Correspondence from Chambers to Simpkins

    IN  THE

Hiutth States (Eaurt rtf Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit

No. 15,904 Civil

ORVAL E. FAUBUS, Governor of Arkansas, et al.,

Appellants, 
v.

JOHN AARON, et al.,
Appellees.

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

W iley  A. B ran ton ,
119 E. Barraque Street, 
Pine Bluff, Arkansas,

Thttrgood Marshall,
Suite 1790,
10 Columbus Circle,
New York 19, New York,

Attorneys for Appellees.



I N D E X
PAGE

Table of Cases ...............................................................  i
Argument:

Appellants’ Point I ............................................. 1-3
Appellants’ Point II ............................................  3-6
Appellants’ Point III ........................................... 6-1

Table of Cases

Aaron v. Cooper, 243 F. 2d 361, affirming 143 F.
Supp. 855 .....................................................................  3

A. B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 2 Cir. 1952, 191 F . 2d 498.. 3, 4, 5
Barnes v. United States, 9 Cir. 1956, 241 F. 2d 252 .. 2
Baskin v. Brown, 4 Cir. 1949, 174 F. 2d 391 .......... 3
Beecher v. Federal Land Bank, 9 Cir. 1945, 153 F. 2d

987 ................................................................................. 2
Berger v. United States, 1921, 255 U. S. 2 2 .............. 2
Cox v. McNutt, S. D. Ind., 1935, 12 F. Supp. 355 . . . .  6
Craven v. United States, 1 Cir. 1927, 22 F. 2d 605 2
Dakota Coal Co. v. Fraser, 8 Cir. 1920, 267 F. 130 6
Durkin v. Pet Milk Co., W. D. Ark., 1953, 14 F. R. D.

375 .........   4
Eisler v. United States, 1948, 83 U. S. App. D. C. 315,

170 F. 2d 273 .................................................  2
Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., 1913, 230 U. S.

35 ................................................................................... 2
Ferrari v. United States, 9 Cir. 1948, 169 F . 2d 353 .. 3

Hazel-Atlas Class Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 1944,
322 U. S. 238 .............................................................  5

Helmbright v. John A. Gebelein, Inc., D. Md. 1937,
19 F. Supp. 621 .........................................................  4



11

Howard v. Illinois Central E. Co., 1908, 207 U. S. 463 4
Hurd v. Letts, 1945, 80 U. S. App. D. C. 233,152 F. 2d 

121 ................................................................................. 1
In re Linahan, 2 Cir. 1943, 138 F. 2d 650 .................. 2
In re St. Louis Institute of Christian Science, 1887,

27 Mo. App. 633 .........................................................  4

Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, Etc., W. D. Va.
1943, 3 F. E. D. 2 5 1 .....................................................  4

Joyner v. Browning, W. D. Tenn., 1939, 30 F. Supp.
512 ................................................................................. 6

Keown v. Hughes, 1 Cir. 1932, 54 F. 2d 1027 .............. 2
Kind v. Markham, S. D. N. Y. 1945, 7 F. E. D. 265 .. 4
Littleton v. De Lashmutt, 4 Cir. 1951, 188 F. 2d 973 3
Loew’s, Inc. v. Cole, 9 Cir. 1950, 185 F. 2d 641 . . . .  2
Miller v. Rivers, M. D. Ga. 1940, 31 F. Supp. 540 .. 6
Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. v. Molyneaux, 8 Cir.

1934, 70 F. 2d 545 .....................................................  2
Morse v. Lewis, 4 Cir. 1932, 54 F. 2d 1027 .............. 2

Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 1903, 191 
U. S. 555 ..................................................................... 4

O ’Malley v. United States, 8 Cir. 1942, 128 F. 2d 
676 ................................................................................. 3

Phillips v. United States, 1941, 312 U. S. 246 .......... 6
Power Mercantile Co. v. Olson, D. Minn., 1934, 7

F. Supp. 865 .................................................................  6
Price v. Johnson, 9 Cir. 1942, 125 F. 2d 806 .......... 1
R. C. Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn, W. D. Ky., 1935, 12 

F. Supp. 570 ...............................................................  4
Refior v. Lansing Drop Forge Co., 6 Cir., 1942, 124

F. 2d 440 ..................................................................... 2
Robinson v. Lee, C. C. S. C., 1903,122 F. 1010.......... 4
Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 3 

Cir., 1948, 169 F. 2d 514 .........................................  3

PAGE



Ill

Scott v. Beams, 10 Cir., 1941,122 F. 2d 777 ................ 2
Sterling v. Constantin, 1932, 287 U. S. 378 ................ 6
Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, D. Minn., 1936, 13 

F. Supp. 384 ...............................................................  6
Tucker v. Kerner, 7 Cir., 1950, 186 F. 2d 7 9 ..........  3
United States v. Onan, 8 Cir., 1951, 190 F. 2d 1 . . .  . 2
United States v. Pendergast, W. D. Mo., 1941, 39

F. Supp. 189 .............................................   3
Universal Oil Products Co. v. Boot Refining Co.,

1946, 328 U. S. 575 .....................................................  4, 5, 6
Whitney v. Randall, 1937, 58 Idaho 49, 70 P. 2d

384 .'............................................................................... 4
Wilkes v. United States, 9 Cir., 1935, 80 F . 2d 285 .. 3

PAGE



IN THE

iluttcii States (Jkmrt of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit

No. 15,904 Civil

•o-
Obval E. F a u b u s , Governor of Arkansas, et al.,

Appellants,
v.

John A abon, et al., 

--------------o—-----------
Appellees.

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

I

Appellants’ first contention is that the District Judge 
erred in striking their affidavit of prejudice and in refusing 
to disqualify himself because of bias. Assuming arguendo 
that their affidavit was filed with reasonable promptitude, 
i.e., good cause was shown for their failure to file it within 
the statutory period, and accepting appellants’ own state­
ment of facts in support of the allegation of prejudice, 
appellees submit that the application for recusation was 
legally insufficient under 28 U. S. C. A. § 144 and without 
merit.

According to the terms of this statute, “ prejudice”  
which requires recusation must he personal; judicial bias 
and impersonal prejudice are not within its ambit. Price 
v. Johnson, 9 Cir., 1942, 125 F. 2d 806, 811, cert, denied, 
1942, 316 U. S. 677; Hurd v. Letts, 1945, 80 U. S. App.



D. C. 233, 152 F. 2d 121; Loew’s, Inc. v. Cole, 9 Cii\, 1950, 
185 F. 2d 641. See Eisler v. United States, 1948, 83 U. S. 
App. D. C. 315, 170 F. 2d 273, 278, and the cases there 
cited, cert, dismissed, 1949, 335 U. S. 883. The question 
of legal sufficiency, therefore, turns on whether the affidavit 
of prejudice asserts facts from which a sane and reasonable 
mind might infer personal bias or prejudice against the 
affiants, or in favor of the opposite parties, by reason of 
which the presiding judge is unable to exercise his func­
tions in the case. Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., 
1913, 230 U. S. 35, 43-44; Berger v. United States, 1921, 
255 U. S. 22, 23; Keown v. Hughes, 1 Cir., 1920, 265 F. 
572, 577. Cf. Morse v. Lewis, 4 Cir., 1932, 54 F. 2d 1027, 
1032.

The facts and reasons assigned for the prejudice alleged 
by appellants in this case suggest that they “ entertain a 
fundamentally false notion of the prejudice which dis­
qualifies a judicial officer.”  In re Linahan, 2 Cir., 1943, 
138 F. 2d 650, 651. First, the statement that the District 
Judge conferred privately with counsel for the United 
States is not a fact, of itself, showing bias or prejudice 
in civil as well as criminal cases. Compare Scott v. Beams, 
10 Cir., 1941, 122 F. 2d 777; United States v. Onan, 8 Cir., 
1951, 190 F. 2d 1; Barnes v. United States, 9 Cir., 1956, 
241 F. 2d 252 (civil litigation), with Craven v. United 
States, 1 Cir., 1927, 22 F. 2d 605, cert, denied, 1928, 276 
U. S. 627 (criminal prosecution).

Similarly, it is well settled that the bias or prejudice 
which can be urged against the District Judge must be 
based upon something other than rulings in the case, Ex 
parte American Steel Barrel Co., supra, at p. 43; Berger 
v. United States, supra, at p. 31; Morse v. Lewis, supra, 
at p. 1031; Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. v. Molyneaux, 
8 Cir., 1934, 70 F. 2d 545, 547; Befior v. Lansing Drop 
Forge Co., 6 Cir., 1942, 124 F. 2d 440, 444-445; Beecher 
v. Federal Land Bank, 9 Cir., 1945, 153 F. 2d 987, 988;



Littleton v. De Lashmutt, 4 Cir., 1951, 188 F. 2d 973, 975, 
or at the trial of factually related proceedings. Wilkes v. 
United States, 9 Cir., 1935, 80 F. 2d 285, 289; Ferrari v. 
United States, 9 Cir., 1948, 169 F. 2d 353; Tucker v. Kerner, 
7 Cir., 1950, 186 F. 2d 79, 83-84. “ Judges may, and indeed 
must, make rulings as matters present themselves, and, 
having done so, are not subject to a charge of prejudice.”  
O’Malley v. United States, 8 Cir., 1942, 128 F. 2d 676, 685, 
reversed on other grounds, Pendergast v. United States, 
1943, 317 U. S. 412.

Finally, appellants’ statements that the District Judge 
derived a prejudgment of the merits of this case and 
acquired a personal bias from reports furnished by the 
United States Attorney and the Federal Bureau of Investi­
gation—in the course of ancillary proceedings for the 
purpose of rendering complete justice between the original 
parties in Aaron v. Cooper, 243 F. 2d 361, affirming 143 
F. Supp. 855—are without merit. United States v. Pender­
gast, W. D. Mo., 1941, 39 F. Supp. 189, 191, affirmed 
O’Malley v. United States, supra, at pp. 681-682. See 
A. B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 2 Cir., 1952, 191 F. 2d 498; Root 
Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 3 Cir., 1948, 
169 F. 2d 514.

In sum, as Chief Judge Parker concluded in Baskin 
v. Brown, 4 Cir., 1949, 174 F. 2d 391, 394: ‘ ‘ The facts set 
forth in this affidavit * * * show no personal bias on the 
part of the judge against any of the defendants, but, at 
most, zeal for upholding the rights of Negroes under the 
Constitution and indignation that attempts should be made 
to deny them their rights. A judge may not be disqualified 
merely because he believes in upholding the law # *

II

Appellants next contend that the trial court erred in 
overruling their motion to dismiss the pleading filed by 
the law officers of the United States as amici curiae. In



4

short substance the question presented is whether the Dis­
trict Judge should or should not have received and con­
sidered the petition of the amici, suggesting that appellants 
be added as parties defendant and that they be enjoined 
from obstructing or interfering with the execution and 
effectuation of orders previously entered in this ease so as 
to protect the integrity of the judicial process of the courts 
of the United States and maintain the due administration 
of justice. On this question, appellants offer several propo­
sitions. None are grounds for reversal; appellants’ whole 
contention, in our view of the applicable law, is clearly 
without merit.

For the first proposition, it is said that the status of the 
Attorney General appearing solely as amicus curiae is not 
sufficient to justify the aggressive act of filing the petition. 
But this proposition is not substantial in view of the dis­
tinction which can be drawn between amici curiae, so 
labeled, as in the instant case, who have been invited by 
the court on its own initiative to perform specific services 
for it, and those who merely represent interested clients. 
The latter ordinarily cannot file a pleading in a cause. 
That the former may, we think, is clear from the language 
in Universal Oil Co. v. Root Refining Co., 1946, 328 U, S. 
575, 580, 581; A. R. Dick Co. v. Marr, 2 Cir., 1952, 197 F. 
2d 498, 502, cert, denied, 344 U. S. 905. And see, for 
example, Hoivard v. Illinois Central R. Co., 1908, 207 U. S. 
463, 490; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 1903, 
191 U. S. 555, 556; Durkin v. Pet Milk Co., W. D. Ark., 
1953, 14 F. R. D. 375; Kind v. Markham, S. D. N. Y., 1945, 
7 F. R. D. 265; R. C. Tway Coal Co. v. Glenn, W. D. Ky., 
1935, 12 F. Supp. 570; Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 
6167, etc., W. D. Va., 1943, 3 F. R. D. 251; In re St. Louis 
Institute of Christian Science, 1887, 27 Mo. App. 633; 
Whitney v. Randall, 1937, 58 Idaho 49, 70 P. 2d 384; 
cf. Helmbright v. John A. Gebelein, Inc., D. Md., 1937, 19 
F. Supp. 621; Robinson v. Lee, C. C. S. C., 1903, 122 F.



1010. Furthermore, in private litigation such as this, it 
is primarily the function of the law officers of the United 
States, serving as amici, to protect the public interest in 
the agencies of public justice, the administration of justice 
and the integrity of judicial processes. See Universal Oil 
Co. v. Root Refining Co., supra, at p. 581; A. B. Dick Co. 
v. Marr, supra, at 502. Cf. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hart­
ford Empire Co., 1944, 322 U. S. 238, 246, where in con­
nection with a similar affront to judicial processes the 
Supreme Court said:

This matter does not concern only private parties. 
There are issues of great moment to the public * * *. 
Furthermore, the tampering with the administration 
of justice in the manner indisputably shown here 
involved far more than an injury to a single litigant. 
It is a wrong against the institutions set up to 
safeguard the public * * *. Surely it cannot be that 
preservation of the integrity of the judicial process 
must always wait upon the diligence of litigants. 
The public welfare demands that the agencies of 
public justice be not so important * * *.

This brings us to appellants’ second proposition, i.e., 
that the petition was improperly allowed to be filed under 
Rules 15(d) and 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This proposition is untenable. For federal courts have 
‘ ‘ inherent power”  to “ effectively”  vindicate their honor 
and, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it in the Universal 
Oil Products Co. case, supra, at p. 580: “ Accordingly, 
a federal court may bring before it by appropriate means 
all those who might be affected by the outcome of its 
investigation.”  The appropriate, if not the only, means 
for filing the supplemental complaint and adding appel­
lants as parties plaintiff were Rules 15(d) and 21. More­
over, although appellants choose to gloss over it, the 
original plaintiffs in the case had also moved for leave 
to file a supplemental complaint and add additional parties 
(R. 10). Finally, here, unlike the lower court in the



8

Universal Oil Products case, all of “ the usual safeguards 
of adversary proceedings’ ’ were observed.

There is no need to speculate as to appellants’ third 
proposition; it is clearly without support. The instant 
action is not a suit against the state but against state 
officers acting illegally; and it is frivolous to contend that 
the District Court lacked jurisdiction. See Sterling v. 
Constantin, 1932, 287 U. S. 378; Phillips v. United States, 
1941, 312 U. S. 246; Dakota Coal Co. v. Fraser, 8 Cir., 
1920, 267 F. 130; Miller v. Rivers, M. D. Ga., 1940, 31 F. 
Supp. 540, reversed on non-jurisdictional grounds, 1940, 112 
F. 2d 439; Joyner v. Browning, W. D. Tenn., 1939, 30 F. 
Supp. 512; Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, D. Minn., 1936, 
13 F. Supp. 384; Cox v. McNutt, S. D. Ind., 1935, 12 F. 
Supp. 355; Power Mercantile Co. v. Olson, D. Minn., 1934, 
7 F. Supp. 865.

I I I

Appellants’ third contention is that the pleadings in 
this matter required the convening of a statutory district 
court of three judges pursuant to 28 U. S. C. A. $ 2281. 
With numerous decisions squarely against this contention, 
appellees submit that appellants’ counsel misunderstand the 
components of three-judge court procedure.

Here, as in Phillips v. United States, 1941, 312 U. S. 
246, only restraint of executive action was sought ; there 
was no attack on the constitutionality of state statute. 
Moreover, in the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speak­
ing for the Supreme Court in the Phillips case, at 253-254:

Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 53 S. Ct. 
190, 77 L. Ed. 375, which is invoked as a precedent, 
was a very different case. There martial law was 
employed in support of an order of the Texas Rail­
road Commission limiting production of oil in the 
East Texas field. The Governor was sought to



7

be restrained as part of the main objective to enjoin 
“ the execution of an order made by an administra­
tive * * * commission,’ ’ and as such was indubitably 
within § 266 [now § 2281].

W herefore, for the reasons stated above, appellees 
submit that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

W iley A. Brauton,
119 E. Barraque Street,
Pine Bluff, Arkansas,

Thurgood Marshall,
Suite 1790,
10 Columbus Circle,
New York 19, New York,

Attorneys for Appellees.



Supreme Printing Co., Inc., 54 Lafayette Street, N. Y. 13, BEekman 3-2320