Brief for Amicus Curiae

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BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE 1___________ _____  5
INTER-FAITH CENTERS FOR 

RACIAL JUSTICE, INC.
By William T. Downs,

A Homey
10344 Puritan Avenue 
Detroit, Michigan 48238 
345-4175

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BRIEF AMICUS CUR­
IAE ......................................................................................  l

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ........................................  3

THE ARGUMENT .................................................................

I. CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE .......................  4

II. THE FACT OF SEGREGATION .............................. 5

III. METROPOLITAN REMEDY V. LOCAL CONTROL
OF SCHOOLS ...............................   7
A. METROPOLITAN REMEDY ...........................  7

B. LOCAL CONTROL OF SCHOOLS .................... 10
IV. VIOLATIONS BY AFFECTED SCHOOL DIS­

TRICTS........................................................................ 14

V. CONTEMPORARY CIRCUMSTANCES ...................  i 6

VI. CONCLUSION ...........................................................  18



11

TABLE OF CITATIONS
Page

Cases
Attorney General v. Detroit Board o f Education, 154 Mich.

584, 118 NW 606 (1908).....................................................  11
Attorney General v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 92 NW 289 

(1902) ................................ ................................................... 1 1
Board o f Education o f the City o f Detroit v. Elliott, 319 

Mich. 436, 29 NW 2d 902 (1948) ......................................  11
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 US 497, 98 L. Ed. 884 (1954) ........... 14
Bradley, et al v. Milliken, et al, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich.

1971) ........... .......................................................................  6
Bradley, et al v. Milliken, et al, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich.

1972) ......................................................................................  7
Bradley, et al v. Milliken, et al, 433 F. 2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970) 9
Bradley, et al v.Milliken, et al, 484 F 2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973) 12, 16
Bradley v. School Board o f the City o f Richmond, 462 F 2d 

1058 (4th Cir. 1972) ..........................................................  13
Brown v. School Board o f Topeka, Kansas (Brown I), 347 US 

483, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954)   4
Brown v. School Board o f Topeka, Kansas (Brown II), 349 

US 294, 99 L. Ed. 1083 (1 9 5 5 )........................................... 4
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 467

F 2d 142; cert den_____ US____ , 37 L. Ed. 2d 1044
(1973) ............................................................................. 5,8, 10

Clark v. Board o f Education o f Little Rock, 426 F 2d 1035 
(8th Cir. 1970) ....................................................................  7

Colgrove v. Green, 328 US 549, 90 L. Ed. 1432 (1946)......... 7
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1, 3 L. Ed. 2d 3 (1 9 5 8 ) .................  17
Camming v. County Board o f Education, 175 US 528, 44 L.

Ed. 262 (1899) ....................................................................  5
Davis v. Board o f School Commissioners, 402 US 33, 28 L.

Ed. 2d 586 (1 9 7 1 )................................................................  14
Gong hum v. Rice, 275 US 78, 72 L. Ed. 172 (1927) ........... 5

in

Page

Gray v. Sanders, 372 US 368, 9 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1963) . . . . .  7
Green v. County School Board o f New Kent County, 391 US 

430, 20 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1968) ......................... . ................  7
Hadley v. Junior College District o f Metropolitan Kansas 

City, 397 US 50, 25 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1970)............................ 7

Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 197 F Supp. 649,
(E.D. LA. 1961)....................................................................  14

Haney v. County Board o f  Education o f Sevier County, 410 
F 2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969).....................................................  8

Haney v. County Board o f Education o f Sevier County, 429 
F 2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970)................... .................................  14

Jenkins v. Township o f Morris School District, 279 F 2d 617 
(N.J. 1971) ..........................................................................  14

Long v. Board o f Education District No.l Fractional, Royal 
Oak Township, City o f Royal Oak, 350 Mich. 324, 86 NW 
2d 275 (1 9 5 8 ) ......................................................................  12

Monroe v. Board o f Commissioners, 391 US 450, 20 L. Ed.
2d 733 (1968) ......................................................................  17

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896) ......... 4
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964)___  7
School District No.l Fractional Iron Township v. School Dis­

trict No. 2 Fractional, Chesterfield Township, 340 Mich.
678, 66 NW 2d 92 (1954) ...................................................  11

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenherg Board o f Education, 402 US 
1, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554(1971) ..............................•.................  14

U.S. v. Texas, 447 F 2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971) .......................... 8
Wright v. Council o f the City o f Emporia, 407 US 451,33 L.

Ed. 2d 51 (1 9 7 2 )..................................................................  8, 9

Michigan Constitution of 1963:
Art. 8, Sec. 2 ........................................................................  11



IV

Page

Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated
Sec. 131.1 et. seq...................................................................  11
Sec. 257.81 1 ........................................................................  12
Sec. 340.220a ......................................................................  11
Sec. 340.567(a) ....................................................................  12
Sec. 340.570 ......................................................................... 12
Sec. 340.575 .........................   11
Sec. 340.781-782 ................................................................ 12
Sec. 340.789 ........................................................................  12
Sec. 388.371 ........................................................................  12
Sec. 388.851 ........................................................................  11
Sec. 388-851, 1 (a ) ................................................................ 11
Sec. 388.1010(a) .................................................................. 12

Michigan Public Acts
P.A. 1970, No. 48 ............................................................. 6, 16

Legislative Journals
House of the State of Michigan, 1970 H. J. 88, P. 

2157-2158.............................................................................. 6

Miscellaneous
Dr. Martin Luther King .......................................................  4
Redford Record, April 15, 1970 ........................................  9
Bulletin 1005, Michigan State Department of Education 

(1970), School Districts Child Account for Distribution 
o f State Aid. ......................................................................  11

Transportation Data, State Board of Education, 1969-1970 13
Thomas, Norman C., Rule 9: Politics, Administration, and 

Civil Rights (1966) .........................................................  15
Detroit News, November 3, 1972 .......................................  16
Detroit Free Press, January 9, 1974 .................................. 17
Detroit Free Press, January 17, 1974 ................................ 17
Detroit Free Press, May 7, 1972 ..........................................  17

1

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 73-434

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, ET AL.,

Appellants
v.

RONALD G. BRADLEY, ET AL.,

Appellees * 1 2 3

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
FILE A BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

NOW COMES the INTER-FAITH CENTERS FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE, INC., by its attorney, WILLIAM T. DOWNS, and moves 
for leave to file brief Amicus Curiae, and in support thereof says:

1. That the Inter-Faith Centers for Racial Justice, Inc., is a 
non-profit corporation, organized and existing under the laws of 
the State of Michigan since July, 1969, and with the stated pur­
pose “to ameliorate and/or eliminate attitudinal and institutional 
racial and ethnic bias or prejudice, . . .” in the Detroit metropoli­
tan area.

2. That the Inter-Faith Centers for Racial Justice, Inc., is 
sponsored by religious denominations, namely:- The American 
Lutheran Church; the Episcopal Diocese of Michigan; the Jewish 
Community Council; the Lutheran Church in America; the Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese of Detroit; the United Church of Christ; and 
the United Methodist Church.

3. That the Inter-Faith Centers for Racial Justice, Inc., is 
wholly supported by voluntary contributions and is organized on 
the basis of institutional and/or individual memberships; that it 
presently numbers ninety-six individual churches, parishes and



2

community organizations as institutional members, and over 500 
individuals as members.

That in its effort to carry out this purpose the Inter-Faith 
Centers for Racial Justice, Inc., has worked extensively with 
groups of people in Detroit and the surrounding suburbs. People in 
the very geographic area which would be affected by any proposed 
school desegregation order.

5. As a consequence of the membership and organization 
described above, the Inter-Faith Centers for Racial Justice, Inc., is 
in a unique position to know and to assess public opinion and atti­
tude in the specific areas of metropolitan Detroit which would be 
alfected by the proposed order for pupil transportation in this 
case.

6. That because of its extensive involvement in the kind of 
issues which are raised in the instant case, the Inter-Faith Centers 
for Racial Justice, Inc., may be of unique assistance to the Court 
in better understanding the total situation, and in its review of the 
proposed remedy.

WHEREFORE, the Inter-Faith Centers for Racial Justice, 
Inc., prays that this Court grant leave to file Amicus Curiae, and 
accept the brief attached hereto.

Respectfully submitted

INTER-FAITH CENTERS 
FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, INC.

BY_________________

February 9, 1974

William T. Downs 
Attorney

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The Inter-Faith Centers for Racial Justice, Inc., has sought 

the consent of petitioners to the filing of a brief Amicus Curiae. 
The request resulted in the consent of the Attorney General and 
of Counsel for Allen Park Public Schools, et al. The Counsel for 
Grosse Pointe Public Schools neither agreed nor refused. (These 
letters are forwarded herewith to the Clerk of the Court.)

The Inter-Faith Centers for Racial Justice, Inc., is an inter- 
religious t 1! and interracial membership organization whose mem­
bers live throughout the urban and suburban area of Metropolitan 
Detroit. f2l The organization was formed in July, 1969, as a 
means of more effective interfaith cooperation in the cause of 
racial justice. Since September, 1971, the organization has spon­
sored many public informational meetings, principally in suburban 
areas, in order to inform interested people about the progress of 
the school desegregation litigation and the fundamental issues 
involved. At times, these meetings have suffered harassment from 
persons who hold an extreme anti-busing point of view. In spite of 
this, an estimated 3,500 individuals have attended and taken part 
in these meetings. This experience has convinced members of this 
organization that whatever nomenclature may be employed in dus- 
cussion of this issue, there is an underlying element of racial pre­
judice which pervades most, if not all, of that discussion. The 
organization has learned other things. There are substantial num­
bers ot people, including some of our own membership, who are 
opposed to the transportation of pupils between districts, but who 
will accept this remedy as a means of correcting a greater wrong. 
There are presently a significant number of organized groups of

 ̂  ̂ Sponsoring organizations include these religious groups:
American Lutheran Church, Michigan District
Episcopal Diocese of Michigan
Jewish Community Council of Metropolitan Detroit
Lutheran Church in America, Michigan Synod
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Detroit
United Church of Christ, Detroit Metropolitan Association
United Methodist Church, Detroit Conference
United Presbyterian Church, Committee on Religion and Race.
The individual members are drawn primarily from suburban areas and 

90% of the membership is Caucasian.

3



4

people who will undertake to facilitate the implementation of 
court-ordered school desegregation if, and when, an order is 
entered and the matter is settled.

The Inter-Faith Centers for Racial Justice, Inc., seeks this 
opportunity to participate as Amicus Curiae in order for the voice 
of such people to be heard. This was not an easy decision. There 
are members among sponsoring organizations who are opposed to 
cross-district busing in any form. There are members of sponsoring 
organizations who have joined the flight from the city. There are 
members of this organization who are fearful and anxious about 
the uncertainties of a prospective school desegregation order. 
Nevertheless, this organization has come to a painful and difficult 
decision because it believes, “There comes a time when one must 
take a stand, that is neither safe, nor politic, nor popular; but one 
must take it, because it is right” .t

THE ARGUMENT
The briefs of Petitioners and Respondents in this cause will 

undoubtedly treat with the constitutional and legal issues of 
school desegregation, both extensively and intensively. At the 
same time, it may be helpful to simply and briefly state what 
Amicus understands to be the logical evolution and progression of 
constitutional interpretation as it applies to the law of desegre­
gation of public schools.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
The members of this honorable Court are fully familiar with 

Plessy v. Ferguson ^  which pronounced the doctrine o f ‘separate 
but equal’, and of the repudiation of that doctrine by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Brown v. School B o a r d P l e s s y  
was not a case involving public education, but its application and

1̂ 1 Dr. Martin Luther King.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537 ,41L. Ed. 256 (1896).

^  1 Brown v. School Board of Topeka, Kansas (Brown I), 347 US 483, 98L 
Ed. 873 (1954). Brown v. School Board o f Topeka, Kansas (Brown II), 349 
US 294 (1955).

5

acceptance in the field of public education,^! and its use as justi­
fication for racially separated schools should be ssen as illustrative 
of the pervasive influence of that ruling upon American life. Your 
Amicus submits that the doctrine of Plessy became the mortar 
which bonded together the building blocks of racial separation in 
whatever form it appeared during the first half of the 20th cen­
tury; whether it be the explicit form of legislation and ordinance, 
or the subtle and sophisticated form of suburb, zoning restrictions, 
real estate sales practices, or mortgage practices. In this sense, the 
blessing of Plessy appeared to give legal sanction to any device 
designed to culminate in racial separation. In this special sense, all 
activities which would produce the foreseeable result of racial 
separation are “de jure.”

Brown repudiated the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ and 
established, it is hoped, for all time that separate can never be 
equal. In perspective then, the challenge to the Courts, and to the 
nation, since Brown has been to find the ways and means to cor­
rect the overt and covert effects of Plessy.

We agree “ that the Constitution should (not) be applied anti­
thetically to children in the North and in the South.” Nor 
should the Constitution be applied differently to large or small 
cities, or to simple or complex urban areas. The happenstance of 
birth on one or the other side of a school district boundary, or of 
a county line, should not affect the guarantees of a constitution 
which extend throughout a nation. In the specific terms of the 
Detroit situation, residence on the south side of Eight Mile Road 
should embody no different constitutional and legal guarantees 
than residence on the north side of the same street.

II. THE FACT OF SEGREGATION
The record of the trial of this cause contains abundant evi­

dence of the existence of segregation in the public schools of the

t6 l Cumming v. County Board o f  Education, 175 US 528, 44L. Ed. 262 
(1 899). Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 US 78, 72L. Ed. 172 (1927).

Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 461 F. 2d 142, 
148; Cert. den. ______  U S_____ , 37L. Ed. 2d 1044 (1973).



6

City of Detroit and of the existence of segregation in the public 
schools in the total metropolitan area of Detroit. Your Amicus 
strongly confirms the findings of the District Court contained in 
the ruling of September 27, 197l , l 8l and further states that in its 
contact throughout the community no one has seriously denied 
such racial segregation in the public schools.

The District Court further found that acts and/or omissions 
of various agencies of the State of Michigan had caused, contri­
buted to, or maintained this condition of racial segregation in the 
public schools of Detroit. Perhaps the most damning evidence was 
the passage of Public Act 48 in 1970. This specific and flagrant 
act of the legislature which purported to reverse the plan of the 
Detroit Board of Education of April 7, 1970, stands out as the 
ugly pinnacle of State action which perpetuated racial segregation 
in the public schools of Detroit. It is argued that while admitting 
the existence of Public Act 48, l10l it was not the action of the 
people or suburbs which are now affected by the proposed school 
desegregation plan. It is also argued that the Public Act 48 [11] 
was motivated by a commitment to the neighborhood school con­
cept, and only incidentally perpetuated segregation. The timing of 
the passage of this Act condemns this argument as specious. Fur­
ther, any examination of the legislative history of Public Act 
48 will disclose that it was the representatives of the very 
areas now affected by the proposed desegregation plan who 
pressed for its passage. f13l It is often said that representatives are 
responsible to their constituents; are not the constituents also 
responsible for what they demand from their representatives?

338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
l9j Act 48, Mich. Pub. Acts of 1970. 
f 10] Act 48, Mich. Pub. Acts of 1970.

Act 48, Mich. Pub. Acts of 1970.
D2] Act 48, Mich. Pub. Acts of 1970.

Journal 88, House of Representatives, 75th Legislature, Regular Ses­
sion, June 5, 1970, pp. 2157-2158. One petitioner has made a point of the 
vote of black legislators for Act 48. However, petitioner is citing the final vote 
on passage, and is ignoring the bitter struggle which preceded the routine 
business of final passage. Brief of Grosse Pointe Public School System at page 
21 .

At one point in the findings of June 14, 1972, l 141 the 
Honorable Stephen J. Roth states that the issue since September 
27, 1971, has never been whether to desegregate but rather how to 
desegregate. Amicus concurs. This being the case, both the school 
authorities and the Courts have an affirmative duty to eliminate 
“ all vestiges’’ of segregation, H5] t0 destroy it “root and 
branch.” I161

III. METROPOLITAN REMEDY V. LOCAL CONTROL OF 
SCHOOLS
The only serious question is whether there is any reason to 

limit the mandate of the Constitution to the City of Detroit. 
Amicus strongly suggests that there is not. Fiist, there is no con­
stitutional reason, and no general policy reason, to limit relief 
from the constitutional abuse of segregation. Secondly, the facts 
of this case point consistently toward the necessity for, and 
propriety of, a metropolitan remedy.

A. Metropolitan Remedy
There is no constitutional reason to limit a desegregation 

order to a single school district. As this Court has pointed out, the 
Constitution recognizes only States, not their subdivisions. l17l 
The reapportionment cases demonstrate the Court’s unwillingness 
to allow States to subordinate individual rights to the admitted 
interest of the States in conducting public business within pre­
existing subdivision boundaries. l18l The Court took this course in 
the face of sharp warnings that it was entering a “political 
thicket.” l 19l

In the school desegregation area, it is now settled that school 
authorities may not divide a school district into two, when the 
“effect would be to impede the process of dismantling a dual
fl^ l Bradley, et al v. Milliken et al, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
^ 3 J Clark v. Board of Education o f  Little Rock, 426 F. 2d 1035 (8th Cir. 
1970).

Green v. County School Board o f  New Kent County, 391 US 430.20L  
Ed. 2d 716 (1968).
l 17l Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533, 575; 12L Ed. 2d 506(1964).
1181 Reynolds v. Sims, supra. Gray v. Sanders, 372 US 368, 9L. Ed. 2d 821 
(1963). Hadley v. Junior College District o f Metropolitan Kansas City, 397

7



8

school system pursuant to Court orders.” f l 2°1 The Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits have dealt with the reverse of this problem, and 
have required neighboring black and white school districts to 
merge after years of separate existence. I211 Both Circuits based 
their decisions upon findings that separate districts were created 
tor the purpose of maintaining segregated schools. The finding of 
an intent to segregate seems unnecessary to the result however, in 
the light ot this Court’s subsequent Wright decision which focused 
on “the eftect — not the purpose or motivation” of the school 
authorities. f22^

In view of these cases, it is clear that the Constitution does 
not stop on the south side of Eight Mile Road in Detroit. How­
ever, one may ask if there is a policy reason, existing outside the 
Constitution, for restricting a remedy to the school district con­
taining most of the black students? Amicus can think of no such 
policy which is so important that it justifies leaving constitutional 
wrongs unremedied. Certainly, if an adequate remedy can be at­
tained within the segregated school district, it would be unwise for 
a Court to impose a more sweeping remedy. Is a Detroit-only 
remedy adequate? The District Court, after thorough exploration, 
answered, NO! Amicus agrees.

There are several cogent reasons, based upon the specifics of 
the Detroit case, justifying a decree extending beyond the bound­
aries of Detroit.

First, the school children of Detroit are entitled to a com­
plete remedy from the segregation imposed upon them. The Dis­
trict Court, quite reasonably, found that a remedy is impossible 
within the City itself, as every school would be identifiably black 
if only Detroit children were “desegregated.” Assuming no more 
white children leave the Detroit public schools, a Detroit-only 
desegregation plan would create approximately seventy (70%) 
percent black schools within a metropolitan area that is approxi-

12°] Wright v. Council o f the City o f Emporia, 407 US 451, 33L Ed. 2d 51 
(1972).
^  J U.S. v. Texas, 447 F. 2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971). Haney v. County Board 
of Education of Sevier County, 410 F. 2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969).
l-~] Wright v. Council o f the City o f Emporia, supra 407 US at p. 462. 
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, supra.

9

mately eighty (80%) white. It is commonly accepted in South­
eastern Michigan that the white proportion of the Detroit schools 
would further decline precipitously in the next few years, leaving 
the entire school district over ninety (90%) black. Such a cure 
would be worse than the disease as it would give judicial sanction 
to racial separation along school district lines. l23l

Secondly, a Detroit-only plan, leading as it would to a black 
school system surrounded by white school systems, would leave 
the black pupils of Detroit even more vulnerable to discriminatory 
treatment by a suburban dominated State Legislature than they 
have been in the past. The Detroit School District, being the only 
first class district in the State and by far the largest district, can be 
the object of subtle discrimination ostensibly based on neutral 
factors; such as size or classification. Such discrimination already 
exists in State financial aid and transportation reimbursement, as 
the District Court has found. Complete racial identification of 
Detroit schools will only make discrimination more frequent and 
devastating, if history is any guide.

The third reason for extending a plan of desegregation to the 
suburbs lies in the fact that the Detroit Board of Education is not 
solely responsible for the segregation of the Detroit public schools. 
The entire State of Michigan expressly required Detroit to con­
tinue segregation when the Detroit Board of Education attempted 
to take steps to partially desegregate its schools. The will of the 
State of Michigan was expressed in Public Act 48, which the Sixth 
C ircuit Court o f Appeals has previously held unconstitu- 
tionalJ24! Since the State, as a whole, is responsible for preserv­
ing a segregated Detroit, it is only just that the State be involved in 
eliminating that segregation. This conclusion is reinforced by the 
recollection that public debate on Public Act 48 was conducted in 
frankly racial terms, t251 and that many of the leading legislative 
supporters of the Act represented Detroit’s suburbs. This history

l23  ̂ Compare Wright v. Council o f the City o f Emporia, supra 407 US at p. 
464 approving consideration by the District Court of foreseeable population 
shifts.
f24l Bradley et al v. Milliken et al, 433 F. 2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970).
f25l See, for example, one local newspaper, Redford Record, April 15, 
1970.



♦

\

10

of State and suburban involvement in Detroit’s school segregation 
is sharply at odds with the effort of the Michigan Attorney Gen­
eral and suburban representatives in this case to assume the pos­
ture of innocent bystanders.

A final reason for adoption of a Metropolitan remedy lies in 
the origin and nature of housing segregation in Southeastern Mich­
igan. The District Court found that residential segregation, as it 
exists in Metropolitan Detroit, results from Federal, State, local, 
and private efforts. It also found that the Detroit Board of Educa­
tion defined its school attendance zones on the basis of the resi­
dential segregation created by this mixture of public and private 
action. Petitioners, while conceding the existence of segregation, 
would have us believe that the Court cannot remedy the situation 
because it is a result of housing patterns. The Fifth Circuit, U.S. 
Court of Appeals, has said, “we . . . reject this type of continued 
meaningless use of de facto and de jure nomenclature to attempt 
to establish a kind of ethnic and racial separation of students in 
public schools that Federal Courts are powerless to remedy.” f261

B. Local Control of Schools
Both the legal and public debate surrounding Bradley v. Milli- 

ken has frequently produced an alignment of groups verbalizing 
the legal hypothesis of local control of education, or the social 
concept of a neighborhood school, as the reason for denying a 
metropolitan remedy. This Court will recognize that these are 
chameleon terms, subject to varying interpretations and assuming 
new coloration from different points of view. Let us examine the 
meaning of local control of education, and the neighborhood 
school, as they exist in Michigan today.

The State Constitution clearly makes education the responsi­
bility of the State:

“Free public elementary and secondary schools; discrimina­
tion.

SEC. 2. The legislature shall maintain and support a system 
of free public elementary and secondary schools as defined 
by law. Every school district shall provide for the education

126] Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, supra.

11

of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, 
color or national origin.” 127]

The Supreme Court of Michigan has ruled that a local Board 
of Education is a State agency and that public education is 
not a part of local self government inherent in townships and mu­
nicipalities, f29 30 *1

The local Board of Education may make an independent de­
cision to construct a school facility; HOWEVER, that decision is 
subject to State law regarding the quality and specifications of 
construction, [30] and review of the plans, specifications, and site 
location by a State agency.[3H

If a local school board decides to construct a school, and re- 
qures financing in order to do so, it is true that the local board 
may determine to borrow the necessary funds; HOWEVER, its 
borrowing is controlled by State law,1321 and whatever financial 
arrangements it proposes are subject to review and approval by a 
State agency. [331

The local school board may make an independent decision 
regarding the schedule which the schools within its district will fol­
low; HOWEVER, that schedule is subject to the requirements of 
State law,l34l and the proposed class hours per day as well as the 
schedule of days is subject to review and approval by a State 
agencyJ35!

l27  ̂ Constitution of the State of Michigan, Article VIII, Sec. 2.
I28  ̂ Board o f Education o f the City of Detroit v. Elliott, 319 Mich. 436, 29 
NW 2d 902 (1948). Attorney General v.Lowrery, 131 Mich. 639, 92 NW 289 
(1902).

2̂91 School District No. 1 Fractional Iron Township v. School District No.
2 Fractional, Chesterfield Township, 340 Mich. 678, 66 NW 2d 92 (1954). 
Attorney General v. Detroit Board o f Education, 154 Mich. 11 8 NW 606 
(1908).
[30] Mich. Comp. Laws Annotated, 388.851,
1311 Mich. Comp. Laws Annotated, 388.851, Sec. 1(a).
f32J Mich. Comp. Laws Annotated, 340.220a.
f33J Mich. Comp. Laws Annotated, 131.1 et seq (Municipal Finance Com­
mission).
f34  ̂ Mich. Comp. Laws Annotated, 340.575.
l35 l School Districts Child Account for Distribution of State Aid, Bulletin 
No. 1005, Michigan State Department of Fducation (1670).



12

A local school board may make an independent decision re­
garding the curricula to be offered in its district; HOWEVER, 
that curriculum is subject to minimum requirements of State 
law, ancj the course offerings are subject to review by a State
agency .1* 371

A local school board may make an independent decision to 
employ staff lor its schools; HOWEVER, the qualifications of 
those employees are determined by State law, and a State agency 
certifies the eligibility of those potential employees.l38l

A local school board may make an independent decision to 
terminate employees; HOWEVER, the terms and conditions of 
such termination are controlled by State law, and the grounds of 
any specific termination are subject to review and approval or dis­
approval by a State Agency.1391

A local school board may make an independent decision 
about the financing of the operation of its schools; HOWEVER, it 
will do so with the full knowledge that it is likely that approxi­
mately forty (40%) percent or more of its budget will be financed 
from State funds, and it cannot borrow in anticipation of State aid 
without approval.l4°l

A local school board may make an independent decision to 
transport students to schools within its district for any one of a 
number of reasons; HOWEVER, it will do so with the full know­
ledge that approximately seventy-five (75%) of the cost of such 
transportation will be paid from State funds; except in the city of 
Detroit, f415

From this enumeration, it can readily be seen that the State 
of Michigan is inextricably involved in purported “local decisions”

3̂61 Mich. Comp. Laws Annotated, 257.81 1; Mich. Comp. Laws Anno­
tated, 340.781-782; Mich. Comp. Laws Annotated, 388.371.
i37l Mich. Comp. Laws Annotated, 340.789.
3̂8] Mich. Comp. Laws Annotated, 340.570; Mich. Comp. Laws Anno­

tated, 388.1010(a).
3̂91 Long v. Board o f Education District No. 1 Fractional, Royal Oak

Township, City o f Royal Oak, 350 Mich. 324, 86 NW 2d 275 (1958).
Mich. Comp. Laws Annotated, 340.567(a).

*411 Bradley, et al v. Milliken, et al. 484 F. 2d 21 5 (1 97 3). p. 240-241.

13

in virtually every important aspect of school governance. I42^

The term neighborhood school is calculated to summon forth 
mental images of children playfully skipping across the street, or 
down the block, to their neighborhood school. However, this is an 
image from a bygone era, and does not comport with the reality of 
school life in Michigan, and specifically in the Southeastern part of 
Michigan which is the subject of the proposed order in this case. 
The record discloses that school districts within the counties of 
Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb are those likely to be affected by a 
school desegregation order. Transportation of school children is an 
accepted way of life in Michigan — forty (40%) percent of all stu­
dents in Michigan are transported.

Within the tri-county area which would be affected by a 
metropolitan order, in the year 1970, 93,900 school children in 
Oakland County, 50% of those enrolled, regularly rode buses to 
and from school at a cost of $3,800,000; in Macomb County 
41,300 school children, 42% of those enrolled, regularly rode buses 
to and from school at a cost of $2,228,000; and in Wayne County 
(outside of the City of Detroit) 64,000 school children, 52.5% of 
those enrolled, regularly rode buses to and from school, at a cost of 
$2,250,000. In 51 school districts of the three county area outside 
of Detroit, 199,200 students were transported by bus, a total of 
11,671,000 miles, using 1783 vehicles at a cost of $8,278,000j43!

In the face of this reality, the arguments of time, distance, 
and cost, so often advanced as reasons for denying a school deseg­
regation order seem specious.

Amicus submits that contentions advanced by those who are 
opposed to the result of Bradley v. Milliken are a facade; a facade 
carefully designed to camouflage the desire and intention of pre­
serving racially segregated schools in the Detroit metropolitan 
area.

f42  ̂ State control in Michigan is markedly different than State control in 
Virginia considered in: Bradley v. School Board o f the City o f Richmond, 
462 F. 2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), Affirmed by an equally divided Court, 
___ US____, 36L. Ed. 2d 771 (1973).
[4 3] Transportation Data, State Board of Education, for school year 
1969-1970.



14

<0

IV. VIOLATIONS BY AFFECTED SCHOOL DISTRICTS
It is argued, on behalf of petitioners, that segregative acts by 

school officials in affected suburban school districts is a necessary 
basis for including such districts in a remedial plan. This argument 
has a certain attractiveness. It makes an appeal to a certain visceral 
sense of fairness.

While Amicus believes that the petitioners are in error in their 
understanding of the law which shapes the remedy for school seg­
regation, l44l it assumes that respondents have adequately briefed 
this issue.

Amicus believes that the argument of petitioners is without 
validity under present law, and that it can be adequately answered 
as follows:

1. Inasmuch as the United States Constituion, and particu­
larly the Fourteenth Amendment, recognizes only States, and not 
subdivisions of States, the only Finding necessary are those of 
State action, or inaction.f451 Specific findings of State responsi­
bility were made in this case.

2. Once a condition of unconstitutional segregation in pub­
lic schools has been found, then the issue becomes one of feasible 
desegregation, which by definition must involve schools predomi­
nantly of another race. The choice of schools to be involved in the 
remedy is determined by the remedial effect and not by the al­
leged guilt or innocence of the proposed school districts^461

Although believing the settled law to be dispositive of this 
issue, Amicus considers some further discussion to be in order. 
The contention of no suburban responsibility is sharply disputed. 
The prominent role of suburban legislators in the unconstitutional 
enactment of Public Act 48, 1970 has already been noted.

The lower Court found a pattern of conduct on the part of 
government at all levels, Federal, State, and local, combined with
[44] Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 US 497, 98L. Ed. 884. (1954).

Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 197 F. Supp. 649, 658 (Ed.
LA 1961). Haney v. County Board o f Education o f Sevier County, 429 F. 2d
364 (8th Cir. 1970). Jenkins v. Township o f Morris School District, 279 F 2d
617. 628 (N.J. 1971).
J4 *4  Swann v. Charlottc-Mecklenherg Board of Education, 402 US 1, 15;
- * L. td 554 (1**71 ), Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, 402 US

15

those of private organizations to establish and to maintain a pat­
tern of residential segregation.

Let us consider only one part of the evidence upon which 
this finding was based — the Grosse Pointe “Point System”. It is 
not disputed that the Grosse Pointe Brokers Association utilized a 
point system for rating prospective home buyers between the 
years of 1943-1960. This point system was designed to exclude 
Jews and Negroes. I47 * * *1 From the existence of this discriminatory 
policy and practice over such an extended period of time, it can be 
inferred that there was a lack of local and State action which per­
mitted its continuation.

Are the people of Grosse Pointe, having taken action to as­
sure a harmonious neighborhood, now to be heard to say that all 
they want is a ‘neighborhood school’? It is ludicrous for them to 
say that the Grosse Pointe School District is innocently congruent 
with the Grosse Pointe municipal lines for governmental conve­
nience and to foster the neighborhood school concept. The perpet­
uation of school segregation is the first foreseeable result of the 
neighborhood school concept in Grosse Pointe, if it is not, in fact, 
the intended result.

If Amicus has a proper understanding of the position of peti­
tioners; the petitioners are saying essentially this: that John Doe, 
Richard Roe, Jane Poe, Martha Zoe, and Joseph Coe may consti­
tute a City Council, or a zoning board, meeting on Monday nights, 
which adopts policies and procedures which are designed to limit 
the population of that area to a certain economic and ethnic group 
of society. Those same people may meet together on Tuesday and 
Thursday to plan communities and arrange Financing to serve a 
certain pre-determined economic, social, or ethnic group of soci­
ety. On Wednesday nights those same people may meet together as 
a school board and with great impartiality make those day-to-day 
decisions in the governance of the school district which are de­
signed to serve the homogenous population of that district. The 
petitioners argue that since the school board decisions are nondis­

t47 l Rule 9: Politics, Administration, and Civil Rights, Norman C. Thomas, 
Random House, New York, 1966.



16

criminatory, and since the school board finds itself elected by a 
racially identifiable population, it must serve that population; seg­
regation is pure happenstance, and the school officials are free 
from any segregative acts.

Your Honors, racially identifiable school districts surround­
ing the City of Detroit are not a coincidence.

It Amicus has m isconstrued prior decisions of this 
Court, J or jf this Court now believes that in the situation of 
multiple school districts in a Metropolitan area there are peculiar 
factors which require evidence of segregative acts, then Amicus 
urges that this matter be remanded to the lower Court to conduct 
further hearings with the clear direction that any and all evidence 
relevant to the creation and continuation of housing segregation 
be received.

V. CONTEMPORARY CIRCUMSTANCES
The controversial character and the political ramifications of 

the Detroit School desegregation litigation is too well known to 
require elaboration. 1491 The Executive Department of the United 
States government has recently announced its request to file a 
brief before this CourtJ50! It behooves this Court to be fully in­
formed regarding the current circumstances in the affected area 
and in the State of Michigan. Amicus undertakes to objectively 
present such information to the Court. The involvement of the 
State legislature of Micliigan in the affairs of the Detroit school 
district by the enactment of Act 48 of Public Acts 1970 has been 
detailed in the proceeding of the Court below. Section 12 of this 
Act was properly found unconstitutional in subsequent Federal 
litigation.I511 One might think that this would discourage the 
State legilsature from such attempts. However, this is not the Case. 
Act 197 of Public Acts 1973, amended the Mass Transit Law to 
prohibit the use of revenues from the State gasoline tax to support 
any bus lines which transport students to promote integration.

[48] Footnotes No. 45 and 46, supra.
[49] Detroit News, November 3, 1972, p. 16A.
[50] February 1, 1974.
I51l Bradley, et a l \ .  Milliken, et al, 484 F. 2d 215 (1973).

I

One of the sponsors of the bill stated that the intention was clear 
to prevent the busing of students for purposes of integration, even 
and including the transportation of students within the City of 
Detroit. 1-̂ 21 Apparently the State legislature believes that it has 
considerable to say about what goes on within the so-called inde­
pendent school districts.

The racial attitude of some suburban areas is so well known 
that some businessmen attempt to use it as leverage to secure 
selfish advantage. The readers of The Detroit Free Press 152 531 were 
recently exposed to the story of a Sterling Heights real estate de­
veloper who used the threat of integrated housing to compel the 
zoning board to grant a change from residential to commercial 
zoning.

These items are respectfully called to your attention so that 
you may have some feel for the present state of affairs in metro­
politan Detroit. The school desegregation litigation has been a cata­
lyst for hardening divisions among the population. It may be tact­
ful and politic for the petitioners to describe these divisions in 
terms of the traditional urban-rural differences. The fact is that 
such a description in the context of the City of Detroit is a euphe­
mism for describing a black-white division. The issue is controver­
sial; however, community opposition is not a sufficient reason for 
limiting the remedy of school segregation. t54l

Regrettable as it may be, the reality is that the proposed 
school desegregation order controversy is superimposed upon a 
fabric of considerable racial conflict and tension. Consequently, 
positions taken for, or against, the remedy are interpreted almost 
solely in racial terms.!55! Any action by this Honorable Court 
which appears to deny the opportunity for reasonable desegrega­
tion of the Detroit schools will be perceived as a victory of whites 
only, and will be a giant backward step in the struggle for equal 
protection of the law.

[52] Detroit Free Press, January 9, 1974.
[53] Detroit Free Press, January 17, 1974, p. 3A.
I54] Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 US 450, 20L. Ed. 2d 733 
(1968). Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1, 3L. Ed. 2d 3 (1958).
[55] Detroit Free Press, Sunday, May 7, 1972 (Report of a Survey).

17



18

VI. CONCLUSION
In the judgment of Amicus there is reliable evidence to sup­

port each and every finding of the Hon. Stephen J. Roth, and 
ample precedent to justify each and every ruling and order issued. 
While the orders may be more extensive and comprehensive than 
previously entered in such cases, they are necessitated by the reali­
ties of life in a complex metropolitan area. In the pursuit of jus­
tice, one should not hesitate because of the difficulties ahead.

Since Brown II, the Federal Courts have courageously moved 
forward to eradicate inequality in education based upon racial seg­
regation. The Courts have done so within fundamental constitu­
tional principles. One must ask if the inequality is any the less 
onerous because it occurs in three counties instead of one; or be­
cause the inequality is proliferated in multiple school districts in­
stead of one. This unconstitutional condition must be rectified. 
Cross-district busing is an imperfect and burdensome way of doing 
so. Yet, no other solution is proposed. Let those who oppose, pro­
duce a better solution.

A metropolitan solution is required by the evidence, com­
pelled by the Constitution, and demanded by justice.

WHEREFORE, Amicus prays that the conclusions and orders 
of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, made in this cause, be af­
firmed.

Respectfully submitted,

INTER-FAITH CENTERS 
FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, INC.

William T. Downs 
A ttorney-in-fact 
10344 Puritan Avenue 
Detroit, Michigan 48238 
345-4350

February 9, 1974