Legal Research on Chandler Davidson
Unannotated Secondary Research
January 1, 1982
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Case Files, Thornburg v. Gingles Working Files - Guinier. Legal Research on Chandler Davidson, 1982. 5ad7580e-e192-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/13caddcc-a4c0-4763-a05c-b1ce1e46b3a9/legal-research-on-chandler-davidson. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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muld bo likcly in a race-free society. Suppose that the shoe wore on the other
fmt, i.e. that in those sane states, the proportion of uhite officials uere re-
duced to the point whele it comprised onLy one-fifth the nunber one houl.d expect
on the basis of the uhite percentage of the population. In other words, suppose
that the white proportion of elected officials dropped from 94.4t--the current
pcrcentage--to about lst, uhich is one-fifth of thc white percentage of the pop-
ulation in those states, Does anyone believe that whites in that instance f,ould
not see this as evidence of mssive and intolerable exclusion?
The situation of l"lexican Anericans in the Southwest is conparable to that
of Blacks in the South. l'lexicm Anericans have historically been the victims
of violence, state-ssnctioned segregation in schools and housing, "Jim Crow,r
practices, and job discrinination. Yet still today they are widely excludcd from
all neaningful participation in local politics. An analysis of all persons Nho
served as nenbers of city councils. in Texas frcm 1968 to !.978 revcalcd that less
than 6t were Mexican Anericans, in a state xith a 1980 Spanish-origin population
of 21.01. Even in South Texas, rhere Mexican Anericans conprise a majority of
the population, less than one-third (3f.7t) of city council nenbers during this
period were I'lexican Anericans. In reporting these figures, thc Texas Advisory
Comittee to the U.S, Comission on Civil Rights rcnarked, I'It is signifi.cant...
that even today 179 (83.61) of the 214 lartcr citics in Tcxas havc at-lsrge
clectlons for city coucil."5
The pointed reference to at-large elections both by the .roint Center for
political studies and the Texas Advisory comittee reflects a stronS consensus
onong students of electoral politics that; major barrier to ninority political
representation is the existence of electoral mles which, in combination with
bloc voting arcng rvhites, hake it virtually inPossible for ninoritics to elect
candidates of their choice, even when ninority tumout is relatively'high, uhen
there are no fornal barriers to registration and voting, and when there is no
fomal inpedinent to ninority candidates standing for office.6
These electoral practices include at-large elections, run-off requirements,
anti-single shot rules or their equivalent, the numbered place voting system,
and racial gerrynandering, anong others. In many jurisdictions that I have had
the opportunity to observe, several of these structures are used in concert, pro-
viding the franework within which a highly unified white vote overwhelms sn
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equally unified but smaller ninority vote to insure defeat of the latter.s pre-
ferred candidates. Elective office, a major avenue to political influence, is
thus nade rroff linits" to the minority comunity. lyhcn no altemative avenue
to influence exists--md this is often the case--ninority vote <tilution is said
to exist.
In such cases, the ni.nority co:nmunity is not Iunderrcprescnted,'in the Ueak
s.nse that it is sinply unable to elect its preferred candidatcs in rough pro-
portions to its percentage of the population. Rather, the ninority comunity is
frozen out of the polj.tical process altogether. UnIike Repuhlicans or Democrats,
who sometimes find thenselves underrepresented in this weak sense, Blacks in the
South and Mexican Americans in the SouthNest are inpoycrished, historically sub-
qrdinated peoplGwho occupy the position of an excruded group. rn local settlngs
they are isolated in segregated neighborhoods, refused entry into the clubs and
frlendship networks within Hhich informl influence can be Cxerted, and, given
their lack of schooling and their relative shortage of funds, are at a great
disadvantage in establishing effective organizations and voluntary groups of
the kind that nenbers of the white najority often utilize when they find then-
selves disadvantaged in electoral politics.
In ny rosearch on nunicipalities, I have listened to titeralLy hundreds of
ninority leaders and activists conplain of an almost total involuntary isolation
fron the politicaL life of their coroity. It is this uderrepresentation in
a strong sense that I refer to as vote dilution. It is an inability of Dinority
groups in nany comunities to gain even the nerest foothold in the political
systen, a
The minuscule proportion of elected minority officials today--seventeen
years after the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed--is indicative of widespread
vote dilution. Oiven the fact that a significant prcportion of all elected Black
and I'lexican Anerican officials have uon office in the relatively few cities and
counties with oven{helningly ninority populations--the so-called ',black belt',
regions and the I'brorm fringe" in south rcxas--the statistics on elected officials
understate the extent to which, in mny, nany cities, couties, and school districts
with sizable ninority populations there are no ninority officials at all. A
systenatic survey of such jurisdictions, I am convinced, uould reveal that great
nunbers of them exenplify the kind of extrene political isolation that I refer
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to as ninority vote dilution. It is this situation, and not the negligible prob-
tem of slight underrepresentatj.on on govemnental bodies of the sort that Deno-
crats and Republicans sometimes become enbrciled over during redistricting battles,
that Congress rust rddress itself to. In blunter tems, it is not ,'underrepresenta-
tionrt, but virtua!Iy no i.on, that the proposcd ancndmcnt to Section 2
is intended to rectify.
The Theory of the Swing Vote
It is sonetines alleged that while at-large elections and concomitant
dilutionary devices may prevent minorities fron electing pcople of their choice
to office, a trswing votorr wielded by the ninority comunity will giye it an
appreciable influence over candidatss who are elected to office, even if these
candidates are not anong thoso preferred by the minority comunity. This theory
rests on tuo mjor assunptions: a) that the minority vote is t)?ically decisive
to the electoral outcore, or, in other words, that the votes cast by the ninority
comunity are necessary to the wimersr victory; b) that when the first assunp-
tion is corroct, the winning cendidates will then be receptlve to the wishes of
their ninority constitutents, or they my lose the next election.
The first assumption, however, is by no reans always true. In ilouston,
where I live, Blacks in recent years have constituted about one quarter of the
population, and in city elections they have had a tumout rate that is about the
sane as that of whites. An an&lysis of voting pattems over a 2o-vear span
(from 1955 to 1975J rcvcaled that thc margin of victory among winninS council
candidates wder the at-large system was typically so great that the black vote,
cven when unified behind a candidate, was unable to affect'the outcome of all
but five council races out of 77. In other words, the black voters could have
stayed at hone in 72 races, and if the whitesr voting pattem had remained un-
changed, the same candidates would still have been elected. A sinilar analysis
of voting pattems betueen I9SS and l98l in Abilene, Texas--a city with a com-
bined Black and Mexican Anerican population of about l8t during this period--
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indicated that the minority bloc could'have nade the difference in election out-
cores in only l5 of 68 contests. Since 1970, the ninority bloc coutd have
affected the outcone in only 5 out of 28 cases.
More to the poi.nt, even when the first assumption untlcrlying thetlsrring vote,'
thcory is correct, it docs not neccssarily follo\ that winning candidates will