Brief of the Board of Education of the School District of the City of Detroit Defendant-Appellees

    • I) a  v

IN THE UNITED STA TE S COURT OF A P P E A L S  

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

RONALD B R A D L E Y , et a l.  ,

P la inti f f  -A p p e l la n ts ,

v.

W IL L IA M  G. M ILLIKEN, et al. ,

D e fen d a n t -A p p e l lees ,  No. 21036

and

D E TR O IT  F E D E R A TIO N  OF TEACH ERS

D efendant-In tervenor ,

B R IEF OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE C ITY  OF D E T R O IT , P A T R IC K  M cDON ALD 

JAMES H ATH A W A Y, CORNELIUS G O L IG H TLY , AND 
NORMAN D R A C H L E R : D E F E N D A N T -A P P E L L E E S

M il le r ,  Canfield , Paddock  and Stone 
2500 D etro it  Bank and T ru st  Building 
D etro it ,  M ich igan  48226

T elephone :  963-642 0 

A T T O R N E Y S  FOR

THE DETROIT BOARD O F EDUCATION DEFENDANTS



M
IL

LE
R

, 
C

A
N

F
IE

L
D

, 
P

A
D

D
O

C
K

 A
N

D
 S

T
O

N
E

, 
2

3
0

0
 D

E
TR

O
IT

 B
A

N
K

 &
 T

R
U

ST
 B

U
IL

D
IN

G
, 

D
E

T
R

O
IT

, 
M

IC
H

IG
A

N
 4

8
2

2
6

T A B L E  OF CONTENTS

T A B L E  OF AUTHORITIES 

C O U N TE R STA TE M E N T OF ISSUES 

C O U N TE R ST A TE M E N T OF FA C TS 

ARGU M EN T 3

I. The Sole Issue, If Any, B e fo r e  This Court Is 
Whether The D is tr ic t  C ou rt 's  O rd ers  M an­
dating Implementation o f  the Magnet Plan and 
Granting D efen dant -A ppe l lees '  Motion fo r  
Continuance Constitute C lear  A buse  o f  His 
D is c re t io n  in Handling In ter locutory  Injunctive
Matters. 3

A . Neither the D istr ic t  C ou rt 's  O rd er  D irect ing  
Implementation o f  the Magnet Plan Nor its 
O rder  Granting the Motion fo r  Continuance is 
R eview able  by this Court on an In ter locutory
B as is .  3

B. The D istr ic t  C ourt 's  O rd ers  H erein  Complained 
o f  May Be R e v e r s e d  Only upon a Showing o f  C lear  
Abuse  o f  the B road  D is c re t io n  A c c o r d e d  T r ia l  
Courts in Ruling on P r e l im in a r y  Injunctive M atters .  3

C. In Reviewing the T r ia l  C ourt 's  D ispos it ion  o f  the 
P r e l im in a ry  Injunctive M atters H ere  Involved,
This Court Should Not P r e m is e  Its R ev iew  Upon 
the Relative  M er its  o f  the Plans P resen ted
to the T r ia l  Court or  Upon a Pre judgm ent o f  the
Issues to Be D ecided  at the T r ia l  on the M er its ,  4, 5

II. The D istr ic t  C ou rt 's  Continuance o f  the T r ia l  o f  This
Matter On the M er its  is Not P r o p e r ly  B e fore  This 
Court fo r  R ev iew  and, Even If R eview ed  by this Court 
Should Not Be Set A s id e .  6

A . An O rder  Continuing Date o f  T r ia l  Is Not An 
Injunctive Matter Within 28 U. S. C. §1292(a)
(1) And Thus Is Not R ev iew able  on an
Inter locutory  B as is .  6

B. P la inti f f -Appellants  P rov id e  this Court with No
R eason  W hatsoever  to R e v e r s e  the T r ia l  C ou rt 's  
O rder  Continuing T r ia l ,  Even Should this Court 
Undertake to R ev iew  Such O rd er .  6

(1) The Im m ed iacy  R equ irem ents  o f  C arter  
and A lexa n der Apply  Only in R em ed ia l  
Situations W here De Jure Segregation  Has 
Been Found; Not in P r e - T r i a l  Situations

111 , iv

V

1

I

1



M
IL

L
E

R
, 

C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

23
00

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 f

t 
T

R
U

ST
 B

U
IL

D
IN

G
, 

D
E

T
R

O
IT

, 
M

IC
H

IG
A

N
 4

8
2

2
6

 =

W here  No Such Findings Have Been Made.

(2) The Only Matter on Which P la in t i f f -  
Appellants Can A s s e r t  a C la im  for  
P r e l im in a r y  R e l i e f  is the A p r i l  7 Plan, 
and that Matter is C urrently  B e fo re  
this Court and Is T ota l ly  Unaffected by 
A d journm ent  o f  the T r ia l  on the M e r its .

III. Judge Roth Did Not A buse  His D is c re t io n  as a
Matter o f  Law  By O rder ing  the Implementation
o f  Plan A  Instead o f  the A p r i l  7 Plan

A. Implementation o f  the A p r i l  7 Plan Is Not 
Constitutionally  Mandated.

B. Plan A  Is Not An Unconstitutional F r e e d o m  o f  
C hoice  Plan.

IV. Judge Roth Did Not Abuse  His D is c re t io n  B ecause
Plan A  Is Not Unconstitutional A s  Matter o f  Fact ,

A . Judge Roth Found Plan A  S u per ior  to the A p r i l  
7 Plan as a Matter o f  F a ct  Based on T es t im on y  
and the P r e fe r e n c e  o f  The B oard  of  Education.

B. Plan A  Includes M o r e  Than Magnet S ch oo ls .

C. A s  Has Been Indicated E a r l ie r  Plan A  Does 
M o r e  Than D eseg reg a te  by the N u m bers ,  It 
Is a Meaningful E ffo r t  to P r o v id e  Educational 
Advantages By Using Integration A s a Part  
o f  the Whole Education Spectrum .

D. P la inti f fs ,  with Full Opportunity To Do So, 
Fa iled  To P resen t  E vidence  to E stab l ish  That 
A p r i l  7 is S u per ior  to Plan A  or  B.

CONCLUSION AND P R A Y E R  

C E R T IF IC A T E  OF SERVICE

7

8

9

17

19

20

23

24

25

25

27

li



M
IL

L
E

R
, 

C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

25
00

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 f

t 
T

R
U

ST
 B

U
IL

D
IN

G
, 

D
E

T
R

O
IT

, 
M

IC
H

IG
A

N
 4

3
2

2
6

• #
T A B L E  OF AUTHORITIES

C ases  Cited
P a e e

A lexander  v. H olm es  County Board of Education
396 U .S .  19 (1969) 6, 7, 16

A m e r i c a n  F ed era t ion  of M usic ians  v. Stein
213 F .2 d  679. 683 (6th C ir .  1954), ce r t ,  denied, 348 U .S .  873 4

B rad ley  et al. v. M il l iken , et al. 
433 F .  2d 897 (6th C ir .  1970) 4, 8, 25

.
Brotherhood of L o co m o t iv e  E ngineers  v. M .K .  T . R .  Co.
363 U .S .  528, 535 (I960)

.

4

Burton v. Mantanuska V alley  L ines ,  Inc. 
244 F .  2d 647 (9th C ir .  1953) 4

C arter  v. W est  F e l ic ia n a  P a r ish  School  Board
396 U .S .  226 (1969)

.

6, 7, 16, 
19

Cowden Mfg. Co. v. K oratron  
422 F .  2d 371 (6th C ir .  1970) 4

G a r lo ck  v. United. Seal, In c . ,  404 F .2 d  257 (6th C ir .  1968) 5

Green  v. County School  Board of New Kent County 
391 U .S .  430 (1968)

j
17, 18, 
19, 20

H ornback v. B rotherhood of R . R .  Signalmen 
346 F .  2d 161 (6th C ir .  1965) 5

! Hunter v. E r ick so n ,  393 U .S .  385 (1969)L ,  — - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
9, 10

J
: Keyes v. S chool  D is t r i c t  Number One, D enver ,  C o lora d o  
\ 303 F .Su p p .  279 (D. C olo .  1969); on rem and, 303 F .  Supp.

289 (D. C o lo .  1969); stay vacated , 24 L . Ed. 37 (1969);
I after tr ia l ,  313 F .  Supp 61 (D. C o lo .  1970) 12, 13,

14, 15, 16

LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co. , 352 U .S .  249, 257 (1957) 4

M onroe  v. Board of C o m m is s io n e r s ,  391 U .S .  450 (1968) 18

Nashville  1-40 Steering C om m ittee  v. Ellington, 387 F .2 d  
179, 182 (6th C ir .  1967), c e r t ,  denied, 380 U. S. 921 4

Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U .S .  443 (1968) 18

Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U .S .  369 (1967) 10, 11

United States v. C o r r i c k ,  298 U .S .  435, 437 (1935) 4

111



Constitution and Statutes

Fourteenth  A m endm ent to the United States Constitution

28. U. S. C. 1292 (a) (1)

M ichigan P u b l ic  A ct  48, 1970

Page

10

3, 6

8, 9, 11

Other Authorit ies

Karst  & H orow itz ,  "R e itm a n  v. Mulkley: A  T e lop h a se  of
-Substantive Equal P ro te c t ion ,  " 1967 Sup. Ct, R e v . 39, 10

Kurland, "E g a l i ta r ia n is m  and the W a rren  C ourt" ,  68 Mich.
L. Rev. 629, 645 (1970) 18

IV



M
IL

LE
R

, C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

25
00

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 a

 T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

 4
8

2
2

8

C O U N T E R ST A T E M E N T  OF ISSUES

1. Under the Fourteenth Am endm ent and the d ec is ion s  in te r ­

preting it, including this C ou rt 's  O ctober  13, 1970 Opinion in B ra d ley  v. 

M il l iken , did the D is tr ic t  Court,  in con s id er in g  P la in t i f f -A p p e l la n ts ' Motion * 2

to Im plem ent Plan, have the b roa d  d is c re t ion  n orm a lly  a c c o r d e d  tr ia l  judges 

in con s id er in g  p re l im in a ry  injunctive m a t te r s ?

D efendant-A ppellees  submit that this question 
should be answ ered  "Y e s .  "

2. Whether, on the facts contained in the r e c o r d  b e fo r e  it, the 

D is tr ic t  Court acted  within the scope  of its d is cre t ion  in ord er in g  Plan A  into 

e f fec t  ?

D efendant-A ppellees  submit that this question 
should be answ ered  "Y e s .  "

v



M
IL

L
E

R
. C

A
N

F
IE

L
D

, 
P

A
D

D
O

C
K

 A
N

D
 S

T
O

N
E

, 
2

5
0

0
 D

E
TR

O
IT

 B
A

N
K

 a
 T

R
U

ST
 B

U
IL

D
IN

G
, 

D
E

T
R

O
IT

, 
M

IC
H

IG
A

N
 4

6
2

2
6

IN THE UNITED STA TE S COURT OF A P P E A L S

F O R  THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

RON ALD B R A D L E Y , et al. , :

P la in t i f f -A p p e l lan ts ,  : 

v. :

W IL L IA M  G. MILLIKEN, et al. , :

D e fe n d a n t -A p p e l le e s , : No. 21036

and

D E TR O IT FE D E R A TIO N  OF TEACHERS, :

D efendant-Intervenor  o :

C O U N T E R ST A T E M E N T  OF FA C T S

In light of the C ou rt 's  fa m il ia r i ty  with the ca se  at bar ar is ing  out 

o f  an e a r l ie r  appeal by  P la in t i f f -A p p e l la n ts , the B oard  o f  Education Defendants 

would  confine their  counter statement of the ca se  to a ch r o n o lo g ic a l  su m m ary  

o f  act iv it ies  which have o c c u r r e d  s ince  that f i r s t  appeal. On O ctober  27, 1970, 

P la in t i f f -A ppel lan ts  f i led  a "M otion  to Im plem ent Plan, " which sought an O rder  

req u ir in g  im m ediate  im plem entation  of  the s o - c a l l e d  A p r i l  7 Plan. That m otion 

was noticed  for  hearing  on N ov em b er  4, 1970, the day on which the t r ia l  on the 

m er it s  was to c o m m e n c e .  In con sequ en ce ,  the t r ia l  cou rt  continued the date 

o f  t r ia l  until D e c e m b e r  7, 1970 and took tes t im ony  on P la in t i f f -A ppel lan ts  1 

m otion  on N ov em b er  4, 1970.

On N ov em ber  6, 1970, Judge Roth entered  an O rder  mandating the 

B oard  o f  Education Defendants to submit, within twelve days, a d esegrega t ion  

plan cons is t ing  of  the high s ch oo l  attendance changes contained in the A p r i l  7 

P lan  or  " .  . . an updated v e r s io n  th ereo f  which ach ieves  no le s s  pupil integration

-1  -



M
IL

LE
R

, C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

23
00

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 ft

 T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

 4
8

2
2

0

. . . . "  (O rder  at l ) 1 than the A p r i l  7 Plan. On N ov em ber  16, 1970, the B oard  

of Education Defendants submitted three  a lternative plans to the court  - -  the 

Magnet Plan, the Magnet C u rr icu lu m  Plan and the A p r i l  7 Plan. In the letter 

submitted with the plans, the B oa rd  indicated its own p r io r i t ie s  among them, 

giving top p r io r i ty  to the Magnet Plan, second  p r io r i ty  to the Magnet C u r r i c ­

ulum Plan and third p r io r i ty  to the A p r i l  7 Plan.

On N ov em ber  18, 19, and 25, 1970, substantial tes t im ony  was 

presented  regard ing  the plans by each  m e m b e r  of  the B oard  and two m e m b e r s  

o f  its staff. P la in t i f f -A ppellants  p resen ted  no w itn esses  f r o m  outside the 

Detro it  Public  Schoo l  S ys tem  to test i fy  with r e s p e c t  to the plans. A  su m m a ry  

o f  this tes t im ony  is p resen ted  in sec t ion  IV of  the Argum ent port ion  o f  this 

B r ie f ,  su p r a .

On D ecem b er  3, Judge Roth issued  his "Ruling on Sch oo l  Plans 

Submitted, " mandating im plem entation  of the Magnet Plan in Septem ber  1970, 

and entered an O rder  in con fo rm ity  with that Ruling. Additionally ,  Judge Roth 

issued  his "Ruling on Motion fo r  Continuance, " adjourning the tr ia l  o f  this 

cause  on the m e r it s .  F r o m  these Rulings and the O rd ers  entered  in c o n s e ­

quence o f  such rulings, P la in t i f f -A ppellants  have taken this, their second ,  

appeal to this Honorable  Court.

1. Since D efendant-A ppellees  have not been  s e r v e d  with a cop y  of  P la int i f f -  
A ppellants '  Appendix to their B r ie f  as req u ired  by Rule 30, F . R .  A. P . , 
and as p r o m is e d  in their B r ie f  at 5, r e fe r e n c e s  to the r e c o r d  w il l  be 
made in a cco rd a n ce  with Rule 28(e),  F . R .  A. P.

- 2 -



M
IL

L
E

R
. 

C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

2
3

0
0

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 f

t 
T

R
U

ST
 B

U
IL

D
IN

G
, 

D
E

T
R

O
IT

, 
M

IC
H

IG
A

N
 4

8
2

2
6

AR G U M E N T i

I. THE SOLE ISSUE, IF A N Y, B E F O R E  THIS COURT IS 
W HETHER THE DISTRICT C O U R T ’ S ORDERS M A N ­
DATING IM P L E M E N T A T IO N  O F  THE M AGNET P L A N  
AND GRANTING D E F E N D A N T -A P P E L L E E S '  MOTION 
FOR CONTINUANCE CONSTITUTE C L E A R  ABUSE OF 
HIS DISCRETION IN HANDLING IN T E R L O C U T O R Y  IN­
JUNCTIVE M A T T E R S .

A . N either the D is t r ic t  C ou rt 's  O r d e r  D irect ing  Im p le m e n ­
tation o f  the Magnet Plan N or its O rd e r  Granting the 
M otion  fo r  Continuance is R ev iew ab le  by this Court on 
an In ter locu tory  B a s i s .

A s  m o r e  fully  argued in the M otion  to D is m is s  P la intif f  - A ppellant s ' 

Appea l  and B r ie f  in support th e r e o f  h e re to fo r e  f i led  with this Court, the Board  

o f  Education Defendants submit that neither O r d e r  sought to be rev iew ed  on this 

appeal m a y  p r o p e r ly  be p la ced  b e fo r e  this Court. C lear ly ,  the O r d e r  d irect ing  

im plem entation  o f  the Magnet Plan runs against the B oard  o f  Education D e fen ­

dants and mandates no act ion  w h a tsoev er  by  P la in t i f f -A pp e l lan ts .  Consequently , 

P la in t i f f -A pp e l lan ts  la ck  standing to seek  rev iew  o f  this O r d e r .  Equally  c le a r ly ,  

the tr ia l  c o u r t 's  grant o f  a continuance o f  the tr ia l  o f  this cau se  m ay  not be r e ­

v iew ed  by this Court under 28 U. S. C. §1292(a )( l ) ,  which  p rov id es  f o r  in te r lo c u ­

to ry  re v ie w  o f  in junctive o r d e r s  only. F o r  these  re a s o n s ,  the Board  o f  

Education Defendants urge  that P la in t i f f -A p p e l la n ts ' appeal be d is m is s e d .  

P la in t i f f -A ppe l lan ts  m ay  la ter  seek  re v ie w  o f  these  m atters  in an o r d e r ly  

fashion  after  a tr ia l  on the m e r i t s  is had.

B. The D is tr ic t  C ou rt 's  O r d e r s  H erein  Com pla ined  o f  May 
Be R e v e r s e d  Only upon a Showing o f  C lear  A buse  o f  the 
B road  D iscre t ion  A c c o r d e d  T r ia l  Courts in Ruling on
P r e l im in a r y  Injunctive M atters .

In con s id er in g  m otions  f o r  p r e l im in a ry  injunctive re l ie f ,  t r ia l  courts  

a re  req u ired  to weigh ca re fu l ly  the many fa c to rs  which bear on the right to such 

re l ie f .  A m ong  these  fa c to rs  a re  the fo l low ing :  i r r e p a ra b i l i ty  o f  harm  to the 

m oving  party , balance o f  equities among the pa rt ies ,  probab i l i ty  that the m o v -



M
IL

LE
R

, 
C

A
N

F
IE

L
D

, 
P

A
D

D
O

C
K

 A
N

D
 S

T
O

N
E

, 
2

3
0

0
 D

E
TR

O
IT

 B
A

N
K

 f
t 

T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

 4
8

2
2

6

t •
ing party w ill  su c c e e d  on the m e r i t s  and the in terest  o f  the public .  Due to the 

com plex ity  o f  these  fa c to rs  and the p ecu l ia r  ability  o f  the tr ia l  judge to v iew  

them in the p e r s p e c t iv e  o f  the m atter  pending b e fo r e  him, the grant o r  denial o f  

such r e l ie f  w il l  be  r e v e r s e d  only upon a finding o f  c le a r  abuse o f  d is c r e t io n  by 

the tr ia l  judge. B rotherhood  o f  L o c o m o t iv e  E ngineers  v. M. K, T. R. Co. , 363 

U. S. 528, 535, (I960); United States v. C o r r i c k , 298 U. S. 435, 437 (1935).

This  " c l e a r  abuse o f  d i s c r e t io n "  standard o f  r e v e r s a l  is a lso  the settled law of  

this Circuit .  B rad ley ,  et al. v« Milliken, et a l . , 433 F . 2d 897 (6th C ir .  1970), 

Cowden Mfg, Co. v. K o r a tr o n , 422 F. 2d 371 (6th C ir .  1970); N ashvil le  1-40 

Steering C om m ittee  v. E ll ington , 387 F. 2d 179, 182 (6th C ir .  1967), c e r t ,  

denied, 380 U. S. 921; A m e r i c a n  F ederation  o f  M usic ians v. Stein , 213 F. 2d 

679, 683 (6th C ir .  1954), ce r t ,  denied, 348 U .S . 873.

This  Court should e x e r c i s e  grea t  c a r e  not to substitute its d is c r e t io n  

for  that o f  the tr ia l  judge b e fo re  whom  many pages o f  tes t im on y  w e r e  taken with 

r e s p e c t  to the m atters  now p laced  b e fo re  this Court fo r  rev iew .  Burton v. 

Mantanuska V alley  L in es ,  Inc. , 244 F. 2d 647 (9th Cir .  1953). The e x t r a o r d in ­

a ry  pow er  o f  this Court to in ter fe re  with the d is c re t io n  o f  the t r ia l  court  should 

be e x e r c i s e d  only " .  . . in the exceptiona l  ca se  w here  there  is a c l e a r  abuse of 

d i s c r e t i o n . . . . "  LaBuy v. Howes Leather  Co. , 352 U.S . 249, 257 (1957). The

r e c o r d  b e low ,  and pa rt icu la r ly  Judge R oth 's  "Ruling on School  Plans
. -

Submitted" dated D e ce m b e r  3, 1970, rev ea ls  no abuse o f  d is c r e t io n  whatsoever. ;  

On the con trary ,  the r e c o r d  dem onstrates  that Judge Roth analyzed with great  

ca r e  the d esegrega t ion  plans p laced  b e fo re  him by the p a rt ies .  Thus, the 

Board o f  Education Defendants re sp ect fu l ly  urge  this Court not to d isturb the 

O r d e rs  o f  the D is tr ic t  Court here  involved.

C. In Reviewing the T r ia l  C ourt 's  D ispos it ion  o f  the P r e l im in a r y  
Injunctive M atters H ere  Involved, This  Court Should Not 
P r e m is e  Its R ev iew  Upon the Relative  M er its  o f  the Plans 
P resen ted  to the T r ia l  Court o r  Upon a P re judgm ent  o f  the

- 4 -



M
IL

LE
R

, 
C

A
N

F
IE

L
D

, 
P

A
D

D
O

C
K

 A
N

D
 S

T
O

N
E

, 
28

00
 D

E
TR

O
IT

 B
A

N
K

 f
t 

T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

 4
8

2
2

6

# •
*  •

Issues  to Be D ec ided  at the T r ia l  on the M e r it s .

P la in t i f f -A pp e l lan ts  would have this Court substitute its judgment fo r
|

that o f  the tr ia l  cou rt  in re -eva lu a t ing  the re la t ive  m e r i t s  o f  the th ree  plans p r e ­

sented below. F r o m  the b r ie f  f i led  by P la in t i f f -A ppel lan ts  in this Court, one
I

would p r e su m e  that the Magnet Plan i t se l f  is on t r ia l  be fo re  this Court. In r e ­

questing this Court to re a ch  the m e r it s  o f  var ious  plans presen ted ,  P la in t i f f -  

Appellants m isapprehend  the function o f  an appellate  court  in rev iew ing ,  on an 

in te r lo cu to ry  b as is ,  the act ions o f  a tr ia l  judge with reg a rd  to p r e l im in a ry  in ­

junctive  m a tte rs .  The rule that the grant o r  denial o f  a p r e l im in a ry  injunction 

m a y  be r e v e r s e d  only upon a showing o f  c le a r  abuse o f  d is c r e t io n  has the 

c o r o l l a r y  that an appellate  court  should not c o n s id e r  the m e r it s  o f  the ca se  

further  than is n e c e s s a r y  to rev iew  the tr ia l  c o u r t 's  e x e r c i s e  o f  d is c re t io n .  

G a r lo c k  v. United Seal, Inc. , 404 F. 2d 257 (6th C ir .  1968); Hornback v. 

B rotherhood  o f  R. R. Signalmen, 346 F. 2d 161 (6th C ir .  1965).

Consequently ,  the issue  be fo re  this Court is not which  plan presented  

be low  would, in the opinion o f  this Court, w ork  m o s t  e f fe c t iv e ly  in Detroit .  The 

so le  issu e  which  this Court must dec ide  is whether Judge Roth abused his d i s ­

c re t ion  in re je c t in g  the single plan which  P la in t i f f -A ppel lants  p ro p o se d  and the 

only plan of  which they apparently  a pprove .  Unless P la in t i f f -A ppel lan ts  can 

dem onstra te  to this Court, as a m atter  of  law, that the D is tr ic t  Court was under 

an absolute constitutional duty to enter an O rd er  requir ing  im plem entation  of  the 

s o - c a l l e d  A p r i l  7 P la n - - th a t  is ,  unless they prove  that Judge Roth had absolutely  

no d is c re t io n  in the m a t te r - - th e n  this appeal must fail .  Absent p r o o f  o f  such an 

absolute  duty, Judge R oth 's  O rd e r  requir ing  im plem entation  o f  the plan which he 

co n s id e re d  to " .  . . [hold] out the best p r o m is e  of  e f fec t ive  l o n g - t e r m  integration"  

(Ruling at 6) is c l e a r ly  within his d is c re t io n  and must be perm itted  to stand.

- 5 -



M
IL

LE
R

, 
C

A
N

F
IE

L
D

, 
P

A
D

D
O

C
K

 A
N

D
 S

T
O

N
E

, 
25

00
 D

E
TR

O
IT

 B
A

N
K

 f
t 

T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

 4
8

2
2

6

#
II. THE DISTRICT C OU RT'S  CONTINUANCE O F  THE TR IA L  

O F  THIS M A T T E R  ON THE MERITS IS NOT P R O P E R L Y  
B E F O R E  THIS COURT FOR REVIEW  AND, EVEN IF R E ­
VIEWED BY THIS COURT, SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE.

A. An O rd e r  Continuing Date of  T r ia l  Is Not An Injunctive 
Matter Within 28 U. S. C. §1292(a)( l )  And Thus Is Not 
R eview able  on an Inter locutory  B a s i s .

P la in t i f f -A ppellants  urge  this Court to r e v e r s e  the tr ia l  c o u r t 's  O rd er  

continuing the tr ia l  o f  this m atter  on the m e r it s  until A p r i l  o f  the current  y ea r .  

The B oard  o f  Education Defendants resp ect fu l ly  submit that, on the basis  o f  the 

authorities cited  in their  B r ie f  in Support o f  Motion to D ism iss  P la in t i f f -  

Appellants '  Appeal,  this m atter  m ay  not p r o p e r ly  be p laced  b e fore  this Court on 

an in ter lo cu tory  bas is .

Section 1292(a)(1) o f  Tit le  28 of  the United States Code authorizes  

in ter lo cu tory  appeals f rom  o r d e r s  granting o r  denying p re l im in a ry  injunctive
i

re l ie f ,  thereby  creat ing  an exception  to the c le a r  F e d e ra l  p o l i cy  against re p e a t ­

ed p ie c e m e a l  appeals .  It is patent that a continuance of tr ia l  is pure ly  a p r o ­

cedura l  m atter within the d is c re t io n  o f  the tr ia l  court and has no injunctive 

aspect  w h atsoever .  Thus, the Board o f  Education Defendants submit that this 

Court is without ju r isd ic t ion  to rev iew , as an in ter locu tory  m atter ,  the t r ia l  

judge 's  o rd e r  continuing tr ia l .

B. P la inti f f -A ppellants  P rov id e  this Court with No R eason  
W hatsoever  to R e v e r s e  the T r ia l  C ourt 's  O rd er  Continuing 
T r ia l ,  Even Should this Court Undertake to R ev iew  Such * 1
O rd er .

(1) The Im m ed iacy  R equ irem ents  of  C arter  and 
A lexander  Apply Only in R em edia l  Situations 
W here De Jure Segregation  Has Been Found;
Not in P r e - T r i a l  Situations Where No Such 
Findings Have Been Made.

In their b r ie f  be fore  this Court, P la in t i f f -A ppellants  contend that the 

im m ed ia cy  requ irem ents  set by A lexander  v. H olm es County B oard  of  Education, 

396 U. S. 19 (1969), and C arter  v. West F e l ic iana  P a r ish  School B o a r d , 396 U. S, 

226 (1969) requ ire  r e v e r s a l  o f  the tr ia l  c o u r t 's  continuance of  the tr ia l  of  this 

ca se  on the m e r i t s .  The B oard  o f  Education Defendants utterly  r e je c t  this co n -

-6 -



M
IL

L
E

R
, 

C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

2
5

0
0

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 &

 T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

 4
8

2
2

5

tention as a g r o s s  m is -a p p l i c a t io n  of  those c a s e s .  Both A lexander  and C a rter  

invo lved  s c h o o l  d is tr ic t s  p rov ed  to have been  operated  on a de ju re  seg reg a ted  

b a s is .  T hose  c a s e s  w e r e  c o n c e r n e d  with the question of r e m e d y  only: once the

right to r e l i e f  has been  estab l ished ,  how quickly  must that r e l i e f  be i m p le ­

m ented .  We agree  that im m e d ia c y  is the only co n s t i tu t io n a l ly -p e r m is s ib le  

standard fo r  im plem enting  r e l ie f .

H ow ever ,  in the ca se  at b a r ,  there  has b een  abso lu te ly  no finding, 

e ither as a m atter o f  law or of  fact,  that the D etro it  Public  S choo ls  are  

seg reg a ted  on a de ju re  b a s is .  In fact,  Judge Roth e x p r e s s ly  stated that:

"We cannot at this point p r o c e e d  on the assum ption  
that plaintiffs w i l l  s u c ce e d  in proving  their c la im ,  in 
the hearing  on the m e r i t s ,  that the Detroit  s ch oo l  is 
a seg reg a ted  s ch oo l  system , de ju re  or de facto .  "
Ruling on Schoo l  Plans Submitted at 8.

C onsequently ,  P la in t i f f -A p p e l la n ts ' argum ent that the D is tr ic t  C o u r t 's  a d jo u rn ­

ment of t r ia l  v io la tes  the A lexander  im m e d ia cy  standard is without m e r i t  on 

the facts  o f  this ca s e .  2

(2) The Only Matter on Which P la in t i f f -A ppel lants  
Can A s s e r t  a C la im  for  P r e l im in a r y  R e l i e f  is 
the A p r i l  7 Plan, and that Matter is C urrent ly  
B e fo r e  this C ourt  and Is T ota lly  Unaffected by 
A djournm ent o f  the T r ia l  on the M er its .

As noted e a r l ie r  here in ,  the only substantive matter b e fo r e  this 

C ourt  is the D is tr ic t  C ou rt 's  ruling with r e s p e c t  to the plans submitted b e low . 

The continuance of  tr ia l  neither im pedes  this C o u rt 's  re v ie w  of the tr ia l  c o u r t 's  

ruling on plans nor f o r e c l o s e s  P la in t i f f -A ppel lants  f r o m  presenting  grounds for  

additional r e l i e f  at the tr ia l  on the m e r it s .  Thus, the B oard  of Education 

Defendants r e s p e c t fu l ly  submit that P la in t i f f -A ppel lants  have not and cannot p r e ­

sent to this C ourt  any b as is  upon which to in ter fe re  with the tr ia l  c o u r t 's  b roa d  

d is c re t io n  in establish ing  and m odify ing  its t r ia l  ca lendar .  The only p oss ib le  

issue  upon which  P la in t i f f -A ppel lants  may have a c la im  for  im m ediate  r e l i e f - -

- 7 -



M
IL

LE
R

. C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
. 

2
5

0
0

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 ft

 T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

. 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
. 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

 4
8

2
2

6

the tr ia l  judge 's  denial of  their m otion  to requ ire  implementation of the A pri l

7 plan- - is currently  b e fo r e  this Court f o r  im m ediate  d isposit ion .

III. JUDGE ROTH DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION AS
A M A T T E R  OF LAW BY ORDERING THE IM P L E M E N ­
TATIO N OF P L A N  A INSTEAD OF THE A P R IL  7 PLA N

In the f i r s t  in ter locutory  appeal in this ca se ,  this Honorable  Court 

held Section 1 2 of A ct  48 to be unconstitutional and a ff irm ed  the D is tr ic t  C ou rt 's
:

denial of a p re l im in a ry  injunction. B rad ley  v. Milliken, 433 F. 2d 897 (6th Cir. 

1970). On O ctober  29, 1970 P la in t i f f -A ppellants  m oved  for  the " im plem entation
I

of the A pr i l  7th plan at once .  " (Motion to Implement Plan, at 1. ) On N ovem ber

4, 1970, the date set by the D is tr ic t  Court to begin the tr ia l  on the m e r it s ,

P la in t i f f -A ppellants  ca lled  Dr. D ra ch le r  and presented  ev idence  in support of

that Motion. On the afternoon of N ov em ber  4th, at the c lo s e  of  P la inti f fs '

p roo fs ,  Judge Roth ruled f r o m  the bench that the Board of Education had until

N ov em ber  16, 1970 to submit "a  plan along the lines of the A p r i l  7, 1970 Plan,

or  an updated v e rs io n  th ereo f  or som e other plan which under the rules  the Court

ixiay find acceptab le .  . . . "  (Ruling of the Court on Miotion to Im plem ent Plan, at

3. ) The Board of Education com plied  with this o rd er  and submitted three

2
plans to the Court on N ovem ber  16th. The Board unanimously ass igned  f i r s t  

p r io r i ty  to Plan A, second p r io r i ty  to Plan B, and third p r io r i ty  to the A pr i l  

7th Plan. On N ovem ber  18, 19 and 25, 1970 each  m e m b e r  of the Board of 

Education test if ied  concern ing  the three plans b e fo r e  the D is tr ic t  Court. On 

D e c e m b e r  3, 1970 Judge Roth issued his Opinion ord er in g  the implem entation  

of  Plan A. On the same day, an O rd er  was entered ov er  the ob ject ion  to its 

f o rm  of counsel  f o r  the Board of Education Defendants, and P la in t i f f -A ppellants  

filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. 2

2. The Letter  of Transm itta l  and the text of Plan A (Magnet School Plan) and 
Plan B (Magnet C u rr icu lum  Plan) w ere  submitted to this Court on D e c e m b e r  24, 
1970 as Exhibit A to D e fe n d a n ts -A p p e l le e s ' A nsw er  to P laintiff  s -A ppel lants  
Motion fo r  Summary R e v e r s a l  or  in the A lternative  fo r  Injunction Pending Appeal.

i

- 8 -



M
IL

L
E

R
, 

C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

2S
O

O
 D

E
TR

O
IT

 B
A

N
K

 &
 T

R
U

ST
 B

U
IL

D
IN

G
, 

D
E

T
R

O
IT

, 
M

IC
H

IG
A

N
 4

6
2

2
6

P la in t i f f -A pp e l lan ts  again contend, as they did b e fo r e  the D is t r i c t  Court in

Septem ber ,  the Sixth C ircu it  in O c to b e r ,  and Judge Roth in D e c e m b e r ,  that the 

im plem entation  of the A p r i l  7 Plan is constitutionally  requ ired .  This  contention 

has never  been  c le a r ly  explained by P la in t i f f -A p p e l la n ts , and in the ir  B r ie f  

to this C ourt  they again fa i l  to show why A p r i l  7 is mandated, but content th e m ­

se lv e s  with an attack on P lan  A.

A . Im plem entation  of the A p r i l  7 Plan Is Not Constitutionally  
Mandated.

The only argum ent made by P la in t i f f -A ppel lan ts  that the im p lem en ta ­

tion of A p r i l  7 is requ ired  by law is found in their  B r ie f  at 28-29. T h e ir  a r g u ­

m ent is that Section 1 2 of A ct  48 denied plaintiffs of their  constitutional rights 

and that in holding that Section to be unconstitutional this Court held that the 

plaintiffs had a constitutional right to attend high sch oo l  under the A p r i l  7 Plan. 

P la in t i f f -A ppel lan ts  contend, in e f fect ,  that once a state agency  has taken a 

wholly  voluntary act ion  designed to in crease  the d eg ree  of integration in its 

s ch o o ls  that it is " l o c k e d - i n "  to that action  and m ay  not change or  a lter it in any 

way; a sort  of  " r a tc h e t "  theory  of  the Fourteenth  Amendment.

As this Court ca re fu l ly  pointed out in its O c to b e r  13, 1970 Opinion:

"B y  this ruling on the invalidity of §12, we e x p re s s  no 
opinion at the present  stage of the ca se  as to the m e r it s  
of the plan adopted by the School  Board on A pri l  7, 1970, 
o r  as to whether it was the constitutional obligation of 
the School  Board to adopt all or  any part of that plan. "
(Slip Op. , at 1 3. )

In the two Suprem e Court c a se s  bear ing  d i r e c t ly  on the question of the 

constitutionality  of Section 12, the Court made it c le a r  that there is no ratchet 

theory in the Fourteenth  Amendment.

In Hunter v. E r i c k s o n , 393 U. S. 385 (1969), Justice  White, f o r  the 

m a jo r i ty ,  held that the amendment to the Akron  City Charter  was unconstitution

- 9 -



M
IL

L
E

R
, 

C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

23
00

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 f

t 
T

R
U

ST
 B

U
IL

D
IN

G
, 

D
E

T
R

O
IT

, 
M

IC
H

IG
A

N
 4

8
2

2
6

al, not beca use  it suspended the operation  o f  an open housing ord inance ,  but 

because  it p laced  the hurdle o f  a re fe ren d u m  in front o f  any future open housing 

o rd in a n ces .  As the Court states at 389-90 :

"B y  adding §137 to its Charter the City o f  Akron, 
which  unquestionably w ie lds  state p ow er ,  not only 
suspended the operat ion  o f  the existing ord inance  
forbidding housing d is cr im in a t ion ,  but a lso  requ ired  
the approval  o f  the e le c to r s  be fo re  any future 
ord inance  cou ld  take e f fe c t . " (Emphasis added. )

In a c r u c ia l  footnote to that sentence, Justice  White d is c la im s  any intention of  

creat ing  a ratchet theory :

"Thus we do not hold that m e r e  repea l  o f  an existing 
ord inance  v io lates  the Fourteenth Am endm ent. "
(f. n. 5, at 390. )

Justice  Harlan, who had d issented  in Reitm an v. M ulkey , 387 U. S. 369 (1967), 

in his con curr in g  opinion in Hunter sets forth his b e l ie f  that the Fourteenth 

Am endm ent does  not operate  as a ratchet but only fo rb ids  the intentional placing 

o f  a rb it ra ry  hurdles in the way o f  certa in  groups o r  factions which a re  not 

p laced  in the way o f  all fact ions .  He states at 395:

"In the ca se  b e fo re  us, how ever ,  the city  o f  Akron 
has not attempted to a llocate  governm ental  pow er  on 
the b a s is  o f  any genera l  p r in c ip le .  H ere ,  we have a 
p r o v is io n  that has the c le a r  purpose  o f  making it m o r e  
dif f icult  f o r  certa in  ra c ia l  and re l ig iou s  m in or it ie s  to 
a ch ieve  leg is la t ion  that is in their  in terest .  "

The ratchet v. hurdle issu e  was present  in the Reitm an ca se  as w ell ,  and is 

d is cu sse d  in Karst  & H orowitz ,  "R e itm an  v. Mulkley: A  T e lophase  of  

Substantive Equal P ro tect ion ,  " 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 39. P r o f e s s o r s  Karst and 

Horowitz  explain at 49:

"T he  C aliforn ia  court,  in its Reitm an opinion, rested  
its d e c is io n  partly  on the change in the state 's  posture ,

- 1 0 -



M
IL

L
E

R
, 

C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

23
00

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 &

 T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

lN
O

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

 4
8

2
2

8

f r o m  proh ib it ion  o f  pr ivate  d is c r im in a t io n  to a u th or iza ­
tion  o f  such  conduct.  To s o m e ,  this line o f  reason ing  
suggested  that any rep ea l  o f  open housing leg is la t ion  
would b e  invalid. The constitutional ratchet had turned, 
and no s ign if icant stepback  cou ld  be perm itted .  In his 
d issenting  opinion, M r .  Just ice  Harlan r e f le c te d  this 
v iew  when he e x p r e s s e d  the fear  that ' [o jpponents  o f  
state a nt id iscr im in at ion  statutes a re  now in a pos it ion  
to argue that such  leg is la t ion  should be defeated  beca use ,  
i f  enacted, it m ay  be unrepea lab le .  ' [387 U. S. at 395]

"T he  m a jo r i ty ,  h ow ev er ,  went to s o m e  lengths to avoid 
this im plica t ion .  While the Court did not say that a 
le g is la t iv e  rep ea l  o f  the R u m ford  and Unruh A cts  would 
be constitutional,  a s ignificant part  o f  M r .  Justice  
W hite 's  opinion is devoted  to showing how P r o p o s i t io n  14 
could  be co n s id e re d  to be m o r e  than a 'm e r e  appeal.  '
What the Court said on this su b ject  was typ ica l  o f  the 
op in ion 's  'd e feren ce '  to the C ali forn ia  cou rt :

'. . . as we understand the C ali forn ia  court ,  
it did not pos it  a constitutional v io lation  on 
the m e r e  repea l  o f  the Unruh and R um ford  
A c ts .  It did not read either our c a s e s  o r  the 
Fourteenth  A m endm ent as establishing an 
automatic  constitutional b a r r ie r  to the rep ea l  
o f  an existing law prohibiting ra c ia l  d i s c r i m i n ­
ations in housing; nor  did the court  rule that a 
State m ay  n ever  put in statutory f o r m  an e x i s t ­
ing p o l i cy  o f  neutrality  with r e s p e c t  to pr ivate  
d is c r im in a t io n s .  . . .

'The  C ali forn ia  cou rt  could  v e r y  rea son a b ly  
conc lude  that . . . [P ro p o s i t io n  14] would and 
did have w id er  im pact  than a m e r e  rep ea l  o f  
existing statutes. [387 U. S. at 3 7 6 . ] "

If the Fourteenth  A m endm ent does  not em body  a constitutional ratchet, 

D efendant -A ppel lees  re sp ect fu l ly  contend that it was the hurdle set up by the 

the second  sentence  o f  Section 12 which ren d ered  it unconstitutional and not the 

delay  in the im plem entation  o f  any attendance p ro v is io n s  requ ired  by the f ir s t  

sentence  o f  Section  12. If this is the ca s e ,  P la in t i f f -A ppel lants  w ere  not d e ­

pr ived  o f  any constitutional right in presento  by Section 12, but only in futuro. 

Thus, P la in t i f f -A ppel lan ts  are  in e r r o r  when they contend that they have been 

d ep r iv ed  o f  a constitutional right to attend the sch oo ls  they would have attended 

pursuant to A p r i l  7. The p r o p e r  rem ed y ,  and the only r em ed y ,  fo r  the

- 1 1 -



M
IL

L
E

R
, 

C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

2
5

0
0

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 &

 T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

 4
8

2
2

6

unconstitutional hurdle set up by Section 12 was prov ided  by this Honorable

Court in O c to b e r ,  nam ely ,  the re m o v a l  o f  that hurdle by holding the Section to 

be unconstitutional.

P la in t i f f -A ppellants  w il l  undoubtedly respond, as they did be fore  

Judge Roth, by  rely ing  on Keyes v. School  D is tr ic t  Num ber One, Denver, 

C o lo r a d o , 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo .  1969); on re m a n d , 303 F. Supp. 289 

(D. Colo .  1969); stay v a ca ted , 24 L .  Ed. 37 (1969); after t r i a l , 313 F. Supp.

61 (D. Colo .  1970). A ppe l lee  Detroit  B oard  o f  Education submits that Keyes 

does not support the argument that the A p r i l  7 Plan must be im plem ented .

The f i r s t  i s su e  in K eyes ,  and the only issue  which bears  on the ca se  

at b a r  in its p r e - t r i a l  pos tu re ,  con cern ed  r e s c i s s i o n  by the Denver B oard  o f  

three  reso lut ions  p rev iou s ly  p a ssed  by the Board .  The facts  are  these :  On 

January 30, 1969, Defendant B oard  adopted R eso lut ion  1520, which adjusted the 

attendance area s  at se v e ra l  se con d ary  sch oo ls  within the d is tr ic t .  On M a rch  

20, 1969, the Board adopted R esolution  15 24, which apparently  was o f  s im i la r  

effect .  Soon th erea fte r ,  the Board adopted R eso lut ion  1531, which changed 

attendance areas  in certa in  e lem entary  s ch o o ls .  G en era l ly ,  the p u rp ose  o f  each 

o f  these  reso lut ions  was to integrate the sch oo ls  involved.

On June 9, 1969, fo llowing a sch oo l  board e lec t ion  w hich  resu lted  in 

a change in the com p os it ion  o f  defendant Board, Reso lutions  15 20, 1524 and 

1531 w e r e  resc in ded .  P laintiffs  sought, by way o f  p r e l im in a ry  injunctive r e ­

l ie f ,  an o r d e r  enjoining im plem entation  of  R eso lut ion  1533, the resc ind ing  

reso lut ion .  At the hearing on plaintiffs '  m otion  for  such re l ie f ,  substantial 

p r o o f  was adduced as to dem ograph ic  changes which had o c c u r r e d  in the d is tr ic t  

o v e r  the preced ing  decade  and as to actions by the board  o f  education through 

which ". . . c l e a r  patterns o f  segregat ion  [w ere ]  r e in fo r c e d  by o f f i c ia l  action . . . . " 

(303 F. Supp. at 284. ) F r o m  the ev idence  presented ,  the court  m ade n u m e r ­

ous and detailed findings o f  fact. A m ong these  findings w e r e  the fo llow ing :

- 1 2 -



M
IL

LE
R

. 
C

A
N

F
IE

L
D

, 
P

A
D

D
O

C
K

 A
N

D
 S

T
O

N
E

, 
2S

O
O

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 &

 T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

 4
8

2
2

0

s ch o o ls  with a p red om in a n ce  o f  m i n o r i t y - r a c e  students w e r e  a ss ig n ed  in e x p e r ­

ienced  m in o r i t y - r a c e  te a ch e rs  (303 F. Supp. at 284); the B arrett  School  was 

con stru cted  with co n s c io u s  knowledge that it would be a seg reg a ted  m in o r i ty -  

r a c e  s c h o o l  and was not u t i l ized  to r e l ie v e  o v e rc r o w d in g  o f  a predom inantly  

white s ch oo l  lo ca ted  a few  b lo ck s  away (303 F. Supp. at 285); boundary changes 

m ade  by defendant b oa rd  . .n o t  only fa i led  to a l lev iate  N egro  concentrat ion ;  

they added to it. " (Id. ); an addition was con stru cted  at the Hallett School  o v e r  

ob je c t io n s  that this ta ct ic  " .  . .w ou ld  in c r e a s e  seg reg a t ion  at Hallett. " (Id. ); 

and, f inally, the use  o f  num erous m o b i le  c l a s s r o o m s  in the predom inantly  - 

N eg ro  a rea  o f  the city  concentra ted  seg reg a t ion  o f  pupils .  T h ese  detailed  f ind ­

ings o f  fact  d em on stra te ,  as the court  there  phrased  it, that the p r e l im in a r y  in ­

junction i s s u e  had " .  . . b e e n  tr ied  rather ex tens ive ly .  " 303 F. Supp. at 281.

Based on th ese  fa c ts ,  the court  found, as a m atter  o f  law, that:

"W e have seen  that during the ten y ea r  p e r io d  preced in g  
the p a ssa g e  o f  R eso lu t ions  1520, 1524 and 1531, the 
D enver School  B oard  has c a r r ie d  out a segrega t ion  
p o l icy .  To maintain, encourage  and continue segregat ion  
in the public  s ch o o ls  in the face  o f  the c le a r  mandates 
o f  Brown v. B oard  o f  Ed. cannot be c o n s id e r e d  innocent.
The many c a s e s  dec ided  subsequent to Brown, including 
our own C ir cu i t 's  B oard  o f  Ed. v. Dowell ,  im p o s e  an 
a f f irm ative  duty on the School  B oard  to take pos it ive  
steps to re m o v e  that segrega t ion  which has developed  
as a resu lt  o f  its p r io r  a f f irm ative  a c t s . " 303 F. Supp.
at 287.

Thus the m otion  fo r  p r e l im in a r y  injunction was granted. H ow ever ,  the 

court  further  o b s e r v e d  that:

"In determ ining  that the plaintiffs  are  entitled 
to the p r e l im in a r y  r e l i e f  sought, we are  not to be 
understood  as holding that R eso lut ions  1520, 1524 
and 1531 a re  ex c lu s iv e .  It is  true  that the ca se  is 
ex tra ord in a ry  in that there  are  only  two plans p r e ­
sented, one ca lling fo r  integration and one for  
segregat ion .  The status quo has the e f fect  of  r e s t o r ­
ing the integration  plan. H ow ever ,  the B oard  is by 
no m eans prec lu d ed  f r o m  adopting som e  other plan

-1 3 -



M
IL

L
E

R
, 

C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

25
00

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 S

A
N

K
 f

t 
T

R
U

ST
 B

U
IL

D
IN

G
, 

D
E

T
R

O
IT

, 
M

IC
H

IG
A

N
 4

8
2

2
6

!

em bodying the underlying pr in c ip les  o f  R esoutions 
1520, 1524 and 1531. " 303 F . Supp. at 288.

On appeal f r o m  the o r d e r  granting p r e l im in a ry  injunction the United 

States C ircu it  Court o f  Appeals  f o r  the Tenth C ircu it ,  in an unreported  opinion 

dated August 7, 1969, questioned the su f f ic iency  o f  the D is t r ic t  C ou rt 's  o rd er  

and rem anded fo r  additional cons id era t ion .

In the opinion on rem and, an additional f ive pages are  devoted  to d e ­

ta iled  findings o f  c on sc iou s  acts o f  pupil segregat ion  by the defendant Denver 

B oard  at the B arrett ,  Stedman, P a r k  Hill, Ph i l ips ,  Hallett and S m iley  S ch oo ls .  

The court  found . . an undeviating purpose  to iso la te  N egro  students. . . . "  303 

F. Supp. at 294. Again , the court  concluded  as a m atter o f  law  that:

"T he  p o l i c ie s  and actions of  the B oard  p r io r  to 
the adoption o f  Reso lutions  1520, 1524 and 1531, which 
conduct is sp e c i f ica l ly  d e s c r ib e d  in the fo rego ing  f ind­
ings, constitute de jure  segregation .  " 303 F. Supp. at 
289 (Em phasis  added)

Again, the court  enjoined im plem entation  o f  R eso lut ion  1533. Addit ionally ,  the 

court  o rd e re d  im plem entation  of: (1) R eso lut ion  1520, inso far  as it applied to

Sm iley  Junior High School ;  (2) R esolution  1524, inso far  as it applied to Sm iley  

Junior High School ;  and (3) Resolution  1531, inso far  as it applied to Barrett ,

P ark  Hill and Philips Schoo ls .  (303 F. Supp. at 296). In short ,  im plem entation  

was o rd e r e d  only as to those  sch oo ls  found, as a m atter  of  fact  and law , to have 

been pru p ose ly  segregated ,  on a de ju re  basis  by the defendant b oa rd .  C o n s id e r a ­

tion of  the rem ain der  o f  Resolutions 1520, 1524 and 1531 was e x p r e s s ly  r e s e r v ­

ed for  tr ia l .  (Id. ) F inally ,  the opinion e x p r e s s ly  invited su b m iss ion  o f  other 

integration plans by the defendant board. (Id. )

On appeal, the Circuit  Court granted a stay of  the p r e l im in a ry  in ­

junction, again in an unreported  opinion. On application  to Justice  Brennan, as 

Acting C ircu it  Justice ,  the stay was vacated and the injunction reinstated. In 

his o p in io n , Justice  Brennan explicitly  noted the D istr ic t  C ourt 's  finding of

-1 4 -



M
IL

LE
R

, 
C

A
N

F
IE

L
D

, 
P

A
D

D
O

C
K

 A
N

D
 S

T
O

N
E

, 
2

3
0

0
 D

E
TR

O
IT

 B
A

N
K

 f
t 

T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

 4
8

22
6

de ju re  se g re g a t io n  as fo l lo w s :

" F r o m  the facts  found, the D is tr ic t  Court e ither  made 
a c o n c lu s io n  o r  d rew  an in fe re n ce ,  that de ju re  s e g r e ­
gation ex is ts  in nam ed s c h o o ls .  Its grant o f  the 
t e m p o r a r y  injunction is grounded on the p r e m is e  that 
there  is de ju re  segregat ion .  " 24 L .  Ed. 2d at 39.

The d i f f e r e n c e s  between K eyes  and the c a s e  at bar  a re  m an ifest .  In 

the context o f  P la in t i f f -A p p e l la n ts '  m ot ion ,  they are  determinative^, F ir s t  and 

m o s t  im portant ly ,  each  opinion  in K eyes  em p h a s izes  that the grant o f  p r e l im in ­

a ry  r e l i e f  was based  upon a finding o f  de ju re  segrega t ion .  This finding of  de 

ju re  seg reg a t ion  was not grounded in the resc in d in g  reso lu t ion  i tse l f ,  but rather 

was supported  by vo lum inous ev idence  o f  c o n s c io u s ,  purpose fu l  act ion  by 

defendant b o a r d  which  seg reg a ted  pupils within the d is t r i c t  on the bas is  o f  ra ce .  

In short ,  the court  found that defendant board  had " 0 . . c a r r i e d  out a segregat ion  

p o l icy .  . . . "  (303 F . Supp. at 287) during the ten y e a r s  p r io r  to the l it igation.

M r.  Justice  Brennan m akes  c l e a r  that this finding was c r u c ia l  to his r e in s ta te ­

ment o f  the p r e l im in a r y  r e l i e f  granted by the t r ia l  court .  The r e c o r d  in the 

c a s e  at bar rep e ls  the sl ightest  in fe ren ce  o f  any seg reg a t ion  p o l icy  on the part 

o f  the Board o f  Education Defendants. The m a jo r  p r e m is e  in the K eyes holding 

is not p resen t  in the c a s e  at bar and thus it supplies  grounds fo r  o rd e r in g  A pri l  

7 into e f fec t .

Second, the opinion on rem and in K eyes  confined injunctive r e l i e f  

so le ly  to those  sch oo ls  w here  s p e c i f i c  and purpose fu l  act ions by the defendant 

board had c rea ted  o r  perpetuated seg reg a t ion  o f  pupils .  C lear ly ,  r e l i e f  m ust 

be tied to the right to such r e l i e f  in a causal and proport ion a l  m anner .  P la in t i f f - 

Appellants in the c a s e  at bar have utter ly  fa iled  to p resen t  p r o o f  o f  de ju re  

segrega t ion  as to any o f  the sch oo ls  involved in the A p r i l  7 plan. Yet P laintiffs  

contend that the A p r i l  7 P lan  m ust be im plem ented  w h o lesa le ,  intact. Keyes 

s im p ly  does  not stand fo r  this p ropos it ion .

-1 5 -



M
IL

LE
R

, 
C

A
N

FI
E

L
D

, 
P

A
D

D
O

C
K

 A
N

D
 S

T
O

N
E

, 
25

00
 D

E
TR

O
IT

 B
A

N
K

 &
 T

R
U

ST
 B

U
IL

D
IN

G
, 

D
E

T
R

O
IT

, 
M

IC
H

IG
A

N
 4

8
22

6

Third ,  both t r ia l  court  opinions in Keyes note sp e c i f i c a l ly  that the

c o u r t 's  in junctive o r d e r  had the e f fe c t  o f  reinstating R eso lut ions  1520, 1524 and 

1531 only because  the court  was presented  with no a lternative .  It had be fore  

it a segregat ion  plan and an integration plan. It was con stra ined  to a ccep t  the 

latter .  In the c a s e  at bar, quite the con tra ry  obtains. The B oard  o f  Education 

Defendants have submitted and defended under c r o s s  examination two a lte rn a ­

tive plans fo r  integration  and quality education, and Judge Roth s p e c i f i c a l ly  

found Plan A  to be su p er io r  to A p r i l  7. Again , we submit, Keyes does not sup­

port  the r e l i e f  sought by Plaintiffs  herein . C ontrary  to supporting a ratchet 

theory  o f  the Fourteenth Am endm ent,  K eyes m e r e ly  rep resen ts  another a p p l i ca ­

tion o f  the fa m il ia r  p r in c ip le  that once  de jure  segrega t ion  has been established , 

there  is a constitutional duty to rem ed y  that situation by d isestablish ing  the 

s ta te - im p o s e d  dual s tructure .

P la inti f f -A ppellants  apparently make another argum ent to support the 

contention that A p r i l  7 m ust be im plem ented .  They contend (B r ie f ,  at 31, 33) 

that the "b e s t  available  plan" on the r e c o r d  must be im plem ented  "at o n c e "  and 

pendente l i fe  under the rule o f  A lexander  v. Holmes County Board of  E ducation , 

396 U. S. 19 (1969) and C arter  v. West F e l ic iana  P a r is h  School  B oard ,  396 U .S .  

226 (1969). As we pointed out in our A nsw er  to Plaintiff  - A ppe l lan ts1 M otion f o r  

Sum m ary  R e v e r s a l  O r In The A lternative  F o r  Injunction Pending A ppeal ,  the 

" im m e d ia c y "  rule of  A lexander  is applicable  only in situations w here  the r e c o r d  

dem onstrates  and the Court has found that constitutional rights a re  being v io la t ­

ed, in other w ord s ,  in de ju re  situations,, P la inti f f -A ppellants  have yet to 

estab lish  that the Detroit  Board  o f  Education is operating a de jure  segrega ted  

sch oo l  system . In his Ruling on School Plans Submitted, Judge Roth stated at 8:

"W e cannot at this point p r o c e e d  on the assum ption  that 
plaintiffs w ill  su cceed  in proving their  c la im ,  in the 
hearing on the m e r it s ,  that the Detroit  s ch oo l  [ system ] 
is a segregated  sch oo l  system , de ju re  o r  de facto .  "

- 1 6 -



M
IL

LE
R

, 
C

A
N

F
IE

L
D

, 
P

A
D

D
O

C
K

 A
N

D
 S

T
O

N
E

, 
25

00
 D

E
TR

O
IT

 B
A

N
K

 f
t T

R
U

ST
 B

U
IL

D
IN

G
, 

D
E

T
R

O
IT

, 
M

IC
H

IG
A

N
 4

B
22

8

In fact ,  P la in t i f f -A p p e l la n ts ' cu rren t  argum ent is no d if ferent  than the argum ent

advanced by P la in t i f f -A pp e l lan ts  b e fo r e  Judge Roth in S eptem ber  and this Court 

in O ctob er  and the issu e  is the sam e as it was then: whether the D is tr ic t  Court 

abused his d is c r e t io n  in re fus ing  to grant a p r e l im in a r y  injunction. P la in t i f f -  

Appellants have p re se n te d  no additional ev idence  on the question  o f  whether the 

D etro it  s c h o o ls  are  de ju re  seg reg a ted  and this Court should not now r e v e r s e  its 

p r io r  a f f i rm a n ce  of  Judge R oth 's  Ruling of Septem ber  3, 1970 in which  he found 

at 3:

"H e re ,  the p ro o fs  are  not convincing  that there  has been  
a c o u r s e  of  act ion  which  can be c h a r a c te r iz e d  as 
d ire c ted  tow ard  the maintenance of a dual s y s te m  of 
s c h o o ls ,  e ither de ju re  or de facto .  To the con trary ,  
the ev idence  b e fo r e  the Court  indicates  that there  has 
been  a c o n s c io u s ,  de l ibera te ,  p r o g r e s s iv e ,  and con t in ­
uous attempt to p rom ote  and advance the integration o f  
both pupils and faculty. "

B . Plan A  Is Not An Unconstitutional F r e e d o m  o f  C hoice  Plan.

Although P la in t i f f -A ppel lants  have fa iled  to dem onstrate  that they 

are  entitled to any p re l im in a ry  re l ie f ,  they spend m o s t  of  their  e f fo r t  in their 

B r i e f  attempting to show that the Plan o r d e r e d  by Judge Roth is both unconstitu ­

tional and factually  in fe r io r  to the A p r i l  7 Plan. The factual question  w il l  be 

d is c u s s e d  be low  and the constitutional question  h ere .

P la in t i f f -A ppel lants  c h a r a c te r iz e  Plan A  as a " f r e e d o m  of  c h o i c e "  

plan and re ly  on G reen  v. County School  B oa rd  o f  New Kent County, 391 U. S.

430 (19^8) as holding such plans to be unconstitutional.  H ow ever ,  they have 

again attempted to apply d ec is ion s  ar is in g  out o f  de ju re  situations to Detroit  

w here  no such situation has been  estab lished . The Suprem e Court in G reen  was 

dealing with a re m e d ia l  p r o b le m  of  whether the " f r e e d o m  of  c h o i c e "  plan under 

con s id era t ion  had e f fe c t iv e ly  d ism antled  the s ta te - im p o s e d  d u a l - s y s te m  of 

education. Justice  Brennan, writing  fo r  a unanimous Court stated at 439 -40 :

-17



M
IL

LE
R

, 
C

A
N

F
IE

L
D

, 
P

A
D

D
O

C
K

 A
N

D
 S

T
O

N
E

, 
2S

O
O

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 ft

 T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

 4
0

2
2

0

"It is incumbent upon the s ch oo l  b oard  to establish  
that its p ro p o se d  plan p r o m is e s  m eaningful and 
im m ediate  p r o g r e s s  toward d isestab l ish ing  state-  
im posed  segregation .  It is incumbent upon the 
d is t r i c t  court  to weigh  that c la im  in light of the 
facts  at hand and in light of  any a lternatives  which 
m ay  be shown as fea s ib le  and m o r e  p rom is in g  in 
their e f fe c t iv en ess .  W here the court  finds the board  to 
be acting in good  faith and the p rop osed  plan to have rea l  
p r o sp e c ts  f o r  d ismantling the s ta te - im p o s e d  dual 
sys tem  ’ at the ea r l ie s t  p ra c t ica l  date ' ,  then the plan 
m ay  be said to prov ide  e f fec t ive  re l ie f .  . . "

"W e do not hold that ’ f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e ’ can have 
no p lace  in such a plan. We do not hold that a 
’ f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e ’ plan might of  i tse l f  be un­
constitutional, although that argum ent has been 
urged  upon us. Rather, all we dec ide  today is that 
in desegregat ing  a dual sy s tem  a plan utilizing 
' f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e ’ is not an end in itself .  ”

The rem ed ia l  nature of the d e c is ion s  and their l imitation to de ju re  

situations was rea f f i rm ed  in the other two Suprem e Court d ec is ion s  on f r e e d o m  

of  cho ice .  Raney v. B oard  of Education, 391 U. S. 443 (1968); M onroe  v. B oard  

of  C o m m is s io n e r s ,  391 U. S- 450 (1968); see  Kurland, "E g a l i ta r ia n ism  and the 

W a rren  C ou rt" ,  68 Mich. L- Rev. 629, 645 (.1970).

The Court in Green  was dealing with a rem ed ia l  p rob lem  fo r  yet 

another reason. F r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e  had been in e f fec t  in New Kent County for  

three y ears  when the Court found it to be unacceptable .  Justice  Brennan at 441 

detailed the in e ffect iveness ,  as a m atter  of established fact, of the New Kent 

County plan and concluded it had not been "a suffic ient step to ’ e f fectuate a 

transition ' to a unitary system . " In the ca se  at bar,  Plan A has not yet been  

tr ied ; it should not be held unconstitutional on the b as is  of speculation  b e fo r e  the 

fact, but only, if at all, post facto at such time as P la in t i f f -A ppel lants  can prove  

its fa ilure .

-1 8 -



M
IL

L
E

R
, C

A
N

F
IE

L
D

, 
P

A
D

D
O

C
K

 A
N

D
 S

T
O

N
E

, 
23

00
 D

E
T

R
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 ft

 T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

 4
8

2
2

3

In s u m m a r y , D efendant -A ppel lee  contends that Judge Roth was under

no constitutional obligation  to o r d e r  the im plem entation  of the A p r i l  7 Plan

b e ca u s e  of e ither  the unconstitutionality  of  Section  12 o f  A c t  48 or  the pendency

of  a tr ia l  on the m e r i t s .  Consequently ,  it is our posit ion  that Judge Roth had

absolute  d is c r e t io n  in deciding  whether to o r d e r  any p re l im in a ry  r e l ie f  and

that Plan A  is not unconstitutional as a m a t t e r  of law.

IV JUDGE ROTH DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION BECAUSE
P L A N  A IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS M A T T E R  OF F A C T .

B e fo r e  any analysis  can be m ade of  the m e r i t s  o f  P lan  A (Magnet

o r  M cDonald),  one thing m ust  be m ade c le a r  which  is distinguishable  in our

case .  In all  o f  the c a s e s  c ited  by plaintiffs,  including the lead ca se  of  G reen  v.

County S choo l  B oard  of New Kent County et a l . , supra, and C a r te r  v. W est

F e l ic ia n o  P a r is h  S choo l  Board ,  su pra , there  was a finding by the courts  of a

dual sy s te m  of  education in the var ious  sch oo l  d is tr ic t s .  This has not been the

ca se  in D etro it  as Judge Roth has not m ade  such a finding. N or  b eca u se  of the

constant e f fo r ts  by  P la in t i f f -A ppel lants  to ra ise  p re l im in a ry  m atters ,  has he

been given any opportunity to m ake this essent ia l  finding.

Keeping this in mind, the question concern ing  Plan A then b e c o m e s

whether it is unconstitutional as a m a tter  of fact  in the situation presented  here .

In G r e e n , the Suprem e Court c o n s id e re d  the m e r i t s  o f  a s o - c a l l e d  f r e e d o m - o f -  

3ch o ice  plan and laid down the guidelines under which Such plans should be 3

3. It m ust be noted that the f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e  contem plated  by plaintiffs in 
the b r i e f  and in G r e e n , d i f fe r s  m a ter ia l ly  f r o m  Plan A as prov ided  in Detroit .
In those plans students could a rb it ra r i ly  p ick  a s ch oo l  a fter  a long h istory  of  
having been com p e l led  to attend a part icu lar  s ch oo l  so le ly  on the b as is  o f  their 
race .  That is, w here  two separate  s ch oo l  d is tr ic t s  s e r v e d  the sam e geographic  
area in the past, the law now requ ired  them to be m e r g e d  into one. A l l  the 
f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e  plan did in Green  was to allow students who had been part of 
the prev iou s  dual sy s tem  to now ch oose  what sch oo l  they w ished  to attend. 
B eca u se  of  estab lished  patters, v ery  few ch ose  to leave  their old sch oo ls .
Plan A, how ev er ,  d i f fe rs .  F i r s t  of all there are  not now two s ch oo l  sy stem s 
serv ing  the sa m e geograp h ic  area. Secondly, the d e s i r e  to m o v e  is u rged  by 
the educational a ttract iveness  of the m agnet s ch oo ls .

- 1 9 -



M
IL

L
E

R
, 

C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

23
00

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 &

 T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, M

IC
H

IG
A

N
 £

3
2

2
6

con s id ered .  The Court found:

. . w here  the court  finds the B oard  to be acting in good 
faith and the p rop osed  plan to have rea l  p r o sp e c ts  f o r  
dismantling the s ta te - im p o s e d  dual sy s tem  ’ at the ea r l ie s t  
p ra c t ica b le  date ',  then the plan m ay  be said to prov ide  
e f fec t ive  re l ie f .  ” 391 U-S. at 439-

Thus the findings of  Judge Roth are  the determ ining fa c to r  fo r  this Court to

co n s id e r  in decid ing  on the constitutionality of  Plan A.

A. Judge Roth Found Plan A S uper ior  to the A p r i l  7 Plan 
as a Matter of F a ct  B ased  on T est im ony  and the 
P r e fe r e n c e  of The B oard  of  E ducation .

The D etro it  B oard  of Education on N ov em b er  16, 1970, submitted to

J ud ge  Roth three plans pursuant to an O rder of N ov em b er  6, .1970, calling fo r

the su b m iss ion  of  plans to e f fec t  d esegrega t ion  of D etro it  sch oo ls .  The B oard

placed  p r io r i ty  on the plans by unanimous vote (Ex. A of  Defendants ' A nsw er)

as their p r e fe r e n c e  fo r  the m anner in which desegrega t ion  would take p lace  in

Detroit .  H earings w e r e  held on N ov em ber  18, 19 and 25, 1970, at which t ime

testim ony was taken related to the plans f r o m  all B oard  m e m b e r s  and

Superintendent D rach ler .

M em b er  McDonald, as author of said Plan A, tes t i f ied  at length to

its educational soundness and p re fa ced  his com m ents  this way:

" I  might p re fa ce  the b a s ic  explanation of  the Plan, your 
Honor, with the fact  that this Plan is based  upon three 
conditions which we felt  was n e c e s s a r y  fo r  any educational 
plan that w o u ld  in crease  integration to su cceed ,  that the 
c it izens  of  D etro it  have the opportunity to partic ipate  in 
the d ec is ion -m a k in g  through their com m en ts  and s u g g e s ­
tions; that the plan m ust be educationally  sound, that is, 
it m ust im prove  education in the city and, three, that 
any plan introduced m ust be the equivalent to or  ex ceed  
the integration f igures  mentioned in the A p r i l  7 Plan. "
11/18 Tr. at 8.

M em b er  M cDonald  p r o ce e d e d  to show how reg ions  within the City 

would be paired to provide  f o r  desegregat ion  throughout the sy stem  ( 11/18

-2 0 -



M
IL

L
E

R
. C

A
N

F
IE

L
D

, 
P

A
D

D
O

C
K

 A
N

D
 S

T
O

N
E

, 
23

00
 D

E
TR

O
IT

 B
A

N
K

 ft
 T

R
U

ST
 B

U
IL

D
IN

G
, 

D
E

T
R

O
IT

, 
M

IC
H

IG
A

N
 4

8
2

2
8

T r .  at 10, 11). His tes t im on y  then p r o c e e d e d  to show how his plan p rov id ed  

for  a total integration  and was unlike the feeb le  and belated  e f for t  made in

4
P r o je c t  One . M cD onald  a lso  tes t i f ied  to the fact  that the Plan would tend to 

o v e r c o m e  som e  of  the d i f f icu lt ies  of trying  to prov ide  fo r  d ese g re g a te d  s ch o o ls  

in a m ob i le  population, such as D e tr o i t 's ,  for  which  the A p r i l  7 Plan would not 

prov id e  f lex ib i l i ty .

"Just as there  are  m any routes  to this courthouse  
this m orn ing  and the fact that m any of  us took 
d if ferent roads  to get h ere  does  not m ean that any 
o f  us wanted any le s s  to get to this part icu lar  
c o u r t r o o m  this m orn ing  but what it m eans is there  
are  many alternative  ways of reach ing  a goal.  S o m e ­
t im es  you get stuck on the e x p r e s s w a y  and you don't  
get here  until much later ,  other t im es  you get h ere  
qu icker .  What I a m  submitting is that this part icu lar  
goal or this part icu lar  m eans to obtain that goal o f  an 
integrated e x p e r ie n ce  can be obtained through this 
type of plan as opposed  to A p r i l  7, which b eca u se  of 
the rea l i t ie s  o f  our so c ie ty  at p resent ,  p o l i t ica l  and 
so c ia l ,  would not resu lt  in an integrated sch oo l  s y s te m  
but in a seg reg a ted  sch oo l  s y s te m  and once that o c c u r s  
then there  is no p os s ib i l i ty ,  I submit, o f  attempting 
to re - in te g ra te  the sy s tem .  It 's  so  d if f icult  once you 
lo se  the dif ferent percen ta ges  of ra c e s  in a c ity  or 
s y s t e m  to attempt to re in trodu ce  those r a c ia l  m ixtures  
once they are  gone. " (11 /18  T r .  at 58).

As mentioned p rev iou s ly ,  and as M em b er  M cDonald  m akes c l e a r  in 

his tes t im ony ,  (11 /1 8  T r .  49 -51 )  there  are  many de fects  in the A p r i l  7 Plan 

which indicate that it would not prov ide  for  the type of educational advantages 

which plaintiffs c la im  fo r  it. Included among these are  l imitations on potential 

e x t r a - c u r r i c u la r  act iv i t ies ,  trave ling  to and f r o m  sch oo l  during winter months 

in darkn ess ,  thus creat ing  an in c r e a se d  safety  hazard ,  proh ib it ive  c o s t  of m a n ­

dated busing to the schoo l  s y s te m  and general student hosti l ity .  It must always 

be r e m e m b e r e d  that any plan of d esegrega t ion  or any other type of educational 

s ch em e  must look  to educational advantages as the p r im e  c r i t e r ia  for  s u c c e s s .  4

4. It must be noted that " P r o j e c t  One" was an attempt to hold stable a highly 
m ob i le  population in var ious  areas  of  the City and this is not what Plan A  is an 
attempt to do. Plan A  is designed to take advantage of educational incentive 
r e g a r d le s s  of population m obil ity .

-2 1 -



H
IL

L
E

R
, 

C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

2
3

0
0

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 »

 T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

It has been  urged  upon this Court,  just as it has been urged upon e v e ry  court  

s ince  B row n in 1954, that the m e r e  c o m p u ls o r y  mixing of  ra c e s  in an educat ion ­

al arena wil l  by  i tse l f  produce  educational advantage. That is all that A p r i l  7 

t r ie s  to do. Judge Roth, h ow ev er ,  found that truly  integrated education as 

mandated by our cou rts ,  contem plates  som ething e lse .  His v iew  was to put 

forth  a plan which p r o m is e d  to prov id e ,  not only ra c ia l  m ix  in the s c h o o ls ,  but 

a lso  to add meaning and substance to this m ix .  He found that the Plan A 

« p r o m is e d  to prov ide  a lasting integrated ex p er ien ce  fo r  a g rea ter  percentage  of 

Detroit  sch oo l  ch ildren . As the United States Supreme Court  held in Green, 

su pra , at 441:

"W here  it ( f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e ) o f fe rs  rea l  p r o m is e  of 
aiding a desegregat ion  p r o g r a m  to effectuate c o n v e r ­
sion of a s ta te - im posed^  dual s y s te m  to a unitary non- 
ra c ia l  sy s te m  there might be no ob ject ion  to allowing 
such a dev ise  to prove  i tse l f  in operation^5 6. "

T h e r e fo r e ,  it cannot be held as a matter of fact, that the Magnet 

Plan is unconstitutional absent an a f te r - th e - fa c t  look  at its resu lts .

It must a lso  be noted, con trary  to P la int i f f -A ppellants  contention, 

that Dr. Cornelius  Golightly r e co g n ize d  that Plan A, which takes into 

con s id era t ion  m o r e  than s im ple  ra c ia l  mixing by num bers ,  would have a 

g rea te r  l ikelihood of s u c c e s s .  He stated that:

"If  we w ere  in a different kind of environm ent and 
dif ferent kind of com m unity  in which we dec ided  that 
c o e r c io n ,  of c o u r s e ,  was the only way to do it then I 
might say you push the issue that way and we settle for

5. Again it must be stated that con trary  to findings in all c a s e s  concern ing  
" f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e " ,  the Detroit  sch oo ls  have not been  found to operate  a 
s ta te - im p o s e d  dual or de jure  system .

A ls o ,  the magnet concept  as explained e a r l ie r  d i f fe rs  m a ter ia l ly  f r o m  
" f r e e d o m - o f - c h o i c e "  found in de ju re  s ch oo l  sy s tem s .
6. P la in t i f fs '  contention that there w ere  better  a lternatives must be r e je c te d  
in light of Judge R oth 's  Opinion on School  Plans Submitted that it would not 
lead to integration as su c ce s s fu l ly  as Plan A.

-2 2 -



M
IL

L
E

R
. 

C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

2
3

0
0

 D
E

T
R

O
IT

 B
A

N
K

 ft
 T

R
U

3T
 B

U
IL

D
IN

G
, 

D
E

T
R

O
IT

, 
M

IC
H

IO
A

N
 4

6
2

2
6

(hat hut I d o  not fuel that the City  o f  Detroit  is exact ly  the 
sam e as som e  other c i t ie s  which have had long h is to r ie s  
of de ju re  d esegrega t ion .  I think the City  of  Detro it  is 
not that kind of c ity  at all. The City of  D etro it  has its 
p r o b le m s ,  the s c h o o l  s y s t e m  has their p r o b le m s  and I 
think we are  b a s ic a l ly  a decent and good  s ch oo l  sys tem .
We have made a r e a l  e f fo r t  to r e s o lv e  som e  of the p r o b le m s  
that c o m e  around the m atter of r a c e .  I think the City 
of  Detroit  has made m o r e  p r o g r e s s  in integrating the staff 
at the adm in istrat ive  le v e l  w h ere  we have perhaps m o r e  
b la ck  p r in c ip a ls ,  m o r e  b la ck  ass is tant  superintendents and 
the like than any other m a jo r  northern  c ity  in the country  
and, th e r e fo r e ,  s ince  we have had such trem endous  p r o ­
g r e s s  in re ce n t  y e a r s ,  I would  hope, I was hoping that we 
cou ld  w o rk  out a solution that would be e ssen t ia l ly  a 
p o l i t ica l  so lution  rather than a lega l  court  mandate s o lu ­
tion and it is fo r  this re a so n  that the B oa rd  in all c o n s c ie n c e  
d is cu ss  the m e r it s  of the magnet s c h o o l  plan and the m e r it s  
of the magent s c h o o l  c u r r i c u lu m  plan and a lso  of the A p r i l  7 
plan, with the hope that w hatever  plan is f inally  a ccep ted  
by the C ourt  that the s c h o o l  s y s te m  and the City  of  Detroit  
w il l  m ov e  fo rw a rd  co n s tru c t iv e ly  to r e s o lv e ,  bear ing  in 
mind though m y  own re s e r v a t io n  that quality integrated 
education is not what other people  always mean. "
1 1 /1 9  T r .  at 161, 162.

This is m e r e ly  r e e n fo r c e m e n t  for  the pos it ion  that this Court needs to look  

at all the m e r i t s  of each  plan.

B . Plan A  Includes M ore  Than Magnet Sch oo ls .

F o r  F eb ru a ry  1, 1971 im plem entation ,  Plan A  ca l ls  for  the i n c r e a s ­

ing of enro l lm ents  in all high sch oo ls  to 125 per cent and in those high s ch oo ls  

a lready  over  125 per  cent to 10 per cent over  their cu rren t  enro l lm ent .  The 

purpose  of this is to prov ide  space  for  the open en ro l lm en t  of  all high s c h o o ls .  

Only those t ra n s fe rs  by high s ch oo l  students which would in c r e a se  d e s e g r e g a ­

tion o f  the re ce iv in g  s ch oo l  w il l  be granted. This g ives  to all high sch oo l  

students, not m e r e ly  tenth g ra d e rs  in twelve se le c ted  s c h o o ls ,  the opportunity 

to attend m o r e  "d e s e g r e g a te d  s c h o o l s "  im m ed ia te ly .  It o f fe r s  to a w ider  

range of people  the opportunities to attend other sch oo ls  and th e re fo re  is m o r e  

b roa d  in s cop e  than the A p r i l  7 Plan. (Ex. A to Def. A ns.  at VII)

-2 3 -



M
IL

LE
R

, 
C

A
N

F
IE

L
D

, 
P

A
D

D
O

C
K

 A
N

D
 S

T
O

N
E

, 
23

00
 D

E
TR

O
IT

 B
A

N
K

 &
 T

R
U

ST
 B

U
IL

D
IN

G
, 

D
E

T
R

O
IT

. 
M

IC
H

IG
A

N
 4

8
2

2
6

a

Plan A ,  a lso ,  prov ides  f o r  a m iddle  sch oo l  o f  grades  5, 6, 7 and 8 

which would be set up in each reg ion  to h ouse  500 students of  equal ra c ia l  rat ios .  

T h ese  sch oo ls  a r e  to go into e f fec t  in Septem ber ,  1971. (Ex. A  to Def. A ns.  at 

III) T h ese  two additional facets  of  the Plan make it a m o r e  fa r - r e a c h in g  e f fort  

at d esegrega t ion  than the A p r i l  7 Plan and a ls o  support Judge R oth ’ s finding 

that Plan A is not unconstitutional as a m atter  of fact.

C. A s  Has Been  Indicated E a r l ie r  Plan A  Does M ore  
Than D esegrega te  by the N u m bers ,  It Is a M ean ­
ingful E ffort  to P ro v id e  Educational Advantages By- 
Using Integration A s  a P a rt  of the Whole Education

Judge R oth ’ s opinion indicates that a cco rd in g  to his f indings, Plan A 

p r o m is e s  to do much m o r e  than s im p le  " integration  by n u m b e r s " .  It is obvious 

to educators  that much m o r e  is needed in our schoo ls  than m e r e ly  playing a 

num bers  gam e in o r d e r  to s e c u r e  a meaningful educational ex p er ien ce  f o r  all  

students. C ourts ,  which a re  in the posit ion  of  protecting  the rights of  all  

individuals, m ust  make e v ery  attempt to g ive  their sanction to those plans which 

p r o m is e  to g ive  the m ost  meaningful ex p er ien ce  to the g rea tes t  num bers  in the 

sh ortes t  t im e, and which a lso  p r o m is e  to endure f o r  the longest  p e r iod s .  Judge 

Roth found Plan A  had a much h igher  l ikelihood o f  fulfil l ing these needs than did 

e ither Plan B or  the A p r i l  7 Plan.

The Detroit  Board  o f  Education a lso  took full cogn izance  of  the type 

o f  integration it m o s t  p r e fe r r e d  in unanimously  (with one abstention) voting to 

p lace  Plan A  as the top p r io r i ty  among the plans submitted. (Ex. A  to Def. A ns .  ) 

Although each of the plans provided som e  hope for  in creas in g  the ra c ia l  m ix  o f  

sch oo ls  in Detroit ,  The Board felt that Plan A would do this in the m o s t  pos it ive  

manner. Judge Roth, then not only did not abuse his d is c re t io n  in o rd er in g  Plan 

A ,  but fully ob serv ed  the letter  and sp ir it  of  the law by ord er in g  into e f fec t  the 

best  o f  the plans presented  to him.

- 2 4 -



M
IL

LE
R

, C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

2
5

0
0

 D
E

T
R

O
IT

 B
A

N
K

 ft
 T

R
U

ST
 B

U
IL

D
IN

G
, 

D
E

T
R

O
IT

, 
M

IC
H

IG
A

N
 4

8
2

2
0

4

D. P la in t i f fs ,  with Full  Opportunity To  Do So, F a i led  To 
P r e s e n t  E vidence  to E stab l ish  That A p r i l  7 is Su per ior  
to Plan A  or  B .

P la intif fs  had ample opportunity to p resen t  ev idence  as to the m e r it s  

of  the A p r i l  7 Plan and its s u p e r io r i ty  over  Plan A  or  Plan B. They did not 

do th is .  As indicated in the p r io r  opinion of this Court ,  B r a d le y , su p ra , at 

904, "T he  granting or  denial of  a p re l im in a ry  injunction pending final hearing  

on the m e r it s  is within the sound ju d ic ia l  d is c re t io n  of the D is t r ic t  Court .  " 

Since this C o u r t 's  last  opinion, P la in t i f f -A pp e l lan ts  have o f fe r e d  no substantial 

ev idence  to indicate that D etro it  s ch oo ls  are  operated  in a dual m anner ,  or 

that the A p r i l  7 Plan is su p er io r  to Plan A. Thus Judge R oth 's  d is c r e t io n  is 

st i l l  b ased  on a partia l  r e c o r d  and should not be held  abusive  until all the 

ev idence  is in. Pla intiffs  argue,  f r o m  m e r e  supposit ions ,  that Plan A  is not 

as good  as A p r i l  7, but even the est im ates  of en ro l lm en t  which  they quote in 

their  b r i e f  at page 12 indicate that no one is certa in  what e f fect  that Plan 

would have. Since plaintiffs cou ld  o f fer  no other p r o o f  as to the e f fe c t  of 

A p r i l  7, it must be supposed that it was not beyond rea son a b le  d is c re t io n  to 

find Plan A  m o r e  l ikely  to p rov ide  for  d esegrega t ion  in Detro it .

CONCLUSION AND P R A Y E R

On the b a s is  of the authorities c ited  here in ,  the B oard  of 

Education  Defendants pray  that this H onorable  C ourt  a f f i r m  the D is tr ic t  

C ourt  in o rd er in g  im plem entation  of the Magnet Plan in S eptem ber ,  1971

-2 5 -



M
IL

LE
R

, 
C

A
N

F
IE

L
D

, 
P

A
D

D
O

C
K

 A
N

D
 S

T
O

N
E

, 
2

5
0

0
 D

E
T

R
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 ft

 T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

 4
B

22
S

#
and in continuing tr ia l  on the m e r it s  until Spring, 1971

R esp ec t fu l ly  submitted,

M i l le r .  Canfield, Paddock  and Sto

And

Louis R. Lee

Attorneys for  The Detroit  B oard  of 
Education

2500 Detroit  Bank & Trust  Building 
Detroit ,  Michigan 48226 
Telephone - 963-6420

-2 6 -



H
IL

L
E

R
, 

C
A

N
F

IE
L

D
, 

P
A

D
D

O
C

K
 A

N
D

 S
T

O
N

E
, 

2
3

0
0

 D
E

TR
O

IT
 B

A
N

K
 &

 T
R

U
ST

 B
U

IL
D

IN
G

, 
D

E
T

R
O

IT
, 

M
IC

H
IG

A
N

 4
6

2
2

6

V-
t fc &

C E R T IF IC A T E  OF SERVICE 

This is to c e r t i fy  that co p ie s  of  the fo reg o in g  B r ie f  

o f  The Board  o f  Education D efen da nt -A ppe l lees  has been  serv ed  on 

cou n se l  f o r  Appellants  L ou is  R. L u ca s ,  W il l iam  E. Caldw ell ,  525 

C o m m e r c e  T it le  Building, M em ph is ,  T e n n e ss e e  38103; E. Winther 

M c C r o o m ,  3245 W oodburn A venue, Cincinnati,  Ohio 45207; Nathaniel 

Jones ,  1790 Broadway, New Y ork ,  N. Y. ; Jack G r e e n b e rg ,  Jam es  M.

Nabrit  III, N orm an  J. Chachkin, 10 Colum bus C i r c l e ,  New Y ork ,  N, Y. 

10019; B ru ce  M i l le r ,  L u c i l le  Watts, 3426 C a d i l la c  T o w e r ,  Detroit ,  M ichigan 

48226; J. Harold Flannery , Paul Dimond, 38 Kirland Street, C a m b r id ge ,  

M a ss ;  C ounsel  fo r  D e fe n d a n ts -A p p e l le e s , Eugene K ra s ick y ,  The Seven 

Story  O ff ice  Building, 525 W est  Ottawa Street, Lansing , M ichigan 48926, 

and C ounsel  fo r  Intervening Defendant, T h eod ore  Sachs, 3610 

C adillac  T o w e r ,  D e tr o i t ,  M ichigan 48226, by United States Mail,  

postage prepaid , this 3rd day o f  F eb ru a ry ,  1971.

C a r l  H. VonEnde

- 2 7 -