Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Local 638 Brief Amici Curiae

    95-6047(L)
95-6049

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and City of New Y ork.

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

Local 638, Etc.,

Defendant.

Local 28. Sheet Metal and A ir Conditioning Contractors’ A ssociation of New 
York City. Inc., and the Sheet Metal and A ir Conditioning Contractors’ 

Association of Long Island, Inc., (Collectively the "Contractors’ 
Associations") and Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association Local

Union No. 28 ("Local 28"),

Defendants-Appellants.

On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York

BRIEF OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., AND 
THE PUERTO RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., AS AMICI 

CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

Juan A. Figueroa 
Kenneth Kimmerling 

99 Hudson Street 
Fourteenth Floor 
New York. N Y  10013 
(212) 219-3360

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Puerto Rican 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.

Elaine R. Jones 
Director-Counsel

Theodore M. Shaw 
Norman J. Chachkin 
Charles Stephen Ralston 

99 Hudson Street 
Sixteenth Floor 
New York, N Y  10013 

- (212)219-1900
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.



TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE ................................. 1

ARGUMENT .......................................................  3

I. THE REMEDIAL POWERS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS TO
CORRECT ENTRENCHED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION HAVE 
NOT BEEN UNDERMINED BY RECENT DECISIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT................ .. 3

A. The Decision in Adarand v. Pena Reaffirmed the
Remedial Powers of the Federal Courts.......... 3

B. The Court Below Applied The Proper Legal
Standard Regarding Race-Conscious Remedies. . 4

II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S REMEDIAL ORDERS WERE 
APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE 
AND AN END TO THE DISCRIMINATORY ACTIONS OF THE
UNION.................................................  6

A. Hiring Hall and Work Sharing Remedies........... 6

B. The Alteration of the 29.33% Goal................. 11
C O N C L U S I O N ........................................................

CERTIFICATE OF S E R V I C E ..... d

l



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Pages:

Adarand Constructors v. Pena, U.S. , 63 U.S.L.W. 4523
(June 12, 1995) .....................................  3_5; 12

Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. EEOC
478 U.S. 421 (1986) ........................  2, 4, 5, 8, 11

Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1962) ............... 7

Patterson v. NMDU, 13 F.3rd 33 (2nd Cir. 1993) .............  12

Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940)............................... 7

United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) .............  3-5

Statute: Pages •
§ 706(g), Civil Rights Act of 1964  5

Other Authority: Pages-

Uchitelle, Louis, "Union Goal of Equality Fails the Test of
Time," New York Times, July 9, 1995, p . 1, p . 18, col. 6 . 13

li



Nos. 95-6047(L) & 95-6049

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND CITY OF NEW YORK,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.

LOCAL 638, ETC.,

Defendant,

LOCAL 28, SHEET METAL AND AIR CONDITIONING CONTRACTORS' 
ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK CITY, INC., AND THE SHEET METAL AND AIR 

CONDITIONING CONTRACTORS' ASSOCIATION OF LONG ISLAND, INC., 
(COLLECTIVELY THE "CONTRACTORS' ASSOCIATIONS") AND SHEET METAL 
WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION LOCAL UNION NO. 28 ("LOCAL

28") ,

Defendants-Appellants.

On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York

BRIEF OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., AND 
THE PUERTO RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC.,

AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE*

The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., is a non­

profit corporation organized under the laws of the State of New 

York. It was formed to assist African-American citizens to secure 

their rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States. 

For many years, Legal Defense Fund attorneys have represented 

parties in litigation before the Supreme Court of the United States

All the parties to this appeal have given their written
consent to the filing of this brief pursuant to Rule 29, F R App Proc. • • t't' ■



and other federal and state courts in cases involving a variety of 

race discrimination and remedial issues, including many cases 

involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the post- 

Civil War Civil Rights Acts. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , 401 U.S. 424 
(1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Franks v. Bowman 

Transportation C o ., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385

(986); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union , 491 U.S. 164 (1989).

The Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.,

(PRLDEF) is a national civil rights litigation organization founded 

in 1972. Its mission is to further and protect the civil rights of 

Puerto Ricans and other Latinos. PRLDEF has brought many lawsuits 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and obtained 

affirmative race conscious relief. Its efforts to enforce Title 

VII will be hampered if such relief cannot be enforced against 
recalcitrant defendants.

Because of their long-standing involvement and expertise in 

employment discrimination cases, amici, who joined in filing a 

brief amici curiae in the United States Supreme Court in the 

present case (Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. EEO C , 478 

U.S. 421 (1986)), believe that their views will be of assistance to 

the Court in resolving the issues raised in this appeal.

2



ARGUMENT
I.THE REMEDIAL POWERS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS TO CORRECT ENTRENCHED 

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION HAVE NOT BEEN UNDERMINED BY RECENT 
DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.

A. The Decision in Adarand v. Pena Reaffirmed the Remedial Powers o f the Federal Courts.

The defendants and their amicus argue that the district

court's decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent

decision in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, ___ U.S. , 63 U.S.L.W. 4523

(June 12, 1995) because Adarand casts doubt on the court's power ..to
order the relief that was granted. This is a misreading of Adarand

which, in fact, reaffirmed the remedial powers of federal courts in
cases in which discrimination has been established.

The Supreme Court specifically disavowed the proposition that

the standard of strict scrutiny was fatal to race-conscious
remedies. Justice O'Connor, speaking for the Court, stated:

The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the 
lingering effects of racial discrimination against 
minority groups in this country is an unfortunate 
reality, and government is not disqualified from acting 
in response to it. As recently as 1987, for example, 
every Justice of this Court agreed that the Alabama 
Department of Public Safety's "pervasive, systematic, and 
obstinate discriminatory conduct" justified a narrowly 
tailored race-based remedy. See United States v. Paradise 480 
U.S. [149 (1987)] . . . .

63 U.S.L.W. at 4533.

The Court's citation to Paradise is particularly significant 
here, since Paradise is directly analogous to the present case. As 

in Paradise, the defendant union had a long history of almost total 

exclusion of minority workers from the jobs at issue and has had a 

subsequent history of intransigent resistance to court orders 

designed to eliminate the continuing effects of the union's

3



discriminatory conduct. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 186

(Powell, J., concurring)("In many respects this case is similar to
• •

Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC . . . .  Here, as in that case, racial 

discrimination had been continued for many years in contravention 

of repeated decisions of the District Court.") In both cases, "the 

District Court unquestionably had the authority to fashion a remedy 

designed to end the [defendant's] egregious history of 
discrimination." Id. at 196 (O'Connor, Jr., dissenting).

B. The Court Below Applied The Proper Legal Standard Regarding Race-Conscious Remedies.

In both Local 28 (478 U.S. at 480) and Paradise (480 U.S. at 166- 

67), Justice Brennan for the plurality acknowledged that the 

Supreme Court had not agreed on the standard to be applied in 

analyzing the constitutionality of race-conscious remedial 

measures. In both cases, however, the Court held that even under

the most stringent standard, that of strict scrutiny, the remedies 

ordered in those cases were valid since they were narrowly tailored 

to serve the compelling governmental purpose of remedying proven 

racial discrimination. See 478 U.S. at 480 and 480 U.S. at 167.

Adarand resolved the issue by holding that race-conscious 

remedial programs required by the federal government must indeed 

meet strict scrutiny. At the same time, the Court reaffirmed that 

"When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling 

interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it 

satisfies the 'narrow tailoring' test this Court has set out in 

previous cases." 63U.S.L.W, at 4533 . Thus, in Local 28 and Paradise, 
the dispute in the Supreme Court was not over the standard to be

4



applied, but whether the "narrowly tailored" requirement inherent 

in the strict scrutiny standard had been met.1

The District Court here noted specifically that, as of the 

date of its decision, "Race-based court orders are subject to an 

elevated level of scrutiny, but the Supreme Court has not 

established a consistent standard for these cases, " citing the 

passage from Paradise we have cited above. (Amended and Corrected 

Opinion, p. 73.) The District Court further noted the 

contradictory decisions of the Supreme Court following Paradise. 

{Id.) The court below then took exactly the same approach as the 

plurality in both Local 28 and Paradise did, and held that "whatever 

the standard" the relief it granted "passes constitutional muster 

because it serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly 

tailored to meet that standard." {Id .) Thus, the District Court's 

decision is fully consistent with Adarand, and the only issue is 

whether the relief ordered is narrowly tailored to meet the 

compelling governmental interest in eradicating, once and for all, 

the persistent and egregious discrimination and contemptuous 
behavior that Local 28 has engaged in.2

Local 28 involved another issue, whether persons who were not 
themselves the victims of discrimination can receive affirmative 
relief under § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The 
majority's holding that § 706(g) did not bar such relief has not 
been disturbed by any later decisions of the Supreme Court, and 
remains the law of the case here.

2It should be noted that neither the hiring hall nor the work­
sharing remedies are, on their face, race specific; that is, they 
apply to all union members. Thus, it is arguable that the standard 
to be applied to them is that of abuse of discretion. See Local 28 
Sheet Metal Workers v. E E O C , 478 U.S. 421, 482 (1986). However, we 
recognize that both remedies have their origin in other, race- 
specific remedies, the membership goal and the white-nonwhite 
apprenticeship program ratios that'increased the number of minority

5



THE DISTRICT COURT'S REMEDIAL ORDERS WERE APPROPRIATE AND 
NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE AND AN END TO THE 

DISCRIMINATORY ACTIONS OF THE UNION.
Amici will not discuss the factual bases for the order of the 

District Court, except to express their conviction that they are 

well grounded in the record. Here, we will address the 

appropriateness of certain of the additional relief ordered in 

light of the continuing pattern of violations of the orders of the 
lower court and of Title VII.3

II.

A. Hiring Hall and Work Sharing Remedies.

The District Court found that, although the number of minority 

apprentices had increased, the number of minority journeymen 

remained low. The consequence of this pattern was to defeat the 

ultimate purpose of the litigation and the court's orders, viz., to 

eradicate the vestiges of the past discrimination that had excluded 

minority workers from participation in the industry. The court, 

therefore, took into account two obstacles to the achievement of 

that purpose: (1) discriminatory practices of the union that

minimized employment opportunities for minority workers after they 

had finished the apprenticeship program; and (2) the existence of 

fewer work opportunities in the industry because of recent economic

members overall. The purpose of the hiring hall and the work­
sharing remedies is to increase work opportunities for the new 
minority union members.

3By focusing on some of the more important aspects of the 
District Court s order we do not mean to suggest in any way that 
other aspects of the relief ordered (e.g., back pay and attorneys' 
fees) were in any way inappropriate, and we fully support the 
Plaintiffs-Appellees' defense of those remedies.

6



trends.

With regard to the hiring hall remedy, its clear purpose is to 

ensure that work is equitably and non-discriminatorily distributed 

so that minority journe'ypersons can, at long last, receive a fair 

share of the available work. Through a properly-administered 

hiring hall system accurate records of work referrals will be 

possible for the first time. Moreover, union members will have the 

opportunity to obtain work free of not only the discriminatory 

actions of the union, but also of the biases of employers who, as 

the District Court found, consistently hire workers known to them.4 

This practice has a discriminatory impact on minority journeymen 

since they are disproportionately new union members, with less on- 

the-job experience (and consequent exposure to employers), because 

of the effects of prior discriminatory policies. The existing 

system, of employers hiring workers already known to them, 

grandfathered in and continued the effect of past discriminatory 

practices, and the District Court had to correct those effects if 

the legacy of discrimination was to be eradicated.5

Any deleterious effect of the hiring hall on employers is at 

best speculative and tangential. The court's order provides that

4Amended and Corrected Opinion, p. 95.

5See, e.g., Meredith v. Fa ir, 298 F.2d 696, 701-02 (5th Cir.
1962)(requirement that applicants for admission to the University 
of Mississippi submit recommendations from alumni discriminated 
against^ African Americans because of prior history of racial 
discrimination). The discriminatory impact of employers hiring 
workers already known them is strikingly similar to the so-called 
"key-man" system for selecting jurors. See, e.g, Smith v. Texas, 311 u.S. 
128, 132 (1940)("Where jury commissioners limit those from whom
grand juries are selected to their own personal acquaintance, 
discrimination can arise from commissioners who know no negroes as 
well as from commissioners who know but eliminate them.")

7



an employer may specify workers who have special skills if that is 

needed.6 Moreover, the use of hiring halls is a common practice 

in the industry outside of New York, with no documented injury to 
the work that is done.7

Further, the Collective Bargaining Agreements under which the 

industry has operated at least since 1972 have themselves 

restricted any purported freedom of covered employers to select 

whomever they wish as employees.8 Thus, employers must require 

employees to join the union,-9 certain categories of work cannot be 

subcontracted out at all or must be subcontracted to employers 

within the collective bargaining unit;10 and if there is shift work 

outside of the regular workday, the employer must use union members 
who did not work during normal working hours.11

In short, the hiring hall provision is consistent with the 

general provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement that the 

union "agrees to furnish at all time to the Employer, duly 

qualified journeyperson sheet metal workers and registered 

apprentices" in sufficient number to meet the employer's work

6Amended and Corrected Opinion, p. 70.

7See Amended and Corrected Opinion, p p . 96-97.

8Counsel for amici have reviewed the Collective Bargaining 
Agreements that have been in effect between Local 28 and the 
defendant contractors' associations from 1972 to the present.

Collective Bargaining Agreement, Local 28 and Sheet Metal and 
Air Conditioning Contractors' Association, 1972-75; 1981-84- 1984- 
87; 1990-93; 1994-96.

'°E-g., Article IV, § 2, Collective Bargaining Agreement, 1984-8 V .

uE.g., Article IX, Collective Bargaining Agreements of 1984-87- 
1990-93; 1994-96.

8



requirements.12 The hiring hall simply provides a mechanism to 

carry out this requirement in a way that will avoid the prior 

discriminatory practices that have denied minority workers equal 
employment opportunities.

Although the defendants-appellants have sought to present the 

hiring hall and work-sharing provisions as inextricably 

intertwined, they are in fact independent remedies. Thus, if the 

operation of the hiring hall results in the fair and non- 

discriminatory allocation of work opportunities, work sharing will 

not be necessary.13 Even if work sharing does go into operation, 

however, its impact on both employers and non-minority journeymen 

will be minimal. In short, the remedy is narrowly tailored to 

remedy the continuing discriminatory effects of the past patterns 
of racial discrimination.

First, the work-sharing provision is on its face race-neutral. 

That is, it is not in the form of a quota, or goal, that 

distributes benefits explicitly on the basis of race. Second, if 

the provision does have a racial impact in that it affects white 

journeymen disproportionately, that impact will itself be the 

natural consequence of the history of racial discrimination and its 

current perpetuation. That is, it is only those workers who work 

more than 1,200 or 1,680 hours in a year (a number that the 

District Court has found to be small) who will be temporarily laid 

off and sent back to the hiring hall. But those workers begin at

12 •Article V, § 1, Collective Bargaining Agreements of 1981-84- 
1984-87; 1990-93; 1994-96; Article III, Collective Bargaining
Agreement of 1972-75.

13Amended and Corrected Opinion, p. 76.

9



an advantage because they have been preferred for work, and they

obtained that advantage because of the racially discriminatory
• •

policies of the union.

Third, the impact on white workers will be small because there 

are few workers who work as much as 1,200 hours to begin with. 

Moreover, as the District Court pointed out, these workers will not 

permanently lose their jobs, but will simply return to the hiring 

hall to be allocated work on a fair and non-discriminatory basis.14

Finally, the work-share provision is consistent with other 

practices in the industry that are designed to spread limited work 

between union members during times of high unemployment. Thus, 

since 1980, the Collective Bargaining Agreement has contained a 

"shift work" provision whose purpose is to distribute employment 

equitably when unemployment has created hardship. The shift work 

provision mandates that if shifts outside of the regular work day 

are required, union members who did not work during that work day 

be employed.15 Similarly, a Target Work agreement was instituted 

as an amendment to the 1987-90 Collective Bargaining Agreement 

whereby during periods of unemployment, no union member may work 

more than 910 hours per twelve-month period in certain publicly- 

funded projects. After working for that period, an employee must 

be laid off and an employee who has worked less than 910 hours 
hired in his or her place.16

14Amended and Corrected Opinion, p. 84.

15E-g-, Article IX, Collective Bargaining Agreement for 1990-93.

16We do not mean to suggest that the Target Agreement itself 
would be adequate to provide equitable employment opportunities. 
As the District Court noted, the Target Agreement permits employers

10



As the District Court held, the propriety of the relief 

ordered depends on the extent to which expectations of non-minority 

workers may be affected by it. Those expectations, in turn, must 

be assessed in the context of the traditional industry practices 

embodied in the Collective Bargaining Agreements as described 

above, and the uncertainties of work caused by frequent layoffs, 

the level of construction, and so on. The District Court, based on 

its long experience with the industry, found that these 

considerations led to the conclusion that the hiring hall and work­

sharing provisions did not unduly trammel those expectations, and 
we urge that this conclusion was correct.17

B. The Alteration o f the 29.33% Goal.

Finally, the defendants-appellants argue that the District 
Court was without power to alter the 29.33% goal for minority 

representation in the industry, and rely primarily on Patterson v. 
N M D U , 13 F.3rd 33 (2nd Cir. 1993) for that proposition. This

reliance is misplaced. In Patterson the District Court held that 

achieving the 25% goal there was the central purpose of the Consent

to pay rates substantially less than current Local 28 pay scales. 
Furnishing underemployed minority workers the opportunity to work 
at lower pay than white workers is hardly a substitute for 
providing true equal employment opportunity. See, Opinion of 
District Court, p. 91, n. 14.

If this Court is of the view that the work-share provision 
presents problems because it might unduly trammel the expectations 
of non-minority union members, an appropriate remedy would be to 
remand that part of the order to the District Court to require the 
defendants to attempt to negotiate and implement an alternative 
work-share agreement that would accomplish the goal of ensuring 
equal opportunity to all union members without unduly affecting the 
expectations of long-term workers.'

11



Decree, since it corrected the great imbalance in the work force 

that was the central reason for the decree itself; this Court 
affirmed that conclusion.

This case presents a far different factual context; here, 

there has been a long and consistent pattern of union intransigence 

and findings of contempt. The 29.33% goal was instituted as a 

means to measure the union's adherence to the orders of the court 

in the face of this history of recalcitrance. The modification of 

the goal by the District Court was not simply to adjust to changing 

demographics that resulted independently of any actions of the 

union defendant, but to take into account the alteration in the 
labor market caused by the splitting off of part of the union 

itself. Without an appropriate adjustment in the goal, its use as 

a measure of compliance would be doubtful indeed.

CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court was at pains to point out in Adarand both 

"the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination 

against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality," 

and this case presents stark proof of the accuracy of the Court's 

observation. The battle against discrimination in the construction 

industry in particular has been long and arduous and, 

unfortunately, is not over. It is simply not time to abandon 

carefully crafted and narrowly drawn measures to end, once and for 

3-111 such discrimination. Here, the inability of minority workers 

to obtain true equality of opportunity is the result of biases both 

against them and in favor of white workers who had the opportunity

12



to work when minorities were frozen out of the industry on account

of their race.18 The efforts of the District Court to achieve full 

equality should be affirmed by this Court.

spectfully submitt

Elaine R. Jones 
Director-Counsel

Theodore M. Shaw 
Norman J. Chachkin 
Charles Stephen Ralston 

99 Hudson Street 
Sixteenth Floor 
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 219-1900

Attorneys fo r Amicus Curiae NAAC P Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.

Juan A. Figueroa 
Kenneth Kimmerling 

99 Hudson Street 
Fourteenth Floor 
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 219-3360

Attorneys fo r Amicus Curiae Puerto Rican 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.

18A recent article in the New York Times on the "Philadelphia 
Plan" demonstrates that this problem is not limited to the 
construction industry in New York. There, a white foreman explains 
why, when he is able to bypass the union hiring hall, he invariably 
calls white workers:

They are the people I know best. . . .  I would not want 
to trade shoes with Mike [an African-American union 
member], even if he were more skilled than I am, because 
I know it would be harder.

"Union Goal of Equality Fails the Test of Time, " by Louis 
Uchitelle, New York Times, July 9, L995, p. 1, p. 18, col. 6.

13



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing BRIEF AMICI 

CURIAE, have been served by depositing same in the United States 

mail, first class postage prepaid (Priority Mail), on this 17th of 
July, 1995, addressed to the following:

WILLIAM ROTHBERG, ESQ.
16 Court Street 
Suite 2202 
Brooklyn, NY 11241

KAREN M. MORAN, ESQ.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION
Office of General Counsel 
1801 L Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20507

JAMIE K. NICASTRI, ESQ. 
EDMUND P. D 'ELIA, P.C. 
20 Exchange Place 
New York, NY 10005

MARTIN R. GOLD, ESQ. 
GOLD, FARRELL & MARKS 
41 Madison Avenue 
New York, NY 10010

PAUL CROTTY, ESQ.
CORPORATION COUNSEL 
ELIZABETH S. NATRILLA 
ASSISTANT CORPORATION COUNSEL 
HILARY B. KLEIN, ESQ. 
ASSISTANT CORPORATION COUNSEL 
NEW YORK CITY LAW DEPARTMENT 
100 Church Street 
New York, NY 10007

DAVID RAFF, ESQ.
RAFF Sc BECKER
49-51 Chambers Street
Suite 220
New York, NY 10007

CHARLES J. COOPER, ESQ. 
SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & 
TROWBRIDGE 
2300 N Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20037-1128

ANGIE MARTEL, ESQ.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF NEW YORK LAW
DEPARTMENT
Civil Rights Bureau
120 Broadway, 23rd Floor
New York, NY 10271

JUDY SANDLER, ESQ.
SMACNA OF LONG ISLAND, INC. 
Suite 314
315 Walt Whitman Road 
Huntington Station, NY 11746

14*