Brief of the Board of Education of the School District of the City of Detroit Defendant-Appellees
Public Court Documents
February 3, 1971

33 pages
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Case Files, Milliken Hardbacks. Brief of the Board of Education of the School District of the City of Detroit Defendant-Appellees, 1971. f6c9664f-52e9-ef11-a730-7c1e5247dfc0. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/fba55b48-ed8f-417b-923d-cb88f88e111a/brief-of-the-board-of-education-of-the-school-district-of-the-city-of-detroit-defendant-appellees. Accessed July 20, 2025.
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• I) a v IN THE UNITED STA TE S COURT OF A P P E A L S FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT RONALD B R A D L E Y , et a l. , P la inti f f -A p p e l la n ts , v. W IL L IA M G. M ILLIKEN, et al. , D e fen d a n t -A p p e l lees , No. 21036 and D E TR O IT F E D E R A TIO N OF TEACH ERS D efendant-In tervenor , B R IEF OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE C ITY OF D E T R O IT , P A T R IC K M cDON ALD JAMES H ATH A W A Y, CORNELIUS G O L IG H TLY , AND NORMAN D R A C H L E R : D E F E N D A N T -A P P E L L E E S M il le r , Canfield , Paddock and Stone 2500 D etro it Bank and T ru st Building D etro it , M ich igan 48226 T elephone : 963-642 0 A T T O R N E Y S FOR THE DETROIT BOARD O F EDUCATION DEFENDANTS M IL LE R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 2 3 0 0 D E TR O IT B A N K & T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 6 T A B L E OF CONTENTS T A B L E OF AUTHORITIES C O U N TE R STA TE M E N T OF ISSUES C O U N TE R ST A TE M E N T OF FA C TS ARGU M EN T 3 I. The Sole Issue, If Any, B e fo r e This Court Is Whether The D is tr ic t C ou rt 's O rd ers M an dating Implementation o f the Magnet Plan and Granting D efen dant -A ppe l lees ' Motion fo r Continuance Constitute C lear A buse o f His D is c re t io n in Handling In ter locutory Injunctive Matters. 3 A . Neither the D istr ic t C ou rt 's O rd er D irect ing Implementation o f the Magnet Plan Nor its O rder Granting the Motion fo r Continuance is R eview able by this Court on an In ter locutory B as is . 3 B. The D istr ic t C ourt 's O rd ers H erein Complained o f May Be R e v e r s e d Only upon a Showing o f C lear Abuse o f the B road D is c re t io n A c c o r d e d T r ia l Courts in Ruling on P r e l im in a r y Injunctive M atters . 3 C. In Reviewing the T r ia l C ourt 's D ispos it ion o f the P r e l im in a ry Injunctive M atters H ere Involved, This Court Should Not P r e m is e Its R ev iew Upon the Relative M er its o f the Plans P resen ted to the T r ia l Court or Upon a Pre judgm ent o f the Issues to Be D ecided at the T r ia l on the M er its , 4, 5 II. The D istr ic t C ou rt 's Continuance o f the T r ia l o f This Matter On the M er its is Not P r o p e r ly B e fore This Court fo r R ev iew and, Even If R eview ed by this Court Should Not Be Set A s id e . 6 A . An O rder Continuing Date o f T r ia l Is Not An Injunctive Matter Within 28 U. S. C. §1292(a) (1) And Thus Is Not R ev iew able on an Inter locutory B as is . 6 B. P la inti f f -Appellants P rov id e this Court with No R eason W hatsoever to R e v e r s e the T r ia l C ou rt 's O rder Continuing T r ia l , Even Should this Court Undertake to R ev iew Such O rd er . 6 (1) The Im m ed iacy R equ irem ents o f C arter and A lexa n der Apply Only in R em ed ia l Situations W here De Jure Segregation Has Been Found; Not in P r e - T r i a l Situations 111 , iv V 1 I 1 M IL L E R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 23 00 D E TR O IT B A N K f t T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 6 = W here No Such Findings Have Been Made. (2) The Only Matter on Which P la in t i f f - Appellants Can A s s e r t a C la im for P r e l im in a r y R e l i e f is the A p r i l 7 Plan, and that Matter is C urrently B e fo re this Court and Is T ota l ly Unaffected by A d journm ent o f the T r ia l on the M e r its . III. Judge Roth Did Not A buse His D is c re t io n as a Matter o f Law By O rder ing the Implementation o f Plan A Instead o f the A p r i l 7 Plan A. Implementation o f the A p r i l 7 Plan Is Not Constitutionally Mandated. B. Plan A Is Not An Unconstitutional F r e e d o m o f C hoice Plan. IV. Judge Roth Did Not Abuse His D is c re t io n B ecause Plan A Is Not Unconstitutional A s Matter o f Fact , A . Judge Roth Found Plan A S u per ior to the A p r i l 7 Plan as a Matter o f F a ct Based on T es t im on y and the P r e fe r e n c e o f The B oard of Education. B. Plan A Includes M o r e Than Magnet S ch oo ls . C. A s Has Been Indicated E a r l ie r Plan A Does M o r e Than D eseg reg a te by the N u m bers , It Is a Meaningful E ffo r t to P r o v id e Educational Advantages By Using Integration A s a Part o f the Whole Education Spectrum . D. P la inti f fs , with Full Opportunity To Do So, Fa iled To P resen t E vidence to E stab l ish That A p r i l 7 is S u per ior to Plan A or B. CONCLUSION AND P R A Y E R C E R T IF IC A T E OF SERVICE 7 8 9 17 19 20 23 24 25 25 27 li M IL L E R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 25 00 D E TR O IT B A N K f t T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 3 2 2 6 • # T A B L E OF AUTHORITIES C ases Cited P a e e A lexander v. H olm es County Board of Education 396 U .S . 19 (1969) 6, 7, 16 A m e r i c a n F ed era t ion of M usic ians v. Stein 213 F .2 d 679. 683 (6th C ir . 1954), ce r t , denied, 348 U .S . 873 4 B rad ley et al. v. M il l iken , et al. 433 F . 2d 897 (6th C ir . 1970) 4, 8, 25 . Brotherhood of L o co m o t iv e E ngineers v. M .K . T . R . Co. 363 U .S . 528, 535 (I960) . 4 Burton v. Mantanuska V alley L ines , Inc. 244 F . 2d 647 (9th C ir . 1953) 4 C arter v. W est F e l ic ia n a P a r ish School Board 396 U .S . 226 (1969) . 6, 7, 16, 19 Cowden Mfg. Co. v. K oratron 422 F . 2d 371 (6th C ir . 1970) 4 G a r lo ck v. United. Seal, In c . , 404 F .2 d 257 (6th C ir . 1968) 5 Green v. County School Board of New Kent County 391 U .S . 430 (1968) j 17, 18, 19, 20 H ornback v. B rotherhood of R . R . Signalmen 346 F . 2d 161 (6th C ir . 1965) 5 ! Hunter v. E r ick so n , 393 U .S . 385 (1969)L , — - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9, 10 J : Keyes v. S chool D is t r i c t Number One, D enver , C o lora d o \ 303 F .Su p p . 279 (D. C olo . 1969); on rem and, 303 F . Supp. 289 (D. C o lo . 1969); stay vacated , 24 L . Ed. 37 (1969); I after tr ia l , 313 F . Supp 61 (D. C o lo . 1970) 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co. , 352 U .S . 249, 257 (1957) 4 M onroe v. Board of C o m m is s io n e r s , 391 U .S . 450 (1968) 18 Nashville 1-40 Steering C om m ittee v. Ellington, 387 F .2 d 179, 182 (6th C ir . 1967), c e r t , denied, 380 U. S. 921 4 Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U .S . 443 (1968) 18 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U .S . 369 (1967) 10, 11 United States v. C o r r i c k , 298 U .S . 435, 437 (1935) 4 111 Constitution and Statutes Fourteenth A m endm ent to the United States Constitution 28. U. S. C. 1292 (a) (1) M ichigan P u b l ic A ct 48, 1970 Page 10 3, 6 8, 9, 11 Other Authorit ies Karst & H orow itz , "R e itm a n v. Mulkley: A T e lop h a se of -Substantive Equal P ro te c t ion , " 1967 Sup. Ct, R e v . 39, 10 Kurland, "E g a l i ta r ia n is m and the W a rren C ourt" , 68 Mich. L. Rev. 629, 645 (1970) 18 IV M IL LE R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 25 00 D E TR O IT B A N K a T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 8 C O U N T E R ST A T E M E N T OF ISSUES 1. Under the Fourteenth Am endm ent and the d ec is ion s in te r preting it, including this C ou rt 's O ctober 13, 1970 Opinion in B ra d ley v. M il l iken , did the D is tr ic t Court, in con s id er in g P la in t i f f -A p p e l la n ts ' Motion * 2 to Im plem ent Plan, have the b roa d d is c re t ion n orm a lly a c c o r d e d tr ia l judges in con s id er in g p re l im in a ry injunctive m a t te r s ? D efendant-A ppellees submit that this question should be answ ered "Y e s . " 2. Whether, on the facts contained in the r e c o r d b e fo r e it, the D is tr ic t Court acted within the scope of its d is cre t ion in ord er in g Plan A into e f fec t ? D efendant-A ppellees submit that this question should be answ ered "Y e s . " v M IL L E R . C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 2 5 0 0 D E TR O IT B A N K a T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 6 2 2 6 IN THE UNITED STA TE S COURT OF A P P E A L S F O R THE SIXTH CIRCUIT RON ALD B R A D L E Y , et al. , : P la in t i f f -A p p e l lan ts , : v. : W IL L IA M G. MILLIKEN, et al. , : D e fe n d a n t -A p p e l le e s , : No. 21036 and D E TR O IT FE D E R A TIO N OF TEACHERS, : D efendant-Intervenor o : C O U N T E R ST A T E M E N T OF FA C T S In light of the C ou rt 's fa m il ia r i ty with the ca se at bar ar is ing out o f an e a r l ie r appeal by P la in t i f f -A p p e l la n ts , the B oard o f Education Defendants would confine their counter statement of the ca se to a ch r o n o lo g ic a l su m m ary o f act iv it ies which have o c c u r r e d s ince that f i r s t appeal. On O ctober 27, 1970, P la in t i f f -A ppel lan ts f i led a "M otion to Im plem ent Plan, " which sought an O rder req u ir in g im m ediate im plem entation of the s o - c a l l e d A p r i l 7 Plan. That m otion was noticed for hearing on N ov em b er 4, 1970, the day on which the t r ia l on the m er it s was to c o m m e n c e . In con sequ en ce , the t r ia l cou rt continued the date o f t r ia l until D e c e m b e r 7, 1970 and took tes t im ony on P la in t i f f -A ppel lan ts 1 m otion on N ov em b er 4, 1970. On N ov em ber 6, 1970, Judge Roth entered an O rder mandating the B oard o f Education Defendants to submit, within twelve days, a d esegrega t ion plan cons is t ing of the high s ch oo l attendance changes contained in the A p r i l 7 P lan or " . . . an updated v e r s io n th ereo f which ach ieves no le s s pupil integration -1 - M IL LE R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 23 00 D E TR O IT B A N K ft T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 0 . . . . " (O rder at l ) 1 than the A p r i l 7 Plan. On N ov em ber 16, 1970, the B oard of Education Defendants submitted three a lternative plans to the court - - the Magnet Plan, the Magnet C u rr icu lu m Plan and the A p r i l 7 Plan. In the letter submitted with the plans, the B oa rd indicated its own p r io r i t ie s among them, giving top p r io r i ty to the Magnet Plan, second p r io r i ty to the Magnet C u r r i c ulum Plan and third p r io r i ty to the A p r i l 7 Plan. On N ov em ber 18, 19, and 25, 1970, substantial tes t im ony was presented regard ing the plans by each m e m b e r of the B oard and two m e m b e r s o f its staff. P la in t i f f -A ppellants p resen ted no w itn esses f r o m outside the Detro it Public Schoo l S ys tem to test i fy with r e s p e c t to the plans. A su m m a ry o f this tes t im ony is p resen ted in sec t ion IV of the Argum ent port ion o f this B r ie f , su p r a . On D ecem b er 3, Judge Roth issued his "Ruling on Sch oo l Plans Submitted, " mandating im plem entation of the Magnet Plan in Septem ber 1970, and entered an O rder in con fo rm ity with that Ruling. Additionally , Judge Roth issued his "Ruling on Motion fo r Continuance, " adjourning the tr ia l o f this cause on the m e r it s . F r o m these Rulings and the O rd ers entered in c o n s e quence o f such rulings, P la in t i f f -A ppellants have taken this, their second , appeal to this Honorable Court. 1. Since D efendant-A ppellees have not been s e r v e d with a cop y of P la int i f f - A ppellants ' Appendix to their B r ie f as req u ired by Rule 30, F . R . A. P . , and as p r o m is e d in their B r ie f at 5, r e fe r e n c e s to the r e c o r d w il l be made in a cco rd a n ce with Rule 28(e), F . R . A. P. - 2 - M IL L E R . C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 2 3 0 0 D E TR O IT B A N K f t T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 6 AR G U M E N T i I. THE SOLE ISSUE, IF A N Y, B E F O R E THIS COURT IS W HETHER THE DISTRICT C O U R T ’ S ORDERS M A N DATING IM P L E M E N T A T IO N O F THE M AGNET P L A N AND GRANTING D E F E N D A N T -A P P E L L E E S ' MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE CONSTITUTE C L E A R ABUSE OF HIS DISCRETION IN HANDLING IN T E R L O C U T O R Y IN JUNCTIVE M A T T E R S . A . N either the D is t r ic t C ou rt 's O r d e r D irect ing Im p le m e n tation o f the Magnet Plan N or its O rd e r Granting the M otion fo r Continuance is R ev iew ab le by this Court on an In ter locu tory B a s i s . A s m o r e fully argued in the M otion to D is m is s P la intif f - A ppellant s ' Appea l and B r ie f in support th e r e o f h e re to fo r e f i led with this Court, the Board o f Education Defendants submit that neither O r d e r sought to be rev iew ed on this appeal m a y p r o p e r ly be p la ced b e fo r e this Court. C lear ly , the O r d e r d irect ing im plem entation o f the Magnet Plan runs against the B oard o f Education D e fen dants and mandates no act ion w h a tsoev er by P la in t i f f -A pp e l lan ts . Consequently , P la in t i f f -A pp e l lan ts la ck standing to seek rev iew o f this O r d e r . Equally c le a r ly , the tr ia l c o u r t 's grant o f a continuance o f the tr ia l o f this cau se m ay not be r e v iew ed by this Court under 28 U. S. C. §1292(a )( l ) , which p rov id es f o r in te r lo c u to ry re v ie w o f in junctive o r d e r s only. F o r these re a s o n s , the Board o f Education Defendants urge that P la in t i f f -A p p e l la n ts ' appeal be d is m is s e d . P la in t i f f -A ppe l lan ts m ay la ter seek re v ie w o f these m atters in an o r d e r ly fashion after a tr ia l on the m e r i t s is had. B. The D is tr ic t C ou rt 's O r d e r s H erein Com pla ined o f May Be R e v e r s e d Only upon a Showing o f C lear A buse o f the B road D iscre t ion A c c o r d e d T r ia l Courts in Ruling on P r e l im in a r y Injunctive M atters . In con s id er in g m otions f o r p r e l im in a ry injunctive re l ie f , t r ia l courts a re req u ired to weigh ca re fu l ly the many fa c to rs which bear on the right to such re l ie f . A m ong these fa c to rs a re the fo l low ing : i r r e p a ra b i l i ty o f harm to the m oving party , balance o f equities among the pa rt ies , probab i l i ty that the m o v - M IL LE R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 2 3 0 0 D E TR O IT B A N K f t T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 6 t • ing party w ill su c c e e d on the m e r i t s and the in terest o f the public . Due to the com plex ity o f these fa c to rs and the p ecu l ia r ability o f the tr ia l judge to v iew them in the p e r s p e c t iv e o f the m atter pending b e fo r e him, the grant o r denial o f such r e l ie f w il l be r e v e r s e d only upon a finding o f c le a r abuse o f d is c r e t io n by the tr ia l judge. B rotherhood o f L o c o m o t iv e E ngineers v. M. K, T. R. Co. , 363 U. S. 528, 535, (I960); United States v. C o r r i c k , 298 U. S. 435, 437 (1935). This " c l e a r abuse o f d i s c r e t io n " standard o f r e v e r s a l is a lso the settled law of this Circuit . B rad ley , et al. v« Milliken, et a l . , 433 F . 2d 897 (6th C ir . 1970), Cowden Mfg, Co. v. K o r a tr o n , 422 F. 2d 371 (6th C ir . 1970); N ashvil le 1-40 Steering C om m ittee v. E ll ington , 387 F. 2d 179, 182 (6th C ir . 1967), c e r t , denied, 380 U. S. 921; A m e r i c a n F ederation o f M usic ians v. Stein , 213 F. 2d 679, 683 (6th C ir . 1954), ce r t , denied, 348 U .S . 873. This Court should e x e r c i s e grea t c a r e not to substitute its d is c r e t io n for that o f the tr ia l judge b e fo re whom many pages o f tes t im on y w e r e taken with r e s p e c t to the m atters now p laced b e fo re this Court fo r rev iew . Burton v. Mantanuska V alley L in es , Inc. , 244 F. 2d 647 (9th Cir . 1953). The e x t r a o r d in a ry pow er o f this Court to in ter fe re with the d is c re t io n o f the t r ia l court should be e x e r c i s e d only " . . . in the exceptiona l ca se w here there is a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . . . . " LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co. , 352 U.S . 249, 257 (1957). The r e c o r d b e low , and pa rt icu la r ly Judge R oth 's "Ruling on School Plans . - Submitted" dated D e ce m b e r 3, 1970, rev ea ls no abuse o f d is c r e t io n whatsoever. ; On the con trary , the r e c o r d dem onstrates that Judge Roth analyzed with great ca r e the d esegrega t ion plans p laced b e fo re him by the p a rt ies . Thus, the Board o f Education Defendants re sp ect fu l ly urge this Court not to d isturb the O r d e rs o f the D is tr ic t Court here involved. C. In Reviewing the T r ia l C ourt 's D ispos it ion o f the P r e l im in a r y Injunctive M atters H ere Involved, This Court Should Not P r e m is e Its R ev iew Upon the Relative M er its o f the Plans P resen ted to the T r ia l Court o r Upon a P re judgm ent o f the - 4 - M IL LE R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 28 00 D E TR O IT B A N K f t T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 6 # • * • Issues to Be D ec ided at the T r ia l on the M e r it s . P la in t i f f -A pp e l lan ts would have this Court substitute its judgment fo r | that o f the tr ia l cou rt in re -eva lu a t ing the re la t ive m e r i t s o f the th ree plans p r e sented below. F r o m the b r ie f f i led by P la in t i f f -A ppel lan ts in this Court, one I would p r e su m e that the Magnet Plan i t se l f is on t r ia l be fo re this Court. In r e questing this Court to re a ch the m e r it s o f var ious plans presen ted , P la in t i f f - Appellants m isapprehend the function o f an appellate court in rev iew ing , on an in te r lo cu to ry b as is , the act ions o f a tr ia l judge with reg a rd to p r e l im in a ry in junctive m a tte rs . The rule that the grant o r denial o f a p r e l im in a ry injunction m a y be r e v e r s e d only upon a showing o f c le a r abuse o f d is c r e t io n has the c o r o l l a r y that an appellate court should not c o n s id e r the m e r it s o f the ca se further than is n e c e s s a r y to rev iew the tr ia l c o u r t 's e x e r c i s e o f d is c re t io n . G a r lo c k v. United Seal, Inc. , 404 F. 2d 257 (6th C ir . 1968); Hornback v. B rotherhood o f R. R. Signalmen, 346 F. 2d 161 (6th C ir . 1965). Consequently , the issue be fo re this Court is not which plan presented be low would, in the opinion o f this Court, w ork m o s t e f fe c t iv e ly in Detroit . The so le issu e which this Court must dec ide is whether Judge Roth abused his d i s c re t ion in re je c t in g the single plan which P la in t i f f -A ppel lants p ro p o se d and the only plan of which they apparently a pprove . Unless P la in t i f f -A ppel lan ts can dem onstra te to this Court, as a m atter of law, that the D is tr ic t Court was under an absolute constitutional duty to enter an O rd er requir ing im plem entation of the s o - c a l l e d A p r i l 7 P la n - - th a t is , unless they prove that Judge Roth had absolutely no d is c re t io n in the m a t te r - - th e n this appeal must fail . Absent p r o o f o f such an absolute duty, Judge R oth 's O rd e r requir ing im plem entation o f the plan which he co n s id e re d to " . . . [hold] out the best p r o m is e of e f fec t ive l o n g - t e r m integration" (Ruling at 6) is c l e a r ly within his d is c re t io n and must be perm itted to stand. - 5 - M IL LE R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 25 00 D E TR O IT B A N K f t T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 6 # II. THE DISTRICT C OU RT'S CONTINUANCE O F THE TR IA L O F THIS M A T T E R ON THE MERITS IS NOT P R O P E R L Y B E F O R E THIS COURT FOR REVIEW AND, EVEN IF R E VIEWED BY THIS COURT, SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE. A. An O rd e r Continuing Date of T r ia l Is Not An Injunctive Matter Within 28 U. S. C. §1292(a)( l ) And Thus Is Not R eview able on an Inter locutory B a s i s . P la in t i f f -A ppellants urge this Court to r e v e r s e the tr ia l c o u r t 's O rd er continuing the tr ia l o f this m atter on the m e r it s until A p r i l o f the current y ea r . The B oard o f Education Defendants resp ect fu l ly submit that, on the basis o f the authorities cited in their B r ie f in Support o f Motion to D ism iss P la in t i f f - Appellants ' Appeal, this m atter m ay not p r o p e r ly be p laced b e fore this Court on an in ter lo cu tory bas is . Section 1292(a)(1) o f Tit le 28 of the United States Code authorizes in ter lo cu tory appeals f rom o r d e r s granting o r denying p re l im in a ry injunctive i re l ie f , thereby creat ing an exception to the c le a r F e d e ra l p o l i cy against re p e a t ed p ie c e m e a l appeals . It is patent that a continuance of tr ia l is pure ly a p r o cedura l m atter within the d is c re t io n o f the tr ia l court and has no injunctive aspect w h atsoever . Thus, the Board o f Education Defendants submit that this Court is without ju r isd ic t ion to rev iew , as an in ter locu tory m atter , the t r ia l judge 's o rd e r continuing tr ia l . B. P la inti f f -A ppellants P rov id e this Court with No R eason W hatsoever to R e v e r s e the T r ia l C ourt 's O rd er Continuing T r ia l , Even Should this Court Undertake to R ev iew Such * 1 O rd er . (1) The Im m ed iacy R equ irem ents of C arter and A lexander Apply Only in R em edia l Situations W here De Jure Segregation Has Been Found; Not in P r e - T r i a l Situations Where No Such Findings Have Been Made. In their b r ie f be fore this Court, P la in t i f f -A ppellants contend that the im m ed ia cy requ irem ents set by A lexander v. H olm es County B oard of Education, 396 U. S. 19 (1969), and C arter v. West F e l ic iana P a r ish School B o a r d , 396 U. S, 226 (1969) requ ire r e v e r s a l o f the tr ia l c o u r t 's continuance of the tr ia l of this ca se on the m e r i t s . The B oard o f Education Defendants utterly r e je c t this co n - -6 - M IL L E R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 2 5 0 0 D E TR O IT B A N K & T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 5 tention as a g r o s s m is -a p p l i c a t io n of those c a s e s . Both A lexander and C a rter invo lved s c h o o l d is tr ic t s p rov ed to have been operated on a de ju re seg reg a ted b a s is . T hose c a s e s w e r e c o n c e r n e d with the question of r e m e d y only: once the right to r e l i e f has been estab l ished , how quickly must that r e l i e f be i m p le m ented . We agree that im m e d ia c y is the only co n s t i tu t io n a l ly -p e r m is s ib le standard fo r im plem enting r e l ie f . H ow ever , in the ca se at b a r , there has b een abso lu te ly no finding, e ither as a m atter o f law or of fact, that the D etro it Public S choo ls are seg reg a ted on a de ju re b a s is . In fact, Judge Roth e x p r e s s ly stated that: "We cannot at this point p r o c e e d on the assum ption that plaintiffs w i l l s u c ce e d in proving their c la im , in the hearing on the m e r i t s , that the Detroit s ch oo l is a seg reg a ted s ch oo l system , de ju re or de facto . " Ruling on Schoo l Plans Submitted at 8. C onsequently , P la in t i f f -A p p e l la n ts ' argum ent that the D is tr ic t C o u r t 's a d jo u rn ment of t r ia l v io la tes the A lexander im m e d ia cy standard is without m e r i t on the facts o f this ca s e . 2 (2) The Only Matter on Which P la in t i f f -A ppel lants Can A s s e r t a C la im for P r e l im in a r y R e l i e f is the A p r i l 7 Plan, and that Matter is C urrent ly B e fo r e this C ourt and Is T ota lly Unaffected by A djournm ent o f the T r ia l on the M er its . As noted e a r l ie r here in , the only substantive matter b e fo r e this C ourt is the D is tr ic t C ou rt 's ruling with r e s p e c t to the plans submitted b e low . The continuance of tr ia l neither im pedes this C o u rt 's re v ie w of the tr ia l c o u r t 's ruling on plans nor f o r e c l o s e s P la in t i f f -A ppel lants f r o m presenting grounds for additional r e l i e f at the tr ia l on the m e r it s . Thus, the B oard of Education Defendants r e s p e c t fu l ly submit that P la in t i f f -A ppel lants have not and cannot p r e sent to this C ourt any b as is upon which to in ter fe re with the tr ia l c o u r t 's b roa d d is c re t io n in establish ing and m odify ing its t r ia l ca lendar . The only p oss ib le issue upon which P la in t i f f -A ppel lants may have a c la im for im m ediate r e l i e f - - - 7 - M IL LE R . C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E . 2 5 0 0 D E TR O IT B A N K ft T R U ST B U IL D IN G . D E T R O IT . M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 6 the tr ia l judge 's denial of their m otion to requ ire implementation of the A pri l 7 plan- - is currently b e fo r e this Court f o r im m ediate d isposit ion . III. JUDGE ROTH DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION AS A M A T T E R OF LAW BY ORDERING THE IM P L E M E N TATIO N OF P L A N A INSTEAD OF THE A P R IL 7 PLA N In the f i r s t in ter locutory appeal in this ca se , this Honorable Court held Section 1 2 of A ct 48 to be unconstitutional and a ff irm ed the D is tr ic t C ou rt 's : denial of a p re l im in a ry injunction. B rad ley v. Milliken, 433 F. 2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970). On O ctober 29, 1970 P la in t i f f -A ppellants m oved for the " im plem entation I of the A pr i l 7th plan at once . " (Motion to Implement Plan, at 1. ) On N ovem ber 4, 1970, the date set by the D is tr ic t Court to begin the tr ia l on the m e r it s , P la in t i f f -A ppellants ca lled Dr. D ra ch le r and presented ev idence in support of that Motion. On the afternoon of N ov em ber 4th, at the c lo s e of P la inti f fs ' p roo fs , Judge Roth ruled f r o m the bench that the Board of Education had until N ov em ber 16, 1970 to submit "a plan along the lines of the A p r i l 7, 1970 Plan, or an updated v e rs io n th ereo f or som e other plan which under the rules the Court ixiay find acceptab le . . . . " (Ruling of the Court on Miotion to Im plem ent Plan, at 3. ) The Board of Education com plied with this o rd er and submitted three 2 plans to the Court on N ovem ber 16th. The Board unanimously ass igned f i r s t p r io r i ty to Plan A, second p r io r i ty to Plan B, and third p r io r i ty to the A pr i l 7th Plan. On N ovem ber 18, 19 and 25, 1970 each m e m b e r of the Board of Education test if ied concern ing the three plans b e fo r e the D is tr ic t Court. On D e c e m b e r 3, 1970 Judge Roth issued his Opinion ord er in g the implem entation of Plan A. On the same day, an O rd er was entered ov er the ob ject ion to its f o rm of counsel f o r the Board of Education Defendants, and P la in t i f f -A ppellants filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. 2 2. The Letter of Transm itta l and the text of Plan A (Magnet School Plan) and Plan B (Magnet C u rr icu lum Plan) w ere submitted to this Court on D e c e m b e r 24, 1970 as Exhibit A to D e fe n d a n ts -A p p e l le e s ' A nsw er to P laintiff s -A ppel lants Motion fo r Summary R e v e r s a l or in the A lternative fo r Injunction Pending Appeal. i - 8 - M IL L E R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 2S O O D E TR O IT B A N K & T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 6 2 2 6 P la in t i f f -A pp e l lan ts again contend, as they did b e fo r e the D is t r i c t Court in Septem ber , the Sixth C ircu it in O c to b e r , and Judge Roth in D e c e m b e r , that the im plem entation of the A p r i l 7 Plan is constitutionally requ ired . This contention has never been c le a r ly explained by P la in t i f f -A p p e l la n ts , and in the ir B r ie f to this C ourt they again fa i l to show why A p r i l 7 is mandated, but content th e m se lv e s with an attack on P lan A. A . Im plem entation of the A p r i l 7 Plan Is Not Constitutionally Mandated. The only argum ent made by P la in t i f f -A ppel lan ts that the im p lem en ta tion of A p r i l 7 is requ ired by law is found in their B r ie f at 28-29. T h e ir a r g u m ent is that Section 1 2 of A ct 48 denied plaintiffs of their constitutional rights and that in holding that Section to be unconstitutional this Court held that the plaintiffs had a constitutional right to attend high sch oo l under the A p r i l 7 Plan. P la in t i f f -A ppel lan ts contend, in e f fect , that once a state agency has taken a wholly voluntary act ion designed to in crease the d eg ree of integration in its s ch o o ls that it is " l o c k e d - i n " to that action and m ay not change or a lter it in any way; a sort of " r a tc h e t " theory of the Fourteenth Amendment. As this Court ca re fu l ly pointed out in its O c to b e r 13, 1970 Opinion: "B y this ruling on the invalidity of §12, we e x p re s s no opinion at the present stage of the ca se as to the m e r it s of the plan adopted by the School Board on A pri l 7, 1970, o r as to whether it was the constitutional obligation of the School Board to adopt all or any part of that plan. " (Slip Op. , at 1 3. ) In the two Suprem e Court c a se s bear ing d i r e c t ly on the question of the constitutionality of Section 12, the Court made it c le a r that there is no ratchet theory in the Fourteenth Amendment. In Hunter v. E r i c k s o n , 393 U. S. 385 (1969), Justice White, f o r the m a jo r i ty , held that the amendment to the Akron City Charter was unconstitution - 9 - M IL L E R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 23 00 D E TR O IT B A N K f t T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 6 al, not beca use it suspended the operation o f an open housing ord inance , but because it p laced the hurdle o f a re fe ren d u m in front o f any future open housing o rd in a n ces . As the Court states at 389-90 : "B y adding §137 to its Charter the City o f Akron, which unquestionably w ie lds state p ow er , not only suspended the operat ion o f the existing ord inance forbidding housing d is cr im in a t ion , but a lso requ ired the approval o f the e le c to r s be fo re any future ord inance cou ld take e f fe c t . " (Emphasis added. ) In a c r u c ia l footnote to that sentence, Justice White d is c la im s any intention of creat ing a ratchet theory : "Thus we do not hold that m e r e repea l o f an existing ord inance v io lates the Fourteenth Am endm ent. " (f. n. 5, at 390. ) Justice Harlan, who had d issented in Reitm an v. M ulkey , 387 U. S. 369 (1967), in his con curr in g opinion in Hunter sets forth his b e l ie f that the Fourteenth Am endm ent does not operate as a ratchet but only fo rb ids the intentional placing o f a rb it ra ry hurdles in the way o f certa in groups o r factions which a re not p laced in the way o f all fact ions . He states at 395: "In the ca se b e fo re us, how ever , the city o f Akron has not attempted to a llocate governm ental pow er on the b a s is o f any genera l p r in c ip le . H ere , we have a p r o v is io n that has the c le a r purpose o f making it m o r e dif f icult f o r certa in ra c ia l and re l ig iou s m in or it ie s to a ch ieve leg is la t ion that is in their in terest . " The ratchet v. hurdle issu e was present in the Reitm an ca se as w ell , and is d is cu sse d in Karst & H orowitz , "R e itm an v. Mulkley: A T e lophase of Substantive Equal P ro tect ion , " 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 39. P r o f e s s o r s Karst and Horowitz explain at 49: "T he C aliforn ia court, in its Reitm an opinion, rested its d e c is io n partly on the change in the state 's posture , - 1 0 - M IL L E R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 23 00 D E TR O IT B A N K & T R U ST B U IL D lN O , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 8 f r o m proh ib it ion o f pr ivate d is c r im in a t io n to a u th or iza tion o f such conduct. To s o m e , this line o f reason ing suggested that any rep ea l o f open housing leg is la t ion would b e invalid. The constitutional ratchet had turned, and no s ign if icant stepback cou ld be perm itted . In his d issenting opinion, M r . Just ice Harlan r e f le c te d this v iew when he e x p r e s s e d the fear that ' [o jpponents o f state a nt id iscr im in at ion statutes a re now in a pos it ion to argue that such leg is la t ion should be defeated beca use , i f enacted, it m ay be unrepea lab le . ' [387 U. S. at 395] "T he m a jo r i ty , h ow ev er , went to s o m e lengths to avoid this im plica t ion . While the Court did not say that a le g is la t iv e rep ea l o f the R u m ford and Unruh A cts would be constitutional, a s ignificant part o f M r . Justice W hite 's opinion is devoted to showing how P r o p o s i t io n 14 could be co n s id e re d to be m o r e than a 'm e r e appeal. ' What the Court said on this su b ject was typ ica l o f the op in ion 's 'd e feren ce ' to the C ali forn ia cou rt : '. . . as we understand the C ali forn ia court , it did not pos it a constitutional v io lation on the m e r e repea l o f the Unruh and R um ford A c ts . It did not read either our c a s e s o r the Fourteenth A m endm ent as establishing an automatic constitutional b a r r ie r to the rep ea l o f an existing law prohibiting ra c ia l d i s c r i m i n ations in housing; nor did the court rule that a State m ay n ever put in statutory f o r m an e x i s t ing p o l i cy o f neutrality with r e s p e c t to pr ivate d is c r im in a t io n s . . . . 'The C ali forn ia cou rt could v e r y rea son a b ly conc lude that . . . [P ro p o s i t io n 14] would and did have w id er im pact than a m e r e rep ea l o f existing statutes. [387 U. S. at 3 7 6 . ] " If the Fourteenth A m endm ent does not em body a constitutional ratchet, D efendant -A ppel lees re sp ect fu l ly contend that it was the hurdle set up by the the second sentence o f Section 12 which ren d ered it unconstitutional and not the delay in the im plem entation o f any attendance p ro v is io n s requ ired by the f ir s t sentence o f Section 12. If this is the ca s e , P la in t i f f -A ppel lants w ere not d e pr ived o f any constitutional right in presento by Section 12, but only in futuro. Thus, P la in t i f f -A ppel lan ts are in e r r o r when they contend that they have been d ep r iv ed o f a constitutional right to attend the sch oo ls they would have attended pursuant to A p r i l 7. The p r o p e r rem ed y , and the only r em ed y , fo r the - 1 1 - M IL L E R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 2 5 0 0 D E TR O IT B A N K & T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 6 unconstitutional hurdle set up by Section 12 was prov ided by this Honorable Court in O c to b e r , nam ely , the re m o v a l o f that hurdle by holding the Section to be unconstitutional. P la in t i f f -A ppellants w il l undoubtedly respond, as they did be fore Judge Roth, by rely ing on Keyes v. School D is tr ic t Num ber One, Denver, C o lo r a d o , 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo . 1969); on re m a n d , 303 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo . 1969); stay v a ca ted , 24 L . Ed. 37 (1969); after t r i a l , 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo . 1970). A ppe l lee Detroit B oard o f Education submits that Keyes does not support the argument that the A p r i l 7 Plan must be im plem ented . The f i r s t i s su e in K eyes , and the only issue which bears on the ca se at b a r in its p r e - t r i a l pos tu re , con cern ed r e s c i s s i o n by the Denver B oard o f three reso lut ions p rev iou s ly p a ssed by the Board . The facts are these : On January 30, 1969, Defendant B oard adopted R eso lut ion 1520, which adjusted the attendance area s at se v e ra l se con d ary sch oo ls within the d is tr ic t . On M a rch 20, 1969, the Board adopted R esolution 15 24, which apparently was o f s im i la r effect . Soon th erea fte r , the Board adopted R eso lut ion 1531, which changed attendance areas in certa in e lem entary s ch o o ls . G en era l ly , the p u rp ose o f each o f these reso lut ions was to integrate the sch oo ls involved. On June 9, 1969, fo llowing a sch oo l board e lec t ion w hich resu lted in a change in the com p os it ion o f defendant Board, Reso lutions 15 20, 1524 and 1531 w e r e resc in ded . P laintiffs sought, by way o f p r e l im in a ry injunctive r e l ie f , an o r d e r enjoining im plem entation of R eso lut ion 1533, the resc ind ing reso lut ion . At the hearing on plaintiffs ' m otion for such re l ie f , substantial p r o o f was adduced as to dem ograph ic changes which had o c c u r r e d in the d is tr ic t o v e r the preced ing decade and as to actions by the board o f education through which ". . . c l e a r patterns o f segregat ion [w ere ] r e in fo r c e d by o f f i c ia l action . . . . " (303 F. Supp. at 284. ) F r o m the ev idence presented , the court m ade n u m e r ous and detailed findings o f fact. A m ong these findings w e r e the fo llow ing : - 1 2 - M IL LE R . C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 2S O O D E TR O IT B A N K & T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 0 s ch o o ls with a p red om in a n ce o f m i n o r i t y - r a c e students w e r e a ss ig n ed in e x p e r ienced m in o r i t y - r a c e te a ch e rs (303 F. Supp. at 284); the B arrett School was con stru cted with co n s c io u s knowledge that it would be a seg reg a ted m in o r i ty - r a c e s c h o o l and was not u t i l ized to r e l ie v e o v e rc r o w d in g o f a predom inantly white s ch oo l lo ca ted a few b lo ck s away (303 F. Supp. at 285); boundary changes m ade by defendant b oa rd . .n o t only fa i led to a l lev iate N egro concentrat ion ; they added to it. " (Id. ); an addition was con stru cted at the Hallett School o v e r ob je c t io n s that this ta ct ic " . . .w ou ld in c r e a s e seg reg a t ion at Hallett. " (Id. ); and, f inally, the use o f num erous m o b i le c l a s s r o o m s in the predom inantly - N eg ro a rea o f the city concentra ted seg reg a t ion o f pupils . T h ese detailed f ind ings o f fact d em on stra te , as the court there phrased it, that the p r e l im in a r y in junction i s s u e had " . . . b e e n tr ied rather ex tens ive ly . " 303 F. Supp. at 281. Based on th ese fa c ts , the court found, as a m atter o f law, that: "W e have seen that during the ten y ea r p e r io d preced in g the p a ssa g e o f R eso lu t ions 1520, 1524 and 1531, the D enver School B oard has c a r r ie d out a segrega t ion p o l icy . To maintain, encourage and continue segregat ion in the public s ch o o ls in the face o f the c le a r mandates o f Brown v. B oard o f Ed. cannot be c o n s id e r e d innocent. The many c a s e s dec ided subsequent to Brown, including our own C ir cu i t 's B oard o f Ed. v. Dowell , im p o s e an a f f irm ative duty on the School B oard to take pos it ive steps to re m o v e that segrega t ion which has developed as a resu lt o f its p r io r a f f irm ative a c t s . " 303 F. Supp. at 287. Thus the m otion fo r p r e l im in a r y injunction was granted. H ow ever , the court further o b s e r v e d that: "In determ ining that the plaintiffs are entitled to the p r e l im in a r y r e l i e f sought, we are not to be understood as holding that R eso lut ions 1520, 1524 and 1531 a re ex c lu s iv e . It is true that the ca se is ex tra ord in a ry in that there are only two plans p r e sented, one ca lling fo r integration and one for segregat ion . The status quo has the e f fect of r e s t o r ing the integration plan. H ow ever , the B oard is by no m eans prec lu d ed f r o m adopting som e other plan -1 3 - M IL L E R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 25 00 D E TR O IT S A N K f t T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 6 ! em bodying the underlying pr in c ip les o f R esoutions 1520, 1524 and 1531. " 303 F . Supp. at 288. On appeal f r o m the o r d e r granting p r e l im in a ry injunction the United States C ircu it Court o f Appeals f o r the Tenth C ircu it , in an unreported opinion dated August 7, 1969, questioned the su f f ic iency o f the D is t r ic t C ou rt 's o rd er and rem anded fo r additional cons id era t ion . In the opinion on rem and, an additional f ive pages are devoted to d e ta iled findings o f c on sc iou s acts o f pupil segregat ion by the defendant Denver B oard at the B arrett , Stedman, P a r k Hill, Ph i l ips , Hallett and S m iley S ch oo ls . The court found . . an undeviating purpose to iso la te N egro students. . . . " 303 F. Supp. at 294. Again , the court concluded as a m atter o f law that: "T he p o l i c ie s and actions of the B oard p r io r to the adoption o f Reso lutions 1520, 1524 and 1531, which conduct is sp e c i f ica l ly d e s c r ib e d in the fo rego ing f ind ings, constitute de jure segregation . " 303 F. Supp. at 289 (Em phasis added) Again, the court enjoined im plem entation o f R eso lut ion 1533. Addit ionally , the court o rd e re d im plem entation of: (1) R eso lut ion 1520, inso far as it applied to Sm iley Junior High School ; (2) R esolution 1524, inso far as it applied to Sm iley Junior High School ; and (3) Resolution 1531, inso far as it applied to Barrett , P ark Hill and Philips Schoo ls . (303 F. Supp. at 296). In short , im plem entation was o rd e r e d only as to those sch oo ls found, as a m atter of fact and law , to have been pru p ose ly segregated , on a de ju re basis by the defendant b oa rd . C o n s id e r a tion of the rem ain der o f Resolutions 1520, 1524 and 1531 was e x p r e s s ly r e s e r v ed for tr ia l . (Id. ) F inally , the opinion e x p r e s s ly invited su b m iss ion o f other integration plans by the defendant board. (Id. ) On appeal, the Circuit Court granted a stay of the p r e l im in a ry in junction, again in an unreported opinion. On application to Justice Brennan, as Acting C ircu it Justice , the stay was vacated and the injunction reinstated. In his o p in io n , Justice Brennan explicitly noted the D istr ic t C ourt 's finding of -1 4 - M IL LE R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 2 3 0 0 D E TR O IT B A N K f t T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 22 6 de ju re se g re g a t io n as fo l lo w s : " F r o m the facts found, the D is tr ic t Court e ither made a c o n c lu s io n o r d rew an in fe re n ce , that de ju re s e g r e gation ex is ts in nam ed s c h o o ls . Its grant o f the t e m p o r a r y injunction is grounded on the p r e m is e that there is de ju re segregat ion . " 24 L . Ed. 2d at 39. The d i f f e r e n c e s between K eyes and the c a s e at bar a re m an ifest . In the context o f P la in t i f f -A p p e l la n ts ' m ot ion , they are determinative^, F ir s t and m o s t im portant ly , each opinion in K eyes em p h a s izes that the grant o f p r e l im in a ry r e l i e f was based upon a finding o f de ju re segrega t ion . This finding of de ju re seg reg a t ion was not grounded in the resc in d in g reso lu t ion i tse l f , but rather was supported by vo lum inous ev idence o f c o n s c io u s , purpose fu l act ion by defendant b o a r d which seg reg a ted pupils within the d is t r i c t on the bas is o f ra ce . In short , the court found that defendant board had " 0 . . c a r r i e d out a segregat ion p o l icy . . . . " (303 F . Supp. at 287) during the ten y e a r s p r io r to the l it igation. M r. Justice Brennan m akes c l e a r that this finding was c r u c ia l to his r e in s ta te ment o f the p r e l im in a r y r e l i e f granted by the t r ia l court . The r e c o r d in the c a s e at bar rep e ls the sl ightest in fe ren ce o f any seg reg a t ion p o l icy on the part o f the Board o f Education Defendants. The m a jo r p r e m is e in the K eyes holding is not p resen t in the c a s e at bar and thus it supplies grounds fo r o rd e r in g A pri l 7 into e f fec t . Second, the opinion on rem and in K eyes confined injunctive r e l i e f so le ly to those sch oo ls w here s p e c i f i c and purpose fu l act ions by the defendant board had c rea ted o r perpetuated seg reg a t ion o f pupils . C lear ly , r e l i e f m ust be tied to the right to such r e l i e f in a causal and proport ion a l m anner . P la in t i f f - Appellants in the c a s e at bar have utter ly fa iled to p resen t p r o o f o f de ju re segrega t ion as to any o f the sch oo ls involved in the A p r i l 7 plan. Yet P laintiffs contend that the A p r i l 7 P lan m ust be im plem ented w h o lesa le , intact. Keyes s im p ly does not stand fo r this p ropos it ion . -1 5 - M IL LE R , C A N FI E L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 25 00 D E TR O IT B A N K & T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 22 6 Third , both t r ia l court opinions in Keyes note sp e c i f i c a l ly that the c o u r t 's in junctive o r d e r had the e f fe c t o f reinstating R eso lut ions 1520, 1524 and 1531 only because the court was presented with no a lternative . It had be fore it a segregat ion plan and an integration plan. It was con stra ined to a ccep t the latter . In the c a s e at bar, quite the con tra ry obtains. The B oard o f Education Defendants have submitted and defended under c r o s s examination two a lte rn a tive plans fo r integration and quality education, and Judge Roth s p e c i f i c a l ly found Plan A to be su p er io r to A p r i l 7. Again , we submit, Keyes does not sup port the r e l i e f sought by Plaintiffs herein . C ontrary to supporting a ratchet theory o f the Fourteenth Am endm ent, K eyes m e r e ly rep resen ts another a p p l i ca tion o f the fa m il ia r p r in c ip le that once de jure segrega t ion has been established , there is a constitutional duty to rem ed y that situation by d isestablish ing the s ta te - im p o s e d dual s tructure . P la inti f f -A ppellants apparently make another argum ent to support the contention that A p r i l 7 m ust be im plem ented . They contend (B r ie f , at 31, 33) that the "b e s t available plan" on the r e c o r d must be im plem ented "at o n c e " and pendente l i fe under the rule o f A lexander v. Holmes County Board of E ducation , 396 U. S. 19 (1969) and C arter v. West F e l ic iana P a r is h School B oard , 396 U .S . 226 (1969). As we pointed out in our A nsw er to Plaintiff - A ppe l lan ts1 M otion f o r Sum m ary R e v e r s a l O r In The A lternative F o r Injunction Pending A ppeal , the " im m e d ia c y " rule of A lexander is applicable only in situations w here the r e c o r d dem onstrates and the Court has found that constitutional rights a re being v io la t ed, in other w ord s , in de ju re situations,, P la inti f f -A ppellants have yet to estab lish that the Detroit Board o f Education is operating a de jure segrega ted sch oo l system . In his Ruling on School Plans Submitted, Judge Roth stated at 8: "W e cannot at this point p r o c e e d on the assum ption that plaintiffs w ill su cceed in proving their c la im , in the hearing on the m e r it s , that the Detroit s ch oo l [ system ] is a segregated sch oo l system , de ju re o r de facto . " - 1 6 - M IL LE R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 25 00 D E TR O IT B A N K f t T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 B 22 8 In fact , P la in t i f f -A p p e l la n ts ' cu rren t argum ent is no d if ferent than the argum ent advanced by P la in t i f f -A pp e l lan ts b e fo r e Judge Roth in S eptem ber and this Court in O ctob er and the issu e is the sam e as it was then: whether the D is tr ic t Court abused his d is c r e t io n in re fus ing to grant a p r e l im in a r y injunction. P la in t i f f - Appellants have p re se n te d no additional ev idence on the question o f whether the D etro it s c h o o ls are de ju re seg reg a ted and this Court should not now r e v e r s e its p r io r a f f i rm a n ce of Judge R oth 's Ruling of Septem ber 3, 1970 in which he found at 3: "H e re , the p ro o fs are not convincing that there has been a c o u r s e of act ion which can be c h a r a c te r iz e d as d ire c ted tow ard the maintenance of a dual s y s te m of s c h o o ls , e ither de ju re or de facto . To the con trary , the ev idence b e fo r e the Court indicates that there has been a c o n s c io u s , de l ibera te , p r o g r e s s iv e , and con t in uous attempt to p rom ote and advance the integration o f both pupils and faculty. " B . Plan A Is Not An Unconstitutional F r e e d o m o f C hoice Plan. Although P la in t i f f -A ppel lants have fa iled to dem onstrate that they are entitled to any p re l im in a ry re l ie f , they spend m o s t of their e f fo r t in their B r i e f attempting to show that the Plan o r d e r e d by Judge Roth is both unconstitu tional and factually in fe r io r to the A p r i l 7 Plan. The factual question w il l be d is c u s s e d be low and the constitutional question h ere . P la in t i f f -A ppel lants c h a r a c te r iz e Plan A as a " f r e e d o m of c h o i c e " plan and re ly on G reen v. County School B oa rd o f New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430 (19^8) as holding such plans to be unconstitutional. H ow ever , they have again attempted to apply d ec is ion s ar is in g out o f de ju re situations to Detroit w here no such situation has been estab lished . The Suprem e Court in G reen was dealing with a re m e d ia l p r o b le m of whether the " f r e e d o m of c h o i c e " plan under con s id era t ion had e f fe c t iv e ly d ism antled the s ta te - im p o s e d d u a l - s y s te m of education. Justice Brennan, writing fo r a unanimous Court stated at 439 -40 : -17 M IL LE R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 2S O O D E TR O IT B A N K ft T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 0 2 2 0 "It is incumbent upon the s ch oo l b oard to establish that its p ro p o se d plan p r o m is e s m eaningful and im m ediate p r o g r e s s toward d isestab l ish ing state- im posed segregation . It is incumbent upon the d is t r i c t court to weigh that c la im in light of the facts at hand and in light of any a lternatives which m ay be shown as fea s ib le and m o r e p rom is in g in their e f fe c t iv en ess . W here the court finds the board to be acting in good faith and the p rop osed plan to have rea l p r o sp e c ts f o r d ismantling the s ta te - im p o s e d dual sys tem ’ at the ea r l ie s t p ra c t ica l date ' , then the plan m ay be said to prov ide e f fec t ive re l ie f . . . " "W e do not hold that ’ f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e ’ can have no p lace in such a plan. We do not hold that a ’ f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e ’ plan might of i tse l f be un constitutional, although that argum ent has been urged upon us. Rather, all we dec ide today is that in desegregat ing a dual sy s tem a plan utilizing ' f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e ’ is not an end in itself . ” The rem ed ia l nature of the d e c is ion s and their l imitation to de ju re situations was rea f f i rm ed in the other two Suprem e Court d ec is ion s on f r e e d o m of cho ice . Raney v. B oard of Education, 391 U. S. 443 (1968); M onroe v. B oard of C o m m is s io n e r s , 391 U. S- 450 (1968); see Kurland, "E g a l i ta r ia n ism and the W a rren C ou rt" , 68 Mich. L- Rev. 629, 645 (.1970). The Court in Green was dealing with a rem ed ia l p rob lem fo r yet another reason. F r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e had been in e f fec t in New Kent County for three y ears when the Court found it to be unacceptable . Justice Brennan at 441 detailed the in e ffect iveness , as a m atter of established fact, of the New Kent County plan and concluded it had not been "a suffic ient step to ’ e f fectuate a transition ' to a unitary system . " In the ca se at bar, Plan A has not yet been tr ied ; it should not be held unconstitutional on the b as is of speculation b e fo r e the fact, but only, if at all, post facto at such time as P la in t i f f -A ppel lants can prove its fa ilure . -1 8 - M IL L E R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 23 00 D E T R O IT B A N K ft T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 3 In s u m m a r y , D efendant -A ppel lee contends that Judge Roth was under no constitutional obligation to o r d e r the im plem entation of the A p r i l 7 Plan b e ca u s e of e ither the unconstitutionality of Section 12 o f A c t 48 or the pendency of a tr ia l on the m e r i t s . Consequently , it is our posit ion that Judge Roth had absolute d is c r e t io n in deciding whether to o r d e r any p re l im in a ry r e l ie f and that Plan A is not unconstitutional as a m a t t e r of law. IV JUDGE ROTH DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION BECAUSE P L A N A IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS M A T T E R OF F A C T . B e fo r e any analysis can be m ade of the m e r i t s o f P lan A (Magnet o r M cDonald), one thing m ust be m ade c le a r which is distinguishable in our case . In all o f the c a s e s c ited by plaintiffs, including the lead ca se of G reen v. County S choo l B oard of New Kent County et a l . , supra, and C a r te r v. W est F e l ic ia n o P a r is h S choo l Board , su pra , there was a finding by the courts of a dual sy s te m of education in the var ious sch oo l d is tr ic t s . This has not been the ca se in D etro it as Judge Roth has not m ade such a finding. N or b eca u se of the constant e f fo r ts by P la in t i f f -A ppel lants to ra ise p re l im in a ry m atters , has he been given any opportunity to m ake this essent ia l finding. Keeping this in mind, the question concern ing Plan A then b e c o m e s whether it is unconstitutional as a m a tter of fact in the situation presented here . In G r e e n , the Suprem e Court c o n s id e re d the m e r i t s o f a s o - c a l l e d f r e e d o m - o f - 3ch o ice plan and laid down the guidelines under which Such plans should be 3 3. It m ust be noted that the f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e contem plated by plaintiffs in the b r i e f and in G r e e n , d i f fe r s m a ter ia l ly f r o m Plan A as prov ided in Detroit . In those plans students could a rb it ra r i ly p ick a s ch oo l a fter a long h istory of having been com p e l led to attend a part icu lar s ch oo l so le ly on the b as is o f their race . That is, w here two separate s ch oo l d is tr ic t s s e r v e d the sam e geographic area in the past, the law now requ ired them to be m e r g e d into one. A l l the f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e plan did in Green was to allow students who had been part of the prev iou s dual sy s tem to now ch oose what sch oo l they w ished to attend. B eca u se of estab lished patters, v ery few ch ose to leave their old sch oo ls . Plan A, how ev er , d i f fe rs . F i r s t of all there are not now two s ch oo l sy stem s serv ing the sa m e geograp h ic area. Secondly, the d e s i r e to m o v e is u rged by the educational a ttract iveness of the m agnet s ch oo ls . - 1 9 - M IL L E R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 23 00 D E TR O IT B A N K & T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N £ 3 2 2 6 con s id ered . The Court found: . . w here the court finds the B oard to be acting in good faith and the p rop osed plan to have rea l p r o sp e c ts f o r dismantling the s ta te - im p o s e d dual sy s tem ’ at the ea r l ie s t p ra c t ica b le date ', then the plan m ay be said to prov ide e f fec t ive re l ie f . ” 391 U-S. at 439- Thus the findings of Judge Roth are the determ ining fa c to r fo r this Court to co n s id e r in decid ing on the constitutionality of Plan A. A. Judge Roth Found Plan A S uper ior to the A p r i l 7 Plan as a Matter of F a ct B ased on T est im ony and the P r e fe r e n c e of The B oard of E ducation . The D etro it B oard of Education on N ov em b er 16, 1970, submitted to J ud ge Roth three plans pursuant to an O rder of N ov em b er 6, .1970, calling fo r the su b m iss ion of plans to e f fec t d esegrega t ion of D etro it sch oo ls . The B oard placed p r io r i ty on the plans by unanimous vote (Ex. A of Defendants ' A nsw er) as their p r e fe r e n c e fo r the m anner in which desegrega t ion would take p lace in Detroit . H earings w e r e held on N ov em ber 18, 19 and 25, 1970, at which t ime testim ony was taken related to the plans f r o m all B oard m e m b e r s and Superintendent D rach ler . M em b er McDonald, as author of said Plan A, tes t i f ied at length to its educational soundness and p re fa ced his com m ents this way: " I might p re fa ce the b a s ic explanation of the Plan, your Honor, with the fact that this Plan is based upon three conditions which we felt was n e c e s s a r y fo r any educational plan that w o u ld in crease integration to su cceed , that the c it izens of D etro it have the opportunity to partic ipate in the d ec is ion -m a k in g through their com m en ts and s u g g e s tions; that the plan m ust be educationally sound, that is, it m ust im prove education in the city and, three, that any plan introduced m ust be the equivalent to or ex ceed the integration f igures mentioned in the A p r i l 7 Plan. " 11/18 Tr. at 8. M em b er M cDonald p r o ce e d e d to show how reg ions within the City would be paired to provide f o r desegregat ion throughout the sy stem ( 11/18 -2 0 - M IL L E R . C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 23 00 D E TR O IT B A N K ft T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 8 T r . at 10, 11). His tes t im on y then p r o c e e d e d to show how his plan p rov id ed for a total integration and was unlike the feeb le and belated e f for t made in 4 P r o je c t One . M cD onald a lso tes t i f ied to the fact that the Plan would tend to o v e r c o m e som e of the d i f f icu lt ies of trying to prov ide fo r d ese g re g a te d s ch o o ls in a m ob i le population, such as D e tr o i t 's , for which the A p r i l 7 Plan would not prov id e f lex ib i l i ty . "Just as there are m any routes to this courthouse this m orn ing and the fact that m any of us took d if ferent roads to get h ere does not m ean that any o f us wanted any le s s to get to this part icu lar c o u r t r o o m this m orn ing but what it m eans is there are many alternative ways of reach ing a goal. S o m e t im es you get stuck on the e x p r e s s w a y and you don't get here until much later , other t im es you get h ere qu icker . What I a m submitting is that this part icu lar goal or this part icu lar m eans to obtain that goal o f an integrated e x p e r ie n ce can be obtained through this type of plan as opposed to A p r i l 7, which b eca u se of the rea l i t ie s o f our so c ie ty at p resent , p o l i t ica l and so c ia l , would not resu lt in an integrated sch oo l s y s te m but in a seg reg a ted sch oo l s y s te m and once that o c c u r s then there is no p os s ib i l i ty , I submit, o f attempting to re - in te g ra te the sy s tem . It 's so d if f icult once you lo se the dif ferent percen ta ges of ra c e s in a c ity or s y s t e m to attempt to re in trodu ce those r a c ia l m ixtures once they are gone. " (11 /18 T r . at 58). As mentioned p rev iou s ly , and as M em b er M cDonald m akes c l e a r in his tes t im ony , (11 /1 8 T r . 49 -51 ) there are many de fects in the A p r i l 7 Plan which indicate that it would not prov ide for the type of educational advantages which plaintiffs c la im fo r it. Included among these are l imitations on potential e x t r a - c u r r i c u la r act iv i t ies , trave ling to and f r o m sch oo l during winter months in darkn ess , thus creat ing an in c r e a se d safety hazard , proh ib it ive c o s t of m a n dated busing to the schoo l s y s te m and general student hosti l ity . It must always be r e m e m b e r e d that any plan of d esegrega t ion or any other type of educational s ch em e must look to educational advantages as the p r im e c r i t e r ia for s u c c e s s . 4 4. It must be noted that " P r o j e c t One" was an attempt to hold stable a highly m ob i le population in var ious areas of the City and this is not what Plan A is an attempt to do. Plan A is designed to take advantage of educational incentive r e g a r d le s s of population m obil ity . -2 1 - H IL L E R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 2 3 0 0 D E TR O IT B A N K » T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N It has been urged upon this Court, just as it has been urged upon e v e ry court s ince B row n in 1954, that the m e r e c o m p u ls o r y mixing of ra c e s in an educat ion al arena wil l by i tse l f produce educational advantage. That is all that A p r i l 7 t r ie s to do. Judge Roth, h ow ev er , found that truly integrated education as mandated by our cou rts , contem plates som ething e lse . His v iew was to put forth a plan which p r o m is e d to prov id e , not only ra c ia l m ix in the s c h o o ls , but a lso to add meaning and substance to this m ix . He found that the Plan A « p r o m is e d to prov ide a lasting integrated ex p er ien ce fo r a g rea ter percentage of Detroit sch oo l ch ildren . As the United States Supreme Court held in Green, su pra , at 441: "W here it ( f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e ) o f fe rs rea l p r o m is e of aiding a desegregat ion p r o g r a m to effectuate c o n v e r sion of a s ta te - im posed^ dual s y s te m to a unitary non- ra c ia l sy s te m there might be no ob ject ion to allowing such a dev ise to prove i tse l f in operation^5 6. " T h e r e fo r e , it cannot be held as a matter of fact, that the Magnet Plan is unconstitutional absent an a f te r - th e - fa c t look at its resu lts . It must a lso be noted, con trary to P la int i f f -A ppellants contention, that Dr. Cornelius Golightly r e co g n ize d that Plan A, which takes into con s id era t ion m o r e than s im ple ra c ia l mixing by num bers , would have a g rea te r l ikelihood of s u c c e s s . He stated that: "If we w ere in a different kind of environm ent and dif ferent kind of com m unity in which we dec ided that c o e r c io n , of c o u r s e , was the only way to do it then I might say you push the issue that way and we settle for 5. Again it must be stated that con trary to findings in all c a s e s concern ing " f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e " , the Detroit sch oo ls have not been found to operate a s ta te - im p o s e d dual or de jure system . A ls o , the magnet concept as explained e a r l ie r d i f fe rs m a ter ia l ly f r o m " f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e " found in de ju re s ch oo l sy s tem s . 6. P la in t i f fs ' contention that there w ere better a lternatives must be r e je c te d in light of Judge R oth 's Opinion on School Plans Submitted that it would not lead to integration as su c ce s s fu l ly as Plan A. -2 2 - M IL L E R . C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 2 3 0 0 D E T R O IT B A N K ft T R U 3T B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IO A N 4 6 2 2 6 (hat hut I d o not fuel that the City o f Detroit is exact ly the sam e as som e other c i t ie s which have had long h is to r ie s of de ju re d esegrega t ion . I think the City of Detro it is not that kind of c ity at all. The City of D etro it has its p r o b le m s , the s c h o o l s y s t e m has their p r o b le m s and I think we are b a s ic a l ly a decent and good s ch oo l sys tem . We have made a r e a l e f fo r t to r e s o lv e som e of the p r o b le m s that c o m e around the m atter of r a c e . I think the City of Detroit has made m o r e p r o g r e s s in integrating the staff at the adm in istrat ive le v e l w h ere we have perhaps m o r e b la ck p r in c ip a ls , m o r e b la ck ass is tant superintendents and the like than any other m a jo r northern c ity in the country and, th e r e fo r e , s ince we have had such trem endous p r o g r e s s in re ce n t y e a r s , I would hope, I was hoping that we cou ld w o rk out a solution that would be e ssen t ia l ly a p o l i t ica l so lution rather than a lega l court mandate s o lu tion and it is fo r this re a so n that the B oa rd in all c o n s c ie n c e d is cu ss the m e r it s of the magnet s c h o o l plan and the m e r it s of the magent s c h o o l c u r r i c u lu m plan and a lso of the A p r i l 7 plan, with the hope that w hatever plan is f inally a ccep ted by the C ourt that the s c h o o l s y s te m and the City of Detroit w il l m ov e fo rw a rd co n s tru c t iv e ly to r e s o lv e , bear ing in mind though m y own re s e r v a t io n that quality integrated education is not what other people always mean. " 1 1 /1 9 T r . at 161, 162. This is m e r e ly r e e n fo r c e m e n t for the pos it ion that this Court needs to look at all the m e r i t s of each plan. B . Plan A Includes M ore Than Magnet Sch oo ls . F o r F eb ru a ry 1, 1971 im plem entation , Plan A ca l ls for the i n c r e a s ing of enro l lm ents in all high sch oo ls to 125 per cent and in those high s ch oo ls a lready over 125 per cent to 10 per cent over their cu rren t enro l lm ent . The purpose of this is to prov ide space for the open en ro l lm en t of all high s c h o o ls . Only those t ra n s fe rs by high s ch oo l students which would in c r e a se d e s e g r e g a tion o f the re ce iv in g s ch oo l w il l be granted. This g ives to all high sch oo l students, not m e r e ly tenth g ra d e rs in twelve se le c ted s c h o o ls , the opportunity to attend m o r e "d e s e g r e g a te d s c h o o l s " im m ed ia te ly . It o f fe r s to a w ider range of people the opportunities to attend other sch oo ls and th e re fo re is m o r e b roa d in s cop e than the A p r i l 7 Plan. (Ex. A to Def. A ns. at VII) -2 3 - M IL LE R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 23 00 D E TR O IT B A N K & T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT . M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 6 a Plan A , a lso , prov ides f o r a m iddle sch oo l o f grades 5, 6, 7 and 8 which would be set up in each reg ion to h ouse 500 students of equal ra c ia l rat ios . T h ese sch oo ls a r e to go into e f fec t in Septem ber , 1971. (Ex. A to Def. A ns. at III) T h ese two additional facets of the Plan make it a m o r e fa r - r e a c h in g e f fort at d esegrega t ion than the A p r i l 7 Plan and a ls o support Judge R oth ’ s finding that Plan A is not unconstitutional as a m atter of fact. C. A s Has Been Indicated E a r l ie r Plan A Does M ore Than D esegrega te by the N u m bers , It Is a M ean ingful E ffort to P ro v id e Educational Advantages By- Using Integration A s a P a rt of the Whole Education Judge R oth ’ s opinion indicates that a cco rd in g to his f indings, Plan A p r o m is e s to do much m o r e than s im p le " integration by n u m b e r s " . It is obvious to educators that much m o r e is needed in our schoo ls than m e r e ly playing a num bers gam e in o r d e r to s e c u r e a meaningful educational ex p er ien ce f o r all students. C ourts , which a re in the posit ion of protecting the rights of all individuals, m ust make e v ery attempt to g ive their sanction to those plans which p r o m is e to g ive the m ost meaningful ex p er ien ce to the g rea tes t num bers in the sh ortes t t im e, and which a lso p r o m is e to endure f o r the longest p e r iod s . Judge Roth found Plan A had a much h igher l ikelihood o f fulfil l ing these needs than did e ither Plan B or the A p r i l 7 Plan. The Detroit Board o f Education a lso took full cogn izance of the type o f integration it m o s t p r e fe r r e d in unanimously (with one abstention) voting to p lace Plan A as the top p r io r i ty among the plans submitted. (Ex. A to Def. A ns . ) Although each of the plans provided som e hope for in creas in g the ra c ia l m ix o f sch oo ls in Detroit , The Board felt that Plan A would do this in the m o s t pos it ive manner. Judge Roth, then not only did not abuse his d is c re t io n in o rd er in g Plan A , but fully ob serv ed the letter and sp ir it of the law by ord er in g into e f fec t the best o f the plans presented to him. - 2 4 - M IL LE R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 2 5 0 0 D E T R O IT B A N K ft T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 8 2 2 0 4 D. P la in t i f fs , with Full Opportunity To Do So, F a i led To P r e s e n t E vidence to E stab l ish That A p r i l 7 is Su per ior to Plan A or B . P la intif fs had ample opportunity to p resen t ev idence as to the m e r it s of the A p r i l 7 Plan and its s u p e r io r i ty over Plan A or Plan B. They did not do th is . As indicated in the p r io r opinion of this Court , B r a d le y , su p ra , at 904, "T he granting or denial of a p re l im in a ry injunction pending final hearing on the m e r it s is within the sound ju d ic ia l d is c re t io n of the D is t r ic t Court . " Since this C o u r t 's last opinion, P la in t i f f -A pp e l lan ts have o f fe r e d no substantial ev idence to indicate that D etro it s ch oo ls are operated in a dual m anner , or that the A p r i l 7 Plan is su p er io r to Plan A. Thus Judge R oth 's d is c r e t io n is st i l l b ased on a partia l r e c o r d and should not be held abusive until all the ev idence is in. Pla intiffs argue, f r o m m e r e supposit ions , that Plan A is not as good as A p r i l 7, but even the est im ates of en ro l lm en t which they quote in their b r i e f at page 12 indicate that no one is certa in what e f fect that Plan would have. Since plaintiffs cou ld o f fer no other p r o o f as to the e f fe c t of A p r i l 7, it must be supposed that it was not beyond rea son a b le d is c re t io n to find Plan A m o r e l ikely to p rov ide for d esegrega t ion in Detro it . CONCLUSION AND P R A Y E R On the b a s is of the authorities c ited here in , the B oard of Education Defendants pray that this H onorable C ourt a f f i r m the D is tr ic t C ourt in o rd er in g im plem entation of the Magnet Plan in S eptem ber , 1971 -2 5 - M IL LE R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 2 5 0 0 D E T R O IT B A N K ft T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 B 22 S # and in continuing tr ia l on the m e r it s until Spring, 1971 R esp ec t fu l ly submitted, M i l le r . Canfield, Paddock and Sto And Louis R. Lee Attorneys for The Detroit B oard of Education 2500 Detroit Bank & Trust Building Detroit , Michigan 48226 Telephone - 963-6420 -2 6 - H IL L E R , C A N F IE L D , P A D D O C K A N D S T O N E , 2 3 0 0 D E TR O IT B A N K & T R U ST B U IL D IN G , D E T R O IT , M IC H IG A N 4 6 2 2 6 V- t fc & C E R T IF IC A T E OF SERVICE This is to c e r t i fy that co p ie s of the fo reg o in g B r ie f o f The Board o f Education D efen da nt -A ppe l lees has been serv ed on cou n se l f o r Appellants L ou is R. L u ca s , W il l iam E. Caldw ell , 525 C o m m e r c e T it le Building, M em ph is , T e n n e ss e e 38103; E. Winther M c C r o o m , 3245 W oodburn A venue, Cincinnati, Ohio 45207; Nathaniel Jones , 1790 Broadway, New Y ork , N. Y. ; Jack G r e e n b e rg , Jam es M. Nabrit III, N orm an J. Chachkin, 10 Colum bus C i r c l e , New Y ork , N, Y. 10019; B ru ce M i l le r , L u c i l le Watts, 3426 C a d i l la c T o w e r , Detroit , M ichigan 48226; J. Harold Flannery , Paul Dimond, 38 Kirland Street, C a m b r id ge , M a ss ; C ounsel fo r D e fe n d a n ts -A p p e l le e s , Eugene K ra s ick y , The Seven Story O ff ice Building, 525 W est Ottawa Street, Lansing , M ichigan 48926, and C ounsel fo r Intervening Defendant, T h eod ore Sachs, 3610 C adillac T o w e r , D e tr o i t , M ichigan 48226, by United States Mail, postage prepaid , this 3rd day o f F eb ru a ry , 1971. C a r l H. VonEnde - 2 7 -