NAACP v. Alabama Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama

    IN  THE

d m tr t c f tljp Minted S ta te s
October Term, 1956 

No.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCE­
MENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, a Corporation,

v.
Petitioner,

STATE OF ALABAMA, ex ret. JOHN PATTERSON, 
Attorney General.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAM A

R obert L. Carter,
20 West 40th Street,
New York, N. Y.

T hurgood M arshall,
107 West 43rd Street,
New York, N. Y.

A rthur D. S hores,
1630 Fourth Avenue, North, 
Birmingham, Alabama

Attorneys for Petitioner
F red D. Gray,

113 Monroe Street,
Montgomery, Alabama, 

of Counsel.



INDEX TO PETITION

PAGE

Opinion B e low ................................................................  1

Jurisdiction .....................................................................  2
How the Federal Questions Were Presented........ 2
How the Federal Questions Were Disposed Of . . . .  3

Questions Presented......................................................  4

Statement of the C ase .................................................... 5

Reasons for Allowance of the W r it ................................ 13
I—The Judgment Below, While Appearing To 

Be Based Upon State Procedural Grounds, Is 
Nevertheless Re viewable By This C ou rt___  13

II—In Refusing To Produce The Names and 
Addresses Of Its Members Petitioner Was 
Exercising Rights Guaranteed By The Four­
teenth Amendment............................................  17
A. The Order to Produce the Membership

Lists Was Made at a Time when Elected 
Officials and Private Individuals in Ala­
bama Had Demonstrated Their Deter­
mination to Thwart All Efforts toward 
Compliance with This Court’s Decisions 
Invalidating Racial Segregation and to 
Subject All Who Sought Compliance to 
Economic Pressures, Mental Harassment, 
Threats and V iolence.................................  19

B. The Action of the Court Below, Consti­
tuted an Unconstitutional Encroachment 
by the State of Alabama upon First 
Amendment Rights of Petitioner and Its 
Members ....................................................... 25



u

III— The Rights Asserted By Petitioner And De­

nied By The Courts Below Are Of Great Gen­
eral Importance Which It Is In The Public 
Interest To Have Decided By This Court . . .  31

Conclusion ....................................................................... 35

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabam a................ la
Judgment of the C ou rt.................................................. 9a
Orders and Decrees of the Circuit C ou rt...................  10a
The Montgomery Advertiser, Monday, March 4, 1957 19a

PAGE



I l l

Table of Cases

Adkins v. The School Board of the City of Newport 
News, — F. Supp. — (E. D. Va., decided January
11, 1957) ......................................................................

American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 
384, 402 ........................................................................

PAGE

33

27

Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 .............................  30
Beauliarnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 262-263 .......... 28
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 6 1 6 .........................  25
Brewer v. Hoxie School District, 238 F. 2d 91, 105

(8th Cir. 1956) ............................................................  30
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S.

673, 681-682 ..................................................................  4,13
Broad River Power Company ex rel. Daniel, 281 U. S.

537 ................................................................................ 13
Browder v. Cayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M. D. Ala. 1956),

aff’d 1 L. Ed. 2d 114 ................................................... 22
Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 ..................... 18, 27, 29
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 138 F. Supp.

336, 337 (E. D. La. 1956), writ of mandamus de­
nied, 351 U. S. 948 (1956), aff’d, — F. 2d — (5th 
Cir., decided March 1, 1957).....................................  32

Carson v. Board of Education of McDowell County,
227 F. 2d 789 (4th Cir., 1955)...................................  33

Carson v. Warlick, 238 F. 2d 724 (4th Cir., 1956) . . .  33
Corte v. State, 259 Ala. 536, 67 So. 2d 786 (1953) . . .  23
Cox v. Lermon, 233 Ala. 58, 169 So. 724 (1936 )........ 23

Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U. S. 2 2 ...................................  4,14
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 .............................  26, 27
Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 199 ...................  4,13
Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306, 308-309 ...................  4,13

Erie R. Co. v. Purdy, 185 U. S’. 148, 154 .................... 13
Ex parte Bahakel, 246 Ala. 527, 21 So. 2d 619 (1945) 16



IV

Ex parte Blakey, 240 Ala. 517,199 So. 857 (1941) . . .  4,15
Ex parte Boscowitz, 84 Ala. 463, 4 So. 279 (1888) . . .  4,15
Ex parte Dickens, 162 Ala. 272, 50 So. 218 (1909) . . .  4,14

PAGE

Ex parte Driver, 255 Ala. 118, 50 So. 2d 413 (1951) ..  16
Ex parte Farrell, 234 Ala. 498, 175 So. 277 (1937) . . .  16
Ex parte Frenkel, 17 Ala. App. 563, 98 So. 878

(1920) ........................................................................... 16
Ex parte Hart, 240 Ala. 642, 200 So. 783 (1941) . . . .  16
Ex parte Hill, 229 Ala. 501, 158 So. 531 (1935 )........  25
Ex parte King, 263 Ala. 487, 83 So. 2d 241 (1955) . . .  25
Ex parte Morris, 252 Ala. 557, 42 So. 2d 17 (1944) . .4,15,16 
Ex parte National Association for the Advancement 

of Colored People, a Corporation: In re State of 
Alabama ex rel. John Patterson, A tt’y. Gen. v. 
National Association for the Advancement of Col­
ored People, 91 So. 2d (Adv. p. 2 2 0 )..................... 3,11,14

Ex parte National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People, a Corporation: In re State of 
Alabama, ex rel. John Patterson, A tt’y- Gen. v. 
National Association for the Advancement of Col­
ored People, 91 So. 2d (Adv. p. 2 2 1 )..................... 3,12,14

Ex parte Rice, 258 Ala. 132, 61 So. 2d 7 (1952 )........ 16
Ex parte Sellers, 250 Ala. 87, 33 So. 2d 349 (1948) . . .  4,15
Ex parte Weissinger, 247 Ala. 113, 22 So. 2d 510

(1945) ...........................................................................  16
Ex parte Wheeler, Judge, 231 Ala. 356, 358, 165 So.

74 (1935) ......................................................................  4,15

Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co.,
264 U. S. 298 ..............................................................  25

Francis v. Scott, 260 Ala. 590, 72 So. 2d 93 (1954) ..  24

Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U. S. 233
18, 26, 27, 29, 30

Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 4 3 .........................................
Herman v. Watt, 233 Ala. 29, 169 So. 704 (1936) . . .

25
23



V

Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U. S.
460, 464 ........................................................................ 30

Hunter v. Parkman, 250 Ala. 312, 34 So. 2d 211 (1948) 23

International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 
U. S. 215, 233 ..............................................................  30

Jacoby v. Goetter Weil Co., 74 Ala. 427 (1883 )........  18, 24
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,

341 U. S. 123 ..............................................................  28, 30

Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 .............................  27

Lawrence v. State Tax Commission of Mississippi,
286 U. S. 276, 282 ..................................................  4,13,14

Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. National Associa­
tion for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc.,
unreported, (La. App. First Cir.) .......................  34

Louisiana ex rel. LeBlanc v. Lewis, unreported No.
55899 (D. C., 19th Jud. D is t .) ...................................  34

Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 4 4 .........................  27
Ludley v. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U. and Agri­

cultural and Mechanical College, etc. (Civil Actions 
No. 1833, 1836, 1837, E. D. La., 1956) .................. 33

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 1 0 5 ...................  27

National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. U. S., 319 U. S.
190.................................................................................. 18, 29

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 ...............................  30
New York Central v. New York and Penn. Co., 271

U. S. 124 .......................................................................  13
New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63 29
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 .........................  27

Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S.
186

PAGE

25



VI

Patton v. Robison, 253 Ala. 248, 44 So. 2d 254 (1950) 24
Pennekamp and the Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.

Florida, 328 U. S. 331 ................................................  18, 29
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 5 1 0 ..............18, 29, 30

Riley v. Bradley, 252 Ala. 282, 41 So. 2d 641 (1941) ..  23
Roby v. Colehour, 146 U. S. 153, 159-160 .................... 13
Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226 ...............................  4,13

Sheldon v. Sheldon, 238 Ala. 489,192 So. 55 (1939) . 23, 24
Shiland v. Retail Clerks, Local 1657, 259 Ala. 277,

66 So. 2d 146 (1953) ................................................... 24

Texas v. National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People, etc., No. 56-649 pending (D. C.
7th Jud. Dist.) ............................................................  34

Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 ....................... 18,26, 27,28
Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 314 U. S. 252 ..  18, 29 
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 3 3 .........................................  29

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S.
144, 152 ........................................................................  34

United States v. C. I. O., 335 U. S. 106, 143-144 ........  28
United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 6 1 2 ...................... 27
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632 ........  25
United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 4 1 .......................  18, 27
United States v. United Mineworkers of America, 330

U. S. 258 ......................................................................  24
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 1 6 3 .................................  13

Ward v. Love County, 253 U. S. 1 7 .............................  13
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,

319 U. S. 624, 641 ......................................................... 35
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 ...........................  27
Williams v. Georgia, 349 U. S. 375 ..................... 4,13,14,17
Williams v. National Association for the Advance­

ment of Colored People, Inc., unreported, No. 
A-58654 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County, G a .) .................. 34

PAGE



vu

Statutes

Title 7, Section 1061, Alabama Code of 1940 .............. 23
Title 7, Section 757, Alabama Code of 1940 .............. 24
Title 10, Sections 194-196, Alabama Code of 1940 . . .  23
Title 13, Section 143, Alabama Code of 1940 ............ 24

Other Authorities

Ashmore, “ The Negro and the Schools 30, 35, 38, 73,
97, 124, 131 (1954) ....................................................  26

Johnson, “ Racial Integration in Southern Higher
Education,”  34 Social Forces 309-12 (1956 ).......... 31

Montgomery Advertiser, “ Off The Beach” , March 4,
1957 (Appendix C) ..................................................  22

“ Private Attorneys-General: Group Action in the
Fight for Civil Liberties,”  58 Yale L. J. 574 (1949) 26

1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 237 (1956) ..............................  32
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 239 (1956) .............................. 32
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 240 (1956) ..............................  33
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 241 (1956 )..............................  33
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 421, 418, 426, 420, 424, 450 (1956) 32
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 422, 449, 592 (1956 )......................  33
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 423 (1956)..............................  33
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 438 (1956) ..............................  32
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 440 (1956) ..............................  32
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 443 (1956) ..............................  32
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 445 (1956) ..............................  32
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 448 (1956) ..............................  33
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 451 (1956) ..............................  34
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 571, 576 (1956)..............................  34
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 586, 588, 730, 731 (1956 )............... 33
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 728, 943, 944, 942, 927, 776 (1956) 33
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 730, 941 (1956 )..............................  33
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 751 (1956 )..............................  34
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 753 (1956 )..............................  32

PAGE



vm

1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 755 (1956) .....................................  33
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 924, 954, 955, 940 (1956) ............. 32
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 928-940 (1956) .............................  33
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 948 (1956).....................................  32
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 958 (1956).....................................  34
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1068 (1956) ...................................  34
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1091-1111 (1956) .........................  33
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1109 (1956) ...................................  33
Robison, J. B., “ Organizations Promoting Civil 

Rights and Liberties” , 275 Annals 18, 20 (1951) 26
Rose, “ The Negro in America”  (1956) .................... 26
Southern School News, Volume I, No. 3, p. 2 ............. 20
Southern School News, Volume I, No. 5, p. 2 ........... 20
Southern School News, Volume I, No. 7, p. 3 ........... 20
Southern School News, Volume II, No. 1. p. 2 ..........  21
Southern School News, Volume II, No. 2, p. 3 ..........  21
Southern School News, Volume II, No. 9, p. 7 ........  21
Southern School News, Volume III, No. 1, p. 10 . . . .  22
Southern School News, Volume III, No. 7, p. 15 . . . .  22
Southern School News, Volume III, No. 9, p. 13 . . . .  22
“ State Control over Political Organizations: First 

Amendment Checks on the Powers of Regulation,”
66 Yale L. J. 545 (1957) ............................................  28

Williams and Ryan, “ Schools in Transition (1954) ..  26
Woodward, “ The Strange Career of Jim Crow”

(1955)

PAGE

26



IN THE

Qlmtrt nf tif? WnxUb States
October Term, 1956 

No.

---------------------- o----------------------
National A ssociation for the A dvancement of 

Colored P eople, a Corporation,
Petitioner,

v.

State of A labama, ex rel. John Patterson, 
Attorney General.

---------------------- o-----------------------

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAM A

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari issue to 
review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama 
entered on December 6, 1956, in the above-entitled cause.

Opinion Below

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama is 
reported at 91 So. 2d (Adv. p. 214) and is printed as Appen­
dix A, infra, page la. The ex parte temporary restrain­
ing order issued by the Circuit Court of Montgomery 
County is printed in Appendix B, infra, page 10a. The 
interlocutory order ordering petitioner to give the Attorney 
General the names and addresses of all of its members in 
Alabama and other documents is printed in Appendix B, 
infra, page 11a. The opinion of the Circuit Court, entered 
on July 25, 1956, adjudging petitioner in contempt and 
affixing a fine of $10,000 as punishment therefor, and a 
supplementary fine of $100,000 if the contempt were not 
purged within 5 days, is printed in Appendix B, infra,



2

page 13a. The order of the Circuit Court of July 31 adjudg­
ing petitioner in further contempt and affixing the fine of 
$100,000 as punishment therefor is printed in Appendix B, 
infra, page 17a.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama was 
entered on December 6, 1956 (R. 30). Jurisdiction of this 
Court is invoked under Title 28, United States Code, Sec­
tion 1257(3), petitioner having asserted in the courts below 
rights, privileges and immunities conferred by the Constitu­
tion and laws of the United States. By order of Mr. Justice 
Black of March 4, 1957, time to file this petition was ex­
tended to and including March 20, 1957.

How the Federal Questions Were Presented

The judgment of which review is sought is the judg­
ment of the Supreme Court of Alabama denying and dis­
missing petitioner’s original petition for writ of certiorari 
seeking to review an adjudication of contempt by the Cir­
cuit Court of Montgomery County.

In substance, the allegations before the Supreme Court 
of Alabama, insofar as pertinent to the jurisdiction of this 
Court, were that petitioner had been denied constitutional 
rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
in that the Circuit Court had issued and enforced by con­
tempt an order that petitioner submit a list of names and 
addresses of its members, officers, employees and agents in 
the State of Alabama, notwithstanding petitioner’s assertion 
and showing that to do so would subject these persons to 
private economic reprisals, loss of public and private em­
ployment, harassment by persons opposed to integration 
of the public schools, intimidation, threats of force and 
actual force (R. 8-10); and in that the judgment of con­
tempt had barred petitioner’s access to Alabama courts to 
litigate its rights to engage in lawful activities in Alabama 
(R. 3, 11-13).



3

Opposition to the motion for petitioner to produce vari­
ous records for the examination of the Attorney General and 
to the order of the Circuit Court granting this motion were 
based on these constitutional grounds (R. 4). After being 
adjudged guilty of contempt, petitioner asserted these 
rights in motions to stay or set aside the contempt order 
tiled in the Circuit Court and in the Supreme Court of 
Alabama (R. 6-10) and in its petitions for writ of certiorari 
filed in the Supreme Court of Alabama (R. 10). The motion 
to dissolve the temporary restraining order and injunction 
and the answer were also based on these grounds (R. 5-6).

How the Federal Questions Were Disposed Of

The Supreme Court of Alabama held that petitioner 
could not raise its constitutional objections on petition for 
writ of certiorari. It denied and dismissed the petition, 
holding that it could quash the order of contempt only if (1) 
the Circuit Court “ lacked jurisdiction of the proceeding,”  or 
(2) “ where on the face of it the order disobeyed was void,”  
or (3) “ where procedural requirements with respect to 
citation of contempt and the like were not observed,”  or (4) 
“ where the fact of contempt is not sustained”  (R. 23-24). 
The court decided that mandamus would have been the 
proper remedy.

But prior to this decision and even in prior proceedings 
in this case,1 certiorari had been recognized by the Supreme 
Court of Alabama as an available remedy to review the 
merits of a contempt action of the type here complained of. 
Ex parte Morris, 252 Ala. 557, 42 So. 2d 17 (1944); Ex parte

1 Ex parte National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, a Corporation: In re State of Alabama ex rel. John Patterson, 
Att’y Gen. v. National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, 91 So. 2d (Adv. p. 220) (on motion for stay) ; Ex parte 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, a 
Corporation: In re State of Alabama, ex rel. John Patterson, Att’y 
Gen. v. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. 
91 So. 2d (Adv. p. 221) (on petition for certiorari).



4

Wheeler, Judge, 231 Ala. 356, 358, 165 So. 74 (1935); Ex 
parte Dickens, 162 Ala. 272, 50 So. 218 (1909); Ex parte 
Boscowitz, 84 Ala. 463, 4. So. 279 (1888); Ex parte Blakey, 
240 Ala. 517, 199 So. 857 (1941); Ex parte Sellers, 250 Ala. 
87, 33 So. 2d 349 (1948).

Although the Supreme Court of Alabama did not ex­
pressly rule upon petitioner’s federal constitutional rights,2 
it nevertheless so disposed of these allegations as to confer 
jurisdiction upon this Court. Actual determination by the 
state court of the federal question in terms is not required. 
Lawrence v. State Tax Commission of Mississippi, 286 
U. S. 276, 282; Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306, 308-309; 
Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 199. Moreover, the 
fact that a decision purports to rest upon state grounds 
does not preclude this Court from deciding whether federal 
constitutional rights were in fact denied. Williams v. 
Georgia, 349 U. S. 375; Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. 
v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 681-682; Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U. S. 
22; Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226.

Questions Presented
I

Whether the refusal of petitioner to produce names and 
addresses of its Alabama members was protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s interdiction against state inter­
ference with First Amendment rights?

I I
Whether the order to produce, the judgment of contempt 

for failure to produce, and the refusal of the Supreme Court 
of Alabama to review and reverse said judgment denied to 
petitioner and its members rights guaranteed by the Four­
teenth Amendment?

2 After deciding not to review the order of the trial court the 
Supreme Court of Alabama did “ discuss” some of the constitutional 
questions involved in the petition. (Appendix A, p. 7a).



5

Statement of the Case

On J une 1, 1956, without notice or opportunity for hear­
ing, the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, 
on the complaint of respondent State of Alabama/' issued a 3

3 The complaint alleged: (1 ) That petitioner, a New York Cor­
poration, maintains its Southeast Regional Office in Birmingham, 
Alabama; (2 ) that petitioner has employed agents to operate this 
office; (3 ) that local chapters of petitioner are organized in the State 
of Alabama; (4 ) that membership dues and contributions for said 
chapters and petitioner are solicited; (5 ) that petitioner had paid 
monies to Autherine Lucy and Polly Myers Hudson to aid them to 
enroll as students at the University of Alabama to test its policy of 
denying entrance to Negroes; (6 ) that petitioner has furnished legal 
counsel to represent Autherine Lucy in her proceedings against the 
University of Alabama; (7 ) that petitioner has supported and 
financed an illegal boycott to compel the Capitol Motor Lines of 
Montgomery, Alabama, to seat passengers without reference to race; 
(8 ) that petitioners’ officers, agents and members have for years 
past and are presently engaged in organizing chapters in the State 
of Alabama, in collecting dues therefor, soliciting contributions and 
expending monies in advancing the aims of petitioner; (9 ) that peti­
tioner has never filed with the Secretary of State a certified copy of 
its Articles of Incorporation and other information required by Title 
10, Sections 192, 193 and 194 of the Code of Alabama, 1940; (10) 
that petitioner has been and continues to do business in the State of 
Alabama and in the County of Montgomery in violation of Article 12, 
Section 232, Constitution of Alabama, 1901, and Section 194, Title 10, 
Code of Alabama, 1940; (11) that petitioner is continuing to do busi­
ness within the state without first having complied with the afore­
said constitutional and statutory provisions and is thereby causing 
irreparable injury to the property and civil rights of the citizens of 
Alabama for which criminal prosecution and civil action at law 
afford no adequate relief.

The state prayed for a temporary injunction enjoining and re­
straining petitioner, its agents and members from further conducting 
its business within the state and organizing chapters and maintaining 
offices within the state; it requested dissolution of all existing chap­
ters of the organization and that upon final hearing the court issue a 
permanent injunction embodying the foregoing and oust petitioner 
from the state (R . 2 ).



6

temporary restraining order and injunction forbidding 
petitioner, its agents and members from conducting any 
business whatsoever within the State of Alabama and from:

“ Soliciting membership in respondent corpora­
tion or any local chapters or subdivisions or wholly 
controlled subsidiaries thereof within the State of 
Alabama.

“ Soliciting contributions for respondent or local 
chapters or subdivisions or wholly controlled sub­
sidiaries thereof within the State of Alabama.

‘ ‘ Collecting membership dues or contributions for 
respondent or local chapters or subdivisions or 
wholly controlled subsidiaries thereof within the 
State of Alabama.”

Although the State did not request it, the court also 
enjoined petitioner from:

‘ ‘ Filing with the Department of Revenue and the 
Secretary of State of the State of Alabama any appli­
cation, paper or document for the purpose of quali­
fying to do business within the State of Alabama 
(App. B, pp. 10a-lla).”

On July 2, 1956, petitioner filed a motion to dissolve 
the temporary restraining order and demurrers to the bill 
of complaint which were set for hearing on July 17. On 
July 5th the State filed a motion to require petitioner to 
produce certain records, letters and papers alleging that 
the examination of the papers was essential to its prepara­
tion for trial (R. 3).

The state’s motion was set for hearing on July 9, 1956. 
After hearing, at which petitioner raised both state and 
federal constitutional objections, the court issued an order 
requiring production of the following items requested in 
the state’s motion:

“ 1. Copies of all charters of branches or chapters 
of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People in the State of Alabama.



7

“ 2. All lists, documents, books and papers show­
ing the names, addresses and dues paid of all pres­
ent members in the State of Alabama of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
Inc. ’ ’

“ 4. All lists, documents, books and papers show­
ing the names, addresses and official position in re­
spondent corporation of all persons in the State of 
Alabama authorized to solicit memberships in and 
contributions to the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, Inc.

“ 5. All files, letters, copies of letters, telegrams 
and other correspondence, dated or occurring within 
the last twelve months next preceding the date of 
filing the petition for injunction, pertaining to or 
between the National Association for the Advance­
ment of Colored People, Inc., and persons, corpora­
tions, associations, groups, chapters and partner­
ships within the State of Alabama.

“ 6. All deeds, bills of sale and any written evi­
dence of ownership of real or personal property by 
the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, Inc., in the State of Alabama.

“ 7. All cancelled checks, bank statements, books, 
payrolls, and copies of leases and agreements, dated 
or occurring within the last twelve months next pre­
ceding the date of filing the petition for injunction, 
pertaining to transactions between the National Asso­
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc., 
and persons, chapters, groups, associations, corpora­
tions and partnerships in the State of Alabama.

“ 8. All papers, books, letters, copies of letters, 
documents, agreements, correspondence and other 
memoranda pertaining to or between the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
Inc. and Autherine Lucy, Autherine Lucy Foster and 
Polly Myers Hudson.”

“ 11. All lists, books and papers showing the 
names and addresses of all officers, agents, servants 
and employees in the State of Alabama of the Na­
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, Inc.”



8

“ 14. All papers, books, letters, copies of letters, 
Hies, documents, agreements, correspondence and 
other memoranda pertaining to or between the Na­
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, Inc., and Aurelia S. Browder, Susie Mc­
Donald, Claudette Colvin, Q. P. Colvin, Mary Louise 
Smith and Prank Smith, or their attorneys, Fred 
D. Gray and Charles D. Langford”  (R. 4, 18-20).

The court then extended the time to produce until July 
24th, and simultaneously postponed the hearing on peti­
tioner’s demurrers and motion to dissolve the ex parte 
temporary injunction to July 25.

On July 23 petitioner tiled its answer on the merits.4 
in addition, petitioner averred that it had procured the

4 Petitioner admitted: (1 ) That it was a New York corporation;
(2)  that it maintained its Southeast Regional Office in Birmingham;
(3) that it hired and employed agents to operate this office; but denied
(4 ) that it had organized local chapters in the state and that agents 
of the Corporation solicited for said local chapters and the parent 
corporation; denied (5 ) that it had employed or paid money to 
Autherine Lucy and Polly Myers Hudson to encourage or aid them 
in enrolling in the University of Alabama; admitted (6 ) furnishing 
legal counsel to assist Autherine Lucy in prosecuting her suit against 
the University of Alabama; admitted (7 ) that it had given moral and 
financial support to Negro residents of Montgomery in connection 
with their refusal to use the public transportation system of Mont­
gomery and had furnished legal counsel to assist Rev. M. L. King 
and other Negroes indicted in connection with that matter, but denied 
all other allegations and inferences contained in that allegation and 
bill of complaint; and denied (8 ) that its officers, agents or employees 
have engaged in organizing chapters for the Corporation in Alabama 
and Montgomery County, collecting dues, soliciting memberships, 
loaning or giving personal property to aid present aims of the cor­
poration; admitted (9 ) that it had never filed with the Secretary of 
State Articles of Incorporation or designated a place of business or 
authorized agents within the State; but denied (10) that it was re­
quired by Sections 192, 193 and 194 of Title 10, Code of Alabama 
to do so. Petitioner denied that it had violated Article 12, Section 
232, Constitution of Alabama, 1901 and Sections 192, 193 and 194, 
Title 10, Code of Alabama, 1940; further petitioner denied (11) 
that its acts were causing irreparable injury to the property and civil 
rights of the residents and citizens of the State of Alabama (R . 5).



9

necessary forms for the registration of a foreign corpora­
tion supplied by the office of the Secretary of State of the 
State of Alabama and filled them in as required. Peti­
tioner attached them to its answer and offered to file same 
if the court would dissolve the order barring petitioner 
from registering (R. 5-6).

At the same tune petitioner filed a motion to set aside 
the order to produce which motion was set down for hearing 
on July 25th. On that date, the court overruled the motion 
to set aside and ordered petitioner to produce the items as 
above stated. Petitioner, realizing that to produce its mem­
bership lists would lead to irreparable harm and being ad­
vised by counsel that the order was arbitrary and unreason­
able and violative of the Constitution and laws of the State 
of Alabama and of the United States, informed the court 
that it was unable to comply with the court’s order. Where­
upon the court at the same hearing found petitioner in 
contempt and assessed a fine of $10,000 against the peti­
tioner as punishment for this contempt.5 * * The court also 
ordered that unless petitioner fully complied with its order 
to produce within five days the fine would be increased to 
$100,000. The motion to dissolve was not heard and all 
proceedings thereon were terminated.

On July 30 petitioner filed in the trial court a motion 
to set aside and/or stay execution of said order pending 
review by the Supreme Court of Alabama and tendered 
substantial compliance.8 However, petitioner asserted that

5 See Appendix B, p. 13a.
« As to paragraph 1 of the state’s motion, petitioner tendered a 

copy o f its standard form of charter stating that it retained no copies 
of charters hut that all charters issued conformed to the tendered
form.

As to paragraph 4 it stated that with the exception of two named 
persons in the State of Alabama those who solicited membership for



1 0

it could not produce the names and addresses of its mem­
bers, as requested in paragraphs 2 and 11 of the state’s 
motion, because it believed in good faith that making these 
available would constitute a waiver of basic constitutional 
rights and would subject said persons to private economic 
reprisals, loss of public and private employment, harass­
ment by persons opposed to the desegregation of public 
schools and to actual physical violence and force. Peti­
tioner tendered in support thereof the affidavit of its execu­
tive secretary and affidavits of members residing in Selma, 
Alabama, whose names had been published as signers of 
a petition requesting the board of education to consider 
desegregating its public schools and, as a result, had been 
discharged from employment. Petitioner also tendered

the Corporation were volunteers and petitioner prescribed no restric­
tion in this regard.

As to paragraph 5 of the state’s motion, petitioner stated that its 
tiles were kept on a subject matter basis, that it receives correspond­
ence at the rate of 50,000 letters per year and that its files are main­
tained for a period of 10 years and that to furnish this information 
would require a search of all these files. But petitioner tendered 
copies of all memoranda to branches which it issued during the twelve 
month period preceding June 1, 1956.

As to paragraph 6, petitioner asserted that it owned no real prop­
erty, that all bills of sale, with the exception o f two which petitioner 
tendered, for purchase of personal property, were in the possession of 
an employee who was on vacation, that the only personal property 
petitioner owned in the State consisted of office equipment and sup­
plies valued at approximately $400.00.

As to paragraph 7, petitioner submitted all cancelled checks, 
payroll checks covering transactions in Alabama, a copy of the lease 
of its office in Alabama and averred that no other agreements existed, 
that it did not maintain a bank account in the State. Petitioner also 
tendered a statement showing all income and expenditures in the 
State.

As to paragraph 8, petitioner submitted all papers, books and let­
ters pertaining to or between it and Autherine Lucy Foster and 
Polly Myers Hudson.

As to paragraph 14 petitioner asserted that it had no such papers.



11

evidence that laws applicable to Macon and Marengo 
counties authorized the boards of education of these 
counties to discharge teachers belonging to organizations 
advocating racial integration, and newspaper clippings 
demonstrating that there were groups operating in the 
State for the express purpose of ruthlessly opposing the 
program and policy advocated by petitioner and its mem­
bers (R. 9-11).

This motion was denied (R. 10, 21), and on the same 
day petitioner filed a motion in the Supreme Court of 
Alabama to stay execution of the judgment below pending- 
review by that court. Argument on this motion was heard 
on July 31, and it was denied that day on the ground 
that no petition for writ of certiorari was before the court. 
The Supreme Court of Alabama held that:

“ It is the established rule of this Court that the 
proper method of reviewing a judgment for civil 
contempt of the kind here involved is by a petition 
for common law writ of certiorari. And this Court 
has through the years felt impelled to grant the writ 
for purposes of review where a reasonable ground 
for its issuance is properly presented in such peti­
tion.

“ But the petitioner here has not applied for writ 
of certiorari, and we do not feel that the petition 
presently before us warrants our interference with 
the judgment of the Circuit Court of Montgomery 
County here sought to be stayed.” 7

While the Supreme Court of Alabama was considering 
petitioner’s application for a stay, the Circuit Court entered 
the order adjudging petitioner in further contempt, increas­
ing the fine to $100,000.00.8

The effect of these orders was not merely to hold peti­
tioner in contempt but to bar a hearing on petitioner’s

7 91 So. 2d (Adv. p. 220).

8 See Appendix B, p. 17a.



1 2

fundamental objections to the temporary restraining order 
and injunction which ousted petitioner from Alabama.

On August 8 petitioner filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari (3 Div. 773) in the Supreme Court of Alabama 
alleging with some detail that the actions of the court below 
had denied petitioner rights conferred by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States and Article 1, Section 8. It was argued on August 
13, 1956, and that same day the Supreme Court of Alabama 
denied the writ with an order which merely stated that 
“ The averments of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari to 
the Montgomery Circuit Court, in Equity, are insufficient 
to grant a Writ of Certiorari.”  9

Thereupon, on August 20, 1956, petitioner filed a more 
detailed petition for writ of certiorari (3 Div. 779) which, 
along with the judgment and opinion of the Supreme Court 
of Alabama, constitutes the certified record filed in this 
Court. On December 6, 1956, the Supreme Court of 
Alabama refused to grant this petition on the ground that 
petitioner could not by certiorari raise the issues presented.

9 91 So. 2d (Adv. p. 221).



13

Reasons for Allowance of the Writ

I

The Judgment Below, While Appearing To Be 
Based Upon State Procedural Grounds, Is Nevertheless 
Reviewable By This Court.

As set out supra, under Jurisdiction, the opinion below 
purports to decide this case on a non-federal ground. Fed­
eral rights, however, may be denied as much by refusal of 
a state court to decide questions as by its erroneous de­
cision. Lawrence v. Mississippi, 286 U. S. 276, 282. In 
numerous cases this Court has held review was warranted 
where federal questions were fairly presented, were neces­
sary to the determination of the cause, and there existed 
no adequate non-federal ground upon which the decision 
below could have been properly based. Dorcliy v. Kansas, 
272 U. S. 306, 308-309; Erie R. Co. v. Purdy, 185 U. S. 148, 
154; Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 199; Roby v. 
Colehour, 146 U. S. 153,159-160.

Furthermore, this Court has on numerous occasions 
gone to the merits over obstacles unfairly imposed by state 
law. See e.g., Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226; Williams 
v. Georgia, 349 U. S. 375; Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163; 
Lawrence v. State Tax Commission of Mississippi, supra; 
Broad River Power Company ex rel. Daniel, 281 U. S. 537; 
New York Central v. New York and Penn Co., 271 U. S. 
124; Ward v. Love County, 253 U. S. 17.

As Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote in Brinkerhoff-Faris 
Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 682:

“  * * * while it is for the state courts to determine 
the adjective as well as the substantive law of the 
state, they must, in so doing, accord the parties due 
process of law. Whether acting through its judiciary 
or through its legislature, a state may not deprive a 
person of all existing remedies for the enforcement



14

of a right, which the state has no power to destroy, 
unless there is, or was, afforded to him some real 
opportunity to protect it.”

Or as stated in Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U. S. 22, 24:
“ Whatever springes the state may set for those 

who are endeavoring to assert rights that the state 
confers, the assertion of Federal rights, when plainly 
and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under 
the name of local practice.”

The basis of the ruling below apparently is that the 
federal questions raised were not properly reviewable by 
the Supreme Court of Alabama on petition for writ of 
certiorari. However, until the instant decision, the scope 
of review of contempt on certiorari extended to a determi­
nation of whether petitioner had been exercising a lawful 
right, and certiorari was considered an appropriate method 
for attacking the validity of an unconstitutional order 
issued by the trial court.10 Where a state court has fre­
quently dealt with particular issues under a specific pro­
cedure, this Court has held that a subsequent refusal to 
consider those issues under that procedure will not bar 
review by this Court. Williams v. Georgia, 349 U. S. 375. 
This case is presented here in the same posture.

The leading Alabama case on certiorari to review a 
finding of contempt is Ex parte Dickens, 162 Ala. 272, 276, 
279, 50 So. 218 (1909), which held that:

10 Indeed, in this case itself, on motion for a stay, the Alabama 
Supreme Court, having before it the same record (except for the 
second order of contempt), which was before it on petition for writ 
of certiorari, heard oral argument, denied a stay and issued an order 
stating that certiorari was an appropriate remedy. 91 So. 2d (Adv. 
p. 220). And in the first petition for writ of certiorari (3 Div. 
773) where the same issues were raised as in the second (3 Div. 779), 
the ground for the Court’s dismissal was not that certiorari was an 
incorrect method for raising the questions petitioner brings here, but 
that the averments in the petition were “ insufficient.” 91 So. 2d 
(Adv. p. 221).



15

“ Originally, on certiorari, only the question of 
jurisdiction was inquired into; but this limit has been 
removed, and now the court ‘ examines the law ques­
tions involved in the case which may affect its merits.’
* * * We think that certiorari is a better remedy than 
mandamus, because the office of a ‘ mandamus’ is to 
require the lower court or judge to act, and not ‘ to 
correct error or to reverse judicial action,’ though 
it may be issued to enforce a ‘ clear right’ * * * ; 
whereas, in a proceeding by certiorari, errors of law 
in the judicial action of the lower court may be in­
quired into and corrected.”

On certiorari the Supreme Court of Alabama has de­
cided whether “ the record in contempt proceedings dis­
closes a want of jurisdiction or an error of law in holding 
that to be contempt which in law is no contempt but the 
exercise of a lawful right * * * .” Ex parte Wheeler, Judge, 
231 Ala. 356, 358, 165 So. 74 (1935). See also Ex parte 
Boscowitz, 84 Ala. 463, 4 So. 279 (1888); Ex parte Blakey, 
240 Ala. 517, 199 So. 857 (1941); Ex parte Sellers, 250 Ala. 
87, 33 So. 2d 349 (1948).

In Ex parte Morris, 252 Ala. 557, 42 So. 2d 17 (1944), 
where petitioner had been held in contempt for refusing to 
produce records of the Ivu Klux Klan, the Supreme Court 
of Alabama on a petition for certiorari, passed upon the 
issues of privilege, self-incrimination, and whether the in­
quiry was within the rightful scope of the grand jury’s 
powers. There it was also observed that a contention that 
First Amendment rights were denied in compelling pro­
duction of membership lists had not been raised below, but 
that “ * * * nothing in the procedure indicates any conflict 
with the right of free assemblage guaranteed under the 
First Amendment * * * ” , implying—especially in view of 
having passed upon kindred questions—that if the issue 
had been raised below it would be properly within the scope 
of its review.

The court below stated that the only proper method to 
review whether petitioner was exercising a lawful right in



16

refusing to produce its membership lists was mandamus.11 * * * * * 17 
However, as indicated above, Alabama precedents prior to 
the decision in this case indicated that certiorari was a 
normal and clearly appropriate remedy for this purpose, 
although in certain circumstances mandamus may have 
been a permissible alternative.1-

11 This ignored the fact that the denial of petitioner’s motion to 
vacate the order to produce and the adjudication of contempt were 
rendered almost simultaneously.

12 In the case of Ex parte Hart, 240 Ala. 642, 200 So. 783 (1941), 
which the Supreme Court of Alabama has cited as authority for the 
availability of mandamus in the instant case, mandamus was employed 
to test the validity of a subpoena duces tecum issued by the clerk as a 
ministerial act, and the opinion in justifying the use of mandamus 
makes much of the fact that the clerk’s duty was ministerial. Manda­
mus has also been held available when the trial court has denied a 
motion to require an answer to interrogatories, because the party pro­
posing the interrogatory has a clear right to an answer. Ex parte Far­
rell, 234 Ala. 498, 175 So. 277 (1937). However, mandamus has been 
denied for the purpose of determining the admissibility of the evidence 
to be procured on such interrogatories when it is alleged for rea­
sons of irrelevancy the interrogatories need not be replied to. Ex parte 
Farrell, supra. In so ruling the court has held that it will not deter­
mine me aanussiDUity ot evidence piecemeal, and that there is ade­
quate remedy on appeal. But in some cases in which the lower court 
has allowed interrogatories, mandamus has been held proper to in­
quire whether the evidence sought is patently inadmissible. Ex parte 
Rice, 258 Ala. 132, 61 So. 2d 7 (1952) ; Ex parte Driver, 255 Ala.
118, 50 So. 2d 413 (1951); Ex parte Bahakel, 246 Ala. 527, 21 So. 2d 
619 (1945). Ex parte Weissinger, 247 Ala. 113, 22 So. 2d 510
(1945), involving mandamus to vacate a decree adjudging that a plea 
in abatement was not sustained in a divorce action, contains broad 
language indicating that mandamus will serve to review questions not 
otherwise reviewable; but in the instant case the clear indication was 
that certiorari was available. See Ex parte Frenkel, 17 Ala. App. 
563, 85 So. 878 (1920), in which the court on mandamus on a 
claim of self-incrimination pretermitted consideration of whether 
interrogatories could inquire concerning the amount of whiskey de­
fendant had consumed.

Moreover, if mandamus is an appropriate method of review in 
cases of this kind, the precedents conclusively demonstrate that cer­
tiorari was also approved of as a proper method for testing the issues
such as these. See, e.g., Ex parte Morris, 252 Ala. 557, 42 So. 2d
17 (1944).



17

Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the federal 
constitutional issues in this case are reviewable by this 
Court, as they were in W illiams v. Georgia, supra, where 
after reviewing prior state court decisions in Georgia 
on the question of the use of the extraordinary motion for 
new trial, contrary to the decision in the case then being 
considered, this Court held, 349 U. S. at 389:

“ We conclude that the trial court and the State 
Supreme Court declined to grant Williams’ motion 
though possessed of power to do so under state law. 
Since his motion was based upon a constitutional 
objection, and one the validity of which has in prin­
ciple been sustained here, the discretionary decision 
to deny the motion does not deprive this Court of 
jurisdiction to find that the substantive issue is prop­
erly before us. ’ ’

II

In Refusing To Produce The Names and Addresses 
Of Its Members Petitioner Was Exercising Rights Guar­
anteed By The Fourteenth Amendment.

In its impact upon petitioner, a non-profit membership 
corporation, and its Alabama members whom it represents, 
the order in suit is a serious interference with essential 
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of asso­
ciation, and the right to petition and sue to seek enforce­
ment of this Court’s decisions against state enforced racial 
segregation. It will not be disputed that the courts of 
Alabama could not constitutionally prohibit such action by 
Negroes to vindicate their civil rights. Yet, in the special 
circumstances existing in Alabama, an effective restraint 
on such action was accomplished by the order to pro­
duce the membership lists and the order of contempt for 
failure to produce.



18

Compliance with the order to produce the names and 
addresses of petitioner’s members would have subjected 
the members to reprisals which would prevent them from 
continuing their activity seeking compliance with the de­
cisions of this Court (R. 9-11). Failure to produce the 
lists subjected petitioner to a $100,000 penalty and also 
effectively prevented petitioner, its members and asso­
ciates from exercising their First Amendment rights in the 
State of Alabama.13 * No state can constitutionally subject 
anyone to this dilemma.

In short, petitioner’s contention is that the order to 
produce the membership lists, the judgment of contempt for 
failure to produce and the refusal of the Supreme Court of 
Alabama to review such judgment was an unlawful re­
straint by the State of Alabama of First Amendment rights. 
This action by the State of Alabama is contrary to appli­
cable decisions of this Court, including United States v. 
Rumely, 345 U. S. 41; Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495; 
Pennekamp and the Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Florida, 328 U. S. 331; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516; 
National Broadcasting Co. Inc. v. U. S., 319 U. S. 190; 
Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 314 U. S. 252; Gros- 
jean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U. S. 233; Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510.

13 Under the law of Alabama a party adjudged in contempt may 
not proceed further in the case. Therefore, the ex  parte preliminary 
injunction remains in force. Jacoby v. Goetter Weil Co., 74 Ala. 427
(1883).



19

A. The Order to Produce the Membership Lists Was 
Made at a Time when Elected Officials and Private 
Individuals in Alabama Had Demonstrated Their 
Determination to Thwart All Efforts toward Com­
pliance with This Court’s Decisions Invalidating 
Racial Segregation and to Subject All Who 
Sought Compliance to Economic Pressures, Mental 
Harassment, Threats and Violence.

The issues in this case can only be understood when 
examined in the light of conditions existing in Alabama. In 
its opposition to the order to produce its membership lists 
for the State of Alabama petitioner made allegations, sup­
ported by the affidavit of its executive secretary, to the 
effect that there existed such a state-wide atmosphere of 
hostility to petitioner that the production of the names of 
petitioner’s members in Alabama would subject them to 
economic reprisals, loss of employment, mental harassment, 
threatened and actual violence (R. 9-11). In further sup­
port of these allegations appearing in the record, petitioner 
respectfully requests this Court to take judicial notice of 
the following public information.

In Alabama, elected representatives have used their offi­
cial power and private individuals have used their collec­
tive influence to build up an atmosphere of hostility against 
anyone who favors the end of racial segregation, especially 
members of the NAACP. This hostility, beginning almost 
immediately after the decisions of this Court in the School 
Segregation Cases on May 17, 1954, increased in intensity 
up to the time of filing of this action. Indeed it continues up 
to the present time. For example, the Alabama Legislature 
in January of 1955 adopted a resolution of nullification 
stating in part: ‘ ‘ The legislature of Alabama declares deci­
sions and orders of the Supreme Court of the United States 
relating to separation of races in the public schools, are, 
as a matter of right, null, void and of no effect;” 15 and

15 Acts of Ala. Spec. Sess. 1956, Act 42, at 70.



2 0

in February, 1955, in a Special Session of the Alabama 
Legislature, both houses, unanimously approved a resolu­
tion petitioning Congress to limit the jurisdiction of the 
United States Supreme Court and other federal courts on 
appeals from state courts.16

An Alabama legislative committee set up for the pur­
pose of preserving segregation in public schools made pub­
lic on October 20, 1954 its first official report calling for the 
establishment of private schools to preserve segregation. 
Included in this report was a threat of economic reprisals 
against anyone who would seek to end racial segregation in 
public schools. “ White employers would be strongly in­
duced to withhold employment from Negro parents who 
would take advantage of the intended compulsion, leases 
would likewise be terminated, and trade and commercial 
relations, now in satisfactory progress, would be af­
fected.”  17

During December, 1954 and January of 1955, five chap­
ters of the White Citizens Council, originating in Missis­
sippi, were organized in Alabama. A  spokesman for that 
organization reported its purpose as follows: “ The white 
population in this country controls the money, and this is 
an advantage that the council will use in a fight to legally 
maintain complete segregation of the races. We intend to 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for any Negro who 
advocates desegregation to find and hold a job, get credit 
or renew a mortgage.” 18 *

On February 2, 1955, 400 members of the White Citizens 
Council of Dallas County, Alabama were addressed by the 
leader of the White Citizens Council of Mississippi.1*

16 Southern School News, Vol. I, No. 7, p. 3.
17 Southern School News, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 2.
18 Southern School News, Vol. I, No. 5, p. 2.
10 Southern School News, Vol. I, No. 7, page 3.



21

During the year 1955 and 1956 White Citizens Council 
groups in Alabama were addressed by such persons as 
Circuit Judge Tom P. Brady, of Brookhaven, Mississippi,20 
Governor Herman Talmadge of Georgia,21 State Senator 
Sam Engelhardt22 23 and U. S. Senator James O. Eastland.22

On June 3, 1955 Attorney General Patterson requested 
the Alabama Legislature to provide additional funds in 
order to employ four more attorneys for his staff “ pri­
marily”  to handle segregation suits. He added, “ the 
initial suits”  will be the most important and warned “ we 
must be ready to handle them properly * * *.”  Montgomery 
Advertiser, June 3, 1955, p. 1.

One of the more recent official actions of the State of 
Alabama was the resolution of the Montgomery City Com­

20 On June 22, 1955 Judge Brady told a White Citizens Council 
in Dallas County that the NAACP "was a willing and ready tool in 
the hands of Communist front organizations” . What the South needs, 
he is reported to have said, “ is an organization as a slingshot to hit 
between the eyes of that giant monster N AACP” which "is pledged 
to the mongrelization of the South.” Southern School News, Volume 
II, No. 1, page 2.

21 Governor Talmadge urged the White Citizens Council members 
not to hesitate to use economic pressure on those “ who would force 
racial integration on the South.” Southern School News, Vol. II, 
No. 1, page 2.

22 Senator Engelhardt told a White Citizens Council gathering in 
Macon County: “ The National Association for the Agitation of 
Colored People forgets there are more ways than one to kill a snake 
* * * W e will have segregation in the public schools of Macon 
County or there will be no public schools.”  Southern School News, 
Volume II, No. 2, page 13,

23 On February 10, 1956, 10,000 White Citizens Council members 
in Montgomery, Alabama, heard Senator James O. Eastland urge 
the retention of segregation at all costs and saying specifically: “ You 
good people of Alabama don’t intend to let the NAACP run your 
schools.”  Southern School News, Volume II, No. 9, page 7.



2 2

mission in response to the order of the U. S. District Court 
in the case involving enforcement of racial segregation in 
intrastate transportation.1’4 The official resolution stated, in 
part, “ The City Commission * * * will not yield one inch, 
but will do all in its power to oppose the integration of the 
Negro race with the white race in Montgomery and will 
forever stand like a rock against social equality, inter­
marriage and mixing of the races in the schools. * * * 
There must continue the separation of the races under 
God’s creation and plan. ’ ’ 20

A fiery cross was burned on the lawn of United States 
District Judge Frank M. Johnson who was one of the three 
judges participating in the decision invalidating segrega­
tion in intrastate transportation in Montgomery.28

Montgomery and Birmingham, Alabama, have in recent 
months witnessed untold numbers of threats, intimidation, 
and actual bombings of homes and churches of Negroes, 
known to have supported compliance with the decisions 
of this Court on racial segregation. Hostility against 
all who seek compliance with the decisions of this Court 
on the question of the illegality of state-imposed racial 
segregation continues to the present time. For exam­
ple, in a column entitled “ Off The Bench”  appearing 
in the Montgomery Advertiser for March 4, 1957, Judge 
Walter B. Jones, trial judge in the instant case, stated 
among other things: “ I speak for the White Race, my 
race,”  and, “ The integrationists and mongrelizers do not 
deceive any person of common sense with their pious talk 24 25 26

24 Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M . D. Ala. 1956), aff’d, 
1 L. Ed. 2d 114.

25 Southern School News, Volume III, No. 7, page 15. The 
members of the City Commission of Montgomery are also members 
of the White Citizens Council, Southern School News, Volume III, 
No. 1, p. 10.

26 Southern School News, Volume III, No. 9, page 13.



23

of wanting only equal rights and opportunities for other 
races. Their real and final goal is intermarriage and mon- 
grelization of the American people.”  The column review­
ing the accomplishments of “ white”  people concludes with 
the following: “ We have all kindly feelings for the world’s 
other races, but we will maintain at any and all sacrifices 
the purity of our blood strain and race. We shall never 
submit to the demands of integrationists. The white race 
shall forever remain white.”  (See Appendix C, pp. 19a- 
22a.)

In this atmosphere of public and organized private 
opinion in Alabama, the surrender of petitioner’s member­
ship lists wTould inevitably lead to serious economic pres­
sure, loss of employment, mental harassment, threatened 
or actual violence. The fear of unlawful reprisals resulting 
from release of the membership lists was heightened by the 
severity and scope of the restraining order,-7 the court’s 
making the production of petitioner’s membership lists a 
prerequisite to a hearing on petitioner’s motion to dissolve 
the restraining order, even though no testimony was con­
templated or could have been taken in connection with the 
latter,27 28 and by the punitive and arbitrary nature of the

27 When petitioner offered to register in its answer, there was no 
issue before the court warranting a continuation of these proceedings. 
If petitioner had been doing business in Alabama in violation of 
Alabama law, there are adequate statutory penalties which could 
have been imposed. See Title 10, Sections 194, 195, 196, Alabama 
Code of 1940.

28 After the ex parte temporary injunction had been issued, peti­
tioner on July 2 filed a motion to dissolve the injunction and 
demurrers to the state’s complaint. The motion to dissolve tests the 
equity in the bill. Corte v. State, 259 Ala. 536, 67 So. 2d 786
(1952). On such motion, oral testimony is not permissible unless 
objection thereto is waived. See Title 7. Section 1061, Alabama 
Code of 1940. Herman v. Watt, 233 Ala. 29, 169 So. 704 (1936) ; 
Cox v. Lermon, 233 Ala. 58, 169 So. 724 (1936) ; Hunter v. Park- 
man, 250 Ala. 312, 34 So. 2d 211 (1948) ; Riley v. Bradley, 252 Ala. 
282, 41 So. 2d 641 (1941); Sheldon v. Sheldon, 238 Ala. 489,



24

fine imposed as punishment for contempt.28
Under the circumstances disclosed, we submit, the sur­

rendering of petitioner’s membership lists would inevi-
192 So. 55 (1939). From decision on this motion, appeal lies 
directly to the Supreme Court of the State. See Title 7, Section 757, 
Alabama Code of 1940; Francis v. Scott, 260 Ala. 590, 72 So. 2d 93 
(1954); Patton v. Robison, 253 Ala. 248, 44 So. 2d 254 (1950); 
Shiland v. Retail Clerks, Local 1657, 259 Ala. 277, 66 So. 2d 146
(1953).

On July 5, the Attorney General filed a motion for pretrial dis­
covery, reciting that the documents requested were “ necessary and 
material to the trial of said cause and contained evidence pertinent 
to the issues of said trial.” The court so scheduled its hearing dates 
that hearing on the state’s motion and compliance therewith became a 
prerequisite to a hearing on petitioner’s motion to dissolve. Upon 
adjudging petitioner in contempt, the court terminated all further 
proceedings in connection with this case on authority of Jacoby v. 
Goetter Weil & Co., 74 Ala. 427 (1883).

28 In deciding what penalty to assess for contempt, courts must 
consider the nature of the defiance, the consequences of the contu­
macious behavior, the necessity of effectively terminating the defiance 
in the public interest and the importance of deterring such acts in the 
future. The court must also consider the defendant’s financial re­
sources, the consequent seriousness of the burden to it, and whether 
the refusal constituted the only avenue by which a claimed constitu­
tional right could be preserved for review by a higher court. United 
States v. United Mineworkers of America, 330 U. S. 258.

The court failed to consider any of these matters in this case, 
and there is no evidence in the record or before the court to demon­
strate that petitioner’s financial resources are such as to make it 
possible for it to pay a fine of $100,000.00. If the court had con­
sidered such evidence, it would discover that petitioner is a non­
profit membership corporation; and that during the 12-month period 
preceding June 1, 1956, its income from sources in Alabama amounted 
to only $27,309.46, and its expenditures within the state for the 
same period amounted to only $21,707.60. A  fine of this magnitude 
in view of petitioner’s limited resources is certainly excessive.

Title 13, Section 143, Alabama Code of 1940, limits punishment 
which a court may impose for criminal contempt to a fine of $50 and 
imprisonment not exceeding 5 days. There is no limitation as to 
the punishment which the court may impose for civil contempt.



25

tably lead to serious economic pressure, loss of employ­
ment, harassment, intimidation, threats and actual violence 
against its members.30

B. The Action of the Court Below Constituted an 
Unconstitutional Encroachment by the State of 
Alabama upon First Amendment Rights of Peti­
tioner and Its Members.

Petitioner is a non-profit membership corporation 
organized to secure an end to racial discrimination through 
peaceful means of persuasion.

In large measure, petitioner has been the collective force 
through which Negroes and others interested in fighting 
racial intolerance have pooled their resources toward bring­
ing about nationwide compliance with the Fourteenth

Under the definition of criminal contempt in Ex parte Hill, 229 Ala. 
501, 158 So. 531 (1935), and Ex parte King, 263 Ala. 487, 83 So. 
2d 241 (1955), the punishment here imposed, see Appendix B, 
pages 13a-18a, constitutes criminal contempt and, therefore, should 
have been held to the statutory limitation. In Ex parte Hill, supra, 
the court said at pages 503, 504: “ The question here seems to be 
dependent upon whether the court made an order as a punishment 
in the nature of criminal contempt or, on the other hand, sought only 
to enforce a compliance with its writ of injunction. The decree of 
the court settles that question. It is declared to be punishment for 
what has been done, and it committed petitioner to jail for a definite 
period of time.” Compare the decision in Ex parte Hill urith the 
decision in the case at bar.

3U Fear engendered by such compliance would have destroyed peti­
tioner as an organization even more effectively than the court’s order. 
Consequently, under the circumstances of this case, the disclosure 
ordered was so unreasonable and arbitrary as to constitute a denial 
of due process. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 
U. S. 186; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616; Hale v. Henkel, 
201 U. S. 43; Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco 
Co., 264 U. S. 298; United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632. 
Disobedience, therefore, could not subject petitioner to contempt.



2 6

Amendment.31 Through petitioner and its affiliates Negroes 
have sought judicial relief from disenfranchisement because 
of race, educational discrimination and segregation on pub­
lic carriers. As an organization through which Americans 
collectively act to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitu­
tion of the United States, petitioner and its members have a 
constitutional protection against onerous state sanctions 
which would restrict such activity and deny rights incident 
thereto. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516; De Jonge v. 
Oregon, 299 U. S. 353.

By means of speeches, pamphlets, public meetings, peti­
tions and other means of communication, petitioner seeks 
to prepare Negroes and others “ for an intelligent exercise 
of their rights as citizens”  and to create an “ informed pub­
lic opinion”  concerning these rights. These rights are pro­
tected from interference by the states. Grosjean v. Ameri­
can Press Co., Inc., 297 U. S. 233, 249-250.

The part of the order to produce to which petitioner ob­
jected was that which required petitioner to disclose the 
names and addresses of its Alabama members. Petitioner 
objected to identifying these members on the ground that to 
do so, in the special circumstances of this case, would con­
stitute an unwarranted interference with rights secured to 
petitioner and its members by the First Amendment and 
protected from state encroachment by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

31 See R. 5-6; “ Private Attorneys-General: Group Action in the 
Fight for Civil Liberties,”  58 Yale L. J. 574 (1949); Ashmore. 
The Negro and the Schools 30, 35, 38, 73, 97, 124, 131 (1954) ; 
Williams and Ryan, Schools in Transition 38-39, 52, 55, 60, 71, 73, 
79, 92, 96-106, 127, 130, 137, 139, 161, 179, 182, 202, 222, 224
(1 9 5 4 ) ; Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 110-111
(1 9 5 5 ) ; Rose, The Negro in America 242, 259, 263-267 (1956 ed.) ; 
Robison, “ Organizations Promoting Civil Rights and Liberties” , 
275 Annals 18, 20 (1951).



27

Disclosure of the names and addresses of petitioner’s 
members, in view of the members’ well-founded fear 
of exposure to economic and physical reprisals, would in­
hibit members from speaking, writing, petitioning, or as­
sembling to end racial discrimination as individuals and 
would also seriously inhibit their right of association, to 
combine in and join petitioner so that the organization 
might represent them through the same means of expres­
sion. Moreover, the resulting decrease in petitioner’s 
present and potential membership would destroy peti­
tioner’s right to exist as an organization for the purposes 
set out in its charter and to effectively exercise rights of 
free expression to secure for its members and Negro- 
Americans in general the equality before the law which the 
Constitution and this Court accord them.

It is clear that the state of Alabama could not by direct 
action prohibit petitioner and its members from exercising 
their rights of free expression although that expression 
may be contrary to majority opinion. Kunz v. N. Y., 340 
U. S. 290; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268; De Jonge 
v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353.

There can be no doubt that First Amendment rights 
are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment not only 
from direct prohibitions upon their exercise by the state 
but also from the state’s “ indirect discouragements,”  
American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 
402, which take the form of taxes, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 
319 U. S. 105; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 
licenses, Bursty n v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495; Kunz v. N. Y., 
340 U. S. 290; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 
conditions upon which privileges are granted, Wieman v. 
Updegraff, 344 IT. S. 183, or the requirements of public 
disclosures as to political associations, United States v. 
Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 46; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516; 
538-540; cf. United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612.



28

Further, it seems clear that the concept of free speech 
must necessarily include the right of individuals to “ pool 
their capital, their interests or their activities under a 
name and form that will identify collective interests,”  Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 
187, (concurring opinion) in the form of a corporation or 
association in order to more effectively secure enjoyment 
of liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. Where, as here, 
such collective activity takes place, the state may not im­
pose sanctions against the corporation or association which 
result in denying to it and its members rights of free speech 
and assembly. Cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516; Beau- 
harnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 262-263.31’

I f the right to freedom of speech and assembly does not 
include the right of individuals to join together and law­
fully express a united opposition to state abridgement of 
rights, then the future of our democratic form of govern­
ment is in serious jeopardy.

“ The expression of bloc sentiment is and always has 
been an integral part of our democratic electoral and 
legislative processes. They could hardly go on with­
out it. Moreover, to an extent not necessary 
now to attempt delimiting, that right is secured by 
the guaranty of freedom of assembly, a liberty essen­
tially coordinate with the freedoms of speech, the 
press, and conscience. . . .  It is not by accident, it 
is by explicit design, as was said in Thomas v. 
Collins, . . . that these freedoms are coupled to­
gether in the First Amendment’s assurance. They 
involve the right to hear as well as to speak, and any 
restriction upon either attenuates both.”  (United 
States v. C. I. 0., 335 U. S. 106, 143-144 (concurring 
opinion). 32

32 See also comment, “ State Control Over Political Organizations: 
First Amendment Checks on Powers of Regulation,”  66 Yale L. J. 
545 (1957).



29

While, under some circumstances, a “ secret oath bound”  
organization dedicated to unconstitutional purposes and 
engaging in illegal activities may be “ proscribed”  by re­
quiring it to give up its membership list, New York ex rel. 
Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, a corporation such as 
petitioner, well-known as the chief organization combating 
governmentally-enforced racial discrimination through 
peaceful and legitimate means, is entitled to protection 
against “ arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference 
with . . . [its] patrons,”  Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U. S. 510, 535-536; see Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, and, 
as in the special circumstances of this case, such a corpora­
tion must be entitled to protect itself against abridgements 
of its speech, free assembly and the right to petition the 
government.

This Court has recognized the right of “ communication 
corporations”  to free speech and press protection. Gros- 
jean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U. S. 233; Times- 
Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 314 U. S. 252; Pennekamp 
and the Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Florida, 328 U. S. 
331 (newspaper corporations); National Broadcasting Co., 
Inc. v. U. S., 319 U. S. 190 (radio corporations); Burstyn 
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 (motion picture distributor 
corporation).

Although not all corporations may exercise rights of 
free speech, the above-cited decisions demonstrate the con­
stitutional protection of free expression on the part of 
various corporations engaged in the dissemination of in­
formation and “ free trade in ideas”  vital to a self-govern­
ing society.33 Petitioner’s purposes and activities are in 
this respect identical with those of newspapers, radio sta­

33 In Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 501, the Court con­
sidered irrelevant the fact that motion picture “ production, distribu­
tion, and exhibition is a large-scale business conducted for private 
profit.”



30

tions, and motion pictures and, therefore, it is entitled to 
constitutional protection of free speech.

Moreover, decisions of this Court indicate that peti­
tioner is also in a position to assert its members’ rights to 
free speech and assembly in the instant case. In Grosjean 
v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U. S. 233, 249-250, 280, 
this Court held the licensing tax violated the general pub­
lic’s right to “ the circulation of information”  and to “ free 
and general discussion of public matters”  as well as the 
newspaper corporation’s rights. Similarly, in Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535, this Court held 
that a compulsory public school statute violated not only 
the private-school corporations’ rights but also “ the liberty 
of parents and guardians.”  Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 
U. S. 249; Brewer v. Hoxie School District, 238 F. 2d 91, 
105 (8th Cir. 1956). “  ‘ [T]he domain of liberty, withdrawn 
by the Fourteenth Amendment from encroachment by the 
states’ . . .  no doubt includes liberty of thought and 
appropriate means for expressing it . . . ” , Hughes v. 
Superior Court of California, 339 U. S. 460, 464. States 
are therefore prohibited from taking any action which 
amounts to a prior restraint on the right of freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press. Near v. Minnesota, 283 
U. S. 697.

In the instant case, petitioner is the only one who is in 
a position to assert the constitutional rights of its members. 
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 
U. S. 123, 154, 159, 186-187 (concurring opinions); 
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 
215, 233. No individual member could challenge the order 
to produce, assuming the procedural possibility of such 
action, without disclosing his membership and subjecting 
himself to economic and physical reprisals resulting in a 
denial of his rights to free speech and association—the very



31

reprisals which constitute the basis for refusal to disclose 
the names and addresses required by the Court’s order to 
produce (R. 8-10).

Under the circumstances of this case, and the appli­
cable decisions of this Court it is apparent that in refusing 
to produce its membership lists petitioner was exercising 
constitutionally protected rights.

I l l

The Rights Asserted By Petitioner And Denied By 
The Courts Below Are Of Great General Importance 
Which It Is In The Public Interest To Have Decided 
By This Court.

The questions involved in this case are perhaps the most 
important Fourteenth Amendment questions presented to 
this Court in the wake of the School Segregation Cases. 
For, if the proceedings below are valid, compliance with 
these decisions and cognate cases may be effectively 
evaded in other states as well as in Alabama.

While progress has been made in nine of the southern 
states toward the ending of segregation in public educa­
tion, the remaining eight southern states, including Ala­
bama, have pursued a statewide policy of preventing com­
pliance with the principles established in the Brown case. 
Indeed, five of these eight states, including Alabama, still 
deny their Negro citizens admission to their state uni­
versities.* 34

Negro Americans in these states are for many reasons 
unable to exercise their individual rights of freedom of

34 Johnson, “ Racial Integration in Southern Higher Education,”
34 Social Forces 309-12 (1956).



32

speech and assembly or to combine to effectively exert 
political pressure to bring about a change in the status quo. 
The only effective relief has been through legal action in 
the courts. Consequently, the entire panoply of state 
power has been invoked for the purpose of insulating 
state policies of racial segregation against successful attack 
in the courts.

State legislatures in addition to Alabama’s have not 
only adopted resolutions of “ nullification”  and “ interpo­
sition, ’ ’ 86 but have implemented this by adopting other 
measures, seeking to circumvent the decisions of this 
Court and to continue segregation in public education.30 * * * * * * * 38 
All of these measures are of questionable constitutionality,

30 Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 17-XX, Special Session,
1956, of the Florida Legislature, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 948
(1956); House Resolution No. 185, Regular Session, 1956, of 
the Georgia General Assembly, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 438
(1956); House Concurrent Resolution No. 10, Regular Session,
1956, of the Louisiana Legislature, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 753 (1956) ;
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 125, Regular Session, 1956, of 
the Mississippi Legislature, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 440 (1956); Act
of February 14, 1956, Calendar No. S. 514, of the South Carolina
Legislature, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 443 (1956) ; Senate Joint Resolu­
tion No. 3, 1956 Session o f the Virginia Legislature, 1 Race Rel. 
L. Rep. 445 (1956).

38 Florida: Ch. 29746 (1955), 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 237 (1956) ; 
Chs. 31380, 31389, 31390, 31391 (1956), 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 924, 
954, 955, 940 (1956).

Georgia: Appropriation Act §§7-8, Acts 11, 12, 13, 15, 197 
(1956), 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 421, 418, 426, 420, 424, 450 (1956).

Louisiana : Const. Art. X II, § 1, La. R. S. 17:331-334, La. R. S. 
17.81.1, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 239 (1956), held unconstitutional in 
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 138 F. Supp. 336, 337 (E . D. 
La. 1956), motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus 
denied, 351 U. S. 948 (1956), aff’d —  F. 2d —  (5th Cir., decided 
March 1, 1957) ; La. R. S. 17:2131-2135, La. R. S. 17:443, 1 Race



33

but they will remain in force unless challenged by public 
protest and litigation too expensive for the average Negro 
to finance alone.37

Yet Negro Americans’ only effective redress lies in such 
litigation, in the free exercise of the ballot, and freedom of 
speech and assembly. Only through joint and concerted 
exercise of these rights can a weak and unpopular minority

Rel. L. Rep. 730, 941 (1956) now being challenged as unconstitu­
tional in three consolidated suits, Ludley v. Board of Supervisors of 
L. S. U. and Agricultural and Mechanical College, etc. (Civil Actions 
No. 1833, 1836, 1837, E. D. La., 1956) ; Acts 28, 248, 250, 252, 
Senate Bill 350, Const. Art. X IX , § 26, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 728, 943, 
944, 942, 927, 776 (1956) ; House Concurrent Resolution No. 9, 1956 
Session, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 755 (1956).

Mississippi : House Concurrent Resolution No. 21, Regular Ses­
sion 1956, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 423 (1956); Proposed House Bill 
No. 30, Regular Session, 1956 (vetoed by Governor), 1 Race Rel. 
L. Rep. 448 (1956); House Bills No. 31, 119, 880 (1956), 1 Race 
Rel. L. Rep. 422, 449, 592 (1956).

North Carolina : Chs. 1-7, 1956 Extra Session, 1 Race Rel. L. 
Rep. 928-940 (1956); Act 336, 1955, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 240 
(1956), see Carson v. Board of Education of McDowell County, 
227 F. 2d 789 (4th Cir. 1955) and Carson v. Warlick, 238 F. 2d 724 
(4th Cir., 1956).

South Carolina: Act 329 (1955), 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 241 
(1956), Acts 662, 676, 677, 712, 813 §3  (1956), 1 Race Rel. L. 
Rep. 586, 588, 730, 731 (1956).

Virginia: Ch. 70, Extra Session 1956, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1109 
(1956) held unconstitutional in Adkins v. The School Board o f the 
City of Newport News, —  F. Supp. —  (E . D. Va., decided Janu­
ary 11, 1957); Chs. 56-71 (1956), 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1091-1111 
(1956).

See also laws and cases cited in footnote 20.

37 For a detailed analysis of the need for organized efforts and 
support in this field see “ Private Attorneys-General: Group Action 
in the Fight for Civil Liberties,” 58 Yale L. J. 574 (1949).



34

succeed in securing equality before the law.38 This joint 
and concerted action has taken place largely under peti­
tioner’s aegis.

The pattern is clear—either by legislative or judicial act 
to seek to prevent petitioner and its members from con­
tinuing its activities,39 with the expectation that such state 
action will effectively frustrate efforts of citizens of the 
state to seek full compliance with the law as declared by 
this Court.

38 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 
152 note 4, where Mr. Chief Justice (then Mr. Justice) Stone said: 
“ Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the 
review of statutes directed at particular religions, * * * or national 
* * * or racial minorities * * * whether prejudice against discrete 
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seri­
ously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily 
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”

39 Georgia: Williams v. National Association for the Advance­
ment of Colored People, Inc., unreported, No. A-58654 (Sup. Ct. 
Fulton County).

Louisiana: Louisiana ex rel. LeBlanc v. Lewis, unreported, No. 
55899 (D . C., 19th Jud. Dist.), app. dismissed sub nom. Louisiana 
ex rel. Gremillion v. National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, Inc., unreported (La. App. First Cir.) “ since 
the cause was removed to the United States District Court, 
Eastern District of Louisiana, on March 28, 1956 [No. 1678] * *
1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 571, 576 (1956).

Mississippi: House Bill No. 33, Regular Session 1956, 1 Race 
Rel. L. Rep. 451 (1956).

South Carolina: Act No. 741, 1956, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 751 
(1956).

Texas: Texas v. National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, Inc. (and National Association for the Advance­
ment of Colored People Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.), 
pending No. 56-649 (D. C. 7th Jud. Dist.), 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1068 
(1956).

Virginia : Chs. 31-37, Extra Session 1956; Ordinance adopted by 
Board of Supervisors of Halifax County, August 6, 1956, 1 Race 
Rel. L. Rep. 958 (1956).



35

This case does not merely present an abstract issue of 
whether disobedience of an order requiring a foreign cor­
poration to disclose the names and addresses of its members 
to the state may properly be punished by contempt. The 
crucial question is whether a state may deprive a group of 
its citizens of the right to collectively seek the attainment 
of full citizenship status as guaranteed by the Constitution 
and the decisions of this Court. Moreover, if the state is 
free to utilize the method here employed to suppress sup­
port for a federal right in conflict with a state policy of 
racial discrimination, it can employ this method to enforce 
statewide conformity in other areas. Moreover, there is 
no doubt that similar procedures will be followed by 
courts in other states. “ Compulsory unification of opinion 
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”  West Vir­
ginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 641.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this petition for a writ of 
certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert L. Carter,
20 West 40th Street,
New York, N. Y.

T hurgood Marshall,
107 West 43rd Street,
New York, N. Y.

A rthur D. S hores,
1630 Fourth Avenue, North, 
Birmingham, Alabama

Attorney's for Petitioner
F red D. Gray,

113 Monroe Street,
Montgomery, Alabama, 

of Counsel.



l a

APPENDIX A

Opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama

3 Div. 779

------------------------------- o-------------------------------

Ex parte National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People, a Corporation

In Re: T he State of A labama ex rel. John Patterson, 
as Attorney General of the State of Alabama,

v.
National A ssociation for the A dvancement of 

Colored People, a Corporation.
--------------------------- o---------------------------

Petition for Certiorari to M ontgomery Circuit Court

in E quity

Per Curiam.

The Circuit Court ordered the petitioner to bring cer­
tain books, documents and papers into court on a certain 
date for inspection by the State of Alabama in a cause 
tiled by the Attorney General on behalf of the State against 
the petitioner. On the date set to produce, the court granted 
the petitioner eight additional days within which to comply 
with its order.

Thereafter the court offered the petitioner additional 
time to produce the documents. In reply to the court’s 
offer to grant additional time, counsel for petitioner stated 
in open court that additional time would not be required, 
that the petitioner would not produce the books, docu­
ments, and papers as ordered by the court and that it 
elected to stand on its decision not to bring the papers into 
court for inspection by the State.



2a

As a result of petitioner’s brazen defiance of the order 
of the court, the petitioner was adjudged in contempt of 
court and fined $10,000.00. The decree provided that in 
the event the petitioner failed to comply fully with the 
order to produce within five days from that date that the 
fine for contempt would be raised to $100,000.00.

On the last day that petitioner had to comply with the 
court’s order or suffer the fine to be raised for refusing 
to comply, the petitioner offered to bring some of the 
documents into court, but refused to fully comply with the 
order to produce. This offer of partial compliance by 
the petitioner was not accepted by the court. Thereafter 
the court decreed that the fine be raised as indicated above.

This petition for writ of certiorari presents the single 
question, v iz : The legality vel non of the order of contempt.

The ultimate aim and purpose of the litigation is to 
determine the right of the state to enjoin petitioners from 
doing business in Alabama. That question, however, is 
not before us in this proceeding.

On the petition for certiorari the sole and only review- 
able order or decree is that which adjudges the petitioner 
to be in contempt. Certiorari cannot be made a substitute 
for an appeal or other method of review. Certiorari lies 
to review an order or judgment of contempt for the reason 
that there is no other method of review in such a case.— 
Ex parte Dickens, 162 Ala. 272, 50 So. 218. Review on 
certiorari is limited to those questions of law which go to 
the validity of the order or judgment of contempt, among 
which are the jurisdiction of the court, its authority to 
make the decree or order, violation of which resulted in 
the judgment of contempt. It is only where the court lacked 
jurisdiction of the proceeding, or where on the face of it 
the order disobeyed was void, or where procedural require­
ments with respect to citation for contempt and the like 
were not observed, or where the fact of contempt is not 
sustained, that the order or judgment will be quashed.

A p p e n d ix  A



3a

It is well to remember tliat ‘ ‘ a proceeding for contempt 
is not a part of the main case, before the court, but is 
collateral to it, a proceeding in itself.”  Ex parte Dickens, 
supra. In the process of the trial in the main case there 
are ample remedies for review. Appeal lies from interlocu­
tory decrees, such as those on demurrer to the bill, orders 
granting, or refusing temporary injunctions, orders sustain­
ing or denying motions to dissolve or discharge. Tit. 7, 
§§ 754, 1057, Code of 1940.

An order requiring defendant to produce evidence in a 
pending cause may be reviewed on petition for mandamus.— 
Ex parte Hart, 240 Ala. 642, 200 So. 783. Hence, if peti­
tioner felt itself aggrieved by the order requiring it to 
produce certain evidence, it should have sought to have 
the order reviewed by mandamus. Where a party to a 
cause elects not to avail of such remedies to test the validity 
of an order requiring him to do or refrain from doing a 
certain act and simply ignores or openly declines to obey 
the order of the court, he necessarily assumes the conse­
quences of his defiance, and is remitted to the lone hope 
of having the reviewing court find and declare the order of 
contempt void on its face. That is the status of petitioner 
here.

Here we do not have before us a decree on the equity 
of the bill, or a final decree granting relief to complainant, 
or, in fact, the decree granting a temporary injunction. 
All that we have presented to us is the order adjudging 
the petitioner to be in contempt, and as we will show that 
order is well sustained.

So, were the sanctions imposed upon petitioner for its 
willful contempt committed in the presence of the court 
within the court’s lawful authorityf We will first inquire 
whether the contempt in the instant case is in its nature 
civil or criminal.

We approved the following definition of a civil contempt 
in Ex parte Dickens, supra.

A p p e n d ix  A



4a

“ A ‘ civil contempt’ consists in tailing to do some­
thing ordered to be done by a court in a civil action, 
for the benefit of the opposing party therein.” —162 
Ala. 276.

The distinction between civil and criminal contempts 
is thus stated in 12 Am. Jur., Contempt, §6, p. 392:

“ Criminal contempt proceedings are those 
brought to preserve the power and vindicate the 
dignity of the court and to punish for disobedience 
of its orders. Civil contempt proceedings are those 
instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of 
private parties to suits and to compel obedience to 
orders and decrees made for the benefit of such 
parties. The former are criminal and punitive in 
their nature, and the goverment, the courts, and the 
people are interested in their prosecution. The 
latter are civil, remedial, and coercive in their nature, 
and the parties chiefly interested in their conduct 
and prosecution are those individuals for the en­
forcement of whose private rights and remedies the 
suits were instituted.”

Criminal and civil contempts are defined in 17 C. J. S., 
Contempt, §§ 5 and 6, pp. 7, 8, to be as follows:

“ A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed 
against the dignity and authority of the court, or a 
judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the 
administration of justice which tends to bring the 
court into disrepute or disrespect.

# # #
“ Civil contempt consists in failing to do some­

thing ordered to be done by a court in a civil action 
for the benefit of the opposing party therein, and is,

A p p e n d ix  A



5a

therefore, an offense against the party in whose 
behalf the violated order is made. If, however, the 
contempt consists in doing a forbidden act, injurious 
to the opposite party, the contempt may be con­
sidered criminal.”

We indicated our approval of both of the above quotations 
in Ex parte King, 263 Ala. 487, 491, 83 So. 2d 241, 245.

We held the contempt to be criminal in the King case 
at page 490 because it was “  ‘ * * * punishment for what 
has been done, and it committed petitioner to jail for a 
definite period of time.’ ”  We further stated at page 491, 
“ It seems to us that the penalty is for past disobedience 
rather than to compel obedience.” —Ex parte King, supra.

We also held the contempt to be criminal in Ex Parte 
Hill, 229 Ala. 501, 158 So. 531, for the same reasons.

The petitioner insists that its contempt was criminal 
because the trial court used the word punishment in the 
decree. The Supreme Court in United States v. United 
Mine Workers of America, 330 U. S. 258, 297 n. 64, 67 
S. Ct. 677, 91 L. Ed. 884, speaking of the use of the word 
punishment as indicating the type of contempt said: 
“  ‘ punishment’ has been said to be the magic word indicat­
ing a proceeding in criminal, rather than civil contempt. 
* * * But ‘ punishment’ as used in contempt cases is 
ambiguous. ‘ It is not the fact of punishment but rather 
its character and purpose . . .—Gompers v. Bucks Stove 
& Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 441 (1941).”  There were two 
fines in the United Mine Workers of America case. The 
fine assessed for past contumacy was held to be for criminal 
contempt; and the fine to coerce the union into future 
compliance with the court’s order was held to be for civil 
contempt.

In the light of these principles it is clear to us that the 
fines in the instant case were for civil contempt. The 
decree adjudging the $10,000.00 fine said:

A p p e n d ix  A



6a

“ Ordered, adjudged and decreed further that in 
the event the respondent fully complies with the 
court’s order to produce within five days from this 
date, then it may move to have this fine reduced or 
set aside. However, in the event the respondent 
fails to comply fully with the order to produce 
within five days from this rdate, then it is ordered, 
adjudged and decreed that the fine for this contempt 
be $100,000.00.” (Emph. sup.)

The $10,000.00 fine was coercive because it gave the 
petitioner a right to have the fine set aside after full com­
pliance with the order to produce. The $100,000.00 fine 
was coercive because the petitioner had five days within 
which to comply with the court’s order or to be fined said 
amount. Neither fine apparently was severe enough or the 
petitioner would have produced the documents within the 
time allowed instead of offering partial compliance with 
the court’s order on the last day of grace.

The time given the petitioner in the instant case prior 
to assessing the larger fine was the same time given the 
union by the Supreme Court of the United States in modi­
fying the civil contempt fine in the United Mine Workers 
of America case, supra. We quote from page 305:

“ * * * to pay a fine of $700,000, and further to pay 
an additional fine of $2,800,000 unless the defendant 
union, within five days after the issuance of the 
mandate herein, shows that it has fully complied 
* * * ” (Emph. sup.)

Our statutes limit punishment for contempt by the cir­
cuit court to five days in jail and a fine of fifty dollars.— 
Title 13, §§ 9 and 143, Code of 1940. But our cases hold 
that the statutory limitations apply to criminal contempt 
and not to civil contempt.—Ex parte King, supra; Ex parte 
HiU, supra; Ex parte Dickens, 162 Ala. 272, 50 So. 218.

A p p e n d ix  A



7a

The amount of the fine in the instant ease, not being 
limited by statute, is within the sound discretion of the 
court and in the absence of an abuse thereof will not be 
disturbed.—Maclnms v. United States, C. A. Cal. 191 F. 2d 
157, 342 U. S. 953, 96 L. Ed. 708, cert, denied 72 S. Ct. 628; 
United States v. Landes, C. C. A. N. ¥., 97 F. 2d 378; Ex 
parte Hill, supra. The fine adjudged by the circuit court 
is not excessive.

We could well conclude here by ordering a denial of the 
writ and a dismissal of the petition, but will discuss briefly 
the merits of the order to produce so that the parties may 
know the views entertained by the court.

The petitioner argues that its belated offer to produce 
included everything except items number 2 and 8 as set out 
in its brief, and that it was not required to produce these. 
Items 2 and 8 are:

“ 2. All lists, documents, books, and papers, ad­
dresses and dues paid of all present members in the 
State of Alabama of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, Incorporated.

* * *
“ 8. All lists, books, and papers showing the names 

and addresses of all officers, agents, servants and 
employees in the State of Alabama of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
Inc.”

Assuming that the petitioner did offer to bring in for 
inspection by the State everything except the documents 
listed in items 2 and 8, could the court require the peti­
tioner to disclose this information f We think so. The 
court held the information to be competent and relevant; 
and the petition shows that the court had jurisdiction of the 
petitioner and of the subject matter.

A p p e n d ix  A



8 a

This court in holding that an officer of the Ku Klux 
Klan, Inc. was in contempt of court for failing to turn over 
a list of members of said organization when ordered to do 
so by the court, said:

“ The first duty of every citizen is allegiance to 
the constitution and laws of the state and nation and 
the lawful judgments and decrees of the courts . . . 
Only privileged communications and facts made 
so by the law or lawful government regulations are 
protected from disclosure. The identity of the mem­
bership of said organization does not fall within such 
privileged class.”—Ex parte Morris, 252 Ala. 551, 
554; 42 So. 2d 17.

The Supreme Court of the United States recently up­
held a contempt citation of a labor union official, for his 
failure to produce before a grand jury, union records 
“ showing its collections of work-permit fees, including the 
amounts paid therefor and the identity of the payors . . . ”  
(Emp. sup.). The court said at page 705:

“ The union and its officers acting in their official 
capacity lack the privilege at all times of insulating 
the union’s books and records against reasonable de­
mands of governmental authorities.”— United States 
v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 64 S. Ct. 1248, 88 L. Ed. 1542.

The courts, when their jurisdiction is duly invoked, have 
authority to exercise visitatorial powers and inquire as to 
the acts of such corporations as the petitioner and keep 
them within the bounds of their lawful authority.—Essgee 
Co. of China v. United States, 262 U. S. 151, 43 S. Ct. 514, 
67 L. Ed. 917; In re Verser-Clay Co., 10 Cir., 98 F. 2d 859, 
120 A. L. R. 1098; Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 
31 S. Ct. 538, 55 L. Ed. 771, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 558; Ex 
parte Morris, supra.

A p p e n d ix  A



9a

The guaranties found in the Federal and State Consti­
tutions against compulsory self-incrimination do not extend 
to a private corporation so as to justify it in refusing, on 
the ground that it might be thereby incriminated, to comply 
with a lawful order directing it to produce corporate rec­
ords in legal proceedings.— United States v. White, 322 
U. S. 694, 64 S. Ct. 1248, 88 L. Ed. 1542; Wilson v. United 
States, supra; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 
50 L. Ed. 652; United States v. Lawn, S. D. N. Y., 115 F. 
Supp. 674.

It is clear, therefore, that the circuit court, in equity, 
had authority to order the petitioner to disclose names, 
addresses and dues paid by petitioner’s members, officers, 
agents and employees and that the petitioner could be held 
in contempt of court for non-compliance with the court’s 
order to produce.

Writ denied and petition dismissed.
All the Justices concur.

A p p e n d ix  A

Judgment of the Court

Comes the Petitioner, National Association For The 
Advancement of Colored People, a Corporation, by At­
torneys, and the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the 
Circuit Court of Montgomery County, In Equity, being 
submitted on briefs and duly examined and understood 
by the Court,

I t  is considered and ordered that a Writ of Certiorari 
to Montgomery Circuit Court, in Equity, be and the same 
is hereby denied, and that the Petition be and the same is 
hereby dismissed at the cost of the Petitioner, National 
Association For The Advancement of Colored People, a 
Corporation, for which costs let execution issue accordingly.



10a

APPENDIX B

Orders and Decrees of the Circuit Court

Decree for T emporary Restraining Order and I njunction

This cause, being submitted to the Court upon applica­
tion of the complainant duly verified as required by law 
for a temporary restraining order and injunction as prayed 
for in the original complaint filed in this cause and upon 
consideration thereof and of the evidence offered in support 
thereof in the form of sworn petition and exhibits attached 
thereto, and the State not having elected to give bond, the 
Court is of the opinion same should be granted.

I t is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed by the 
Court that the respondent, its agents, servants, employees, 
attorneys, and all officers thereof and all persons in active 
concert or participation with respondent, and all persons 
having notice of this order be, and they hereby are, re­
strained and enjoined until further orders of the Court 
from :

1. Conducting any further business of any description 
or kind or respondent within the State of Alabama; organ­
izing further chapters of respondent within the State of 
Alabama; maintaining any offices of respondent within the 
State of Alabama.

2. Soliciting membership in respondent corporation or 
any local chapters or subdivisions or wholly controlled sub­
sidiaries thereof within the State of Alabama.

3. Soliciting contributions for respondent or local chap­
ters or subdivisions or wholly controlled subsidiaries thereof 
within the State of Alabama.



11a

4. Collecting membership dues or contributions for 
respondent or local chapters or subdivisions or wholly con­
trolled subsidiaries thereof within the State of Alabama.

5. Filing with the Department of Revenue and the Sec­
retary of State of the State of Alabama any application, 
paper or document for the purpose of qualifying to do 
business within the State of Alabama.

A p p e n d ix  B

It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the 
Sheriff of Montgomery County, Alabama, or any other law­
ful officer of the State of Alabama, serve a copy of the peti­
tion and this order upon the respondent by service thereof 
upon any officer, agent or servant of respondent found within 
the State of Alabama.

Done at Montgomery, 
June, 1956.

Alabama, this the 1st day of

s /  W alter B. J ones, 
Circuit Judge.

EXHIBIT II

I nterlocutory Decree on M otion of the State 
to R equire R espondent to P roduce Certain 

Books, Papers and Documents

The present suit was initiated by the State of Alabama 
filing an original bill having for its purpose among other 
things the issuance of a temporary injunction restraining 
the Respondent from further conducting its business within 
the State of Alabama; and praying on final hearing that 
the Respondent be permanently enjoined from conducting 
any business within the State of Alabama and that the 
Respondent be enjoined from organizing or controlling any



12a

chapters and from exercising any of its corporate functions 
within the State of Alabama.

In accordance with the prayer of the bill, a temporary 
restraining order was issued on June 1st, 1956, and on 
July 5th the Complainant filed its motion to produce and 
same was duly set for hearing on July 9tli, 1956. Then on 
June 26, 1956, the Respondent filed its motion to dissolve 
the temporary injunction and also demurrers to the bill, 
which were duty set for hearing on July 17, 1956; but the 
matter is now before the Court and is submitted on the 
motion to produce filed by the State. A hearing has been 
had on this motion to produce at which time the same was 
argued to the Court by the Attorney General and Counsel 
for the State, and by Counsel for the Respondent.

In support of the State’s motion to produce, the Attorney 
General offered the sworn original bill, the sworn motion 
to produce, and the answer of the Respondent in its motion 
to dissolve the temporary restraining order.

It is the contention of the Respondent that the motion 
to produce is premature, that the motion should not be 
ruled upon until the demurrer to the bill has been passed 
upon, and the Attorney for the Respondent makes the con­
tention that the motion to produce is in the nature of dis­
covery by the State in aid of a penalty or forfeiture against 
the Respondent, and Respondent argues that a Court of 
Equity will not grant discovery in aid of a penalty or 
forfeiture.

The State, on the other hand, contends that its bill is 
one for discovery and relief in aid of a public purpose, and 
that under a motion to produce the Respondent may be 
compelled to present any papers, books, or documents relat­
ing to matters within the exclusive knowledge of the 
Respondent. The State also insists that, aside from any 
statute, a Court of Equity has inherent power to compel 
the production of original documents for evidential pur­

A p p e n d ix  B



13a

poses. This is settled law in Alabama, and this right, as 
our Supreme Court has frequently said, is a right given 
under the inherent power of a Court of Equity to compel 
the production of books and documents when it is shown 
that such production is indispensable to the doing of justice 
as auxiliary to any proper relief.

The Court is of opinion that the points urged by the 
Respondent are not well taken, and that, to the extent 
hereinafter indicated the Respondent should produce on or 
before 10:00 a.m., Monday, July 16, 1956, in the office of the 
Register of the Court, for the inspection of the State of 
Alabama, the records hereinafter named. It is, therefore,

Ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the Court that Re­
spondent on or before the above-named date and at the 
above-named place, do produce all of the books, papers or 
documents described in paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11 and 
14 of the Motion to Produce.

All other questions reserved.
Done at Montgomery, Alabama, this July 11, 1956.

(Signed) W alter B. Jones 
Circuit Judge

A p p e n d ix  B

Decree A djudging R espondent in Contempt and 
F ixing Punishment T herefor

This suit seeks to enjoin among other things, the respond­
ent, from further conducting its business within the State 
of Alabama, seeks the dissolution of all its chapters in 
the State, and asks that on final hearing an order of ouster 
be entered against the respondent. Due and proper service 
of the bill has been had upon the respondent, and through itB 
attorneys it has entered an unqualified appearance in the 
cause. A temporary restraining order was issued upon the



14a

filing of the bill. Later the State filed a motion to re­
quire respondent to produce certain books, documents and 
papers. This was duly set down for hearing before the 
court. At that time counsel for respondent objected to the 
motion to produce and the court ruled, as shown by its 
order on file, that certain books, papers and documents 
mentioned in the motion to produce should be brought into 
court, and a time was fixed for the production of the evi­
dence requested by the State. Later the respondent moved 
the court to set aside the order to produce, assigning in 
substance that it had filed a full and complete answer, that 
the information called for by the State was already known 
to the Attorney General and that the books and papers 
were not now material or necessary to the trial and deter­
mination of the issue raised in the suit.

The motion to set aside the order to produce has been 
argued at length before the court by the Attorney General 
and by counsel for the respondent, and the respondent has 
offered oral testimony on the motion to set aside. Several 
hours have been consumed in hearing the matter in open 
court. The grounds of the motion to vacate are not well 
taken.

Upon the denial by the court of the motion to set aside 
the order to produce, the court offered respondent addi­
tional time to produce the documents heretofore ordered 
produced. Counsel for respondent stated in open court 
that additional time would not be required, that respond­
ent would not produce the books, documents and papers 
as ordered by the court and that it elected to stand on its 
decision not to bring the papers into court for the inspection 
of the State.

The action of the respondent without question puts it 
in contempt of court, and its counsel practically concede 
this. So the respondent is in willful contempt of the court, 
and the only matter before the court at this time is a formal

A p p e n d ix  B



15a

order adjudging respondent in contempt and in taking 
judicial sanctions against it for its contempt.

The court adjudges and decrees that the respondent is 
in willful contempt in failing to obey the order of the court 
to produce for inspection the documents referred to in the 
order to produce. This brings up now for the consideration 
of the court what punishment should be decreed against 
the respondent. Before fixing that punishment these gen­
eral principles of equity may be stated: The purpose of
punishing for a contempt is to vindicate the dignity and 
authority of the court from the disrespect shown to its 
orders, to aid in compelling the performance of the court’s 
order, performance which is confessedly in the power of 
the respondent at this time, and which performance re­
spondent’s counsel state will not be given. In the present 
contempt proceeding the court must consider the character 
and magnitude of the harm threatened by respondent’s 
continued contumacy and the probable effectiveness of the 
sanction invoked.

Under the law, there is no way by which a corporation 
can be jailed or imprisoned, so a fine must be imposed, and 
in the imposition of this fine the presiding judge may prop­
erly consider the extent of the willful and deliberate de­
fiance of the court’s order, the seriousness of the conse­
quences of the contumacious behavior, the necessity of 
effectively terminating respondent’s defiance as required 
by the public interest, and the importance of determining 
such acts in the future. The extent of the punishment is 
discretionary with the court.

The present willful and deliberate, and considered, de­
fiance of the court’s order is not to be lightly taken. It is 
not such an act which admits of any but severe punishment. 
The court can not permit its orders to be flouted. It cannot 
permit a party, however wealthy and influential, to take 
the law in his own hands, set himself up above the law, and

A p p e n d ix  B



1 6 a

contumaciously decline to obey the orders of a duly con­
stituted court made under the law of the land and in the 
exercise of an admitted and ancient jurisdiction. If this 
were allowed there would be no government of law, only 
the government in a particular case of the litigant who 
elected to defy the court for his own private and selfish 
ends. The respondent in this case has elected to stand on its 
brazen defiance of the order of a court with full power and 
authority to issue the order against it. Respondent having- 
made its election to defy the court must abide the conse­
quences of its stand. Upon a full consideration of the rec­
ord in this case, it is

Ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court that Na­
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
is in contempt of court for its willful and deliberate refusal 
to produce the documents described in the former order 
of the court in this cause.

Ordered, adjudged and decreed further by the court 
that as punishment for its said contempt the said National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People be 
and it is hereby fined the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars, 
and judgment is hereby rendered against the said respond­
ent and in favor of the State of Alabama for said sum of 
Ten Thousand Dollars, for which let execution issue.

Ordered, adjudged and decreed further that in the event 
the respondent fully complies with the court’s order to pro­
duce within five days from this date, then it may move to 
have this fine reduced or set aside. However, in the event 
the respondent fails to comply fully with the order to pro­
duce within five days from this date, then it is ordered, 
adjudged and decreed that the fine for this contempt be 
$ 100,000.00.

A p p e n d ix  B



17a

Let the costs in this matter, to be taxed by the Register, 
be paid by the said National Association for the Advance­
ment of Colored People.

Done in open court in the presence of the counsel for 
the parties to this suit on this July 25, 1956.

/ s /  W alter B. Jones 
Circuit Judge, Presiding

A p p e n d ix  B

Decree A djudging Respondent in F urther 
Contempt and F ixing P unishment T herefor

This Court, having by decree, dated July 25, 1956, 
ordered, adjudged and decreed respondent, National Asso­
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People, in contempt 
of Court for its willful and deliberate refusal to produce 
the documents described in the former order of the Court 
in this cause, dated July 11, 1956, and having further 
ordered, adjudged and decreed that as punishment for 
said contempt the said National Association for the Ad­
vancement of Colored People, be fined the sum of $10,000.00, 
and judgment rendered against the said respondent in 
favor of the State of Alabama for the sum of $10,000.00, 
and having further ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
in the event respondent fully complied with the Court’s 
order to produce within five days from July 25, 1956, that 
it might move to have its fine reduced or set aside, but in 
the event the respondent failed to comply fully with the 
order to produce within five days from July 25, 1956, it 
was ordered, adjudged and decreed that the fine for this 
contempt be $100,000.00.

And the respondent, National Association for the Ad­
vancement of Colored People, having failed to comply



18a

with this order and not having produced the documents 
described in the former order of the Court in this cause by 
midnight, July 30, 1956, it is ;

Ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, is in contempt of this Court for its willful and 
deliberate refusal to produce the documents described in 
the former order of the Court in this cause by midnight, 
July 30, 1956.

It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court 
that as punishment for its said contempt the said National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, be 
and it is hereby fined the sum of $100,000.00, and judgment 
is hereby rendered against the said respondent and in favor 
of the State of Alabama for said sum of $100,000.00, for 
which let execution issue.

That the costs in this matter to be taxed by the Register 
be paid by the said National Association for the Advance­
ment of Colored People.

Done in Montgomery, Alabama, on this the 31st day 
of July 1956.

A p p e n d ix  B

/ s /  Walter B. Jones 
Circuit Judge, Presiding



19a

APPENDIX C

T he M ontgomery A dvertiser 
Monday, March 4, 1957

OFF THE BENCH 
By Judge Walter B. Jones

1 Speak For The White Race

Sen. Carmack of Tennessee in 1925 made a speech in the 
U. S. Senate in defense of the South which was then, as 
now, under vicious attack. He began his address by saying: 
“ I speak, Sir, for my native state, for my native South.”

Today I paraphrase the senator’s words by saying: “ I 
speak for the White Race, my race,”  because today it is 
being unjustly assailed all over the world. It is being sub­
jected to assaults here by radical newspapers and maga­
zines, communists and the federal judiciary. Columnists 
and photographers have been sent to the South to take back 
to the people of the North untrue and slanted tales about 
the South. Truly a massive campaign of super-brainwash- 
ing propaganda is now being directed against the white race, 
particularly by those who envy its glory and greatness. 
Because our people have pride of race we are denounced 
as bigoted, prejudiced, racial propagandists and hate- 
mongers by those who wish an impure, mixed breed that 
would destroy the white race by mongrelization. The in- 
tegrationists and mongrelizers do not deceive any person 
of common sense with their pious talk of wanting only 
equal rights and opportunities for other races. Their real 
and final goal is intermarriage and mongrelization of the 
American people.

When members of the white race point with pride to its 
impressive record and call impartial history to witness its 
technical and political supremacy through the centuries, 
its cultural creativeness, we are sneered at as breeders of



20a

race hatred. Pseudo-scientists tell us there is no such thing 
as a superior race. We are assured by them that the white 
race will some day be forced into an inferior place by the 
colored races of the world and that the day of white leader­
ship is nearing its end.

Students of race recognize three main divisions: White, 
Mongoloid, and Negroid, each created by God with differ­
ent qualities, instincts, and characteristics, transmissible 
by descent.

The white or G’aucasion race includes peoples whose 
skin color may be white, pink, ruddy or light brown. Their 
hair is usually wavy or straight. It is never “ dead black”  
or woolly. The white race includes the tall blonds of North­
west Europe, the Scandinavians, Norwegians, Dutch, 
Swedes, Russians and also the French, Germans, English, 
Italians and Americans, and further, the Greeks, the Jews, 
the Arabs, the Spanish and Portuguese.

So let us now study a little history and inquire if the 
white race has any justification for pride in its contribu­
tions to world civilization and leadership.

Members of the white race have ever been the world’s 
discoverers and explorers, and from our race have come 
bold spirits like Lief the Red, Columbus, Vasco da Gama, 
Balboa, Magellan, Cabot, Drake, La Salle and Peary.

Consider sculpture: The white race has produced
Proxiteles, Myron, Phidias, Donatello, Houdon, Rodin, 
Thorwaldsen, St. Gaudens, Daniel Chester French, Canova, 
Bernini, and Herbert Adams.

When you listen and enjoy beautiful music remember 
the great musicians: Mozart, Bach, Chopin, Beethoven, 
Handel, Liszt, Brahms, Wagner and Verdi, are of the 
white race.

No race has produced poets who compare with our 
poets: Virgil, Horace, Ovid, Pindar, Lucretius, and Dante;

A p p e n d ix  C



21a

in the English-speaking wold, (Shakespeare, Milton, Byron, 
Burns, Wordsworth, Pope, Shelley, Tennyson, Whitman, 
Rosetti, Lanier and Poe.

When you come to consider the eminent artists of the 
ages, the white race takes pride in its Fra Angelico, 
Michaelangelo, Boticelli, Velasquez, Raphael, Titian, Rem­
brandt, Van Dyck, Rubens, Gainsborough, Millet, Corot, 
Landseer, Whistler, Benjamin West, Abbey and Gilbert 
Stuart.

The best in literature comes, too, from white authors: 
Homer, Cervantes, Montaigne, Victor Hugo, Sir Walter 
Sir Walter Scott, Charles Dickens, Tolstoy, Hans Christian 
Andersen, Ruskin, Robert Louis Stevenson, Rudyard Kip­
ling, Thackeray and Macaulay.

The white race is proud of its philosophers: Socrates, 
Ulato, Maimonides, Aristotle, Spinoza, Francis Bacon, 
Locke, Descartes, Kant, Hume and Spencer.

Practically all useful inventions have been made by 
members of the white race: The airplane, steamboat, steel, 
wireless telegraphy, telephone, the telescope, the type­
writer, the X-ray, movable type, the rotary printing press, 
the sewing machine, the cotton gin, the steam engine, the 
automobile, the motion picture machine, and the incan­
descent light bulb.

From the ranks of the white race have come the world’s 
great law-givers, statesmen and jurists, among them: Solon 
of Athens, Gaius, Justinian, Crotius, Coke, Jefferson, 
Blackstone, Wilson, George Mason and Marshall.

Among the historians of the world the white race can 
claim Xenophon, Thucydides, Herodotus, Plutarch, Tacitus, 
J. R. Greene, J. A. Froude, Bancroft, Prescott and Carlyle.

When you consider the great surgeons and medical men 
the white race can claim Hippocrates, Galen, Vessalius, 
Pare, William Harvey, John Hunter, Crawford Long, J. 
Marion Sims, Cushing and Keen.

A p p e n d ix  C



22a

Remember that Christ, a Jew, is the founder of Chris­
tianity. Recall, too, other great religious leaders: Moses, 
David, Solomon, Judas Maccabeus, John Knox, John Huss, 
Tyndale, Miles Coverdale, and John Wyclift'e.

Every one of the 57 signers of the Declaration of Inde­
pendence and every one of the 39 signers of the Federal 
Constitution were members of the white race.

When you look up at the universe of stars and galaxies, 
recall some of the white race’s astronomers and scientists: 
Copernicus, Galileo, Herschel, Halley, Kepler, Newton and 
Sir James Jeans.

So when you call the roll of the world’s noble and useful 
spirits, the men and women of the white race stand up in 
honor and glory with a just pride in the race’s achieve­
ments. We have all kindly feelings for the world’s other 
races, but we will maintain at any and all sacrifices the 
purity of our blood strain and race. We shall never submit 
to the demands of integrationists The white race shall 
forever remain white.

A p p e n d ix  C



S u pr e m e  P r in t in g  Co., I n c ., 114 W orth  S treet, N. Y. 13, B E e k m a n  3-2320