously assigned under the dual zone system or to attend the desegregated school to which they will be re assigned under a single zone system? The District Court answered this question “ No” . The Plaintiff s-Cross-Appellees contend the answer should be “ No”. 2. Whether the court below erred in disapproving, on the record and evidence in this case, that provision of the Desegregation Plan which permits transfers from desegre gated schools based wholly upon the race and color of the majority of the children in the school? The District Court answered this question “No”. The Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellees contend the answer should be “No” . I l l INDEX TO BRIEF PAGE Statement of Questions Involved on Plaintiffs’ Appeal.. i Counterstatement of Questions Involved on Defen dants’ Cross-Appeal __________ ii Statement of Pacts.......... ....... .......................... .............. 1 A r g u m e n t : D irect A ppeal ...................................... 14 A rgu m en t : Cross A p p e a l ........................................ 23 Co n c l u s io n ............................................................................................ 27 Cases: T able op A uthorities Augustus v. Board of Public Instruction of Escambia. County, Florida, No. 19408 (July 24, 1962) .......... 15 Boson v. Rippy, 285 F. 2d 4 3 ................ ........ ............11, 26 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U. S. 249 .............................................................................. 17 Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F. 2d 819 ...................................... ..... 14 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 7 .................................21, 25 Edwards v. Kings Mountain Memorial Hospital, 118 F. Supp. 417 .......................................................... 14 Gibson v. The Board of Education of the City of Nashville, 272 F. 2d 763-766 ......................... 24 Goss v. Board of Education of the City of Knoxville, Tennessee, 301 F. 2d 164 .....................................21, 25 PAGE Kelly v. Board of Education, 270 F. 2d 209, cert, denied 361 U. S. 924 ___ ___ ____ ____________ __11, King v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 114 F. Supp. 700 ............ ....... ...... ................. Kinnear Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 214 F. 2d 891 ........................ ......... .......................... McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 .. Maxwell v. County Board of Education of Davidson County, Tennessee, 301 F. 2d 828 ............................. Northeross v. Board of Education of the City of Memphis, 302 F. 2d 818 ............... .........................17, Norwood v. Tucker, 287 F. 2d 798 (8th Cir. 1961) .... Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 .............................. Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637 .... State of Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U. S. 413 ...................................................... ..... Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 ............................. U. S. v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118 .... Wilkinson v. Field, 108 F. Supp. 541......................... 25 14 15 19 25 24 24 19 19 20 19 15 15 I n th e finite (Hxmxt uf Appeals F oe t h e S ix t h C ircuit Nos. 15,038-039 J am es J o n ath an M app , et al., Plaintiff s-Appellants, — v .— T he B oard op E ducation op th e C ity of C hattanooga, H am ilto n C o u n ty , T ennessee , et al., Defendants-Appellees. J am es J o n ath an M app , et al., Plaintiffs-Cr oss- Appellees, T he B oard op E ducation op th e C ity op C hattanooga, H am ilto n C o u n ty , T ennessee, et al., Defendants-Cr oss- Appellants. BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS AND PLAINTIFFS-CROSS-APPELLEES Statement of Facts The present appeals, Nos. 15,038 and 15,039 are from a final judgment and decree entered in this cause on April 20, 1962 by the United States District Court for the East ern District of Tennessee, Southern Division (Wilson, D.J.), approving a Plan of Desegregation of the public schools in the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee (Sla-SGa).1 The appeal by plaintiffs below (No. 15,038) involves issues presented by an interlocutory order entered May 1 Unless otherwise indicated citations are to Plaintiffs’ Appendix. 2 16, 1960 sustaining- a motion to strike certain portions of the complaint, and by the final judgment’s failure to re quire immediate desegregation of a two-year technical training course offered in the City of Chattanooga at the Chattanooga Technical Institute and immediate desegrega tion of the City’s technical high school, “Kirkman.” (These plaintiffs-appellants will be referred to hereafter as the plaintiffs.) The cross-appeal, No. 15,039, has been taken in this case by the Board of Education of the City of Chattanooga, Tennessee (referred to hereafter as defendants) appealing from that part of the final order which: (1) failed to approve the plan for continued operation of dual school zone lines until a system of single zones is established over a six-year period, and requiring parents to notify school authorities before a specified date whether their children will either enroll in the newly desegregated school to which they are assigned under the single zone plan or will continue in the segregated school to which they were previously assigned under the dual zone plan; and (2) disapproves a provision of the Desegregation Plan which permits children to transfer from desegregated schools where the majority of children in the school are of the opposite race. The instant brief is in support of the plaintiffs’ first ap peal (No. 15,038), and is a reply to the defendants’ cross appeal (15,039). A single appendix accompanies this brief. There have been two prior appeals in this case, both taken by the school authorities. The first appeal was taken by the defendants-appellees on December 2, 1960 following an order by the court below denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment, granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, directing defendants to submit a plan of desegregation before December 20, 1960, and providing 3 for a hearing thereon in the District Court on January 9, 1961. Before that appeal could be heard it was necessary for defendants to submit their plan of desegregation which they did on December 20, 1960 and a hearing was held thereon on January 23, 1961 instead of January 9, 1961. Following this hearing, the District Court tentatively dis approved the plan submitted and ordered the defendants to submit, within 60 days, another plan. An appeal was taken from this order on February 10, 1961. Before either appeal could be heard defendants submitted a second plan on March 23, 1961. Thereafter, on November 13, 1961, this court affirmed both judgments of the court below. Mapp v. Bd. of Educa tion of City of Chattanooga, 295 F. 2d 617 (6th Cir. 1961). The first plan (87a-93a) submitted December 20, 1960, provided that in the school year 1962-3 compulsory segre gation would be abolished in selected schools in Chatta nooga in grades 1, 2, and 3 (88a). The selected schools were to be announced by October 1, 1961, permitting an entire school year to elapse before any desegregation took place (88a). Thereafter, beginning in 1963, one additional grade would be desegregated in the selected schools (88a). After the 1962-63 school year, desegregation was to be effected in other schools in accordance with plans to be submitted (89a). Desegregation was to be effected in these selected schools by the establishment of a single system of school zones (89a). The plan provided that in the period of transition to single zones, children might continue the practice of attending schools to which they were zoned by the dual school zone system. These dual school zones were to re main in existence until single zone lines were in full and complete operation, although no terminal date had been fixed (89a). 4 The plan further provided that parents desiring to en roll their children in desegregated schools should file a written “ Notice of Intention” with the defendant board prior to January 1, 1962. Transfers would he granted to a student from a desegregated school for good cause shown, good cause being “where the majority of students in that school or in his class are of a different race.” Finally, the plan provided for continuance of the “pro gram of elucidation” commenced by the defendant board in July 1955 (91a). The District Court’s judgment of January 27, 1961 was that the first plan did not meet the requirements of the Brown decision. However, the court did not then reject the first plan but gave defendants a right to file an alter nate plan, within 60 days, and reserved to defendants the right to a reconsideration of the first plan. The second plan submitted by defendants on March 23, 1961 was, in essence, a grade a year plan providing for desegregation in all schools in the first grade in September 1961. Consequently, on January 5, 1962, following this court’s affirmance of the two orders of the District Court direct ing defendants to bring in a plan, and rejecting the first plan, defendants filed an amendment to the original plan of December 20, 1960. This amendment is entitled: “ Im plementation of and Amendments to the Original Chatta nooga Plan of Desegregation, Submitted to the United States District Court, Eastern District of Tennessee, Southern Division, on December 20, 1960” (20a-23a). Ac cording to this instrument, the first plan had been im plemented as follows: 1) between April and July 1961 defendants had conducted a complete school census; 2) the defendant board announced at a special meeting on 5 September 30, 1961 the single school zone lines which would be in operation in selected schools in the school year 1962-63; 3) the defendant board also announced the names of the 16 schools which were to be desegregated in grades one through three upon the opening of school in September 1962-63; 4) forms to be used to give the board written notice of intent to enroll in a new school to which a pupil might be zoned under the new single zone system were distributed to all schools; 5) pupils and parents were notified of these developments; 6) the superintendent and his staff conducted many meetings to insure full under standing of the plan and the steps taken to implement same. In addition to the foregoing, denominated “ implementa tion,” the original plan was modified in two respects: 1) a definite date (September, 1962) was set as the date for desegregation of six special programs, such as the classes for the multiple-handicapped, the severely mentally re tarded, etc. All elementary schools were to be desegre gated in grades one through four in September 1963 on the basis of single zones. No further desegregation steps were outlined, although the first order of the court below had expressly required defendants to include vocational training in their plan. A pre-trial con ference had been previously scheduled for January 5, 1962, the day this implemented and amended plan was filed. This conference resulted in an order requiring defendants to amend their plan to provide for desegrega tion of vocational training within 10 days from the date of the order. Thereafter, on January 15, 1962 defendants filed a document entitled, “Amendment to Original Chattanooga Plan of Desegregation, Filed December 20, 1960, as 6 Amended January 5, 1962, With Regard to Vocational Trailing” (24a-26a). By this amendment, defendants com mitted themselves to a minimum desegregation rate of one additional grade each year after all elementary schools are desegregated in grades one through four in Septem ber 1963-64 school year. The desegregation of each addi tional grade, beginning with the fifth grade in 1964, was to take place throughout the system with the result that all elementary schools would he desegregated in grades one through six in September 1965. The plan then pro vided that in September 1966 desegregation would com mence in junior high school and continue each year there after through grades seven, eight and nine. Desegregation of the senior high school, including Kirkman Technical High School, was to commence in September 1969, con tinuing a grade-a-year thereafter until the senior class was desegregated in September 1971. The plan was that all schools be desegregated nine years after its commence ment. Attached to this amendment was a report adopted by the defendant board at its regular meeting on January 10, 1962 at the suggestion of the superintendent. This report, according to the amendment, “ Summarizes the historical development of the varied curricula at the four senior high schools presently operated by the Chattanooga board, said report revealing that the courses offered at City High, Howard High, Kirkman Technical Institute, and Brainerd High varied in a substantial degree for various reasons only remotely influenced by race” (em phases added) (25a-26a). In this report the defendant board contended that vocational education should not be singled out for special consideration as a part of the desegregation of Chattanooga’s city schools. Contained in this report is a chart listing the courses offered in the four high schools. A study of this chart reveals the defi ciencies in the technical or vocational program offered 7 Negroes at Howard High, the city’s only Negro high school, as compared with the technical program offered whites at Kirkman (33a-38a). This chart also demonstrates the limited academic programs available to Negroes at Howard High School as against the broader and more comprehen sive academic program afforded whites at Brainerd and Chattanooga high schools. The original plan, of which the January 15, 1962 docu ments were amendments also provided that, on or before a specified date, parents of children who might attend a desegregated school as a result of the institution of a system of single zones, were to notify the school author ities of their intention to enroll their children in the newly desegregated school (90a). Failing such notification, the child presumably remained in the segregated school to which he was zoned under the dual line system. Parents of children entering school for the first time apparently had the right to notify the defendant board of their inten tion to enroll their children in the school in which such child would be enrolled under the new single zone system or of their intent to have that child enroll in the segregated school which he would have been eligible to attend hut for the elimination of segregation. As the opinion of the court below points out (69a-70a) this consent provision appears to relate only to the 16 elementary schools selected for initial desegregation in September 1962, but this is not clear from a reading of the plan. However, it now appears that defendants have abandoned their appeal from that part of the judgment of the court below which precludes them from requiring any such notice of intention in the plan, as this ruling is not argued in their brief. In its opinion, the court ruled with respect to the notice of intention as follows: 8 The court does expressly disapprove of so much of the defendants’ proposed admission plan as would re quire any student or parent to apply for, or consent to, implementation of desegregation in accordance with the plan (79a). Defendants’ notice of cross-appeal filed on May 18, 1962, states that it is “ limited strictly to paragraphs 9 and 13 of said judgment as same may constitute disapproval of the admission and transfer provisions of the Chattanooga Plan of Desegregation as amended, particularly, Sections IV, ‘The Interim Operation of Present School Zones’ and VI, ‘Privilege of Transfer’ in original plan filed Decem ber 20, 1961” . The brief of defendants on their cross-appeal is devoted entirely to the validity of the transfer provision as set forth in Section VI of their plan and which provides as follows: 1. Upon receipt of applications as provided in existing school board policy, transfer of students in desegregated schools may be granted when good cause therefor is shown. 2. The following will he regarded as some of the valid reasons for good cause for transfer: (a) When a student would otherwise be required to attend a school where the majority of students in that school or in his class are of a different race. (b) When, in the judgment of the board, upon recom mendation of the superintendent, it is in the best inter est of the student, and the board policy, to transfer him from one school to another (90a-91a). Subparagraph (b) is not in dispute on this appeal. Although defendants do not discuss the validity of the notice of intention provision in their brief, they request a 9 reversal of the judgment below to the extent that it dis approves of “ the admission and transfer provisions” of their plan. (See Brief for defendants-appellants in No. 15,039, pp. 5-6.) Defendants’ plan of December 20, 1960, as amended Jan uary 5 and 15, 1962, was not adopted by the court below. After a hearing on the merits of defendants’ plan on Feb ruary 1 and 2, 1962, that court rendered an opinion disap proving the notice of intention and the transfer provisions. It approved the plan with the following modifications (81a-82a): (1) The desegregation in September of 1962 of the first three grades in 16 selected elementary schools as designated by name in the defendants’ First Plan is amended. The fol lowing special programs will also be desegregated in Sep tember 1962: Class for multiple handicapped; classes for orthopedically handicapped children; authorization for the United Cerebral Palsy Program to be desegregated; classes for perceptually handicapped; classes for severely mentally retarded; class for educable mentally retarded at the G. Bussell Brown School. (2) The desegregation in September of 1963 of the first four grades of all elementary schools. (3) The desegregation in September 1964 of the remain ing grades in all elementary schools. (4) The desegregation in September of 1965 of the first year of all junior high schools. (5) The desegregation in September of 1966 of the re maining grades in all junior high schools. (6) The desegregation in September of 1967 of the first year in all high schools. (7) The desegregation in September of 1968 of the re maining grades in all high schools. 10 (8) The desegregation in September of 1969 of the Chat tanooga Technical Institute. (9) The Board of Education may adopt any admission or transfer plan as may in its judgment be reasonable or proper for the operation of the Chattanooga Public Schools; provided, however, that no admission or transfer plan may be based upon race and have as its primary purpose the delay or prevention of desegregation in accordance with the plan herein approved. (10) The map of the proposed single school zones as attached to the defendants’ First Plan as amended is ap proved, with the School Board having the right to modify zones from time to time in accordance with their general policies and practices and without regard to purely racial factors. (11) Within 60 days after implementing each annual step of the plan herein approved the School Board shall report to the Court as to progress under the plan to the date of the respective report. This cause will be retained within the jurisdiction of the Court and this order will be subject to modification from time to time as may appear just and proper. (12) This order shall provide only for the minimum rate of desegregation and defendants shall at all times be vested with the discretion to proceed with desegregation at an accelerated rate. Except as herein expressly provided the defendants shall not be otherwise restrained by this order. In disapproving the continuance of dual school zone lines, the provision requiring parents to notify defendants of their intention or to give consent before a specified date, the court ruled: “ The initial provision . . . says in effect that for the school year beginning in September 1962, students 11 residing within a desegregated school zone who had formerly been attending a different school, may enroll in the desegregated school provided that his parents give consent before a specified time. # “ It speaks of ‘single zone’ schools, but then refers to ‘schools desegregated by the School Board’ as though these were different schools. No school becomes a single zone school until it is desegregated, and then only as to the grades desegregated. In short, the pro vision is not only somewhat confusing, but the Court is unable to understand the reason for any such pro vision in the Plan. As was recently held in the case of Northeross, et al. v. Board of Education, et al., 6 Cir., ------ - F. 2d ------ , students ‘cannot be required to apply for that to which they are entitled as a matter of right.’ ” Disapproval of the transfer provision was predicated upon the testimony of the superintendent as to the resegre gation effect of a similar provision in the Nashville, Ten nessee plan (Appendix p. 43a) approved by this court in Kelly v. Bd. of Education of Nashville, 270 F. 2d 209 (6th Cir. 1959), cert, den., 361 IT. S. 924, and the Fifth Circuit’s contrary decision in Boson v. Bippy, 285 F. 2d 43 (5th Cir. 1961). The court below held: It does appear that a similar transfer provision was approved by the Court in Kelly v. Board of Education case. However, the Court in that case held as it did “ on the evidence before us.” In the record of the present case there was evidence by the witness, Dr. Weinstein, that the Nashville trans fer plan had operated to minimize progress under the desegregation plan. The Court.. . disapproves of so much of the transfer plan proposed by the defendants as permits transfers 12 based only upon students being in a racial minority in any particular school. The plaintiffs urged the court below to require immediate admission of Negroes to the Kirkman High School and to require the immediate desegregation of a two-year tech nical course at Chattanooga Technical Institute, but the court ruled that “ the same reasons which have herein been held to justify delay in the desegregation of academic courses in high school would also justify delay in the desegregation of vocational courses” (80a). Although the court below found that the Chattanooga Technical Institute is limited to white students, it permitted this institute to be desegregated as the next annual step following desegrega tion of the high schools (80a). The motion to strike the allegations of the complaint in this case relating to the assignment of teachers on the basis of race came before the court below (Darr, D.J.) in May 1960. At that time, the court struck from the complaint the following: 1. Plaintiffs, and members of their class, are injured by the policy of assigning teachers, principals and other school personnel on the basis of race and color of the children attending a particular school and the race and color of the person to be assigned. Assign ment of school personnel on the basis of race and color is also predicated in the theory that Negro teachers, Negro principals and other Negro school personnel are inferior to white teachers, white principals and other white school personnel and therefore, may not teach white children.” 2. “Enter a decree enjoining defendants, their agents, employees and successors from assigning teachers, principals and other school personnel to the schools 13 of the City of Chattanooga on the basis of the race and color of the person to be assigned and on the basis of the race and color of the children attending the school to which the personnel is to be assigned 3. “ the assignment of teachers, principals and other school personnel on a nonracial basis,” The court ruled that these allegations were not material or pertinent and therefore did not raise a justiciable question (Appendix pp. 16a-17a). The superintendent testified, how ever, on his deposition, which was subsequently admitted into evidence (see Pre-Trial Order), that teachers are assigned on the basis of race and color; that a Negro with the title of supervisor assists in the improvement of the quality of education in Negro schools; that there are no Negroes in administrative or clerical positions; that there are two Negro helping teachers assigned to Negro schools (39a-42a), The superintendent also testified on the final hearing on the plan on February 1-2, 1962 that there are no plans for desegregating teachers (40a). 14 ARGUMENT: DIRECT APPEAL I Whether the court below erred in sustaining the motion of the defendants-appellees to strike from the complaint alle gations with respect to the assignment of teachers, princi pals, and other professional school personnel on the basis of race, and portions of the prayer of the complaint seeking to enjoin racial personnel assignments? The District Court answered this question “No.” The Plaintiffs-Appellants contend the answer should be “Yes.” Plaintiffs submit that the Court below erred in granting Defendants’ motion to strike the allegations of the com plaint directed towards the non-racial assignment of teach ers and other school personnel. As a general proposition, the motion to strike parts of a complaint is not favored and in most instances will only be successful when attacking obviously frivolous and prejudicial matter. Edwards v. Kings Mountain Memorial Hospital, 118 F. Supp. 417; King v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 114 F. Supp. 700. As this court noted in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F. 2d 819: Partly because of the practical difficulty of deciding cases without a factual record it is well established that the action of striking a pleading should be spar ingly used by the courts . . . The motion to strike should be granted only when the pleading to be stricken has no possible relation to the controversy. The issue of whether plaintiff’s complaint could properly request desegregation of the school system (as evidenced by racial assignment of teachers) presented serious ques- 15 tions of law and fact. A substantial question of law existed as to plaintiffs’ standing to request relief beyond non- racial assignment of pupils. An additional, and serious question of fact, which could only be resolved upon the pres entation of evidence existed as to plaintiffs’ claim of in jury to Negro students ensuing from the continuance of a major vestige of the segregated school system. It is a generally accepted proposition that the summary nature of a motion to strike renders it an improper instance for the settlement of serious questions of law and disputed ques tions of fact. Wilkinson v. Field, 108 F. Supp. 541; U. 8. v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp. 118. Further, de fendants can make no showing of prejudicial harm resulting from a full hearing on the issue of teacher segregation, and this is a necessary element when a motion to strike is to be sustained. Kinnear Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refin ing Co., 214 F. 2d 891, 894. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, may be seriously prejudiced by the entertainment of such a motion for their complaint against racial assignment of teachers may be mooted by their admittance to schools where they will be taught by white teachers. Therefore as a threshold matter the granting of defendants’ motion was improvident. All of these factors noted above were fully considered in the Fifth Circuit case of Augustus v. Board of Public Instruction of Escambia County, Florida, No. 19408 (July 24,1962) in which a portion of a complaint directed towards racial assignment of teachers was held to be improperly dismissed under a motion to strike. The Court of Appeals there stated: Whether as a question of law or one of fact, we do not think that a matter of such importance should be de cided on motion to strike. . . . We hold, therefore, that, at the then stage of the proceeding, the district court 16 erred in sustaining defendants’ motion to strike the allegations relating to the assignments of teachers, principals and other school personnel on the basis of race. The posture of this case differs from Augustus in one important particular. Although the district court sustained defendants’ motion to strike, testimony of the superintend ent, at the trial and on deposition, was permitted to be made a part of this record. This testimony firmly estab lishes defendants’ policy of assigning teachers and other school personnel on the basis of race. Plaintiffs contend that given this state of the record, this court may upon finding the motion improperly granted, decide the issue upon the merits. This is an appropriate remedy, for the evidence relied on is completely supported by defendants’ own testimony and further establishes that defendants have no plan or intention to assign teachers on a non-racial basis at any time in the future. Such a proce dure is further dictated by the totality of circumstances attendant on this case: plaintiffs’ initial complaint to de segregate . the Chattanooga public schools was served in April, 1960 and as of August, 1962, desegregation has been achieved in no measure whatsoever. Further, defendants, who have been fully aware of their obligation since the Brown decision of 1954 to proceed with all deliberate speed, have spent five years “ educating the citizenry” while de segregating not one school in the city. When under court direction to proceed more concretely toward desegregation they have authored many dilatory plans whose main effect was to integrate in the slowest, most piece-meal fashion and retrogress to resegregation through racial transfer pro visions. The remedy plaintiffs propose would require defendants to assume their responsibility to discontinue the racial assignment of school personnel which further 17 postpones plaintiffs’ full enjoyment of their constitutional rights. As regards the grounds upon which this court may find that teacher segregation is a violation of plaintiffs’ con stitutional rights, plaintiffs submit that Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483, affirmatively requires the cessation of segregation in the entire school system. From the very beginning the Supreme Court approached these cases as an attack on segregation in the entire educa tional system as opposed to the right of individual Negro pupils to be admitted to white schools maintained by states under the separate but equal doctrine. This was the very reason for setting these cases down for re-argument in 1954 after the court’s first pronounce ment that further enforcement of racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional. Upon re-argument, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U. S. 249, the court again made clear that what was contemplated in these cases was a reorganization of the school system on a non-racial basis. This court itself recognized the full import of the Brown case in North-cross v. Board of Education of the City of Memphis, 302 F. 2d 818, when it stated: In May 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that “Separate educational facilities are inher ently unequal,” and that segregation of the races in separate schools deprived the minority group of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Four teenth Amendment. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, and further, the first Brown case decided that separate schools organised on a racial ha-sis are contrary to the Constitution of the United States. 18 It is a matter of common knowledge that the assignment of Negro teachers to Negro schools is one of the major ways in which the educational system is maintained on a segre gated basis. The harm inflicted on Negro children does not emanate solely from the fact that they attend school only with other Negroes, but is generated by the knowledge that their race is separated as an imputation of inferiority. If teachers are assigned on the basis of race, then obviously the policy of segregation continues as a reminder of the formerly imposed racial discrimination, and the Negro students have not been relieved of the source of their harm—a segregated school system. Therefore, the rights they assert are not solely the rights of the teachers, but are personal and central to their relief. Consequently, the rights secured by the Supreme Court’s decision in the Brown case could not have been so incom plete as merely to secure the right to attend a “white” school in a racially segregated system. School authorities cannot, therefore, be heard to say that they have no duty to eliminate racial discrimination in the school system and may continue to operate segregated schools, assign teachers on the basis of race and, in short, do business as usual. Teachers are an integral part of the school system and the mandate to end racial discrimination in the school system clearly carries with it the duty to end the policy of assigning teachers on the basis of race. II Whether the court below erred in refusing to require immediate desegregation of the Chattanooga Technical In stitute, a two-year course beyond the high school level, and the Kirkman High School, the City’s only technical high school, both of which are limited to white students. 19 The District Court answered this question “No” . The Plaintiffs-Appellants contend the answer should be “Yes” . The defendants operate two educational institutions, Kirkman Technical High School and Chattanooga Techni cal Institute at which only white students may receive tech nical and vocational training. The Chattanooga Technical Institute provides two years of advanced training beyond the high school level. The only institution at which Negroes may receive any vocational training is Howard High School which has a combined academic and vocational curriculum. It is undisputed that there are vocational training courses given at Kirkman High School which are not available in the Negro high school.2 There is absolutely no provision for Negroes to obtain two years of technical training be yond high school, as provided for whites at the Chattanooga Technical Institute. The issue here is fairly simple. As an outgrowth of the doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, it was recog nized that where the state could not provide equal facilities however separate, Negroes could not be subjected to dep rivation of educational opportunities permitted all other citizens, and immediate admission of Negro plaintiffs to formerly all-white schools was ordered. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 H. S. 629; Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 H. S. 637; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U. S. 637. In the Sweatt case, the State of Texas had opened a law school for Negroes, which the court, however, found unequal in staff, library, and curriculum to the University of Texas Law School which was limited to whites. The court stated: 2 The following courses are given at Kirkman High School and are not available to Negroes at Howard High School: Machine Shop, Sheet Metal, Welding, Drafting, Electricity, Commercial Art, Industrial Chemistry, and Printing. 20 . . . petitioner may claim his full constitutional right: legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to students of other races. Such education is not avail able to him in a separate law school as offered by the State. We hold that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four teenth Amendment requires that petitioner be ad mitted to the University of Texas Law School. In all of the above cases, the court refused to permit de fendants’ promises to equalize facilities in the future to modify the order for immediate admission. In Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the court stated: “ The state must provide (legal education) for her in conformity with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other group” (at p. 631).3 Immediate admission where discrimination had produced demonstrably unequal facilities was the law prior to the Brown decision. Brown took on the further task of requir ing desegregation in public schools even absent a showing of inferior plant and other educational facilities. A post- Brown decision, State of Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U. S. 413, is the latest case to apply the rule of prompt and immediate admission. This case dis tinguished the second Brown decision of 1955 which re quired “all deliberate speed” and held the rule of prompt admission was not modified where the state provides edu cational training for white persons which was not available presently in any form to Negroes. Such a holding was not limited to deprivation of collegiate or graduate school edu- 3 It is to be noted that defendants here, have made no promises to make the curriculum at the Negro high school equal to that of the white high school during the deferment of desegregation. 21 cation for Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 7, which concerned admission to public schools stated: Of course, in many locations, obedience to the duty of desegregation would require the immediate general admission of Negro children, otherwise qualified as students for their appropriate classes, at particular schools. This court passed on the identical issue in Goss v. Board of Education of the City of Knoxville, Tennessee, 301 F. 2d 164. In that case, the Fulton High School, which was limited to white students, offered some technical and voca tional courses which were not available in any Negro high school. Defendants proposed, as do defendants here, to reach the desegregation of this school pursuant to a stag gered desegregation plan for all schools which would have postponed desegregation of Fulton High School for nine years. The district court specifically rejected this solution. On appeal this court stated approvingly: Judge Taylor wisely withheld approval of the plan insofar as it denied Negro students the right to take the technical and vocational courses offered at Fulton High School. The board should, as he suggested, present within a reasonable time a plan that would permit all Negro students who desire and are qualified to have an opportunity to take the special courses of this high school (at p. 168). The court below based its acceptance of deferred desegre gation for vocational schools on testimony which attempted to justify the unavailability of various courses on the ground that employers would not hire Negroes with these skills. This argument is infirm on several grounds. The strength of the statement is questionable, since no Negroes have ever received such training, and consequently the 22 opportunity for refusing them employment has been nil. Further, Negro students are permanently disabled from even attempting to break down any racial barriers in em ployment because at the outset they are deprived of proper training. Given such training, they might achieve the gradual breakdown of racial barriers, especially with grow ing federal controls on racial discrimination in many areas of private employment.4 In addition to the practical as pects, it can never be legitimate, in terms of the constitu tional obligation to provide equal training for all students, for an educational system to impose racial discrimination on students as a reflection and reinforcement of supposed discrimination such students will meet on graduation. Kirkman High School and Chattanooga Technical Insti tute, therefore, present a separate and more pressing need for desegregation and should be dealt with immediately outside the general plans for desegregation. This source of social and economic injury to the Negro community war rants immediate attention. 4 Executive Order 10925 bars private employers who receive Government contracts from denying employment to qualified per sons because of race. 23 ARGUMENT: CROSS APPEAL III Whether the court erred in disapproving that provision of the Desegregation Plan which provides for the continued operation of dual school zones throughout the entire period of transition to single school zones and in disapproving that provision which requires parents to notify the board of their desire to have their children continue to attend the segregated school to which they were previously as signed under the dual zone system, or to attend the de segregated school to which they will be reassigned under a single zone system? The District Court answered this question “No”. The Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellees contend the answer should be “ No”. Defendants are appealing from so much of the judgment below as disapproves their plans: (1) To continue racial school zone lines during the period a school proceeded to full integration; and (2) To require parents to make known their desire by a specific date, to send their children to a school open to all races under the newly drawn zone lines. The plan is in essence one of leaving all children in their present segregated schools during the “ transition” period and requiring those who wish the opportunity to go to a desegregated school to make formal request for such. The defendants’ plan as such differs little from other school boards’ attempt to justify the continuance of segregated schools because a pupil placement law was available through which Negro parents could request transfer of their children to white schools. These laws have repeatedly 24 been held not to constitute a reasonable start towards compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision. North-cross v. Board of Education of the City of Memphis, 302 F. 2d 818; Norwood v. Tucker, 287 F. 2d 798. As stated in Gibson v. The Board of Education of the City of Nashville, 272 F. 2d 763-766, plans which require requests for transfer where racial zone lines are maintained by the school board, are not “ inconsistent with a continued policy of compulsory racial segregation.” Defendants cannot defend their policy by claiming it is “voluntary” and not compulsory segregation if Negro parents do not make the request for transfer to a “ desegre gated” school for Negroes have no more right to request attendance at solely “Negro” schools than have whites to request attendance at solely “white” schools. They there fore cannot permit requests from parents to modify the obligation of the state to discontinue the maintenance of “Negro” and “ white” schools. Goss v. Board of Education of the City of Knoxville, Tennessee, 301 F. 2d 164. The duty to desegregate a school system which the state has actively segregated, in violation of the constitution, is on the defendant school board, not the individual plaintiffs. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 7. As the court below stated, quoting from Northcross v. The Board of Education of the City of Memphis, 302 F. 2d 818, students “ cannot be required to apply for that to which they are entitled as a matter of right.” The court’s decisions in Brown and Cooper established the right of all children to freedom from state-imposed educational segregation based on color. They make plain the state’s duty, not merely to afford an election to be unsegregated, but to affirmatively cease the organization of the school system on the basis of race. Nor do the de cisions contemplate an arrangement perpetuating segre- 25 gation subject to individual application by which desegre gation can be achieved only in isolated instances. The de fendants are attempting to shift to the individual a re sponsibility the constitution imposes on them. Behind this attempt is a hope that the Negro community will be qui escent and fail to apply for transfers, thus allowing the pre-existing pattern of segregation to continue. An evasive scheme, however ingenious, should not be permitted to nullify the right of plaintiffs to attend school on a non- segregated basis. Cooper v. Aaron, supra. IV Whether the court below erred in disapproving, on the record and evidence in this case, that provision of the Desegregation Plan which permits transfers from desegre gated schools based wholly upon the race and color of the majority of the children in the school! The District Court answered this question “No” . The Plaintiffs-Cross-Appellees contend the answer should be “No”. As a part of defendants’ original plan submitted on December 20, 1960, they proposed to permit transfer from desegregated schools when “good cause” was shown. One reason taken as such good cause occurs: When a student would otherwise be required to at tend a school where the majority of students in that school or in his class are of a different race. A racial transfer plan identical to this has been approved by this court on previous occasions. Kelly v. Board of Education, 270 F. 2d 209, certiorari denied 361 TJ. S. 924. Maxwell v. County Board of Education of Davidson County, Tennessee, 301 F. 2d 828; Goss v. Board of Education of the City of Knoxville, Tennessee, 301 F. 2d 164. 26 Another circuit has disapproved such a plan, Boson v. Rippy, 285 F. 2d 43, and an application for certiorari in the Maxwell and Goss cases is pending in the Supreme Court of the United States for resolution of the conflict in circuits. Plaintiffs do not abandon their argument that the transfer plan, to any extent it is availed of by parents, must work toward re-segregation. The affirmance of the court below, however, may be had without reference to the validity of the plan on its face. In the Goss case, this court sustained the racial trans fer plan, reasoning that only in its application may it be violative of constitutional rights. The court forthwith, however, admonished defendants “ that it cannot use this as a means to perpetuate segregation” (at page 168). To insure this rule, responsibility was left to the trial court to evaluate the transfer provision as an operating mecha nism : “The trial judge retains jurisdiction during the transi tion period and the supervision of this phase of re organization may be safely left in his hands” 5 (at p. 168). The court below expressly accepted the standard set by this court in the Kelly case and prohibited the use of the racial transfer plan on the basis of evidence before it that the plan would operate to perpetuate segregation. It does not appear that a similar transfer provision was approved by the Court in Kelly v. Board of Edu cation case. However, the Court in that case held as it did “ on the evidence before us.” 5 Such delegation is in line with the second Brow n decision which counseled that district courts which handled desegregation cases from their inception were best equipped to perform the judicial function of assaying what constituted good faith imple mentation of desegregation. 27 In the record of the present case there was evidence by the witness, Dr. Weinstein, that the Nashville trans fer plan had operated to minimize progress under the desegregation plan. The Court. . . disapproves of so much of the transfer plan proposed by the defendants as permits transfers based only upon students being in a racial minority in any particular school. The District Court’s order that the racial transfer rule was not to be a part of the general desegregation plan was probably a decision that no side mechanism be allowed to decelerate a rate of integration which was the bare mini mum of defendants’ obligation. Absent the transfer rule, the court was assured of total desegregation of the school system within seven years. Within the area of discretion the District Court made the decision to remove any factors which might disrupt the schedule and make progress toward desegregation more halting and uncertain. CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court below should be reversed as to Appeal No. 15,038 and affirmed as to Appeal No. 15,039. Respectfully submitted, Constance B ak es M otley J ack G reenberg L eroy D . Clark 10 Columbus Circle New York 19, New York A von N. W illiam s , Jr. Z. A lexander L ooby 327 Charlotte Avenue Nashville 3, Tennessee B ruce B oynton 431 East Ninth Street Chattanooga 2, Tennessee Attorneys for Appellants I n t h e United States (iliwrt nt A rea ls F oe th e S ix t h C ircuit No. 14,444 J am es J o n ath an M app , Plaintiff-Appellee, —versus— T h e B oard of E ducation of th e C it y of Chattanooga, H am ilto n C o u n ty , T ennessee, et al., Defendants-Appellants. appeal from th e u n ited states district court for th e EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE, SOUTHERN DIVISION APPENDIX TO APPELLEE’S BRIEF Z. A lexander L ooby A von W illiam s 327 Charlotte Avenue Nashville, Tennessee C onstance B aker M otley T hurgood M arshall 10 Columbus Circle New York 19, New York Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee f\2_ ; .* ̂ 4 ., /D u I Tj /55 5" T Cr ̂ \ |7. <a—j- * S-£^~ ~..... ; ‘ /!) /J 2 j f { r / 4 ' A r & lr v K - S’X j l (p*f>, INDEX TO APPENDIX PAGE Statement of March 31, 1956 ........ ........ ....................... 4b- Statement of July 9, 1958 ................................................ 8b Statement of March 7, 1960 ............................................ 10b Excerpts From Depositions ............................................ 12b W itnesses : Pages o f Original Printed Record Page Dr. John Walter Letson Direct .............................................. 3-37 12b Recalled Cross................................................ 105-108 57b Redirect .......................................... 108-117 60b William D. Leber Direct .............................................. 47-76 23b Cross........................................ 76-87 44b Redirect .......................................... 87-92 53b Dean Petersen Direct ..................................-........... 120-126 64b Cross .............................................. 126-135 68b Redirect .......................................... 135-141 75b Recross .......................................... 141-142 79b Mrs. Sammie C. Irvine Direct ....................... -..................... 143-145 80b Cross ......................... .................... 146 81b Supplem entary Statement o f October 12, 1955 .......... lb 11 George C. Hudson Pages o f Original Record Printed Page Direct .................... ............... 148-152 82b Raymond B. Witt Direct .............................. ............... 153-155 86b Cross ......................... ............... 155-158 88b Redirect .................... ............... 159-168 90b Supplementary Statement of October 12, 1955 October 12, 1955 Chattanooga P ublic S chools 413 East Eighth Street Chattanooga 3, Tennessee October 12,1955 S u pplem en tary S tatem en t by th e C hattanooga B oard of E ducation w it h R eference to th e D ecisions of th e U nited S tates S uprem e C ourt of M ay 17,1954, and M ay 31, 1955, on th e S u bject of R acial D iscrim ination in th e P ublic S chools On July 23 we released a statement of policy concerning our position with respect to the Supreme Court decisions on racial discrimination in the public schools. The Board reaffirms its stated policy. We are interested primarily in the welfare of all the children in the city schools. We are in the second phase of our announced procedure, giving consideration to the selection of members of the advisory committee who will assist us as we study the problem and seek a solution. As soon as the committee has been selected and organized, we will begin public meetings to counsel with interested Chattanooga citizens seeking their viewpoints and advice. It is evident that some people have misunderstood our original statement of policy. We have had several sugges tions offered as possible solutions to our problem. For example, some people have questioned why we did not adopt a plan similar to that being tried in some southern cities where certain schools will be designated for each race and some for both white and Negro children, with attendance being on an optional basis. We believe our posi tion is better since it leaves us free to find and accept this 2b or any solution that might be superior. Moreover we are in a position to draw from the people of Chattanooga the answers that they finally believe to be the wisest and best for this community. The Supreme Court clearly recognized that each school board would have its different problems because no two communities are exactly alike. That also means that if a problem is different, its solution may necessarily be differ ent from the solution in another community. That is what we think the Supreme Court said in its decision. Once the Court recognized that the problem varied with each community, it directed each school board to counsel with the people of its own community in order to determine exactly what the problem is in that particular community. Now, as we read the Court’s decision, this means that the Court recognizes that racial discrimination can end only when the majority of the citizens are willing for it to end. That is why we want to secure the view of our fellow citizens with the aid of the interracial advisory committee, repre senting our best citizens of varying points of view. We will welcome interested groups from all over the City to come and discuss this most serious problem with us and the advisory committee. We want ideas and suggestions from everyone; for, as we understand the Supreme Court’s decision, this is what the Court intended for us to do first. The Court has placed control of the situation in our hands as long as we act in good faith, and we intend to act in good faith at all times. This is of the utmost importance. It is also important that we be able at all times to prove our good faith in a court of law. We can decide whether our community should take a little step or a big one or a series of little steps over a period of years. But once the Court decides we are not acting in good faith, the Court will tell us what to do. Supplementary Statement of October 12, 1955 3b We are responsible for the educational opportunities of all 24,000 children in the City schools. In everything we do we must always have their welfare in mind. This means that our obligation to a Negro child is no greater and no less than our obligation to a white child. In other words, we do not know the answers, but we do know that we must not penalize a Negro child in his educational opportunities, nor must we penalize a white child. Therefore, we shall in the near future name our inter racial advisory committee and be ready to begin considera tion of this question in search for the answers. In the hearings that will be held we shall not sit formally as a board of education but as a committee of the whole. Our regular chairman, even though he has adopted a position contrary to the policy of the Board, will sit with us and participate with all the rights and privileges and courtesies to which he is entitled and which are enjoyed under the law by any other Board member. We are convinced that every one will come to realize that it is far better for the Board of Education to retain the responsibility for arriving at a decision as to what is best for our children and our com munity instead of having some drastic action imposed upon us. The Court itself opened the way for each community to solve its problem in its own way so long as the effort is carried on in good faith each step of the way. This we intend to do. Chattanooga B oard of E ducation R. E . B iggers A lf J. L aw , J r . W. I). L eber H arry M ilder R aymond B. W it t , J r . M rs. J . B. (S am m ie C.) I rvin e , Secretary H arry A lle n , Commissioner and Chairman Supplementary Statement of October 12, 1955 4b Chattanooga P ublic S chools 413 East Eighth Street Chattanooga 3, Tennessee March 31,1956 S tatem en t of M arch 31, 1956, by th e Chattanooga B oard of E ducation w it h R eference to th e D ecisions of the U nited S tates S upreme Court of M ay 17,1954, and M ay 31, 1955, on th e S u bject of R acial D iscrim ination in th e P ublic S chools Events in the last year have convinced the Chattanooga Board of Education that the community will not accept any form of integration within the City schools at any time within the near future. We, therefore, take this opportunity to report to the community our decision to postpone any change in the public schools for a period of at least a few years probably five years or more. Because of organiza tional problems confronting the schools now, the decision could not be longer postponed, and we feel that the public is entitled to have this information without delay. We believe this to be in harmony with the spirit of the two U. S. Supreme Court rulings on the question. We believe our decision will not harm any child of either race. We believe this action to be a good faith compliance with the supreme law of the land. Following the Supreme Court decision of May, 1955, we announced, after careful thought and consideration, our statement of policy regarding the matter of segregation in the operation of our public school system. As we started our search for an answer, we said that there would be no Statem ent o f M arch 3 1 , 1 9 5 6 5b change in the operation of our schools for the school year commencing in September, 1955. We have proceeded in good faith, in line with our an nounced policy, to seek a solution to our problem. We have talked with many people; we have studied the law; we have taken note of plans and developments in other communities ; we have observed every development; for in our hearts and in our prayers this problem has been constantly with us. We have asked every citizen of Chattanooga to help us in our efforts to find a legal solution which would harm no child of either race, and we are grateful to those good citizens who have shared their thinking with us. From the outset we have realized that the answer must be found in the hearts of the citizens of our community. We have said that we will comply with the law. We have said that this means we will comply with the law as we understand it as we read the words used by the United States Supreme Court. As a result of all that has happened in our community and elsewhere, we are firmly convinced that any measure of integration within the foreseeable future would do the community irreparable damage. The cause of public education has already suffered severe damage. Hasty action could result in harm to the welfare of our children to an extent unknown. The quality of all education at all levels would suffer. No one would gain. Everyone would lose from too hasty action. As a Board of Education, our duty is not to make the law or to say the law is right or wrong. It is our duty to operate the schools to the best of our ability for the benefit of the children within the legal framework that binds us. Our personal feelings have no proper place in the decision to comply with the law. Statement of March 31,1956 6b We do not believe the Court will require us to take a step that will destroy much of the progress the public schools of Chattanooga have made during the last 25 years. We do not believe the Court will require us to take a step that we believe in good faith would be detrimental to the well-being of all of our children. In this dilemma, our primary responsibility is to make the problem clear to the community. This is what the Court’s words mean to us. Before any problem can be solved, the exact nature of the problem must be known to those who must solve it. Some 150,000 Cliattanoogans are involved in this problem; and every single one has an opinion on the problem. Yet events have proven that this issue is so close to the hearts of all of us that emotions prevent a discussion of the issue. It has proven impossible to discuss the question in a calm manner with many people. Sooner or later our emotions overcome us. As a result, we have not been able to make the problem clear to our fellow citizens. Misunderstanding has increased almost daily. Normal friendly relations have worsened. Your Board hopes this breathing spell may restore a spirit of good will to our community, an atmosphere where free discussion is possible without bitterness and hate. We feel that such a period is essential if the problem is ever to be solved without results that none of us would knowingly seek. The Court told us to elucidate the problem. To date that has been impossible. Yet that first step is essential. Were we to skip the first step of making the problem clear, we would be violating the Court’s ruling. During this period of time we will exert every effort to improve our schools, yet working always within the frame- Statement of March 31,1956 7b Statement of March 31,1956 work of the law as we understand it. For the future only the people of this community and developing circumstances here and elsewhere can point the way to a fair solution. Chattanooga B oard of E ducation R. E. B iggers A lf J. L aw , J r . W . D . L eber H arry M iller R aym ond B. W it t , Jr. Mrs. J. B . (S am m ie C .) I rvine , Secretary H arry A l le n , Commissioner and Chairman 8b Chattanooga P ublic S chools Chattanooga, Tennessee July 9,1958 Every single decision of the Chattanooga Board of Edu cation is made with one objective in mind—to provide the best possible education for all of the children in Chat tanooga. The decision of the U. S. Supreme Court on the question of racial discrimination has confronted the community with a serious decision. Each Chattanooga citizen must accept his responsibility to help solve this grave problem. The position of this Board on the question of compliance with this decision is a matter of public record and needs no reiteration. In the meantime, public education must go forward. It must be improved for the benefit of all. We are in a period of transition and no one knows the time element. We must move in good faith to continue and improve public education and to minimize tension. We are certain education cannot take place in an atmosphere of tension and bitter conflict. Your School Board has been and now is attempting to make the problem clear to the community. All citizens must know exactly what our problem is before we can go about working out a solution. In our combined judgment it would be extremely unwise to comply with the recent request to integrate our public schools at the beginning of the next school term, and it is our decision that the request be denied. Statem ent o f July 9 , 1 9 5 8 9b Statement o f July 9,1958 We shall continue to do our best to meet our grave responsibility to all the children in the Chattanooga public school system. With God’s help, it can be done. Chattanooga B oard of E ducation R. E . B iggers George C. H udson , Sr. (Mrs. J. B.) S am m ie C. I rvine Alf J. L a w , Jr. W illiam D . L eber R aymond B . W it t , J r . F. H. T rotter, Commissioner and Chairman 10b C hattanooga P ublic S chools Chattanooga, Tennessee March 7,1960 To th e C itizen s oe Chattan ooga : The Chattanooga Board of Education denies the recent demand for “total integration” of the Chattanooga Public Schools with the conviction that to do otherwise would be premature and to the detriment of the vast majority of white and Negro children. The school board has never questioned the legality of the Constitutional principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, although individual members of the board may have ques tioned the wisdom of the decision. The Court recognized that implementation of these principles would require the solution of varied problems. It placed upon the school board the responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving them. In attempting to make the problems clear to the community, we are in the first stage of compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision. This step has not been completed and cannot be completed by the school board alone. The Board of Education has been delegated the responsi bility for public education in this community. We are con vinced that a substantial majority of the people we serve strongly prefer the continuation of our schools in accord ance with the historical pattern. We are also fully aware that a substantial minority of the community desires com pliance with the Supreme Court’s decision. Ordinarily the wishes of the majority would be a clear directive to the Statem ent o f M arch 7 , 1 9 6 0 lib school board. When the wishes of the majority are in direct conflict with the Constitution of the United States, we know that the Constitution must somehow prevail. There could be no law if each community had the right to interpret the Constitution in its own way. Your school board has attempted to elucidate the prob lem and will continue in its efforts. We have met many long hours with various groups—pastors, business leaders, a representative union group, Negro groups—always working toward understanding of the Court’s action and its signifi cance to the community. We earnestly seek your understanding. Chattanooga B oard of E ducation S. D ean P etersen , Commissioner and Chairman G eorge C. H udson , Sr. (Mrs. J. B .) S am m ie C. I rvine A lf J. L a w , J r . W illiam D . L eber B aymond B . W itt , J r . Statement of March 7,1960 1 12b Excerpts From Depositions # ^ ^ D r. J ohn W alter L etson , being first du ly sw orn , was exam ined and deposed as fo l lo w s : Direct Examination by Mrs. Motley: D. Mr. Letson, would you state your full name and posi tion for the record, please! A. John Walter Letson, Superintendent of Schools, City of Chattanooga. —4— D. How long have you been the Superintendent! A. Since November 1957. D. Are you one of the defendants in this lawsuit! A. Yes. # # # # # — 21— D. Now you said that you have been here since 1957, I —22— believe! A. Right, D. That’s September 1957! A. November. D. November 1957. Since you have been Superintendent of Schools here has the Board adopted any resolutions relating to integration of schools! A. Yes, the Board has, has issued two statements, if I remember correctly. D. Do you remember when they were issued? A. One last summer. I don’t remember the exact date. It’s a matter of record, however. One was issued this school year, sometime in February, if I remember correctly. D. So you think there are a total of two statements issued by the Board relating to integration? A. Yes, since I have been here. D. We’d like to get the statements at the end. We don’t — 3— 13b need it right now. Now since you have been Superintendent have you worked on any plan or plans for desegregating the schools? A. Yes. D. What are those plans? A. I have been a part of a series of meetings that the Board has held in regard to this problem since, since I ’ve been in Chattanooga. D. You’ve attended a series of meetings? A. Yes. —23— D. With the Board? A. Yes. D. Has any plan been approved or adopted or suggested? A. The Board of Education has, did state its position be fore I came to Chattanooga that established rather clearly its purpose and intention. It did say that it was the inten tion of the Board of Education to comply with the Supreme Court’s decision. In the intervening period of time the Board of Education has been working, and I have been a part of that plan, to, to follow the instructions of the Supreme Court in im plementing that decision. The Board of Education has certainly been in the process of, of elucidating the problem and doing many things to develop a community understanding of the problem and its solution. D. Now let’s see if we can be a little more specific. In addition to announcing an intention to comply with the Supreme Court’s decision, specifically what has the Board done with respect to that intention ? Has it held any public meetings ? Has it published any documents ? Has it devised any plan? Has it studied any plans? A. It certainly has studied plans. It has held a number of meetings. They have not been public meetings. It has proceeded according to a —2 4 - plan in its desire and in its effort to live up to that original statement. Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct 14b D. Well, other than meetings with the Board itself, you’re saying that there have not been any public meetings on this question? A. But there have been a number of private meetings. D. You mean the Board has met privately with persons who are not members of the Board? A. Oh, yes. D. How many such meetings do you think there have been in the last three years? A. It would have to be a guess. It’s a matter of record. I—I would say six, seven, eight. D. Are these community interest groups? A. Yes. D. Citizens groups? A. Yes. D. Now in addition to meetings, has the Board published any documents on this question? That is, in addition to the resolutions which we know we have copies of here, but has the Board put out any informational material for the benefit of the community? A. Not during the three years that I have been here. D. Now specifically, what plans has the Board studied? A. There was a review of the Little Rock plan, Nashville - 2 5 - plan, certainly published materials of general application in regard to this problem have been a matter of interest and concern and information for the Board. D. Has any specific plan been approved? A. Other than that the Board of Education is proceeding according to its plan to develop an acceptance of its original position, which is that it was going to comply with the Supreme Court’s decision. D. Now since this suit has been filed has any plan or change in plan been made? A. No change. A further con sideration of the problem and the steps that the Board has Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct 15b taken and is contemplating taking in the accomplishment of its original position. D. Has the Board discussed this problem with the teachers at these joint meetings that you refer to? A. No, not the Board itself. It has been a subject of some consideration by various groups in the school system. D. Now getting back to this plan that you say the Board adopted, when did the Board adopt this plan, do you recall or do you know? A. I could only speak from the record. It was soon after the original Supreme Court decision, ’54. Mr.Witt: ’Fifty-five. By Mrs. Motley. D. And now in addition to the meetings which you spoke of a moment ago with community interest groups, has the - 2 6 - Board done anything further or additional to implement this plan that you talk about? A. Not to my knowledge. The intention and desire of the Board of Education was to proceed to the limits of time and ability to develop a community understanding of the problem. D. Now in developing this community understanding of the problem, what techniques, specifically, have they been using at these meetings, for example? A. A series of meetings, first with ministerial groups. A discussion meet ing that went into the background of the problem, tried to assess the position of our community in relation to that problem, and attempted to develop an understanding on the part of the people in attendance of what the problem actu ally is and how progress might be made toward the accom plishment of that original position. D. Now in addition to meeting with the ministerial alliance, what other community groups have you met with, Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct 16b specifically? A. A number of informal groups with out specific organizational connection, but groups that the Board felt would be instrumental and informational in helping with this problem. D. What about the Parent Teachers Association? Have you met with them? A. Not as an organization. —27— D. Have any of these meetings involved Negro citizens? A. Yes. D. What Negro citizen groups have you met with? A. The ministerial group, of course, number one. The edu cational group representatives from our own staff and our own administrative staff throughout the school system, and a few other meetings that were, that involved some, both white and colored people, but they were not organizational , in the sense that they had an organizational tie. D. Now what happens at these meetings? Do you have school administrators who’ve had experience in integration to come and speak to the groups ? A. No. D. Or what? A. No. It’s an informal discussion among the members of the Board of Education and those in at tendance on the problem. D. You’ve had no professional assistance, in other words? A. No. D. In the development of this plan? A. No other, no. I think the answer should be no. D. Now as a result of these meetings that the Board has had with respect to its plan, has it arrived at any con clusions, formulated any steps? A. No formal ones that - 2 8 - have, no formal ones that have been placed in writing, other than those public statements that I previously mentioned. I would say that in general the Board came away from most Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct L / } u y 17b Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct of these meetings with, with a clearer understanding of the size of the problem and its difficulty. D. Has the Board studied the possible use of the Ten nessee pupil assignment law? A. Not in detail. It has been a matter of record, of course, and has been a topic of con sideration and discussion on a few occasions. D. But that law hasn’t actually been used here, has it? A. It has not been placed in effect at the present. D. Now since you’ve been the Superintendent, do you know whether the Board has received any petitions from citizen groups to comply with the Supreme Court decision and desegregate the schools? A. Yes, on one occasion. D. When was that? A. Last summer. D. The summer of ’59? A. Yes. D. From whom or from what group did the Board receive such a petition? A. I don’t remember the specific name. I know Mr. Carter was one of the participants. I think Mr. Mapp was also one of the participants. —29— D. We’d like to get a copy of that petition, too. A. Yes. Mr. Craig: You will supply it? The Witness: Yes, we will supply it. By Mrs. Motley: D. Now did the Board ever reply to that petition? A. Yes. That’s one of the statements that— D. One of the public statements? A. Yes. D. That you have ref erred to ? A. Yes. D. Now have any Negro parents ever requested assign ment of their children to the white schools here? A. To my knowledge, not until the present case came into the picture. 18b D. Now this petition that you referred to a moment ago which you said the Board received last summer from Mr. Mapp and Mr. Carter, now Mr. Mapp is one of the Plaintiffs in the lawsuit, I understand? A. Yes. D. Now in that petition did he request at that time that the Board desegregate the schools? A. Yes. D. Or did he request specific assignment of his children? —30— A. As I recall the petition it was a general request that the Board desegregate the schools in Chattanooga. D. Now after that petition, did Mr. Mapp ever request an assignment of his children to a white school? A. Not to my knowledge. D. Did Mr. Mapp ever come to your office and say that he wanted his child assigned to a white school? A. Not until the existing case came into the picture. D. Well, you mean he filed his case and then he came to you and asked for an assignment? A. No. No. He asked for the placement of his child previous to the beginning of this lawsuit. D. Now— A. But that was not following the petition last summer, however. That was the point I was making. D. It was not following the petition? A. It was not immediately following that petition. D. But first he sent a general petition asking for desegre gation. Do I understand you correctly? A. Yes. D. After— A. Which was answered by the Board. D. Which was answered by the Board? A. (Witness inclined his head.) D. Now after that, he came in person to your office? A. Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct D. And requested assignment of his children to a white school? A. Yes. 19b D. Is that correct? A. Yes. D. Now what happened with respect to that request that he made in person? A. It was referred to the Board of Education. D. And what action did the Board take on it? A. The Board issued a statement the following—I’m probably in error. I ’m not sure. I don’t think the Board did issue a statement following that request. D. Did they send him a letter or anything? A. No. D. Did they call him up and tell him anything? A. To my knowledge, no. D. Now in addition to Mr. Mapp, who else among the Negro parents has ever come to your office in person and requested assignment of his or her children to white schools ? A. Reverend Kirnon and Mrs. Maxey. D. Now they appeared also in person in your office? A. Yes. D. And that was after this petition of last summer? A. , Yes. —32— D. Now with respect to this petition which you say Mr. Mapp and Mr. Carter signed, is it possible that that was the summer of ’58 instead of ’59? A. Yes, that’s—yes, I thing it was. It was in ’58. Also let me correct my state ment a moment ag*o. D. Sure. A. There was a statement made by the Board following the request by Mr. Mapp and others to enroll their children. There was a statement issued. D. In writing? A. In writing, issued by the Board, and a copy of it was forwarded to the persons involved. Mr. Witt: You want that? Mrs. Motley: We’d like to get a copy of that state ment. Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct 20b Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct By Mrs. Motley: D. So that your statement now is that Mr. Mapp sent a petition to the Board in 1958? A. Yes. D. Originally? A. Yes. D. The Board issued a statement with respect to that in ’58? A. Yes. D. And then two years later, 1956, he appeared in person —3 3 - in your office, is that right ? A. You mean’60? D. In 1960, I meant to say. A. Yes. I don’t recall the date of that appearance, but it’s a matter of record. D. That was this year? A. Yes. D. Now when Mr. Mapp and Reverend Kirnon and Mrs. Maxey came to your office and requested assignment of their children to a white school, did they have children enrolled in the public school system at that time ? A. Yes. D. Do you know what school their children went to school, what schools their children were enrolled in? A. Orchard Knob, to my knowledge, although I think one was in the group transferred to East Fifth Street by, trans ported to East Fifth Street this year. D. Well, why was this person transported, or a child transported? A. In an effort to relieve an overcrowded situation at the Orchard Knob School, we utilized some space at the East Fifth Street School and the children were transported there. D. Now you say Mr. Mapp and Reverend Kirnon and Mrs. Maxey had children in the Orchard Knob School when they came to your office? A. I ’m not certain. It is my - 3 4 - understanding that they had children in the Chattanooga public schools, and I ’m sure that, that some of those, some 21b of the children involved were at East Fifth Street, al though they were a part of the Orchard Knob School. D. Now. A. For a part of this year. D. Isn’t it that after they came to your office they were transported or transferred to the East Fifth Street School? A. No, that transfer had been made previous to— D. Their coming? A. Previous to their coming. D. And that transfer was made on the basis of the fact that the Orchard Knob School was overcrowded? A. Yes. D. Now isn’t it true that there was a white school called the Glenwood School which was under-enrolled at that time to which they might’ve been assigned? A. The three children, or the children involved could possibly have been assigned in terms of space to the (Kenwood School. D. And is it not a fact that they requested assignment of their children to the Glenwood School? A. Yes. D. And at the time they requested that, there was space —35— there for them? A. Yes, space for the three involved. Not space to relieve the overcrowded situation at Orchard Knob. D. Well, how many under-utilized classrooms did you have in the Glenwood School at that time? A. They aren’t un-utilized classrooms. They are classrooms with an en rollment that could be expanded. D. How many such classrooms would you say? A. Well, I wouldn’t—it would be my guess without looking at the record and the distribution of existing enrollment, that f three or four of those classrooms could accept a few addi tional children without exceeding the desirable level. D. Now their request, the transfer was denied on the basis of race, wasn’t it? A. It was referred to the Board of Education and the Board’s statement answered that request. Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct 22b D. I see. Now at the present time what is the enrollment in the G-lenwood School and what is its capacity, do you know? A. I would prefer to look at the record before giv ing that answer. D. Well, we’d like to get that also at the end. Now when Mr. Mapp and Mrs. Maxey and Reverend Kirnon came to your office, what specifically took place? A. They told, they told me of their desire for their children to be enrolled - 3 6 - in the Glenwood School. I told them that the request would be referred to the Board of Education. D. You didn’t discuss with them the problem that their children were Negro and the schools white? A. (Witness shook his head from side to side.) D. That never occurred to you? A. Not at that occasion, not at that time. D. You made no statement to them regarding the race of their children? A. I ’m not sure that I understand your question. D. Now Mr. Mapp and Reverend Kirnon and Mrs. Maxey are Negroes, are they not? A. Yes. D. As far as you know? A. Yes. D. They came to your office and requested assignment of their children to a white school? A. Yes. D. And you mean this was never discussed that their children were white, or Negro and wanted to go to a white school? A. Well, it was understood and known, of course. I don’t think we particularly discussed it at that particular time. Certainly it was a matter of common knowledge on the part of all of us. D. Now let me ask you this: Normally when a request -—37— for transfer is made, do you normally refer those requests to the Board? A. No. Dr. John Walter Letson—Direct 23b D. What procedure do you follow when you receive a request for transfer? A. We make it normally on the basis of the attendance area in which the children are as signed. There can be exceptions from that attendance only for reasons that are believed to be justified. That decision is normally made by the staff. A handi capped child or for some particular reason that makes it a difficulty for that child to attend the school in that area is taken into consideration as the decision is made. * * # # # —47— M r . W illiam D. L eber, being’ first duly sworn, was examined and deposed as follows: Direct Examination by Mrs. Motley: D. Mr. Leber, would you state your full name? A. William D. Leber, L-e-b-e-r. D. Are you a member of the Board of Education of the' City of Chattanooga? A. Yes. D. How long have you been a member of the Board? A. Since August of 1954. D. Since you’ve been a member of the Board, has the Board adopted any resolutions regarding desegregation of the schools of Chattanooga? A. Yes. D. I ’m going to show you this document and ask you whether you recognize it. A. These are all the statements, aren’t they ? D. The first statement in the booklet which is entitled “Official Statements of the Chattanooga Board of Educa tion on the Supreme Court Decisions of May seventeenth, 1954, and May thirty-first, 1955,” contains a statement dated July twenty-second, 1955. A. Yes. D. And you were a member of the Board at that time? William D. Leber—Direct 24b William D. Leber—Direct A. Yes. D. Now the next statement is dated October twelfth, 1955. Do you see that? A. Yes ma’am. D. And you were a member of the Board at that time ? A. Yes. D. The next statement is dated November fifteenth, 1955, and you were a member of the Board at that time? A. Yes. D. Next statement is dated March thirty-first, 1956. Were you a member of the Board at that time? A. Yes. D. The next statement is dated July ninth, 1958. Were you a member of the Board at that time? A. Yes. D. Final statement is dated March seventh, 1960. Were you a member of the Board at that time? A. Yes. D. Are you familiar with all of these statements? A. Yes, I am. I couldn’t repeat them, I mean. I ’d have to read them. D. Now since July twenty-second, 1955, when the first statement was adopted, would you tell us what the Board has done with respect to integration, specifically? A. Yes. We have attempted to elucidate the community in regard —49— to desegregation. We’ve met with numerous groups, com munity-interest groups; groups that have come to us to talk about the situation since that time. D. Have you done anything other than talk to community- interest groups? A. Nothing specifically except bringing the community to an awareness of the problem, talking vY among ourselves and talking to individuals. Other than J that, nothing specifically except moving the community toward the time of compliance, full compliance. —48— 25b D. At these meetings have there been any professional persons discussing desegregation, how it’s effected, and so forth? A. When you speak of “ professional,” you mean outside professional groups? D. Yes. A. No. D. Now specifically, what problems, if any, were dis cussed at these meetings? A. The change in the customs that this community has observed for a period of a hundred and fifty (150) years, or a hundred (100) years, whatever the time may be; unaccustomed as the people would be to this change, to try to get them to accept the change that will be necessary in full compliance, and that sort of thing. — 50— D. Well, what has the Board done to try to get the com munity to accept the decision. I don’t understand. Specif ically what, what have you done? A. I think specifically what we’ve attempted to do is to get the leadership of the community to bring the community behind the school board, to get them behind the school board. We need, we needed the responsible people of the community to help in this matter, to talk to the people and get them to understand, the people that they may be the leader of. For instance, a min ister of a church or a person that employs a lot of people, for example. A person that’s active in community affairs, that meets with groups of people like civic clubs and one thing and another, to get them to back the school board openly. D. So that since 1955 until the present you have been meeting with community leaders, is that right? A. Yes. D. Now let me call your attention to the second statement dated October twenty-second, 1955, the third paragraph of that statement. It says this: “ It is evident that some people have misunderstood our original statement of policy.” Now it isn’t clear to me from reading this exactly what the Board William D. Leber■—Direct 26b had in mind by “ some people have misunderstood their original policy.” A. You say it’s not clear to you? —51— D. No. What prompted the statement? A. In our orig inal statement, if you notice the first few paragraphs or the first paragraph, in fact, stated that, well, let’s see. It wouldn’t be the first paragraph. Let’s see. “ The Chat tanooga Board, we have come to a decision.” Yes, it is the first paragraph, that we would comply with the decision of the United States Supreme Court on the matter of integra tion of public schools. So many people just read that paragraph, and from that first statement the manner in which the community received it was, well, I don’t know exactly how to explain it, was com pletely to the reversal of the way some of us expected it to be received. It was received with violence, a violent re action, you might say. D. Well. A. Not any violent— D. What violence? A. Not any physical violence, but— so we felt after the first statement— D. Well, what, excuse me. Would you explain what you mean by violence? You say the statement was received with violence? A. Violent reaction. D. Violent— A. I changed that from violence to violent —5 2 - reaction, and I mean the people who were—I’m speaking in my own behalf and not for anyone else—people who were my friends became, they called me names. They—they seemed to be not my friends any more. The groups in which I moved denounced the decision that the school board had made. The community in general was, as I viewed it, was in an uproar over this fact that we’d stated we’d comply, and they William D. Leber-—Direct 27b saw no reason for me having made such a statement, so after that we felt, I felt with the others it was necessary that we make another statement. D. Did any group send any written statements to the Board? A. Yes. D. Opposing the Board’s position? A. Numbers of them. D. Do you have those? A. I— D. In the records ? A. I don’t. I ’m not sure that we have kept those in the record. We received them individually and not as a group. I don’t believe we received them as a group. D. Now I want to direct your attention to the statement of November fifteenth, 1955; it refers here to the establish ment of an Interracial Advisory Committee. Is that com- —53— mittee still in existence? A. No. It hadn’t been discharged but it’s—it hadn’t been active. D. How long has that committee been inactive? A. Since its first meeting. D. And its first meeting was November fifteen? A. Yes. D. Nineteen fifty-five? A. (Witness inclined his head.) D. And that was a public organizational meeting? A. Yes, it was a public, not an organizational meeting. It was a public meeting that this statement was to be read to them, and the purpose of the Interracial Advisory Committee was outlined in that statement. D. Did the committee ever actually meet? A. Yes. They met that night. D. On November fifteenth? A. Yes. D. Nineteen fifty-five? A. Yes. D. Now who was on that committee, do you recall? A. I can’t recall the names, but they were people from all sections of the city, representing all walks of life, and they William D. Leber—Direct fatter u P » 28b William D. Leber—Direct were divided according to the ratio of the division of Negro and white children in the schools. We had about two-thirds white, I think, and one-third —5 4 - Negro on the, on the Interracial Advisory Committee. They were chosen. Do you wish me to read them! D. How many names do you have there! A. I think there’s about thirty-five (35), isn’t there, Raymond! D. Well, we could probably get a copy of that. I don’t think it will be necessary for you to read those names. We’d like to get a copy of that, Mr. Witt. A. Thirty-five I think is right. D. And the thirty-five people on that advisory committee! A. Yes. D. And they have not met since the opening or organiza tional meeting! A. Not as an advisory committee. On that Interracial Advisory Committee there were forty (40) people; twenty-eight (28) white and twelve (12) Negro. D. Now what happened at that first advisory counsel meeting other than the reading of this statement by the chairman! A. If I remember correctly, the chairman didn’t even get to finish his reading of his statement because it, it resulted in a riot, name-calling, almost physical violence, in a general uproar, throwing of stink bombs. It ended in a complete riot, and we feared for the safety of some of the - 5 5 - people on the Interracial Advisory Committee. D. You mean the members of the committee rioted! A. No. D. Or outside the— A. The people attended, outside people. D. Oh, members of the public rioted! A. Yes. 29b D. Is this the reason why there have not been any meet ings since that time? A. With the Interracial Advisory Committee, we felt that, that this, at that time, that this question was so filled with emotion that we could not hold a public meeting where we could discuss it. D. Have you held any private meetings of the advisory committee? A. No. D. Was there any police protection at that first meeting, public meeting of the advisory committee? A. No. We did not anticipate that we would need police protection, and we did not call on the police department. We didn’t, in fact, know that there would be such a large attendance of people present. There was a little notice put in the paper about it. We did not put it there, however, but it was put there, and we didn’t ask for police protection. We weren’t too sure whether, how—whether we could —56— depend on the police or not. We didn’t know whether we needed them or not or whether they’d come or whether they’d send them or what-not, so we just didn’t have any. D. You didn’t know whether you could depend upon the police and you didn’t know whether they would come if you sent for them? Did you ever make any inquiries— A. No. D. —of the police chief? A. As I said, we discussed it but finally decided that we wouldn’t probably need them, and we didn’t ask for them. D. In other words, because of this hostility evidenced at the meeting to your proposal, you just never called your advisory committee again? A. No. That’s right. D. Now that was five years ago? A. Yes. D. Now what’s the reason for not calling the advisory committee now, 1960, five years later? A. From the, on William D. Leber—Direct 30b the basis of which I just stated, that we felt that if we called the advisory committee together it would of necessity have to be a public meeting. When the school board meets it’s supposed to be a public meeting, and as we felt we could not hold these meetings in public, so therefore you might say we went underground and at no time did the school board meet after that as a group in—we met in small - 5 7 - groups and with small, small groups of individuals of com munity-interest people. D. Well, are you saying that you have not had a public meeting of this advisory committee since ’55 because you fear that you could not have a public meeting without this rioting! A. That’s right. D. How do you know that, since you haven’t had any meetings— A. Well now. D. —in five years? A. I, for one, was not willing to attempt it after that first meeting. D. Now do you have anything other than your mere assertion that you could not get the cooperation of the police? A. Do I have? D. At future meetings? A. I didn’t say that. D. Do you have any— A. I didn’t say that for future meetings. I said for that meeting. D. Well, let me ask you this: Has the Board ever at tempted to get the cooperation of the police in connection with any meetings of the Board? A. No, we never. —58— D. On this question? A. No, we never have. D. So that, so that since 1955 the Board has not made any effort to get this, to have a meeting, rather, of this Interracial Advisory Committee? A. No. William D. Leber—Direct 31b D. Let me direct your attention to the statement dated March thirty-first, 1956. The opening statement says “Events in the last year have convinced the Chattanooga Board of Education that the community will not accept any form of integration within the city schools at any time within the near future. We therefore take this opportunity to report to the community our decision to postpone any change in the public schools for a period of at least a few years, probably five years or more.” What investigation or study or survey did the Board make to determine that the community would not accept any form of integration within the city schools at any time in the foreseeable future, and what study or survey did the Board make to determine that it would be at least five years before there could be any integration in the com munity? A. Well, subsequent, or rather after the Inter racial Advisory Committee riot, after our first statement, the community was in such an upheaval according to the people that talked with us individually, according to the number of people that called the school office, according to the pronouncements by people from, I ’d say, even pulpits, - 5 9 - in meetings held by people that were running for office, by the general talk in any group that you happened to be present, and a number of us at that time were very active in civic affairs, going to numerous meetings most every night in the week meeting with different people, and the general upheaval and as it concerned the schools, led us to believe the wisdom of making such a statement. D. Did somebody make a report of this to the Board? Did the Superintendent make a report? A. No. D. In which he documented this? A. We made a report, we talked it ourselves. It was in, every time we got to- William D. Leber—Direct 32b gether it was necessary that we talk about this situation. In fact, if I remember correctly, the school Superintendent at that time could not properly run the schools for trying to answer the questions as to what the school board was going to do the coming year, and so on, and so forth, and it was necessary that we have a time when we could settle the community, if we could, so that we could talk about this matter in a peaceful atmosphere and carry our elucidation problem faster and probably get to a place that we could talk even to our friends about it. D. Now what was the basis for the decision that it would be probably five years or more? A. Of course, that, in our —60— ' own mind we felt that it would take that long for the com munity to settle down, that— D. Well, how did you arrive at the figure five years as opposed to some other figure? A. Well, I don’t know that I could say just exactly why the five years. That we say a period of at least a few years and probably five, on the basis that it would take that long to elucidate the community to even get a semblance of peaceful atmosphere in which to move toward this full compliance that we talked about in the first statement. D. Now it’s been four years, a little more than four years, hasn’t it? A. Yes. D. Since you made this statement? A. (Witness in clined his head.) D. So you think that the Board is now ready to follow its original determination to integrate the schools? A. Well, I—I don’t—I don’t know whether you could say, as you realize, that the school board is an agent of the com munity. We represent both Negro and the white people of this community, and until at least I ’m speaking for my William D. Leber—Direct 33b self now, until I feel that the least harm that can be done to either a Negro child or a white child will be when I ’ll move for full compliance, and until our elucidation process which we’re now in proves to us that we can move with the least harm to education in the City of Chattanooga, that’s —61— when I think we’ll move, or when I ’ll move. Whether it be five years I don’t, I ’m—I couldn’t say. D. Well, how do you measure this! How are you going to be able to tell? A. I think the events of the last sixty (60) days would be a good, or maybe ninety (90) days now, I ’m not sure just how long ago it’s been, would be a good example of whether or not the community’s ready for it or not, if— D. What’s happened in the last ninety days? A. Well. D. Which affects this problem? A. These sit-ins at Kress’s, for example. If one store can create a situation whereby thousands of people milling and fighting and tear ing at one another, if a few sit-ins can cause that what would integration of forty-seven schools be? D. So that what you actually do is to judge by the amount of hostility which you feel is present in the community? A. No. D. Before implementing this plan? A. I wouldn’t say that. Until this time not one person has come, I ’d say, I might take that back, “ one person.” Not more than, not as many as five people have publicly said that this should be done now, and the leadership of the community has not moved behind us. We know that. D. In other words, you are saying that it’s not up to —62— the Board to decide when integration shall take effect, but it’s up to the community to decide? A. No, I didn’t say William D. Leber—Direct 34b that, but after all, we are the agents of the community and if the members of the community could get rid of this Board if they wanted to. D. Is the Board elected or appointed by the Mayor? A. I-—I couldn’t answer that on a yes-or-no question. It’s— the members are selected by a screening committee which is presented to this Board. The Board then nominates and sends to the Mayor and Commissioners, and they appoint. D. Well, it’s a sort of self-perpetuating Board? A. You might call it that. D. Isn’t it? A. Yes. D. And it isn’t elected by the people? A. No. But we, the screening committee is representative of the community. Mr. Witt: The Commissioner of Health. The Witness: Huh? Mr. W itt: The Commissioner of Health. Mr. Meacham: The Commissioner of Health. The Witness: Yes, there’s one exception, the Com missioner of Health and Education who is, by his office, Chairman of the Board. He’s elected by the people. —63— By Mrs. Motley: D. Now since March thirty-first, 1956, when you issued this statement to the effect that integration would not take place at any time in the near future, has the Board done anything other than hold meetings to determine whether there has been a change in the community attitude toward the Board’s policy? A. No, they haven’t done anything except hold meetings and receive, not formal receipt of the community, various groups in the community or various William D. Leber—Direct 35b individuals in the community as talking to individual members of the Board. D. Has the Board made any studies to see to what extent there would be integration or desegregation in the com munity? A. No. Not a formal study, no. D. Has the Board instructed the Superintendent to de vise any plan? A. No. We feel that we have a plan, that we’re in a plan of compliance at the present time. D. Well, what is your plan? A. Elucidation, at the present time. We are— D. By “ elucidation” you mean talking to the community? A. Yes, trying to. D. Trying to win over the community? A. Trying to, yes. D. Now did I understand you to say a few moments ago that not as many as five individuals have requested the - 6 4 - Board to integrate? A. No. D. Recently? A. I didn’t say that. I said not as many as five have publicly stated that they thought— Mr. W itt: White community. The Witness: Huh? Mr. Witt: White community. The Witness: White, white community, of the white community. By Mrs. Motley: D. Now don’t you have some group here known as the Community Relations Counsel composed of white persons which has requested desegregation recently? A. There has been a group. Now as to what the name, I I couldn t definitely say that that was the name, but we have had a William D. Leber—Direct 36b group appear before the Board to request that we inte grate, but there again, they have not made it known to the community that they wished us to integrate. They want us to integrate without—and they, they stay in the background. D. When did they appear before the Board? A. I would say about thirty (30) to forty-five (45) days ago, or maybe it was just previous to this suit. I ’m not quite sure, but I think it— D. And that group is composed of whites, is it? A. Yes. —65— D. Do you know who the chairman is? A. I should know, but I can’t recall his name. Mrs. Irvine: Shavin. By Mrs. Motley: D. They represent more than five people, don’t they? A. I think they do, but now remember I said five. They have not publicly stated. D. Does this statement of theirs appear in the minutes of the Board? A. No. We did not meet as a board. Thej ̂ made no formal request. They just talked to the Board members, they talked to us as individuals in a group. D. Now let me direct your attention to the statement dated July ninth, 1958, and ask you if that’s the statement issued by the Board after Mr. Mapp and Mr. Carter pre sented a petition to the Board asking for desegregation of the schools. A. Yes sir, that’s it. D. Now Mr. Mapp and Mr. Carter are Negro citizens of Chattanooga, aren’t they? A. Yes. I ’m not sure that Mr. Carter is at the present time a citizen of Chattanooga. I think he moved, since moved. D. Now let me direct your attention to the statement William D. Leber—Direct 37b dated March seventh, 1960, and ask yon if that is the state ment issued by the Board in response to the request of Mr. Mapp, Reverend Kirnon, and Mrs. Maxey to have their children assigned to white schools? A. Yes, that’s it. — 66— D. Now what was that statement based on? Did the Board make any survey or study to determine that the demand for total integration is premature? A. It was not made on a formal survey, but again the community arose with the publication of the fact that integration had been asked for, and anyone on this Board was aware of the fact that to do what was asked to be done would bring dire results to the school system of Chattanooga. D. Now. A. And all education. D. How were they aware of that fact? How— A. I beg pardon? D. How was the Board aware of that fact? A. Aware? D. You say everyone on the Board was aware of the fact that to integrate would bring dire results. How were you aware of that fact ? A. By—- D. On March seventh, 1960? A. By people of the com munity talking to individuals, by letters to the editor, by— in the newspapers, the general tone of the community. We —we don’t just stay at home. D. Was there anything other than talk that you went on? Did you go on anything other than people talking? A. —67— What else would you— D. I mean to who talked the loudest? A. What do you have? Like what, for instance, here? Like what? Go on what? D. Did you make any study or survey to determine— A. I said we made no formal study. William, D. Leber—Direct 38b D. Other than this talk ? A. No. D. You just go by what you read in the newspaper? A. No. I said we went by talking with individuals, by groups of people in which we moved, and in that manner. The people where we worked, where I work, and— D. In other words, there’s been no formal determination that integration is premature. This is just informal off-the- cuff community talk, newspaper talk sort of thing? A. I wouldn’t say it was newspaper talk. It’s the actual contact with citizens which, in the movement of our daily lives, both at work and in church and community activity. D. How many newspapers do you have here? A. Two. D. Are they both opposed to the Board’s position? A. I ’m not sure that either one of them are opposed to the Board’s position. D. Has either newspaper supported the Board’s position? A. I think both newspapers have supported the Board’s - 68- position. I—now you, when you—you may be talking about one thing and I may be talking about another. I ’m talking about the situation which we are now in, in compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision. D. Both newspapers have supported your statement that you will comply with the Supreme Court? A. They did not. You didn’t ask me that question. D. I ’m sorry. I guess you misunderstood me. I asked you whether— A. No, they did not support the original statement. Both newspapers did not. D. Did one? A. I think one did, yes. D. And the other opposed? A. Yes. D. Now in addition to the newspaper which opposed your position, do you have a list of organizations or individuals William D. Leber—Direct 39b who opposed your position? A. I haven’t got a written list, but I have it in my mind, as far as I ’m concerned. D. Do you have communications from organizations op posing your position in your files? A. I have had many communications, many communications. D. Are they a part of the official records of the Board? A. No. —69— D. Now since this suit has been filed has the Board made any plan for compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision? A. Again, I wish to state that we feel we are complying with the Supreme Court decision. D. You feel that you are complying with it by talking to people in the community? A. Yes. Elucidation. D. And is that, that’s the extent of your understand ing of the Supreme Court’s decision? A. No. D. That all the school boards have to do is talk to people in the community? A. No. D. And when the people in the community get ready to desegregate the schools the Board should then desegregate the schools? A. No. However, the Supreme Court set down three rules. D. What three rules— A. And made other— D. —are you referring to? A. Elucidation, assessing, and solving. D. Well, you’ve been elucidating. Have you been as sessing the problem? A. We’ve attempted to, yes. I - 7 0 - think we have. I think we’ve assessed it. D. And what is your conclusion? A. That the com munity is not ready for integration. D. And this is based on what? A. On the school board’s assessing of the situation in Chattanooga. William D. Leber—Direct 40b D. Now how did you assess the situation? A. I told you that once before. Talking with groups and moving in the community. D. Oh, I see. Now have you done any solving of the problem? You said the third was solving, I think. A. No, we haven’t solved it. The problem’s still unsolved. I mean the way it—as far as full compliance is con cerned. D. Is there any integration at all in the Chattanooga community in any public facility? A. I—I ’m not sure. D. What about the buses? A. I—I was just fixing to say, unless you were talking about the buses. I think they have taken the signs down off the buses. D. Now has there been any violence in connection with that? A. Well, yes, there has. Not too much, but not— D. Where? A. Not too much. —71— D. Where? A. There’s been— D. Where has there been violence? A. There’s been times when flare-ups have resulted. D. Where? Where? Mr. Meacham: Cutting. The Witness: Huh? Mr. Meacham: Cutting on the bus. The Witness: Cutting and things like that. I couldn’t specify the time or the place, but it has happened. By Mrs. Motley. D. How many times has it happened? A. Well, I— I don’t know. It’s probably happened more than I know William D. Leber—Direct 41b about. Some of those things don’t get in the paper. It’s been in the paper several times. D. Well, if it were a major disturbance it would cer tainly be in the paper, wouldn’t it? A. I believe it would, yes. D. So that there haven’t been any major disturbances in connection with desegregation of the buses, isn’t that true? A. Major, no. D. How long has that been in effect, desegregation of the buses? A. I think that’s been about possibly four years, I think, maybe. I ’m not sure. —72— D. About four years? A. I think so. Or maybe— Mr. Meacham: Eieven (11) years. The Witness: Maybe— Mr. Meacham: Eleven years. The Witness: Huh? Mr. Meacham: Eleven years. Mrs. Motley: Eleven years? The Witness: You mean desegregation? Mr. Meacham: They didn’t pass that ordinance till the 1949 code. Mrs. Motley: Desegregating the buses? Mr. Meacham: The City— The Witness: But they didn’t take those signs down now. Mr. Meacham: The City of Chattanooga has, for your information, has utterly no segregation ordi nance on its books, and has not had since 1949. Mrs. Motley: All segregation ordinances? Mr. Meacham: They were— Mrs. Motley: Have been repealed? William D. Leber—Direct 42b Mr. Meacham: They were omitted and repealed with publication of the 1949 code. Mrs. Motley: I see. Mr. Meacham: It took several years for people —73— to discover that, though. By Mrs. Motley: D. The school board, has the school board ever dis covered that, Mr. Leber! Mr. Meacham: We’ve still got the State laws. D. That the City has no segregation ordinances? A. They still— D. And repealed all of them eleven years ago? A. I wasn’t aware that they were that old, but I knew that they had, that the City of Chattanooga had no ordinances at the present time. D. Has the Board taken that into consideration in its assessment of whether the community is ready for— A. I think it has. * * # # * —74— By Mrs. Motley: D. You heard Doctor Letson’s testimony, did you not? A. Yes. D. Did you hear him testify that he thought the Board had met seven or eight times with these community- interest groups? A. Yes. D. Does that conform with your recollection of the number of times the Board has met in the last— A. Since he’s been here. We met. William D. Leber—Direct 43b D. Oh. A. We met. D. Since he’s been here now? A. We met before he came. D. How many times all told wonld you say the Board has met since 1955 with these groups? A. I—I tell you, that would be a hard thing to say definitely. We would , like—I think we have a record of that. I would judge at least twelve (12) or fourteen (14) times, or maybe —7 5 - more than that, even. D. Do these meetings appear in the minutes, or any record of these— A. No, the Board doesn’t meet offi cially, only small groups. You see, each of us live in different sections of the city, and we’ll take a few of us live in one section will take a group and meet in the homes and talk about the situation. Some of us have conflict ing— D. Do you report to the Board then, as a whole, on your meetings? A. No, we don’t make any formal report. D. Now let me ask you this: Has the Board, as a board, sitting in a board meeting, ever had any meetings with these community-interest groups other than this ad visory counsel? A. Yes. D. When was that? A. Well, I think, I think that the Board was in session. Now it may not have been. We had, we met with a group from Saint Elmo, a Negro group, P. T. A. group. Let’s see. I don’t know. It may’ve been one, one or so other times. The Board was in session, of course, at the time that Mr. Carter and Mr. Mapp made their request, and we were in session when we answered it, and that’s about the extent, I think. D. So that the only time the Board has met in session has been with Negro groups, is that right? A. I ’m not William D. Leber—Direct 44b William D. Leber—Cross —76— sure. I—I am not sure that that, that that is right. My memory doesn’t, I can’t answer that definitely. I). But you can’t recollect any meeting with any white groups when the Board was in session, can you? A. Well, of course we have white groups at all of our meetings, and I ’m not sure that that question has or has not come up at our official meetings. * # # # # Cross Examination by Mr. W itt: X. Mr. Leber, are you a member of a labor union? A. Yes sir. X. Which union ? A. International Typographical Union. X. Do you participate in union affairs? A. Yes sir. X. Would you describe the reaction, as you perceived it, of the organized labor in this community to the school board’s decision of July twenty-second, 1955, to comply with the Supreme Court’s decision? A. Yes. At that time the C. A., A. F. of L., C. I. 0. was not a joint group. I was a member of the A. F. of L. and the Central Labor Union was a body of people where all the A. F. of L. unions had delegates that transacted business for the unions of the area, and in Chattanooga particularly, things that were of interest. —76a— (The following was dictated over the telephone to the reporter by Mr. Raymond Witt on June 9, I960:) “During the noon recess the attorneys all repaired to Judge Darr’s chambers wherein he ruled that the Defendants had the right to examine witnesses following the direct examination of the Defendants 45b by the Plaintiffs’ attorneys, and reserved until a later date the right to assess the cost of such examinations to the proper party. “Attorneys for the Plaintiffs noted their exceptions to Judge Darr’s ruling.” William D. Leber—Cross —77— They had a meeting, they held meetings two times a month, and the first meeting they held after the original decision of the statement that the school board made, a resolution was introduced to the C. L. U., Central Labor Union, praising the school board for its decision to com ply with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Labor World at that time was printed once a week, and in the following issue of the Labor World an editorial was written praising the decision of the school board. There were very few delegates attending that meeting where this resolution was adopted on the strength of, on account of the fact that it was summertime and we do not have such a very good attendance in the summertime. I believe afterwards a count was made of twenty-two people being present. The following meeting, the hall was full. The temper of the delegates were of such nature that they would not allow any other business to be transacted at C. L. U. ex cept to take up this resolution that had been passed by the preceding body. —78— The meeting at that time rescinded the action of the previous meeting, and instead of praising the school board they denounced it and, and said they’d have no part in such 46b an affair and they thought that we were completely out of order in doing what we did. They, at the meeting that’s what took place. Just about what took place. X. Was this a surprise to you? A. It was absolutely. It was a surprise to a number of us who, I knew in my thirty (30) some-odd-years of membership in the union, I felt that if one group of people would support such a decision it would be the labor group, because the parent organization, A. F. of L., for the past twenty-five years in national conventions had passed resolutions saying that integration of the public schools should be a fact, and I thought that, with the integrated meetings of the C. L. U. delegates, with labor working side by side with Negro and white, that a decision to integrate the school system would be accepted but while I am more, my—my connections are more with the labor group and church groups, probably, than any other groups, I have been denounced in labor most violently. In fact, I couldn’t even, up to two years after that decision I couldn’t’ve even been elected chairman of my chapel. In fact, people passing by me at work threw vindictive darts at me, by word of mouth, in the fact that I had a part in this decision. I was very much surprised. —79— X. Did you attend a meeting with a group from the school board and the executive committee of the Central Labor Union at a later date? A. I did. X. Did the executive committee of the Central Labor Union indicate any support for the school board? A. None whatsoever, in that they would openly support the school board in its decision. I think that no support openly would come from it. All of them said that they hoped it wouldn’t happen and offered no visible means of support. William D. Leber—Cross 47b X. Is your union integrated locally? A. We do not have any Negroes in our local union. X. Are there any integrated local labor unions? A. I ’m not sure that I could answer that exactly. I just really don’t know. I know that they have a few Negro delegates to the C. L. C. which is now the combined group of A. F. of L., C. I. 0. at the central labor counsel meetings once a month. Now whether they’re integrated unions, I don’t know. X. In the private meetings that you have testified that the school board has held, would you describe how those meetings were conducted? A. Yes. The manner in which we followed was that the Board would tell the group pres ent what, what they—what the plan was, what the problem was. Would go into the various meetings that the Board —80— had had in discussing the statements that we’d made, why we made them, and I—I think generally that’s about the way that it was, was handled, and— X. Have you met with a group of Methodists, white Methodist ministers? A. Yes. X. Bid this group indicate approval of the school board’s position? A. I ’m not too sure whether they approved the school board’s position or not. They did not say that they would in any way help the school board or in any way publicly support integration or at any time would they mention it in their churches, as they were willing to listen. They were, they patted us on the back for a job well done up to now, hoped we could continue to do a good job, and as far as that was concerned just count them out. X. Bid they offer the Board any support? A. None that I can recall at all. None whatsoever. X. Bid you meet with a group of Presbyterian ministers ? A. I did. William D. Leber—Cross 48b X. Did you meet with a group of Cumberland Presby terian ministers, white? A. I—I believe I was at that meeting, yes. X. Did you meet with a group of Baptist ministers ? A. I believe it was the First Cumberland, First Presbyterian - S i - ministers’ group I did not meet with, and I met with the Baptists. X. Did you meet with a group of Episcopal ministers? A. Yes. X. Did you meet with a group in Mr. Harry Miller’s home? A. Yes. X. Do you consider, do you have any evidence that you can testify to of any progress that has been made toward community acceptance of this decision in recent years ? A. No. In fact, it’s, it’s a little, if you want to use the words, discouraging that the leadership of the community is com pletely devoid of its responsibility in this case, or this problem. No visible support was given. Even some went so far, some preachers even went so far as to say “Before I ’ll bring this up in my church I ’ll have a call in my pocket to another church before I ’ll even mention it.” X. Are you speaking of white ministers? A. White ministers. X. Why do you consider the leadership of the community to be particularly important? A. I think the leadership, the leadership of the community is important in that they are the ones that usually have the pulse of the people in which they move amongst at the tip of their fingers. The preachers. We’ve always felt that they stood for law and —8 2 - order, and I think they do; that they always stood for what’s right and what’s wrong; and I believe they do; but William D. Leber-—Cross 49b yet at the same time in this question of integration or desegregation they just don’t seem to want to, to have any thing to do with it. In fact, a number of them have told me so, that they just were not going to mention it in their church, and that was that, and they just intimated that I just as well quit talking about it, as far as they were concerned. X. Has one of the purposes of these meetings been to encourage, accept, the acceptability, the acceptance of the fact that compliance is inevitable? A. Yes, it has, and I think that, that the elucidation process that we’ve been through has brought the extreme, if you want to use the extremes at both ends to a closer understanding of the prob lem. Maybe in one meeting we might have somebody that would say “Well, why don’t you just go ahead and inte grate?” And then maybe we’d have ten or twelve that would just hold their hands up in holy horror, and with those two extremes I think that we have gotten those that refuse to see, before refused to see the problem to understand it a little bit better. Yet at the same time they seem to want to hold back. They don’t want to get out in front themselves. They don’t want to be known to be identified with it. They want us to - 8 3 - get up on the—and do it and just leave them out of it, and if, if that’s the only way that it can be done. X. Ho you believe there has been an increase in the number of people who believe the decision, compliance is inevitable? A. Yes. X. In recent years? A. I think they have. I think that there’s, that there’s a greater understanding exists at the present time in the City of Chattanooga. I think that, as William D. Leber—Cross 50b an example, there has been some integrated meetings. I was asked previously were there any public meetings and I, maybe I misunderstood the question. I don’t know whether you’d consider some meetings public meetings or not, but take for example at our education counsel we had some integrated meetings. I think the, some groups have met at the Episcopal Church. I think maybe some of the other churches have have had integrated meetings. I don’t think these were meetings for show, just for show. I think they were sincere meetings of the two groups coming together trying to solve their mutual problems in an area in which they’re both interested, and I don’t believe that could’ve happened five years ago, and I think that the school board could be responsible for the understanding and the coming together in a great measure. It may not’ve been entirely, but I think in a great measure that could’ve been. —84— X. How have you found out that more people consider compliance inevitable? A. Well, I think the way I found out is by this elucidation process that we’re in, of meet ing with the people. X. No, I mean how, of your own personal knowledge, from what has happened to you? A. Well, you mean as fas as I move in the labor union, or just personnel on the street, or— X. You’ve made the statement in answer to the ques tion that more people consider compliance to be inevit able. I would like for you to detail the facts upon which you arrived at that conclusion. A. Well, to enumerate them I—I guess I ’d say that I ’ll go to my labor union. William D. Leber—Cross 51b I think that there’s a greater feeling among the member ship of my union, of which there are a hundred and sixty- five (165) in Chattanooga, is that if I go to a meeting I take great part in their plans, that it is inevitable. X. Do they tell you this? A. Yes. Not all of them, but a good many of them do. I think that five years ago they, of course they wouldn’t even speak to me hardly, but now I can be elected, and I am at the present time chairman of my chapel, which shows that the condition is improved. They seem to think that the school board has done a - 8 5 - good job in, in bringing understanding among the races. In my church, I belong to Centenary Methodist Church, which is quite a large church and I ’ve been a member there a long time and I know a number of people there, and in talking to them which there’s a great bull session every Sunday morning on the front of the church, a number have said they don’t like it but it seems to be inevitable, and a number without saying at first have said that it’s inevitable. People that I have never met before and I ’m intro duced as a member of the school board have said that they feel like it’s inevitable, and I believe that that’s the manner in which I ’ve— (breaking off). X. Is it in your opinion, in your understanding of the school board’s position, is the school board waiting for complete agreement of the total community to comply? A. Absolutely not. We know that there could never be complete agreement. I think that I, for one, on the school board member, am waiting until we feel that least harm can be done to the school system and to individuals and the school pupils and teachers and one thing and another William D. Leber—Cross 52b before we move to full compliance. We can never hope to have a hundred percent compliance. X. Have you made any personal efforts on a man-to man basis to convince your acquaintances of the necessity — 86— of compliance? A. Yes, I have. I’ve—-I’ve talked and talked and talked to a number of people and I—just any number. I couldn’t begin to estimate how many people I have talked to. X. Would you say twenty-five (25) ? A. I ’d say more than twenty-five. Maybe I ’ve talked to the same person twice, but I ’d say it was nearer a hundred (100). X. In your opinion has this gradual change toward improvement in the community’s attitude progressed to the point where you think the Board could order imme diate desegregation? A. No, I do not. X. What percentage of the white leadership would you think the Board would have to have supporting it before the Board could move? A. That might be difficult to answer in that, in the churches if we just had one or two white churches of leading white churches with a member ship, of a rather larger membership to come out and say that this is the thing we must do; if a few civic clubs would go on record as saying that this is the thing that must, we must do; if—if we could. I—I don’t know whether you’d call it leadership or not, in politics of the community. When a man can run for county judge and on the basis of sit-in receive fifteen thousand (15,000) votes after he’d been disbarred, dis qualified, held up and we might say even ridiculed to the community for some of the things he’s done, you might consider that the people that vote are the leaders of the William D. Leber—Cross 53b William D. Leber—Redirect - 8 7 - community, and I ’d say that at least we should have a majority of the voters of the community in favor of in tegration. X. You say “ in favor of it.” Do you mean to say ap proving desegregation? A. Approving, yes. Approving some method of desegregating the school system. X. Would you draw any distinction between being, ac cepting the decision or approving it or being resigned to it? A. Yes, I ’d draw a distinction between that. I think that acceptance would not necessarily mean in favor of it. I think that it would mean resigned to it and they would not do violence to the physical set-up of the school system where children could go home in safety, or be in school in safety, without the police or some sort of pro tection being provided for them, and I—I believe that would be resignation rather than complete acceptance on the— (breaking off). X. How many people have told you that they are in favor and urge integration in the white community? A. I—I ’d say less than twenty (20). Mr. Witt: That’s all. Redirect Examination by Mrs. Motley: ED. Now Mr. Leber, in addition to this community hostility that you refer to during the course of your testi- — 88— mony, has the Board relied on anything else in post poning desegregation here? A. I ’m not sure that I get what you mean. Mrs. Motley (to the reporter): Would you read the question back, please? William D. Leber—Redirect (The reporter read the question.) I The Witness: I’m—I’m not too sure that, of course, the hostility of the community and the harm that it could do to the school system as a result of this hostility, causing the deterioration in the type of education that the children, both white and Negro, would receive, if that’s what you mean, yes. The hostility has, is the basis on which I say that has caused me to postpone desegregation. By Mrs. Motley: RD. Now I ’d like to understand your testimony. Is it your testimony that the climate of opinion has improved here in the last five years, or that the climate of opinion has deteriorated! Which is it! A. I would say that the climate, up until a few months ago, we thought or I thought had improved immeasurably. Of course there’s a difference in possibly judging whether or not the climate has im proved by what might happen in private situations like the sit-in or in the school situation, but I believe that more people feel the inevitability of integregation in Chattanooga today than they did five years ago. RD. Now since this suit was filed would you say that —89— there has been an improvement in the attitude of the people, or a deterioration of that attitude! A. I believe that this suit caused some deterioration in the attitudes. I think that, whether I could judge that the attitude of the people was a lasting one or not, for the moment some of them got real mad, some of them that I thought were ready, we’ll say, for integration, and I think it had a stiffening attitude 55b toward some people rather than letting it go on. They thought we were doing— ED. Has this been discussed at the Board meeting, this stiffening attitude1? A. I don’t know that it has been dis cussed officially at our Board meetings. We discussed it, I think, individually. ED. Now let me ask you this: Have you read any of the opinions of the Supreme Court on segregation— A. Yes. ED. —in schools? A. I have. ED. Which ones have you read? A. Well, we have several. I believe I read the Little Eock opinion, and now understand I ’m not a lawyer, and I ’m not sure that I understood the opinion; and I read the Nashville one, I be lieve. Didn’t you supply that? Mr. W itt: That’s the Circuit Court of Appeals. The Witness: Circuit Court of Appeals, and I be- —90— lieve we had some briefs on a case out in Texas, may be Dallas, I belieye. By Mrs. Motley: ED. Did you ever read the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Brown case in May 1955? A. No, I never read that. ED. Did you ever read— A. Oh, well now, no. ED. —the major decision itself? A. Let me take that back. I ’m not sure whether I read that case. Mr. Meacham: That’s the original case. The Witness: Huh? Mr. Meacham: That’s the original case. The Witness: Yes, that’s the original case. Yes. William D. Leber—Redirect 56b William D. Leber—Redirect By Mrs. Motley. ED. There were two decisions in connection with the original case. There was a decision in ’54 in which they announced the principle of segregation in schools as uncon stitutional. Then there was a second opinion in 1955 in which they— A. I think that must’ve been the one I read, that second opinion. ED. Discussed the type of decree to be issued in these cases. Do you remember reading that? A. I think I—I think that ’55 was the one that I read. —91— ED. But you also remember the Little Eock case? A. Yes. ED. And do you remember the Little Eock case, they said that the desegregation plan could not be suspended be cause of the community hostility? A. Yes, but if it’s my understanding of that case, of course, I, not going into it, the school board had ended, I mean they were in a manner of suspension themselves. They weren’t doing anything. We’re working at this case. We’ve got this plan and we’re working at it. We’re not dragging our feet. We don’t want to drag our feet. ED. But you understand that the Supreme Court has said that community hostility cannot suspend or delay implementation of the constitutional principle. You under stand that this question has already been decided by the Supreme Court, don’t you? A. No, I didn’t understand it that way. ED. You don’t understand that the Supreme Court’s al ready ruled on— A. In other words, I was connected jointly. I mean the, the working of the school board with the hostility of the community. The— 57b ED. You don’t understand the Supreme Court’s already ruled that you can’t rely on community hostility as a basis for not moving. You don’t understand that? —92— Mr. Meacham: Well, in one case. The Witness: I—I don’t understand that gener ally, no. By Mrs. Motley: ED. You don’t? A. (Witness shook his head from side to side.) Dr. John Walter Letson— Recalled—Cross Mrs. Motley: Well, we don’t have any further questions. Mr. Witt: I don’t have any further questions. (Further this deponent saith not.) ̂ ̂ ̂ ^ —93— Db. J o h n W alter L etson , recalled, was examined and deposed further as follows: Cross Examination by Mr. W itt: # # # * • —105—AE,w w w w X. Has the Board made any effort, so far as you know, to provide the leadership to secure the understanding of the community to the inevitability of compliance with the Su preme Court’s decision? A. Mr. Witt, I ’d like to say that in my judgment and my—I know in terms of my experience, 58b I have never worked with a group that I felt was any more sincere in its delineation of this problem and in its attack on this problem than has been this Board of Educa tion. I would say that that has been true from the day that it was my privilege to become acquainted with this group up until the present, and I would also like to say that there has never, in any experience that I have had with this Board of Education, been any indication of subterfuge or duplicity in the approach it has made to this question. Mrs. Motley: Excuse me. (To the reporter:) —106— Would you read the previous question? (The reporter read the previous question.) Mrs. Motley: Thank you. The Witness: And in that, in that answer, Mr. Witt, in speaking of the apparent sincerity of this group, I would say that it has certainly attempted to provide the leadership in bringing, helping to bring this community forward in understanding of the complexity and the eventual acceptance of this solution. By Mr. W itt: X. In your analysis of the situation and from your ex perience what importance, importance do you attach to the position of the white leadership of the community in the solution of this problem and eventual compliance? A. Chattanooga has a rather unique problem as compared with most other communities of its size and nature, and that is the relationship with public and private schools that is Dr. John Walter Letson— Recalled—Cross 59b somewhat different from the one you’ll find in the average community. This relationship creates a very definite problem in terms of the financing of public education in Chattanooga. A con siderable portion of the leadership of this community by individual decision is not a part of the public school sys tem in that their children attend private schools. This has had an impact upon the financing of education in Chattanooga, and I think any degree, anything that would — 107— accelerate that process or further that process would make the problem of financing public education in this City even more difficult. X. How would you define community leadership in the sense that you are using the word? A. Those people who, through their influence, have an impact upon the thinking and actions of other people. X. For example? A. Thinking of the owner of a large business, or the manager of a large business, to some de gree, has an influence upon the thinking of his employees. The ownership of the mass media, of course, influences to some degree the thinking of the people. In terms of finances, the people who are best able to provide the re sources are those who would be in leadership positions. X. Would you include any religious group in this leader ship structure? A. Yes, because I certainly think that the leaders, that the pastors are very influential individuals in terms of the thinking of our community and in terms of influence in the thinking of our community. X. Of your own knowledge, do you know of any white pastor who has publicly supported the school board from his pulpit? A. To my knowledge there has been none in Chattanooga. Dr. John Walter Letson—Recalled—Cross 60b X. Of this leadership group that you defined, where did the large percentage of their children attend school? A. The private schools. X. Of your acquaintance, based upon your acquaintance with the community sector or segment of the community leadership, do they support the school hoard’s decision to comply, publicly or privately? A. I would say that it is my very definite opinion that they do not, and I would comment as Mr. Leber did that there is a distinction be tween acquiescence and opposition hut in, in a great ma jority of the cases I would say that there has been and there still is vigorous opposition. There may have been some growth in the acceptance of the inevitability of this change, hut there has been very little growth in the, in the acceptance of it in the sense that it implies approval. # # * * # Redirect Examination by Mrs. Motley: RD. Doctor Letson, in the three years that you’ve been here, do you know of anything other than community hos tility on which the Board has relied to postpone desegrega- —109— tion? A. I know that the Board has been very conscious of what would be the result of, of a move in this direction in terms of its effect upon individual students. ED. And this is the only reason why the Board has not desegregated the schools, because there was this community opposition? A. Community opposition and this related question of, of its effect upon the over-all school system, because the Board has been very conscious of this, of this financial problem and what would be, in its opinion, in- Dr. John Walter Letson—Recalled—Redirect — 108— 61b evitable damage to the educational opportunities that could be provided for all boys and girls if there was an action in this direction before the community had reached a point of general acceptance. # # # # # —113— Ry Mrs. Motley: ED. Now Doctor Letson, how much more time, in your opinion, is going to be needed before the Board can de segregate the schools here in Chattanooga? A. I can’t an swer that question. I would certainly say that it will re quire less time than it, than appeared to be the case when —114— I came to Chattanooga. ED. And as far as you have been able to determine, there are no obstacles to desegregation here in Chattanooga other than this community hostility about which you spoke at great length? A. I would certainly say that there are some additional obstacles that apply to the individual children involved, and I say, I say this as it applies to children of either race: There is no more, no greater tragedy that could happen in the life of any child than to be rejected by his peers and if, if this is accomplished or is done before there is a general readiness on the part of children, school system, the damage that will be done to the individual pupils involved from, from an educational and emotional standpoint will be very great. In the consideration of this Board of Education that, that point has been discussed, it has been considered, and again not limited in terms of race but discussed in terms of Dr. John Walter Letson—Recalled—Redirect 62b our over-all administrative policies for the administration of the school system. It has its implications in many aspects of, of the ad ministration, and it is certainly every educator’s hope that conditions will be such in all of our schools that will be conducive to the maximum growth and development of every child. ED. Well, this supposed rejection of, I suppose you —115— assume Negroes would be rejected by whites, that’s— Mr. Witt: Not necessarily. The Witness: Not necessarily am I saying that, or assuming that. By Mrs. Motley. ED. Or vice versa, you say? A. No, I ’m not saying it either way. I ’m saying that it is certainly an educational problem to be considered in the decision as to whether we proceed in this direction. It may work the other way round. ED. I don’t— A. The Negroes may reject the whites. I mean it works either way, but if it is— ED. Well. A. If it is a fact— ED. All this rejection you’re talking about stems from the segregated pattern, doesn’t it? It’s all based on that, this rejection of people because of color? Isn’t that based on segregation, the fact that they have been set aside? A. To some degree I think you’re right, but I wouldn’t say that it’s the only answer. We have the same problem in our white schools with some children now, and in the Negro schools with some children now. ED. Oh, you already have this problem of rejection on the part of children for other reasons? A. It’s, it’s always Dr. John Walter Letson—Recalled—Redirect 63b a part of education, yes. It’s a basic part of education and —116— a basic problem that— ED. So that this wouldn’t be any new problem to you, then, would it? A. Wouldn’t be new. It would merely be a complication. Mr. Meacham: Acute. By Mrs. Motley: ED. Doctor Letson, I believe you stated during the course of your testimony that all of the meetings of the Board are required to be public meetings? A. All meetings of the Board where there is an action taken. ED. Now this meeting on March seventh, 1960, was that a public meeting at which the Board took action on the ap plication of these Plaintiffs for assignment of their children to school? A. At the time that it was made a matter; of the record and at the time that the Board officially acted upon it, it was a public meeting. ED. Now was March seventh a regular meeting day of the Board when this resolution or statement was adopted? A. I don’t think so. ED. So that the public was not generally aware, was it, that the Board was having a meeting at which action was going to be taken, when this statement was drawn up ? A. It was officially made a part of the record at the regular Board meeting following that, that day. —117— ED. So that when this statement was drawn up it was not a public meeting, was it? A. No, not at the—not at the time that the Board worked on it. At the time that the Board officially adopted it, it was a public meeting. Dr. John Walter Letson—Recalled—Redirect 64b RD. Now isn’t it a fact that this statement was released to the press prior to that official meeting? A. Yes, it was. —120— Dean Petersen—Direct M b . D ean P etersen , b e in g first du ly sw orn , w as exam ined and deposed as fo l lo w s : Direct Examination by Mr. Williams: D. This is Mr. Dean Petersen? A. Right. D. Mr. Petersen, I believe yon are Chairman of the Board of Education of Chattanooga, are you not? A. That’s right. D. Mr. Petersen, are you also the Commissioner of Edu cation of the City of Chattanooga? A. I am. D. Will you explain, if you please, the system of govern ment in the City of Chattanooga? A. The City govern ment of Chattanooga consists of a mayor and four com missioners: Commissioner of Public Works, Streets, and Sewers, one. Commissioner of Fire and Police. Commis sioner of Parks and Playgrounds. And fourth, the Com missioner of Education and Health. That’s my position. And the Mayor is the Chairman and the Fiscal or Finance Commissioner. D. Yes. And this, this Commission sits as a board or counsel? A. That’s right. D. From time to time, does it not? A. That’s right. —121— D. And has the general supervision of all governmental affairs for the City of Chattanooga? A. That is right. D. Yes sir. Now as Chairman of the Board of Educa tion, how long have you been the Chairman of the Board 65b of Education? A. Since April the twentieth, 1959, thirteen months and eleven days. D. Were you— A. Twelve days. D. Were you on the Board prior to that time? A. No, I was not. D. Did you hold any public office prior to that time? A. No. D. Yes sir. A. This is my first public office, yes sir. D. Yes sir. Since you have been Chairman of the Board what plan or plans has the Board formulated to deal with the question of desegregation of the schools? A. Well, as has been stated by the Superintendent and by Mr. Leber, we are in the process of elucidating. D. Yes sir. And by this, and by this you mean this proc ess of meeting privately with what you deem to be respon sible community leaders in an attempt to get them to agree — 122— with the decision? A. To agree. D. Is that correct, sir ? A. Yes. D. Yes sir. A. In substance. D. Yes sir. And except for that, the Board has not con sidered or formulated any plan for compliance with the decision of the Supreme Court relating to segregation in public schools, has it? A. The Board has been in this proc ess of elucidation since I have been on the Board. Of course, I—all I know before April the twentieth, 1959, is hearsay, what they have told me, and of course I have read the statements—• D. You have— A. —that they have made. D. Yes sir. You have read the resolutions, the previous resolutions that were made by the Board, I presume, sir? A. Yes. Dean Petersen—Direct 66b D. Yes sir. And you have attended the Board meetings? A. I have attended— D. And— A. —all of the official Board meetings. D. Yes sir. A. Since I have been a member. D. Yes sir. And you have heard, in the deliberations, — 123— the discussions, as to what progress the Board had made thus far and what it had done? A. Yes. D. And you have never heard in any Board meeting any indication that the Board had done anything further than what you have just testified that it had done and was doing? A. Yes. D. Is that correct, sir? A. That’s right. D. Yes sir. Mr. Petersen, I previously mentioned the Commission, the City Commission, and I believe that you’ve testified that that Commission does handle the govern mental affairs of the City? A. That’s right. D. And as Commissioner of Education and Health you bring your problems to the Commission, the Commissioner, the other Commissioners bring their problems there and you all discuss them together and try to work out on a co operative basis the best program for the government of the City, is that correct, sir? A. That is correct. D. And when you are called upon by some other Commis sioner to perform some function which is related to some thing that he’s doing, you do your best to afford full co operation to the end that the governmental affairs of the - 124- City may be properly integrated and carried out, is that correct, sir? A. If I believe in— D. Yes sir. A. —in what he is proposing, yes. I have a vote which is the same as any other vote. D. Yes sir. Well, in your capacity as Chairman of the Dean Petersen—Direct 67b Board of Education and as Commissioner of Education, if you bad a problem relating to law enforcement in con nection with the schools or with the health department of the City, you would and could call upon the Police Com missioner to take care of that for you and to cooperate with you in carrying it out, would you not, sir? A. We, we expect— D. Yes sir. A. —the Police Commissioner to uphold law and order. D. Yes sir. A. In our City. D. And you would be entitled to that cooperation on the part of the Police Commissioner, would you not, sir? A. That is right. D. Mr. Petersen, you heard the testimony here of Mr. Leber to the effect that the Board was attempting, well, and you have testified yourself that the Board was attempt ing to wait until they could obtain a climate of acceptance of the decision before they took any steps toward it, toward - 1 2 5 - desegregation? A. (Witness inclined his head.) D. Now I will ask you, sir, how much more time is it your opinion that the Board needs before it takes any af firmative steps to comply with the Supreme Court decision? A. I can’t say exactly how many years or months, weeks, or days. I don’t know. D. Well. A. But I do know of the hostile atmosphere, because I have lived in this community for forty-seven (47) years and I think I know the people pretty well. D. Well, you are not a part of that hostile attitude your self, I ’m sure. As a member of the Board you take the position in accordance with this first statement that the Board intends to comply with the law. A. I haven’t— Dean Petersen—Direct 68b D. Do you not, sir? A. I haven’t been accused of being a part of the asmosphere. My record is open. D. Yes sir. A. And has been. D. Mr. Petersen, do you know of anything that the Board has relied on since you have been a member of the Board, other than this hostile attitude on the part of the com munity? A. That is the main thing. — 126— D. Yes sir. A. But it has many facets. D. Yes sir. You’ve considered all, all the facets that you can think of, of the community hostility, but it all comes back to the fact that you just aren’t, you just feel like the people don’t want it, is that it, sir? A. Yes. We—we—-I feel like that. Mr. Williams: Yes sir. Thank you. Thank you, sir. Cross Examination by Mr. Meacham: X. Commissioner, let me clarify a matter or two here. At the outset you related the names of the various Commis sion posts, but I believe the names you gave were the ones under the older law and most of those names have now been changed. As a matter of correcting that, why, the Com missioner of Public Works, Streets, and Airports is the correct name of that department? A. (Witness inclined his head.) X. The Department of Public Utilities, Grounds, and Buildings is the correct name for another department? A. That I called Parks and Playgrounds. X. That was the old name. And the Health and Educa tion is correct? A. (Witness inclined his head.) X. As is Fire and Police? A. Fire and Police. I was Dean Petersen—Cross 69b Dean Petersen—Cross —127— aware of the fact that I wasn’t stating them right, and I thank you for correcting me there. X. Now under the charter of the City of Chattanooga its government is managed by this Board of Commissioners, and under the law is it not true that this Board of Commis sioners can act only throug'h the minutes of its meetings, the action taken reflected in those minutes, and as indi viduals the Commissioners have no power! A. That’s right. Mr. Williams: Well, I, well, that’s all right. Mr. Meacham: It’s just a matter of record. That is the charter law. Mr. Williams: That’s all right. By Mr. Meacham: X. Now Commissioner, does the City Commission of Chattanooga have any control over the public schools! A. The City Commission appropriates the money for the public schools. The City Commission does not attempt in any way to run the public schools from the standpoint of personnel, administration, or anything of that sort. X. Under the charter amendment of 1941 which created the independent school board, the only function that the City Commission has at the present time is to appropriate money for its operation and to confirm nominations of suc cessor Board members, is that correct! A. Right, and to, —128— and to approve property purchases, things of that kind. X. But it has no power or responsibility for the admin istration and operation of the schools! A. That’s in the hands of the Superintendent and his staff. 70b X. And it has no power to make— A. And the Board. X. It has no power to make policy for the management of the schools? A. That’s right. X. That’s vested in the school board? A. That’s in the school board. X. How do you have any powers over the school by virtue of your office as Commissioner of Health, Education and Health, while the Board is not in session? A. I do not. X. Ho you have any power of administration of the schools? A. I do not. X. Your power is entirely as a member and ex-officio Chairman of the Board of Education? A. That is right. X. And I believe you are the odd member and cast a vote only when there’s a tie? A. There isn’t any reason to cast —129— a vote, for me to cast a vote unless there is a tie. X. That’s right, A. I am entitled to cast a vote if I wish. If I wish to express my opinion, I can vote, regardless of what the result is. X. Now Commissioner, prior to the time you entered public life, became a member of the City Commission, what was your occupation? A. I was a principal of Red Bank High School, which is a county high school in one of our adjoining municipalities, township of Red Bank-White Oak. X. Prior to that time had you been in the City educa tional system? A. One time I was Supervisor of Athletics and Physical Training for the City of Chattanooga, and the football coach at the Chattanooga or City High School. X. And prior to that time I believe you taught and coached at Central High School? A. That’s right. X. The large county high school? A. For sixteen (16) years I was coach and teacher at Central High School, Athletic Director. Dean Petersen—Cross 71b X. Now I believe yon were asked about, in your opinion was the Board of Education basing its entire course in this —1 3 0 - matter upon the hostile attitude or atmosphere of the City. Have you been in contact with few or many people who have expressed their position in this matter? A. Mr. Meacham, I have been in contact with a great many people. During my campaign for this office I met a lot of people in all walks of life, of course, and I did not realize until that time that so many people were interested in so many ways in this problem that we’re talking about, but I certainly have run into and I—I hear, as every other member of this Board hears every day of my life, I—I hear people pro and con discussing this problem. Everybody is interested in it, it seems, or most everybody, and we have different shades of opinion about it, different ideas as to what should be done. X. In your opinion is this hostile attitude diminishing to any extent at the present time? A. I think it’s diminishing in some quarters, and I thing the sit-in strikes has intensi fied it in other quarters, and if I may, since you have asked a question or brought up this point, Mr. Williams asked about did I think it was entirely the hostile attitude that motivates the Board in what it’s doing now and what it has been doing, this process we call elucidation, I would like to say that the members of this Board have over and over again in our discussions brought up the fact that they want to do the thing which will not hurt the children of the —1 3 1 - City of Chattanooga, regardless of race. Over and over again that has been mentioned from so many angles, so that I—I would be amiss if I left that out of my testimony here today. X. In your opinion, if there were a hasty step taken to Dean Petersen—Cross 72b integrate the schools immediately, is there any likelihood that the school system here might be destroyed or abolished? A. Well, I—I think it’s possible if the people who furnish the money would not continue to furnish the money. I think that most of our people, regardless, want to see our public schools kept, kept open here. A great many of them do, anyway. Some who would not. X. Now you read the Chattanooga News-Free Press, I assume? A. Yes, I read the Free Press and the Times. X. Are you familiar with the editorial policy of the Chat tanooga News-Free Press with reference to the establish ment of private schools by grants from the state to in dividual pupils? A. Yes, I am. X. Is that part of the atmosphere in this community? A. A segment of it. X. About what percentage of the people of Chattanooga would you indicate the News-Free Press represents or whose opinion they reflect? A. Well, I don’t know that I - 1 3 2 - can do that accurately. I heard a statement just recently to the effect that they, circulation of the Chattanooga Free Press is ten thousand (10,000) more daily than that of the Chattanooga Times at the present. I think that will answer your question maybe in part. X. And did you hear the editor or publisher of that paper say that the policies that he had pursued were de signed to fit the majority of the people here? A. I did. X. Is that part of the atmosphere of this community that certain high and powerful groups are willing to estab lish private schools to the detriment or possible extinction of public schools? A. That was what was said. X. That’s been a published pattern for the last several months, has it not? A. Yes. You might say more than that. Certainly for the last several months. Dean Petersen—Cross 73b X. As to the private schools,— A. Yes. X. ■—of course? A. Yes. X. Desegregation has been a target— A. Right. X. —of that paper for many years? A. Right. —133— X. Now during this period of some thirteen (13) months that you’ve been a member of the Board, the discussions that you’ve had with various public groups and the citizens as a whole that you’ve come in contact with, in your opinion is it possible peacefully, with good order and no damage to the schools, to desegregate them as of this time? A. I —I couldn’t say yes that I believe that at this time. I be lieve that we would have extreme difficulties if we would desegregate completely at this time. X. February of this year, were the police forced to turn fire hoses upon a mob here in the City? A. It was, yes. X. What did that grow out of? A. On our main street. The sit-down. X. In your opinion has that helped or hurt the cause of desegregation here? A. I think it has hurt it more than it has helped it, because— X. Now then. A. Because the police and fire depart ments, of course, were part of the police department at the time, because they did what they did some of our Negro people think that it will be an easy thing to control what ever may happen in case of desegregation, and I think that they are mistaken in that idea. No matter, the police force —1 3 4 - in Chattanooga, as in many other cities in the United States, as is lacking in numbers, we all feel, those who know any thing at all about our government feel that we should have more policemen than we have, and if we should have de segregation, why, it’s quite possible that even though the Dean Petersen—Cross 74b colored people do have great faith now, some of them, in our police department, I doubt that the police department could physically do what they would expect them to do in certain events. X. On this occasion in February I believe that the auxiliary police reserve and firemen were called out to handle the situation? Mr. Williams: I didn’t hear that question. Pardon me. By Mr. Meacham: X. I believe that auxiliary police and firemen were called out in addition to the regular officers to help cope with the situation? A. That’s right, every one available. X. Now I understood you to say, direct examination, that you did not base your opinion that immediate desegre gation could not be had solely on this question of violence or hostility. Do you have any other bases upon which you place that opinion? I believe you’d already mentioned the possible closing or in effect destruction of the school sys tem. A. I said— —135— X. Or anything with reference to the individual pupils? A. I said that it is possible that the schools could be dam aged seriously due to lack of finances that the people of this community or any other community ceased, they don’t believe in what’s going on to the point where they refuse to support them, if they withdraw their children from the schools and send them to private schools that there is a possibility that our public school system would be hurt to the point where it couldn’t function at all as it is fuctioning now, and therefore the children of both races would be severely hurt. Dean Petersen—Cross 75b Now I didn’t, in your question there, I doubt if I got the full implication of what you mean. If you would restate it, why— X. Well, what I was referring to was whether in your opinion hasty and forceable desegregation of the schools might injure some of the pupils either physically or psy chologically? A. Why, certainly, in addition to the phy sical, the emotional, or psychological damage to them would very likely occur to possibly large numbers of the children. I—I believe that. Mr. Meacham: That’s all. Redirect Examination by Mr. Williams: ED. Mr. Petersen, you’ve heard Doctor Letson’s state ment that the Negro population of the school comprises ap- —136— proximately thirty-nine percent of the entire population? A. Yes. ED. Would you say that the Negro population of Nash ville comprises approximately the same percentage of the population, I mean of Chattanooga, comprises approxi mately the same percentage of the population of Chat tanooga? A. Now you’re a little bit mixed up. ED. In other words, I ’m asking you, sir,— A. Start again, please. ED. —if you know what approximately is the percentage of the Negro population in Chattanooga. A. The late, the latest report that we have had has been 39.7. ED. Yes sir. Approximately, that’s— A. That is, in the—in the— ED. In the City proper? A. In the schools, now. Mr. Meacham: Thirty-five (35) in the City. Dean Petersen—Redirect 76b Dean Petersen—Redirect By Mr. Williams: ED. Well, the— A. It’s thirty-five. ED. Then you would say that the population in the City, that the total Negro population in the City is a little less? A. Than— ED. But about the same amount as the Negro population in the schools? A. Well. —137— ED. Yes sir. A. The Negro population in the schools is a little bit more. ED. Yes sir. It’s about a third? A. By some— ED. It’s about a little over a third? A. A little over a third. ED. Yes sir. A. Eight. ED. Now the schools are financed through appropriations which are made by the Board of Commissioners of the City of Nashville, is that not correct, sir? Mrs. Motley: Chattanooga. The Witness: You mean Chattanooga? By Mr. Williams: ED. Of Chattanooga. I ’m sorry. I can’t get away from my home town, Mr. Petersen. A. Most of our money is collected by the county and by the state. Most of our reve nue comes from the state and county. ED. Oh, I see. A. This year the direct appropriation from the City of Chattanooga in round numbers was just a little bit more than six hundred thousand dollars ($600,000). We have two million eight hundred thousand (2,800,000) plus from the county and a little bit less from the state —138— this year for total budget of a little bit more than six mil lion dollars ($6,000,000). 77b ED. Then, then a substantial proportion of your schools, school funds come from the state which has no connection with the City of Nashville except— Mrs. Motley: Chattanooga. The Witness: Chattanooga. By Mr. Williams: ED. City of Chattanooga, except that Chattanooga is a governmental subdivision ? A. That’s right. Of course, we send the money to Nashville. We send the money over there. ED. I guess that’s why I keep mentioning Nashville. A. We send a whole lot more than we get back. ED. Yes sir. A. As every big county does. ED. Well, these funds come from state taxes which are returned to Chattanooga1? A. To Hamilton County and to Chattanooga. ED. Yes sir. A. Yes. ED. And of the funds which are contributed by the City, they are obtained from the taxation of this better than one- third Negro population also, are they not? A. It’s mostly from property owners. ED. Yes sir. A. In Chattanooga. —139— ED. And there are a considerable portion of the Negro people who are property owners, are there not, sir? A. There are— ED. Yes. A. —quite a few. ED. Yes sir. A. I couldn’t tell you the percentage. ED. And— A. I don’t know. ED. And most of these funds which come from state taxation are based on the sales tax, are they not, sir? A. Sales tax. Dean Petersen—Redirect 78b Bean Petersen—Redirect RD. Yes sir. A. Gasoline tax. RD. Which is applicable to the Negro? A. Cigarettes. RD. Yes sir. A. And so on. RD. Now Mr. Petersen, you said that one of your con siderations in connection with this community hostility was that you didn’t want to hurt little children, is that correct, sir? A. That’s right. RD. Yes sir. And if it should he true that thirty-nine percent of the children in your school system are being hurt — 140— then that would and should he a major consideration which the Board ought to take into consideration, should it not, if thirty-nine percent are being hurt by segregation, then that would be a factor that you’d want to take into con sideration, would it not, sir? A. (No audible reply.) RD. Sir? A. I am—I do not admit that— RD. I see. Yes sir. A. -—that that thirty-nine percent of the children are being hurt. RD. Then if you— A. We have good schools. RD. Then— A. For— RD. Then— Mr. Meacham: Let him— Mr. Williams: You— Mr. Meacham: Let him answer. Mr. Williams: Pardon me, sir. Pardon me, sir. By Mr. Williams: RD. Go ahead, sir. A. You might as well say on the other hand that sixty-one percent are being hurt. RD. Yes sir. It would be your opinion that if the schools were integrated that the sixty-one percent who are white — 141— would be hurt then, is that correct, sir? A. Possibly. 79b ED. Yes sir. And then you do disagree with the Supreme Court decision, do you not, sir? A. I do. RD. Yes sir. A. Yes. ED. And as a matter of fact, Mr. Petersen, when you ran for the office, you ran on an opposition to integration plat form, did you not, sir? A. I made the statement that I did not want to see the operation of the schools changed. RD. Yes sir. And that has a part in the part that you have played in the deliberations of the Board since you have been Chairman, the Chairman of the Board in con nection with the action, any action which the Board may have taken or not taken, does it not, sir? Well, what I ’m trying to say is your feeling in that regard as expressed in your platform has had a part to play in the actions which you’ve taken as a member of the Board? A. I have not changed my mind. Mr. Williams: Yes sir. That’s it. That’s all. Recross Examination by Mr. Meacham: EX. You have joined in and agreed with the policy that’s —142— been announced by this Board since you’ve been a member, have you not? A. As to what’s been done by this Board since I ’ve been on it, I—I agree to, yes, the statements that have been made. EX. You take no responsibility, though, for what was done before? A. I cannot take responsibility for what was done before I became a member of the Board. Mr. Meacham: That’s all. (Further this deponent saith not.) * * * * * Bean Petersen—Recross Mrs. Sammie C. Irvine—Direct —143— M bs. S am m ie C. I rvin e , being first duly sworn, was ex amined and deposed as follows: Direct Examination by Mrs. Motley: D. Mrs. Irveen. Mr. Craig: Irvine. D. I ’m sorry. It’s Irvine. A. Irvine. D. Irvine? A. (Witness inclined her head.) D. How long have you been a member of the school board? A. Since it was created in 1941. D. Now I ’m going to ask you to look at the little docu ment, blue-covered document in front of you, which con tains the official statements of the Board of Education on the Supreme Court’s decision, and direct your attention to the statement dated March thirty-first, 1956. A. March? D. Thirty-first. A. Yes. D. Nineteen fifty-six. A. All right. D. Now were you a member of the school board at that time ? A. I was. —144— D. Did you participate in the adoption of this statement? A. I did. D. Now isn’t it a fact that at the time this statement was adopted the Board had actually abandoned its original intention to integrate the schools and had decided to drop the whole matter for a while? A. Not, not changing their minds on our, our plan and what we were going to do. D. Now isn’t it true that the statement itself says that “ Events in the last year have convinced the Board of Education that the community will not accept any form of integration within the City schools at any time within the near future” ? A. Yes. 81b Mrs. Sammie C. Irvine—Cross D. “We therefore take this opportunity to report to the community our decision to postpone any change in the public schools for a period of at least a few years, probably five years or more” ? A. I consider that a postponement, but just still holding to our decision. D. So that on March thirty-fist, 1956, the Board had actu ally postponed its plan to integrate, hadn’t it? A. Well, we realized that the time was not right. D. And this was based upon this community hostility? —145— A. Largely. D. What happened at that meeting and all? A. Yes. D. Is there anything on which the Board relied other than community hostility? A. Well, I can— D. To reach this decision? A. In thinking of it from my own personal point of view, which goes back to the ques tion of hostility, I was—had such an experience of what had formerly been my very close friends socially and whose homes I ’d been in and had been in my home that were just so very much opposed to anything that I was doing. D. So that this decision to postpone was then based upon what your friends had said and the hostility that you had met individually? A. Well, that was the way I would have of judging the feeling of citizens that I knew well. D. And that was the basis of this statement there? A. Well, with all of us. It was a combined statement, of course. D. Yes. A. With all of us. Mrs. Motley: All right. That’s all. Cross Examination by Mr. W itt: —146— X. Just one question, Mrs. Irvine. A. Uh-huh. X. You’ve testified that the community hostility con- 82b cerned you, Mrs. Irvine, but did you not also give primary concern to the results of this community hostility1? A. Oh, yes. X. What results did you foresee? A. Well, we had con tinually, from the beginning, said that we, in our state ments, that we wouldn’t—were determined not to do any thing that would hurt a white child or a colored child and that that, from the—all of the evidence that was coming to me was just what was happening even on, among adults, but it would be a result of our trying to integrate at this time. X. Well then, was your decision then based in the final analysis on your own conception of your responsibility to all the children? A. Indeed. X. It was this responsibility which was your primary consideration? A. That’s right. X. The community hostility merely influenced your judg ment as to this? A. That’s right. # # # * # —148— M r . G e o r g e C. H u d s o n , being first duly sworn, was ex amined and deposed as follows: Direct Examination by Mrs. Motley: D. Mr. Hudson? A. (Witness inclined his head.) D. How long have you been a member of the Board? A. About three years. D. About three years? A. June or July of 1957. D. Now since you have been a member of the Board do you know of anything on which the Board has relied other than community hostility to postpone integration here in George C. Hudson-—Direct 83b Chattanooga? A. All of the things that I ’m familiar with have been mentioned here already. D. I ’m sorry, I can’t hear you. A. All of the things with which I ’m familiar have already been mentioned here. D. You have— A. That is, the.— D. You have nothing to add other than this community hostility as the basis for the postponement? A. I am in fear, which is one of my primary considerations, that it will damage the children involved. —149— D. What will? A. Desegregation. D. How will it damage the children? A. Emotionally by being ostracized, rejected, not accepted. D. How do you know this? A. Well, I ’ve never been in a position of being rejected. D. This is— A. Rejected. D. This is all conjecture on your part. I mean you don’t have any scientific study or survey? A. Oh, no, I ’m not a scientist. D. I mean you just, this is all conjecture, isn’t it, on your part? A. No, not necessarily. D. What is it based on, then, that this will happen? A. It’s based on reading, on sociologists and others with re gard to what happens to people when they’re rejected, not accepted in their group; a knowledge of how I think I would feel under similar circumstances. It’s not scientific, of course. D. What psychologists or sociologists have you read? A. I can’t give you any text. I can’t give you any, the names of any books or any authors on the subject. D. But the Board hasn’t made any study, really, to de- —150— termine the effects of integration or what it might be on George C. Hudson—Direct 84b children here, has it? A. The Board is made up of pro fessional and business people who have very little time to do research in other fields. D. And so that you really don’t know what the effects of integration will be, do you? A. There are a lot, a great many things I don’t know. Mrs. Motley: Do you want to read the question, please ? (The reporter read the last question.) The Witness: Not from personal experience. By Mrs. Motley: D. Now I think you mentioned that you felt that some of the children might be rejected? A. Yes. D. Which group were you referring to? A. I think it could happen in either group, where there’s a large ma jority one way, some small minority in another. D. Have you studied or has your Board studied integra tion in some other communities like Baltimore or Washing ton and other places? A. We have done a great deal of reading on the subject, yes. We have never made trips to those areas to get first-hand information. — 151— D. Has the Board given any consideration in the last three years to the effect of segregation on Negro children that the Supreme Court talked about? A. Well, that’s your whole problem, isn’t it? If I understand your ques tion. Certainly we’ve discussed it. D. Yes. The psychological damage incurred? A. Oh, yes. George C. Hudson—Direct 85b D. You say you’ve discussed it? A. (Witness inclined Ms bead.) D. Now you say the Board has considered the psycho logical damage to Negro children involved. What conclu sion has the Board reached with respect to that? A. We didn’t ever take a vote on it, hut I think there is some unanimity of agreement that any such ostracism on the part of others, one group of school children from another group of school children resolves in an emotional disturb ance to the one who’s been ostracised. D. And this includes the present system of segregation, the Negroes are set aside, the basis of that? A. I ’m in clined to think on the basis of conversations with some of my Negro friends that it occurs not only between white and Negro but between groups of whites and groups of Negroes. Anybody that has, who is different from someone else is going to be withdrawn from, and to some extent ostracised —152— D. So that you’re talking about a problem which is not going to result from integration, but a problem that we have as people, as human beings— A. I— D. •—anyway? A. I think that’s true. I think it’s, it’s a larger problem on, on the differences in race, but the prob lem exists also in cases of foreigners who do not speak English well, who speak broken English, who cannot fit well into the pattern of the group with which they are as sociated. That sort of thing. Mrs. Motley: Well, I think that’s all. Mr. Witt: No questions. Mrs. Motley: Thank you. (Further this deponent saith not.) # # # # # George C. Hudson—Direct 86b Raymond B. Witt—Direct —153— M e . R aymond B. W it t , b e in g first du ly sw orn , w as ex am ined and d eposed as fo l lo w s : Direct Examination by Mr. Craig: D. We bad some discussions leading up to this deposi tion that we’re taking now. That’s true, isn’t it? A. Yes sir. I). I ask you specifically, sir, if you didn’t express to me a sort of fear or apprehension of some untoward inci dent as a result of our taking depositions at all, and speci fically here at this place? A. Mr. Craig, in all of my legal representation of any client I feel that it is my responsi bility to analyze all of the possibilities in any situation and then attempt to be prepared for any eventuality, no matter how remote it may be. This was the sense in which I made this comment to you. D. Yes sir. A. I merely recognized that this was a pos sibility. I). And suggested that maybe some place in the Federal Building would be safer? A. Yes sir, I did. D. I ask you if the other members of the Board, I mean if you got that opinion from other members of the Board or if they had your same fears? A. I think I ’ll have to take complete responsibility for that. —154— D. Now would you or not say that you assessed the situation rightfully or wrongfully? A. Very fortunately I assessed that the possibility was, was remote and it did not occur, thank you, so far. D. Based on that, do you think that maybe your assess ment of the situation as it existed and the possibilities of any hostility on the part of the community might’ve been 87b assessed wrong? A. Of course, Mr. Craig, I realize the in herent weaknesses in any one individual’s assessment of a total community. D. Pardon me, and may I say that I was thinking in terms of the whole Board, the whole Board’s assessment of the situation as it did or might exist under a program that would desegregate the schools prior to this time? A. It is my considered judgment that the present members of this school board have a better evaluation of this total com munity on the question of integration than any other peo ple in the whole world, because of their peculiar position and not because of the ability particularly of any member of the Board or the Board together. It’s merely because of the focal point that they happen to hold in this community, and that in their judgment of this situation they represent virtually thousands of factual situations which to them all add up to their judgment; —155— whether it’s right or wrong, this is the situation. D. But you did decide, and I mean the Board as a whole, after you had this organizational meeting of this Inter racial Advisory Committee, that your assessment of the situation in Chattanooga had been wrong when you made your first announcement? A. When we made our first announcement, if you’re referring to the statement of July the twenty-second, 1955. D. Yes sir. A. The Board’s assessment of the com munity had been of an extremely limited nature, because if you will recall the final, what I refer to as implementa tion decision of the Supreme Court, I believe, was handed down on May thirty-first, 1955, and our statement was given to the public on July twenty-second, which was approxi mately seven and a half weeks later. So the Board had had Raymond B. Witt—Direct 88b Raymond B. Witt—Cross an extremely limited opportunity to assess the community’s reaction to this decision. We live with the continuing knowl edge that our assessment may be completely wrong, but still it must, we are the ones that must make this. Mr. Craig: That’s all, sir. The Witness: Thank you, sir. Cross Examination by Mr. Meacham: X. Mr. Witt, I want to ask one thing here. Isn’t there another factor in this matter that the City at large is losing —156— rapidly its white population, moving into the county, against whom no suit’s been filed? Mrs. Motley: I didn’t hear the end of that. Mr. Meachan: Moving into the county against whom no suit has been filed. Mrs. Motley: Oh. The Witness: Well, based upon the school attend ance data for the current school year, this is cer tainly a reasonable explanation, plus the observation of the development, I mean the west side redevelop ment and the shift in population there, I think it’s safe to assume, of course I could not make a flat statement without a very thorough survey that this is true, but based upon the limited information I have I think it is true, and I think it will prob ably continue. By Mr. Meacham: X. This loss of population naturally is going to result in lowering the revenues of the City of Chattanooga to pro- 89b Raymond B. Witt—Cross vide funds for schools, isn’t it? A. I think that will be true. X. And one reason that these people have moved is be cause of the threat or imminence of integrated schools. Is that part of it? A. That would be— Mr. Craig: His opinion. The Witness: —certainly an opinion that, from my acquaintance with the talking with people in the — 1 5 7 - community, that certainly the vast majority of them would prefer to not be in a situation where their children would go to school with Negro children, and therefore it’s probably that this is part of their decision. X. Well. A. Of course, I— X. Among our adjoining municipalities, are there any Negro citizens in Red Bank-White Oak, to your knowledge? A. I don’t, I can’t answer that question. X. Are there any in East Ridge? A. I can’t answer that question. I don’t think so, but I don’t know. X. Now you were asked about your assessment, and of course you’ve heard testimony today about the. hostile at titude. Did you receive a communication this morning in that vein? A. Unfortunately, yes. I ’m sure it was a crank, but nevertheless I got it. X. Would you care to exhibit that at this time? A. (Witness removed an object from his brief case.) It’s harm less in a sense. (All counsel examined same.) This is, of course, nothing but an annoyance, but it’s a very simple thing for somebody to object to. (Discussion had off the record.) 90b Raymond B. Witt—Redirect X. Back on the record, then. One more question, Mr. Witt. You’ve been on this board for how many years'? —158— A. Since 1953. X. In your opinion, based upon your knowledge of the community atmosphere, feeling, the ingrained, more rea soned customs of the people in this section, is the time ripe for desegregation of the schools at the present moment1? A. No. There’s no, in my opinion, to do it now would be, well, I ’ll say this: It would be—I would not be discharg ing my responsibility, as I see it, to both the white children and the Negro children of this community if I voted to desegregate the schools at the present time. X. Have you been encouraged by the developments, the voluntary public integrated meetings that have been held, the fact that the education and gospel that the school board has been spreading is beginning to take some root? A. This is a two-edged sort of thing. What I call the intel lectual or the mental acceptance of inevitability of com pliance has in my opinion, from what people have said to me voluntarily and otherwise, there has been a marked development or increase in the numbers of people who now have come to the mental acceptance of the fact that it’s inevitable, but the basic tragedy that I see in it is by the same token I see a developing attitude among white peo ple of the intensity of their feelings towards the Negro race which is extremely unfortunate, but it exists. —159— Redirect Examination By Mrs. Motley: RD. Mr. Witt, you’re a lawyer, aren’t you? A. Sup posed to be, yes ma’am. RD. And I assume that you’ve read the Supreme Court’s 91b decisions on school segregation, haven’t you? A. The ma jority of them, yes. ED. Did you read the Supreme Court’s decision of May twenty-four, 1955, the second Brown suit? A. Yes. ED. May thirty-one. A. Yes ma’am. ED. Nineteen fifty-five. A. Yes ma’am. ED. Then you know, don’t you, that the Supreme Court has already ruled that opposition to the principle of non- segregation will not be permitted to set that principle aside, don’t you? A. No. ED. You don’t know that? A. I think you would find that in the law schools that decision of the Supreme Court in the Little Eock case, I believe is what you’re referring to. ED. No, I ’m referring to the decision of May thirty-one, 1955. —160— Mr. Meacham: Brown against Topeka. Mrs. Motley: Brown against Board of Education. Mr. Meacham: Board of Education. The Witness: I am aware of the fact that mere hostility was mentioned, but there was also other phraseology in the decision reconciling public and private interests with all deliberate speed, the eventual, the implementation of constitutional princi ples that are additional factors that require con sideration to the one you mentioned. Of course, I ’m fully aware of— By Mr. Motley: ED. They specifically eliminated community hostility or disagreement— A. I think the— ED. -—with the Supreme Court’s decision. A. I think the word— Raymond B. Witt—Redirect 92b Mr. Meacham: That was the Little Rock case. The Witness: I think the adjective— Mrs. Motley: What? Mr. Meacham: That was the Little Rock case. The Witness: Now wait a minute. I think the word that was used was “mere,” the mere hostility of the community will not be allowed to— By Mrs. Motley: RD. Disagreement with this decision. A. Yes. RD. Is that what they said? A. Yes, the mere disagree- —161— ment will not be allowed to, in effect,— RD. To set aside the principle? A. That’s right. RD. Words to that effect? Mr. Williams: It goes without saying that the mere— The Witness: Disagreement. Mr. Williams: —disagreement with the principles will not be allowed to yield because of disagreement with them. Mrs. Motley: That’s right. The Witness: That’s right. Well, of course,— By Mrs. Motley: RD. That’s all you’ve been talking about, isn’t it, mere disagreement with the decision? A. No. RD. What have you been talking about? A. We’ve been, I think that what the Board has been talking about is the results of this hostility as foreseeable and as the Board is able to prejudge them, and the responsibility that Raymond B. Witt-—Redirect 93b the Board will have to assume for its decision. The hostility is a reality. This Board is acting in a representative capacity. This Board owes a responsibility, a sworn responsibility to all the citizens of this community. Our individual feelings are completely irrelevant in the matter, and we’re attempting —162— as best we know how to discharge our responsibility to the citizens of this community and to the Supreme Court of the United States, and as we see it, the discharge of these re sponsibilities are in basic conflict with each other in this community. ED. You represent the Negroes in this community, or just whites? A. We attempt to represent the Negroes and the whites. ED. What other Board decisions do you have pending approval of the community? You have any other Board de cisions which are resting or pending approval of the com munity? A. Our, our position is not the approval of the community, that we are—we are awaiting the approval of the community. ED. What is your position? A. Our position— ED. That’s what I understood you to say. A. No. Our position is that, as I understand it, is that we must, this Board must have some public tangible support from a sub stantial jDortion of the white community before we can act in such a way as to not harm the school system and the community. ED. Where do you find that in the Supreme Court’s de cision? A. It’s not in there. ED. It isn’t in there? A. In so many words. ED. Is it? A. No. Raymond B. Witt—Redirect — 163— 94b RD. And then in the March 1956 resolution of the Board, were you a member of the Board then? A. I was. RD. When they decided to postpone it for a period of five years because of events of the preceding year? A. Yes. RD. Now those events that are referred to, they’re re ferring to community hostility, aren’t they? A. Yes. RD. And the Board’s postponed its plan dependent, be cause of community hostility, did it not? A. It postponed the physical placing of Negro and white children in the same classroom. It did not in any way postpone or slow down its attempt to make the problem clear to the com munity and try to get community understanding of the problem so that the community then could move toward an acceptance of what we have said from the beginning was inevitable. RD. You mean the plan included the placement of Negro children in white schools? A. No, I do not. I mean, I am distinguishing between, when you use the word “plan” the implication is, as I understand it, that plan means the —1 6 4 - moment when, the time when Negro and white children will be in the same classroom. RD. That’s right. A. Plan, as we see it, is a transition period in which we attempt, the best we know how, with the limited resources we have, to provide the leadership to the thinking community to come to an acceptance of its in evitability. In this community you have had a constant reiteration day after day, “you don’t have to do it, you don’t have to do it,” and we have been attempting to get across to the community that it is inevitable, that it has got to be done, and until the community leadership—we aren’t concerned, we aren’t particularly worried about what some fringe group says, but until the community leadership, the peo- Raymond B. Witt—Redirect 95b pie with whom we associate from day to day and the people that normally or in some instances nsed to be our friends say “We will support you, and we will support you and take the risk,” how can the Board act? Rib. But your plan never included the actual placement of Negroes in the schools? A. Oh, of course. Absolutely. BD. It did or did not? A . This, this will be a step in the plan. The only time we’re, the only thing we’re disagreeing with you on is when. BD. Well, what did you postpone in 1956 when you —165— adopted that resolution? A. There were rumors. BD. Postponing for five years, what did you postpone? A. There were rumors in the community that certain schools would be desegregated or that we would be de segregated and there was a certain—it was creating an atmosphere in the community that was unhealthy, and since we did not think that then was the time to move we decided to tell the community about it in an attempt to lessen the tension in the community and develop a climate in which two people could talk to each other. BD. In other words, what you postponed in 1956 was any intention to place Negroes in white schools, is that right? A. We postponed at that time the time when you would put, that’s right. In other words, he would, we would con tinue with our elucidation plan as we saw it, but the time when any Negro children, any white children would be put together, we said probably five years. We don’t know. BD. So that in 1956 you postponed the time when Negro children would actually be placed into white schools, is that right ? A. I think that’s right. BD. And that postponement was based upon community hostility, wasn’t it, which arose during the previous years, Raymond B. Witt—Redirect Raymond B. Witt—Redirect —166— you said? A. It was based upon community hostility and a balancing of our conflicting responsibilities that we had to balance. ED. That you had to balance? A. That’s right. ED. Now you read the Supreme Court’s decision in the Little Eock case, didn’t you? A. Yes ma’am. ED. And there the school board had postponed a de segregation plan because of community hostility, had it not? A. That’s correct. ED. And the Supreme Court ruled in that case that the school board could not postpone the desegregation plan because of community hostility, didn’t it? A. It did not— Mr. Meachain: I thought they just asked for two and a half years. They didn’t actually postpone it. Mrs. Motley: They wanted to postpone it for two and a half years. Mr. Meacham: Two and a half years, and that’s what they were asking for, but they hadn’t done it. Mrs. Motley: Well, the District Court had granted it. That’s how it got to the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Meacham: They were sued. By Mrs. Motley. ED. So that the answer, the question is the Supreme - 1 6 7 - Court’s already ruled that you can’t postpone any desegre gation plan because of community hostility, hasn’t it? A. In that, no, I don’t think so. Of course, that— ED. What did they rule? A. I think that the law of the Little Eock case before the Supreme Court is that in any 97b situation where the full force of the state government and all the officials of a state are thrown against and contrary to the constitution of the United States as interpreted by the Supreme Court and the entire power of the federal government that there can be no answer but that the state will have to yield, and to me that was the decision in the Little Rock case, and the Little Rock school board was merely caught in between two mammoth forces over which they had no control. ED. And you don’t have that situation in Tennessee, do you, where the whole power of state government is pitted against your effort— A. No, and we’re— ED. —to desegregate? A. We’re thankful that we do not. Mr. Meacham: Yet. The Witness: Yet. Of course, the Legislature meets in January. By Mrs. Motley: ED. But you think that you will probably have it here in the local community, that opposition to your decision? A. —1 6 8 - Well, that’s one thing I don’t think I have to think. I think I know that. ED. And there’s nothing else upon which the Board places this postponement other than community hostility, is there? A. And the results of that community hostility. Mrs. Motley: I think that’s all. Mr. Williams: That’s all. (Further this deponent saith not.) * # * # # Raymond B. Witt—Redirect r \ r \ /^ \ 3 8 No. 14,517 In the Itutpii States! (Emtrl of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit Jam es Jo n ath an M app and D eborah L ’T an y a M app, m inors, by Jam es R . M app, their father and n ext friend; Pless M axey, J r ., a m inor, by his m other and n ext friend, Mrs. Josephine M axey; Kathy K irnon, a m inor, by her father and n ext friend, T h e R everend H . H . K irnon, Plaintiffs-Appellees, vs. T h e B oard of Education of the C ity of Chattanooga, H am ilton C ounty, T ennessee; Dean Petersen, C hairm an of the B oard of Education of the City of Chattanooga; George C. H udson, Sr., Mrs. J . B. Irvine, W illiam D. L eb er, R ay m ond B . W itt, J r ., C orley R . Y oung, and G ordon K ellett, M em bers of the B oard of Education of the C ity of C hatta nooga; and B ennie C arm ichael, Superintendent of Schools of the C ity of Chattanooga, Tennessee, Defendants-Appellants. B R I E F A N D A P P E N D IX F O R A P P E L L A N T S W I T T , G A IT H E R , A B E R N A T H Y , C A L D W E L L & W IL S O N R A Y M O N D B. W I T T , J R . 1234 V olunteer Bldg. Chattanooga 2, Tennessee A ttorneys for T h e Board of Education of the C ity of Chattanooga, H am ilton County, Tennessee. Court Index Press, Inc. — Law Printers — 809 Walnut St. Cincinnati 2, Ohio. S T A T E M E N T O F Q U E S T IO N IN V O L V E D Since the U n ited States Suprem e C o u rt has placed the prim ary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving such varied local school problem s as m ay be in volved in the full im plem entation of the constitutional principles enunciated in B row n , et al v. B oard o f E d u ca tion o f T o p ek a , Kansas> 347 U . S. 483 (1 9 5 4 ), 349 U . S. 294 (1955) upon local school authorities, in this instance, the defendant Chattanooga B oard of Education , w hen such a B oard submits a Plan of D esegregation representing the sum total of its efforts to discharge such responsibility in good faith and in conform ity with the criteria of im ple m entation set forth in the second B row n decision, is not a D istrict C ou rt required to hear such proof as is offered by a defendant B oard in support of its Plan of D esegre gation as a necessary requisite to obtaining the facts upon w hich to m ake the judicial appraisal required of the Dis tric t C o u rt as to w hether the defendant B oard has dis charged the prim ary responsibility placed upon such B oard by the U n ited States Suprem e C ou rt, particularly when the actions and plans of such defendant to be so appraised m ust necessarily involve facts and conditions peculiar to the local com m unity, and finally, req u ire a B oard judgm ent of factors incapable of precise deter m ination? T h e D istrict C o u rt answered this question “ N o ” . A ppellant contends the answer should have been “Yes” . I N D E X Statem ent of Q uestion I n v o lv e d ............................................ i Statem ent of F a c t s ........................................................................... 2 A rgu m en t — P O IN T I — Since the U n ited States Suprem e C o u rt has placed the prim ary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving such varied local problem s as m ay be involved in the full im plem entation of the constitutional principles enunciated in B row n , e t al. v. B oard o f E du cation o f T o p ek a , Kansas, 347 U . S. 483 (19 5 4 ), 349 U.S. 2 9 4 (1955) upon local school authorities, in this instance, the defendant Chattanooga B oard of Edu cation , when such a B oard subm its a Plan of D esegregation representing the sum total of its efforts to discharge such responsibility in good faith and in conform ity w ith the criteria of im ple m entation set forth in the second B row n decision, is not a D istrict C o u rt required to hear such proof as is offered by a defendant B oard in support of its Plan of Desegregation as a necessary requisite to obtaining the facts upon w hich to make the judici al appraisal required of the D istrict C o u rt as to w hether the defendant B oard has discharged the prim ary responsibility placed upon such Board by the U n ited States Suprem e C ou rt, particularly w hen the actions and plans of such defendant to be so appraised m ust necessarily involve facts and conditions peculiar to the local com m unity, and finally, require a B oard judgm ent of factors in capable of precise determ ination? T h e D istrict C ou rt answered this question “N o ”. A ppellant contends the answer should have been “Y es.” .......................................................................................... 7 Relief .......................................... 14 CASES C IT E D Page Brow n, et al. v. B oard of Education of T op ek a, K an sas, 347 U .S. 483 (19 5 4 ), 349 U .S. 2 9 4 (19 5 5 ) . .7 , 8, 10 Kelly v. B oard of Education of the C ity of Nashville, 270 F. 2d 2 09 , Sixth C ircu it (19 5 9 ) at p. 2 2 4 . . 10-11 C ooper v. A aron , 358 U . S. 1, at p. 2 5 .................................. 10 IN D E X T O A P P E N D IX C hronological L ist of R elevant D ocket Entries . . . . la T h e Chattanooga Plan of D e se g re g a tio n ........................ 3a D efendants’ B rief in Support of its Plan of D esegrega tion ....................... ..................................................................... 9a O rder of Ju d ge D arr, D istrict J u d g e .................................. 37a In the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Sixth Circuit N o. 14 ,517 Jam es Jo n ath an M app and D eborah L ’T an y a M app, m inors, by Jam es R . M app, their father and n e x t friend; Pless M axey, J r ., a m inor, by his m other and n ext friend, Mrs. Josephine M axey; Kathy K irnon, a m inor, by h er father and n ext friend, T h e R everend H . H . K irnon, Plaintiffs-Appellees, vs. T h e B oard of E d u cation of the C ity of Chattanooga, H am ilton County, T ennessee; D ean Petersen, C hairm an of the B oard of E ducation of the C ity of C hattanooga; G eorge C . H udson, Sr., Mrs. J . B . Irvine, W illiam D. L eb er, R ay m ond B. W itt, J r ., Corley R . Y oung, and G ordon K ellett, M em bers of the B oard of Education of the C ity of C h atta nooga; and B ennie Carm ichael, Superintendent of Schools of the C ity of Chattanooga, T ennessee, Defendants-Appellants. 2 B R I E F F O R A P P E L L A N T S S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S T h e com plaint in this action was filed in the U nited States D istrict C o u rt for the E astern D istrict of Tennessee, Southern Division, on A p ril 6, 1960, by Jam es R . M app, Mrs. Josephine M axey, and the R everend H . H . K irnon for th eir m in or children invoking jurisdiction pursuant to provisions of T itle 28, U n ited States Code, Section 1343 (3), being a suit in equity authorized by law, T itle 42 , U nited States Code, Section 1983, to be com m enced by any citizen of the U n ited States or o th er person w ithin the jurisdiction thereof, to redress the deprivation under color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom o r usage of a state of rights, privileges, and im m unities secured by the Constitution and laws of the U n ited States. T h e rights, privileges, and im m unities sought to be secured by this action are rights, privileges and im m unities secured by the due process and equal protection clauses of the F o u r teenth A m endm ent of the Constitution of the U n ited States. (A pp’t. A 7 )1 T h is case concerns the racial desegregation of the public schools in the City of Chattanooga. T h is was a proceeding for a perm anent in junction enjoining defendant Board, its m em bers and the Superintendent of Schools of C hatta nooga from continuing the operation of a com pulsory bi-racial school system and for o ther relief. Plaintiffs are all citizens of the U n ited States, State of T ennessee, re siding in Chattanooga, H am ilton County, Tennessee. Plaintiffs are all m em bers of the N egro race. T h e action was brought on their own behalf and on behalf of oth er ' Appellants’ appendix filed with the Circuit Court, No. 14,444, February 21, 1961, at page 7a. 3 Negro children and their parents in the City of Chatta nooga who are similarly situated. The minor plaintiffs are eligible to attend and do presently attend public schools in Chattanooga under the jurisdiction, manage ment, and control of the defendants. Defendants are as set forth in the caption. Plaintiffs contend that the operation of a compulsory bi-racial school system in Chattanooga violates the rights of the plaintiffs and members of their class which are secured to them by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Con stitution. The plaintiffs state that the injury which they and the members of their class suffer as a result of the operation of a compulsory bi-racial school system is irrevocable and will continue to irrevocably injure plaintiffs and their class until enjoined by the Court. The plaintiffs requested a decree enjoining defendants, their agents, employees and successors: (1) from operating a compulsory bi-racial school sys tem in Chattanooga, Hamilton County, Tennessee; (2) from continuing to maintain in a dual scheme or pattern of school zone lines based upon race and color; (3) from assigning pupils to schools in the City of Chattanooga on the basis of the race and color of the pupils; (4) from assigning teachers, principals, and other school personnel to the schools in the City of Chattanooga on the basis of the race and color of the person to be assigned and on the basis of the race and color of the children attending the school to which the personnel are to be assigned; 4 (5) from approving budgets making available funds, approving employee and construction contracts, and approving policies, curricula and programs which are designed to perpetuate or maintain or support a school system operating on a racially segregated basis. (App’t. A 13) In the alternative, plaintiffs prayed that the Court in a decree direct defendants to present a complete plan within a period of time to be determined by the Court, for the reorganization of the entire school system of Chattanooga, Hamilton County, Tennessee, into a unitary non-racial school system. Plaintiffs further asked that the Court re tain jurisdiction pending Court approval and full and complete implementation of defendants’ plan. On April 26, 1960, defendants moved to strike from the plaintiffs’ complaint certain portions thereof with regard to the assignment of school teaching personnel and other personnel on the basis of race or color. Said motion to strike was sustained. Depositions of the defendants were taken on June 1, 1960, by plaintiffs’ attorneys. The answer of defendants was filed on June 7, 1960. (App’t. A 16). Defendants ad mitted the operation of a bi-racial school system and sub mitted that the defendant Board since July 22, 1955, had been actively working with and carrying forward a plan for elucidating, assessing, and ultimately solving with all deliberate speed the problem of achieving a desegregated school system in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Defendants in said answer briefly outlined the actions taken by defend ants in implementing its plan of elucidation. Defendants’ plan submitted that its actions constituted a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance but that in its judgment additional time was necessary. De- 5 fendants also requested the C ou rt to approve its plan for elucidation thereby giving the necessary tim e in w hich to elucidate, reconcile and bring ab ou t acceptance of a plan for desegregation of the school system. O n Ju n e 7, 1960, a m otion for a trial w ith an advisory ju ry was filed by defendants. . O n Ju n e 20, 1960, plaintiffs filed a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent with accom panying affidavits and brief in sfipport of said m otion. (A pp’t. A 35). O n Ju ly 8, 1960, defendants subm itted a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent on the basis that the facts did n ot w ar ran t a class action and that the adm inistrative rem edies under the Tennessee Pupil A ssignm ent Law had not been exhausted by plaintiffs. B rief in support thereof was at tached. (A pp’t. A 55). O n Ju ly 15, 1960, plaintiffs’ reply to defendants’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent was filed along w ith m em orandum of points and authorities in opposition to the m otion. (A pp’t. A 63). O n Ju ly 20, 1960, oral argum ents were heard on the m otions for sum m ary judgm ents and defendants subm itted a brief in opposition to plaintiffs’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent. (A pp’t. A 75). O n O ctober 21, 1960, the D istrict C o u rt filed its m em or andum on said m otions denying defendants’ m otion and granting plaintiffs’ m otion for sum m ary judgm ent and fu rth er d irecting defendants to subm it a plan for desegre gation of the schools of the City of C hattanooga before the 20th day of D ecem ber, 1960, and providing for a hearing on defendants’ plan to be held in the D istrict C ou rt on Jan u ary 9, 1961. (A pp’t. A 97). A n appropriate ord er was filed on N ovem ber 3, 1960. (A pp’t. A 100). A m otion was filed by defendants on N ovem ber 28, 1960, (A pp’t. A 101) for an am endm ent to the order 6 granting a discretionary appeal. A brief in support of said m otion was also filed. (A pp’t. A 102). An ord er denying said m otion was entered on D ecem ber 6, 1960. (A pp’t. 107a). On D ecem ber 2, 1960, defendants filed a notice of appeal in the office of the C lerk of the D istrict C o u rt in C h atta nooga and also filed an appropriate cost bond. (A pp’t. A 116). On D ecem ber 8, 1960, a m otion to stay judgm ent pend ing appeal was filed by defendants. (A pp’t. A 107). O n D ecem ber 13, 1960, plaintiffs filed a m em orandum in opposition to defendants’ m otion to stay judgm ent pending appeal. (A pp’t. A 108). O n D ecem ber 14, 1960, the C ou rt filed a m em orandum on m otion to suspend injunction denying the m otion. (A pp’t. A 112). O n D ecem ber 19, 1960, an appropriate ord er was en tered with regard to the denial of the stay. (A pp’t. A 115). On D ecem ber 20, 1960, the C hattanooga Plan of D e segregation was filed, (p. 3a of appendix). Plaintiff’s objections to said plan and brief in support thereof were filed on D ecem ber 30, 1960. O n Jan u ary 3, 1961, Ju d ge D arr reassigned the hearing to Jan u ary 23, 1961. On Jan u ary 19, 1961, defendants filed a brief in support of th eir Plan of D esegregation as filed, (p. 9a of appendix). O n the date set for the hearing, Ju d g e D arr delivered a m em orandum opinion from the bench in open cou rt p rior to the introduction of any proof, holding that the Plan as subm itted does not m eet the requirem ents of the C ourt. O n Jan u ary 27, 1961, an ord er was entered to said effect and requiring defendants to subm it an alternate plan w ithin sixty days. (p. 37a of appendix). T h ereafter, notice of appeal was properly filed with cost bond. 7 D efendants contend that the D istrict C o u rt com m itted substantial e rro r as follows: In failing to hear proof offered by defendants in support of and justification of the design and stru ctu re of the Plan of Desegregation as subm itted by defend ants, and in disapproving such Plan w ithout hearing such proof. A R G U M E N T P O I N T I Since the U n ited States Suprem e C o u rt has placed the prim ary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving such varied local school problem s as m ay be in volved in the full im plem entation of the constitutional principles enunciated in BROWN, ET A L . v. BOARD OF E D U C A T IO N OF TOPEKA, KANSAS, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), 349 U . S. 294 (1955) upon local school authorities, in this instance, the defendant Chattanooga Board of E d u cation, w hen such a B oard subm its a P lan of D esegregation representing the sum total of its efforts to discharge such responsibility in good faith and in conform ity with the criteria of im plem entation set forth in the second BROWN decision, is not a D istrict C ou rt required to hear such proof as is offered by a defendant B oard in support of its P lan of D esegregation as a necessary requisite to obtaining the facts upon which to m ake the judicial appraisal required of the D istrict C o u rt as to w hether the defendant B oard has discharged the prim ary responsibility placed upon such B oard by the U n ited States Suprem e C ou rt, p articu larly w hen the actions and plans of such defendant to be so appraised m ust necessarily involve facts and conditions peculiar to the local com m unity, and finally, req u ire a 8 Board judgment of factors incapable of precise determin ation? The District Court answered this question “No”. Appellant contends the answer should have been “Yes”. T h e language of the U n ited States Suprem e C o u rt in the second B row n decision is clear and unam biguous as it places prim ary respon sib ility upon local school authorities for elucidating, assessing, and solving the varied local school problem s involved in the full im plem entation of the constitutional principles req u irin g the rem oval of racial discrim ination from a public school system. T h is respon sibility m ust be discharged in good faith. I t is also clear that D istrict C ourts are to make a judicial appraisal of the actions of local school authorities, such as defendant B oard of Edu cation , to determ ine w hether o r n ot such B oard has m et such responsibility in good faith. Is it possible to make such an appraisal w ithout hearing the proof offered by the defendants? T h e Suprem e C ou rt specifically recognized the “com plexities” facing school boards operating bi-racial school systems. (S49 U . S. 294, 299). T h e defendant B oard was presented w ith an awe some responsibility—H ow to rem ove racial discrim ination and also m aintain an efficient school system providing a quality education? If the possible detrim ental im pact upon the school sys tem resulting from the rem oval of racial discrim ination could be disregarded, the problem becam e relatively simple. B u t how could a school board show total disregard for the educational program of all the children of the com m unity, for to provide such a program is its sole reason for existence? H as D efendant B oard acted in good faith in this di lem m a? Has it assumed “the prim ary responsibility” 9 placed upon it by the Suprem e C ourt? (supra, at 299 ). W h at steps did it take to define the “varied local school problem s” (supra, at 29 9 ) involved in the rem oval of racial discrim ination from its school system? Did it make these problem s clear to its com m unity? H ow did it go about assessing and evaluating such problems? A re there problems? A re they of substance? W h a t solutions are proposed? A re the solutions reasonable and practicable? Does the Chattanooga Plan of Desegregation reflect a “facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs”? (supra, at 300). W h at public needs? W h at p ri vate needs? Does the Plan recognize “ the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as prac ticable on a non-discrim inatory basis”? (supra, at 300). H ow did defendants in terp ret “as soon as practicable”? W as this interpretation made in good faith or did defend ants indulge in sophistry? Does the C hattanooga Plan “properly take into account the public interest in the elim ination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective m an n er”? (supra, at 300). Is this the “public interest” in a national sense, o r does it refer to the citizens of Chattanooga, o r a com bination thereof? Does such Plan reflect that com m unity disagreem ent has caused a yielding of the vitality of the constitutional p rin ciples involved? Has defendant B oard given weight to “public and private considerations” in the design and structure of the Plan of Desegregation? (supra, at 300). H ave the defendants carried the burden of establishing that the tim e required by the Plan “is necessary in the public in terest” to carry ou t the ruling in an effective m anner “and is consistent with good faith com pliance at the earliest possible date”? (supra, at 300). 10 H ave the defendants m ade a “constructive use of tim e” and do they propose to do so during the fu rth er period of transition? (C o o p er v. A a ro n , 358 U . S. 1, at 25). Since courts were authorized to consider school adm in istration problem s in m aking this judicial appraisal, was n ot it incum bent upon school officials to carefully analyze such adm inistrative problem s in designing and stru ctu rin g its P lan of D esegregation? D id the defendants concerned perform this function? A nd how thoroughly and carefully? Is not this one elem ent of proof bearing directly upon de fendants’ assum ption of the responsibility placed upon them? Defendants respectfully contend that the D istrict C o u rt com m itted e rro r in refusing defendants th eir day in court. In so doing, the Suprem e C o u rt decisions in the B row n cases were incorrectly in terpreted and applied by said D istrict C ou rt. In view of the ch aracter, quality and com plexity of the factual findings inherent in a judicial appraisal of w hether “the action of school authorities con stitutes good faith im plem entation of the governing constitutional principles” , defendants contend that a Dis tric t C o u rt cannot discharge its judicial responsibility in the instant situation w ithout being provided with all the evidence as to w hat the facts are in C hattanooga, w hat the defendants did and propose to do, and why. (349 U . S. at 299). T h e language of the B row n D ecision s as referred to above, is sufficiently clear that no additional case authority would appear necessary to prove the rightness of defend ants’ resistance to the D istrict C o u rt’s refusal to hear the evidence. T h e following quotations from K elly v. B oard o f E duca tion o f th e C ity o f N ash ville , 270 F. 2d 2 09 , Sixth C ircu it (1959) support this position: 11 “T h erefo re , a con sid era tion o f th e sch oo l p rob lem s confronted by the B oard of E d u cation of the C ity of Nashville, and the so lu tion s arrived at by the B oard, is necessary to a determ ination of the controversy be fore us.” (Em phasis ours) (at 215) “T h e reasons why the school authorities supported this plan and considered it best, under the circu m stances, are pertin en t to the determ ination of the issues before us, inasm uch as the solution of such school problem s is the prim ary responsibility of the local school authorities. Brow n v. B oard of E d u ca tion, supra.” (at 216) “ Cases involving desegregation, like other cases, de pend largely upon the facts. W h ile the law has been stated, perhaps, as definitely as it can be stated at the present tim e, by the Suprem e C ou rt, nevertheless, its application depends upon the facts of each p ar ticu lar case. ‘(Because) of the Sreat variety of local conditions, the form ulation of decrees in these cases presents problem s of considerable com plexity’. Brow n v. B oard of Education , 347 U . S. 4 8 3 , 495 , 74 S. Ct. 686 , 692 , 98 L . Ed. 8 7 3 .” (at 225) T h e clear im port of these quotations is that a D istrict C o u rt m ust hear proof as to the consideration given local school problem s by the local school authorities, as well as the local solutions proposed for these local problem s. T h e C hattanooga Plan of Desegregation is the end result of such considerations, and as such cannot contain its own justification. T h is property is left for the proof to be subm itted. A dditional support for defendants’ contentions that e rro r was com m itted in the refusal to hear proof is found in the following quotations from the case of K elly v . B oard o f E d u ca tion o f th e C ity o f N ash ville , su pra : 12 “ F o r this reason decisions applying the desegregation doctrine in o th er cities or areas w here different condi tions obtain are of little value. L o ca l con d ition s call fo r th e ap p lica tion o f a local rem ed y (Em phasis ours) (at 225 ). “ * * * Because of the n atu re of the problem s and the local conditions, the school authorities often find th at action taken by o th er school districts is inappli cable to the facts w ith w hich they are dealing. * * * T h e public interest m ust be considered along with all the facts and conditions prevalent in the school district. Educational standards should not be low ered .” (Q uoting from a decision by Ju d g e Jo h n J . Park er in B riggs v. E llio tt , D. C ., 132 F . Supp. 776). (at page 226). “ ‘T h ese decisions serve only to dem onstrate that local school problem s are ‘varied ’ as referred to by the Suprem e C o u rt’, and th at w hat w ould be a reasonable am ount of tim e to effect com plete integration in one city or area, m ight be unreasonable in an o th er.” (Q uoting with approval from A a ron v. C o o p er , 243 F . 2d 361 , 363 , E igh th C ircu it), (at page 227). T h e defendant B oard has a “prim ary responsibility” . T h e D istrict C ou rt m ust m ake a “judicial appraisal” . Guide lines for such appraisal have been outlined by the Suprem e C o u rt: “adjusting and reconciling public and private needs” “the public interest in the elim ination of such ob stacles in a systematic and effective m an n er” “giving w eight to these public and private considera tions” “p rom pt and reasonable start” “carry ou t the ruling in an effective m an n er” “consider problem s related to adm inistration” 13 A ll of the criteria req u ire the exercise of judgm ent. D e fendants contend that since the D istrict C o u rt was to m ake its appraisal w ithin such guidelines it followed th at D efend ant B oard m ust also follow such criteria in the process of discharging its prim ary responsibility. W h erev er and w henever the exercise of judgm ent is concerned, the good faith of those exercising such judgm ent is an essential p art of the total circum stances to be appraised. A nd w hen the application of generalized criteria are involved in such judgm ents, specific factual proof as applied to the p ar ticular situation is the only possible foundation for a judicial determ ination of good faith. T h e D efendant B oard exercised judgm ent in the circum stances peculiar to C hattanooga. Unless the D istrict C o u rt is fully advised of the pertin en t facts considered by the C hattanooga B oard of Edu cation , its judicial appraisal w ould be founded on incom plete data. N o oth er conclusion is possible. W ith o u t hearing the facts, the D istrict C o u rt can n ot be in a position to m ake a factual determ ination as to the existence or absence of good faith upon the p art of D e fendant Board. A nd w ithout such determ ination, a ju d i cial appraisal of the judgm ent exercised by such Board, and reflected in its Plan of Desegregation, cannot have a solid foundation. F o r exam ple, it would appear incontrovertible th at D e fendant B oard has an equal responsibility to both white and N egro children insofar as the quality of educational opportunity is concerned w ithin the Chattanooga School System. In an attem p t to m eet this responsibility while effecting a radical change in the school system, D efendant B oard stru ctu red its Plan of D esegregation in such a way as to provide a good educational environm ent in each de segregated classroom. Known or predictable factors con trib u tin g to tension w ithin a classroom were isolated and 14 plans m ade to reduce such to an absolute m inim um . In essence this m eant that a classroom w ould n ot only have to be desegregated b u t integrated if the children in such classrooms were to have equal opportunities for norm al grow th and developm ent. Obviously, the details of such a procedure and the reasons therefor could n ot be in cor porated w ithin the Plan of D esegregation. A nd the Dis tric t C o u rt could not be in a position to m ake a judicial appraisal of this factor w ithout h earing proof on this point. O th er sim ilar judgm ents are reflected in the Plan of D e segregation. D efendants request the opportunity to lay such facts before the C o u rt p rio r to having its Plan of Desegregation approved or disapproved. R E L I E F A ppellants respectfully request that the D istrict C o u rt be directed to provide appellants an opportunity to pre sent proof in support and justification of the design and stru ctu re of its Plan of D esegregation p rio r to the finding of any facts and any decision approving o r disapproving said Plan of D esegregation, and th at such fu rth er relief be granted as the C o u rt m ay deem equitable. R espectfully subm itted, T h e B oard of E ducation of the City of C hattanooga, H am ilton C ounty, T ennessee, et al. R A Y M O N D B. W I T T , J R . Its A ttorney A P P E N D I X CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF RELEVANT DOCKET ENTRIES 1961 1-19 D efendants’ brief in support of its plan of de- segregation, filed. Service of copies m ade by counsel. 1-23 T w o copies of M em orandum , to M r. R aym ond B. W itt, J r ., from B ennie C arm ichael, Supt. of C hattanooga P ublic Schools; 2 copies of R ecord of A ctivities of C h atta nooga B oard of E ducation from M ay 1, 1955 through Jan u ary 11, 1961, and a “Sum m ary of the evidence” de fendants are prepared to subm it as explanation and justifi cation of the Plan of D esegregation as presented by defts, filed. 1- 27 O rder, D arr, D .J ., that Plan of D esegregation does not m eet requirem ents but that it is not presently rejected ; that deft, will file an alternate plan w ithin 60 days; that the righ t of defts. to a reconsideration of the first plan, and the rights of the pltfs. o r defts. to except to present judgm ent is reserved; and that the operation of the in ju n ction is suspended until term ination of the appeal, filed. C . C. 11, p. 348-a. 2 - 10 N otice of A ppeal of the B oard of Education , City of Chattanooga, filed. Service of copies by Clerk to all attorneys of record. 2-10 Cost B ond in the sum of $ 2 5 0 .0 0 filed. 2a In the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT For the Eastern District of Tennessee Southern Division Civil A ction N o. 3564 JA M E S JO N A T H A N M A P P and D E B O R A H L ’T A N Y A M A PP, m inors, by Jam es R . M app, th eir fath er and n ext friend, and P L ESS M A X E Y , J R ., a m inor, by his m oth er and n ext friend, Mrs. Josephine M axey, and K A T H Y K IR N O N , a m inor, by her father and n ext friend, T h e R everend H . H . K irnon, Plaintiffs, vs. T H E B O A R D O F E D U C A T IO N O F T H E C I T Y O F C H A T T A N O O G A , H A M IL T O N C O U N T Y , T E N N E S S E E , a public body corporate, and D E A N P E T E R S E N , C hairm an of the B oard of E ducation of the City of Chattanooga, and G E O R G E C. H U D S O N , SR ., M RS. J . B . IR V IN E , W I L L IA M D. L E B E R , R A Y M O N D B. W I T T , J R ., C O R L E Y R . Y O U N G and G O R D O N K E L L E T T , m em bers of the Board of E ducation of the C ity of C hattanooga, and B E N N IE C A R M IC H A E L , Superintendent of Schools of the C ity of Chattanooga, Tennessee, Defendants. 3a THE CHATTANOOGA PLAN OF DESEGREGATION (Filed D ecem ber 20, 1960.) Pursu an t to the O rder of this C o u rt entered on N ovem ber 3, 1960, defendant B oard of E d u cation of the C ity of C hattanooga and B ennie C arm ichael, Superintendent, do hereby subm it the following plan of desegregation: I. A Policy of Compliance 1. T h e C hattanooga B oard of Education , since 1954, has been keenly aware of the overturn of the long-estab lished doctrine of separate but equal facilities for the races. Its concern has been of both a philosophical and practical nature. A fter the Suprem e C o u rt decision of 1954, the B oard studied the issues of principle involved and, after serious and deeply sincere deliberation, publicly announced its in ten t to com ply with the decision. T h e greatest concerns were in m eeting the requirem ents of the ord er of the C ou rt to assess local conditions, to provide for com m unity-w ide elucidation of the local im ple m entation of the C o u rt’s decision, and to find practical means by which racial discrim ination could be abolished eventually in the Chattanooga City School System w ith the least dam age to the educational process. Shortly after the B oard ’s announced intent to com ply with the Suprem e C o u rt decision, it appointed a biracial advisory council to assist in the task of assessment of local conditions and to elucidate to the com m unity the prob lems of local im plem entation of the C o u rt’s decision. T h e object of the B oard in this action was to seek the solution of these problem s through the public forum , believing that through free, open, full and continuous discussion of the problem , a solution w ould be developed. U n fo r tunately, en tren ch m en t on both sides of the question was so intense that the norm al processes of dem ocracy d eteri orated . In spite of this, the B oard has continued to hold m any m eetings w ith various groups, both form al and in form al, a t w hich the problem has been discussed in depth w ith representative persons, m em bers of both races and at great length. 2. T h ese actions have constituted the B oard ’s first step in a plan of im plem entation of its publicly announced policy of com pliance. T h e B oard herew ith subm its the following and addi tional steps in its plan of desegregation. II. A bolishm ent of Compulsory School Segregation Based U p o n Race 1. Effective w ith the beginning of the school year, 1962- -63, com pulsory school segregation based upon race shall be abolished in selected schools of the Chattanooga Public School System; and students shall be adm itted to these schools in grades one, two and three w ithout regard to race in keeping w ith the procedures outlined in the following sections. In addition, desegregation m ay be effected in certain special program s. T h e elem entary schools to be desegregated for the school year, 1962-63, will be announ ced by O ctober 1, 1961. 2. Beginning w ith each subsequent school year, one additional grade shall be desegregated in these schools, i.e., grade four in Septem ber, 1963, grade five in Septem ber, 1964, etc. T'3. D esegregation will be effected in o th er schools and special program s after the 1962-63 school year according to plans to be subm itted to, and as approved by, the Dis- 4a The Chattanooga Plan of Desegregation The Chattanooga Plan of Desegregation tric t C ou rt, said plans to be consistent w ith the general principles and provisions of these initial steps. III. Establishm ent of a Single System of School Zones 1. T h e C hattanooga B oard of E ducation will conduct and analyze by Septem ber 1, 1961, a com plete school census of the entire City of Chattanooga. 2. O n the basis of the analysis of these data, a plan of single school zones based upon location and size of school buildings and school population w ithout regard to race will be established and announced by O ctob er 1, 1961. 3. T h e full and com plete application of these single zone lines w ithout regard to race is the goal of this plan and shall be achieved through the procedures outlined in Sections IV and V , dealing with the In terim O peration of Present School Zones and Admission to Schools by Single Zones, respectively. IV . T h e In terim O peration of Present School Zones 1. In the period of transition to single zones, children m ay continue the practice of attending schools to w hich they are zoned by existing Board policy. 2. School zones as now established, o r as they m ay be subsequently am ended by the B oard of Education , shall rem ain operative only until such a date as single zone lines are in full and com plete application. V. Adm ission to Schools by Single Zones 1. Beginning with the school year, 1962-63, students in grades one, two and three residing w ithin a new single school zone w hich places the pupil in a different school than the one he would attend under existing zones, may enroll in his new single zone school provided: 5a The Chattanooga Plan of Desegregation (a) said school has been desegregated by the B oard of E d u cation ; and (b) provided parents, guardians, o r those acting in the position of parents of students desiring to enroll in said schools, shall file a w ritten notice of in tent w ith the B oard of Edu cation , at its offi cial headquarters p rio r to Jan u ary 1, 1962 ; and subject to the paragraph im m ediately following. 2. T h e B oard of Education , in accordance w ith exist ing policy, m ay adjust zone lines so as to m aintain sound and efficient organization of individual schools. V I. Privilege of T ran sfer 1. U pon receipt of applications, as provided in existing school board policy, transfer of students in desegregated schools m ay be granted when good cause therefor is shown. 2. T h e following will be regarded as some of the valid reasons of good cause for transfer. (a) W h en a student w ould otherwise be req u ired to attend a school w here the m ajority of students in that school or in his class are of a different race. (b) W h en in the judgm ent of the Board, upon the recom m endation of the superintendent, it is in J T h e best interest of the student, u n der board policy, to transfer him from one school to another. VII. A T im etab le of Im plem entation T h ro u g h a C on tinuing P rogram of Elucidation 1. T h e proper tim ing, continuation of the program of study and elucidation and careful planning and organ ization of the school system are the essence of this plan. T h e Board, superintendent and adm inistrative staff recog- 6a nize and accept responsibilities for the developm ent of full understanding of the plan and its im plem entation — to the schools and classes affected, to the com m unity at large, and particularly to principals, teachers, parents and pupils. 2. M eetings concerning these problem s have already been held by the superintendent and staff w ith all p rin cipals in the system. As the schools to be desegregated are identified, a planned and continuous program of con ferences with the principals and teachers of the schools and classes im m ediately affected will be initiated in ord er to develop a workable, equitable and successful transition to the single zones. 3. U pon the com pletion of the census, and the tentative identification of schools to be desegregated, the Board, superintendent and staff will organize both form al and in form al conferences with the com m unity leaders of the affected schools in ord er to study the application of the plan in each school and to provide data and suggestions w hich m ay help the B oard refine its judgm ents in the final selection of schools to be desegregated. 4. U pon receipt of w ritten notices of in ten t to enroll on the basis of the single zones, the Board, superintendent and staff will initiate' an intensive program of elucidation of the specific plans under way for each school. T h is p ro gram of elucidation will involve specifically the teachers, parents, and pupils of the individual classes to be affected upon the opening of school in 1962-63. C om m unity lead ers will also be invited to join in this program of elucidation, designed to make the transition workable and successful. 5. T h e B oard will exhaust every avenue of com m unica tion with the leaders and citizens of the com m unity at large, in ord er to obtain the im plem entation of this plan 7a The Chattanooga Plan of Desegregation 8a The Chattanooga Plan of Desegregation tow ard the continued m aintenance and im provem ent of the efficiency and effectiveness of the instructional program of the C hattanooga Pu b lic Schools. 6. In subsequent years, the program of elucidation shall be continued in the follow ing schedule: By O ctob er 1 — the publication of any m odification of ex isting a n d /o r single zones, after the analysis of cu rren t census data and discussion w ith com m unities affected. —T h e publication of o th er and additional schools to be desegregated after full analysis of data and dis cussion w ith the com m unities affected. By Jan u ary 1 — Submission of w ritten statem ent of in tent to enroll. From Jan u ary 1 to O pening of School — Program s of elu cidation to the teachers, parents, and pupils involved and to the com m unity at large. iening of School — Im plem entation of zone m odifica tions, desegregation of o th er and additional schools, and admission to schools on single zone basis. T H E C H A T T A N O O G A B O A R D O F E D U C A T IO N — G eorge C. H udson M rs. J . B . Irvine, Sr. G ordon K ellett W illiam D. L eb er R aym ond B. W itt, J r . C orley R . Y ou n g D ean Petersen, C hairm an of the B oard of Education B ennie C arm ichael, Superintendent R A Y M O N D B. W I T T , J R . A ttorney for Defendants (D U L Y C E R T I F I E D ) 9a (C A P T IO N O M IT T E D ) DEFENDANTS’ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS PLAN OF DESEGREGATION I The Principle Issue T h e principle issue in this hearing is w hether o r not the Chattanooga Plan of D esegregation as presented m eas ures up to the criteria outlined by the U n ited States Suprem e C o u rt in B row n v. B oard o f E d u cation o f T o p ek a , 347 U.S. 483 (5-17-54), 349 U.S. 2 9 4 (5-31-55) and as en larged upon by the Suprem e C o u rt in C o o p er v. A a ron , 358 U.S. 1 (9-29-58) and specifically applied by the Sixth C ircu it in K elly v. B oard o f E d u cation o f C ity o f N ash v ille , 270 F. 2d 209 (1 9 5 9 ), cert. den. 361 U.S. 924 . O ther decided cases m ay bear upon the issue involved b u t the above cases are of prim ary im portance. II Criteria of Compliance Defendants subm it that the criteria of com pliance are as follows and that the Chattanooga Plan of D esegregation meets these criteria of com pliance: 1. I t is “a prom pt and reasonable start tow ard full com pliance” . 349 U.S. 294 , 300. 2. I t reflects an adequate consideration by the defend ants “of the com plexities arising from the transition to a system of public education freed from racial discrim ina tion ” . 349 U .S. 2 9 4 , 299 . 3. I t reflects an adequate assum ption by the defendants of the prim ary responsibility for elucidating, assessing and solving the “varied local school problem s”, a solution of 10a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation w hich is necessary for the full im plem entation of the con stitutional principles enunciated by the U . S. Suprem e C ou rt in the B row n Cases. 349 U .S. 294 , 299 . 4. T h e Plan subm itted as well as the o th er acts of the defendants constitute good faith im plem entation of the governing constitutional principles. 349 U .S. 2 9 4 , 300 . 5. T h e C hattanooga Plan reflects a “facility for ad justing and reconciling public and private needs” . 349 U.S. 294 , 300. 6. T h e C hattanooga Plan recognizes “the personal in terest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a non-discrim inatory basis” . 349 U.S. 294 , 300 . 7. T h e Plan “properly takes into account the public interest in the elim ination of such obstacles in a system atic and effective m an n er” . 349 U .S. 2 94 , 300 . 8. T h e Plan reflects that disagreem ent w ith the con stitutional principles has n ot caused a yielding of the vitality of such principles, supra, p. 300 . 9. T h e Plan reflects that w eight has been given to pub lic and private considerations, supra, p. 300. 10. T h e defendants have carried the burden of estab lishing that the tim e required by the Plan is necessary in the public interest to carry ou t the ru lin g in an effective m anner and is consistent w ith good faith com pliance at the earliest practicable date. 11. T h e defendants have adequate plans to m eet the local school problem s and to effectuate a transition to a racially non-discrim inatory school system. 12. T h e Chattanooga Plan will accom plish the transi tion to a school system m aintained on a racially non- discrim inatory basis as soon as reasonably practicable consistent w ith the public interest and the efficient opera tion of the schools. 270 F . 2d 2 0 9 , p. 212 . Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation 13. C om m unity opposition has been taken into account only to m inim ize effects of such upon the efficiency of the schools, supra, p. 212 . 14. D efendant B oard has m ade a “constructive use of tim e” and they do propose to so do during the fu rth er period of transition. 358 U.S. 1, p. 25. III D efendant B oard ’s Basic O bjective T h e C hattanooga Plan of D esegregation represents the com bined best wisdom and judgm ent of the Chattanooga B oard of Education , its Superintendent and adm inistrative staff, as to the m axim u m desegregation presently possible consistent with a m inim um d etrim en t to public education in the com m unity, and at the same tim e providing the best possible base for expanding desegregation in an or derly fashion in the future while im proving the quality of public education in ou r com m unity. T h is has been defendants’ objective consistently since M ay of 1955. Every act has been evaluated as it m ight bear directly o r indirectly upon this objective. T h e defendant B oard does not claim infallible wisdom, nor does it claim that mistakes m ay not have been m ade, n or that mistakes will not be made as the im plem entation of this Plan p ro gresses. B u t defendant B oard does state that it has done the best it knew how to do, in the circum stances in which it found itself. IV What is the Law? In h erent in the C hattanooga Plan is the assum ption that public education is of vital im portance to this com m unity, I. 11a 12a to the children of this com m unity, and to the nation. And fu rther, that the rights of 2 6 ,0 0 0 children are involved. T h e Plan fu rth er assumes that no act should be taken, n or policy adopted, th at could be expected to have a detrim en tal effect upon the quality of educational oppor tunity for the 2 6 ,0 0 0 children. T h e Plan also assumes that racial discrim ination m ust be rem oved from the C hattanooga school system. T h is Plan represents a judgm ent by the defendant C h at tanooga B oard of E d u cation that com plete desegregation instantly w ould result in a severe d etrim en t to the cause of public education in C hattanooga for a substantial period of tim e, and, therefore, com plete desegregation im m edi ately is n ot advisable and is unwise. T h e Chattanooga Plan also assumes that the Suprem e C o u rt decisions in the B row n Cases, supra, do n ot require im m ediate and com plete desegregation in order to com ply w ith the constitutional principles enunciated in the two B row n Cases. Im m ediate and com plete desegregation is n ot the law. T h e Plan also assumes that it is a basic tenant of the constitutional principles referred to in the B row n Cases th at the initial judgm ent on the ex ten t of desegregation possible and practicable in any given com m unity is the prim ary responsibility of the local school authorities; and, fu rther, that this initial group judgm ent by the persons charged w ith the responsibility of operating a school system is entitled to substantial w eight if said school authorities have conducted themselves in a good faith valuation of their circum stances and if the local school authorities are m aking a good faith effort to im plem ent the constitutional principles enunciated in the B row n D ecision s. Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation T h e following quotation from K elly v. B oard o f E duca tion o f th e C ity o f N ash ville , 270 F . 2d 2 09 , Sixth C ircu it (6-17-59) at p. 215 is p ertinent: “ ‘F u ll im plem entation of the constitutional prin ciples involved in this case required (a) solution of varied local school problem s. School authorities have the prim ary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problem s * * * . ’ B row n v. B oard o f E d u ca tion , 349 U .S. 2 94 , 299 . T h erefore , a consid era tion o f the sch oo l p rob lem s co n fron ted by th e B oard o f E d u cation o f th e C ity o f N ash ville , and the solu tion s arrived at by th e B oard , is necessary to a d eterm in ation o f th e con troversy b e fo re u s (Em phasis ours) A gain at p. 216 in the same opinion: “T h e reasons why the school authorities supported this plan and considered it best, under the circum stances, are pertinent to the determ ination of the issues before us, inasm uch as the solution of such school problem s is the prim ary responsibility of the local school authorities. B row n v. B oard o f E duca tion , supra.” T h e n at p. 224 : “ H olding that the appellees had carried the burden of proof of establishing the validity of the School B oard ’s plan, and that it should, therefore, be ap proved, the cou rt, in its opinion, declared that ‘ it is n ot th e business o f th e F ed eral C ou rts to op era te th e p u b lic schools and they should intervene only when it is necessary for the enforcem ent of rights protected by the Federal Constitution. If the judgm ent of the School Board was clearly erroneous, or if it was not supported by the evidence, the C o u rt would be justi fied in finding that the defendants had not carried the burden of proof resting upon them and that the School B oard ’s plan should be disapproved. H ow - 13a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation 14a ever, where in this case, the judgment of the School Board is supported by the clear preponderance of the evidence, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the lawful prerogatives of the legally constituted school authority if the Court should undertake to set its judgment aside and substitute some other plan. A d m ittedly the problem is not susceptible o£ an easy solution. T h e Suprem e C o u rt of the U n ited States has made it clear that adjustm ent m ust be m ade in accordance w ith the exigencies of each case, and that the concept of ‘all deliberate speed’ is a flexible one. For this reason decisions applying the desegregation doctrine in other cities or areas where different condi tions obtain are of little value. L ocal conditions call for the application of a local rem edy.’ ” (Em phasis ours) C ircu it Ju d g e M cA llister in the Nashville Case, supra, at page, 2 26 , includes a quotation from the decision of Ju d ge Jo h n J . Parker in Briggs v. Elliott, 133 F . Supp. 776 , a portion of such quotation w hich is as follows: “ ‘It (the Suprem e C ourt) has not decided that the federal courts are to take over or regulate the public schools of the states * # #.Because of the n ature of the problem s and the local conditions, the school au thorities often find that action taken by o ther school districts is inapplicable to the facts w ith w hich they are dealing # # * . T h e public interest m ust be con sidered along w ith all the facts and conditions preva lent in the school district. Educational standards should n ot be lowered. If the school authorities have acted and are proceeding in good faith, their actions should not be set aside by a co u rt so long as their action is consistent with the ultimate establishment of a nondiscrim inatory school system at the earliest practicable date’ ” (emphasis ours) Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation V P u b lic E ducation Must be Maintained and Efficiently Operated In B row n v. B oard o f E d u cation o f T o p ek a , supra, at p. 493 , the following significent statem ent is set forth: “T od ay, education is perhaps the most im portant function of state and local governm ents. Com pulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both dem onstrate ou r recognition of the im portance of education to ou r dem ocratic society. It is req uired in the perform ance of ou r m ost basic public responsibilities, even service in the arm ed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. T od ay it is a principal instrum ent in awakening the child to cu ltu ral values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust norm ally to his environm ent. In these days, it is doubtful that any child m ay reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, w here the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which m ust be m ade available to all on equal term s.” F rom this, D efendant Board reasons that one of the con stitutional principles enunciated in this case is the im por tance of public education. From this, defendant B oard fu rth er reasons that the m aintenance of an efficient school system providing a quality education is a cardinal prin ciple that m ust be considered in any decision that a local school board may make. T h is requires a local board to make an evaluation of the negative im pact upon a school system resulting from the rem oval of racial discrim ination in some form of desegregation. It implies a balancing of the rights of the com m unity to a continued quality educa 15a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation tional program against the rights of the plaintiffs’ and those sim ilarity situated to have racial discrim ination rem oved com pletely from such school system. D efendant B oard construes the Suprem e C o u rt’s decision to req u ire that this evaluation be m ade by said B oard and D efendant B oard believes th at if it had disregarded the probable or possible im pact upon public education resulting from desegregation that such could be a violation of the p rin ciples enunciated by the Suprem e C o u rt in the B row n decisions. I t is req uired that the im m ediate im plem entation of such constitutional rights in a public school system be balanced against the detrim ental im pact upon public education re sulting from desegregation for deterioration in the quality of public education weakens the rights of the total com m unity. T h e Nashville B oard evaluated the circum stances and factors existent in th eir own com m unity and cam e to the conclusion: “T h a t a sudden o r ab ru p t transition to a desegre gated basis w ould engender adm inistrative problem s of such com plexity and m agnitude as to seriously u n derm ine and im pair the educational system of the city .” K elly v. B oard o f E d u ca tion , 270 F . 2d 2 09 , 6th C ir. (1959). H ere is a specific criteria , th at is, the possible detrim en t to an educational system resulting from desegregation. T h is balancing of incom patible objectives is a responsi bility of a school board. T h e D istrict C o u rt found: “T h a t p rop er school adm inistration requires that the school board take into account the existence of this factor (the drastic ch aracter of the change im posed by desegregation on a school system), n ot to 16a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation 17a accede to hostility or placate the opponents of de segregation, but in order to m inim ize the effects of such opposition upon the efficiency of the schools * # *_>> K elly v. B oard o f E d u ca tion , supra, p. 224 . B oth the N egro and white children in the com m unity have a vital interest in the quality of educational oppor tunity afforded to them . T h is vital interest is shared by th eir parents and the com m unity in general, as well as the nation. T h a t desegregation in Chattanooga will have a detrim en tal effect upon the quality of the educational program is a certainty. T h e local B oard m ust evaluate w ithin its judgm ent in good faith, (1) the possible d etri m ental im pact upon public education resulting from vari ous degrees of desegregation against (2) the constitutional rig h t of plaintiffs and those sim ilarly situated to the full benefit of their constitutional rights. T h e solution to such balancing of rights is a com prom ise w hich results in a m inim um detrim en t to public education w ith the m axi m um exten t of desegregation, based upon a good faith evaluation of all factors existing in C hattanooga pertinent to such decision. VI During the Transition Period the Rights of Negroes are Qualified T h e principal difficulty arises from different in terp reta tions of the significance of the Suprem e C o u rt’s decisions in the two B row n Cases, supra. I t is apparently plaintiffs’ position that the law is that a N egro now has an unqualified righ t to be adm itted to schools on a racially non-discrim ina- tory basis. I t is defendant Board of E d u cation ’s position that a N egro under such circum stances does not have an unqualified right. Such righ t is qualified by the language of the S econd B row n decision, supra, and also by the Defendants’ Brief in Supp&rt of Its Flan of Desegregation decision of the Sixth C ircu it in the Nashville case. K elly v. Board o f Education o f the C ity o f N a sh ville , supra. T h ese two decisions and the K elly decision m ean th at a N egro has a righ t to be adm itted on a racially non-dis- crim inatory basis if his admission is consistent w ith the continued efficient operation of the school system to w hich he is being adm itted. U n d er one interp retation , carried to its extrem e, a board of education has no responsibility to take into consideration the com m unity resistance to desegregation; and if to desegregate w ould m ean, in the best judgm ent of the board concerned, th at said school system w ould be destroyed and done away w ith, then this w ould n ot be a legally valid reason for refusing admission to a N egro child. W h at legal grounds are there for the defendant B oard ’s position that this righ t is a qualified right? In the first Brown decision, 347 U .S . 4 8 3 , at p. 4 9 3 , after the recitation by the co u rt of the facts and the sum m ary of the points brou gh t ou t by the plaintiffs and defendants, and p rior to any specific reference to the n atu re of its decision, the C o u rt stressed the im portance of public education to the nation in a ra th er lengthy paragraph. T h is raises the question: Is the im m ediate granting of rights to a N egro of sufficient im portance that such should be granted in- stanter, com pletely disregarding the effect of such adm is sion upon a school system? If the Suprem e C o u rt m eant to disregard such possible effect or any consideration th ere of, then a N egro does have an unqualified right. O th er wise, such right is qualified in some m anner. T h e exact and precise natu re of the various qualifications will be left to later consideration herein. In the first Brown decision, supra, at p. 4 9 5 , the C ou rt said that: “ * * * the form ulation of decrees in these cases presents problem s of considerable com p lexity .” If 18a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation the righ t of the N egroes was unqualified, then there w ould have been no necessity of considering any com plexities that the C ou rt referred to in the language quoted above. A consideration of the com plexities was necessary according to the C ou rt preparatory and prelim inary to the form ulation of decrees effectuating the righ t that the N egroes m ight have. It is defendants’ contention that the bare declaration of a right is of no substance w ithout the rem edy that effectuates that right and therefore the rem edy and the righ t are m erged and the n ature of the rem edy necessarily qualifies the right, or at least the tim e w hen, and the circum stances under which, the righ t will be fully m atured to the benefit of Negroes. T h is is a prac tical m atter. T h e n ext pronouncem ent by the Suprem e C o u rt was M ay 31, 1955, in B row n , et al. v. B oard o f E d u cation o f T o p ek a , 349 U.S. 294 . T h e last sentence in the first para graph of this decision gives the substance of this decision when the cou rt said: “ there rem ains for consideration the m anner in w hich relief is to be accorded.” T h e n at page 299 there is the following: “T hese presentations were inform ative and helpful to the C ou rt in its consideration of the com plexities arising from the transition to a system of public edu cation freed of racial discrim ination.” Of w hat significance is the word “transition”? I t certainly implies that im m ediate rem oval of racial discrim ination is n ot possible in public education and that there m ust be an interim period of some tim e, varied according to local ities concerned, in which there will continue to be racial discrim ination. By inference such approves the continua tion of racial discrim ination to some degree and for some period of tim e. T h e C ourt speaks of an eventual rem oval 19a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation of all racial discrim ination as a goal to be attained at some point in the future. I t certainly follows that if such re m oval of racial discrim ination is a goal, that u n til the tim e that goal is reached there will be racial discrim ination. A nd if there is racial discrim ination it necessarily means th at certain N egroes will not have an unqualified righ t to admission to schools on a non-racial basis. O n the same page the C o u rt refers to the “solution of varied local school problem s” . I t goes on to place the responsibility on school authorities “for elucidating, assess ing and solving these problem s” . I t fu rth er states th at the local courts will have to m ake the determ ination as to w hether o r n ot the acts of the local school board in im ple m enting the governing constitutional principles constitutes good faith. T h e words “elucidating, assessing and solving” all indicate a process, that is, a m ovem ent tow ard the a t tainm ent of the goal of the rem oval of racial discrim ina tion from public school systems. H ere , again, the C ou rt is necessarily referring to an indeterm inate period of tim e in w hich there will continue to be racial discrim ination in public school systems. A t page 300 , 349 U .S. 2 9 4 , the Suprem e C o u rt speaks of courts being “guided by equitable principles” in “fash ioning and effectuating the decrees” , “facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs” ; “ the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as p ra cticab le on a non-discrim inatory basis” . (E m phasis ours) F u rth e r along the C o u rt refers to the elim ination of a variety of obstacles in m aking the transi tion. I t speaks of “ the public interest in the elim ination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective m an n er” . C ertainly, the C o u rt m ust have m eant here th at there were certain obstacles that a school board w ould have to over com e before it could free its school system of racial dis- 20a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation crim ination . A nd again, it is obvious that d u rin g the tim e when these obstacles are being identified and are being rem oved, there will continue to be racial discrim ina tion and that the righ t of N egroes in such circum stances to admission to a school on a non-discrim inatory basis will n ot be an unqualified right. In these circum stances N egroes will have to tem porarily forego their constitutional rights until such obstacles have been rem oved. A gain, later in the same opinion, the C ou rt refers to “while giving w eight to these public and private considera tions.” It requires defendant boards to make a prom pt and reasonable start tow ard full com pliance. B u t here the language is to “ the defendants” . Is the prom pt and reasonable start requirem ent lim ited to defendants in the lawsuit that the Suprem e C o u rt was concerned w ith or does this prom pt and reasonable start apply to all school boards in the U n ited States that at that tim e m aintained a bi-racial school system? T h e C o u rt w ent on to say that once such a start had been m ade that the courts m ight find that additional tim e was necessary and it placed the burden upon the defend ants in such a situation to establish that additional tim e was necessary in the public interest and that such tim e was consistent with the good faith com pliance at the earliest practicable date. H ere again the necessary im plication of the C o u rt’s language is, that during this additional tim e if such is proved to be necessary, there will be a continuation of racial discrim ination in the school system affected. I t again follows that as long as there is racial discrim ination in such a school system that all N egroes will n ot have an unqualified righ t to adm ittance to certain schools. T h e n at p. 301, supra, the C ou rt stated: “T h ey will also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants m ay propose to m eet these problem s 21a and to effectuate a transition to a racially non-dis- crim inatory school system. D uring this period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases” . From this language it is obvious that local boards will have to form ulate plans to m eet the problem s. T h is also pre supposes that they w ould have to do some thinking and analyzing in order to state w hat the problem s were before they could plan how they were going to m eet them . A ll of this again substantiates the fact that it is the law that there will be a period of tim e in w hich racial discrim ination will continue. A nd, if racial discrim ination continues, certain N egroes will not have an unqualified rig h t to be adm itted to schools on a non-discrim inatory basis. T h e n ext case of im portance is the case of C o o p er , e t al v. A a ro n , e t al, 358 U .S. 1, (1 9 5 8 ), the L ittle R ock case. In any analysis of the m eaning of the words used by the Suprem e C o u rt in this decision, it m ust be rem em bered that this decision began w ith these words: “As this case reaches us it raises questions of the high est im portance to the m aintenance of ou r federal sys tem of governm ent. I t necessarily involves a claim by the G overnor and Legislature of the State that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal cou rt orders resting on this C o u rt’s considered in terp reta tion of the U n ited States C on stitu tion ” . T hese are strong term s and it should be noted that the C o u rt states as a fact that the Arkansas governor and legis lature both affirmatively stated and claim ed that they had n o duty as state officials to o b ey F ed era l C ou rt orders. At page 7, supra, the C o u rt points ou t that D istrict Courts are directed to require a prom pt and reasonable start 22a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation tow ard full com pliance. F u rth er along on page 7, supra, in speaking of the D istrict C ou rt the Suprem e C ou rt said: “A fter analysis of the relevant factors (which, of course, excludes hostility to racial desegregation) (the C ou rt) m ight conclude that justification existed for not requiring the present nonsegregated admission of all qualified N egro children .” E xactly what is the m eaning of the parenthetical expression? It would seem that if this hostility to racial desegregation would affect the quality of the public school system, that it m ust be considered though it would not be sufficient justification for not doing anything. T h e C ou rt goes on to say: “ In such circum stances, however, the C ou rt should scrutinize the program of the school authorities to make sure that they have developed arrangem ents pointed toward the earliest practicable com pletion of desegregation and had taken appropriate steps to put th eir program into effective operation.” H ere, again, the language used refers to a process, a transi tion, and a period of time. A prom pt start is required and any plan m ust be diligently and earnestly pursued. T h e C ou rt goes on to say: “State authorities were thus duty bound to devote every effort toward initiating desegregation and bring ing about the elim ination of racial discrim ination in the public school system.” T h e word “tow ard” and the phrases “bringing ab ou t” both refer to a period of tim e and a transition period. T h e following pertinent inform ation is found in an article entitled “T h e U nited States Suprem e C o u rt and 23a 24a D esegregation”, by Paul H artm an , in T h e M odern Law Review , Ju ly 1960, at pages 356 and 357 : “ In term s of res jud icata , the second B row n deci sion applies to the school districts w hich were defend ants in the cases before the cou rt. H ow ever, it is clear that its im portance, like that of the first B row n deci sion, goes far beyond settling a dispute betw een the parties to the suits. T h e opinion granting relief was m eant to provide a b lu ep r in t fo r th e ord erly transi tion from racially segregated schools w herever they existed to schools open to pupils w ithout regard to color o r race. “A n im p ortan t feature of this plan is the gradual im plem entation of the first B row n decision declaring segregation unconstitutional. As noted above, the Suprem e C o u rt relied on ‘equitable principles’ on authorizing this step-by-step approach. N o doubt, the cases before the Suprem e C o u rt in the segregation controversys were equity cases, since all plaintiffs ap plied for injunctions. H ence, the co u rt had at its disposal the broad discretionary powers granted to courts of equity. W h a t is n o v e l is that th e en jo y m en t o f clear con stitu tion a l rights o f individuals m ay be delayed th rou gh th e op era tion o f eq u ita b le p rin cip les . T h a t the righ t to be free from discrim ination is one that requires im m ediate im plem entation follows from Suprem e C o u rt decisions rendered betw een 1938 and 1950 in suits brought by N egroes w ho, because of their race, were refused admission to state-supported graduate schools. F inding that plaintiffs had been denied the equal protection of the laws, the C ou rt stressed the ‘personal and present’ natu re of their con stitutional rights, and accordingly required the grad uate schools to provide facilities for the N egro students suing for relief, as soon as they did for applicants of the white race. In these cases the im m ediate im ple m entation did n ot present adm inistrative problem s; it involved nothing m ore than the admission of one Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation person—the plaintiff in each suit; furtherm ore, it was clear that the num ber of future qualified N egro claim ants for admission to graduate schools w ould be lim ited. “ In contrast, it was obvious that the process of de segregation of public elem entary and high schools as req uired under the first B row n opinion w ould be an operation of gigantic proportions. In the year be tween the first B row n opinion affirming the consti tutional right of the N egro pupil to equal protection of the laws, and the im plem enting decision, the tre m endous difficulties of uprooting an old-established way of life in a large area of the U nited States becam e all too clear. H e n c e , to so ften th e im pact o f the ru lin g th e S u prem e C ou rt d ev e lop ed in the secon d B row n decision the co n cep t o f gradualism justified by the principle of flexibility governing the shaping of rem edies in equity. T h e result was that the righ t of the individual N egro elem entary or high school pupil to im m ediate vindication of his ‘personal and present constitutional right had to b e su bord in ated to the in terest o f th e w h ole com m u n ity in a sm ooth and o r derly transition to desegregate sch ools.” (Em phasis ours) Defendants subm it that we are concerned with qualified rights during a period of transition. VII T h e C onstitutional R ights are Qualified by the P ublic and Private Interest in an Efficient P ublic School System T h is represents a practical view point upon the part of the Suprem e C ou rt in view of the radical nature of the change required by its decisions. O nce it has been estab lished and accepted that these constitutional rights are 25a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation qualified during a transition period, the n ext logical step is to exam ine the n ature of these qualifications. W h at standard or standards m ust be m et by a local school board if it proposes a plan of desegregation th at does n ot grant im m ediate desegregation in all schools? T h e w ording of the Suprem e C o u rt decisions do n ot set forth a clear-cut standard or set of criteria . T h e Suprem e C o u rt recognized the existence of “varied local school problem s.” I t also recognized that these problem s would have to be solved. T h e C o u rt also referred to a balancing of rights and in ter ests in referrin g to “a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs” ; “ the public interest in the elim ination of such obstacles in a system atic and effective m an n er” ; “giving w eight to public and private considera tions.” T h e C o u rt also referred to: “ Problem s related to adm inistration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into com pact units to achieve a system of determ ining admission to public schools on a non-racial basis, and revisions of local laws and regulations w hich m ay be necessary in solving the foregoing problem s.” T hese principles are guidelines for both local school boards and local D istrict C ourts, although they are perhaps p u r posely general in character. If the price of desegregation is the abolition of public education, and if this is a co rrect interpretation of the Suprem e C o u rt’s decisions, then the local school board need make no evaluation of the im pact of desegregation upon a school system. B u t if there is a degree of harm to a school system and the educational process that is u n acceptable while in the process of rem oving racial segre- 26a gation, then the local school board m ust evaluate its com m unity, the im pact of desegregation upon its com m unity, and design a plan of desegregation that will m aintain a reasonably efficient school system and at the same tim e gran t the m axim um im plem entation of constitutional rights of m em bers of the N egro race. In exercising this judgm ent, defendant B oard necessarily had to evaluate factors incapable of precise determ ination. It is in this area that the good faith of the B oard is of the essence in the valuation of the B oard ’s perform ance of this specific responsibility. W h en the Suprem e C o u rt placed upon the school au thorities the prim ary responsibility for elucidating, assess ing and solving certain local school problem s, the process that was set forth by the Suprem e C ou rt and required by it of local school boards, necessarily, would require the passage of a certain am ount of tim e. T h is passage of time w ould be required because the discharge of the respon sibility laid upon school authorities by the Suprem e C ou rt would require school authorities to do certain things as they made clear to their respective com m unities the p rob lems that were created by the Suprem e C o u rt’s decisions. Elucidating is a process. Assessing is a process. A nd, in the process of elucidating and assessing, the solution to problem s evolves in the minds of those who are necessary to the decision. N one of these responsibilities could be discharged by a school board instantly. I t is basic that no problem can be solved until the exact and precise nature of that problem is carefully evaluated and determ ined. T h is was why elucidating was felt by defendant B oard to be a necessary first step in the process of com pliance with the Suprem e C o u rt’s decision. F o r exam ple, defendants determ ined that the first necessary step was for the com - 27a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation m unity to com e to the position of accepting the fact that com pliance w ith the Suprem e C o u rt’s decisions was inevi table and that there was no escape, no subterfuge, and no dodging that could be done. T h e means by w hich a com m unity arrives at such a conclusion are varied and different. D efendant B oard felt th at this intellectual recognition of the finality of the Suprem e C o u rt’s decision was necessary. Events in neighboring states and com m uni ties over a period of years assisted the com m unity to arrive at this decision of the acceptance of the inevitability of the Suprem e C o u rt’s decisions. T h e com m unity has resisted desegregation. D id the Suprem e C o u rt d irect local school boards to com pletely disregard resistance to desegregation, even though such resistance could be and probably would be reflected in m any ways so as to dam age public education seriously in a com m unity? T h e m any ways in w hich resistance to desegregation is reflected in a com m unity are often not sub ject to con trol by any group o r governm ent. W e refer to the attitudes that can be reflected in the classroom and on the playground and by parent-to-parent, all within behavior patterns that do not violate any law nor respond to the application of force. D efendant B oard has been constantly aware of the fact that education takes place prim arily in the classroom. T h e atm osphere in a classroom , the spirit of the classroom, the relationship betw een the teacher and the students, and the relationship betw een the students and each other, are a necessary and vital part of the educational process. A ll efforts w ith regard to public education are keyed to what happens in a p articu lar classroom. Psychological and in tangible considerations are involved, such as “those quali ties w hich are incapable of objective m easurem ent but w hich m ake for greatness in a law school” . Sw eatt v. 28a P ain ter, 339 U .S. 629 . H ere is w here we m eet with term s such as environm ent, feeling of inferiority, m otivation, edu cational and m ental developm ent and such other term s frequently quoted by the Suprem e C o u rt in B row n v. B oard o f E d u ca tion , supra. In the classroom defendants are speaking of integration as distinguished from the term desegregation. W e are speaking of acceptance in a psychological sense. In foot note 11 in the first B row n decision, D r. K. B. C lark was quoted in a paper given to the M id-Century W h ite House Conference on Children and Y ou th in 1950 entitled “Effect of Prejudice and D iscrim ination on Personality Develop m en t” . A t a recen t m eeting of the A nthropology Section of the A m erican Association for the A dvancem ent of Science (D ecem ber 1960), Professor K enneth B. C lark of the C ity College of N ew Y ork defined integration as “a subjective individual process involving attitudinal changes and ‘the rem oval of fears, hatred, suspicion, sterotype super stitions and m yths’ ” . D efendant B oard felt that it could not disregard the ultim ate im pact of desegregation upon the respective classrooms where desegregation will occur. In its attem p t to discharge its responsibilities for providing educational opportunities to all children on an equal basis it has had this im pact in m ind and has felt its responsi bility to do all w ithin its power to lessen the im pact on the individual classrooms insofar as it is possible to so do. VIII What Factors Resulting from Desegregation Affect the Quality of Education In K elly v. B oard o f E ducation o f th e C ity o f N ash ville , supra, Ju d ge M cA llister included in the opinion m any 29a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation references to factors that professional educators and school board m em bers cited as having an im pact upon the quality of education. T h e C o u rt in its opinion m entioned at p. 212 that: “T h e B oard of E d u cation * * * endeavored * * * to find a solution w hich w ould accom plish the transi tion as soon as practicable consistent w ith the public interest and the efficient operation of the schools” . W h ile it is true that the C ircu it C o u rt does n ot specifically approve this statem ent n eith er does the C o u rt im ply that the “efficient operation of the schools” is n ot a desirable objective for the N ashville School B oard to consider. T h ose portions of the Nashville B oard ’s testim ony that the C ircu it C o u rt include or refer to in its O pinion bear upon those factors that m ay be expected to have a d etri m ental effect upon the school system. T h e Superintendent of Schools, p. 2 1 7 , referred to the plan as involving “less of this dam age to the children than any o ther plan we could propose” . H e also referred to the fact that the change “goes cou n ter to the feelings of a great m any people” . “T h e re are a lot of adjustm ents to be m ade and # # * that this adjustm ent can be m ade w ith less friction * * * , it can be m ade m ore sm oothly, it can be m ade w ith less difficulty, psychologically, educationally, socially, and otherwise if it is done slowly” . F u rth e r along the Superintendent m ade this statem ent: p. 217 “I t is very im portant that there be betw een the two races and betw een individuals representing the two races a relationship of friendliness, cooperation, and respect such as I think we have had in the past * * H om ogeneous grouping was m entioned as a desirable educational objective and that quick desegregation would ru n cou n ter to this objective. 30a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation 31a V irtually all of the testim ony in the N ashville case that was considered sufficiently im portant by the C ircu it C ou rt for specific recitation thereof in the opinion had to do w ith factors having a negative im pact on the educational en vironm ent in the classrooms. T hese were refences to: “ tension affecting the teachers” “new experience for the teacher” “difficulties in securing teacher cooperation” “questions of teacher recru itm en t” “ap titu d e” “achievem ent” “teachers cannot do their best in the m idst of excite m ent and turm oil and upheaval” . A t page 2 20 , supra, the C ou rt referred to the Superintend e n t’s testim ony as follows: “T h is business of teaching and working through teachers is not just a legal m atter. I t ’s a spiritual m at ter at base, and unless we can develop that rapport, w hich a teaching group m ust have to touch the lives of children, we are not a successful school system, how ever good our buildings m ay be or w hatever other physical features we may have * * T hese and sim ilar factors have been taken into consider ation by defendant Board of Education in designing the Plan of Desegregation. F rom its own experience and from the experience of other com m unities, it is apparent that readiness for de segregation varies within a school system on a school-by school basis. Factors showing a great am ount of readiness of a particu lar school com m unity can be identified in advance and these favorable factors can be used in an intelligent fashion to develop greater readiness for the desegregation process. T h is is the reason for the Chatta- Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation nooga Plan of D esegregation lim iting its original desegre gation to selected schools. T h e purpose of the selection is to introduce into the desegregated classrooms (when such occurs) the m axim u m n u m b er of favorable factors in order th at the experience of the desegregated classrooms and schools will be an acceptable process for all persons concerned. I t will rem ove m any fears of the unknow n and it will dem onstrate the reality of an intelligent effort to rem ove racial discrim ination. H ere the School B oard finds itself in the field of sociology, psychology, and eco nom ics. T h e schools to be selected will be selected by the School B oard w ith these criteria in m ind, and w ith the ultim ate objective of dem onstrating to the com m unity the fact that desegregation will w ork and that m any of the fears that parents have of this process are n ot necessarily true. I X If Defendant Board’s Actions Constitute a Good Faith Implementation of the Governing Constitutional Principles the Plan Should be Approved Unless the Judgment is Clearly Erroneous or if it is not Supported by the Evidence D efendant B oard is charged w ith the legal responsibility of operating a public school system for the citizens of C h at tanooga, Tennessee. A ncillary to this duty and. ordinarily in harm ony therew ith it has a responsibility to operate in a m anner consistent w ith the laws of the State of T en n es see, the Federal laws, the C onstitution of Tennessee and the C onstitution of the U n ited States. W h en the desires of a vast m ajority of its constituency were placed in direct conflict w ith its duty under the U n ited States C onstitution, the School B oard faced a dilem m a of considerable m agni- 32a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation 33a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation tude. T h e B oard consistently recognized its obligation to com ply. T h e B oard ’s dilem m a was how to operate a school system w ithin the fram ew ork of the U n ited States C on stitution when to do so w ould be cou n ter to the wishes of its constituency. O rdinarily, it is the School B oard ’s responsibility to operate in such a way as to p u t into effect in the school system the wishes of the people of C hattanooga. A nd when any public body continues to function cou n ter to the wishes of those whom it represents, such public body is replaced by a group responsive to the will of the m ajority of those citizens for whom it acts. T h e C hattanooga B oard of Education found itself in this dilem m a in 1955 following the B row n D ecision s, supra. A ny B oard of Education placed in such position that ignored either the m andate of the U nited States Suprem e C ou rt or the m andate of those whom it represented and for whom it acted, would have been violating a legal re sponsibility. T h e only rem aining course for defendant B oard was to attem pt to reconcile what appeared to be irreconcilable. T h ere was no other choice. I t is w ithin the reality of these paradoxical circum stances that defendant B oard of E d u cation ’s good faith m ust be judged. If defendant B oard had shown u tter disregard for the cause of public education, there would have been no dilem m a. On the contrary, if defendant B oard had refused to acknowledge any responsibility to the U nited States C onstitution there would have been no dilem m a. D efendant Board believed both of its contradictory respon sibilities to be of vital im portance. I t set out to m eet both responsibilities within the lim it of its capacities and legal authority. I t should be rem em bered that at the tim e de fendant B oard originally took under consideration its posi tion and policies with regard to the two B row n Decisions in Ju n e and Ju ly of 1955 , that the only guides defendant B oard had were the words used by the Suprem e C o u rt in these two decisions. T h e good faith of the eleven individuals who have served as m em bers of the defendant B oard during this period is a basic fact to be determ ined at the hearing. T h e B oard exists as an agency of the people. T h e B oard is responsible directly to the com m unity electorate. T h e existence of this legal relationship has a d irect bearing on the exercise of good faith by defendants. T h e join t judgm ents that defendants have rendered from tim e to tim e were arrived at in this atm osphere and environm ent. T h e realistics of the m yriad factors im pinging on defendant B oard m ust necessarily be considered for such factors as grasped by said defendants were basic to the exercise of good faith. “If the school authorities have acted and are p ro ceeding in good faith, their action should not be set aside by a co u rt so long as th eir action is consistent w ith the ultim ate establishm ent of a non-discrim i- natory school system at the earliest practicable date. B riggs v. E llio tt , 133 F . Supp. 7 76 , 864 , 815 . “ H olding that the appellees had carried the burden of proof of establishing the validity of the School B oard ’s plan, and that it should, therefore, be ap proved, the cou rt, in its opinion, declared that ‘it is not the business of the Federal C ourts to operate the public schools and they should intervene only when it is necessary for the enforcem ent of rights protected by the Federal C onstitution. If the judgm ent of the School B oard was clearly erroneous, of it it was not supported by the evidence, the C o u rt would be justi fied in finding that the defendants had n ot carried the burden of proof resting upon them and that the School B oard ’s plan should be disapproved. H ow ever, when in this case, the judgm ent of the School B oard is sup ported by the clear preponderance of the evidence, it 34a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation w ould be an unw arranted invasion of the lawful prerogatives of the legally constituted school authority if the C o u rt should undertake to set its judgm ent aside and substitute some other p lan’ K elly v. B oard o f E d u cation o f C ity o f N ash ville , supra, approving D istrict C ou rt, p. 224 . S U M M A T IO N In C o o p er v. A a ron , supra, page 20, Ju stice Fran k fu rter said: “By w orking together, by sharing in a com m on effort, m en of different minds and tem pers, even if they do n ot reach agreem ent, acquire understanding and thereby tolerance of their differences * * #. T h e L ittle R ock School B oard had em barked on an ed u cational effort ‘to obtain public acceptance of its p lan’. T h u s the process of the com m unity’s accom odation to new demands of law upon it, the d ev e lo p m en t of habits of accep tan ce of the righ t of colored children to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution, A m end. 14. had peacefully and prom is ingly begun.” (Em phasis ours) T h en at page 21 - “T h e use of force to further obedience to law is in any event a last resort and one not congenial to the spirit of ou r n ation .” A gain at page 26 - “T h a t the responsibility of those who exercise power in a dem ocratic governm ent is not to reflect inflamed public feeling but to help form its understanding is especially true when they are confronted w ith a prob lem like a racially discrim inating public school system. * * * Com pliance with decisions of this C o u rt is the C onstitutional organ of the suprem e law of the land, 35a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation has often, th rou gh ou t ou r history, depended on active support by state and local authorities. I t presupposes such su p p ort.” T h e Plan of D esegregation adequately m eets the test set forth by the Suprem e C ou rt. T h e defendant B oard has perform ed its function in good faith and w ithin the spirit of the Suprem e C o u rt decisions, particularly as expressed by Ju stice Fran k fu rter. T h e Plan is supported by the evidence. I t is consistent w ith the ultim ate goal of rem oval of racial discrim ination and the efficient operation of a public school system. It should be aproved. R espectfully subm itted, R aym ond B. W itt, J r . 1234 V olunteer B uilding C hattanoga, Tennessee Ellis M eacham 324 H am ilton Bank Building C hattanooga, Tennessee O f Counsel: A nderson, M eacham & Collins 324 H am ilton Bank Building C hattanooga 2 , Tennessee C E R T I F I C A T E O F S E R V IC E T h is is to certify that on this 19th day of Jan u ary , 1961. I served upon A von W illiam s, J r . , Z. A lexan d er Looby, M cC lellan-Looby Building, 327 C harlotte A venue, N ash ville, T ennessee, and T h u rg o o d M arshall, Constance B aker M otley, Suite 1790 T e n Colum bus C ircle, N ew Y ork 19, N ew Y ork , attorneys for plaintiffs, a copy of D efendants’ B rief in Support of Its P lan of D esegregation, by m ailing 36a Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Plan of Desegregation same to them via air m ail, special delivery, in properly addressed envelopes w ith sufficient stamps affixed thereto. A ttorney for D efendants 37a (C A P T IO N O M IT T E D ) JUDGMENT T h is cause cam e on to be heard this 23rd day of Jan u ary , 1961, before the H onorable Leslie R . D arr, U n ited States D istrict Ju d ge, upon the entire record and especially upon the plan for desegregation heretofore filed in this case by the defendants and the objections thereto filed by the plaintiffs; and the C o u rt being of the opinion that said plan, on its face, is not a m inim um or reasonable start to desegregate the school system of C hattanoga with all deliberate speed, and that defendants should be required to subm it a second or alternate plan, b u t that the said first plan should not be finally rejected pending the outcom e of an appeal by the defendants now pending in the C o u rt of Appeals for the Sixth C ircuit. It is therefore, O R D E R E D , A D JU D G E D and D E C R E E D , as follows: 1. T h e said plan filed by the defendants in this case is n ot sufficient on its face to m eet the req uirem ent of the decision of the Suprem e C ou rt in B row n v. B oard o f E d u ca tion (1935) 349 U.S. 294 , 75 S.Ct. 753 ; b u t said plan is n o t presently rejected, pending determ ination of the appeal by defendants now pending in the U nited States C o u rt of Appeals. 2. T h e defendant, Board of Education will file with this C o u rt an alternate, a second plan, within sixty (60) days from date of this judgm ent. 3. T h e righ t of defendants to a reconsideration of the first plan as it is or as am ended, and the rights of plaintiffs Order of Judge Darr, District Judge o r defendants to excep t to the present ju d gm en t of the co u rt is reserved. 4. T h e operation of the injunction , excep t for the req u irem en t herein that the defendants subm it said second o r altern ate plan w ithin sixty (60) days, is suspended until the term in ation of the appeal in this case now pending in the U n ited States C o u rt of Appeals. A pproved for E n try : / s / (M rs.) C onstance B aker M otley / s / L ooby & W illiam s By A von W illiam s, J r . A ttorneys for Plaintiffs. R aym ond B . W itt, J r . A ttorn ey for Defendants. S ig n e d :-------------------------- 1 / 2 6 / 6 1 T h u rsd ay