Cummings v. City of Charleston Brief and Appendix for Appellants

    Itutpfc (Hour! nf A p p a l s
F oe the F ourth Circuit

I n  t h e

John H. Cummings, J ohn L. Chisolm, W illiam Cromwell, 
A rthur P rice, E dward V. P ayne, R obert J ohnson, 
Dan Nowell, E rnest Cromwell, J ames N. F orest, 
H enry B oyd, B enjamin W right, Clarence Brown and 
H orace Gross, for  themselves and all other persons 
similarly situated,

Plaintiff's-Appellants,

T he City op Charleston, a Municipal Corporation, 
T he Charleston Municipal Golp Course Commission, 
Gerald M. Carter, Chairman, A lfred 0 . H alsey, 
Cornelious 0 . T hompson, T. Moultrie M cK evlin, 
W illiam A. Dotterer, Leroy Nelson and C. D issell 
Jenkins, members of the Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course Commission; and J ohn E. A dams, Manager of 
the Charleston Municipal Golf Course,

Defendants-Appellees.

BRIEF AND APPENDIX FOR APPELLANTS

Matthew J. P erry 
L incoln C. J enkins, J r.

1107% Washington Street 
Columbia, S. C.

T hurgood Marshall 
J ack Greenberg 
J ames M. Nabrit, III  

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, N. Y.
Attorneys for Appellants

Norman C. A maker,
Of Counsel.



INDEX TO BRIEF

Statement of the Case ......................................................  1

Question Presented .......    5

How the Question Arises ..................................................  5

Statement of the Facts ....................................................  5

Argument ..............................................................................  6

Conclusion .......................................................  10

T able oe Cases:

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 ...............................  9
Boynton v. Virginia,------U .S .---------, 5 L.ed. 2 d -----.... 9
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 295 .................  7

Danner v. Holmes (5th Cir. January 9, 1961) .... ..........  8
Dawson v. Mayor of the City of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 

386 (4th Cir. 1955), aff’d 350 U.S. 877 ..................... 4

Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, 350 U.S. 413
(1956) ...................................................................................  7

Henry v. Greenville Airport Commission (4th Cir.
8247) .................................................................................. 7, 9

Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 ......................... 4

Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955) ....................................  8

McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 
(1950)

PAGE

7



11

Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) .........  7
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)  ..... ....... ..........  7

Tate v. Dep’t of Conservation and Development etc.,
352 U.S. 838 ................................. .....................................  4

United States v. Louisiana,------ U .S .------- , 5 L.ed. 2d
....... . ........ - ............. -...... .................................................... 8

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Complaint .............................. ......... .............. ............... . la

Answer ..................................................................................  8a

Motion for Preliminary Injunction ........ ........................  14a

Affidavit of John H. Cummings ............... ................ ......  15a

Affidavit of John L. Chisolm ...............................     17a

Affidavit of Benjamin Wright ......................................... 19a

Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction ....    21a

James L. White
Direct ................................      21a
Cross ..............................................................    30a

John L. Chisolm
Direct ....       34a
Cross ......................................................................  35a

Colloquy .........      35a

PAGE



John E. Adams
Direct ....................................................................  38a
Cross ......................................................................  39a

Colloquy on Granting of M otion...............................  39a

Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction .... 46a

Hearing on Trial ................................................................  48a

Colloquy ........................................................................  48a

John E. Adams
Direct .................................................................. 49a
Cross ......................................................................  51a
Redirect ................................................................  52a

Colloquy on Supreme Court’s 1954 Decision .......  53a

Order Granting Permanent Injunction........................... 60a

Notice of Appeal ................................................................  66a

Ill
PAGE



1 st t h e

I n M  (Orwrt of A p p e a ls
F ob the F ourth Circuit

--------....— ..... — ........... .......................... .............................. .

J ohn H. Cummings, J ohn L. Chisolm, W illiam Cromwell, 
A rthur P rice, E dward Y. P ayne, R obert J ohnson, 
Dan Nowell, E rnest Cromwell, J ames N. F orest, 
H enry B oyd, Benjamin W right, Clarence Brown and 
H orace Gross, for themselves and all other persons 
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

T he City oe Charleston, a Municipal Corporation, 
T he Charleston Municipal Gole Course Commission, 
Gerald M. Carter, Chairman, A lfred 0 . H alsey, 
Cornelious 0 . T hompson, T. Moultrie McK evlin, 
W illiam A. Dotterer, L eroy Nelson and C. D issell 
Jenkins, members of the Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course Commission; and J ohn E. A dams, Manager of 
the Charleston Municipal Golf Course,

Defendants-Appellees.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

Statement o f  the Case

This civil action brought by plaintiffs (John H. Cum­
mings, John L. Chisolm, Robert Johnson, and Benjamin 
Wright), Negro citizens and residents of the City and 
County of Charleston, South Carolina and of the United 
States on behalf of themselves and others similarly situ­
ated, seeks to secure immediate access to the recreational



2

facilities of the Charleston municipal golf course, a public 
facility of the City of Charleston, South Carolina. Plain­
tiffs have been denied the use of those facilities because of 
their race and color. The court below permanently enjoined 
defendants (The City of Charleston, The Charleston Munic­
ipal Golf Course Commission, and the Manager of the golf 
course) from enforcing those sections of the Code of Laws 
of South Carolina of 1952 (§§51-182-51-184) which require 
segregation of the races in parks and recreational areas in 
any County of South Carolina having a city with a popula­
tion of more than sixty thousand persons and the concomi­
tant policy and practice of racial discrimination based upon 
those sections, declaring those sections unconstitutional and 
void under the equal protection and due process clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. The court below entered judgment approxi­
mately three months after hearing on the merits but decreed 
that the injunction should not become effective until eight 
(8) months from the date thereof and it is from this portion 
of the order of injunction that plaintiffs appeal. Previously, 
essentially the same evidence had been adduced on hearing 
for preliminary injunction, which was denied. Hearing on 
the merits was scheduled for approximately six weeks fol­
lowing the preliminary hearing.

This action was commenced by filing a complaint, July 
6, 1959 in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of South Carolina, Charleston Division. Jurisdic­
tion was invoked under 28 U.S.C. §§1331,1343 and 42 U.S.C. 
1983 alleging deprivation of rights protected under Section 
One of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States and by 42 U.S.C. §1981.

The action was brought as a class suit pursuant to Rule 
23(a) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The com­
plaint (App. p. la) alleged that the defendants had es­



3

tablished and were maintaining the Charleston Municipal 
Golf Course “ as a part of the recreational facilities and 
advantages to citizens and residents of the City of Charles­
ton;” that “white residents of Charleston County are per­
mitted to use said course” but that in accordance with the 
requirements of certain sections of the South Carolina Code 
of Laws for 1952 “the named plaintiffs and the class of 
persons they represent . . . have been and will continue 
to be excluded by the defendants from the use of these fa­
cilities because they are Negroes . . . unless the relief 
prayed in this complaint is granted.” Alleging denial of 
rights under the equal protection and due process clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, the complaint prayed for the relief of de­
claratory judgment and injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§2201, 2202 and Eule 57, F.E.C.P., for temporary and 
permanent injunctions to restrain defendants from enforc­
ing certain sections of the Code of Laws of South Carolina 
for 1952 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§2281, 2284, and for a 
declaration of the unconstitutionality of those sections.

The defendants answered (App. p. 8a) admitting the 
material allegations of the complaint but denying that the 
policy, custom, and usage of the defendants in providing 
separate golfing facilities for white and Negro residents 
of Charleston was unlawful and constituted a denial of 
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Defendants also denied that 
the specified sections of the South Carolina Code were un­
constitutional. The answer prayed for dismissal of the 
complaint.

Thereafter plaintiffs moved with affidavits for a prelim­
inary injunction to restrain defendants from “making any 
distinctions based upon color in regard to the use of the 
Charleston Municipal Golf Course.” After a hearing held 
on June 28, 1960 in the City of Charleston, S. C. (a tran­



4

script of relevant portions appears App. p. 21a), this was 
denied on June 29,1960.

The cause then came on for a full hearing on the merits 
on September 7, 1960. (A transcript of relevant portions 
appears App. p. 48a.) The transcript of the hearing on 
motion for preliminary injunction was made a part of the 
record and additional testimony was taken. The Court 
below, after hearing decided to recuse itself stating that it 
disagreed with the United States Supreme Court decisions 
governing this question (App. p. 57a). Thereafter, how­
ever, the court did in fact undertake to decide the cause. 
It issued an opinion and order dated 26 November 1960 
which, as set forth above, enjoined defendants from en­
forcing their policy of racial discrimination and declared 
Sections 51-182 through 51-184 of the Code of Laws of 
South Carolina for 1952 unconstitutional on the authority 
of Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879; Dawson v. 
Mayor of the City of Baltimore, 220 F. 2d 386 (4th Cir. 
1955), aff’d 350 U.S. 877 and Tate v. Department of Con­
servation and Development, etc., 352 U.S. 838. The court 
however, concluded that it would be “ equitable” to grant 
the defendants a reasonable period of time to comply with 
its order and therefore postponed the effective date of its 
order until eight months from the date thereof. The text 
of the opinion and order attached is set out in the Ap­
pendix, infra, p. 60a.

Notice of appeal was filed on December 9, 1960.



5

Question Presented

Whether an eight month delay imposed by the court 
below in making effective its order enjoining defendants 
from denying the use of municipally owned and operated 
recreational facilities is a denial of equal protection of the 
laws secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con­
stitution of the United States where such delay was im­
posed without any evidentiary support demonstrating its 
necessity.

How the Question Arises

The question arises in the record from the trial court’s 
determination that its order dated 26 November 1960 en­
joining the defendants from enforcing the statutes, policy, 
custom and practice pursuant to which plaintiffs had been 
refused permission to use the facilities of defendant golf 
course should not be made effective until eight (8) months 
from the date of its issuance.

Statement o f  Facts

The facts appear from the complaint, the admissions in 
the answer, from the record of testimony at the hearing- 
on the motion for preliminary injunction, and from the 
record of the trial. None of the material allegations of the 
complaint or evidence has been controverted.

On or about November 23, 1958, plaintiffs appeared at 
defendant golf course with other Negro residents of the 
City of Charleston and requested permission to play. The 
request was made to Mr. John E. Adams, Manager, and a 
defendant herein (Comp., App. p. 5a). Mr. Adams quoted 
to defendants from sections 51-181-51-184 of the South



6

Carolina Code of Laws for 1952 which require segregation 
of the races in the use of public recreational facilities and 
informed them that because of this law he was rejecting 
their request for permission to play golf (E l, App. p. 
24a*). He also stated that his refusal was because of the 
plaintiffs’ race (El, Id.). “White only” signs were posted 
at the entrance to the course pursuant to Section 51-182 
of the Code of Laws (Comp., App. p. 5a). The plaintiffs 
felt that as taxpayers of the City of Charleston, they were 
entitled to play on the defendants’ course (El, App. p. 26a).

The manager, Mr. Adams, has testified that the policy, 
custom and usage of excluding Negroes still persists and 
that signs which read “ white only” are still posted at the 
entrance to the course (El, App. p. 39a). He further tes­
tified that he and other officials still consider themselves 
bound by Sections 51-181, 51-182, 51-183 and 51-184 of 
the Code of Laws of South Carolina for 1952 (ET, App. 
p. 50a).

Argument

The eight months’ delay of relief imposed by the Court 
below denies plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws, by 
arbitrarily postponing the enforcement of their constitu­
tional rights. Not a shred of evidence was introduced to 
support this delay. We need not speculate what evidence, 
if any, could support a delay of this sort for it is clear that 
in this case no facts alleged to justify a delay were even 
presented to the court below.

The Supreme Court has held that the rights protected 
by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

# RI refers to the record of the hearing on motion for preliminary 
injunction. RT refers to the record of the trial on the merits.



7

ment are “personal and present” (emphasis added). Sweatt 
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950). Cf. Sipuel v. 
Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948). Only in connection 
with elementary and high school desegregation has the 
Supreme Court sanctioned any delay in the realization of 
the right to equal protection of the laws. Brown v. Board 
of Education, 349 U.S. 295, 300 (1955). But even in such 
cases delay must be reasonably related to administrative 
obstacles in the task of changing from a biracial to a 
nonracial school system. Indeed, in connection with de­
segregation at the university level, no delay has been found 
justified by the Supreme Court of the United States. As 
that Court said in Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida, 
350 U.S. 413, 414 (1956):

As this case involves the admission of a Negro to a 
graduate professional school, there is no reason for 
delay. He is entitled to prompt admission under the 
rules and regulations applicable to other qualified can­
didates. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 94 L.ed. 1114, 
70 S.Ct. 848; Sipuel v. University of Oklahoma, 332 
U.S. 631, 92 L.ed. 247, 68 S.Ct. 299; cf. McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma State Begents for Higher Education, 339 
U.S. 637, 94 L.ed. 1149, 70 S.Ct. 927.

Moreover, this Court has recently held that there may 
be no delay in granting access to governmentally owned 
public accommodations, even before a trial on the merits, 
where the right to relief is clearly established on motion 
for preliminary injunction. Henry v. Greenville Airport 
Commission (4th Cir. 8247), decided in this Court on De­
cember 1, 1960, held that the trial court “ has no discretion 
to deny relief by preliminary injunction to a person who 
clearly establishes by undisputed evidence that he is being 
denied a constitutional right” . It is submitted that there



8

is even less reason for delay when constitutional rights 
have been finally adjudicated as in the case at bar.

This case is, perhaps, illuminated by reference to the 
similar problem of the considerations governing stays of 
injunctive orders pending appeals on the merits. While 
the defendants in this case have not appealed, and appar­
ently see no way of overturning the injunctive decree, 
they have, nevertheless, been granted a stay. But this is 
a case where no stay would be justified even if an appeal 
from the injunction had been filed, for a stay may not be 
granted without any legal or factual basis therefor. See 
Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955) where a stay pending 
appeal was vacated. The rule of the Lucy case has been 
applied as recently as January 9, 1961, in Danner v. Holmes 
(5th Cir. unreported), where Chief Judge Tuttle vacated 
a stay pending an appeal of an order of the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Geor gia, which 
required that Negro students be admitted to the University 
of Georgia. The only ground urged in support of the stay, 
which was a recognition of the right of every litigant to 
appeal an adverse decision, was held to be insufficient be­
cause there was no “ substantial likelihood of a reversal of 
the District Court.” The Supreme Court on January 10, 
1961, unanimously rejected an application to vacate Judge 
Tuttle’s order. The Supreme Court also applied the same 
principle in denying a requested stay where the ground 
of appeal was “ obviously without merit” in United States
v. Louisiana,------ U .S .------- , 5 L.ed. 2d 245 (1960). Thus,
it is submitted that in this case where no appeal has been 
taken, no grounds are urged for reversal of the injunctive 
decree, and there is no factual showing in support of the 
delay of enforcement, it is plain that the injunctive decree 
should be implemented forthwith.



9

The right, which plaintiffs seeks to assert in this case, that 
of equal access to public recreation, perhaps may be deemed 
hardly as significant as the right of equal access to, for 
example, public educational facilities. But more is involved 
here than the right to play golf before expiration of the 
eight months’ tstay. If this constitutional right can be de­
nied with no factual or legal basis, there is no reason why 
eight months may not in another case become twelve months 
— or more, or why the present stay may not be extended. 
The decision below might apply with equal logic to an air­
port terminal, see Henry v. Greenville Airport Comm.,
supra, a bus terminal, see Boynton v. Virginia, ------  U.S.
------ , 5 L.ed. 2d------ , and every other public facility. As the
Supreme Court of the United States said in Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 635:

. . . illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get 
their first footing in that way, namely: by silent ap­
proaches and slight deviations from legal modes of 
procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to 
the rule that constitutional provisions for the security 
of person and property should be liberally construed. 
A  close and literal construction deprives them of half 
their efficacy and leads to gradual depreciation of the 
right, as if it consisted more in sound than in sub­
stance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the 
constitutional rights of the citizens, and against any 
stealthy encroachments thereon.

It is therefore important not merely for the vindication 
of plaintiffs’ rights in this case, but for the integrity of 
the constitutional principle at stake, that the decision below 
be reversed insofar as it postpones the enforcement of ap­
pellants’ constitutional rights.



10

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the decree of the 
Court below should be reversed insofar as it postpones 
the effective date of its order. Appellants further pray 
that if this relief be granted the Court accelerate the 
issuance of its mandate and for such other and further 
relief as may be just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

Matthew J. P erry 
L incoln C. J enkins, Jr.

1107% Washington Street 
Columbia, S. C.

T hurgood Marshall 
Jack Greenberg 
J ames M. Nabrit, III 

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, N. Y.

Attorneys for Appellants

Norman C. A maker,
Of Counsel.



A P P E N D I X

F oe the Eastern District of South Carolina 
Charleston Division

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

J ohn H. Cummings, J ohn L. Chisolm, W illiam Cromwell, 
A rthur Price, E dward V. P ayne, R obert J ohnson, 
Dan Nowell, E rnest Cromwell, J ames N. F orest, 
Henry B oyd, B enjamin W right, Clarence Brown and 
H orace Gross, for themselves and all other persons 
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

T he City of Charleston, a Municipal Corporation, 
T he Charleston Municipal Golf Course. Commission, 
Gerald M. Carter, Chairman, A lfred 0 . H alsey, 
Cornelious 0. T hompson, T. Moultrie M cK evlin, 
W illiam A. D otterer, L eroy Nelson and C. D issell 
J enkins, members of the Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course Commission; and J ohn E. A dams, Manager of 
the Charleston Municipal Golf Course,

Defendants.

Complaint

The plaintiffs respectfully represent to the Court as 
follows:

1. (a) The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1331. This action 
arises under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, Section 1, and under the Act of Con­
gress, Revised Statutes, Section 1977, derived from the 
Act of May 31, 1870, Ch. 14, Section 16, 16 Stat. 144 (Title



2a

42, United States Code Section, Section 1981), as hereafter 
more fully appears. The matter in controversy, exclusive 
of interest and costs, exceeds the sum of Ten Thousand 
($10,000.00) Dollars.

(b) Jurisdiction is also invoked under Title 28, United 
States Code, Section 1343. This action is authorized by the 
Act of Congress, Revised Statutes, Section 1979, derived 
from the Act of April 20, 1871, Ch. 22, Section 1, 17, Stat. 
13 (Title 42 United States Code, Section 1983), to be com­
menced by any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof, to redress the deprivation 
under color of state law, statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom or usage of rights, privileges and immunities 
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States and by Act of Congress, Revised 
Statutes, Section 1977, derived from the Act of May 31, 
1870, Ch. 14, Section 16, 16 Stat. 144 (Title 42, United 
States Code, Section 1981) providing for the equal rights 
of citizens and of all persons within the jurisdiction of the 
United States, as hereafter more fully appears.

(c) Jurisdiction is further invoked under Title 28, United 
States Code, Sections 2281 and 2284. This is an action for 
temporary and permanent injunctions to restrain defen­
dants, as officials of the State of South Carolina, their 
agents and servants, in the enforcement of Sections 51-181, 
51-182, 51-183 and 51-184, Code of Laws of South Carolina 
for 1952, on the ground that the aforesaid statutes deny 
rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con­
stitution of the United States.

2. This is a class action authorized under Rule 23(a) (3) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rights here

Complaint



3a

involved are of common and general interest to the members 
of the class represented by plaintiffs, namely, Negro citizens 
and residents of the City and County of Charleston, South 
Carolina and of the United States who have been denied the 
use of public golfing facilities in the City of Charleston, 
South Carolina, The members of the class are so numerous 
as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the 
Court individually as parties plaintiff. The plaintiffs and 
those they represent as a class all seek common relief 
based upon common questions of law and fact affecting 
their several rights.

3. This is a proceeding for declaratory judgment and 
injunction under Title 28, United States Code, Sections 
2201 and 2202, and Rule 57, Rule of Civil Procedure, for 
the purpose of having this Court declare the rights and legal 
relationships of the parties and for an injunction im­
plementing the rights so declared, to w it:

Whether, under the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution defendants may enforce against plaintiffs and 
others similarly situated Sections 51-181, 51-182, 51-183 and 
51-184 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina and enforce 
the custom, practice and usage of racial segregation, each 
of which deny to plaintiffs the right of using the Charleston 
Municipal Golf Course maintained by the City of Charleston 
for white persons only.

4. The plaintiffs are all citizens and residents of the 
City of Charleston, South Carolina and of the United States, 
and are classified as Negroes under the laws of the State 
of South Carolina, except that James L. White is a resident 
of Charleston County.

Complaint



4a

5. The City of Charleston, South Carolina is a Municipal 
Corporation, created and existing under and pursuant to 
the laws of the State of South Carolina.

6. The Charleston Municipal Golf Course Commission 
is an official organ of the City of Charleston, having the 
power to supervise and promulgate rules concerning the 
Charleston Municipal Golf Course pursuant to authority 
vested and accorded it under the ordinances of the City of 
Charleston, South Carolina; that Gerald M. Carter is Chair­
man of the Charleston Municipal Golf Course Commission 
and that Alfred 0. Halsey, Cornelious 0. Thompson, T. 
Moultrie McKevlin, William A. Dotterer, Leroy Nelson 
and C. Dissell Jenkins, are members thereof; and that John 
E. Adams is the Manager of said Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course. Said defendants are sued in their official and in­
dividual capacity.

7. Defendants have established and are maintaining and 
operating a golf course known as the Charleston Municipal 
Golf Course as a part of the recreational facilities and 
advantages to citizens and residents of the City of Charles­
ton, and the Defendants herein are charged with the duty 
of maintaining, operating and supervising same. White 
residents of Charleston County are permitted to use said 
course. As a part of their supervisory control and authority 
with respect to said golf course, the Defendants are vested 
with the power to promulgate and enforce rules and regu­
lations concerning the use, availability and admission to 
said Charleston Municipal Golf Course, to the person who 
desires to use same, provided the said rules and regulations 
are not in conflict with the sections of the statutes mentioned 
above in paragraph 3.

Complaint



5a

8. On or about November 23,1958 the plaintiffs presented 
themselves at the Charleston Municipal Golf Course and 
sought permission to play golf, directing their request to 
the defendant, John E. Adams, Manager of said Golf 
Course, whereupon said defendant refused to grant per­
mission to plaintiffs. In accordance with the requirement 
of Section 51-182 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina 
for 1952, signs which read “ white only” were posted at the 
entrance to the Charleston Municipal Golf Course.

9. The plaintiffs properly presented themselves and re­
quested permission to use the facilities of the Charleston 
Municipal Golf Course, and were denied the use of these 
facilities by the defendants solely because of their race or 
color, as required by the provisions of Sections 51-181, 51- 
182, 51-183, and 51-184 of the Code of Laws of South 
Carolina for 1952. The Charleston Municipal Golf Course 
is operated by the defendants solely for the use of white 
persons. The named plaintiffs and the class of persons they 
represent in this action, have been and will continue to be 
excluded by the defendants from the use of these facilities 
because they are Negroes, in accordance with the provisions 
of the statutes mentioned above, unless the relief prayed in 
this complaint is granted.

10. The policy, custom and usage of the defendants of 
providing, maintaining and operating golfing facilities for 
the white citizens and residents of the City and County of 
Charleston out of the public funds while failing and refusing 
to admit Negroes to these facilities on account of their 
race and color is unlawful and constitutes denial of their 
rights under the equal protection and due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the

Complaint



6a

United States. Sections 51-181, 51-182, 51-183 and 51-184 
of the Code of Laws of South Carolina for 1952 are un­
constitutional and are therefore null and void under the 
equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

11. The plaintiffs and those similarly situated and 
affected and on whose behalf this suit is brought, will suffer 
irreparable injury and are threatened with irreparable 
injury in the future by reason of the acts herein complained 
of. They have no plain adequate . or complete remedy to 
redress the wrongs and illegal acts herein complained of 
other than by this suit for declaration of rights and injunc­
tion. Any other remedy which plaintiffs might seek to use 
would be attended by such uncertainties as to deny sub­
stantial relief, would involve a multiplicity of suits, would 
cause further irreparable injury and would occasion damage 
and inconvenience to the plaintiffs and those similarly 
situated.

W herefore, plaintiffs respectfully pray that, upon filing 
of this Complaint, as may appear proper and convenient to 
the Court:

1. The Court convene a three-judge District Court, as 
required by Title 28, United States Code, Sections 2281 and 
2284.

2. The Court advance this action, on the docket and order 
a speedy hearing of this action according to law, and upon 
such hearing,

(a) This Court enter a judgment or decree declaring 
Sections 51-181, 51-182, 51-183 and 51-184 of the Code of 
Laws of South Carolina for 1952 to be unconstitutional and

Complaint



7a

void in that they require separation of the races in public 
parks and recreational facilities, thus denying plaintiffs 
and other Negroes similarly situated the equal protection 
and due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the Constitution of the United States.

(b) That the Court enter a judgment or decree declaring 
that the policy, custom, usage and practice of the defendants 
in denying to plaintiffs and other Negroes similarly 
situated the use of the Charleston Municipal Golf Course, 
while permitting white persons to use said facilities, solely 
on account of race and color, is in violation of the equal 
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.

(c) That the Court issue a temporary injunction, re­
straining and enjoining defendants, their agents and 
servants from enforcing or executing the aforesaid statutes, 
or by custom, usage or practice, from prohibiting plaintiffs 
and other Negroes similarly situated from making use of 
the facilities of the Charleston Municipal Golf Course.

(d) That the Court issue a permanent injunction, re­
straining and enjoining defendants, their agents and 
servants from enforcing or executing said statutes, or by 
custom, usage or practice, from prohibiting plaintiffs and 
other Negroes similarly situated from making use of the 
facilities of the Charleston Municipal Golf Course.

(e) That the Court allow plaintiffs their costs herein, 
and grant such further, other, additional or alternative 
relief as may appear to the Court to be equitable and just 
in the premises.

Complaint



8a

Civil Action 7048

The above named Defendants, answering the complaint 
herein, say:

1. They deny each and every allegation in said Com­
plaint not hereinafter specifically admitted.

2. They admit, upon information and belief, that Plain­
tiffs invoke the jurisdiction of this Court and seek de­
claratory judgment under the provisions referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Complaint, but deny that the 
Court has or should assume jurisdiction of this action, for 
the following reasons:

(a) That the defendants deny that the matter in con­
troversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds the 
sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars, and this 
Honorable Court should not take jurisdiction.

(b) That it appears affirmatively from the allegations 
of the Complaint that the requisite jurisdictional 
amount of the sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) 
Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, is not in­
volved, and said Complaint should be dismissed.

(c) That the Plaintiffs have not exhausted their remedies 
in the Courts of South Carolina, nor have the said 
Courts had before them, nor have they passed upon, 
the constitutionality of Sections 51-181, 51-182, 51- 
183, and 51-184, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 
1952, and that, therefore, this Honorable Court 
should not assume jurisdiction of the matter until 
the question has been decided by the Courts of this 
State.

Answer



9a

(d) That the Sections of the Law of the State of South 
Carolina referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the 
Complaint are limited in their application to counties 
of the State of South Carolina containing cities of a 
population of 60,000 according to the United States 
census of 1930, which confines the application of said 
Sections to Charleston County only, in which County 
the City of Charleston is situate, presenting a purely 
local question not within the jurisdiction of any 
three-judge Federal Court.

3. They admit that the averments of paragraph 2 of the 
Complaint allege that the action is a class action, but, on 
information and belief, deny that the Plaintiffs represent 
any large number or majority of the class which they claim 
to represent, these defendants specifically alleging that 
very few Negro citizens and residents of the City of 
Charleston, South Carolina and of the United States, are 
interested in the existence or non-existence of the Charles­
ton Municipal Golf Course or have any interest in the sub­
ject matter of the action.

4. They have no knowledge or information sufficient to 
form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in paragraph 
4 of the Complaint.

5. They admit the allegations of paragraph 5 of the 
Complaint.

6. Answering the allegations of paragraph 6 of the Com­
plaint, defendants say that the Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course Commission is a board created and established by 
Section 26-1 of the 1952 Code of City of Charleston, charged 
with the duty of maintaining, managing and operating a

Answer



10a

municipal golf course under authority accorded by the laws 
of the State of South Carolina and ordinances of the City 
Council of Charleston, requiring proper rules and police 
regulations for the protection of property and preserva­
tion of peace; that Gerald M. Carter, Alfred 0. Halsey, 
Cornelious 0. Thompson, T. Moultrie McKevlin, William 
A. Dotterer, Leroy Nelson and C. Bissell Jenkins are hold­
over members of the Charleston Municipal Golf Course 
Commission in that, their term of office having expired, 
no successor to any of them has been appointed and no 
appropriation of any kind has been made to or in behalf of 
the Charleston Municipal Golf Course Commission for the 
calendar year of 1959; that Gerald M. Carter is Chairman 
and John E. Adams is manager of the said Charleston 
Municipal Golf Course; and said defendants deny any and 
all allegations of paragraph 6 inconsistent therewith, and 
have no knowledge or information to form a belief that the 
defendants are sued in their official and individual capacity.

7. Answering paragraph 7 of the Complaint, they admit 
that the defendants have established and are maintaining 
and operating a golf course known as the Charleston 
Municipal Golf Course, and that the defendants are charged 
with the duty of maintaining, operating and supervising 
same. That, as a part of their supervisory control and 
authority with respect to the said golf course, the defen­
dants are vested with the power to promulgate and en­
force rules and regulations concerning the use, availability 
and admission to said Charleston Municipal Golf Course 
to the person who desires to use same, as are not in conflict 
with the 1952 Code of City of Charleston, the ordinances of 
the City of Charleston, the Constitution and Laws of the 
State of South Carolina and of the United States; and the

Answer



11a

defendants deny any and all allegations of paragraph 7 
inconsistent therewith.

8. Answering the allegations of paragraph 8 of the 
Complaint, they admit that, on or about November 23, 1958, 
on information and belief, plaintiffs presented themselves 
at the Charleston Municipal Golf Course and sought per­
mission to play golf, directing their request to the defen­
dant, John E. Adams, Manager of the said Golf Course, 
and said defendant refused to grant permission, on infor­
mation and belief, to plaintiffs. They also admit that signs 
reading “W HITE ONLY” were posted at the entrance of 
the Charleston Municipal Golf Course; and said defendants 
deny any and all allegations of paragraph 8 inconsistent 
therewith.

9. Answering the allegations contained in paragraph 9 
of the Complaint, they admit, upon information and belief, 
that plaintiffs presented themselves and requested to use 
the facilities of the Charleston Municipal Golf Course, and 
were denied the use of the facilities by the defendant, John 
E. Adams, who, as Manager of the Golf Course and an 
employee, is responsible to the Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course Commission for maintaining, managing and operat­
ing such Golf Course, and that the said Golf Course is 
operated by the defendants for such golfers who, in the 
judgment of the defendants, will use said course without 
creating a threat to peace and good order; and the defen­
dants deny any and all other allegations contained in para­
graph 9 inconsistent therewith.

10. They deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 
10 and 11 of the Complaint.

Answer



12a

Further Answering Said Complaint and as a Further 
Defense Thereto, Defendants Allege:

11. That this action involves questions of purely political 
or governmental nature, confined to the legislative and 
executive branches of the government, which have acted 
within their constitutional powers, and that any interference 
therewith is beyond the jurisdiction of this Honorable 
Court in the exercise of its equity powers, the questions 
raised touching a sensitive area of social policy of the City 
of Charleston and of the State of South Carolina and its 
political subdivisions, properly exercised under the powers 
reserved to them in the use of their police powers.

Further Answering Said Complaint and as a Further 
Defense Thereto, Defendants Allege:

12. That they are informed and believe that plaintiffs 
did not seek the use of the facilities of the Charleston 
Municipal G-olf Course in good faith but only in a concerted 
effort and as part of a plan to harass and embarrass the 
defendants in the performance of their duties and to en­
force their wills upon the majority of the people of the 
City of Charleston; that plaintiffs are careless of the public 
welfare and know full well that the integration of the races 
at the public golf course of the City of Charleston will 
wreck the Charleston Municipal Golf Course to the detri­
ment of both races; that the plaintiffs do not come into 
Court with clean hands and have no equities with them.

Further Answering Said Complaint and as a Further 
Defense Thereto, Defendants Allege:

13. That the granting of the relief sought by the plain­
tiffs would require the closing of the Charleston Municipal

Answer



13a

Golf Course for the reason that the defendants verily believe 
that the said facilities would not be utilized on an integrated 
basis, and would no longer be self-supporting, and, as an 
economical necessity, would be compelled to be closed; 
and that such would result in the denial of the benefits to 
either race derived from the Golf Course as now operated, 
to the detriment of public interest and convenience, and 
against any possible balance of the equities of the situation.

Further Answering Said Complaint and as a Further 
Defense Thereto, Defendants Allege:

14. That they deny that any irreparable injury is being, 
or will be, suffered by the plaintiffs because of the acts 
complained of, said defendants specifically alleging that if 
plaintiffs prevail, it will then be impracticable and im­
possible to operate the Golf Course and the same will have 
to be closed to all, upon which event a substantial portion 
of the Course will revert to the grantor, its successors or 
assigns, which conveyed the property to the City Council of 
Charleston on or about the 11th day of June, 1929, as pro­
vided in the deed making such conveyance only for the use 
as a municipal golf course, causing the loss of much costly 
improvements made by the City of Charleston.

W herefore, having answered, defendants pray that this 
action be dismissed.

Answer



14a

Motion for  Preliminary Injunction

Plaintiffs move the court to grant a preliminary injunc­
tion against defendants and each of them and their agents, 
servants and attorneys and all persons in active concert 
and participation with them pending the final determination 
of this action and until the further order of this court re­
straining them from making any distinctions based upon 
color in regard to the use of the Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course on the ground that unless restrained by this court 
defendants will commit the acts referred to which will 
result in irreparable injury, loss and damage to plaintiffs 
during the pendency of this action, as more fully appears 
from the affidavits of plaintiffs attached hereto and made a 
part hereof.

Matthew J. Perry

371% S. Liberty Street 
Spartanburg, South Carolina

L incoln C. Jenkins, J r .
1107% Washington Street 
Columbia, South Carolina

J ack Greenberg

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York

Thurgood Marshall 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York

Attorneys for Plaintiffs



15a

J ohn H. Cummings being duly sworn hereby disposes and 
says:

1. He is one of the plaintiffs in the above-entitled case.

2. This is an action for interlocutory and permanent in­
junction to restrain defendants from making any distinc­
tions based upon color at the Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course.

3. Plaintiff is a resident of the City of Charleston, South 
Carolina and a citizen of the United States.

4. Plaintiff is informed that the defendant Charleston 
Municipal Golf Course Commission is a board created and 
established by Section 26-1 of the 1952 Code of the City 
of Charleston, and that it operates the Charleston Municipal 
Golf Course and that the chairman of said board is Gerald 
M. Carter; and that Alfred 0. Halsey, Cornelious 0. 
Thompson, T. Moultrie McKevlin, William A. Dotterer, 
Leroy Nelson and C. Bissell Jenkins are members of the 
Charleston Municipal Golf Course Commission. Plaintiff 
is further informed that John E. Adams is manager of said 
Charleston Municipal Golf Course.

5. On or about November 23, 1958, plaintiff sought per­
mission to play golf at the Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course and was denied permission by John E. Adams, 
Manager of said Golf Course.

6. At the time plaintiff sought permission to play golf 
as aforesaid, signs which read “ white only” were posted at 
the entrance to the Charleston Municipal Golf Course. The 
said signs are still posted at the entrance thereof, and 
plaintiff is informed that the policy of excluding Negroes

Affidavit o f John H. Cummings



16a

from the golf course while at the same time permitting 
white persons to enter and use the facilities of said golf 
course is still being pursued by the Charleston Municipal 
Golf Course Commission and the Manager thereof.

7. Plaintiff is informed that the said John E. Adams 
and the Charleston Municipal Golf Course Commission are 
acting pursuant to certain statutes of the State of South 
Carolina and certain customs which prevail in excluding 
plaintiff and other Negroes from the Charleston Municipal 
Golf Course, which statutes and customs are unconstitu­
tional and cause plaintiff and other persons similarly 
situated to suffer irreparable injury and harm on account 
of the enforcement thereof.

8. Plaintiff and other persons similary situated will 
continue to suffer irreparable injury and harm each day the 
above statutes and customs are enforced unless enjoined 
from so doing.

Affidavit of John II. Cummings



17a

J ohn L. Chisolm, being duly sworn hereby deposes and 
says:

1. He is one of the plaintiffs in the above-entitled ease.

2. This is an action for interlocutory and permanent in­
junction to restrain defendants from making any distinc­
tions based upon color at the Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course.

3. Plaintiff is a resident of the City of Charleston, South 
Carolina and a citizen of the United States.

4. Plaintiff is informed that the defendant Charleston 
Municipal Golf Course Commission is a board created and 
established by Section 26-1 of the 1952 Code of the City 
of Charleston, and that it operates the Charleston Municipal 
Golf Course and that the chairman of said board is Gerald 
M. Carter; and that Alfred 0. Halsey, Cornelious 0. 
Thompson, T. Moultrie McKevlin, William A. Dotterer, 
Leroy Nelson and C. Bissell Jenkins are members of the 
Charleston Municipal Golf Course Commission. Plaintiff 
is further informed that John E. Adams is manager of said 
Charleston Municipal Golf Course.

5. On or about November 23, 1958, plaintiff sought per­
mission to play golf at the Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course and was denied permission by John E. Adams, 
Manager of said Golf Course.

6. At the time plaintiff sought permission to play golf 
as aforesaid, signs which read “ white only” were posted at 
the entrance to the Charleston Municipal Golf Course. The 
said signs are still posted at the entrance thereof, and 
plaintiff is informed that the policy of excluding Negroes

Affidavit o f John L. Chisolm



18a

from the golf course while at the same time permitting 
white persons to enter and use the facilities of said golf 
course is still being pursued by the Charleston Municipal 
Golf Course Commission and the Manager thereof.

7. Plaintiff is informed that the said John E. Adams 
and the Charleston Municipal Golf Course Commission are 
acting pursuant to certain statutes of the State of South 
Carolina and certain customs which prevail in excluding 
plaintiff and other Negroes from the Charleston Municipal 
Golf Course, which statutes and customs are unconstitu­
tional and cause plaintiff and other persons similarly 
situated to suffer irreparable injury and harm on account 
of the enforcement thereof.

8. Plaintiff and other persons similary situated will 
continue to suffer irreparable injury and harm eac-h day the 
above statutes and customs are enforced unless enjoined 
from so doing.

Affidavit of John L. Chisolm



19a

B enjamin W eight being duly sworn hereby deposes and 
says:

1. He is one of the plaintiffs in the above-entitled ease.

2. This is an action for interlocutory and permanent in­
junction to restrain defendants from making any distinc­
tions based upon color at the Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course.

3. Plaintiff is a resident of the City of Charleston, South 
Carolina and a citizen of the United States.

4. Plaintiff is informed that the defendant Charleston 
Municipal Golf Course Commission is a board created and 
established by Section 26-1 of the 1952 Code of the City 
of Charleston, and that it operates the Charleston Municipal 
Golf Course and that the chairman of said board is Gerald 
M. Carter; and that Alfred 0. Halsey, Cornelious 0. 
Thompson, T. Moultrie McKevlin, William A. Dotterer, 
Leroy Nelson and C. Bissell Jenkins are members of the 
Charleston Municipal Golf Course Commission. Plaintiff 
is further informed that John E. Adams is manager of said 
Charleston Municipal Golf Course.

5. On or about November 23, 1958, plaintiff sought per­
mission to play golf at the Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course and was denied permission by John E. Adams, 
Manager of said Golf Course.

6. At the time plaintiff sought permission to play golf 
as aforesaid, signs which read “ white only” were posted at 
the entrance to the Charleston Municipal Golf Course. The 
said signs are still posted at the entrance thereof, and 
plaintiff is informed that the policy of excluding Negroes

Affidavit o f Benjamin Wright



20a

from the golf course while at the same time permitting 
white persons to enter and use the facilities of said golf 
course is still being pursued by the Charleston Municipal 
Golf Course Commission and the Manager thereof.

7. Plaintiff is informed that the said John E. Adams 
and the Charleston Municipal Golf Course Commission are 
acting pursuant to certain statutes of the State of South 
Carolina and certain customs which prevail in excluding 
plaintiff and other Negroes from the Charleston Municipal 
Golf Course, which statutes and customs are unconstitu­
tional and cause plaintiff and other persons similarly 
situated to suffer irreparable injury and harm on account 
of the enforcement thereof.

8. Plaintiff and other persons similary situated will 
continue to suffer irreparable injury and harm each day the 
above statutes and customs are enforced unless enjoined 
from so doing.

Affidavit of Benjamin Wright



21a

Hearing on Motion for  Preliminary Injunction

The hearing in this matter was held in the Judge’s
— [p. 1]—

Chambers at the Temporary Headquarters of the United 
States District Court at No. 1 Broad Street, Charleston, 
South Carolina, on the 28th day of June, 1960, at 3:30 
p. m. o ’clock,

B e f o e e :

H onorable A shton H. W illiams,
United States District Judge. 

# # # # #

Mr. Perry: May it please the Court, I am Matthew
— [p. 2]—

Perry of Spartanburg. Your Honor has before you, I 
believe, our Notice of Motion for a Preliminary Injunc­
tion which was issued and which originally set the date 
for a hearing in this cause for June 15, and pursuant 
to the requestion of counsel, the matter was continued 
until today. And we are now ready to proceed. Present 
from the plaintiffs are myself, Matthew Perry, and Lin­
coln C. Jenkins, Jr., of Columbia.

# # # # #

J ames L. W hite, sworn.
— [p. 9]—

Direct examination by Mr. Jenkens:

Q. Mr. White, you are not one of the plaintiffs in 
this case, are you? A. No, sir.

Q. Speak loudly enough so we may hear you. A. No, 
sir.

Q. Tell us where you live? A. I live at No. 8 Leola 
Street in Charleston Heights.

Q. Is that a part of the corporate limits of the City 
of Charleston? A. No, sir.



22a

Q. So you live outside of Charleston? A. Yes, sir.
Q. You are familiar with this suit, is that correct? 

A. I am.
Q. Are you familiar with some of the circumstances 

leading up to the filing of this particular suit? A. Eight 
from the beginning, sir.

Q. State whether or not you were a part of a group 
of other persons who made application on or about No­
vember 23, 1958, to use the facilities of the golf course, the 
Charleston Municipal Golf Course? A. Yes, sir. Before

— [p. 10]—
the whole thing started, I wrote a letter to the Chairman 
of the Golf Course Commission, requesting him permis­
sion for me, myself, and a group of other fellows to be 
able to play on the Municipal Golf Course. And he in 
turn did not answer the letter. And then I wrote him 
another letter and stating that he didn’t answer the first 
letter and I would like to have some answer on this second 
letter. In the second letter he stated that the Golf Course 
Commission meets—I think it is the second Tuesday in 
every month. I can’t remember correctly, but I think 
it was the second or third Tuesday in every month.

Mr. Eosen: Your Honor, I think the letters would 
be the best evidence of their contents.

Mr. Jenkins: Thank you.

Q. Let me interrupt you a couple of minutes. Let us 
change the line of testimony just a minute. You now do 
not live within the City Limits of Charleston, is that 
correct? A. Correct.

Q. On November 23, 1958, where did you live? A. In 
the City.

Q. You lived within the City of Charleston? A. Yes, 
sir.

James L. White—for Plaintiffs—Direct



23a

Q. Now, on November 23, 1958, did you go to the 
Charleston Municipal Golf Course at all? A. Yes, sir.

— [p. 11]—
Q. Now were you accompanied by any other persons? 

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know approximately the number of persons 

in that group? A. Between 18 and 20 of us.
Q. Do you know the race of those persons? A. All 

Negroes.
Q. All Negroes? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, do you know the plaintiffs in this case? A. 

Yes, sir.
Q. Are these plaintiffs Negroes? A. All Negroes.
Q. Were these plaintiffs or any of them among the 

group which went with you on November 23, 1958 to the 
Charleston Municipal Golf Course? A. Yes, sir.

Q. They were? A. That’s right, sir.
Q. Now, on that date was any request made to use the 

facilities of the Charleston Municipal Golf Course? A. Yes, 
sir.

Q. Did you make such a request? A. Yes, sir.
— [p. 12]—

The Court: That was 1958?
Mr. Jenkins: 1958, if your Honor please.

Q. Of whom did you make such a request? A. Mr. 
Johnny Adams, the Professional at the Golf Course.

Q. Mr. Adams at that time was in what capacity? A. 
The Professional at the Golf Course and also Manager.

Q. He was also Manager of the Golf Course? A. Yes, 
sir.

Q. He was the person in charge of the greens of the 
Golf Course,—the use of the Golf Course, is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, prior to November 23, 1958, had you made any

James L. White—for Plaintiffs—Direct



24a

effort to use the facilities of the Charleston Municipal 
Golf Course? A. Only through correspondence.

Q. Through correspondence? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, as a result of that correspondence, have you 

been allowed the use of the Municipal Golf Course? A. 
No, sir, I never have.

Q. On November 23, 1958, when you made this request 
of Mr. Adams to use the Golf Course, were you allowed to 
use such facilities ? A. No, sir.

— [p. 13]—
Q. You were not. A. No, sir.
Q. At the time you made your request, were the other 

persons who accompanied you in the immediate vicinity 
of you? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you hear any of them make a similar request 
as yours? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether or not they were refused such 
permission? A. Yes, sir, they were refused.

Q. They were refused that permission by Mr. Adams? 
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did Mr. Adams state to you any reason why you were 
refused permission to use the Golf Course? A. Yes, sir.

— [p. 14]—
Q. Mill you state to the Court what that refusal was 

based upon? A. Mr. Adams quoted from a law, a state­
ment from the law, in effect that the State of South 
Carolina refused the Negroes and whites to play together 
on the Golf Course at the same time.

Q. Did Mr. Adams state that he was following this 
statute in refusing you permission to play on the Golf 
Course? A. Well he quoted it from this State law, so 
evidently he was going by the State law that he was 
reading to me.

Q. Did he state that he was refusing you permission 
because of your race? A. Yes, sir.

James L. White—for Plaintiffs—Direct



25a

Q. Now at the time that you sought permission to use 
the Golf Course, did you seek permission for yourself and 
on behalf of the other persons with you! A, I seek it 
for myself and also for whoever wanted to play that was 
with me in the group.

Q. At the time you sought permission to use the Golf 
Course, did you know of any other Negroes who had ex­
pressed any desire to use the Golf Course? A. Would 
you rephrase that question once more.

Q. On November 23, 1958—that is the day I believe 
you testified that you sought permission to use the Golf 
Course? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, as of that date, had you heard of any other 
Negroes who had expressed a desire to use the facilities of 
the Charleston Municipal Golf Course? A. Yes, sir.

Q. You had? A. Yes, sir.
— [p. 15]—

Q. Do you recall any of them giving any reason why 
they had not used the Golf Course?

Mr. Rosen: Your Honor, I don’t want to inter­
rupt counsel, but of course this is hearsay here.

The Court: You object, but I am going to let 
the testimony in, subject to your objection, and I 
will rule on it at a subsquent time.

Q. Do you remember the question? A. No, I don’t.
Q. The question was: Those persons that you had 

heard express a desire to use the Charleston Municipal 
Golf Course, and who were Negroes, and who were not 
allowed to use the Golf Course, had you heard them ex­
press any reason as to why they had not been able to use 
the Golf Course? A. No, sir. We just talked around. We 
always wanted to have a place to play, and, well, no one 
ever attempted to play over there and no one over there

James L. White—for Plaintiffs—Direct



26a

ever answered us in the affirmative that we would be able 
to play, nor did they deny that we would be able to play. 
So we had to go out and try to find out if they would let 
us play over there.

Q. Now, do you recall seeing any signs posted anywhere 
near the Gulf Course on November 23 with reference to 
race at all? A. Yes, sir. That was the first time I ever 
seen it there, but I used to go through there very often

— [p. 16]—
and I never saw it there before.

Q. Do you recall what the sign perhaps said? A. Golf 
Course for white only.

Q. Or words to that effect? A. To that effect.
Q. Even though you saw that sign which says in effect 

“ The use of this Golf Course restricted to whites only,” 
you nonetheless attempted to use the Golf Course? A. I 
did.

Q. Under what right did you attempt to use the Golf 
Course facilities? A. At that time I was a taxpaying 
citizen of the City of Charleston and I felt that I was 
entitled to some of the privileges, and that was one of 
them.

Q. Do you play golf? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you play regularly? A. As often as I can.
Q. Do you play golf now? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Prior to November 23, 1958, did you play golf? A. 

Yes, sir.
Q. What was your purpose on November 23, 1958, in 

going to the Charleston Municipal Golf Course and request-
— [p. 17] —

ing to use that course? A. I felt that had I went over 
there and asked them could I be able to play, they might 
have let me play. I really felt that they would let us 
play. I didn’t see at that time that there would be any 
integration. I didn’t felt that I was trying to close the

James L. White—for Plaintiffs—Direct



27a

place up. I was just trying to find out would they let us 
play.

Q. Did you have a sincere desire to play golf on that 
course? A. Yes, sir, I really did.

Q. Now, there was a group of about 18 or 19 other 
persons with you f A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you hear them express any feeling they may 
have had with reference to the use of the Golf Course? 
A. Well they would not have been there had they not 
feel that they would be able to gain admission themselves. 
They felt too that the Commission—since they didn’t 
answer in the affirmative to the letters—they just felt 
that if they come they would let them play, if they got 
nerve enough. And with the sign sticking out there, they 
figured—I felt that they felt they could just scare us off, 
and I thought I would just go in and try. I didn’t intend 
to get far down there below the driveway they had there, 
but I was amazed and very much surprised that when I 
walked down there nothing happened until I got to the

— [p. 1 8 1 -
club house and Mr. Adams told me—quoted this code of 
law to me.

Q. Have you played golf with any of this group of 
persons that was there with you? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you know all of them ? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Had you played golf at some time or another with 

all of them? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Since November 23, 1958, have you had occasion to 

play golf with any of those persons? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the latest occasion on which you played 

golf? A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was that date? A. On the 26th. That was 

Sunday past.
Q. The 26th of June, 1960? A. Yes, sir.

James L. White—for Plaintiffs—Direct



28a

James L. White—for Plaintiffs—Direct 

The Court: Where did you play?

A. Parris Island.
Q. Did you play in a group last Sunday? A. Yes, sir, 

a group, just 4 of us. One of us wasn’t a plaintiff, but 
one were, and two military personnel went there.

— [p. 19]—
Q. Now, you are a civilian, I believe, is that correct? 

A. Yes, sir, but I am in the reserves, in a reserve status.
Q. Did you use that facility as a civilian? A. With this 

reserve status I am privileged to go and play and be a 
guest of these other military personnel.

Q. And you say you did play, accompanied by at least 
one person who is a plaintiff in this suit? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you had occasion to use that golf facility on 
previous occasions? A. Yes, sir, on the Sunday before 
then.

Q. On the Sunday before then? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you play with Negroes at that time? A. Yes, 

sir.
Q. I assume that the other military personnel on last 

Sunday were Negroes as well, is that true? A. White 
and Negro.

Q. White and Negro. Now, have you seen other Negroes 
using that facility on Parris Island? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you seen any persons that you know to be
— [p. 2 0 1 -

citizens and residents of the City of Charleston using that 
facility? Negroes, I mean. A. Not outside of our group.

Q. Just your particular group? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know whether or not there are other Negroes 

in Charleston, other than this group of 19, who play golf? 
A. Yes, sir, there were many of us, many golfers that 
I didn’t even know until the incident about the golf course 
in November, sir, that mentioned golf. I didn’t even know



29a

they played golf until they came out and said “We cer­
tainly hope you get the Golf Course.”

Mr. Eosen: Your Honor, may I renew my ob­
jection at this time? I don’t want to waive it.

The Court: Yes.
Go ahead.

Q. Have you played on golf courses any place other 
that the golf course on Parris Island? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you state where you may have played golf on 
some other course? A. Yes, sir. I played golf at Wilming­
ton, North Carolina, the Municipal Golf Course there.

Q. At Wilmington, North Carolina. The Municipal Golf 
Course? A. Yes, sir.

— [p. 21]—
Q. Do you recall when you played there? A. Approx­

imately five weeks ago, sir.
Q. Approximately five weeks ago ? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now do golfers use that facility on an integrated 

basis, on a racially integrated basis? A. On a racially 
integrated basis.

Q. And on the Sunday that you used this facility, were 
Negroes and whites using it at the same time? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did it cause any undue occurrence or incidents as 
far as you were concerned? A. As far as I was concerned, 
I didn’t see any.

Q. Were there any other Negroes with you who played 
at that facility at that time at Wilmington, North Carolina? 
A. I beg your pardon?

Q. On the Sunday that you played on the golf course 
at Wilmington, North Carolina, were there other Negroes 
that you saw using that golf facility? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were some of them in your company? A. Yes, sir.
Q. I have no further questions at present. If you will

James L. White—for Plaintiffs—Direct



30a

James L. White—for Plaintiffs—Cross

answer any questions that Mr. Rosen may ask you. He is
- [ p .  22]—

counsel for the other side.

Cross examination by Mr. Rosen:

Q. Mr. White, you are not a citizen and resident of the 
City of Charleston, is that correct? A. That is correct.

Q. And when did you leave the City of Charleston? 
A. In April 1959.

Q. And you don’t contend that the City ovTes you any 
right to let you as a non-resident play on the Coif Course, 
do you? A. Mr. Rosen, I would like to answer that just 
like this: They let other residents in the county play.

Q. Mr. White, do you understand that the motion before 
this Court, upon which you are testifying, is for a tem­
porary type of order? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And not for a main order in the litigation? A. Yes, 
sir.

Q. You understand that? A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many times have you played golf in the last 

30 days? A. I play golf every Sunday, to begin with, and 
as often through the week as I can.

— [p. 23] —
Q. Would you say you have been averaging twice a week 

for the last several weeks? A. (nods yes). And a little 
more, sometimes, I imagine.

Q. And has that been a hardship on you? A. No, sir.
Q. So you personally have been suffering no harm that 

an order which was delayed would affect you in any way? 
You have not been suffering any harm now, any damage? 
A. Yes, sir.

Q. You have been playing your golf regularly? A. But 
I had to go far away.

Q. Where have you had to go ? A. I had to go to Wilm­
ington and I had to go to Parris Island.



31a

Q. And how far is Parris Island! A. 71 miles from 
the Guard Gate to Charleston.

Q. I see. But you are playing in the meantime! A. I 
am playing golf in the meantime.

Q. Now do you think it would be any terrible incon­
venience to you if the temporary restraining order were 
not granted,—to you personally! A. I think it would be 
something wrong to me if I would have to go there and 
not play here, at the Municipal Golf Course here.

— [p. 24]—
Q. But you wouldn’t feel any particular harm that you 

would not recover from, would you? A. Well it depends 
on the type of harm you are insisting on.

Q. Do you feel any physical harm? A. Well I would 
be tired from the trips.

Q. I see. But that would be the extent of your harm? 
A. Yes, sir, and hurt from paying this—not that I am 
paying this City tax now, but the taxes that I have paid 
and wasn’t able to pay.

Q. Would you say that whatever irreparable harm you 
personally would claim would be more of a psychological 
nature than of a physical nature? A. Would you just 
ask that once more, sir?

Q. You say you will be harmed if this order is not 
granted? A. Yes, sir.

Q. You will be harmed? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you say physically it won’t hurt you but you 

would just be a little tired once or twice a week? A. Well 
that physical will hurt me.

Q. Physically it will hurt you? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that the only harm that you foresee if an order

— [p. 25]—
is not granted? A. Well that is one of the reasons.

Q. What are the others? A. I feel the City has been 
unfair to me because I started this thing. I wrote the

James L. White—for Plaintiffs—Cross



32a

letter to the Commission, and since then I have moved out 
of the City, it is true, but I still play golf, you see.

Q. So your irreparable harm is that the City has not 
been fair to you? That is the extent of the harm to you 
personally? A. To me personally, yes.

Q. In addition to this tiredness? A. In addition to be­
ing physically tired in making these trips.

Q. Now this temporary situation that you say you have 
at Parris Island, do a lot of people use that course? A. 
Well at times.

Q. Is it as crowded as the metropolitan golf course 
would be? A. Yes, sir, I think it would be, with the area 
around Beaufort and Savannah also. I remember seeing 
one person from Savannah there,—two to be correct.

Q. And you have to wait in line to play at Parris Island? 
A. Yes, sir.

— [p. 26]—
Q. We have no further questions.

The Court: You don’t claim that you would have 
any right to play on this golf course if this tem­
porary injunction were granted, do you?

A. I beg your pardon, sir?

The Court: I say, you don’t claim that you would 
have any right to play on this golf course if this 
temporary injunction were granted?

A. Sir, let me try to get this “ temporary injunction” cor­
rectly.

James L. White—for Plaintiffs—Cross

The Court: You live outside the City?

A. Yes, sir.



33a

The Court: The City could pass a resolution 
limiting the use of the golf course to City residents 
of Charleston and excluding anybody that lives out­
side the City?

A. Well if they should do that then I—

The Court: Then you would have no right ?

A. I would have no right.

The Court: All right, that is all.
Mr. Jenkins: At this time, I would like to call 

Mr. John Chisolm.
The Court: Is he one of the plaintiffs?
Mr. Jenkins: Yes, sir.

James L. White—for Plaintiffs—Cross

J ohn Chisolm, sworn.
[p. 27]—

The Court: I think you can curtail the witnesses’ 
testimony. There has been some effort to do that. 
There isn’t any use to bring out all of the details, 
because most of the things are in the pleadings 
here, and I will take judicial notice of those.

Mr. Jenkins: Yes, sir.
Mr. Smythe: I think, your Honor, that the in­

cident of November 23 is admitted in the answer.
The Court: You mean, November 23,1958?
Mr. Smythe: Yes, sir.
The Court: That is my impression, that they 

were admitted. If they are admitted, there isn’t any 
use to bring them out in the testimony on that 
point.



34a

Mr. Jenkins: If your Honor please, frankly, what 
we are going to do is to ask this witness whether 
or not he heard the previous testimony and whether 
he agrees that that would be his testimony if he 
testified.

The Court: That will be fine.
Mr. Jenkins: I think, however, that there are 

just a couple of other questions that should be asked 
of this witness.

— [p. 28]—
The Court: That will be all right.

Direct examination by Mr. Jenkins:

Q. Mr. Chisolm, you have heard the previous testimony, 
is that correct? A. I have.

Q. Speak louder, please. A. I have.
Q. Now, if you were to testify, would you testify sub­

stantially along the same lines ? A. I will.
Q. Now, just a couple of other questions. You are one 

of the plaintiffs in this case, is that correct? A. Iam.
Q. You presently live within the City of Charleston, 

is that correct? A. Yes, 255 St. Phillips Street, Charleston.
Q. Now, do you presently have a desire to use the 

Charleston Municipal Golf Course? A. Yes.
Q. Do you have a desire to use it on the basis of—a 

similar basis with all other citizens of the City of Charles­
ton? A. I do.

Q. State whether or not you believe that in being denied
— [p. 29] —

the use of this golf facility presently, you are suffering 
an irreparable injury? A. I am, because I have got to 
go to Wilmington. I cannot go on the Parris Island or 
Navy Yard Golf Courses, because I am not a service man 
in or out of the reserves. I mean, I have never been in 
the service and I have got to go to Wilmington, which is

John Chisolm—for Plaintiffs—Direct



35a

181 miles from Charleston, to play on the regulated golf 
course.

Q. You do play golf, is that correct? A. Ido.
Q. I have no further questions.

Cross examination by Mr. Rosen:

Q. Mr. Chisolm, how long have you been a resident of 
the City of Charleston! A. About 42 years.

Q. And do you realize that until two weeks ago no 
motion had been made to relieve you from this irreparable 
injury that you just testified to? A. I realize that, but 
it is no fault of mine.

Q. Aren’t you a plaintiff in the case? A. I am a plain­
tiff.

Q. Well a motion was made in the plaintiff’s name, 
Mr. Chisolm, so from the time of the commencement of this 
suit until now, you didn’t feel that you were being harmed

— [p. 30]—
to such an extent that you had to apply to this Court for 
temporary relief, did you? A. Oh, yes.

Q. You did feel that way? A. Yes, sir.
Q. But in spite of that feeling, you delayed l ly 2 months 

to bring it to a motion? A. Well we thought that we 
would get an answer that we could play on the golf course. 
We were living in hopes to play on the golf course without 
bringing a restraining order.

Q. Mr. Chisolm, your position hasn’t deteriorated in 
any way since the commencement of this suit, has it? A. 
Oh, yes.

Q. It hasn’t changed? A. Ask that question again, Mr. 
Rosen.

Q. Your position hasn’t changed since July of 1959, 
has it? A. Yes, it has changed somewhat.

Q. Now what is the nature of that change? A. Because 
I can’t get to Wilmington as often as I used to.

John Chisolm—for Plaintiffs—Cross



36a

Q. I see. Is that the only change? A. That is the only 
change, and I am a great lover of golf, and I can’t golf as 
often as I used to.

— [p. 31]—
Q. So your condition today is, for all practical purposes, 

the same as it was a year ago, isn’t that correct? A. Yes.
Q. And there is no great urgency that is going to cause 

you any great harm, is there? A. Could I answer that 
the way I want to answer you ?

Q. Yes. A. I like golf. I have got a lot of money in­
vested in a golf outfit, I want to play golf near to home. 
So it will hurt me if I  have still got to go to Wilmington, 
North Carolina, to play golf.

Q. But you understand that your testimony is pursuant 
and in furtherance of a motion for a temporary restrain­
ing order? It has nothing to do with the merits of the 
litigation. You do understand that, don’t you, Mr. Chisolm? 
A. Yes.

John Chisolm—for Plaintiffs—Cross

The Court: Is there anything further.
Mr. Jenkins: There are no further questions for 

this witness.
The Court: All right. Do you have any further 

witnesses?
Mr. Perry: One further, sir. Mr. John Adams.

John E. A dams, sworn.

Mr. Perry: May it please the Court, before I
— [p. 32]—

proceed with the examination of this witness, may 
I make a statement to the Court, and ask the Court’s 
position with reference to it.

We have subpoenaed Mr. Adams. He is one of 
the defendants in this case. And, of course, your



37a

Colloquy

Honor has read the pleadings. As I understand the 
position of the City, the events of November 23 
essentially are agreed by the City in the City’s 
answer. I don’t know whether in every particular 
of the testimony which has come out here, but es­
sentially the events of November 23 seem to be ad­
mitted.

Mr. Rosen: Insofar as the answer admits them, 
Mr. Perry. I couldn’t go beyond the answer.

Mr. Perry: Yes, sir. I see.
Actually, it is our purpose to further strengthen 

our case to show that there is no dispute as to the 
events of November 23, by propounding certain 
questions to Mr. Adams. If, however, it appears 
that there is no dispute whatsoever concerning* the 
events of November 23, then of course we might 
very well forego the examination.

The Court: I don’t know of any dispute as to that.
Mr. Rosen: Your Honor, I know of no essential

— [p. 3 3 3 -
dispute.

You mean, to vary from your witnesses today?
Mr. Perry: Yes, sir, that is right.
Mr. Rosen: Insofar as the pleadings are con­

cerned, that answer was filed about a year ago, your 
Honor.

The Court: It was filed in July.
Mr. Rosen: Yes, sir, in 1959, and I think it admits 

the incident.
The Court: And I think that all of the other 

events that this other witness was talking about are 
admitted.

Mr. Rosen: I think they are.
Mr. Smythe: Paragraph 8 of the answer admits 

Paragraph 8 of the complaint.



38a

Mr. Rosen: Your Honor, we would agree—
The Court: Paragraph 8?
Mr. Smythe: Yes, sir.
The Court: What is that Paragraph 8? Yes, that 

is right. In other words, you admit that they sought 
permission to play golf, directing their request to 
the defendant John E. Adams, Manager of the said 
Golf Course, and the said defendant refused to grant 
permission on information and belief to plaintiffs.

— [p. 34]—
They also admit that there was a sign posted For 
White Only at the entrance of the Charleston Mu­
nicipal Golf Course. The said defendants deny any 
and all other allegations inconsistent therewith.

But you do admit that Mr. Adams refused to per­
mit them to play golf ?

Mr. Rosen: We do, your Honor, and I believe 
that is before you, and we might save the time of 
this witness.

Mr. Perry: I think so. And of course I apologize 
to the witness for having inconvenienced him. We, 
of course, in an effort to be thorough and to present 
the case thoroughly, thought perhaps we had better 
protect ourselves by placing Mr. Adams under sub­
poena.

The Court: I don’t think there is any question 
about that particular fact.

Mr. Perry: There is, perhaps, one question which 
I think Mr. Adams might clarify for the Court.

Direct examination by Mr. P erry :

Q. Mr. Adams, you are Mr. John Adams, the Manager of 
the Charleston Municipal Golf Course? A. Yes.

— [p. 35]—
Q. Back in July of 1959, the City admitted essentially

John E. Adams—for Plaintiffs—Direct



39a

that the plaintiffs in this action had presented themselves 
before yon to play golf on the Golf Course on the date 
alleged in their action. A. That is correct.

Q. Do you subscribe to that answer as filed by the City? 
A. Ido.

Q. Sir, does this situation substantially exist today? 
A. The conditions haven’t changed.

Q. The conditions have not changed. Negroes still are 
not permitted to play golf on the Charleston Municipal 
Golf Course? A. That is correct.

Q. Are there signs limiting admission to white persons 
only still posted at the entrance? A. There are, sir.

Q. Sir, do you still invoke the same statute which you 
relied upon in November 1958? A. Yes.

Mr. Perry: You may examine the witness.

Cross examination by Mr. Rosen:

Q. Mr. Adams, I have just one question. Has any Negro
— [p. 36]—

presented himself to play golf at your Golf Course since 
the incident in 1958 ? A. No, sir.

The Court: Are there any further witnesses?
Mr. Perry: There are no further witnesses for 

the plaintiffs.
The Court: Do you have any?
Mr. Rosen: Your Honor, we will reply upon our 

affidavits which we have filed with you, and pre­
sented Mr. Perry copies of.

The Court: You gentlemen for the plaintiffs, 
about the only question I see for me to consider is 
whether you will suffer irreparable harm if the in­
junction isn’t granted right now7. I am willing to 
fix a date for the trial of the case on its merits in

John E. Adams—for Plaintiffs—Cross



40a

August or September, and try it and render a 
decision that will wind up the whole thing at that 
time.

But I am a little doubtful whether you have made 
out a case for a preliminary injunction, because I 
don’t see, since the case will be tried within a month 
or two on the merits, where you can suffer any ir­
reparable harm by the refusal to grant this motion.

If you have anything to say on that point, I will
— [p. 37]—

be glad to hear you.
Mr. Perry: Very good, sir.
May it please the Court, the evidence which has 

been adduced, the answer of the defendants, the 
status of all of the pleadings, seem to leave no doubt 
but what the plaintiffs are denied access to mu­
nicipally-owned facilities, to wit, the Charleston Mu­
nicipal Golf Course facilities. The plaintiffs—

The Court: You are well aware of the hesitancy 
of federal courts particularly to grant injunctions. 
I think in my eight years I have never granted but 
one or two preliminary injunctions.

Mr. Perry: Well, sir, there is hesitancy; however, 
under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro­
cedure, the Court has the—

The Court: Upon what grounds would I base the 
granting of an injunction? Wouldn’t I have to base 
it on irreparable harm?

Mr. Perry: On the ground that these plaintiffs 
are being denied equal protection of the laws as 
protected to them by the 14th Amendment. These 
being personal rights, each day these rights are 
denied to them, they suffer irreparable harm. Each 
day the City of Charleston operates a golf course 
facility out of the public funds and does so and

Motion for Preliminary Injunction



41a

excludes these persons on the ground of race, we
— [p. 38]—

respectfully submit, they suffer irreparable injury 
and harm.

It so happens that in a situation where the facts 
are clear and where there is no dispute concerning 
the facts, one way or the other, this Court has the 
authority under Rule 65 to grant the preliminary 
injunction. And while this authority is based upon 
sound judicial discretion, we respectfully submit that 
the discretion of the Court is not unfettered. It is 
to be reckoned, it is to be applied by the status of 
the law which has been adjudged by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, and we respectfully sub­
mit that the Court has decided in a long list of cases 
after Brown v. Board of Education; Dawson v. 
Mayor was the first pronouncement on this point. 
Holmes v. City of Atlanta decided pretty much along 
the same— at the same time established once and for 
all that the plaintiffs in these cases are entitled to 
an injunction when they present themselves and 
show facts which are undisputed.

Here we take the position that the City has 
erected and does maintain this facility at taxpayers’ 
expense. It is a governmentally-owned facility there­
fore. And the status of the law is such that the 
plaintiffs are entitled to the relief. We come to 
court asking for a preliminary injunction.

The Court: If I grant a preliminary injunction, 
what more would you want?

— [p. 39]—
Mr. Perry: Well, sir, of course, I believe that 

your Honor—
The Court: You wouldn’t care for anything in 

addition to that, would you?

Motion for Preliminary Injunction



42a

Mr. Perry: Well, of course, it would be, I believe, 
up to the City to make some effort in having your 
Honor—

The Court: In other words, you would sit down 
then and wait for the City to move.

Mr. Perry: Well, absolutely, sir. The plaintiffs, 
of course, each day they are denied access to these 
facilities, are denied access to tax-supported facil­
ities.

The Court: The fact that this matter has been 
pending over a year,— I believe one witness said he 
went before the City officials two years ago. The 
fact that nothing has been done in the way of urging 
a decision on the case would indicate that nobody 
has suffered any irreparable harm.

Mr. Perry: In that event, sir, perhaps we should 
put on additional evidence to show the efforts that 
have been made. I respectfully submit that we have 
made inquiries to the Clerk of Court, to your Honor. 
We received a reply from your Honor stating that 
the matter could be heard in April or possibly in 
June. Your Honor will recall these series of letters.

— [p. 40]—
The letter of your Honor is dated October 19, in 
response to an inquiry on my behalf.

The Court: Well I am tied up in courts from 
October until February, and the only time I have 
open is in March, and at that time I was in the 
hospital.

Mr. Perry: I realize that, sir, and of course I 
make no effort to criticize the Court.

The Court: This is the earliest moment that I 
could hear it. When I got out of the hospital, we 
had three weeks of court in Florence, and three 
weeks of court in Charleston.

Motion for Preliminary Injunction



43a

Mr. Perry: Of course.
The Court: And we just finished those courts just 

a few weeks ago, and this is the earliest moment that 
it could possibly be heard.

Mr. Perry: While we recognize that, sir, may I 
interrupt the Court to say, of course, we simply take 
the position that we have not been sitting idly by. 
And I think that since Mr. Rosen inherited the file 
in this matter—

Mr. Rosen: I did, and in all fairness to the Court, 
I want to say this, Mr. Perry: This motion was just 
made two weeks ago. And your Honor heard it very 
promptly, much more promptly than the City was 
prepared to actually handle it.

The Court: There wasn’t any other motion for a
— [p. 41]—

preliminary injunction?
Mr. Rosen: This is the first one that I find in the 

file, now.
Mr. Perry: That is true, sir.
The Court: When was the motion for a prelimi­

nary injunction made ?
The Clerk: June 8th, 1960, your Honor.
Mr. P erry: That is correct.
Mr. Rosen: The suit was for a temporary and 

for a permanent injunction, 11 y2 months ago, and 
until June 8, there was no motion ever made to 
carry out that part of the original complaint.

Mr. Perry: That is correct, sir, but we rather 
took the position that if we had been given a speedy 
heaxing in our case on the merits, that it would not 
have been necessary to present a motion for a 
preliminary injunction.

The Court: Well the only way I could have given 
you a speedy hearing would have been to have

Motion for Preliminary Injunction



44a

refused to go to Greenville, where I go every year 
for several weeks, and to have refused to hold the 
courts in Florence, Orangeburg and Charleston, and 
just to give this precedence over all of the other 
courts.

Mr. Perry: That certainly was not our intention, 
sir.

The Court: I don’t judge, from what you say, that
— [p. 42]—

that was your intention or has been your intention.
The point I am making is: What showing have 

you made that the parties have suffered and are 
now suffering irreparable harm, when your action 
was brought a year ag*o and nothing was done to­
wards getting a preliminary injunction until just a 
few weeks ago ?

Mr. Perry: Your Honor, of course our only answer 
to that is that if we had been given the hearing, 
which we think perhaps—at least we had reason 
to believe should have been given during* the interim 
of one year, during the pendency of this action, 
then of course it would not have been necessary to 
present the motion for a preliminary injunction. The 
motion for a preliminary injunction was filed—

The Court: As far as I am concerned, the hearing 
is just about as early as I could have given you. 
I was in the hospital from August until September, 
the latter part of September of last year, and I was 
holding court all during October and November, and 
then I commenced holding court again—a three or 
four weeks term of court in Charleston in January. 
Then I went back to Greenville in February. And 
March was the only time that I had any time off, 
and unfortunately I was in the hospital then for 
two weeks, in March. And after I came out, I had

Motion for Preliminary Injunction



45a

court in Orangeburg, three weeks of court in 
Florence and three weeks of court in Charleston. 
I just finished a few weeks ago.

— [p. 4 3 ] -
Mr. Perry: Nevertheless, sir, we respectfully sub­

mit that a case for a preliminary injunction has 
been made out, and we respectfully urge the is­
suance of a preliminary injunction, enjoining the 
discriminatory practices which are pursued by the 
Manager and the members of the Charleston Mu­
nicipal Golf Course Commission.

The Court: Well I am going to deny your motion 
for a preliminary injunction, but I think under the 
circumstances that we should arrange to set some 
date when the matter can be heard on its merits. 
And from just reading the papers here, there ap­
pears to be some very serious questions that will 
come up on the hearing on the merits. And I can 
give you sometime in August or the first part of 
September.

Mr. Perry: Of course we would want as speedy a 
hearing as possible, sir, under those circumstances.

Mr. Rosen: Your Honor, we would prefer Sep­
tember, because Council meets only once a month 
in the summer, and that would give us the benefit 
of two meetings prior to the hearing. I don’t guess 
there is too much difference between the latter part 
of August and the first part of September to you.

The Court: I couldn’t hold it until the latter part 
of August, because I have let some of my relatives 
have my house. What about the first two weeks in

— [p. 44]—
September ? I can give you the first Monday in Sep­
tember.

Motion for Preliminary Injunction

#  *  #  *  #



46a

Order

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

F oe the E astern D istrict of South Carolina 

Charleston D ivision 

Civil Action No. 7048

-----------------------------------------------— ------------ --------------------------------------

J ohn H. Cummings, J ohn L. Chisolm, R obert Johnson, 
B enjamin W right, for themselves and all other persons 
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

T he City of Charleston, a Municipal Corporation, 
T he Charleston Municipal Golf Course Commission, 
Gerald M. Carter, Chairman, A lfred 0 . H alsey, 
Cornelious 0. Thompson, T. Moultrie M cK evlin, 
W illiam A. D otteree, Leroy Nelson and C. B issell 
Jenkins, members of the Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course Commission; and J ohn E. A dams, Manager of 
the Charleston Municipal Golf Course,

Defendants.

The complaint in this ease was filed on July 6, 1959. No 
further action was taken until June 8, 1960 when the plain­
tiffs filed their motion for a preliminary injunction. At a 
hearing before me on June 28, 1960 it was clear that the 
pleadings and the evidence did not make out a case where a 
preliminary injunction should be granted. It is therefore



47a

Order

Ordered that the motion for a preliminary injunction is 
refused.

So Ordered.

Ashton H. Williams 
United States District Judge

Signed at Charleston, S. C. on 
this 29th day of June, 1960

[S eal]

A  T rtje C opy. A ttest.

/ s /  E rnest L. A llen  
Clerk of U. S. District Court 

East Dist. So. Carolina



48a

— [p. 1]—
C /A  7048

Transcript o f  Hearing

The above entitled case came on to be heard in the Court­
room of the Charleston County Court House, in the City of 
Charleston, South Carolina, on the 7th day of September, 
1960, at 11 o’clock a. m., with

H onorable A shton H. W illiams, Presiding
United States District Judge. 

# * # # #
- t p .  2 ] -

Mr. Perry: The plaintiffs are ready, your Honor.
The Court: All right, you may proceed.
Mr. Perry: May it please the Court, we have taken 

up with the corporation counsel the proposition of 
using the testimony which comprises the record in 
the hearing which was held before your Honor on 
June 28 of 1960, which was the hearing on the motion 
for a preliminary injunction,—to be used in the pro­
ceedings of this morning. In other words, it is our 
desire to stipulate that the record of those proceed­
ings be made the record of this hearing on the merits 
this morning.

The Court: I f there is no objection, that will be 
done.

Mr. Rosen: We have no objection, your Honor.
Mr. Perry: It was further agreed that possibly 

some additional testimony would be taken. The 
plaintiffs desire to place on the witness stand again 
Mr. John Adams, the Manager of the Golf Course.

The Court: All right.
Mr. Perry: Your Honor, I assume that your feel­

ing is still the same with regard to the reading of 
the pleadings ?

The Court: That is all right. There is no use to 
read them.



49a

Mr. Perry: Are the pleadings considered in evi­
dence, sir ?

— [p. 3] —
The Court: Yes.
You have no objection to that, do you?
Mr. Rosen: We have none, your Honor. I don’t 

think they would constitute evidence. That would be 
my only point of disagreement with counsel.

The Court: Well of course they wouldn’t be evi­
dence, but they will be taken just as if you had read 
them.

Mr. Perry: Merely as a part of the record, your 
Honor.

The Court: A part of the record, yes.

John E. Adams—for Plaintiffs'—Direct

Testimony for Plaintiffs

J ohn E. A dams, Sworn

Direct Examination by Mr. Perry :

Q. Your name is Mr. John Adams? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Adams, I believe that you are the Manager of 

the Charleston Municipal Gulf Course? A. That’s correct, 
sir.

Q. How long have you been in that employment, sir? 
A. 31 years, sir.

Q. Mr. Adams, what is the policy of the Charleston 
Municipal Golf Course with reference to permitting persons

- [ p .  4 ] -
of different races to play on its premises? A. It is re­
stricted.

Q. Restricted to what race? A. To white only.
Q. To white only? A. (nods yes).
Q. And I believe, Mr. Adams, that in so doing, the



Charleston Municipal Golf Course Commission relies upon 
the statutes of the State of South Carolina, which are 
recorded at Title 51, Sections 181, 182, 183 and 184. Is that 
correct, sir?

Mr. Rosen: Your Honor, we object to that question 
on the ground that the Commission does not consist 
of Mr. Adams as a member. He is not a member of 
the Commission, and I doubt that he could answer 
for the Commission.

The Court: Objection sustained.

Q. May I ask you, s ir : do you know whether the Commis­
sion feels that it is governed by any applicable law of the 
State of South Carolina?

Mr. Rosen: Same objection, your Honor. He
wouldn’t know how the Commission felt, I don’t be­
lieve.

The Court: Objection sustained.

Q. Mr. Adams, have your superiors stated to you the
— [p. 5 1 -

policy under which they are operating and have they 
quoted to you any regulations which they are following? 
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what is that information, sir? A. That I was 
to follow the State Code of Laws that you quoted, 51-181, 
182 and 183, and to use that procedure.

Q. And as of this time, Mr. Adams, is it not still the 
policy of the Charleston Municipal Golf Course Commis­
sion to refuse to perimt Negroes to use the facilities of the 
Golf Course? A. That is correct, sir.

Q. Do you still have signs posted at the entrance of the

John E. Adams—for Plaintiffs—Direct



51a

Golf Course limiting admission to white persons only? A. 
Yes, sir.

Q. Now, Mr. Adams, I believe you testified in the hear­
ing on the motion for a preliminary injunction in this 
matter. A. (nods yes).

Q. You stated at that time that you recalled the incident 
during which these plaintiffs sought permission to play 
golf ? A. I did.

Q. You do recall that incident? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And these are the persons who sought permission to

— [p. 6 1 -
play golf on the date alleged in the complaint? A. Which 
ones?

Q. The persons named as plaintiffs in this action, John 
H. Cummings— A. Yes, sir.

Q. John L. Chisolm? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Bobert Johnson? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And Benjamin Wright? A. Yes, sir.
Q. You do recognize that those are the persons, along 

with others, who sought permission to play? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And I believe that that permission was refused by you? 

A. It was, sir.
Q. And you were operating under the regulations which 

you have just now mentioned? A. I did, sir.
Q. Thank you.

Mr. Perry: You may examine the witness.

Cross Examination by Mr. Rosen:

Q. Mr. Adams, what physical facilities do you have for
— [p. 7 1 -

checking in golfers at the Golf Course ? A. I operate from 
the main Club House, which is a brick building, that has an 
upstairs rest room for ladies, and downstairs we have a 
men’s locker room, consisting of 35 lockers. We have three

John E. Adams—for Plaintiffs—Cross



52a

showers, and we have two toilets and one urinal, and a small 
lobby.

Q. You say a small lobby? A. Yes.
Q. Are there any other buildings on the Municipal Golf 

Course? A. There is leased to the Stono Golf Club a build­
ing adjoining No. 9 fairway, which has been leased for 30 
years to them, which is a private club chartered in the 
State of South Carolina, which we have no control of.

Q. All golfers are not members of that Club, is that 
correct? A. No, sir. It is a private club, with restricted 
membership.

Q. Mr. Adams, approximately how many people play golf 
at the Municipal Golf Course during the average year? A. 
Possibly between 35,000 and 40,000, sir.

Q. Would that be the number of people or would that 
be the number of games played? A. No that would be the 
total number of rounds played. That does not indicate the 
number of players, because it is all repeat play.

— [p. 8]—
Q. I see. And has the play increased tremendously during 

the last several years? A. It has, sir.
Q. Has the Course about reached the saturation point 

from the standpoint of the ability to take any additional 
golfers ? A. At times it is.

Q. At what times? A. Especially in the spring of the 
year, and Saturdays and Sundays.

Q. It has reached the saturation point from the stand­
point of additional persons, is that correct? A. Yes, sir, 
for satisfactory play.

Mr. Rosen: The witness is with you.

Redirect Examination by Mr. P erry:

Q. Mr. Adams, I have one or two more questions, please. 
Did I understand you to say, sir, that a portion of the Golf

John E. Adams—for Plaintiffs—Redirect



53a

Course premises is leased to a private corporation? A. 
One building, sir.

Q. And it is leased to that private corporation by whom, 
please? A. By the City of Charleston.

Q. By the City of Charleston. So the City of Charleston 
is actually the owner of those premises still, isn’t it? A.

— [p. 9 ] -
It is, sir.

Q. Thank you.

The Court: Who decides who shall play golf? Do 
you have to be a member of the Golf Club?

A. No, sir. It is open to any citizen.

The Court: It is open to every citizen?

A. Every citizen, going under the jurisdiction of the rules 
set down by the Golf Course Commission as of the date.

The Court: Is there anything else?
Mr. Perry: Nothing further for the plaintiffs, 

your Honor.
Mr. Rosen: Your Honor, we had planned to place 

on the witness stand Mr. Adams, but since he has 
already taken the stand, we will have no other 
witnesses.

However, we would like to introduce into evidence 
a copy of a deed. I have agreed with Mr. Perry as to 
the introduction of this deed.

Would you allow me a second, your Honor?
The Court: Yes, sir.
Mr. Rosen: Your Honor, this is a deed from Edisto 

Realty Company to the City Council of Charleston, 
which deed conveys to the City the major part of the

John E. Adams—for Plaintiffs—Redirect



54a

present Municipal Golf Course. The defendants
— [p. 10]—

would like to introduce this as a defendants’ exhibit.
Mr. Perry: No objection, your Honor.

Deed from Edisto Realty Company to City 
Council of Charleston, dated July 26, 1929, 
marked in evidence as Defendants’ Exhibit A.

Mr. Rosen: Your Honor, I won’t take up the time 
of the Court in reading the contents of that deed, 
which is now in evidence, but it provides that in the 
event this Course is not used as a Municipal Golf 
Course that the title to the same reverts to the 
grantor of the deed, who is the Edisto Realty Com­
pany, on which I will have something further to say 
a little later on in the proceedings.

The Court: All right.
Mr. Rosen: We have no further testimony.
The Court: Do you gentlemen have anything to 

say in argument ?
#  *  #  #

— [p- 15]—
Mr. Rosen: We of course take the position that 

the public welfare and the goal of amicable race 
relations require that the races be segregated in 
publicly owned facilities. I certainly understand that 
many courts have taken a contrary position.

The Court: Haven’t all of them taken that posi­
tion?

Mr. Rosen: Yes, sir, I believe all of them have.
Your Honor, I would like to say this, however,—
The Court: And they have taken that position 

based upon the belief that the decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States was a proper decision,

Colloquy



55a

which I don’t take. I don’t think the Supreme Court 
had any right to read into the constitution what they 
did in the 1954 decision.

Mr. Rosen: Your Honor, may I state something in 
connection with your equity powers! I would like 
to cite to you two or three decisions with regard to 
your Honor’s possible adverse holding, if the Court 
was constrained to hold that the State statutes are 
unconstitutional. At least I think the issue is clearly 
presented in this case, probably for the first time.

If your Honor were constrained to hold that, I 
would like to point out to your Honor that in many of

— [p. 16]—
the District Court decisions in the southeast, since 
1956, the courts have recognized the importance to 
the community the problems of a city in adjusting to 
whatever requirement is made by the order and have 
generally given to the municipalities involved a 
reasonable time to work out the problems which of 
necessity would be involved, either in a closing of the 
golf course or in the allowing of all citizens to play.

We feel, the City of Charleston feels, that in these 
particular cases which I am about to cite to your 
Honor there was not the additional ground that is 
present in this case; namely, the City of Charleston 
holds title to this property under a deed of reverter, 
which means that in the event this Court issued a 
preemptory order that had to be obeyed at once, and 
the citizens and the City felt it. could not be obeyed, 
property, valued at tremendous sums of money, 
would be completely lost to the City.

Your Honor, in the case of Simpkins v. The City 
of Greensboro, 149 Fed. Supp., 562, the Court there, 
after hearing the case on the merits delayed the

Colloquy



56a

imposition of a mandatory injunction for a period of 
76 days, which was of course close to three months. 
In Hampton v. The City of Jacksonville, which was 
in 1959,—I don’t have the Federal Supplement 
annotation, your Honor,—it is 4 Race Relations Law 
Reporter, Page 339,—from the time of the hearing 
on the motion for summary judgment,—I don’t think

—• [p- 17]—
that case was tried on the merits, your Honor,— there 
was a total delay of six months.

Your Honor, in other cases, such as Hayes v. The 
City of Nashville, 137 Fed. Supp., 853, the Court 
made its ruling and then provided that the injunc­
tion would not go into effect until a reasonable time 
had expired, during which conferences would be held 
with the District Judge, and so forth. I am unable 
to tell from the reported decision exactly how long 
the delay was. I assume from reading it that a 
delay of several months was contemplated. And to 
the same effect is the case of Augustus v. The City 
of Pensacola, Florida, 1 Race Relations Law Re­
porter, Page 681, and in this ease also a reasonable 
time was granted.

Your Honor, in this particular case, the hardship 
here probably would be greater than in those 
decisions because some of the cities are in a position 
to close the course and then decide, in an atmosphere 
not charged with all of the passions that these things 
bring forth,—they would then be in a position to 
coldly decide just what they are going to do. We 
can’t do that. If your Honor were to issue an order 
today, and if we wanted to study it and decide what 
to do, and close it temporarily, as they did in the 
Edisto Beach case, we would lose the course. I point 
that out to your Honor, because in spite of the United

Colloquy



57a

States Supreme Court decisions, and in spite of the
— [p. 1 8 3 -

Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions, and in spite of 
the District Courts decisions, all of them recognize 
the right in equity, to allow a reasonable time, de­
pending upon the factual situation.

We feel that a reasonable time here, your Honor, 
would certainly be not less than six months. There 
are cases that give that, where the cities are not 
faced with the problem that we are faced with here. 
And we point these out to your Honor in the hope 
that they will be taken into consideration if the 
Court decides that the State statutes in question do 
not meet the test of constitutionality.

The Court: Well there isn’t any question, about 
that, is there ?

Mr. Rosen: No, sir, I don’t think there is.
The Court: According to the decision of the 

Supreme Court in 1954.
The thing that bothers me more than anything else, 

I am so absolutely convinced that the Supreme Court 
of the United States in 1954 was merely legislating 
and not interpreting the constitution. They have 
taken an oath to sustain the constitution and I have 
taken an oath to do the same thing. And I have in 
mind that I cannot conscientiously follow the Su­
preme Court in this particular case, because I am so 
convinced—and practically all of the lawyers in the 
United States are so convinced—that the Supreme 
Court was wrong. And I feel that I would be violating

— [p. 19]—
my oath of office if I attempted to follow the Supreme 
Court of the United States in this particular case.

Now the only thing that I can think of is to state 
my position and disqualify myself to hear a case of

Colloquy



58a

this kind, because of my conviction that the Supreme 
Court was wrong in 1954, and that I cannot con­
scientiously, under my oath, follow that decision of 
the Supreme Court.

Is there anything further?
Mr. Perry: I would merely like to say, sir: did I 

understand that you have made your ruling, sir, or 
is further comment indicated?

The Court: You can comment. I am always open 
to reason.

Mr. Perry: Thank you, sir.
Of course we recognize that there is diversity of 

opinion on the Supreme Court decision, but it never­
theless has been decided, and I respectfully urge 
that this Court is bound to follow that decision.

The Court: I am either bound to follow it or dis­
qualify myself.

Mr. Perry: Well of course, sir, if that is what you 
intend to do.

The Court: I can’t overrule the Supreme Court, 
If I could, I would. But that is impossible. And if 
I decide this case, I will have to follow the Supreme

— [p. 2 0 1 -
Court decision. But I cannot in good conscience, as 
I see it now—I am open to argument,—I cannot in 
good conscience follow this decision under my oath. 
I took an oath to support the constitution, and I 
don’t think this is the constitution. The Supreme 
Court was conscientious in its decision. I make no 
aspersions as to the motive of the Supreme Court in 
rendering such a decision. But I am absolutely con­
vinced that there is absolutely nothing in the con­
stitution that authorizes this decision. And under 
my oath, I don’t think I have to follow it.

Colloquy



59a

Is there anything further!
Mr. Perry: Would you indulge me a moment, your 

Honor?
The Court: All right.
Mr. Perry: There is perhaps one additional obser­

vation that we would like to make.
Your Honor, may we request that whatever course 

your Honor takes, and I believe you have practically 
indicated what you may decide to do—

The Court: I think that I should disqualify myself. 
I can’t follow the Supreme Court conscientiously in 
the 1954 decision.

Mr. Perry: Well, sir, what position would we be 
in? Is this morning’s hearing a nullity?

The Court: I don’t know what position you would
— [p. 21]—

be in.
Mr. Smythe: Your Honor, you are not disqualify­

ing yourself at this time, as I understand it. You 
are taking the question of disqualification under 
advisement, is that correct?

The Court: Yes. I am willing to hear from you 
on that question.

Mr. Perry: May we request a speedy ruling from 
your Honor?

The Court: I will give you a speedy ruling. I 
don’t know exactly when it will be, but I will make 
the ruling in a very short time.

Is there anything further?
Mr. Rosen: We have nothing further, your Honor.
Mr. Perry: We have nothing further, your Honor.
The Court: Court will recess.

# *  # # *

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60a

Order

Civil Action No. 7048

This is an action in which the plaintiffs, all of whom are 
Negro residents of the City of Charleston, South Carolina, 
on behalf of themselves and all other Negro citizens sim­
ilarly situated, seek a judgment declaring that Sections 
181, 182, 183 and 184, Title 51 of the 1952 Code of Laws 
of South Carolina and the policy, custom and usage of 
denying to these Negro plaintiffs and the members of the 
class they represent permission to use the Charleston Mu­
nicipal Golf Course, owned, operated, supervised and 
maintained by the City of Charleston, South Carolina, 
while at the same time permitting and granting white per­
sons the right, privilege and permission to use said golf 
course, deprive these persons and members of their class 
of their constitutional rights as secured by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
Plaintiffs also seek an injunction against the operation 
of the Charleston Municipal Golf Course on a basis that 
requires segregation solely because of race or color.

I have held two hearings in this matter, one of which 
was the consideration of plaintiffs motion for preliminary 
injunction. I concluded, after hearing the evidence, that 
the preliminary injunction should not issue and proceeded 
thereafter to hear the matter on its merits.

The Complaint alleges among other things that on or 
about November 23, 1958 the plaintiffs presented them­
selves at the Charleston Municipal Golf Course and sought 
permission to play golf, directing their request to the de­
fendant, John E. Adams, manager of said golf course. 
It is further alleged that the defendant, John E. Adams, 
refused to grant permission to the plaintiffs to play golf 
on the golf course facilities. In accordance with the require-



61a

Order

ment of Section 51-182 of the Code of Laws of South 
Carolina for 1952, signs which read “ white only” were 
posted at the entrance of the golf course.

The answer of the defendants, though rather lengthy 
and detailed, admits the material allegations of the com­
plaint, particularly the events of November 23, 1958. De­
fendants deny, however, that the policy, custom and usage 
of the defendants in providing golfing facilities for the 
white citizens and residents of the City of Charleston out 
of the public funds, while failing and refusing to admit 
Negroes to these facilities on account of their race and 
color, is unlawful and constitutes a denial of their rights 
under the equal protection and due process clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. Defendants further deny that Sections 51-181, 51- 
182, 51-183 and 51-184 of the Code of Laws of South Caro­
lina for 1952 are unconstitutional.

From the evidence, there is no dispute between the 
parties concerning the events of November 23, 1958. 
Further, according to the testimony of the manager of the 
golf course, Mr. John E. Adams, the policy, custom and 
usage of denying Negroes the privilege of using the 
Charleston Municipal Golf Course still persists, and signs 
which read “white only” are still posted at the entrance 
to the golf course. He further testified that the golf course 
officials still consider themselves bound by Section 51-181, 
51-182, 51-183 and 51-184, Code of Laws of South Carolina 
for 1952.

The statutes involved prohibit the joint use of public 
parks, public recreation centers, public amusement centers 
or public bathing beaches by members of both the colored 
and white races in any county in South Carolina having 
a City with a population of more than sisty thousand



62a

Order

(60,000) persons, according to the 1930 Census of the 
United States. These statutes apply only to Charleston 
County and the Charleston Municipal Golf Course is the 
only public recreational facility involved in this suit.

The same statutes were before this Court in Clark v. 
Flory, 141 F. supp. 248 (1956) and I stated at that time 
that in my opinion they were unconstitutional. However, 
in that action, which involved the Edisto Beach Park, the 
legislature of South Carolina closed the park to all per­
sons prior to the hearing of the suit, and I held that the 
closing of the park had rendered the issues of that case 
moot under the decision of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U. S. 
237, 97 L. Ed. 291 and Michael v. Cockerell, 161 F. 2d 163.

The statutes in this case are clearly unconstitutional 
under Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 124 F. supp. 290, 223 F. 
2d 93, 350 U. S. 879. See also Dawson v. Mayor, 220 F. 2d 
386 (4th Cir. 1955), aff’d. 350 U. S. 877 and Tate v. De­
partment of Conservation and Development, etc., 133 F. 
Supp. 53, 231 F. 2d 615, and 352 U. S. 838.

This Court further concludes that the policy, practice, 
custom and usage of denying these Negro plaintiffs and 
other members of the class they represent the right and 
privileges of admission to use the facilities of the Charles­
ton Municipal Golf Course is a denial to these plaintiffs 
and members of the class they represent the equal pro­
tection of the laws as secured to them by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and 
such practice, policy, custom and usage is, therefore, un­
constitutional.

During the hearing in this matter, counsel for the City 
introduced into evidence the deed to the golf course 
premises and stated that should the City of Charleston 
cease to operate the golf course as a municipal golf course,



63a

Order

under the terms of the deed, the premises will immediately 
revert to the grantor or its successors. It was further 
stated that the City of Charleston has invested a large 
sum of money into the golf course facilities and that there 
are many issues which will have to be resolved by the 
City of Charleston and the Golf Course Commission, in­
cluding public acceptance of the operation of the golf 
course facilities on a non-segregated basis. In view of the 
foregoing, I have concluded that it will be equitable for 
this Court to grant the defendants’ a reasonable period 
of time within which to resolve the matters which they 
have presented. Now, in accordance with this opinion it is,

Ordered, adjudged and decreed that Sections 51-181, 51- 
182, 51-183 and 51-184 of the Code of Laws of South 
Carolina for 1952, which require segregation of the races 
in the use of parks and recreational areas in any County 
of South Carolina having a City with a population of more 
than sixty thousand (60,000) persons according to the 1930 
Census of the United States, are unconstitutional and void 
in that they deny and deprive plaintiffs and other Negro 
citizens similarly situated of the equal protection of the 
laws and due process of law secured by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 
rights and privileges secured by Title 42, United States 
Code, Section 1981 and 1983.

It is fu rth er  ordered, adjudged astd decreed that the 
policy, practice, custom and usage of denying these Negro 
plaintiffs, and other members of the class they represent, 
the right and privilege of admission to use the facilities 
of the Charleston Municipal Golf Course is a denial to 
these plaintiffs and the members of the class they represent 
the equal protection of the laws as secured to them by



64a

Order

the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and such practice, policy, custom and usage 
is, therefore, unconstitutional.

It is fu rth er  ordered, adjudged ahd decreed that the 
defendants, their successors in office, assigns, agents, serv­
ants, employees and persons acting on their behalf, be 
and they are hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing 
the aforesaid statutes and the policy, custom and usage of 
denying to these plaintiffs and other Negroes similarly 
situated the right to use the Charleston Municipal Golf 
Course on a basis which requires discrimination on ac­
count of race or color.

It is fu rth er  ordered, adjudged aud decreed that this 
judgment shall become effective eight (8) months from the 
date hereof.

It is fu rth er  ordered that the defendants pay all costs 
in this matter.

In concluding the Court wishes to add that it is not in 
agreement with the famous “ 1954 Decision” of the Supreme 
Court and its flow of case law which has necessarily guided 
this opinion. It has always been the belief of this Court 
that the decisions of our highest Court which first as­
certain and define the intent of the framers and adopters 
of the Constitution and its amendments have the effect 
of becoming an integral part of the Constitution itself. 
As such these first interpretations, like the Constitution, 
can be lawfully altered and modified only by the amending 
process.

Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896) announced 
that separate but equal provisions for races was not 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Upon this pronouncement, it is my opinion



65a

Order

that the Court should have closed its doors to further in­
terpretation on the point.

The cases are clear and I am bound by my judicial oath 
to follow them. I do so with reluctance, and with the hope 
and belief that Congress will some day pass legislation 
forbidding the Supreme Court from rendering decisions 
not supported by the Constitution.

Let a copy of this order be served upon each of the 
defendants.

/s /  A shton H. W illiams 
Ashton Id. Williams 

United States District Judge

A  T rue Copy, A ttest,

E rnest L. A llen 
Clerk of U. S. District Court 

Eastern Dist. So. Carolina

Signed at Charleston, S. C., 
this 26th day of November 1960

[Seal]



66a

Notice o f  Appeal

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

F oe the E astern D istrict of South Carolina 

Charleston Division 

Civil Action No. 7048

J ohn H. Cummings, J ohn C. Chisolm, R obert J ohnson, 
Benjamin W right, for themselves and all other persons 
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

T he City of Charleston, a Municipal Corporation, The 
Charleston Municipal Golf Course Commission, 
Gerald M. Carter, Chairman, A lfred 0 . H alsey, Cor- 
nelious 0 . T hompson, T. Moultrie M cK evlin, W illiam 
A. D otterer, Leroy Nelson and C. D issell Jenkins, 
members of the Charleston Municipal Golf Course Com­
mission ; and John F. A dams, Manager of the Charleston 
Municipal Golf Course,

Defendants.

Notice of A ppeal to the
United States Court of A ppeals for the F ourth Circuit

Notice is hereby given that the plaintiffs above-named 
hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit from that portion of the Order of No­
vember 26, 1960 and filed herein on November 28, 1960 
which provides that the judgment shall become effective 
eight (8) months from the date thereof.



67a

December

Notice of Appeal

, 1960.

Matthew J. P erky
371% South Liberty Street 
Spartanburg, South Carolina

L incoln C. Jenkins, J r.
1107% Washington Street 
Columbia, South Carolina

T hurgood Marshall 
J ack Greenberg

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York

Attorneys for Plaintiffs