Campbell v. Gadsden County District School Board Brief of Defendants-Appellants Cross Appellees
Public Court Documents
July 7, 1975

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Campbell v. Gadsden County District School Board Brief of Defendants-Appellants Cross Appellees, 1975. 65942cb2-ac9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/fda32015-a721-4d3d-bc88-8e9e74434a20/campbell-v-gadsden-county-district-school-board-brief-of-defendants-appellants-cross-appellees. Accessed July 16, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 75-1998 WITT CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross Appellant versus GADSDEN COUNTY DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL., ETC. , Defendants-Appellants Cross Appellees Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS _______ CROSS APPELLEES LAW OFFICES OF BRIAN T. HAYES POST OFFICE BOX 1385 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302 Attorneys for Defendants- Appellants Cross Appellees IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT NO. 75-1998 WITT CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross Appellant versus GADSDEN COUNTY DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL. , ETC. , Defendants-Appellants Cross Appellees CERTIFICATE REQUIRED BY FIFTH CIRCUIT LOCAL _____________ RULE 13(a) ____________ _ The undersigned, counsel of record for Appellants certifies that the following listed parties have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that Judges of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification or refusal pursuant to Local Rule 13(a). Witt Campbell, for himself and others similarly situated Gadsden County Board of Education, M.D. Walker, as Superintendent of Schools of Gadsden County Edward Fletcher, Cecil Butler, C. W. Harbin, Jr., Will I Ramsey, Sr., Randolph Greene, as members of the Gadsden County Board of Education BRIAN T. HAYES TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 ARGUMENT— POINT I 7 ARGUMENT— POINT II 9 ARGUMENT— POINT III 16 CONCLUSION 18 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 19 l TABLE OF CITATIONS Page Adkins v. Duval County School Bd, et al (5th Cir., 1975) Case No, 74-1653 7, 16 Bassett v. Atlanta Independent School District 485 F.2s 1268 (5th Cir., 1973) 18 Gay v. Wheeler, 363 F. Supp. 764, 782 (S.D. Tex, 1973) 14, 15 Horton v. Lawrnece County Bd. of Edu. 320 F. Supp, 790, 797 (N,D, Ala,1970) Affirmed 449 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1971) 12 Johnson v. Combs, 471 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1972) 17 Lee v, Macon County Bd. of Educ. 453 F,2d 1104 (5th Cir., 1971) 9 Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ. 456 F.2d 1371 1373 (5th Cir., 1972) 9,12 Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ. 470 F.2d 958, 959 (5th Cir., 1972) 10 Singleton v. Jackson, 419 F.1211 (5th Cir. 1970) 2, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18 Smith v. Bd. of Public Instruction of Pinellas County, 438 F.2d 1209, 1210 (5th Cir., 1971) 14 United States v. Gadsden County School District, TCA 1515 (N.D., Fla. 1970) OTHER CITATIONS 4, 5, 14 28 U.S.C. 1343 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985 1, 2 1, 2 , 7, 8, 16 ii U.S. Const. Thirteenth Amend. 12 U.S, Const. Fourteenth Amend. 1, 2, 15, 16 Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1 Florida Statutes 231.351 7 Florida Statutes 231.36 et seq. 7 Florida Statutes 230.33 (7) 7 Florida Statutes 231.57 (2)(c) 8 iii POINTS ON APPEAL POINT I DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION? POINT II DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE SINGLETON V, JACKSON MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 419 F.2s 12ll (5th Cir. , 1970) STANDARD? POINT III DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES? iiii IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT NO. 75-1998 WITT CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross Appellant, v s . GADSDEN COUNTY DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD, et al., etc., Defendant s-Appe Hants Cross Appellees. BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS CROSS APPELLEES STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Complaint in this cause was filed on December 20, 1973 in the District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Divison. See R-5. The proceedings were initiated by Witt Campbell, a black principal, acting for himself and others similarly situated against M. D. Walker, as Superintendent of Schools of Gadsden County, the Gadsden County District School Board, and five individuals, as members of the Gadsden County Board of Education. Plaintiff asserted a cause of action under 42 U.S.C., 1981, 1983 and 1985, and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend ment to the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. 1343. Relief sought was an injunction against the Defendants from maintaining a pattern and practice of racial discrimination in hiring, promotion, and in terms and conditions of employ ment. Also requested were back pay and damages, class action relief pursuant to Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and other equitable relief. Thereafter on February 14, 1974, the Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. See R-45. Upon Motion of the Defendant, the District Court on March 19, 1974, dismissed the Complaint on the grounds that an action will not lie against a County School Board of Education under Title 42, U.S.C. 1981, 1983 or 1985 and that the Court lacked jurisdiction under the asserted 28 U.S.C. 1343. See R-51. On the 25th day of April, 1974, the District Court granted a Motion for Rehearing and entered its Order allowing the Plain tiff to proceed for injunctive relief on the theory that an alleged violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights always gave jurisdiction to a Federal Court. See R-58. An Answer was filed on May 10, 1974, denying the alle gations of the Amended Compalint. See R-79. Various motions for Summary Judgment were filed which culminated in the Order of Partial Dismissal removing the class action issue from the Court and leaving for trial the question of Witt Campbell's claim of demotion under Singleton v. Jackson, 419 F .2d 1211 (5th Cir., 1970). See R-395. On this issue the cause was tried on January 22, 1975, before the Honorable Norman C. Roettger, Jr. sitting by special assignment from the Southern District of Florida. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court permanently enjoined the School Board, its individual members, and the Superintendent from failing to give a principalship to the Plaintiff and ordered the Plaintiff to be assigned to the position of an elementary school principal effective for the commence ment of the 1975-76 school year term. See R-444. -2- Notice of Appeal was timely filed on the 2nd day of April, 1975. See R-451. Notice of Cross Appeal was filed by the Plaintiff on the 11th day of April, 1975. See R-453. Motion for Stay was filed on the 25th day of March, 1975 and denied by the Court on April 10, 1975. See R-445,454. -3- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS The Plaintiff, Witt Campbell, is a black, tenured admin istrator who has been employed by the Gadsden County Board of Public Instruction since 1934, He served as principal in a series of black elementary schools until the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division entered a final desegragation order in the case of U .S. v. Gadsden County School District, TCA^-1616, mandating the School board of Gadsden County, Florida, to effectuate and put into operation a unitary and nondiscriminatory school system. Entered on August 7, 1970, this Order gave the School Board just sixteen days to transfer student assignments and reassign staff teachers, principals and other personnel within the school system. At the time, the Plaintiff was serving as principal of Stevens Elementary School. Pursuant to the directives of this Order, Stevens Elementary School was to be phased out, reducuing the number of principalships available in the desegregated school system and leaving the Plaintiff without a position as a principal. The Plaintiff was transferred to Assistant Principal and Desegregation Specialist at Chattahoochee Public Schools (a high school), Chattahoochee, Florida. In his new position, the Plaintiff received a Five hundred Dollar pay increase and remained a tenured administrator in the system. -4- The Plaintiff testified that he objected to this transfer and demanded an elementary school principalship. However, testi mony revealed that there were no openings or changes in ele mentary school principalships between the time of the Plain tiff's transfer and the time Plaintiff brought this action, except for one instance wherein the principal at St. Johns School was transferred to Havana Middle School and the principal at Havana Middle School went to St. Johns. Superintendent N. D. Walker testified that he considered the transfer of Witt Campbell a promotion with equal or greater prestige and more responsibilities. Yet, the District Court found to the contrary. The District Court concluded that the Plaintiff was demoted by his reassignment because he has less responsibility than he held previously as principal of Stevens Elementary School, and because his position as Assistant Principal and Desegre gation Specialist of Chattahoochee Public Schools (a high school) is less prestigious than his former position. Further, the Court determined that the facts of this case were governed by Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir., 1970), since the Plaintiff was demoted after a reduction in the number of principalships by Defendant pursu ant to its inplementation of the Court's Desegregation Order TCA-1616. See R-441. -5- Although the Court found that "the reassignment of Plaintiff was not a result of a pattern or practice of racial discrimination" (Findings of Fact No. 6, R-441, emphasis supplied), the Court concluded that the "Defendant had not developed objective and reasonable nondiscriminatory standards for selecting personnel to be dismissed or demoted" (Conclusions of Law No. 3, R-443), and ordered that the Plaintiff be assigned to the position of an elementary school principal effective for the commencement of the 1975-76 school term. (See R-444). -6- POINT I DID THE COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION? The Court lacked jurisdiction over the Defendant, the Gadsden County School Board, because it is not a proper party Defendant against whom injunctive relief may be granted under Section 1981, 1983 or 1985 of Title 42 U.S.C. The Gadsden County School Board is not a "person" within the meaning of the word in Section 1981, 1983, or 1985 of Title 42, U.S.C. for the purpose of establishing subject matter jurisdiction; therefore, it was clearly improper for the District Court to grant the Plaintiff, Witt Campbell, injunctive relief against the School Board under the above authority. See the decision of this Court in Adkins v. Duval County School Board, et al, (5th Cir., 1975) Case no. 74-1653. The elected members of a Florida School Board, as individuals, have no authority to employ, dismiss or demote any school-employed person under existing Florida Law. Florida Statutes 231.351, and 231.36, et seq. Further, the Defendant, M.D. Walker, as Superintendent, cannot employ or transfer any employee without the approval of the School Board, Florida Statutes 230.33(7). Therefore, injunctive relief is not a proper remedy as against any of these individuals. -7- In sum, the Plaintiff did not establish subject matter jurisdiction of this cause in the Federal District Court under Title 42 U.S.C, 1981, 1983 or 1985 as against any of the named Defendants. Moreover, the Defendants submit that subject matter juris diction of this cause was not established under the Fourteenth Amendment, since the Court below found no racial discrimination in the transfer of the Plaintiff herein from an elementary school principal to assistance principal of a county high school at no loss in pay, pension, rights or tenure. Plaintiff's proper forum was in State Court or an Adminis trative hearing pursuant to Florida Statutes 231.57 (2) (c) . -8- POINT II DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE SINGLETON V. JACKSON MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 419 F.2d T2TI (5th Cir. 1970) STANDARD? "The essence of the Singleton approach as a protection of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of those displaced is this: if a school official, administrator, teacher, principal, or coach is demoted or dismissed as result,of a desegraga- tion order, and if his objective qualifications for his former position do not diminish in an absolute sense after the issuance of the order and his displacement, then he must be given the opportunity to assume any new position equal to the one he lost, prior to the offering of the position to any new applicants. This is the per se preseumption of Singleton underlined in our recent decision in Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 453 F .2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1971), ... ." Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 456 F.2d 1371, 1373 (5th CIF77~TWI)~- (Emphasis supplied) Hereafter referred to as Lee II Paraphrasing the language of the Singleton decision, supra at 1218, this Court stated further that Singleton: "granted a limited preferential right to pro motion in the event of subsequent vacancies, to members of the pre-desegregation order school staff population who were dismissed, demoted or displaced in the wake of school desegregation." Lee II, supra at 1373. (Emphasis supplied) A "demotion" was defined in Singleton, supra at 1218, to be as follows: -9- "Demotion," as used in order requiring that a staff member to be dismissed or demoted in a school district be selected on basis of objective and reasonable nondiscriminatory standards, includes any reassignment (1) under which staff member receives less pay or has less responsi bility than under assignment he held previously, (2) which requires a lesser degree of skill than did assignment he held previously, or (3) under which staff member is asked to teach a subject or grade other than one for which he is certified or for which he has had substantial experience within a reasonably current period," Defendants contend that Witt Campbell's appointment as Assistant Principal and Desegregation Specialist was not a demotion since he lost no salary or pension rights. Lee v . Macon County Board of Education, 470 F.2d 958, 959 (5 th Cir. 1972) . Even if this Court finds to the contrary, there has been no new openings of any elementary school principalships to which WITT CAMPBELL should have been assigned as dictated by Singleton, supra. The Court below specifically inquired as to this fact at Tr 88, line 22, through Tr 89, line 9: "THE COURT "Q There have been no principalships open in the high schools since 1970, is that correct— no vacancies? "A No, sir. "Q Have there been any vacancies in the ele mentary principalships other than this? I assume this is a swap at Gretna? "A Yes, sir, that was an exchange of two principals, one from one school to another just a swap was what it amounted to." -10- Also, in its Findings of Fact announced from the Bench, the District Court found at Tr 99, line 7 through line 18: "Now at that point, the relief to be ordered becomes somewhat difficult. There has not been an elementary school vacancy since 1970, except for the strange swap of Mr. Harrell and Mr. Jones. There has been no vacancy in the high schools in Gadsden County since the desegregation order of 1970, but there have been three vacancies, other than swap arrange ments, in the junior highs. Now, the Plaintiff is qualified for both elementary and secondary administration, but he has plainly indicated that he would like to be principal of an elementary school and has given his reasons and the Court finds that that is his primary purpose and the relief he wants." The Plaintiff herein has demanded a principalship at the elementary school level and has been granted such position by the District Court, even though there has been no violation by the Defendants as per Singleton in not granting the Plaintiff such elementary school principalship before this date. There simply has been no openings at the elementary school principal- ship level to which the Plaintiff should have been appointed by the Defendants since the 1970 school desegregation order. To order a pre-Desegregation Order, incumbant, elementary school principal out of his job so that the Plaintiff may have it is unjustified, unlawful, and is not mandated by Singletbn. By its Order, the District Court has unconstitutionally deprived a pre-Desegregation Order, incumbant, elementary school principal of his job. This is not a case in which the Plaintiff was denied an elementary school principalship because that principalship -11- was given to an applicant from outside the school system as in Lee II, supra. The issues presented do not involve the constant rejection of the application of the Plaintiff herein and the employment of a new applicant to an elementary school principal- ship after the Plaintiff was demoted from his elementary school principalship. The elementary school principal who should be required to lose his job as a result of the 1970 Desegregation Order should have been determined by the standard set forth in Singleton. Singleton, supra at 1218, requires that: "If there is to be a reduction in the number of principals, teachers, teacher-aides, or other pro fessional staff employed by the school district which will result in a dismissal or demotion of any such staff members, the staff member to be dis missed or demoted must be selected on the .basis of objective and reasonable non-discriminatory standards from among all the staff of the school district." * * * * * * * * * * "Prior to such a reduction, the school board will develop or require the development of nonracial objective criteria to be used in selecting the staff member who is to be dismissed or demoted. These criteria shall be available for public inspection and shall be retained by the school district. The school district also shall record and preserve the evaluation of staff members under the criteria. Such evaluation shall be made available upon request to the dismissed or demoted employee." An example of the implementation of this procedure is set forth in Horton y. Lawrence County Bd, of Educ., 320 F.Supp 790, 797 (N.D, Ala., 1970) affirmed by this Court at 449 F.2d 792 (5th Cir., 1971); -12- "Here is what should have been done, for example, respecting the principals; Under the June order the number of high schools in the system, and hence the number of high school prin cipal jobs in the system, was reduced from nine to six. (Closing of Moulton High, and conver sion to elementary status of Tennessee Valley and Courtland.) Of those who were principals at the close of the term, seven were interested in re-employment for the 1970-71 year. (The principal at Courtland and Hatton left the county system,) All seven should have been considered by the Board for the six high school principal- ships on the basis of "objective and reasonable nondiscriminatory standards." The criteria should have been available for public inspection, and the evaluation of the seven persons under the criteria should have been made available to the one "demoted," or not selected for retention as a high school principal. Moreover, the one demoted (to an elementary school principalship) would have under the Singleton decree and the June order a "preferential right" to promotion— namely, that (if he is white} the Board must offer him a position as high school principal before it can hire or promote a black person as high school principal; and vice versa. That is, the person "demoted" must be given a right of first refusal before a person of a different race can be hired at the level from which demoted." The standards used by the Defendants to determine which elementary school principal should lose his principalship in 1970 were given by the Defendants in their Answers to Interrogatories answer number 3(b), R-82 stated; "3. (b) Involuntary transfers prior to court ordered desegregation were recommended by the Superintendent based, generally, upon hardship, professional and interpersonal relationships with fellow teachers, personality conflicts, administrative necessities and other considerations which the Superintendent felt were in the best interest of the school system and the students on a case by case basis. There was no written policy for such involuntary transfers. -13- "Subsequent to court ordered desegregation, transfers were necessiated to effect the orderly reassignment of teachers, principals and staff to effect a unitary school system, which reassign ments were further necessitated by the permanent closing of Stevens Elementary School. "No policies have been reduced to writing inasmuch as all involuntary transfers are handled in strict conformity with the orders as set forth in the case of United States v. Wakula County School District, et al, Case No. 1616-1971, U.S District Court, Northern District of Florida."* *This case has previously been referred to in this brief as United States v. Gadsden County School District. Should the Plaintiff complain that these standards were not within the requirement of Singleton, supra, and that he was incorrectly chosen as the elementary school principal to be demoted as a result of the 1970 Desegregation Order, the Defendants would like to direct the Court to the language of the court in Gay v. Wheeler, 363 F. Supp. 764, 782 (S.D. Tex., 1973). "What constituted professional competence or incompetence has no easily ascertainable boundar ies. What objective criteria are appropriate and necessary to judge professional competence or incompetence is likewise incapable of exact delineation. In most desegregation cases, courts have used the word "objective" to mean non-- arbitrary, non-capricious and racially non- discriminatory. The District's evaluative system viewed from this stance, was clearly objective in that it was developed and administered free of bad faith, improper motive or racial motivation. The Court concludes, therefore, that the method of evaluation and comparison used by the District was fairly conducted by qualified professionals acting in a professional manner, who were not motivated or influenced by‘impermissible racial considerations. Smith v. Board of Public Instruction of Pinellas County, 438 F .2d 1209, 1210 (5th Cir., 1971) . -14- In the present case, the District Court found that the transfer of the Plaintiff was not racially motivated in addition to its finding of no pattern or practice of racial discrimination by the Defendants. These findings read in light of the policy set forth in Gay v. Wheeler, supra, compel the conclusion that the School Board's decision to re-assign the Plaintiff from his elementary school principalship as a result of the 1970 school desegregation order should stand. If this is not done, Defendants suggest that the pre cedent established by this case will allow administrators or teachers, white or black, to come to Federal Court claim ing jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment, prove no racial discrimination and yet prevail if the Court is inclined to second guess or otherwise re-evaluate a transfer by a local school board of any given teacher or administrator. If it stands, the net effect of this decision is to allow Federal Courts to hear teacher employment suits whether racial discrimination is involved or not. -15- POINT III DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES? Defendants question under what authority the District Court has granted the Plaintiff an award of attorney's fees. Since the school board is not a proper party Defendant against whom an action may be brought under Section 1981, 1983, or 1985 of Title 42 U,S,C., see Adkins v, Duval County School Board, supra, and racial discrimination was not proved eliminating a Fourteenth Amendment cause of action, does the District Court's Order mean that attorney's fees will be assessed against the individual members of the School Board? Plaintiff's attorney has obtained injunctive relief for Witt Campbell allowing him‘elementary school principalship « which Defendants contend is an improper remedy not justified by the evidence. Plaintiff's attorney failed to obtain class action relief for the other Plaintiffs originally named in this suit. Plaintiff's attorney failed to prove a pattern or practice of racial discrimination, Plaintiff's attorney presented a multitude statistical evidence, much of it obtained from Defendants as a result of pre-trial discovery. A considerable amount of the evidence -16- collected by Plaintiff was of little weight in the prosecution of Plaintiff, Witt Campbell's case; but the presentation of such evidence required Defendants to answer it, and placed large burdens of time and expense on Defendants, which will have to be borne by the elected members of the Gadsden County School Board as individuals and the Superintendent M.D. Walker of Gadsden County School Board. The facts do not lend themselves to the finding of unreasonableness and obstinancy on the part of the Defendants that supports an award of attorney's fees, Johnson v. Combs, 471 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1972), and therefore Defendants request this Court to reverse the award of attorney's fees. -17- CONCLUSION Defendants contend that in the interest of fairness to all concerned, this case should be reconsidered at the trial level to determine the advisability of entering an order mandating the school board to offer Witt Campbell an elementary school principalship for the commencement of the 1975-1976 school year under Singleton Standards. Bassett v. Atlanta ... Independent School District, 485 F.2d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 1973). Respectfully submitted A Tallahassee, Florida ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS- APPELLANTS CROSS APPELLEES -18- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was furnished by mail to Kent Spriggs, 324 West College Avenue, Tallahassee, Florida; Jack Greenberg, 10 Columbus Circle, New York, N.Y., and Richard Gardner, The Quincy n iiState Bank Building, Quincy, Florida, this / day of July, 1975. -19 A. B. LETTER SERVICE, 327 RUE CHARTRES NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA INC. 70130