Compiled Research on Police Use of Deadly Force
Unannotated Secondary Research
January, 1978
135 pages
Cite this item
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Case Files, Garner Working Files. Compiled Research on Police Use of Deadly Force, 1978. 95422973-34a8-f011-bbd3-000d3a53d084. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/1c34b1e4-dd66-4f3d-b857-ecc15205d1dd/compiled-research-on-police-use-of-deadly-force. Accessed February 12, 2026.
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Chapter 5
COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE
i
At both the Tennessee Advisory Committee
open meeting and the Commission hearing, a
broad cross section of the Memphis community
was solicited for comment on the nature of police-
community relations in Memphis. This process
proved invaluable in terms of identifying problems
and the extent of agreement as to the causes of
those problems. In addition, much testimony was
heard as to what the various community groups
and leaders, representing diverse interests and con
stituencies, perceive can and should be done to
address the problems raised.
Memphis Branch of the NAACP
Maxine Smith, a native Memphian, school board
member, and executive secretary of the NAACP in
Memphis since 1962, spoke forcefully of her belief
that police-community relations in Memphis, par
ticularly from the viewpoint of the black commu
nity, have historically been and continue to be
“ very poor.” '
Citing the long and difficult struggles that black
Memphians have undergone to obtain their civil
rights, Ms. Smith stated that such change has
come about only when elected officials and com
munity leaders have been forced to react because
of "extreme pressure.
We have attempted to appeal to the good
sense, to the fair play...to the morality which
we have found to be absent in most instances,
and, unfortunately, the response has only been
to crisis. '
Despite gains in other civil rights areas, Ms.
Smith conceded a sense of frustration at the ina
bility of the black community to affectuate change
in the manner in which she perceives that blacks
are discriminated against “ in the adminstration of
justice” in Memphis. In identifying specific
problem areas that particularly affect blacks, i.e.,
police misconduct, failure of internal and external
controls of police misconduct,-' and employment
discrimination within the Memphis Police Depart
ment, Ms. Smith cited the resistence of elected of
11121
ficials (particularly Mayor Chandler)-' and commu
nity leaders " to solving those problems as the
major obstacle encountered by the black commu
nity:
It bewilders me that the burden of change
falls on the shoulders of the black people and
isolated white friends...we are the segment of
the community who is least able to bear the
burden financially, politically, or any other
way.^
Referring to police misconduct as “ this curse
that afflicts us,” “ Ms. Smith stated that since she
has been with the NAACP in Memphis, “ there
have been hundreds, perhaps thousands, of cases
filed by the NAACP charging police brutality.” ”
She explained that the NAACP does not file every
complaint received,"’ but rather attempts to deter
mine those that have “ merit and validity.” " Ms.
Smith stated that in many cases the condition of
the complainants has demonstrated “ physical
evidence of physical abuse” and that in some in
stances there are great differences in size of the
officers and the individual arrested and battered
with the advantage being given to the arresting of
ficer."*
Our job is not to try the person who comes
into our office...but be the individuals guilty
or innocent, there is something wrong, we feel
very strongly, with an arresting officer who
has to half kill an individual in order to arrest
that individual.'-'
Ms. Smith emphasized that not all complaints
received by the NAACP involved physical abuse:
The sanctity of the home is just completely
ignored. Police just enter homes as if they
owned them...without benefit of a warrant or
anything else.
It would seem that...the law would dic
tate...that abuse, verbal abuse, can be just as
debilitating to the alleged victim as physical
abuse.'-*
Too often we get people who are held for 72
hours on suspicion and, you know, we are
suspicious because we are black.'-'
31
Ms. Smith stated that charges such as
“ disorderly conduct" and “ resisting arrest” are
often used as a “ license" for a police officer to
physically and verbally abuse a c it izen .N oting
that blacks have a history of arrest out of propor
tion to their presence in the Memphis population,
Ms. Smith stated:
I an< not surprised at the number of arrests
because our complaints reflect so often (that
those] persons who are are arrested (are those
persons who are] beaten, abused verbally.’ ’
Ms. Smith added that the charges are often
dismissed at the subsequent judicial hearing.'"
With regard to the recently appointed Police
Director, E. Winslow Chapman, Ms. Smith stated
a sense of “ gratification” that Director Chapman
“ has expressed a willingness" to resolve citizen
complaints against department personnel. Noting
the increased level of communication between her
office and the police director, initiated by Director
Chapman, Ms. Smith stated:
...the number of complaints and the condition
of complainants have not lessened in number
of severity.... (Director Chapmen’s attitude’;
hasn’t trickled down to the policeman on the
street who has the day=to-day contact with the
citizen.'"
In order to have as many responsible officials
notified of complaints received by the NAACP as
possible, Ms. Smith stated that the complaints are
referred to several different areas:' "̂
We direct [the complaints] not only to the
head official of the police department...but to
the mayor, members of the city council, to the
media, to the FBI, to the Attorney General, to
the civil service, the...Human Relations Com
mission; and we arc practically ignored.
I see no real commitment on any part of the
community, exclusive of the black community
and some human relations groups, to really rid
our city of the problem of police abuse....'-'
Ms. Smith said there is a “ lack of sensitivity to
the needs and the desires of black people that is
continuously exhibited by the police depart
ment.’ "̂ '* Expressing ber belief that the department
is unable to investigate itself even-handcdly,'-" Ms.
Smith said that in the "vast majority’"* of com
plaints investigated by the police department, “ no
cause is found’"-' for disciplinary action. In
response to written requests for reports of the de
partment’s findings in each complaint referred,
Ms. Smith stated, “ the longest report is a one sen
tence report— denying guilt on the part (tf the of
ficer or officers involved” '-"' She characteri/etl the
response of other city. State, and Federal agencies
to which the NAACP has referred complaints as
follows:
We have never had any response that in
dicated that any real effort was being made to
correct the condition or any admittance that
any wrong had been committed.
Ms. Smith cited the disparity in the number of
blacks in the department as a factor contributing
significantly to the state of poor police-community
relations in Memphis. Recalling efforts of the
NAACP and other organizations over the past
several years to improve black representation in
the department,'-*" she said, in terms of employment
opportunities for blacks, "(I]t has been our ex
perience and our observation th;it the department
has done no more than it has been forced to do.’"*"
Noting that the Memphis Police Department had
no affirmative action plan for minority employ
ment until the consent decree between the U.S.
Department of Justice and the-city of Memphis,""
Ms. Smith stated that the department still had no
blacks in policy making positions in the depart
ment:
There was a consent decree en
tered...community groups did negotiate and
met for a long time (on the issue of minority
employment (. However, to my knowledge,
those who were most affected had nothing to
do with the consent and the only thing that
has come out of that has been an increase in
the number of black patrolmen. I think that's
fairly token in the whole scope of things."'
Ms. Smith cited the creation of the Afro Amer
ican Police Association"* as "indicative that
something is amiss within the Department.’ ’""*
(T]hat group has come to our office because
conditions were so miserable and so racially
biased (against the black officers] who serve
within the police department.'*
Ms. Smith said, "If the police department will
not treat its own members fairly, certainly it will
not treat the citizenry it serves fairly” "' Ms.
Smith, citing a research study conducted by the
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sociology departments of Memphis State Universi
ty and Lemoyne-Owens College”* at the time the
NAACP undertook its study of the administration
of justice,” ̂ said there is a “ vast difference in the
level of trust” between the black community and
the white community with regard to the Memphis
Police Department.'" “ |M|lack people," she said,
“ generally don’t trust police officers" and are
“ reluctant" to notify the department when law en
forcement assistance is needed.'” Indicating that
white Memphians,"’ particularly the more af
fluent,-" are more disinterested than trusting of the
department, Ms. Smith offered by way of explana
tion that the problems “ don't reach them."'-
That is the kind of mentality that 1 think per
vades most communities and I think they are
as little concerned about the police as they
arc their impression of black people and poor
people, because there are many victims, white
victims, who arc on the lower end of the
economic pole, who too are victimized....-”'
Calling for increased communication between
the black and white communities, Ms, Smith ex
pressed the need for all components of the com
munity to deal with problems inhibiting overall
good police-community relations in Memphis.
Emphasizing that it is neither equitable nor possi
ble for the black community to solve all the
problems, Ms. Smith stated that the total commu
nity must make the commitment to resolve those
problems, problems that ultimately affect every
Memphis citizen.
Memphis Urban League
Herman Ewing, executive director of the Mem
phis Urban League since 1969, was invited to ap
pear before the Tennessee Advisory Committee to
share his impressions o f police-community rela
tions based upon his perspective and experience
with the organization. Mr. Ewing described the
Memphis Urban League:
...a community service organization that has
dedicated itself to improving the quality of life
of blacks and low-income people in the Mem
phis community (with the) understanding that
when the quality of life is imprt)ved for the
low man on the totem pole, it is improved for
the entire community."
The Memphis Urban League, affiliated with the
National Urban League, Inc., is largely au
tonomous in the conduct of local affairs, subject to
policies and standards established for all affiliates
by the national organization. It receives financial
support from a variety of sources, including con
tracts with local, .State, and federal (ioverment;
contributions from the Memphis United Way; aiul
private eontribiitioiis.Approximately 6t) percent
of the Memphis Urban League's funding is depen
dent upon public and private contributions from
the Memphis community."'
Stating that, “ the general welfare and at
mosphere of government towards the citizenry is
an item of major concern for the Urban
League,"'^ Mr. Ewing cited the defensive attitude
of the “ leadership"'" in the community (which he
said,“ permeates" the entire community as well as
the Memphis Police Department-"' as the single
factor contributing the most to what he termed, “ a
bad situation up and down, just a bad situation."'"
Mr. Ewing told the Tennessee Advisory Commit
tee:
Now, it seems as though what government is
saying is, “ We would rather have blacks out
on the street corner and on the roof tops and
marching in the streets rather than go in and
sit down in a calm and deliberate manner
[and] attempt to get to the heart of the
problems that face our community," and
[this]...represents a crisis in leadership."
Although he perceives the major problem to be
the lack of positive civic leadership, Mr. Ewing
said he did not wish to “ minimize"''' the police de
partment's role:
[T]herc continues to be, not isolated, but very
frequent cases where policemen exhibit, if not
excessive force, just poor attitudes in general
toward the general public.'"
Mr. Ewing stressed that incidents of police
misconduct arc not perpetrated by the “ large
majority" o f Memphis police officers, but, he said,
"there is a substantial minority that continues to
do things in their own way and encouraging new
fecruits to pick up the old habits.” '"
Mr. Ewing stated his belief that another signifi
cant factor contributing to the ongoing lack of
Confidence of the black community in the depart
ment is the “ mentality" of “ career officers who
Were certainly very vigorous in enforcing the
separate but equal doctrines of not many years ago
(and] still are inlluenced by their training of those
years...."-"
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Citing past conversations with Memphis police
officers, Mr. Ewing stated that there is pressure
put upon police recruits by certain veteran officers
to “ become a part of an invisible system of doing
things that is not a part of any formal, structured
record in the police d e p a r tm e n t .M r . Ewing
stated that new officers are encouraged to “ say
nothing” ' ’ when minor violations of departmental
regulations by other officers arc observed. He
added that this practice puts a recruit in “ a dif
ficult position when it comes to survival Illus
trating this dilemma from a police officers’ view
point, Mr. Ewing stated;
If I am going to be a partner to this per
son...do I stand up for what is right and run
the risk of being unprotected, should 1 get in
a potentially hostile situation, or do I go along
with these minor infractions only to be forced
to go along with a major infraction of the
regulations simply because I have built a pat
tern of going along with the minor infrac
tions.
Mr. Ewing emphasized that the image of the
Memphis Police Department in the black commu
nity has hindered the efforts of the Urban League
in recruiting blacks to the department.™
(Ojne o f the problems is that to be a recruiter
for the police department, such as the Urban
League or any other institution, you almost
have to become an advocate of the police de
partment and it becomes very difficult to say
to a young person who perhaps could pursue
a career in law enforcement with the Mem
phis Police Department that we recommend
this to you.”'
An aggravating factor to the incidents of police
misconduct, Mr. Ewing stated, is the “ obvious lack
of strict disciplinary action against police officers
who commit offenses against minorities.” "̂ Citing
the nonresponsiveness of the department’s internal
affairs bureau (lAB), in both the investigation and
public reporting of police misconduct,™ Mr. Ewing
said there is no adequate forum, either internal or
external, for coping with police misconduct. In the
opinion of Mr. Ewing, neither the lAB, the civil
service commission,™ nor the courts have been
able to effectively mete out the disciplinary action
required.™ Nothing the “ obvious” ineffectiveness
of the department’s efforts to police itself, Mr.
Ewing stated;
Internal coverups or internal failure to in
vestigate fully I instances of police miscon
duct] to the complete satisfaction of the en
tire community makes any police department
attempt to project an image of good will hard
to swallow.™
Mr. Ewing indicated that resort to a criminal
court of law has proved ineffective because of
both the evidentiary burden required for convic
tion and a basic “ insensitivity of the courts to
citizens’ complaints of abuse.’ ’"’ With regard to
the civil service commission, he cited the "few in
stances" in which the commission has upheld de
partmental disciplinary action as indicative of the
commission’s ineffectiveness in dealing with the
problem.""
Based upon his perspective from day-to-day con
tacts with black and economically disadvantaged
Memphians, Mr, Ewing outlined several problem
areas that need to he addressed to improve the
poor state of police-community relations in Mem
phis. He offered several recommendations, notably
an increase in police training in handling “ minority
community relations.’’""
Beyond specific recommendations, Mr. Ewing
emphasized that the primary ingredient necessary
for solving the pervasive police-community rela
tions problems in Memphis is an informed and
positive commitment of the leadership of Memphis
to deal with the problems. He stated that the
problem will only be resolved;
...when the leadership of this city...can step
forward and say, “ Yes, these are our
problems,” Not just a general admission that
we have got problems—that is an out—but,
“ these are our problems. We invite leadership
of all communities, of all groups to assemble
with us to project some solutions which we
will implement to resolve these problems,"
Until we do that, we are not going to get
anywhere.’ "
American Civil Liberties Union of
Tennessee (ACLU/T)
During the course of both the Tennessee Ad
visory Committee’s open meeting and the Commis
sion’s hearing, testimony was heard from ACLU/T
officers and cooperating attorneys regarding po
lice-community relations in Memphis,
Chan Kendrick, executive director of the Ten
nessee affiliatate of the National American Civil
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Liberties Union, Inc., provitled testimony on the
ACLU/I involvement in poliee-comimmity rela
tions. Philip Arnold and Uruee Kramer, who are
members of the ACLU/T, spoke of their ex
perience in litigating eases that involved police
misconduct.^'
I he ACLU/I ollice loctiteil in Memphis is one
ot 46 affiliate chapters nationwide and currently
has approximately 550 members who support its
function of ACLU: to protect anti defend the civil
liberties of individuals and groups whose legal
rights are guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution. The ACLU/T provides guidance and
legal counseling, and often legal representation as
well, to individuals and groups seeking to secure
their civil rights. The majority of ACLU/T efforts
have been in Memphis and the immediate areas.
fhe three ACLU/T representatives, reflecting
the opinions of other private and public service or
ganization representatives, said they consider the
matter of police misconduct against Memphis re
sidents to be, “ perhaps the top priority issue"^" of
their organization. The ACLU/T routinely receives
complaints o f police misconduct in the course of
its operations. Mr. Kendrick said:
...during the past year [from April 1976 to
April 1977] we received about 175 com
plaints of police misconduct. A lot of those
were beatings, harrassment, breaking into
someone s home or car...field interrogation,
that sort of thing. Most of our complaints
range in that area.'^
Mr. Kendrick testified that the ACLU/T screens
out those cases believed to be without merit and
routinely refers the remainder to the Memphis Po
lice Department’s Internal Affairs Bureau” As ob
served by other persons who have received com
plaints of police misconduct, Mr. Arnold said that
some complainants arrive at the ACLU/T office
bearing evidence (e.g., “ scars, or stitches or what
ever” ) of physical abuse.”
Mr. Kendrick reflected the testimony of others
in commenting upon the nonresponsivencss and
futility of referring complaints to the lAB. He
stated that approximately 100 of the 175 com
plaints received during the last year had been
referred to the lAB, with the complainants rect îv-
ing, if anything, only a form letter in response to
their complaints.^’
In adtiition, Mr. Kendrick stated that he writes
tlii'cclly to the lAB in an attempt tt) ascertain the
dispostion of the eomphunts th;it the ACLU/ f has
referred;
My letters to the Intern;il Affaris |Burc;iu|
have not been answered. 1 will write a fol
lowup letter alter I send a complaint to the
department ;ind 1 will never hear from them
one way or the other.”*
Mr. Kendrick ;dso responileil to Director Chap
man’s announcement that he wanted complaints of
police misconduct to be brought directly to his at
tention. Htiving done so on several occasions, Mr.
Kendrick said that as (T July 15, 1977, his office-
had not received any correspondence from the
director in response to the complaints referred to
him.” ’
Mr. Kramer, testifying about the reluctance of
many persons to file a complaint of police miscon
duct with the lAB, said that retaliation by police
officers against certain persons who have filed
complaints was a factor causing the reluctance. He
cited a specific incident where officers had fol
lowed one of his clients repeatedly after she had
filed a complaint with the lAB, which had “ a
chilling effect upon her filing a suit.” ’*"
Of the complaints received by the ACLU/T ap
proximately two-thirds involved complaintmts who
had criminal charges brought against them, such as
resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, assault and
battery on a police officer, and interfering with a
police officer."'
It has often happened in a situation...where
the police would stop someone and question
that person. It ends up often with the person
being physically assaulted and then, of course,
charged with resisting arrest and assault and
battery on an officer.’*’
In an effort to determine the validity of these
kinds of charges, the ACLU/T has monitored the
disposition of those charges through the judicial
process.**' The monitoring activity was from April
1976 through April 1977 and included approxi
mately 100 complaints of police misconduct filed
with the ACLU/T where the complainant was
charged with one or more o f these kinds of
criminal charges.
Mr. Kendrick stated that between 25-30 percent
were ultimately dismissed, the vast majority before
35
102̂ ^
the charges were brought to trial."'* Typically in
such instances, Mr. Kendrick stated, the arresting
officer will not appear to testify in support of the
charges, which are therefore dismissed."^
Mr. Arnold citing both his involvement with
ACLU/T and his experience in private practice,
stated his opinion that police officers will
frequently use their arrest powers in an effort to
justify physical abuse against citizens;"" He
described one case:"^
A person was arrested for disregarding a red
light and a couple of other traffic offenses and
then assault and battery on the police officer
and resisting arrest.
This person was subdued by the police officer
with an old shock absorber. He was hit over
the head with an old shock absorber and
beaten into unconsciousness and then, of
course, he was charged with resisting arrest
and battery....
The city court judge did sustain one of the
traffic charges—disregarding a red light—and,
of course, the other charges were dismissed.""
All three ACLU/T representatives stated their
belief that the substantial majority of police
misconduct affects blacks in particular, but is also
visited upon other persons “ of low-economic
standing.”"" Mr. Arnold discussed a practice that
has particular impact upon the black community,
the statistics for which were developed pursuant to
an ACLU-supported lawsuit"*’ against the Memphis
Police Department—the use of deadly force;
Now whether or not we deal with the
propriety of the issue of deadly force — we
looked at its application and we found that 5 8
percent of the persons arrested in the city of
Memphis arc black; but of those persons
against whom deadly force was employed, that
is who the police shot at, 87 percent were
black.
We got a statistician to testify and his analysis
was that there was only one chance in ten
thousand mathematical probablity, that race
was not the factor in these disparate
statistics."'
Mr. Kendrick, in addressing possible solutions to
ongoing police-community relations problents in
Memphis, said that change in police practices and
community attitudes through voluntary community
action will not be significant without provisions for
mandatory change as well. Citing limited resources
and other problems in litigating change, he en
dorsed the recommendation of A.C. Wharton of
the Memphis and Shelby County Legal Services
Association of Federal funding for litigation to
combat police misconduct."'^ With regard to the
Memphis Police Department's ability to effectively
combat police misconduct by its officers, Mr. Ken
drick stated;
We have talked for a long time in this com
munity about police investigating police. It is
not going to work. It hasn’t worked, and it
will not work in the future. What we need is
an independent agency to investigate police
complaints.""
Memphis and Shelby County
Legal Services Association
A.C. Wharton appeared before both the Tennes
see Advisory Committee and the Commission to
address those police-community relations concerns
upon which he has developed an informed opinion
as executive director of the Memphis and Shelby
County Legal Service Association since 1973.
The function of the legal services association,
established in 1971, is to provide legal representa
tion to indigent clients in a variety of civil matters.
It docs not handle criminal matters and can litigate
only those civil matters that are not likely to
generate a possible legal fee — a limitation designed
to avoid invading the province of private attor
neys.
The association is funded largely through the
Legal Services Corporation, a private, nonprofit
organization created ;ind funded by Congress to
provide legal assistance to the poor in civil mat
ters."" It also receives a small portion of its funds
from local sources.
Mr. Wharton said that his organization receives
nUmefous complaints of police misconduct. In
commenting upon the extent of such complaints,
Mr. Wharton stated;
The frequency is extremely high, and 1 have
worked in various cities throughout the
country. I have not worked with the police de
partments, but 1 have filed lawsuits against a
number of police departments, and 1 would
say that Memphis luis one of the highest rates
of reports of police miscomluct of any city in
the United Stated."'"
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Mr. Wharton indicated at the Tennessee Adviso
ry Committee open meeting his impression that
the black and poor residents of the Memphis com
munity, i.e, those most directly affected by police
misconduct and poor police-community relations
in general, have been continually frustrated by the
failures of past attempts to improve the situation;
...I have been into the community; 1 know the
impatience that the citizens are holding there,
I know that they are hungry for some clear
and decisive action on this problem. '̂*
Mr. Wharton said the. association had routinely
referred persons who complained of police
misconduct to the internal affairs bureau of the
Memphis Police Department and to State and
Federal law enforcement officials." In addition,
Mr. Wharton said, because of the likelihood of a
fee generating from a civil action, some complai
nants have been referred to private attorneys.""
Because o f limited staff resources and jurisdic
tional restraints, he said, the everyday function of
the legal services association has been in such
areas as landlord-tenant, family, and consumer
matters. In the past, therefore, staff had not con
centrated on combating the problem of police
misconduct.*"* Recently, however, recognizing the
severity of the problem and the unwillingness or
inability of either the 1AB-, State and Federal law
enforcement officials, the private bar, or city offi
cials to address the problem, Mr. Wharton said the
legal services association has initiated efforts
within its Jursidiction to combat police miscon
duct;
I will say that as we move into these areas
that these lawsuits ( based upon citizens com
plaints) will be prosecuted with the same
vigor that we have prosecuted lawsuits
against...other public authorities.
And while we hold no false impressions as to
what the Federal courts here are going to do
for us, I do think that if the police department
comes to know that each time they crack a
skull or do something illegally, they arc going
to have to answer for it in court whether they
prevail or not; I think that might serve as a
deterrent.""’
Asked to comment on the nature o f the respon
ses from the lAB, Mr. Wharton stated;
Well, the only response we got is once we
sent [a person] over and the police officer fs)
filed suit against [her), that’s the most direct
response we liave received.'*”
The suit,'" filed in early October 1976
(immediately prior to the Tennessee Advisory
Committee’s open meeting), was a libel and
slander action against the person who complained
of police misconduct to the lAB, filed by the po
lice officers named in the complaint. Mr. Wharton,
during the open meeting, expressed his exaspera
tion. both as a concerned citizen and as a person
who had referred complainants to the lAB;
...how in the world can anyone in light of this
particular lawsuit now advise an individual to
go to the Internal Affairs Bureau and file a
complaint when that individual knows that he
or she. whether they prevail on that complaint
or not, fis) subject to being sued, |is| subject
to being put to the cost of defending a
lawsuit'.’ "’ *
Subsequently, the association defended the com
plainant with Mr. Wharton personally handling the
case. Mr. Wharton based his defense on a citizen’s
right to complain about legitimate allegations of
police misconduct without fear of retaliation."”
The suit against his client was dismissed on Janua
ry 25, 1 977.
Mr. Wharton said he had previously informed
individuals that their complaints of police miscon
duct would be held in confidence by the lAB,
based upon his understanding of the lAB
process."’** The lAB, however, as required by the
Memphis Police Association’s bargaining agree
ment with the city of Memphis, must provide the
accused police officer with a copy of the complai
nant’s signed affidavit against the officer prior to
any questioning by lAB."” Presumably, this was
the manner in which the officers gained the infor
mation needed to initiate the unsuccessful lawsuit.
Mr. Wharton expressed his opinion that the
lawsuit filed by the police officers against the com
plainant was an intentional device to put the entire
community on notice that citizens who had eom-
plaints about police misconduct could expect a
lawsuit if they filed those complaints with the
Memphis Police Department."’"
Citing his experience and knowledge of internal
investigation divisions in other cities in general and
the lAB in particular, Mr. Wharton said he
thought the idea of police departments policing
police is inherently unworkable."’** He said he
102 / .17
m
thought that proposals to make the lAB responsi
ble either to a local arm of the judiciary or to the
law enforcement committee of the city council'"’
might be workable devices to make the process ef
fective. but because there had not been any seri
ous effort by responsible olTicials to initiate such
action that “ from an extremely practical stand
point, I don’t think anything local is going to
work.” ' "
Mr. Wharton said that complaints of police
misconduct, specifically physical abuse by police
officers at the Memphis city jail, has resulted in
the legal services association, with cooperating
ACLU Attorney Phillip Arnold, filing suit against
city officials;"'^
[Ojur contentions are basically that
there...exists exists a pattern of police miscon
duct, police brutality, within the city jail. We
arc asking the Federal court to order a
number of corrections to remedy that situa
tion.'"'
Citing several practical and legal considcra-
tions"'* that currently restrict the extent and
degree of litigation to combat police misconduct,
as well as the failure of local officials to combat
the problem, Mr. Wharton recommended that the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; (1 ) recommend
to Congress that a program be instituted to pro
vide grants and contracts to independent private
organizations for the specific purpose of filing
lawsuits against law enforcement officials accused
of police misconduct,"' and (2) recommend that
the U.S. Department of Justice institute criminal
proceedings against police officers whose actions
indicate violation of federally guaranteed constitu
tional rights.'"*
Public Defender Offices
Both Memphis and Shelby County governments
maintain public defender offices that have the
responsibility, if not the adequate means, to pro
vide constitutionally guaranteed legal representa
tion to those charged with a criminal offense who
cannot afford the services of a private attorney.
Separately authorized, financed, and maintained,
the Shelby County office (established in 1917)
basically handles felony cases,"’ while the relative
ly new (established in 1974) city office is
restricted to defense of misdemeanor charges in
municipal court.'"*
Shelby County Public Defender Edward G.
Thompson has been with the office since 1964 and
director of the program since 1974. The county
public defender's staff consists of 13 full-time at
torneys, 1 3 part-time attorneys, supported by 8 in
vestigators and several graduate student social
workers.
Nancy Sorak has been head of the city’s public
defender program since 1975. She is a city em
ployee and the program is funded entirely from
the city budget. The office staff consists of four at
torneys who maintain a*’ ’ tremcndous caseload’ ’ ""
without benefit of investigative assistants.
Both Mr. Thompson and Ms. Sorak were sub-
penaed to appear before the Commission on May
9. Their impressions and opinions were particu
larly relevant to the Commission’s inquiry into po
lice-community relations in Memphis, because
being public defenders and local government em
ployees, their testimony afforded a unique per
spective and insight into police-community rela
tions. With regard to the extent of physical abuse,
both stated that demonstrative and factual
evidence of unwarranted physical abuse by police
officers has been . continually observed by them
and their respective staffs.'’ "
Mr. Thompson stated that the attorneys and in
vestigators in his office frequently receive
“ significant” complaints of physical abuse during
the course of their representation of indigent
clients. “ Almost daily we get a complaint about
being shoved, or the handcuffs too tight,” he said.
He distinguished these types of complaints from
those he termed “ significant” (turning a police
dog On a suspect after the suspect has been in cus
tody, or placing a telephone book on a suspect’s
head, with the book being hit by an officer using
a police baton, for the purpose of obtaining a con-
fessioh. Significant complaints, he said, are
received several times a week.'’’ '
Ms. Sorak speaking for herself and her staff,
stated:
We have observed what we feel, all of us feel,
are instances of abuse by the police depart
ment that were not necessarily brought to our
attention by our clients. In very bad situations,
of course, looking at him...you can see that he
has been subjected to some abuse and some
questioning will determine that it did not hap
pen at the time he was arrested or for (the
reason] he was arrested.'”
As
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38
1028
As discussed earlier in this chapter, several
representatives of various public and private ser
vice organizations, as well as individual complai
nants themselves,alleged that a pattern exists of
Memphis police officers charging a citizen with of
fenses such as “ resisting arrest," "ilisorderly con
duct,” or “ interfering with a police olTicer” to jus
tify, often after the fact, physical abuse by the
charging officer.
Ms. Sorak, as the person responsible for defend
ing indigent clients who have been charged with
such offenses, is in the position to comment on
this serious allegation. Ms. Sorak stated;
I think that our main observation of abuse is
people that come in on essentially what I
; would call “ trumped up charges” ...very
[ frequently disorderly conduct, resisting arrest,
I interfering with a police officer, will be
• crafted up together and generally when you
. see those three charges, you arc going to see
t a defendant that has received some treatment
from a police officer....'-^
In some instances, Ms, Sorak stated, due to the
lack of a speedy trial, inability to secure bail, and
the conditions of the city jail some of her clients
have chosen to plead guilty to one of the
“ trumped up charges.
Mr. Thompson said he believes that there is a
relationship between citizen's allegations of physi
cal abuse and the charges placed against them by
the officers who allegedly perpetrated the abuse.
He said his opinion is not as informed as Ms.
Sorak’s, because his office does not generally de
fend clients on misdemeanor charges.'' '̂*
Concurring with the opinions of other witnesses,
both public defenders cited the lack of response
; from the lAB, despite specific requests for infor
mation about the disposition of com pla in ts .M r.
Thompson offered his belief that, despite Director
Chapman’s stated intentions, the Memphis Police
Association's contract with the city severely
restricts his options in investigating complaints
against police officers:
Many of our people arc told that if they want
their complaint pursued that they must take
the polygraph, the lie detector test, ad
ministered by the internal affairs, and then the
policeman will refuse to do it and the in
vestigation stops.'-"
Ms. Sorak said she had spoken with Director
Chapman about police misconduct and her con
cern that complaints be investigated and resolved.
Director Chapman indicated his agreement with
her aiul requested that he be notified ilireetly of
such eomphiints. After seniling three alTidiivits of
complaints to the director and receiving no resp-
sonses, her office staff inquired ;is to the disposi
tion of the first complaint sent:
(W]e received no notice of what happened to
it or anything, and, finally, through contacting
the police director, we found that they were
not going to pursue it, and we advised the
woman that she should take civil action if she
felt it was necessary. There was nothing else
we could do.'-"
With regard to persons they have referred to the
lAB, both public defenders said they have occa
sionally been informed by complainants of in
cidents of retaliation by the individual police of
ficers cited in their complaints.""’ Both public de
fenders said that many of their clients refuse to file
a complaint with the lAB and were reluctant to go
“ back to the police department under any circum
stances.’ ’"" Mr. Thompson stated his opinion that
the clients do not believe they will get any positive
response from the department."'- Ms. Sorak ex
panded on Mr. Thompson’s remarks, stating that
in addition to the belief of many clients that the
department will not act on their complaints, many
of her clients are confused as to what their legal
rights are and the proper avenues for vindication
of those rights.'"''
Mr. Thompson and Ms. Sorak, while reeognizing
that they represent only indigents, expressed their
belief (supported by their experienee in private
practice and general observation of the communi
ty) that the majority of police misconduct in Mem
phis is visited upon poor and black residents.""
Both were also in agreement that, because the
poor and black residents bear most of the direct
burden of police misconduct, the “ middle class"
(i.e., largely white and affluent) of Memphis,
through ignorance or indifference, is not a factor
in pressing for an end to police misconduct.
Speaking of the likelihood of the entire commu
nity effectively working towards ending police
misconduct, Mr, Thompson stated:
I think you would have to get the middle elass
interested and at the present time they are not
102'.)
39
because they either don’t see [police miscon
duct] or don’t choose to believe it when they
read about it.'-’'
Ms. Sorak expressed her agreement with Mr.
Thompson’s opinion and added;
I suspect that if any of [the middle class]
population...were subjected to the kind of
treatment that we see on a daily basis that
they would be exceedingly indignant and be
pursuing [action] in all directions. But the
fact of the matter is that it doesn't happen to
those persons.'-"*
Both public defenders were asked their opinions
on what is needed to alleviate the police-communi
ty relations problems they had discussed. Mr.
Thompson said that eventual solutions to the
problems must include commitments by the politi
cal leadership and the community to...“ do
something about the problem and not pretend it
doesn’t exist.” He indicated that this will require
a change in community attitudes towards the
problem, because “ the attitude that you see in
some officers of the police department reflects
community attitudes to some extent.” Mr. Thomp
son indicated, however, that this commitment will
not come about voluntarily;
1 think the spearhead is going to have to come
from Federal courts the same as it did in the
school [desegregation] cases here and the
park cases and other the others.'■'*’
Ms. Sorak expressed her agreement with Mr.
Thompson’s statement and also called for dis
semination o f information to the community, par
ticularly the poor and black members, with regard
to constitutional rights and the appropriate means
to redress their grievances;
[T]here needs to be information out on the
streets of what is a justifiable complaint.
Everyone knows that if an officer beats your
head or sics dogs on you that obviously you
arc not being treated fairly, but I think the
majority of the community don’t realize that
there are a lot of other things that can con
stitute arbitrary police abuse action...! think
that the legal community...could make the
populace aware of what would constitute
grounds for a complaint, when you see it, or
when you are the subject of it, and where you
might take your complaint, and what kind of
action you might expect.'*'"
40
The consensus of both public defenders as to
the existence, nature, and extent of police miscon
duct in particular and police-community relations
problems in general, is significant. In the course of
their professional responsibilities, both public de
fenders have indisputedly been in the positon to
speak with knowledge and experience. Both arc
local government employees, and neither (Ms.
Sorak in particular) are in a position to be natu
rally critical of the Memphis Police Department
and the officials responsible for its operation. The
significance of their testimonies, moreover, is un
derscored by the fact that they substantiated in
many significant areas the earlier testimonies of
representatives of the NAACP, Urban League,
ACLU, and the Memphis and Shelby County
Legal Services Association.
Individual Complaints of Police
Misconduct
Numerous Memphis residents interviewed by
members o f the Tennessee Advisory Committee
and staff of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
told of mistreatment by Memphis police officers.
Their allegations included harassment, verbal
abuse, brutality, and physical intimidation. Staff
members also attended meetings of community
groups where individual citizens gave vent to their
frustrations and spoke of their inability to cope
with or even understand why they or their commu
nities had been singled out by certain Memphis
police officers for continual surveillance. A sur
veillance, they stated, that reduced their freedom
of movement and made them virtual prisoners in
their own neighborhoods. A situation they found
particularly intolerable since, they insisted, such
action by the MPD was restricted to specific-
minority neighborhoods or communities.
Collaterally, approximately 30 Memphis re
sidents appeared at the Tennessee Advisory Com
mittee’s open meeting, October S-9, 1976, and
told of alleged police mistreatment. The testimony
given at the open meeting is illustrative of the
many complaints o f police mistreatment received
by the Advisory Committee and Commission staff
during the course of this study.
Individual Complainants
A black woman, mother of nine children, told
the Advisory Committee that her entire family had
been \
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1030
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been verbally abused and physically beaten by
Memphis police officers. She said that police of
ficers had accosted two of her sons in front of
their home, searched them, and in the process
began to beat one of them on the hands with a
llashlight. Other family members who altempleil to
question the police were threatened with arrest.
She said that a second and third police car arrived
and police officers began to grab and beat every
one in sight including a paraplegic son who, in ad
dition to being beaten, was knocked out of his
wheelchair by police. She said that they were cited
with disorderly conduct and assault and battery.
At the trial of the family members, the judge
dropped all charges except disorderly conduct.
A middle-aged black man, a resilient of north
Memphis, described an incident in which he was
stopped by police as he walked home from a local
sundry. Three officers in a squad car stopped him
and asked where he was going. When he replied
that he was going home, he was told by the police
officers that he was going to jail. As he was put
into the squad car, he said, a young black man was
pulled out of the car by the officer. The officer
beat the young man for 2 or 3 minutes and threw
him back in the car. A short time later the young
man was pulled from the car a second time, and
the three black officers beat him for about 5
minutes before throwing him hack into the car.
Later, when the officers turned their flashlights on
the young man in the car, the complainant saw
that the young man’s head was “ busted in front
and behind."'^"
A grandmother related a harrowing experience
with the Memphis police. In attempting to retrieve
her grandchildren from the vicinity of a fight
among neighborhood children, she was accosted
by police officers and placed under arrest. When
her son attempted to intervene, he also was ar
rested. She said that while being carried downtown
the police officers, both of whom were white, said
to her son, “ We f—black women but we wouldn't
f— your mama you little son-of-a-bitch....We ain’t
going to quit until we arrest all of you black-assed
niggers, some of ya’II we are going to kill." She
said her son's life was threatened several times
during the ride to the police station.'^'
A young black woman spoke of two white of
ficers who came to her home to serve a warrant
on her brother. When they were informed that he
was not there and did not live there, she said they
used abusive language and forced their way into
her home. She said that as she attempted to go out
the door to the porch, where she could be seen by
neighbors, she was forcefully thrown to the fioor,
anil the officers stepped on her hack, put two pairs
of handcuffs on her, dragged her to the police car,
where she was literally thrown into the squad car.
Despite her protests they left her 2-year-old child
in the house alone as they drove away to the po
lice station.
Anothcr complainant, a black minister, told of
his son’s arrest while standing on a corner waiting
for his mother to pick him up after school. The
son, a junior high school student. w;is shouting and
wtiving his arms to get his mother’s attention as
she ptissed in her ear. Two police officers, passing
by, stopped their car and searched the youth who
became frightened and started to run. The po
licemen yelled for him to halt and he did. The po
liceman approached the youth and one said, “ You
know if you hadn’t stopped, we were going to
shoot you'.’ ’ ’ The officer slapped the boy and ar
rested him for disturbing the peace.
The charges of police misconduct made during
the Advisory Committees’ open meeting were
representative of charges made by Memphians
during private interviews with Commission staff
and those filed with the NAACP. ACLU, and
PUSH.
Virtually all of the complainants interviewed and
those who appeared at the open meeting said that
they had filed formal complaints with the internal
affairs bureau of the Memphis Police Department
and several had willingly taken or offered to take
a polygraph test to substantiate their charges. The
complainants said that no action, to their
knowledge, was ever taken by the bureau.
Subsequent to the October 1976 open meeting.
Mayor Chandler said that the lAB would in
vestigate the complaints of citizens who appeared
before the Advisory C om m ittee .A ccording to
Mayor Chandler, however, several of the complai
nants were uncooperative when contacted by lAB
officials.'^' Given the initial lack of lAB response
to citizen complaints, together with the ex
periences they had endured at the hands of the po
lice, lack of cooperation was not an unexpected
response.
1031
Community Leaders
Business Leaders
Although the Tennessee Advisory Committee to
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights iliti not eon-
duct extensive interviews with indlvithml business
leaders of Memphis in its sturly of police-commu
nity relations, some measure of the business com
munity’s knowledge of police relations with the
black community was attained through the Mem
phis Area Chamber of Commerce. Chambers of
commerce arc known not only for their interest in
the economic development of the cities they
represent, but also for their interest “ in the total
welfare...and quality of life" of their communi
ties.
Samuel Hollis, president of the Memphis Area
Chamber of Commerce, said “ we recognize that
there are some problems” between the Memphis
police and the community they se r v e .T h o u g h
the chamber regularly maintained contact with the
mayor and the new police director, and had of
fered assistance to both in their efforts to improve
police-community relations, it did not have any
standing committee or similar vehicle for con
tributing to those efforts. Mr. Hollis stated that his
contacts with the NAACP, members of the
chamber board, and staff who are black had made
him aware of allegations of police misuse of
power.'*" The hearing conducted in Memphis by
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, however,
was the first time Mr. Hollis was aware of the
large number of complaints which had been
lodged against the police.'*”
On behalf of the chamber of commerce, Mr.
Hollis offered “ support ...in any way possible"
toward solving any problems and promoting any
solution to the ill will between police and commu
nity. It was difficult for Mr. Hollis to specify what
assistance the chamber might offer. The expertise
of some of the chamber’s business leaders might
be useful to the police, or the chamber might ful
fill the role of providing information to its mem
bership about relations between the police and the
black community, if asked to do so. He
acknowledged, however, that
...in general...the feedback we. get from our
members would be more concern of crime
and law and order as opposed to police bru
tality...and I think it is a matter of (lack ofl
42
information. ..(W |e would be happy to
cooperate with them (city officials] in any ef
fort....'"’"
Police Director E. Winslow Chapman appeared
to be trying to upgrade the professionalism of the
Memphis police. Mi. Hollis saul .Special training
and discipline arc needed to help some police of
ficers overcome their prejudice toward blacks—a
prejudice with which they were reared, according
to Mr. Hollis, a native of Memphis.'"''
Edward Boldt, also a Memphis native and the
executive director of the chamber of commerce,
was less inclined to agree with Mr. Hollis that a
real problem in police-community relations exists
in Memphis. Recent media reports of alleged bru
tality dill not indicate that any severe problems ex
isted in Memphis in Mr. Boldt’s opinion.'"’- Just .S
days before Mr. Boldt was interviewed by a staff
member of the Commission, Police Director Chap
man had fired two police officers for beating a
black inmate at the city jail, suspended one for
beating a white male conventioneer, and also
suspended a fourth officer involved in a beating""'
Like Mr. Hollis, Mr. Boldt had also met with
Director Chapman and offered the support of the
chamber. Mr. Boldt thinks the business communi
ty, in general, is pleased with the selection and the
performanee of Director Chapman.
In 1976 the chamber of commerce was instru
mental in creating the Greater Memphis Council
on Crime and Delinquency. As an affiliate of the
National Council on Crime and Delinquency, the
purpose of the incorporated group is
“ investigation, research, education, and action
concerning the causes of, and ways to prevent or
reduce crime and delinquency in the Greater
Memphis area.” '"’* The 40-member council is
chaired by Newton Allen, and each council
member serves on one of eight committees:
justice, law enforcement, prisons and rehabilita-
lion, media, churches, family life, schools, and
youth. At present, only two of the committees
(prisons and rehabilitation and family life) are ac
tive. Mr. Allen said the head of the law enforce
ment committee had met with Director Chapman
to assure him of the committee’s support, but the
committee was not yet actively dealing with police
issues. Mr. Allen said he believes that problems
between police and minorities do exist because of
ihc numerous allegations of misconduct that are
report
police
tors.” '
fill
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103::
reported. It is not unusual, he said, that in a large
police department, there would he a ‘•few had ac
tors.” ''-'
The Memphis Area Chamber of Commerce has
a human relatittns division which, among other ser
vices, promotes purchasing from minorily vendors,
the hiring ol ex-oltenders, and provicles counseling
for minority business people. The number of posi
tions on the ehamber board was increased so that
places would be available for minorities and
women.'•'« The Memphis chamber, therefore, has
proved itself to be interested in the welfare of all
Memphians and has taken positive steps to ensure
their involvement in the ehamber.
Changes that will prohibit ehamber involvement
in social issues are imminent, however. The broad
interests of the Memphis Area Chamber, i.e., in
terests in the social development of Memphis as
well as its economic development, have not been
totally acceptable to many local business people.
In September 1977 the chamber announced a mas
sive reorganization and the resignation of Execu
tive Director Boldt. The chamber of commerce
was in severe financial trouble and steadily losing
members. James McGehee, president-elect of the
chamber, said that the ‘ ‘ broad scope has resulted
in some d iv is iv e n e s s .T h e reorganization and
cut in staff (from 29 persons to 10) will result in
focusing the chamber’s work strictly on recruiting
industries that will provide new jobs. Chamber
membership has declined steadily since 1974 when
it peaked at 2,432. This year the chamber had ap
proximately 1,800 members.'-'" In contrast, the
Nashville-Davidson Chamber of Commerce had
3,500 members in 1977.
In 1968, after the disturbances that followed the
murder of Dr, Martin Luther King, Jr., the busi
ness leadership of Memphis pledged $4 million
over the next 3 years “ to get the city going
again.” '-'" One businessman referred to those
pledges as “ blood money.” Samuel Hollis, refer
ring to those years, said, “ The chamber did a lot
to keep this town from blowing up in the 1960s
and 1970s...a lot to get this community through
those rough times and sometimes it wasn't popu
lar.” ""'
Business leaders have now made it abundantly
clear, however, that they will no longer support a
chamber that maintains involvement in “ social
programs.” Significant questions will be answered
after the chamber's full attention is turned to
economic development. The questions are: Can a
chamber ol commerce be ellective in economic-
development when major social issues (police-
community relations among them) still divide the
minority coinmumty from a substantial portion ol
the white community ’ Can a city prosper and at
tract new industry, new jobs, when its social, racial
unrest is well known'.'
Religious Leaders
Members of the Memphis clergy and religious
lay leaders have made some attempts to improve
relations between the Memphis police tinti citizens.
I heir ellorts. however well mtentioneii. have been
Iragmented ami truitless. Religious representatives
have acknowledged that a severe police-communi
ty rehitions problem does exist.
The 1972 city council investigation of police
brutality (discussed in chapter 4) promptetl action
by a coalition of church women and later by the
Metropolitan Intcr-I-aith Association. The women’s
coalition, which referred to itself as ‘ ‘ Women of
Memphis,” included Church Women United, the
National Council o f Jewish Women, the Diocese
Council of Catholic Women, and other nonreli
gious groups called for the implementation of
recommendations made in the report of the city
council investigation. The group offered its sup
port to Director of Police Jay Hubbard and called
tor Robert James, chtiir ol the city council law en
forcement committee, "to ttike immediate ac
tion. As shown in chapter 4, however, no
changes were made in the MPD as a result of the
city council study.
The Metropolitiin Inter-Faith Associtition was
asked by the Committee on Health, Welfare, and
Churches of the Memphis and Shelby County
Humtln Relations Commission to appoint a task
force to research and report on improving police-
community relations. The interfaith association is
an active, religious organization that provides
some social services. An undated letter to the task
lorcc members Irom the two conveners indicated
that the First meeting was attended by only two
task force members.'"- The task force did not
become active.
The most substantive effort made by religious
leaders to improve police-community relations
came in 1974. A number of churches and civic or-
1 lt ' ' ‘
43
.103 :^
The professional code of broadcasters
acknowledges the personal responsibility of a
broadcaster to the community;
A broadcaster and his staff occupy a position
of responsibility in the community and shouki
conscientiously endeavor to be acquainted
with its needs and characteristics in order to
serve the welfare of its citizens.' '̂*
The media of Memphis have, at times, provided
indepth coverage of police-citizen discussions and
confrontations. Whether the media has provided
enough such coverage and whether its obligations
as teacher and interpreter have been met is a
question the Memphis community must answer.
Investigative journalism is an effective means for
truly serving the community in that information is
gathered through other than regular or official
sources. In Memphis, investigative reporting on
police-community relations matters has been the
exception rather than the rule. Paul Barnett of
WREG-TV said his station did not do investigative
reporting with the exception of some "human in
terest" stories such as a family being evicted.
M.E. Griener cited “ limited staff” as the reason
WMC-TV docs little investigative work, although
some had been done on allegations of police bru
tality.' "̂
The citizens of Memphis should recall the in
vestigative journalism of the Commercial Appeal,
which in 1971, followting a tip from inside the po
lice department itself, pursued information on the
traffic accident that allegedly killed Elton Hayes.
As a result, one Memphis police officer was in
dicted for murder and four other officers were in
dicted for assault to murder in connection with the
incident. All were acquitted following a trial in
December 1973. Several media persons in Mem
phis told staff of the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights that every rational person in Memphis be
lieved that at least one of those police officers
beat Elton Hayes to death.
In contrast, Memphis citizens should note a
story in the Commercial Appeal on August 10,
1977, that reported the preliminary hearing of
three defendants involved in a shooting on July
31—two blacks and one white Memphis police of
ficer. The off-duty officer was accused of killing
the son of the two black defendants who are
charged with assault to murder and assault and
battery. The 20-inch story devotes 8 inches to the
44
police officer's account of the killing, 11-1/2
inches to background information (the court
process, who are parties involved, what type bul
lets were rccovererl where, etc.) and 1/2 inch to
the black (.lefeiulants’ account of the killing.'""
When interviewed by Commissittn staff, the re
porter who wrote the story said he simply
"reported on the court hearing” and not much was
said about the black defendants' side of the
story.'"' Certainly that may be the etise. However,
why would a reporter not seek information from
the other parties involved? If such information was
not available from the black defendants or police,
why not state that in the news story? Would an
editor question such a one-sided account of a
black-white tragedy given the ongoing allegations
of police-citizen confiict? The editors did not
question the story. The reporter, who is not nor
mally assigned to the police beat, said he was not
pressed by a deadline, but simply had to "draw the
line somewhere" when it came to gathering
news.'"-
A story on August 6, 1977, in the weekly Tri-
Siale Defender, the only black-owned-and-operated
newspaper in Memphis, reported the same July 3 1
shooting. The article reported only the black de
fendants' side of the story; no mention of the pr)-
lice account was made.'"' Memphis citizens should
again ask, why did the reporter and editor not
seek information from the other parties involved?
Mayor Wyeth Chandler said at the Commis
sion's May 1977 public hearing that he believed
the media have sometimes aroused negative at
titudes toward the police department. He specifi
cally mentioned "a black newspaper...! whose ]
headlines searingly state as facts, allegations."'"^ A
review of articles in the I'ri-Siale Defender from
late 1975 to late 1977 show that, with few excep
tions, news articles on police-citizen conflict did
ihclUdc both police and citizen statements. A typi
cal 1976 headline read "Woman ‘ Knocked Out,'
Beaten by Policemen."'"' In 1977 the headlines
rhotc often qualified such allegations, as did this
One; "Man Says Police ‘ Fractured His Skull'. "'""
> Mayor Chandler testified that Police Director
Chapman had told him that the problem of
"seating headlines" had diminished since Chap
man took office.'"' Linda Dickson, new managing
editor of the I'ri-.Siaie Defender, said communica
tion between the police department and the
newsp;i|
assumei.
Neil '
t,lining
iim c \ .
intenuei
the rigli
poseil II
right ul
and to I
The pel
broade,.
setting
aceouiii
tions w I
Profe;
Prok
historv
Menipl
organi/
Bar \
1,200 I
of Ilk
ABA 1
menilk
eounti
maim.I
variels
churel.
The .'
mated
the \\ 1
Of I
phis,
Natioi
the A1
tees;
deal V.
donali
Nei,
coiulll
probl,
mittei
munii
stated
lieved
relati.
part,
was .1
newspaper had improved since Mr, Chapman had
assumed his duties.'""
Neil Sheehan, the man who is credited with ob
taining the Pentagon Papers for the .Veu York
lintes^ said thtit the writers t>l the first amendment
intended to give more to the journalist than just
the right to report and publish. He said, "tiiey im
posed upon us a duty, a responsibility to tissert the
right of the American people to know the truth
and to hold those who govern them to account."'""
The people o f Memphis must ask themselves if the
broadcasters and journalists of Memphis are as
serting their right to hold city and police officials
accountable for the poor police-community rela
tions which exist in Memphis.
Professional Bar Associations
Professional associations of lawyers have a long
history of service to the community. Those in
Memphis are no exception. The largest of those
organizations, the Memphis and Shelby County
Bar Association (MSCBA) has approximately
1,200 members, most <if whom are also members
of the American Bar Association (ABA). The
ABA is a national organization having the largest
membership of any association of lawyers in the
country. The MSCBA, independent of the ABA,
maintains 29 sttmding committees and conducts a
variety of educational forums in schools and
churches during an annual •T.aw Day" celebration.
The MSCBA president, Emmett Marston, esti
mated he devotes about one-third of his time to
the work of the a.ssociation.'""
Of the approximately 4 7 black lawyers in Mem
phis, 35 are members of the local chapter of the
National Bar Association (NBA). Many belong to
the ABA also. The NBA maintains ad hoc commit
tees; provides opportunities for its members to
deal with police-community relations problems by
donating their expertise.
Neither professional association, however, has
conducted any formal study of police-citizens
problems nor does either have a permanent com
mittee which would deal directly with police-com
munity relations. NBA President Larry Brown
stated that he and the NBA "very definitely" be
lieved there was a problem in police-community
relations in Memphis,"" and his MSCBzX counter
part, Mr. Marston, said he did not know if there
was a problem.
The American Bar Association has traditionally
developed, and revised as necessary, a model Code
of Professional Responsibility which has servetl as
gui(.le lor the various Slates in the a<.h>['>tion t>f'
biiuling professional coiles of comluct for lawyers
in their jurisdictions. With regard to professional
responsibility to identify problems in their commu
nities. canon 2 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility reads, in part:
The legal profession should assist lay persons
to recognize legal problems because such
problems may not be self-revealing and often
are not timely noticed. Therelbre, lawyers
should encourage and participate in educa
tional and public relations programs concern
ing our legal system with particular reference
to legal problems that frequently arise.'""
Canon 8 specifically encourages lawyers to aid in
making needed changes and improvements which
will advance the legal system.
Professional organizations elsewhere have con
ducted studies and published reports dealing with
various phases of the American law enforcement
system, i.e., courts, police, prisons. A recent publi
cation of the North Carolina Academy of Trial
l.awyers deals with the civil rights of both police
and citizens.'"" It serves not only the purpose of
educating both lay people and law enforcement
personnel about their (iwn rights, but makes them
aware of each other's rights and duties and thus
creates a base of common knowledge and
promotes mutual respect.
The possibilities for a professional lawyers as
sociation to make a significant contribution to im
proving police-community relations in Memphis
are countless. Unfortunately, no definite plans for
doing s<j have been made to date.
Three attorneys who testified at the U S. Civil
Rights Commission hearing stated that they did
not feel the legal community of .Memphis had
adequately fulfilled its responsibility in the area of
the udministration of justice, especially regarding
allegations against the police department. Some
thought local lawyers in private practice were con
cerned that they wouki bring professional harm to
themselves if they got involved; others thought the
sm.ill number of lawyers interested in criminal law
made it difficult for tlie associations to pursue the
issue.
r
r
4.S
103i)
ganizations held 2 days of public hearings on po
lice brutality in March 1974. Rev. Ed Currie ot
the Tennessee Black Assembly and Mary McWil
liams of the Second Congregational Church
chaired the hearings. A report on the hearings
cited the death in 197 1 of Elton Hayes, a black
man, and the subsequent acquittal of Memphis po
lice officers indicted in connection with his death,
as a major impetus for the hearings.'”-'
During the 2 days of hearings, police' and
citizens, district attorney’s office personnel, and
private attorneys talked about the problems
between blacks and police and possible solutions
to those problems. The report on the hearings
clearly stated that the citizens who sponsored the
hearings had given up the notion that public otti-
cials would solve the problem:
Because of the lack of proper follow-up on
police brutality and misconduct cases and the
feeling that the Memphis City Cttuncil and
other officials will not act responsibly on
recommendations for an independent police
review procedure, it is necessary for local
community groups to structure their own
redress procedures. A coalition effort to sig
nificantly alter the present criminal justice
structure and process is mandatory and must
be done immediately before someone else is
murdered by police in Memphis.'”^
The procedures for redress that were recom
mended included the formation of a civilian review
board, a citywide citizens committee to conduct an
indepth study of the Memphis police department,
and a review of police criteria for using deadly
force,
There is no indication of direct followup to the
March 1974 hearings. However, the U.S. Depart
ment of Justice’s Community Relations Service
program of conciliation between city officials and
citizens (discussed in chapter 4) was begun in late
March 1974. The recommendations made by the
church-civic leaders are similar to those made
later during that program.
The leader of an organization of clergy, well
known in the 1960s for its stands on social issues,
told staff o f the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
in 1977 that his group had no policy or statement
regarding recent allegations of police brutality.
Rev. Edward Reeves, president of the Memphis
Ministers Association, said the association was just
beginning to rebuild after a long dormant period.
46
The association is an ecumenical biracial associa-
tit)n with approximately 1 10 members."’'’ In Janua
ry 1977, when the association declined to take a
stand on the death penalty. Rev. Reeves said;
The associtition seems to fiivor the general
prtictice of refraining from offering endorse
ments. recommendations, prttnounce-
ments.... rhe primary goal set by the steering
committee for this year was to establish a
bond of fellowship among the clergy ot Mem
phis.'”^
Rev. Reeves said that personally, through talks
with blaek ministers, he was aware of severe
problems between black citizens and city police. It
was his impression, however, that most elergy were
hopeful that Police Director Chapman would make
positive changes. It appeared to many church
leaders that Mayor Chandler was attempting,
through Director Chapman, to improve human
relations in Memphis."’"
In August 1977, after a year when allegations of
police brutality were often discussed at their
meetings, the National Conference of Christians
and Jews set up a committee on police-community
relations. The committee, composed of 9 of the 53
board members, meets weekly. Staff said the com
mittee was having informal talks with police and
city officials about alleged police misconduct. Sub
sequent action by the committee will be planned
after the initial rounds of talks. MPD Director
Chapman, City Council Law Enforcement Com
mittee Chair Robert James, and Memphis Police
Association President Joe Kent had met with the
committee. Mr. Kent had been invited and agreed
to attend the NCCJ national conference on police-
community relations in late August. The NCCJ,
said staffer Lynn Bampfield, is concerned about
police-community relations in Memphis and has
become “ deeply involved" in trying to improve
those relations.'**
Media
One of the highest compliments paid to the
American media is that which refers to it as the
“ fourth branch of government." In addition to the
executive, judiciary, and legislative branches, the
media, in the minds of most Americans, is vested
with the public’s trust and is implicitly asked to
serve as watchdog over the government of the
people. This public trust brings with it a special
relationsi
media. I
and rigi
governm
attempiu
time, ho
respect
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mittee v
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citizen ̂
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newsp:
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1031)
relationship between the government and the
media. Journalists and broadcasters arc sensitive,
and rightly so, to criticism or comments Irom
government officials that give the appearance <if
attempting to intlucnce the media. At the same
time, honest governmental bodies are cautious to
respect the right of the media to have access to
certain information and to report that information.
For these reasons, the Tennessee Advisory Com
mittee will not draw any conclusions nor make any
recommendations about the performance of the
Memphis media and its relationship to police-
citizen conflict in Memphis. However, the Adviso
ry Committee and staff do submit the following
observations for the consideration of the citizens
of Memphis—those who vest their trust in the
newspapers, radio and television stations of Mem
phis.
During preparations for the Tennessee Advisory
Committee’s open meeting to discuss police-com
munity relations in October 1976, representatives
of Memphis radio and television stations and
newspapers were personally interviewed by staff of
the U.S. Civil Rights Commission. All were
cooperative in giving their professional opinions
about the status of relations between the commu
nity and police. Five of the seven per
sons—reporters, news directors, editors—explicitly
stated that critical problems existed between po-
liee and black citizens and have for years. Yet
when the Advisory Committee’s open meeting was
held and representatives of the media were asked
to participate in the meeting to discuss these same
matters, all, with the exception of staff of the
black newspaper. The Tri-Siate Offender, declined
to participate.
Representatives of the Scripps-Howard papers
(Commercial Appeal and the Press Scimitar) said
company policy forbade them from appearing.
They said only the chief editor could grant permis
sion for them to appear.” " Efforts to contact Com
mercial Appeal editor Michael Grehl were unsuc-
•cessful. Phone calls from staff of the U.S. Commis
sion on Civil Rights were not returned.
Broadcasters were even less responsive to invita
tions to participate. One radio station promised a
participant who never materialized.” ' Of the two
television stations invited to speak at the 1976
open meeting, one made no reply, the other
declined, citing an ongoing Federal Communica
tions Commission investigation into the station’s
programming and employment as the reason.' ‘ -’
Citizens of Memphis should be advised that in
numerous other studies conducted by Advisory
Committees to the U.,S. Commission on Civil
Rights, representatives of the media have been
asked to give their opinions publicly on critical
community problems and have done so. A
l97.“S-76 study of police community relations in
Miami and Dade County is a notable example. An
editorial writer of the Miami News, publisher of
the Oiario Las Americas, and an investigative re
porter of WPLG-TV' were among the journalists
who spoke at the June 1975 open meeting of the
Florida Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commis
sion on Civil Rights. Never before have media
representatives declined to participate In open
meetings held by the State Advisory Committees
o f the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in the
southern region.
Professional codes of ethics for both newspaper
journalists and broadcasters clearly define their
obligations to inform and educate the public, espe
cially on issues of vital concern or controversy in
the community. The code of ethics of the Amer
ican Society of Newspaper Editors states that the
primary function of a newspaper is to commu
nicate to its readers what the members of the com
munity do, feel, and think. It further states that
"its opportunities as a chronicle are inclissoliihlx
linked [/o) its ohlipations as teacher and in
terpreter (emphasis added).
The National Association of Broadcasters’ code
of good practice for television and radio singles
out controversial public issues and the obligation
of broadcasters to provide a public forum for
discussion of those issues;
The broadcaster should develop programs
relating to controversial public issues of im
portance to his fellow citizens, and give fair
representation to opposing sides of issues
which materially affect the life or welfare of
a substantial segment of the public.'’ ^
Broadcasters are regulated by the Federal Commu
nications Commission and are required to serve
the public interest as defined by the community
served.” ' Citizens can challenge the license of a
radio or television station that they feel does not
fairly reflect their interest and serve the needs of
the community.
03 /
47
Emmett Marston anti Larry Brown agreed that
their organizations would be willing to review the
report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
based on its extensive study of police-community
relations, draw their own conclusions, and deter
mine how they, as vital community organizations,
might become involved in dealing with police-com
munity relations. Mr. Marston of the AFJA
qualified his response by saying that “ if finding
that a real problem exists" his group would con
sider being involved in finding solutions.""* Mr.
Brown said “ we already know that these things
I problems in police-crimmunity relatitins]
exist...."'"''
Elected and Appointed Officials
City Council Members
Of the 13 members of the Memphis City Coun
cil, 1 1 were interviewed by staff of the U.S. Com
mission on Civil Rights regarding their opinions of
police-community relations.'"" Seven of those
council members (John Ford, J.D. Patterson, Fred
Davis, Billy Hymen, Pat Halloran, A.D. Alissan-
dratos, and Jeff Sanford) said they believed that
police-community relations in Memphis were not
good. Council Chairperson Oscar Edmonds, Jr.,
Law Enforcement Committee Chairperson Robert
James, Ed McBrayer, and Thomas Todtl saiil they
were unaware of any serious problems between
police and the community.
Both Mr. Alissandratos and Mr. Halloran, mem
bers of the three-man law enforcement committee,
affirmed their belief that the majority of Memphis
police were good officers but, in Mr. Halloran's
words, it was apparent that some officers simply
“ cannot restrain themselves" from using excessive
force.'"" “ 1 think there is a percentage in the po
lice department of individuals that do ntU react in
a very favorable or humane way,” Mr. Halloran
said.' '̂"’ Both councilmen felt that Director Chap
man was making an honest effort to eliminate
those officers unfit for duty.
Mr. Halloran recommended that a full evalua
tion of the entire MPD by a professional organiza
tion, such as the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, would help improve police-com
munity relations. Such a study would identify
weaknesses within the department, as well as point
out the strengths of the department. The commu
nity’s confidence in the department would thereby
be increased, as would the confidence of police
themselves. Increased communication between the
city council, its law enforcement committee, and
the MPD were also recommended by Mr. Hal-
loran'-"" and Mr. Davis.
Councilperson Fred Dtivis suggested that firmer
guidelines on police conduct would help improve
police-community rchitions. Mttre human rehitions
trtiining for police, strict tliscipline for officers who
broke ileptirtment rules, the cretition of a special
dttmestic crisis intervention squail. and tin increase
in the number of black officers, as well as their in
creased presence ;it supervisory levels would help
solve problems between police and black
citizens.''"'
Robert James ticknowledged that he received
notices from the NAACP of alleged police brutali
ty but said the numbers and seriousness of such
notices had dwindled.'"' Given the rising crime
r;ite, he said he thought police brutidity was nor
mal. “ VVe should almost expect it," he said, "not
condone it, but expeet it." He said he thought it
a "marvel...that the police restrain themselves to
the extent that they do.” '"' Mr. James offered an
explanation for this "normal" hehavir)r on the part
of the police. He submitted that some police were
abnormal and therefore as poliee t)ffieers used ex-
eessive force which he termed "normal":
1 think police work attracts a few sadistic peo
ple. This is the nature of it. It is one of the
hazards of the occupation....'""
...quite a few of the police that are accused of
brutality have had questionable behavior
sometime in the past....'"'
Mr. James said he felt that black citizens did
overreact to poliee abuse (apparently meted out
by a few sadistic police) but he knew most minori
ty persons in Memphis were frustrated:
I don’t think that the white people have the
frustrations that the blacks do because they
have low incomes and htive got inlLition ;uul
unemployment... pereentiigewise the blacks
are in the majority of the htirdship cases
economically.'""
A better system t>f justice which would eliminate
the "revolving door" for the crimitial, would re
lieve the frustration which Mr. Jtimes believes po
lice feel, and it would, thereby, improve police-
community relations. Mr. James also recom-
men
wee
tow,
the
in ii
O
he I
con;
thoi
ack'
stat
eve
pro
Dir
i
test
(Jc!
rol.
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tlu
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pii
in
Rt
tT)
h i
til
an
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ot
Ci
P'
w
h.
at
l l
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48
1038
mended better “ screening of police applicants to
weed out those few that do slip in that are inclined
toward sadism.” -'"' He did not mention any role for
the city council or its law enforcement committee
in improving police-citizens relations.
Oscar Edmonds, chair of the city council, .said
he personally did not think there were any police-
community problems in Memphis, although he
thought some black citizens thought otherwise. He
acknowledged that Director Chapmen had publicly
stated that problems did exist; he supposed, how
ever, that Mr. Chapman had “ taken care" of the
problems.'*'"
Director of Police
E. Winslow Chapman, director of police,
testified under oath, without reservation, that there
definitely was a problem with police-community
relations in Memphis. He described the problem as
twofold: “ a defensive attitude on the part o f the
department and the officers" and "a feeling of
frustration plus some sense of misunderstanding on
the part of the community....” *" Mr. Chapman
noted also that there was a particular lack of con
fidence in the Memphis police among black Mem
phians.
Director Chapman, who was appointed to office
in September 1976, discussed with the U.S. Civil
Rights Commission the two major steps he planned
to take to improve police-community relations.
First, every police officer would be made aware
that physical abuse and overreaction on the part of
an officer “ will not be tolerated.”*'* Mr. Chapman
said he considered the attitude and performance of
officers the primary factors which affect police-
community relations, and consistently fair and
professional behavior on the part of all police
would have to be achieved. Mr. Chapman said that
he had begun, two or three times each week, to
answer police calls on a random basis and observe
the performance of the police officers involved.
He said he hoped that this sporadic monitoring
would result in improved police conduct and ser
vices.*'*
The second step Director Chapman stated he
was taking to improve police-community relations
was a concerted effort to “ establish rapport with
the black community, to hear their problems and
to respond to these problems...."*" Mr. Chapman
did not elaborate on how he intended to establish
rapport with the black community. However, he
did say during the Commission's May 1977 public
hearing that he had considered the establishment
of some type of citizen board to provide for citizen
participation in police matters. He cited the Mem
phis affiliate of the National Council on Crime and
Juvenile Delinquency as one active citizens’ group
which was already working with him. Mr. Chap
man stated that he did “ intend to get into it
(consideration of opportunities of citizen-pidice
communication I when we have the budget and
negotiations (police union contract( out of the
way....”*'-'
Mayor of Memphis
Wyeth Chandler, mayor of Memphis since 1972,
agreed with Police Director Chapman that there
was a problem with police-community relations in
Memphis. “ I think it’s (police-community relations
problem] perhaps the same in every major city in
the country, but I think we do have a problem.”*'"
The mayor acknowledged that many black
citizens, and some white citizens also, probably felt
their civil rights were violated by police. Mayor
Chandler believed, however, that these citizens
would be more likely to say they “ don’t get a fair
shake, rather than talking about police brutali
ty-
In response to questions at the Commission’s
May 1977 public hearing about efforts to improve
police-community relations in Memphis, Mayor
Chandler cited the recruitment and hiring of more
blacks and women as an effort that began early in
his first term of office. The creation of a commu
nity relations division with the police department
was another example he cited. The division is no
longer in existence, he said, because Bill Crumby,
Director Chapman’s predecessor, believed the po
lice personnel assigned there were needed in regu
lar departmental operations because of the high
crime rate in Memphis.*'"
The incentive for all pt l̂ice officers to promote
good pblicc-community relations was quite clear in
the mayor’s mind. He told the Commission;
...if a man steps out of line he is fired. He is
sent home. And eventually if it happens more
thdn once, it it recurs and the evidence is
there, he is removed from the police depart-'
ment and finds employment elsewhere. That is
the incentive to try to make everybody behave
ihemselves and do whatever should be
done.*"'
49
1 0 3 : i
A more positive incentive cited by Mayor Chan
dler was inservice training where “ ev
ery policemen...has been instructed on how to
act. ” 220 Lt. William Turner, chief training officer
of the MPD, said, however, that not one of the 40
hours of inscrvice training required of police of
ficers each year is devoted to human relations
training. (See chapter 3.)
Once again, like Director Chapman, Mayor
Chandler was not opposed to the idea of citizen
involvement in the police department. “ I would
not mind a group that would like to come down
and discuss policy and have an input in the policy
with either criticism or praise,” he said.''''' Mayor
Chandler referred to the team of citizens who
worked with the city and the U.S. Department of
Justice, Community Relations Service, in 1974 to
negotiate some solutions to police-citizen tensions
as a “ very good” effort;
...[as] a group of citizens representing every
segment of this city who make their feelings
known and become a sounding board for him
[director of police] in operation of the police
department. As such, certainly it’s [a citizens
committee] acceptable.
Mayor Chandler also said he regarded the office
of the mayor and the city council itself as primary
channels for citizen input regarding police opera
tions.** ̂ Two rather specific recommendations for
improving police-community relations were
directed by the mayor to the citizens and the po
lice. He urged greater patience on the part of both
groups, and more cooperation on the part of
citizens:
...I think a little more patience perhaps on
both sides, the side of the police department
and the side of the citizens, in particular the
black citizens.**^
...I would like to see every citizen...[as] pfoud
of its police department as they should be,
happy with it, working with it, cooperating
with it, helping eliminate the criminal in this
city. That is what 1 would like to see.***
Notes to C hapter 5
1. Maxine Smith, testimony before the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights hearing, Memphis, Tennessee, May 9, 1977, trans
cript, p. 224 (hereafter cited as Hearing Transcript).
2. Maxine Smith, statement before the Tennessee Advisory
Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights open meet
ing, Memphis, Tennessee, October H-9, 1976, transcript, pp.
373, 3K7 (hereafter cited as Open Meeting Transcript).
3 Ibid., p. 413.
4. For the purpose of this report, the term, “ police miscon
duct” refers to the following categories as set forth under the
heading “ Types o f Complaints” from records of the Memphis
Police Department, Internal Affairs Bureau, subpenaed by the
Commission: Physical abuse, verbal abuse, theft, conduct un-
becH>ming an officer, neglect of duty, harassment, discourtesy.
Illegal arrest, illegal search, other. In referencing specific allega
tions of police misconduct, an attempt to identify the type of
misconduct by these categories has been made.
5. Smith Statement. Open Meeting Transcript, pp. 364—65.
6. Ibid., pp. 387 -8S .
7. Ibid., p. 389.
8. Ibid., p. 378.
9. Ibid., p. 368.
10. Ibid., p. 375.
11. Ibid. Ms. Smith elaborated stating, “ W e perhaps don’t file
some that we should." Hearing Transcript, p. 24.
12. Smith Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, p. 368.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 392.
15. Ibid., p. 392.
16. Ibid., p. 393.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Smith Testimony. Hearing Transcript, p. 27.
20. Ibid., p. 25.
21. Smith Statement. Open Meeting Transcript, p. 369.
22. Ibid., p. 374.
23. Ibid., p. 366.
24. Ibid., p. 377.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 378.
27. Smith Testimony, Hearing Transcript p. 26.
28. Ibid., p. 57.
2<#. Ibid.
3t). United States v. City of Memphis, No. 74-285 (U .S .D C.
W .D . Tenn., consent decree issued Nov. 27, 1974)(hereafter
referred to as U.S. v. Memphis).
31. Smith Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 29.
32. Sec discussion o f minority employment in chapter 3.
33. See discussion o f the Afro-American Police Association in
chapter 3.
34. Smith Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 28.
35. Smith Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, p. 367.
36. Ibid., p. 393.
37. S.
38. Si
39. ii
40. II
41. 11
42. U
43. II
44. I
45. ■■
Leag'
46. T
47. T
48. I
Ewin
lice I
parii
sion
49. 1
50. I
51. I
52. 1
53.
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
thi.-
an.
61
62
6.̂
6a
65
6 (.
nc
Ri
6-
6;
6'
50 lOiO
37. See discussion in chapter 4.
38. Smith Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, pp. 3 9 3 -9 4 .
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. 388.
41. Ibid., p. 390.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., p. 388 .
44. Ewing Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, p. 86.
45. “ National Urban League: Terms o f Affiliation for Urban
League Affiliates” , art. 1, sec. C .
46. Herman Ewing, telephone interview, July 8 , 1977.
47. Ibid.
48. Ewing Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, p. 87. Mr.
Ewing was the Urban League representative on the 1974 Po
lice-Community Negotiating Team organized by the U S. De
partment of Justice. Community Relations Service; see discus
sion, chapter 4.
49. Ibid., pp. 8 8 -8 9 .
50. Ibid., p. 98.
51. Ibid., p. 107.
52. Ibid., p. 88.
53. Ibid., p. 87.
54. Ibid., p. 85.
55. Ibid., p. 88,
56. Ibid,, p. 96.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., pp. 9 6 -9 7 .
60. Ibid., pp. 101—02. The city o f Memphis is required to use
the Urban League, among others in the recruitment o f blacks
and women for city employment. U S. v. Memphis, at 15.
61. Ewing Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, p. 102.
62. Ibid., p. 84.
63. Ibid., pp. 8 3 -8 4 .
64. See further discussion, chapter 6.
65. Ewing Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, pp. 8 3 -8 5 .
66. Written Statement o f Herman Ewing, presented to the Ten
nessee Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, Open Meeting, Memphis, Oct. 8, 1976, p, 1.
67. Ewing Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, p. 83.
68. Ibid., pp. 8 4 -8 5 .
69. Written Statement o f Herman Ewing, p. 2.
"*0. Ewing Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, p. 103.
I. See also, discussion in chapter 6.
72, Chan Kendrick, telephone interview, July 22, 1977
(Hereafter cited as Kendrick Interview).
73 Arnold Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, p. 222.
74. Kendrick Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 30
75. Ibid.
76. Arnold Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, p. 190.
77. Kendrick Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 30.
78. Ibid.
79 Kendrick Interview.
80. Kramer Testimony, Hearing Transcripts, pp. 161-62.
81. Kendrick Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 3 1 -32 .
82. Arnold Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, p. 188.
83. Kendrick Testimony. Hearing Transcript, pp. 3 1 -32 .
84. Ibid., p. 32.
85. Kendrick Interview.
86. Arnold Statement, Open Meeting, Transcript, p. 192.
87. City o f Memphis v, Payne, Crim. No. 28 -31 (Memphis City
Court Dec. 15, 1975).
88. Arnold Statement, Open Meeting. Transcript, p. 192.
89. Quoted Statement is from Kramer Testimony, Hearing
Transcript, p. 159. See also: Kendrick Testimony, Hearing
Transcript, p. 78; Arnold Statement, Open Meeting Transcript,
pp. 2 2 0 -2 1 .
90. Wiley v. Memphis Police Department, Civil No. 7 3 -8
(U .S D .C .W .D . Tenn July 15. 1975). u/y'd 528 F. 2d 1247 (6th
Cir., 1977), petitian fur ceri. filed. 45 U .S.L W . 3755, (U.S.
May 10. 1977)(N o. 7 6 -1 5 7 1 ) .
91. Arnold Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, pp. 2 1 1 -1 2 .
92. Kendrick Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 75.
93. Ibid., p. 35.
94. Legal Services Corporation Act. 42 U S.C. v2996 et seq.
(1 9 76 ).
95. Wharton Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 37.
96 . Wharton Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, p. 199.
97 . Wharton Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 36.
98. Wharton Statement. Open Meeting Transcript, p. 194.
99. Ibid.
too. Ibid., pp. 195 -96 .
101. Wharton Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 37.
102. Lacey v. Jones, N o. 355505 et seq. (Gen. Ses. C t., Shelby
County, Tenn.). Consent dismissal ordered Jan. 25 , 1977.
103. Wharton Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, p. 197.
104. Commercial Appeal. Nov. 17, 1976.
105. Lacy v. Jones.
106. Wharton Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, p. 197.
1 O(] 1 I
51
107. “ Agreement Between City of Memphis, Tennessee, and
Memphis Poliec Association*', art. XII, sec. 7 (p, 21). See
further discussion on agreement, chapter 6.
lOH. Wharton Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, pp.
197-9H.
109. Wharton Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 41.
110. Wharton Statement, Open Meeting Tran.script, p. 216.
111. Wharton Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 41.
I 12. Perkins v. Chapman, No. 7 7 -2 2 1 4 (U S.D C. W D. Tenn..
filed Apr. 1 I, 1977).
1 13. Wharton Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 3X -39.
114. Wharton Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, p. 208;
Hearing Transcript, pp. 8 3 -8 4 . See further discussion, chapter
6 .
115. Wharton Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 72.
116. See 18 U .S.C . y24I, 242, and 245: Wharton Testimony,
Hearing Transcript, p. 72.
117. Edward G . Thompson, interview in Memphis, Apr. 27,
1977.
118. Nancy Sorak, interview in Memphis, Apr. 27, 1977.
I 19. Ibid.
120. Thompson Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 46—47;
Sorak Testimony. Hearing Transcript, pp. 5 1 -5 3.
121. Thompson Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 46—47.
122. Sorak Testimony. Hearing Transcript, p. 51.
123. See discussion, chapter 5.
124. Sorak Testimony. Hearing Transcript, p. 5 1.
125. Ibid., p. 53.
126. Thompson Testimony. Hearing Transcript, p. 49.
127. Thompson Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 47—48;
Sorak Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 5 3 -5 4 .
128. Thompson Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 48.
129. Sorak Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 54.
130. Thompson Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 7 7 -7 8 ;
Sorak Testimony. Hearing Transcript, p. 77.
131. Thompson Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 49.
132. Ibid., p. 87.
133. Sorak Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 5 2 -8 8 .
134. Thompson Testimony. Hearing Transcript, p. 71.
135. Ibid.
136. Sorak Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 73.
137. Thompson Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 50.
138. Sorak Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 55.
139. Elmo Baker Statement. Open Meeting Transcript, pp.
224-29.
.S2
140. Marshall Hobson Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, pp.
2 3 5 -3 9 .
141. Virginia Washington Statement. Open Meeting Transcript,
p. 239.
142. Deborah Lynn Rayford Statement, Open Meeting Trans
cript. p. 240.
143. Rev. J R. James Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, pp,
3 1 4 -2 2 .
144. /Vi'.v.r Scimitar. Oct. 12. 1976.
145. Wyeth Chandler, interview in Memphis. Apr. 29. 1977.
146. Samuel Hollis, president. Memphis Area Chamber of
Comm erce, Testimony. Hearing Transcript, p. 9 1.
147. Hollis Testinu>ny, Hearing Transcript, p. 90,
148. Samuel Hollis, interview in Memphis, Apr. 22. 1977
(hereafter cited as Hollis Interview).
149. Hollis Testimony. Hearing Transcript, p. 90.
150. Ibid., p. 92.
151. Ht)llis Interview.
152. Edward Boldt, interview in Memphis, May 2. 1977
(hereafter cited as Boldt Interview).
153. Press Scimitar. Apr. 27, 1977, p. 6.
154. Greater Memphis Council on Crime and Delinquency, “ By
L aw s," Aug. 24, 1976, p. 2.
155. Newton Allen, interview in Memphis. Apr. 28, 1977.
156. Boldt Interview.
157. Cot}imerciai Appeal, Sept. 10, 1977, p. 1.
158. Ctmimercial Appeal, Sept. 1 I, 1977, p. A -6 .
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid.
161. Sister Mary Anne Guthrie, chairman. Wom en of Memphis
Coalition, letter to Jay Hubbard, Feb. 14. 1973. USCCR files;
Letter to Robert B. James, city councilman, Feb. 14. 1973.
USCCR files.
162. Margaret Dichtcl and Colvin Baird, memo to members of
Memphis Inter-Faith Asst>ciation Task Force, undated, USCCR
files.
163. “ Report on Police Brutality and Police Misconduct in
Memphis. Tenn.,” March 1974.
164. Ibid., p. 4.
165. Ibid., p. 5.
166. Rev. Edward Reeves, interview in Memphis. Apr. 16.
1977 (hereafter cited as Reeves Interview).
167. Press Scimitar. Apr. 14. 1977.
168. keeves Interview.
169. Telephone interview. Aug. 24, 1977.
170 William Sorrell, managing editor. Commercial Appeal.
telephone interview, Oct. 1. 1976; Ray Wilson, city editor.
/V<'.vv-.S't7>m7i/r, telephone interview, Oct. I, 1976,
171. Chui
W D IA R.u
172. Bot>l
director, \
sident and
Oct. 4, IV
173. John
Holt, Rinc
174. Ibid ,
175. 47 1'
176. Hoh.
177. Paul
178. M l.
179 Wav
interview
180. Com
181. Don
view, Sei
182. Ibul
183. Tn
184. Te-
185. In
186. irt
187. Ch
188. liii.
189. Ho
190. Rn
Bar As-
191. Bi.
192. M.
193. 11.
no. 8, .
194. N
metu A
195. A
Testini.
196. M
197. H
198. J
Hymai
terviev
Meinp
Apr.
1977.
1977,
Edm.
loran,
tervie
mond
171. Charles Scruggs, vice president and general manager,
W D IA Radio, telephone interview. Sept. 22 , 1976.
172. Bobby D. Doctor, letter to Paul Barnett, a.ssistant news
director, W R E G —T V , Sept. 24 , 1976; M .E. Greiner, vice pre
sident and general manager, W M C -T V , telephone interview,
Oct. 4 , 1976.
173. John Hohenbcrg, The Professional Jtturnalist (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1973), p, 570.
174. Ibid., p. 574 .
175. 47 U S.C. Y l5 1 et ,seq. (1 9 7 0 ).
176. Hohenberg, The Professional Journalist^ p. 575.
177. Paul Barnett, interview in Memphis, Apr. 12, 1976.
178. M .E. Greiner, telephone interview. Sept. 21, 1976.
179. Wayne Trotter, urban affairs editor. Commercial Appeal,
interview in Memphis, Apr. 1 1, 1976.
180. Commercial Appeal, Aug. 10. 1977, p. 29.
181. Don G roff, reporter. Commercial Appeal, telephone inter
view, Sept. 29, 1977.
182. Ibid.
183. Tri-State Defender, Aug. 1, 1977, p. 1.
184. Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 348.
185. Tri-State Defender, Apr. 2 4 , 1976, p. 1.
186. Tri-State Defender, Apr. 2 3 , 1977, p. 1.
187. Chandler Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 348.
188. Interview in Memphis, Apr. 15, 1977.
189. Hohenberg, The Professional Journalist, p. 533.
190. Emmett Marston. president, Memphis and Shelby County
Bar Association, interview in Memphis, Apr. 19, 1977.
191. Brown Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 98.
192. Marston Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 96.
193. Bureau o f National Affairs, Inc., "L a w W eek, "vo l. 46 ,
no. 8, Aug. 23, 1977.
194. North Carolina Academy o f Trial Lawyers, Law Enforce
ment Manuel, August 1977.
195. A .C . Wharton, Nancy Sorak, and Edward Thompson,
Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 8 3 -8 6 .
196. Marston Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 104.
197. Brown Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 105.
198. John Ford, interview in Memphis, Aug. 11, 1976; Billy
Hyman, interview in Memphis, May 2, 1977; J.O. Patterson in
terview in Memphis, May 4 , 1977; Robert James, interview in
Memphis, Apr, 29, 1977; Ed McBrayer, interview in Memphis,
Apr. 29, 1977; Thomas Todd, interview in Memphis, May 3,
1977; A .D . Alissandratos, interview in Memphis, Apr. 27,
1977; Jeff Sanford, interview in Memphis, Apr. 20, 1977; Oscar
Edmonds, Jr., interview in Memphis, Apr. 2 1 , 1977; Pat Hal-
loran, interview in Memphis, May 4, 1977; and Fred Davis, in
terview in Memphis, Apr. 2 2 , 1977 (hereafter cited as Ed
monds Interview, Holloran Interview, and Davis Interview,
respectively). Council members Glenn Raines and Pat Vander
Schoaf were not available for interviews.
199. Halloran Interview.
200. Halloran Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 274.
201. Ibid., pp. 2 8 8 -8 9 .
202. Davis Interview.
203. Ibid.
204. James Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 268.
205. Ibid., pp. 2 7 6 -7 7 .
206. Ibid.
207 . Ibid., p. 283.
208. Ibid., p. 294.
209. Ibid., pp, 2 8 2 -8 3 .
210. Edmonds Interview.
211. Chapman Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 3 0 0 -0 1 .
212. Ibid., p. 302.
213. E. Winslow Chapman, interview in Memphis, Apr. 19,
1977.
214. Chapman Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 303.
215. Ibid., pp. 303 and 311.
216. Chandler Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 328.
217. Ibid., p. 344,
218. Ibid., p. 330.
, 219 . Ibid., p. 332.
■' 220. Ibid.
221. Ibid., p. 335.
222. Ibid., p, 341.
223. Ibid., p. 335.
224. Ibid., p. 336.
225. Ibid., p. 348.
104a 53
Chapter 6
POLICE MISCONDUCT— INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
REVIEW
Community Perspective of the
Problem
Virtually everyone heard by the Tennessee Ad
visory Committee and the Commission who has
been in a position to reflect and comment upon
the state of police-community relations in Mem
phis agrees that problems do exist. On the salient
factors such as the nature, extent, causes, and
remedies, however, there are often sharp dif
ferences of opinion. These differences are most
prevalent in the matter of police misconduct and
the remedies for it. A basic dichotomy exists
which may be summarized as; ( 1 ) the opinion of
those persons who maintain that a pattern and
practice of police misconduct of severe propor
tions exists in Memphis, exacerbated by the utter
failure of the mechanisms designed to remedy it;
ancf (2) the opinion of those persons who question
the extent of the police misconduct and who main
tain their belief and confidence that there are
adequate corrective mechanisms, functioning ef
fectively to remedy whatever police misconduct
might exist.
In terms o f ascertaining why this divergence of
opinion exists, it is important to identify, albeit in
a necessarily general fashion, those persons who
espouse each opinion.
Those persons who have the first opinion are;
(1) those who have alleged being victims of police
misconduct and who are frustrated at the alleged
failures of the remedial mechanisms; and (2) those
persons (with the exception of Memphis Police
Department (MPD) personnel) who have, through
the course of their private and professional lives,
been in positions to receive citizens’ complaints of
police misconduct and, in 'attempting to seek
remedial action on their behalf, have substantiated
the alleged failures of the available mechanisms to
effectuate remedial action. The testimonies of
several, but not nearly all, of these,persons have
been included in this report.
In terms o f why these persons hold this opinion,
it is unreasonable to suggest that they have ulterior
motives for doing so. With regard to the in
dividuals who complain of police misconduct and
their frustrations at remedial action, it is difficult,
if not impossible, to find reasonable motives for
their opinions other than that they have felt vic
timized by their police and have not witnessed
anything having been done about it. With regard
to those persons who have been recipients of the
complaints of individual citizens and who have at
tempted to have their complaints remedied, the
responsible nature of the positions they hold in
their organizations, their collective experiences
which connote informed opinion, and the unanimi
ty of their opinion despite the different functions
of their organizations, all discount any reasonable
identification of ulterior motives as to why they
hold their opinion.
Those persons who espouse the second opinion,
however, that the extent of police misconduct is
not severe but even "normal” and to be expected,'
are virtually all in positions with vested interests
for holding that opinion. Virtually all are in
elected or appointed positions that have direct or
oversight responsibilities to ensure that MPD per
sonnel conduct their operations in a fair and effec
tive manner.
There remains, of course, a substantial majority
of the community that, because they do not exer
cise any direct control over the situation and have
not been directly affected by the problem of police
misconduct, have not placed themselves in a posi
tion to have an informed opinion in the matter.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine both
the internal (within the MPD) and external
(administrative recourses outside the MPD and
civil and criminal legal action) review mechanisms
that arc currently available to those community
members who believe they have been victims of
police misconduct. In identifying internal and ex
ternal remedies, both the scope of the remedy as
it is purported to be and its actual effectivenss in
operation are examined.
54
104 1
As a foreword to this examination, the Tennes
see Advisory Committee sets forth the following
premises which are, or should be, of unquestioned
validity: (1) all persons have a right to seek
responsive action to complaints of police miscon
duct and to have valid complaints acted upon in
an open and affirmative manner; (2) the responsi
ble public officials have an obligation to ensure
that effective mechanisms exist to investigate and
respond to complaints of police misconduct and to
ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken;
(3) the community has a civic right and responsi
bility to be informed of the extent to which police
misconduct is a problem and to take the necessary
community action to ensure that public officials
are exercising both the preventive and responsive
steps needed to correct the problem in an open,
fair, and efficient manner.
Nature of Internal and External
Review
Prior to any detailed discussion of the internal
and external review mechanisms that purportedly
exist to remedy police misconduct in Memphis, an
overview of the nature o f these remedies, i.e., the
scope of the remedies offered and their limitations,
needs to be set forth.
Of primary significance is the fact that all inter
nal and external remedies are basically reactionary
rather than preventive in nature. They are essen
tially official responses to police misconduct after
the fact. As stated in the President’s Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, Task Force Report: The Police,^ “ The best way
to deal with misconduct is to prevent it by effective meth
ods of personnel screening, sufficient training, constant
retraining and supervision.’ ’ ^
Internal Review
Beyond the prerequisite preventive methods of
police misconduct, however;
Without question, the best means for ensuring
that personnel are complying with departmen
tal policies and general notions of fairness is
through effective internal police procedures.
Internal discipline can be swifter and, because
imposed by the officers’ own superiors, more
effective. If properly carried out, internal
discipline can assure the public that the de
partment’s policies concerning community
relations are fully meant and enforced. This is
particularly true when the department's own
investigation discovers misconduct without
any citizen complaint.
Strong discipline shows the public that
misconduct is merely the action of individual
officers—the few who violate the rules in any
organization—and not action which is
customarily tolerated in the department. Con
sequently, high priority should be given to im
proving internal police procedures so that
they can satisfy as much of the public as
possible concerning their fairness and effec-
tivenss.^
As the results of the MPD internal review efforts
dictate (see exhibits 4, 5, and 6 and the following
discussion) the critical importance of using inter
nal review in winning the public confidence by
demonstrating open, fair, and effective internal
discipline has been largely unrealized in Memphis.
External Review
In all jurisdictions, if a complainant remains
dissatisfied with the internal disposition of a
case, there are other avenues of appeal out
side the police agency; The local prosecutor;
the courts; elected officials such as council-
men or the mayor; the State’s attorney
general; and the U.S. Department of Justice.'
In addition, in Memphis the community relations
commission and the civil service commission (see
discussion, below) are two additional external
mechanisms for limited review of police miscon
duct.
For a variety of reasons, not limited to the situa
tion in Memphis, all forms of external review, to
varying degrees, have been historically ineffective
nationwide in coping with police misconduct in a
systematic, comprehensive fashion.' This fact rein
forces the need for a fair and effective internal
review process.
An analysis of the external review mechanisms
in Memphis underscores the validity of the above
conclusion as to the historical ineffectiveness of
external reviews of police misconduct. In sum
marizing in this chapter the effectivenss of external
review mechanisms in Memphis, the traditional
factors militating against effective external review
mechanisms are compared and contrasted with the
actual history of external review efforts in the
Memphis community.
55
1015
EXHIBIT 4
Citizen Complaints of Police Misconduct Investigated By lAB Category
(January 1, 1974-April 29, 1977)
Category 1974 1975 1976 1977 • Totals
Physical Abuse 72 119 131 60 382
Verbal Abuse 32 29 30 9 100
Theft
Conduct Unbecoming
53 19 26 7 105
Officer 135 39 40 15 229
Neglect of Duty — 17 25 6 48
Harrassment — 24 38 10 72
Discourtesy 17 12 14 5 48
Illegal Arrest 23 24 20 3 70
Illegal Search 15 8 3 1 27
Other
Total Complaints Investigated
13 16 15 1 45
1,126
* through April 29.
56 1 0 4 1 ^
EXHIBIT 5
MPD Disciplinary Actions By lAB Category Resulting From lAB Investigations of
1126 Complaints
(January 1 ,1974-April 29,1977)
i f -3
Dismissal Suspension
Written
Reprimand
Verbal
Reprimand No Action Unknown Under
(years)
77*
(years) (years) (years) (years) (years) Investigation
75 76 74 75 76 77* 74 75 76 77* 74 75 76 77* 74 75 76 77* 74 75 76 77* 1977*
Physical Abuse 0 0 3 0 1 3 4 3 0 2 4 0 0 0 4 0 63 102 115 17 8 12 1 2 38
Verbal Abuse 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 30 25 29 4 1 2 0 0 5
Theft 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 1 52 12 21 5 1 2 1 0 1
Conduct Un
becoming Officer 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 5 0 124 34 30 2 10 2 0 0 13
Neglect of
Duty 0 Q 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 22 3 0 2 0 0 3
Harrassment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 38 7 0 1 0 0 3
Discourtesy 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 16 12 11 0 0 0 0 2 3
Illegal Arrest 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 17 20 20 0 6 4 0 0 2
Illegal Search 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 8 3 0 0 0 0 0 1
Other 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 7 7 15 1 5 6 0 0 0
Sub-Totals 0 0 6 0 3 7 11 3 1 8 8 1 1 5 11 1 324 256 304 39 31 31 2 4 69
Totals 6 24 18 18 923 68 69 = 1126
* Through April 29.
EXHIBITS
Percentages of MPD Disciplinary Actions by lAB Category Resulting From lAB
Investigation of 1126 Complaints
Jan. 1974-April 29,1977
X
r J ^
— I— - n. 2 “o ? -3 3 r.
" T ’
As the summary of external review effectiveness
in Memphis indicates, any declaration that citizens
have effective and viable alternatives to internal
review of police misconduct can only be placed in
the category of a "let them eat cake" response to
the problem.
Memphis Police Department
Internal Affairs: Police
Misconduct Investigation and
Discipline
As set forth in the discussion in chapter 5, both
the Tennessee Advisory Committee and the Com
mission heard overwhelming testimony from mem
bers of the Memphis community as to the ineffec
tiveness and nonresponsiveness of the MPD inter
nal affairs (i.e., investigation and discipline)
process. Much of this testimony was directed at
the MPD Internal Affairs Bureau (lAB), the inter
nal organization established specifically for the
purpose of investigating police misconduct. As
discussed below, however, the lAB is only a com
ponent, although an important one, of the entire
MPD internal affairs process. To the extent that
the lAB has been singled out as the major, if not
the only, reason for the ineffectiveness of the
MPD internal affairs efforts, the criticism has been
largely misdirected. Much more on point is the
criticism which is targeted at the entire MPD in
ternal affairs process.
As the data supplied to the Commission pur
suant to subpena so dramatically reflect, (sec ex
hibits 4, 5, and 6) instances of disciplinary action
taken in response to citizen’s complaints, particu
larly of physical abuse, have been virtually nil.
With regard to the critical category of physical
abuse of citizens by police officers, for example, in
the period from January I, 1974, through April
29, 1977 (time reference of the data subpenaed),
there were 3 82 complaints of physical abuse alone
filed with the lAB. Complaints of physical abuse
are exclusive of those complaints separately
categorized by the lAB under nine other types of
complaints (see “ Category" column in exhibit 4).
Of the 382 complaints, 38 were still under in
vestigation ax of April 29, 1977. Of the remaining
344, the data reflect that the disciplinary actions
taken in 23 complaints are unknown by the lAB.
Subtracting the 38 complaints under investigation
and the 23 complaints for which the disciplinary
actions taken, if any, are unknown, there remains
a total of 321 complaints investigated by the lAB
and referred for disciplinary action to appropriate
MPD supervisory personnel for which the MPD
disciplinary disposition is known.
The MPD disciplinary actions taken as a result
of the 321 investigations of physical abuse in
vestigated by the lAB have resulted in a total of
three dismissals (0.93 percent) of the total and I 1
suspensions (3.5 percent) of the total). Verbal and
written reprimands, the only other types of
disciplinary actions taken, have been given in four
and six instanees, respectively (a eombined figure
which represents 3.1 percent of the total).
Based on this data, the odds of a police officer
being dismissed due to an investigation of a com
plaint of physical abuse of a citizen are less than
1 in a 100; of being suspended, 1 in 28; of being
reprimanded verbally or in writing, 1 in 29.
Analysis of why meaningful disciplinary action
in response to citizens’ complaints has been vir
tually nonexistent must include factors other than
an examination of the lAB alone. One factor is the
disciplinary process b)r which the lAB has absolu
tely no control. Another is the relevant provisions
of the Memphis Police Association Bargaining
Agreement with the City of Memphis^ which sub
stantially affect the ability of the lAB to compile
the necessary evidentiary record to dispute or sub
stantiate the merits of a complaint, and, therefore,
ultimately impact upon the disciplinary process as
well.
MPD Internal Investigation Process
The Memphis Police Department has historically
maintained an entity within the department to in
vestigate allegations of police misconduct. Offi
cially referred to as the internal affairs bureau, the
lAB is charged with investigating all citizens’ com
plaints of police misconduct. In addition, in a low
percentage of instances, the lAB investigates
charges of police misconduct initiated by ap
propriate MPD supervisory personnel."
Since May 1974, the lAB has been located in
offices (100 N. Main, Room 1104) outside MPD
headquarters. This move was made by order of
former Police Director lay Hubbard for the pur
pose of facilitating the filing of complaints by
citizens who might otherwise be reluctant to do so
at the MPD headquarters.
l O T I
59
Inspector Robert Wilkinson was the commander
of the lAB at the time o f the Tennessee Advisory
Committee’s October 1976 open meeting and the
May 1977 Commission hearing. According to In
spector Wilkinson,” the lAB staff consists of 1 1
commissioned police officers (incliuling 2 black
males and 1 black female) and .1 clerical support
staff. All assignments to lAB are made from per
sons volunteering for lAB assignment and the posi
tions are permanent, i.e., lAB officers do not rou
tinely rotate to other MPD assignements.
Shortly after E. Winslow Chapman became
director in late September 1976, he organized the
lAB line of authority from the chief of police to
the director (see MPD organizational chart, ex
hibit 2). The lAB separates complaints into nine
specific categories (see exhibit 4) of misconduct
and one miscellaneous category. An analysis of the
computer printouts'" furnished by the MPD in
response to Commission subpena discloses that the
vast majority of disciplinary actions arc referenced
to categorized departmental regulations," written
guidelines regarding police conduct. They are •
comprehensive and include such broad categories
as “ DR 105 Adherence to Law,” which in effect
makes any violation of law or regulation (Federal,
State, county, and local) also a violation of depart
mental regulation.
In addition to departmental regulation viola
tions, police officers have also been investigated
and disciplined for other specifically proscribed
conduct as set forth in the city ordinances of
Memphis and the Memphis Civil Service Personnel
Manual.'* As illustrated by MPD General Order
12-76 Internal Discipline, many minor infractions
of work rules are disposed of without the
assistance of the lAB. The order provides specifi
cally, however, that all sworn allegations of verbal
or physical abuse will be directed to the lAB for
investigation and that all major offenses require in
vestigation by the lAB.
The data illustrated in exhibits 4, 5, and 6 were
compiled from statistics of lAB investigations of
citizen complaints and the MPD disciplinary ac
tions taken as a result o f them as prepared and
submitted by lAB Commander Robert Wilkinson
in response to Commission subpena. The data in
the exhibits, therefore, chronicle the entire 40-
month history of lAB investigations of and MPD
response to investigations of police misconduct in
volving proscribed conduct ai;ciiii.si cinzt’i’a. The
data in the exhibits il<i iiaf include disciplinary ac
tions taken by the VI PD for reasons other than
violations of the nine categories of police miscon
duct as defined and listed by the lAB. Disciplinary
actions for violations of "work” rules (e g., .ibiise
of sick leave, insubordination, property loss, ete.)
are not relevant to the issue of disciplinary actions
taken in response to allegations of police miscon
duct against citizens (e g., physical abuse, verbal
abuse, illegal arrest, etc.) and arc not in any
manner rcfiected in exhibits 4, 5, and 6.
Based upon information supplied by Inspector
Wilkinson, the process in effect May 9, 1977,
whereby the lAB investigates citizen complaints of
police misconduct is as follows.'"
The lAB requires a citizen who wishes to make
a complaint against an officer to appear in person
at the lAB office and complete and sign a sworn
affidavit summarizing the charges against the of
ficer. The lAB will not respond to anonymous
complaints or complaints made by telephone. The
affidavit is completed by the complainant after an
interview with an lAB officer. After the complai
nant signs the affidavit in the presence of a notary,
an lAB officer questions the complainant in an ef
fort to solicit further evidentiary information (e.g.,
names of witnesses) from the complainant which
will aid the lAB in its investigation. lAB officers
then contact witnesses, if any, named by the com
plainant and take written and oral (tape recorded)
testimony from witnesses or other persons ascer
tained to be relevant to the inquiry.
In certain instances, in particular where the
complainant has no witnesses, the lAB officer will
request that the complainant take a polygraph ex
amination (administered by trained MPD person
nel or, on occasion, by an independent examiner).
If the complainant refuses to take the polygraph
examination, the lAB will continue its investiga
tion. In instances where there arc no witnesses to
substantiate the complaint, however, it is a matter
of the complainant’s word against the officer’s. By
Uhion contract provision'" a police officer can
refuse to take a polygraph examination for any
reason.
Should the lAB at any stage of investigation of
a citizen complaint determine that there is proba
ble cause to believe that the officer named by the
complainant has committed a criminal offense, the
60
l O b ! '
lAB is required by terms of the union contract'-' to
discontinue investigation of the complaint, subject
to a criminal investigation by the appropriate MPD
criminal investigative branch. Subsequent to the
criminal investigation, the lAB may renew its in
vestigations to determine whether a noncriminal
violation has likely occurred. Prior to any
questioning of an officer pursuant to a sworn af
fidavit of complaint by a citizen, the lAB is
required, by terms of the union contract'" to pro
vide the accused police officer with a copy of the
signed affidavit. Upon completion of the lAB in
vestigation, the complete results are forwarded to
the various supervisory MPD personnel, depending
upon the rank and duty assignment of the officer
involved. By order of Director Chapman, made in
September 1976, a summary of all lAB investiga
tions (with exception of those complaints that are
clearly insignificant) are forwarded to his atten
tion. Included in each summary is a written state
ment of the lAB commander stating his profes
sional opinion as to whether the lAB investigation
does or does not support the complaint made. The
lAB finds approximately 60 percent of its in
vestigations do not support (i.e., “ unfounded” ) the
complaint and about 40 percent do support (i.e.,
“ founded” ) the complaint.'^
Subsequent to the lAB investigation and discipli
nary action, if any, the lAB sends each complai
nant a form letter which states, in effect, that the
police officer’s commanding officer has taken the
action that he considered proper. The letter also
states that the complainant may come to the lAB
office if he or she desires further information re
garding the disposition of the complaint.
In the spring of 1977, negotiations were con
ducted by representatives of the Memphis Police
Association and the city of Memphis regarding
renewal and changes in the 1974 union contract,
which was to expire as of June 30, 1977. As a
result of the negotiations, the union contract was
renewed, effective July 1, 1977, through June 30,
1980.'" One of the significant changes is the revi
sion in the lAB procedure involving investigations
of police misconduct that result in, or are likely to
result in, a criminal charge placed against the ac
cused police officer(s)."* The new procedure calls
for complete investigations of all complaints,
whether administrative or criminal in nature, by
the lAB with assistance o f an appropriate criminal
investigative branch as required and requested by
the lAB.
In conversation with Inspector Wilkinson of the
lAB^" and Sgt. Steve Brown, vice president of the
MPA,' '̂ both persons agreed to the general pur
poses of the change in the lAB criminal investiga
tive procedure; ( 1 ) to facilitate an orderly and
timely investigation of all complaints; (2) to place
full investigative authority for all citizen com
plaints in the independent lAB, purportedly
removing conflicts of intere.st that might be occa
sioned by a criminal branch investigating “ one of
its own” ; and (3) to attempt to gain public con
fidence in the entire MPD internal affairs process.
The provision allowing a police officer to refuse to
take a polygraph any time and without any ex
planation for the refusal has remained
unchanged.
MPD Internal Discipline Process
The MPD has written comprehensive procedures
setting forth the department’s handling of discipli
nary matters."" General Order (GO) 12-76 pro
vides that the authority for the MPD to discipline
police officers is derived from “ the City Charter,
Ordinances, [and] the Civil Service regulations
and is implicit in positions of command manage
ment and supervisory responsibility.” ""
The line of authority for administering discipline
is based upon the level disciplinary action contem
plated.
Director E. Winslow Chapman"' and former
Acting Chief John Holt"" outlined the current
process whereby the level of disciplinary action
contemplated is determined.
Director Chapman receives all substantive lAB
investigation reports together with a written sum
mary of each investigation made by Inspector Wil
kinson of the lAB. The summary includes the in
spector’s written opinion as to whether the com
plaints are founded or unfounded. Director Chap
man reviews each summary and notes those in
vestigations which he believes are serious and will
warrant discipline that will require his action or
subsequent review. In these instances, the director
requires personal notification of the internal
discipline, if any, subsequently taken. The director
then meets with his immediate subordinate
(formerly the chief of police; currently, the ap
propriate deputy director, i.e.. Deputy Director for
61
1051
Administering Authority
Immediate Supervisor
Precinct/Bureau Commander
Branch Commander
(If applicable)
Deputy Chief
Director/Chief of Police
TABLE 3
Level of Disciplinary
Action Authorized
Oral Admonition
Oral thru 3 days suspension
Oral thru 5 days suspension
Oral thru 9 days suspension
Oral thru termination
Statement of
Charges Required
Optional
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
o
111
ii.
>1
62 1 0 5 :o
Operations M.S. Jones or Deputy Director for Ad
ministration James Herbert) and discusses with
him the disposition of the remaining complaints.
Of the remaining investigations not identified by
the director for his personal review, the deputy
director may initiate disciplinary action or deter
mine at which level of operational assignment (i.e.,
deputy chief, precinct commander) the disciplina
ry action, if any, should be administered. Often
this is done on a case by case basis in discussion
with the deputy chiefs o f the various operational
assignments.
If any disciplinary action is taken (above an
“ oral admonition” ) the accused officer must be
presented with a “ statement of charges,” which he
or she normally is granted the option of answering.
In some instances, determined by the officer issu
ing the charges, the officer may be required to
, respond to the charges in writing. ’̂
Procedures are available to provide an officer
who has been ordered disciplined to appeal the ac
tion internally. Depending upon the severity of the
disciplinary action, the appeal may be heard by an
authority ranging from the officer’s immediate su
pervisor to the director o f police.^"
At the appeal hearing, the accused officer may
be represented by a union representative if he or
she so requests and the MPD may be represented
by its legal advisor, at the discretion of the
director. The complainant is not allowed to appear
or enter testimony or evidence at the hearing.
Subsequent to the MPD appeal hearing, an officer
may appeal any disciplinary action to the civil ser
vice commission, if the action taken is at least
suspension from duty for more than 10 days.^"
With regard to the work status o f an officer ac
cused of police misconduct, GO 12-76 provides
that pending investigation results, an officer
remains in pay status and may continue in normal
duties or be placed in non-enforcement duties or
be temporarily relieved o f all duties. In addition, if
an officer is formally charged or indicted for a
criminal offense, the officer may be suspended
from duty with or without pay or dismissed.
Bargaining Agreement with City
of Memphis
In July 1977 the Memphis Police Association
entered into its second 3-year bargaining agree
ment with the city o f Memphis.'" Throughout the
course of its negotiations with the MPA, the city
has quite effectively combated MPA demands that
would require expenditures of revenues, e.g., more
police officers, higher salaries, and more promo
tions. That the city of Memphis needs more
qualified police officers''^ and that competitive
salaries are necessary to attract and keep com
petent and effective police personnel is without
question. It is also without question that the city’s
current poor economic status (although possibly
exaggerated by the mayor)’ '* is a significant barrier
to these demands.’ ̂ In the crucial matter of inter
nal investigations o f police misconduct, however,
the city, suffering no economic effects and perhaps
as a tradeoff to the unheeded economic concerns
of the MPA, has acquiesced considerably to the
MPA demands.
In any discussion of investigation and discipline
for police misconduct, there are two fundamental
aspects to consider; (1) a police officer is a
“ trustee of the public interest” ’ ’ and in the exer
cise o f a critical portion of the police power of the
city and State,’* where life (and all too often)
death decisions are made, the police officer must
be held strictly accountable for his or her conduct
in the performance of his or her duties by the
public employer;” and (2) the acceptance of po
lice employment does not relegate a police officer
“ to a watered-down version of constitutional
rights.” **
In the pursuit of effective and fair investigations
o f and discipline for police misconduct, these two
aspects obviously require a legal and rational
balance. This balance may be struck by an ex
amination of the nature of administrative
proceedings (where a police officer’s employment
security is in jeopardy) and criminal proceedings
(where a police officer’s liberty is in jeopardy).
Certain provisions of the 1977 union contract
(all o f which were contained in the 1974 union
contract) affect the ability of the MPD to in
vestigate police misconduct effectively and to
discipline police officers. These provisions arc
discussed in this section with this balance in mind.
As illustrated by the discussion below, the MPAs
legal rationale for certain provisions is untenable,
amounting to unsupportablc job security demands
and in no way founded upon constitutionally-based
due process considerations. The acceptance of
these provisions by those city officials responsible
63
i 0 5 ; j
for protecting the public interest is an abdication
of their official duty.
Polygraph Examination
A provision of the union contract states: "No
member shall he ordered to submit to a polygraph
(lie detector) test for any reason. Such tests may
be offered by Police Administration or indepen
dently requested." (art. IV, sec. 5).
The importance of this provision, as it affects
the department’s ability to investigate police
misconduct and take appropriate disciplinary ac
tion, can best be illustrated by the testimony of
Director Chapman before the Commission:
We are faced in the vast majority of the cases
where the citizen said this happened to me.
The officers say that did not happen, or it
didn t happen that way. You really have no
basis upon which to make any substantive
decision as to what you should do.
This accounts for what has obviously been in
ferred or referred to here today, the vast
number of complaints and yet the relatively
small ratio of action taken. The reason is not
that we don’t believe it happened, but very
simple that we can’t prove it happened.
1 think that faced with a case like that we
have no choice but to take no action when we
can’t prove anything did happen.™
The hard facts are that in the majority of in
stances where a citizen complains of police
misconduct there is little evidence except the word
of the complainant as opposed to the word of the
officer(s) as to whether the officer had committed
a wrong against the citizen. In such instances.
Director Chapman has stated that the MPD has
“ no choice but to take no action when we can’t
prove it happened.’ ’™ This impasse brings the
relevancy o f a polygraph examination clearly into
focus; i.e., in many instances o f alleged police
misconduct, a pwjlygraph examination may be the
only useful investigative tool available to the de
partment to ascertain the merits o f a citizen’s com
plaint.
With regard to the reliability of a polygraph ex
amination, it should not be necessary here to ex
amine its merits exhaustively. The following facts
with regard to the MPD’s use of the polygraph
should suffice: (1) utilizing Federal funds,^' the de
partment has developed an “ internal polygraph
capability for law enforcement purposes" with
professional training at the /.onn Institute of Poly
graph in Miami, Florida; (2) the department ad
ministers a polygrtiph examintition to each appli
cant to the MPI) as a reipiirement for selection to
the force;'’̂ (.1) a polygraph extimitiation is rou
tinely utilized by the lAB (by consent of complai
nant and officer) in the investigation of citizens’
complaints. The MPD, therefore, has demon
strated its reliance on polygraph examinations both
in recruitment and complaint investigation and has
developed a profcssiontil capability for doing so.
Any statement by departmental personnel
questioning the reliability and use of a polygraph,
therefore, is clearly at odds with the department’s
actual practice and reliance upon it.
With regard to the constitutional rights of a po
lice officer (particularly the right to refuse to in
criminate himself or herself)thcre is simply no in
fringement of rights in compelling a police officer
to take a polygraph examination on matters,
"directly, and narrowly relating to the per
formance of his official duties,"^-' provided that the
officer’s answers cannot be used in a criminal
prosecution.
The Supreme Court, in a series o f three cases,
has grappled with the need to make public officials
(e.g., police officers) accountable for the per
formance o f their public function and at the same
time protect their constitutional rights. In the
Gardner case, the Court ruled that a police officer
cannot be discharged for refusing to waive a right
(i.e., freedom from self-incrimination) that the
Constitution guarantees to the officer.™ In the
Garrity case, the Court further established that if
a police officer gives testimony because of a threat
of removal from office, such testimony cannot be
used against the officer in a subsequent criminal
proceeding.
In Gardner, however, the Court turned directly
to the issue of a police officer’s accountability to
the public employer for the official performance of
his or her duties and established a formula for
achieving it. The Court, recognizing that a police
officer “ is a trustee of the public interest, bearing
the burden of great and total responsibility to his
public employer..." emphasized that “ the po
liceman is either responsible to the State or to no
one” -*" Accordingly, the Court stated:
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64
1 0 5 4
If appellant, a pt)liccman, had refused to
answer questions specifically, directly, and
narrowly relating to the performance of his of
ficial duties, without being required to waive
his immunity with respeet to the use of his an
swers or the fruits thereof in a eriminal
prosecution of himself, the privilege against
self-incrimination would not have been a bar
to his dismissal.'"'
It should be noted that the 1977 union contract
does provide that an officer may be disciplined for
“ refusal to answer pertinent questions concerning
any non-criminal matter."'" Allowing an officer to
refuse to take a polygraph examination, however,
at least in those instances where it is the complai
nant’s word against the officer’s, makes a mockery
of this provision. Both Sergeant Kent, MPA pre
sident," and Inspector Wilkinson, lAB com
mander,'* agreed that approximately 90 percent of
the officers requested by the lAB to take a poly
graph refuse to do so. In such instances, therefore,
it is still the word of the complainant (who may,
and often does, take a polygraph examination at
the request of the lAB) against the uncontested
word of the officer.
Procedures whereby a police officer may be
compelled to take a polygraph examination, while
also protecting the officer’s constitutional rights,
can be readily established: Where a citizen’s com
plaint does not allege a fact situation connoting a
criminal offense, no constitutional question arises.
Therefore, the officer should be compelled, if
necessary (i.e., no other evidence is available) to
take the examination at the initiation of the lAB
investigation. Where a citizen’s complaint does al
lege a situation connoting a criminal offense, the
officer should be compelled to take the polygraph
examination when the criminal offense issue is
disposed of, i.e., ( 1) upon completion of an initial
investigation which results in no probably cause
that a criminal violation has taken place; (2) upon
decision of the appropriate prosecutor not to
prosecute the charge for whatever reason; or (3)
upon dismissal o f charges or acquittal at a sub
sequent criminal prosecution. As discussed above,
according to the dictates of the U.S. Supreme
Court, compelled statements of an officer can
never be used against him or her in a subsequent
criminal hearing. The procedures of delaying com
pelled statements via a polygraph examination
when there is probable cause to believe a crime
has been committced, therefore, is not legally
necessary.
riicre arc several reasons, however, why such
procedures should he utilized. One is that the tic-
cused officer will be given extrti tissurance that the
compelled st;ilcmenls will not be nscti in a
criminal proceeding. Another is that the prosecu
tor, should a criminal charge be directed against
the officer, will not have to contend with the
defense that the officer’s compelled statements, or
the fruits of them, will be used in the criminal
proceeding. Pending all delays, of course, the of
ficer should be assigned nonenforcement duties or
suspended, depending on the seriousness of the al
legation and in accordance with existing depart
mental procedures.
Procedures making a polygraph examination
mandatory, despite the fact that an officer has
been charged and cleared of a criminal offense,
are essential. It is axiomatic that an officer who
may not be convicted of a criminal charge, either
by a decision not to prosecute or by failure of the
State to meet the burden of proof required for
conviction (i.e., guilt beyond a reasonable doubt),
may nonetheless be guilty of a violation of a public
trust for which departmental disciplinary action
should be taken.
Director Chapman has stated that the
“ polygraph thing has been totally blown out of
proportion...” and it is not “ a decisive factor
because...a polygraph is not permissible as
evidence in court.” '" This statement confuses the
issue by ignoring the distinction between the al
lowable use of a polygraph in administrative
proceedings, as opposed to its impermissibility in
criminal proceedings. Director Chapman lapsed
into non sequitur by stating that although the
MPD cannot take administrative action when it
fails to find sufficient proof (exacerbated by not
using the polygraph), the complaints of police
misconduct do not “ just go by the wayside” ''*
because they arc often referred for criminal
prosecution. ObvKiusly, if the MPD cannot meet
the burden of proof to take administrative discipli
nary action (i.e., supported by a mere preponde
rance of the evidence), there is virtually no
likelihood that a prosecutor will be able to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The procedures set forth with regard to com
pelling an officer to take a polygraph examination
b.'i
f ?
can in no way, as dictated by the U.S. Supreme
Court, conflict with the officer’s constitutional
rights. Should unforseen incriminating statements
result from the polygraph examination, neither the
statements nor the fruits of them can be used
against the officer in a subsequent criminal
proceeding. Accordingly, once an officer is com
pelled to take a polygraph examination, the officer
cannot rationalize any refusal to respond, based
upon a constitutional right. In such instances, the
officer’s refusal to respond should be recognized
for what it actually is—an unacceptable refusal to
be held accountable for conduct in the per
formance of duty.
Beyond the evidentiary value of a polygraph ex
amination in ferreting out police misconduct, there
are two other compelling reasons why a police of
ficer should, in appropriate circumstances and ac
cording to established procedures, be required to
take a polygraph examination or be dismissed for
refusal to do so: (1) established procedures
whereby a police officer knows in advance that his
or her conduct in the performance o f official du
ties will be strictly scrutinized and that his or her
version of the facts will be tested by means o f a
polygraph should have a significant deterrant ef
fect in preventing police misconduct; (2) public
confidence will be greatly enhanced if the depart
ment demonstrates that it is using every reasonable
means to investigate allegations of police miscon
duct; at the same time, this should go a long way
towards demonstrating a sense of fairness to the
complainant who previously, in electing to subject
himself or herself to the polygraph, knew that the
officer could refuse to do so with impunity.
It is syllogistic to state that being subjected to a
polygraph is an unpleasant experience for both of
ficer and complainant, and therefore its use should
be avoided. It is an unfortunate fact of life in
Memphis that the number of complaints of police
misconduct is cause for public outrage, exceeded
only by the fact that so few disciplinary actions
result from them. The MPD—the entire communi
ty—cannot afford to ignore any reasonable means
for making Memphis police officers accountable
for their conduct in the performance of their
awesome public trust. To do otherwise suggests
continued ignorance o f the critical problem of po
lice misconduct in Memphis, continued acceptance
of MPA demands that are contrary to the public
interest, and continued abdication of civic respon
sibility by those public officials charged with en
suring accountability for police misconduct.
identity of Complainant
Before Internal Affairs intcrogates an officer
as a direct result of a complaint by a citizen
whose identity is known that citizen shall be
required to sign a sworn affidavit, clearly stat
ing the allegation, a copy of which shall be
provided to the officer at the time of the in
terrogation. (Union contract, art. XV, sec. J.)
Prior to specific discussion on how this provision
affects the ability o f the MPD to investigate com
plaints o f police misconduct, the essential im
portance of an adequate complaint investigation
process and its impact on police-community rela
tions needs to be set forth. The President’s Com
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice made the following statement in this re
gard:
No department can be expected to operate
without some misconduct at times by some of
its personnel. Every department can, however,
be expected to attempt to discover its faults,
correct them where possible, and learn from
them. Since law enforcement is primarily a
business which deals with the public and must
have its trust, complaints by citizens offer a
unique opportunity—a channel for communi
cation that may otherwise not exist, a means
for discovering failures to follow department
policies, a method for the redress of
grievances, and an early warning of larger
troubles. How a department treats such com
plaints is a general index of its concern or
lack of concern for community relations.”
The union contract provision is clearly at odds
with the effective utilization of citizens’ complaints
as set fbrth in this statement. The provision, allow
ing an accused officer to know the identity of the
complainant at the initial stage of lAB investiga
tions has the following debilitating effects upon the
department’s ability to ferret out police miscon
duct. First, this procedure discourages a person
who feels mistreated by a police officer from filing
a complaint. Particularly in those instances where
a person alleges physical abuse by a police officer
(approximately one-third of all lAB investigations
involve allegations of physical abuse” the person
obviously will be reluctant to file a formal com
plaint, knowing that to do so may invite retaliatory
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66
action by the accused officer. Second, this fear of
retaliation, far from being mere apprehension, has
been a reality for certain complainants. Several
persons outside of the MPD testifieil before the
Commission that such retaliation has ttiken place. ''
In addition. Inspector Wilkinson, lAH commander,
verified that the lAB has received, investigtited,
and substantiated complaints by citizens who have
been, in Inspector Wilkinson's phrase, verbally if
not physically "intimidated" by police officers
against whom they have filed complaints.'’"
Further, as discussed in chapter 5,’" police officers
have unsuccessfully sued a complainant for filing
charges with the lAB. The legal merits of this suit
were so weak (i.e., no allegation that the complai
nant acted with wilful and malicious intent) that
the motives of retaliation and intimidation, rather
than valid legal redress, were forcefully presented.
Sergeant Kent, MPA president, ignoring the fact
that there have been incidents of retalitttion by ac
cused officers against complainants, testified that
he did not believe that the sworn affidavit
procedure has any inhibiting effect upon citizens
who may wish to file a complaint of police miscon
duct. Sergeant Kent also stated that the communi
ty has a responsibility to police officers to "see
that our people get due process of law.”'"’ Accord
ing to Sergeant Kent's standard of "due process,"
this requires the MPD to proceed in administrative
disciplinary proceedings on the same evidentiary
level that is required in criminal prosecutions'”
This contention is not only legally unsupportable,
but it also ignores the responsibility of public offi
cials to have their conduct in the performance of
official duties subject to reasonable and workable
investigation.
As with the discussion regariling the use t)f a
polygraph, the issue of a p*>lice officer's constitu
tional rights needs to be brought into focus. In this
instance, the constitutional right to face an accuser
appears to be the shield offered by the MPA to
support this contract provision. Again, however, as
with the constitutional right to be free from self
incrimination, the right to face accusers is based
upon the need to protect a person from being un
duly deprived of liberty through criminal prosecu
tion. Even in a criminal prosecutittn, this right is
not so absolute as to require that the identity of
an accuser be given to a defendant in every in
stance. It is established police practice to utilize
"reliable informants" to gather information against
an ticcused without the accused ever having the
benefit of either knowing or questioning the infor-
ntants. The basic rationale for this practice is that
to inform every defendant automatically of the
identity of police informants woukl "dry up" valu
able police sources of information and seriously
impair the police function of apprehending
criminals.
It approaches the height of sanctimony for po
lice officers, who embrace the use of unidentified
"reliable informants " agtiinst citizens in criminal
prosecutions, to state that they should have an un
fettered right to know the identity of persons
whose complaints of misconduct may, or may not,
be used as evidence in MPD administrative
disciplinary proceedings.
There are clearly no constitutional dictates that
require informing police officers of the identity of
a complainant in departmental administrative
disciplinary proceedings. Should subsequent
criminal charges be placed against the officer, the
officer at that time has available all of the con
stitutionally-based rights as defined and prescribed
in the law of criminal procedure.
Further diminishing any rational basis for an of
ficer being presented with a complaints' identity is
the fact that the department never initiates
disciplinary action against an officer solely on the
word of a complainant. Disciplinary action is
taken, if at all, only when there is other evidence
to substantiate the complaint's allegations'"' The
complaint is used merely as a tool to initiate in
vestigation and not as the basis for disciplinary ac
tion.
The practical effect of not providing an accused
officer with the identity of the complainant before
the officer is questioned by the lAB needs to be
set forth to lend a perspective to this discussion.
In most cases, after the lAB questions the of
ficer, the facts of the incident, without actual dis
closure of the complainant's identity, will allow the
officer to discern who the person is who filed the
contplaint. In most cases, once the officer has
been questioneil, there is simply no way to avoid
the fact that the officer will have the informtition
necessary to take retaliatory action against the
complainant. Obviously, the MPA was aware of
this fact when they successfully obtained this
provision in the union contract. Twn reasons mav
t
to
P-
h
tT'
67
105/
be offered why the MPA would wish to have it
guaranteed in the contract. One is to ensure that
in every instance the officer will be informed of
the identify of the complainant. Another is to put
all putative complainants on public notice that the
officers will be informed of their identity should
they choose to file a complaint.
To minimize the likelihood of retaliatory action
by an accused officer, therefore, procedures
should be established whereby in appropriate cir
cumstances (particularly when physical abuse is al
leged) the lAB will conduct an initial investigation
to discern if the complainant’s allegation can be
substantiated by other evidence prior to question
ing of the accused officer. This will serve to
facilitate the assembly of an evidentiary record
that might otherwise be jeopardized by the police
officer's possible retaliation, and also provide the
lAB with additional data upon which to question
the officer.
It should be emphasized that the point o f this
discussion is in no way intended to infringe upon
an officer's knowledge o f the basis o f the charge
against him or her. It is simply to illustrate that the
identity o f the complainant is not necessary to pro
tect the rights of the officer, but, on the contrary,
there are compelling reasons why this identity
should not be immediately disclosed. These
reasons are to facilitate rather than discourage
citizens’ complaints and to reduce the likelihood
o f retaliation against citizens who have exercised
their right to seek redress for what they believe is
police misconduct.
The facts are that this union contract provision
does serve to discourage citizens from filing com
plaints o f police misconduct and has also served as
a vehicle to facilitate retaliatory actions against
citizens who have filed complaints. With the
realization that there is simply no basis in law or
fact that this provision is required or necessary to
protect the rights of police officers, this provision
should be recognized for what it is—a successful
attempt, authorized by the public employer in
violation of the public interest,’ to further isolate
police officers from accountability for their con
duct in the performance of duty.
Effective Use of Citizen
Complaints
Reception of Citizen Complaints
The fundamental importance of using citizen
complaints to improve police-community relations
cannot be overstated. Citizen complaints serve as
vehicles to discipline misbehaving officers and
deter others from misbehaving."^ Equally impor
tant is the fact that citizen complaints offer a
“ channel for communication’ ’"’' between the police
and the community that serves not only to
facilitate better police administration, but also to
enhance the confidence of the community in the
department.
Since citizen complaints are extremely impor
tant to police departments, efforts should be
made to encourage citizens with grievances to
file them. Unfortunately, police officers and
departments often regard a citizen complaint
as an attack on the police as a whole rather
than a complaint against an individual officer,
and therefore, attempt to discourage citizens
from filing them. The discouraging of citizen
complaints not only deprives a department of
valuable information but also convinces the
public that the kinds of practices complained
about are condoned or even expected.""
The lAB’s citizen complaint procedures, rein
forced by certain provisions of the union contract,
have the effect of discouraging citizens from filing
complaints of police misconduct with the lAB. Ex
cept in those rare instances where an lAB in
vestigation is requested internally, all lAB in
vestigations are predicated upon a signed and
sworn affidavit of a citizen, a copy of which is pro
vided to the officer at the time of lAB questioning.
This process dramatically reduces the usefulness
of citizen complaints. As stated in the report of
the President’s Task Force on Law Enforcement
ahd Administration of Justice;
When made, a complaint should be accepted;
I 1 ) whether reported in person, in writing, or
by telephone; (2) whether made anonymously,
sworn to, or in any other form; and (3)
whether from the victim, an eyewitness, a per
son who has merely heard of the incident or
an organization such as a civil rights group.
...Even if the complaining citizen wishes to
drop the complaint, the department should
continue its investigations, if only to prevent
68
1
m
-fe'*-''
any possibility that complaining witnesses will
be discouraged or intimidated.
Departments should advertise widely, as
[some departments) have done, that they seek
out all complaints of police misbehavior of
any type. Complaint forms shouUl be available
for civic organizations, civil rights groups, an
tipoverty agencies, and neighborhood advisory
committees. Advisory committees should be
constantly reminded to encourage residents
with complaints to bring them forward.**^
Publicizing Complaint Disposition
Criticism of the MPD for failing to notify either
complainants or other citizens who have referred
complaints to the lAB of the disposition of the
complaints has been great and continues to be a
significant factor contributing to poor police-com
munity relations. The department’s current use of
a form letter, that contains no disposition of the
specific complaint, is simply unacceptable given
the fundamental importance o f demonstrating to
the complainant, as well as the community, that
the department has the will and ability to police it
self.
While the department does provide the complai
nant with an opportunity to be informed orally of
the disposition of his or her complaint, this
procedure, in addition to putting the burden on
the complainant to return to the lAB, is useless in
building a formal record and having it available for
public scrutiny.
Once the decision on a complaint has been
made, the complainant should be notified of
the decision and of the basis for it. And the
public should have access to the facts of the
case and the nature of the decision. Unless
the public has access to reliable information,
it is likely to assume the worst. On the other
hand, if complainants are told o f the disposi
tion, "they would know that the Department
is concerned and that their complaint was hot
thrown in the wastebasket.” ""
In addition, when an incident or series of In
cidents has raised tension in an area, it will
often be desirable for the determination to be
announced and explained directly to the re
sidents o f the area either through the commu
nity relations unit, a neighborhood advisory
meeting, or some other similar procedure. An
annual report by the police department
providing such facts as the number and kinds
of people who made them, the disposition of
the complaint, and the punishments imposed
can also make a useful contribution to better
public understanding.""
Director Chapman gave two reasons why the de
partment refuses to notify anyone in writing as to
the disposition of a citizen’s complaint. The first Is
to avoid display of facts or an admission of wrong
doing that might be used in subsequent litigation
against the officer and the department.^" The
second is to protect the rights of the officer in
those instances where an officer is compelled to
make statements under a promise of immunity,
whieh precludes the use of the statements in any
subsequent criminal action against the officer.^'
Because of the strong public policy considera
tion which requires that the community should be
aware o f the department’s disciplinary actions, and
because of the largely illusory legal rationalizations
of the reasons themselves, neither of these reasons
are acceptable barriers to public disclosure. All
that is needed is that the complainant be notified
of the decision and the basis for it. This entails
only the disciplinary action taken, in which case
no further explanation is necessary, or if no
disciplinary action is taken, a brief explanation as
to why no action was taken.
With regard to any possible civil litigation, to
the extent, if any, such information would be rele
vant to the law suit, it would clearly be discovera
ble by the plaintiff through the normal rules of
discovery allowable in civil cases. With regard to
criminal prosecutions, it is difficult to imagine how
the nature of this information could possibly in
fringe upon an officer’s rights. Furthermore, as
discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court has
specifically ruled that neither the compelled state
ments o f a police officer nor the fruits of them can
be used against the officer in a subsequent
criminal prosecution.
At any rate, the department can readily adopt pro
cedures by which the complainant (and the public
upon request) can be notified of the disposition of a
complaint and at the same time protect any legally
required rights of all concerned. To infer that dis
closure is an all-or-nothing proposition is merely a
self-serving misstatement of fact.
69
1051)
Analysis of Disciplinary Actions
Taken
Response of Director Chapman
The effectiveness of the Internal Affairs Bureau
is significantly impaired due to a variety of factors
previously discussed. It might be assumed that
when the lAB overcomes these factors and com
piles an evidentiary record which supports the
validity of the complaint that disciplinary action
would logically result. During Director Chapman’s
tenure, however, the facts are that over halF'* of
the complaints that the lAB commander has
declared to be “ founded” have resulted in absolu
tely no disciplinary action of any kind.
Director Chapman offered two reasons during
his testimony at the Commission hearing why
disciplinary action had not been taken despite the
lAB’s findings. The first explanation offered was
that “ mitigating circumstances,” ” such as the
severity of the incident and the officer’s service
record, would account for the fact that no discipli
nary action had been taken. The second reason of
fered by Director Chapman was his belief that,
despite the lAB commander’s opinion, disciplinary
action could not be taken because o f the depart
ment’s inability to “ prove that the incident took
place.
The first reason offered by Director Chapman is
logically supportable but obviously does not ac
count for the majority of instances where no
disciplinary action has been taken despite the find
ing of the lAB. Rather, in most instances no
disciplinary action is taken in response to a
founded complaint because of the director’s al
leged belief that the department cannot prove the
charge. The factors (e.g., lack of the use of a poly
graph examination) that adversely affect the lAB’s
ability to meet the necessary burden of proof have
previously been discussed. Beyond the evidentiary
problems, which are largely correctable, the fact
that Director Chapman has ignored the findings of
the lAB in 5 3 percent of the cases where the lAB
investigations have dictated that the complaints
were founded, casts severe doubt upon his
willingness to effectively combat police miscon
duct.
Particularly in view of the fact that a police of
ficer may appeal significant disciplinary action to
the civil service board. Director Chapman’s uni
lateral decision not to initiate disciplinary action in
the majority o f meritable cases casts doubt on his
stated intent to discipline offending officers.
In August 1977, Director Chapman reassigned
Inspector Wilkinson, lAB commander, to a post
outside the lAB. According to an article in a
Memphis newspaper,’ * sources close to Director Chap
man stated that he had been disturbed by Inspector Wil
kinson’s charges against a former police officer. The
director was quoted as saying that the charges were “ to
tally unsubstantiated.”
Statistical Overview
The results of the contractual and self-imposed
restrictions placed upon the lAB investigations of
police misconduct and the resulting inability and
unwillingness of appropriate personnel to take
disciplinary action are illustrated in the three ex
hibits incorporated into this chapter.
In 40 months the lAB investigated more than
1,100 complaints, over one-third of which were al
legations o f physical abuse. A total of six dismis
sals have resulted from these investigations, or
0.61 percent of the total investigations made for
which the disciplinary actions are known. There
have been 24 suspensions in the 40-month period,
or 2.10 percent of the total. Therefore, less than
3 percent (i.e., 2.71 percent) o f the investigations
have resulted in disciplinary action above a verbal
or written reprimand. Incredibly, only 3.50 percent
of the investigations have resulted in verbal or
Written reprimands, a “ disciplinary action” that
results in no loss of pay or status.
Conclusion
By any measurement, these statistics expose any
declaration that the Memphis Police Department is
effectively responding to complaints of police
misconduct as a myth. These statistics reinforce
the opinions of many that the department is un
willing and unable to take effective disciplinary ac
tion against offending officers. And these statistics
lend credence to the belief of many that the de
partment has no intention o f taking effective
disciplinary action against officers who abuse
citizens. Rather, these statistics reinforce the con
viction of many people that such lack of response
is tantamount to approval of police misconduct.
70
lO B n
External Review of Police
Misconduct
Administrative Review
City Council
Both the limited authority of the Memphis City
Councir" and the limited focus and success of past
council efforts” with regard to police misconduct
support the proposition that it is not a viable entity
for providing dramatic improvement in police-
community relations.”* Nonetheless, the Memphis
City Council does have at least two important
functions which, if properly utilized, can produce
a positive impact upon the situation.
The first is to exercise legislative oversight of
Memphis Police Department activities. Patrick
Halloran, councilman and member o f the council
law enforcement committee, underscored the cur
rent lack of any such oversight;
1 can’t help but feel that there is a total lack
of communication between the council and
the council [law enforcement] committee and
the department.
This is a much our fault as it is theirs, but it
doesn’t seem to me that they have kept us ad
vised o f their needs, their progress, or their
special problems. We can read about it in the
paper.
So, I guess we should be asking them, “ How
can we help you? What are your problems?
What do you need? Why did this happen?
How are you going to see that it doesn’t hap
pen again?’ ’”
There are substantive reasons, of course, why
the city council should not involve itself with the
administration o f the MPD, per se. The council
can and should, however, exercise its legitimate
and heretofore largely ignored responsibilities to
ensure that, having funded “ every penny’s worth
of tax dollars that goes to implementing the de
partment’s activities,’ ’***’ that those activities are
beneficial and in the public interest. This would
not only make the MPD answerable to those
elected officials charged with its funding, but also
would open channels o f communication between
the MPD and the council and offer another
avenue o f public scrutiny as well.
One notable area that begs the scrutiny of the
city council is the MPD investigation and
discipline process. Another, not unrelated area, is
the bargaining agreement (i.e., union contract)
between the city and the Memphis Police Associa
tion. Both of these areas, as previously discussed
in this chapter, have a significantly negative im
pact upon police-community relations in Memphis
and are clearly in the proper scope of legislative
inquiry.
The second city council function, consenting to
the mayor’s nominations, can also be effectively
used to improve police-community relations in
Memphis. This fact was illustrated in the council’s
unprecedented hearings on the nomination of E.
Winslow Chapman to be director of police in Sep
tember 1976. The hearings enabled both the coun
cil and the public to be apprised of Mr. Chap
man’s qualifications and his opinions on how the
department should be run.
By law"' the city council has authority to ap
point, upon nomination of the mayor, the civil ser
vice commissioners. Apparently, the city council’s
past review of civil service commission nominees
has been perfunctory. Severe criticism has been
expressed by both community people and public
officials against the civil service board in failing to
uphold certain MPD disciplinary actions involving
police misconduct."'^ Scrutiny o f nominees by the
council before they become commissioners will
not only ensure their qualifications for office, but
also provide a public record as to the nominees’
philosophies on such critical areas as police
misconduct.
Community Relations Commission
The purpose and function of the Memphis Com
munity Relations Commission is largely an enigma
to the Tennessee Advisory Committee and staff.
The Community Relations Commission (CRC) did
not send a representative to the Advisory Commit
tee’s October 1976 open meeting. Further, despite
the verbal assurances of cooperation by CRC offi
cials, subsequent to the open meeting and before
and after the May 1977 Commission hearing,
neither Rev. P. L. Rowe, (CRC Chairman) nor his
staff were able to keep appointments to talk with
staff o f the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.
The CRC was apparently established in Februa
ry 1972 following the death of Elton Hayes, the
black youth allegedly beaten to death by nine po
lice officers."' Apparently designed to have a
broad range of functions with regard to communi-
t O ( U
ty relations in general, the CRC, according to the
limited evidence available to the Tennessee Ad
visory Committee, has had no impact with regard
to alleviating police-community problems in Mem
phis.
According to a newspaper article,"'* the CRC
was authorized by the mayor shortly after the Ad
visory Committee’s open meeting to inform com
plainants of police misconduct as to the MPD
disposition o f complaints. It is not known to what
extent, if any, this procedure was ever initiated,
and, through subsequent examination of the inter
nal affairs process, it is apparent no such
procedure currently exists.
In the preparation of both the open meeting and
the Commission’s hearing, staff and members of
the Tennessee Advisory Committee were informed
by persons both within and without the MPD that
the CRC was simply ineffectual. A summary of
these comments is that the CRC, treated with
benign neglect by city officials and held in con
tempt by those who have come to view it as com
munity relations “ window dressing,’ ’ has atrophied
to the point of uselessness. It is the sincere hope
of the Tennessee Advisory Committee that with
meaningful citizen input, the CRC might be reor
ganized and used as a positive factor in the overall
community effort needed to improve police-com
munity relations.
Civil Service Commission
The Memphis Civil Service Commission (CSC)
is headed by three commissioners who serve part
time and without compensation. Given nearly ple
nary powers under the Memphis City Code of Or
dinances"'* with regard to all aspects of the civil
service system, the basic function o f the commis
sioners has traditionally been restricted to presid
ing on the final appeal board for city employees
who have been disciplined by the various depart
mental supervisors."*
Commission Chairman Robert Fargarson said
the lack o f involvement of civil service commis
sioners, other than on the appeal board process, is
because of the restricted time and energies availa
ble to part-time commissioners and the lack of
adequate staff and resources to expand commis
sioner efforts."’ Wade Hardy, CSC commissioner,
gave his opinion o f the restricted function of the
commissioners;
You have to understand that the commission,
civil service commission, is primarily
established to review disciplinary actions
taken (against) those that are employed by
the city to see to it that those who are em
ployed, who, when they are disciplined, are
given a fair administrative hearing by those
that are primarily not associated with the
city’s day-to-day operations.""
With regard to allegations of police use of physi
cal and verbal abuse. Chairperson Fargarson stated
that the CSC has the authority not only to in
vestigate why so few MPD disciplinary actions
result from investigation of citizen complaints, but
also to initiate investigations of the complaints as
well."" For the reasons stated above, however, both
commissioners said they have never initiated such
actions."*’
Both Mr. Fargarson and Mr. Hardy"' said that if
the MPD internal affairs process were proved inef
fective, either a properly staffed and structured
civil service board or another independent
mechanism to review police misconduct “ would
definitely be of merit.’ ’"’
As stated earlier in this chapter, the civil service
board has been severely criticized for failure to
uphold MPD disciplinary actions against police of
ficers accused of physical abuse of citizens. In par
ticular, the actions of the board in reinstating two
police officers who were fired for beating a
prisoner (breaking both his arms) brought criti
cism from Director Chapman and a local
newspaper.""
Despite such criticism, the effect of the board’s
actions, generally, has been more symbolic than
substantive. The facts are that the board has had
occasion to review very few instances where police
officers have been disciplined because of physical
abuse of citizens. While approximately 60 percent
of the cases before the board involve discipline of
police officers,"" very few (only three cases during
the 2-year tenure of Commissioner Hardy)"* in
volve police physical abuse. The miniscule number
of disciplinary actions taken by the MPD against
officers accused of physical and verbal abuse, as
discussed previously,"* accounts for the small
number of disciplinary actions before the board.
The actions of the board, therefore, muddled and
misguided as they may be, are statistically insignifi
cant when compared to the MPD’s demonstrated
unwillingness and inability to initiate disciplinary
actions against offending officers.
72
l O G o
Nonetheless, should the MPD begin to demon
strate effective disciplinary responses to police
misconduct, the current process of the civil service
board would have a proportionately negative im
pact upon the overall effort toward combating the
problem,
A resolution was introduced in the city council
to remove the three members of the board that
reinstated the two police officers who had beaten
a prisoner." The judgment o f the three board
members might well be subject to question; how
ever, such action appears to be misdirected. More
on point is an examination of the civil service
board process itself.
The current process of utilizing unpaid, part-
time commissioners, who may or may not be
qualified or experienced to preside effectively over
civil service matters, to make extremely subjective
judgments without benefit of any meaningful
guidelines of evidentiary or administrative
procedure, calls for reevaluation. For example, it
might be assumed that a police officer’s past em
ployment record, if relevant, would be taken into
account by the board in deciding upon the merits
of the latest MPD disciplinary action before the
board. Commissioner Hardy, however, has stated
that “ for reasons o f justice”*" the board can only
deliberate on the specific incident before it to
determine if the disciplinary action is justified.**
Commissioner Fargarson, however, has stated that
the board can take an officer’s past record into ac
count for the purpose o f determining whether to
uphold the disciplinary action before the board,
but only if the officer’s record is stated by the
MPD to be part o f the basis for the action
taken.""’ These kinds o f conflicting opinions are
conducive to muddled and disjointed board ac
tions.
The civil service board process, therefore, needs
to be reevaluated, with particular attention given
to the desired and permissible authority of the
board to determine disciplinary appeals o f police
officers accused of physical and verbal abuse
against citizens. Further, the authority, procedure,
and desirability o f having the civil service board
act upon citizen complaints should also be studied
along with alternative methods o f civilian review.
The review o f both MPD disciplinary actions
and citizen complaints should he included in a
comprehensive review o f the entire Memphis Po
lice Department conducted by a competent profes
sional organization such as the International As
sociation of Chiefs of Police. Additionally, an ap
propriate committee of a local bar as.sociation. as
a demonstration ol the legal profession’s responsi
bility for improving the administration of justice,
should be called upon to study and recommend
appropriate rules of procedure for use in civil ser
vice board hearings.
Legal Review
Criminal Prosecution
The relevance of the criminal law to police-
community relations is limited by the fact that
many forms of police misconduct affecting po
lice-community relations, such as verbal
abuse, coercion of respect, and the like, are
not violations o f the criminal law. It is further
limited by the problem of proof and credibili
ty o f testimony. In many cases, the only wit
nesses to the misconduct are the policeman
and the alleged victim, and often the alleged
victim and nonpolice witnesses are from
minority groups, are poor or unemployed, or
have criminal records. Finally, many prosecu
tors are reluctant to bring charges except in
serious cases because they work so closely
with the police.""
Clearly, there are several factors, practical as
well as political, that restrict the usefulness of
criminal prosecutions as a viable tool for dealing
with police misconduct. As previously discussed,
there is no substitute for proper methods of
preventing police misconduct before it ' occurs.
Nonetheless, the restricted remedy of prosecution
of police misconduct that constitutes a violation of
the law should be pursued with vigor. This is
necessary in order to demonstrate that no one, in
cluding police officers, are above the law, thereby
ensuring public confidence as well as deterring
misconduct. Furthermore, because a review of the
MPD internal affairs process illustrates that police
officers are able to perpetrate misconduct against
citizens with virtual impunity, the necessity for
criminal prosecution in appropriate circumstances
is essential.
Unfortunately, all the factors that generally
preclude criminal prosecution as a useful method
of stopping police misconduct exist in full force in
Memphis. Additionally, the following facts illus
trate that criminal prosecution of police miscon
duct in Memphis has proved to be more myth than
73
10(13
reality: Despite the hundreds of allegations of
physical abuse by police officers reported to the
MPD and a number of persons killed by police o f
ficers in recent years, the amount of criminal ac
tion brought against police, in both Stale and
Federal courts, has been virtually nil; the number
of convictions has been literally none.
State Action
The district attorney general for the Memphis
and Shelby County area is Hugh Stanton, an
elected official who has been in office since March
1974. TheVe are 27 judicial districts in Tennessee,
and the district attorney offices are largely au
tonomous, having Ju-risdiction to prosecute any
violation of a State statute but, practically, they
handle mostly felony cases, leaving misdemeanors
to be handled in city court.'"’' Mr. Stanton super
vises a staff of 38 county prosecutors as well as 2
attorneys who process indictments. Additionally,
the office has an investigative unit o f 12 persons
responsible for preparing and presenting informa
tion to the Shelby County grand jury.'""
According to Mr. Stanton, the only method for
ascertaining the number of Memphis ptilice o f
ficers who have been indicted for crimes against
citizens (e.g., assault and battery, homicide) would
be to go through each of the approximately 6,500
to 7,000 cases handled by the district attorney
general’s office each year:
We file basically by name, or we have a num
bering system, but it's alphabetical...and I
don’t separate police cases from larceny cases,
and larceny cases from murder cases.'""
Asked to recall how many indictments have
been made against poliee officers during his
tenure, Mr. Stanton stated, "W e have returned
some indictments against officers for larceny and
that kind o f thing,"'"' but he could only recall one
instance where an officer had been indicted for
physical abuse of a citizen.'"*
The office relies almost exclusively upon the
Shelby County Sheriff’s Department and the Mem
phis Police Department to conduct investigations,
including possible criminal police misconduct, for
use in the preparation of criminal cases.'"' Mr.
Stanton stated;
The attorney general’s office has 12 investiga
tors whose primary function is to prepare
cases that are pending in our criminal courts
for trial, and 1 do not have a staff that would
he adequate to investigate as thoroughly as
perhaps they should be all complaints made
against anyone. We refer them to the proper
department in...the Mernphis Police Depart
ment, tind the Memphis Police Deptirtment
has an interntil affairs | bureau | which nor
mally does it.'""
Mr. Stanton added that his office htis conducted
investigtitions of police misconduct, especitilly
when an officer has killed someone.'"" These in
vestigations, he said, are "normally" restricted to
a review of the internal affairs bureau’s investiga
tion,"" although Mr. Stanton stated that his office
will often "follow through" with additional in
vestigative efforts as deemed necessary.'" He ex
plained that his office has no policy to determine
what instances might require their investigation
beyond the MPD investigation.
The office relics almost exclusively, therefore,
upon the investigations of the MPD to determine
whether an allegation of police misconduct might
constitute a criminal offense. In the best of times,
this process might rtiise questions about the effi
ciency of a prosecutor relying upon a department’s
investigation of one of its own officers. Given the
history of the MPD’s failure to demonstrate either
the willingness or ability to take disciplinary action
despite the hundreds of complaints received (41)
percent of which are founded, in the opinion of
lAB officials),"'" the continued reliance by the dis
trict attorney general on MPD investigations is
both unworkable and inexcusable.
That the prosecutor’s office may have too few
investigators and must rely heavily upon the MPD
to prosecute charges other than police misconduct
are factors contributing to the problem. The cur
rent process, therefore, requires a significant
degree of change to ensure proper attention to
criminal police misconduct in Memphis.
First, the district attorney general should recog
nize the fact, as illustrated throughout this report,
that the allegations of police misconduct in Mem
phis are pervasive and the MPD action in response
to them is suspect. Therefore, that office can no
longer rely so heavily upon the MPD for investiga
tions of possible crimintil police misconduct.
Secondly, specific steps that have been taken in
other jurisdictions"" should he initiated in the dis
trict attorney's office. A special investigative unit
should be established within that office to iniriate
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74
10(rl
and conduct independent investif’ations o f alleged
criminal police misconduct in appropriate circum
stances and in every instance of homicide involv
ing police officers. Additional investigators should
be employed as necessary. If funds arc not availa
ble to hire additional investigators, the unit should
be composed from the existing staff. It is difficult
to imagine a more pressing priority in Memphis
than investigation of criminal police misconduct.
The unit should not include any former MPD of
ficer. Although utilizing the results of MPD in
vestigations, it should work independently of the
MPD to ensure the objectivity of its investigations.
Further, this unit should work exclusively on inde
pendent investigations o f alleged criminal police
misconduct anti never on other investigations
where the assistance of the MPD is required for
successful prosecution. Specific recordkeeping on
the number, nature, and results of the investiga
tions should be maintained and made available for
public scrutiny. Because it may be difficult for the
local district attorney general to prosecute police
officers, authority should be given to the State at
torney general to pursue such cases when necessa
ry-
These steps are the minimum necessary to ad
dress the critical problem of criminal police
misconduct in Memphis. As stated in the report of
the President s Commission on l-aw Enforcement
and Administration of Justice, "The basic problem
is to assure that prosecutors enforce the criminal
law as vigorously against public officers as against
private citizens.” "^ The current process of the of
fice of the district attorney general in investigating
possible criminal police misconduct undermines
this assurance.
Federal Action
The authority and scope of Federal criminal
prosecution of police misconduct is substantially
less than that of State and local prosecutors.
Walter James Cody, III, former member of the
Memphis City Council, was appointed to the posi
tion of U.S. Attorney for the Western District of
Tennessee in April 1977. At the Commission's
hearing, Mr. Cody described the process whereby
Federal action may be initiated in response to
evidence of police misconduct.
Both the local U.S. attorney and the U.S. De
partment of Justice, Civil Rights Division, have the
authority to request the Federal Bureau of In
vestigation to prepare a preliminary investigation
of alleged police misconduct. Mr. Cody stated that
this is done either in response to a complaint or
at the initiative of the U.S. attorney. Additionally,
the Civil Rights Division may initiate an investiga
tion with or without the input of the local U.S. at
torney. If probable ctiuse is found that a violation
has been committed, either the U.S. attorney, the
Civil Rights Division, or the two offices working in
concert c;m seek an indictment from the Federtil
grand jury."-' The principal Federtil crimintil
statute with regtird to police misconduct is IS
U.S.C. §242. This Itiw prohibits the deprivation:
...under color of any law...of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected
by the Constitution or laws of the United
States...on account of such inhabitant being
an alien or by reason of his color or race."”
Historically, there have been few Federal
prosecutions of police officers for misconduct
under this or any other Federal statute. For exam
ple, in 1975 out of 9,()()() complaints received na
tionwide by the U.S. Department of Justice, only
40 police otlicers taced eventual prosecution."'
This figure includes all complaints of official
misconduct for which there is a Federal law
proscribing the misconduct alleged in the com
plaints.'"*
In a 10-year period from 1967 to 1977, there
was only one Federal indictment for police
misconduct sought by western district U.S. attor
neys. The grand jury returned an indictment in this
instance against two Memphis police officers in
volved in the killing of a Memphis citizen while
the officers were on duty. Both officers were sub
sequently acquitted of the charge.""
There are various factors that account for the
historical lack ot Federal action regarding criminal
police misconduct. One such factor is the judicial
interpretation of IS U.S.C. §242 that requires
proof of wilful and intentional actions to deprive
a person of his constitutional rights in order to
support a conviction under §242. The U.S.
Supreme Court in Screws i-. United States in
terpreted the statute to require that the prosecutor
prove not merely that the defendant had beaten a
helpless prisoner to death, but that "To convict it
was necessary for them to find that petitioners had
the purpose to deprive the prisoner of a consti-
75
1065
s
tional right....” '-" Another factor has been the pol
icy of the U.S. Department of Justice to defer to
local authorities for prosecution any cases of po
lice abuse under State law prior to involvement, if
any, by the Department o f Justice.
Recent developments, on both the national and
local level, indicate that the dormant Federal ju
risdiction over police misconduct will begin to be
exercised, U.S. Attorney Cody has indicated his in
tention to order investigations and to prosecute
appropriate instances o f police misconduct by
Memphis officers.''" Evidence of this intention was
illustrated by the presentment to the grand jury
and the subsequent indictment of a police officer
accused of beating a person incident to an ar
rest.A dditionally , U.S. Attorney Cody has been
quoted as saying;
The FBI is investigating numerous complaints
that have been received, and if it appears at
the end of those investigations that violations
of the law have occurred, then they will be
presented to the grand jury.''"'
On the national level, U.S. Attorney General
Griffin Bell has stated that the Department of
Justice will no longer automatically defer to local
jurisdictions for prosecutions of police misconduct.
The Department will, in appropriate instances,
take Federal action with or without prosecution at
the local level. Evidence of the Department’s in
terest in police misconduct was illustrated by the
meeting of Drew S. Days, 111, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Rights Division, with black leaders
in M em p h is .M r. Days came to Memphis in Au
gust 1977 at the request of Mr. Cody subsequent
to the shooting deaths of four black Memphians.
The general concern o f the U.S. Department of
Justice and the specific actions of Mr. Cody are
applauded by the Tennessee Advisory Committee.
These developments represent the few, if not only,
meaningful and concerted efforts at combating po
lice misconduct in Memphis. At the same time, it
is extremely regrettable and a sad reflection upon
the Memphis community and its leadership that
Federal prosecution of police misconduct, a very
limited remedy at best, represents the most viable
attempt at abating this community affliction.
Civil Suits
In the President’s Task Force Report: The Police,
the following findings are made, 'which illustrate
the limited nature and impact o f civil suits as a
means to combat police misconduct;
While civil cases are more frequent than
criminal cases, particularly in large cities, civil
litigation also has serious difficulties. The
chief witnesses are still likely to be the alleged
victim and the officer. Even if a victim is suc
cessful, the officer may not be able to pay the
judgment. Unless the prospect of payment is
substantial, there is little incentive for the vic
tim to incur the costs of investigation and
counsel’-''* necessary to the suit or for counsel
to take the case on a contingent fee basis.'-"
The effect of the threat of possible civil liabili
ty upon police policy is not very great. In the
first place, plaintiffs are seldom able to sustain
a successful lawsuit because of the expense
and the fact that juries are not likely to have
compassion for a guilty, even if abused, plain
tiff. Insurance is also now available along with
other protective methods that insulate the in
dividual officer from financial loss.
The attitude of the police administrator is to
try to protect his man or the municipality
from civil liability even though he may
privately be critical of the actions of the of
ficer. Usually legal counsel will instruct the
police administrator to suspend departmental
disciplinary proceedings because they might
prejudice the litigation.
Even in the unusual case where an individual
is able successfully to gain a money judgment
. in an action brought against a police officer or
governmental unit, this does not cause a
reevaluation of departmental policy or prac
tice.
In general, it seems apparent that civil litiga
tion is an awkward method of stimulating
proper law enforcement policy. At most, it
can furnish relief for the victim of clearly im
proper practices. To hold the individual of
ficer liable in damages as a way of achieving
systematic reevaluation of police practices
seems neither realistic nor desirable."*’
There have been a few limited successes in com
bating police misconduct in Memphis through
resort to civil legal remedies. The most notable
was a consent decree enjoining the illegal police
practice of automatic “ field interrogations” (i.e.,
random stop and frisk questioning) of all black
males in certain Memphis neighborhoods without
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe
that a crime had been or was being committed."*"
The failures and frustrations, however, have far
outdistanced the successes. The following state
ment o f Bruce Kramer, private attorney and
76 10(56
cooperating counsel with the American Civil
Liberties Union o f Tennessee, reflects the consen
sus o f other attorneys heard by the Tennessee Ad
visory Committee and the Commission:'^®
Most o f your witnesses...are people who have
records and do not make the ideal witness.
The juries cannot relate to them.
The defendants are [individual] police officers
and...you [must] get by certain Supreme
Court rulings [to] get the officials o f the po
lice department.
And it comes down to a question o f whether
or not there is reasonable force used under
the circumstances; I think Jurors are reluctant
to find, except in the most flagrant situations,
that there was excessive force.
In those rare instances where you get by the
jury or the defendants have failed to ask for
a jury trial, the awards have been very small.
The plaintiffs have a feeling that the principles
have been vindicated, but they are not com
pensated for the 2- or 3-year wait and the
abuse and anxiety that they have gone
through."*® °
Clearly, civil remedies for police misconduct, in
itially limited in scope, have proved to be largely
ineffective in practice as well. Nonetheless, resort
to civil remedies for police misconduct should be
increased and funds should be found to support
them, if for no other reason than the fact that few
other viable remedies currently exist. It is evident,
if regrettable, that such action is necessary in
Memphis to forward positive changes in police
conduct.
Notes to Chapter 6
1. Robert James, chairman. Law Enforcement Committee,
Memphis City Council, testimony before the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights, hearing, Memphis, May 9 , 1977 , transcript p
276 (hereafter cited as Hearing Transcript).
2 . President s Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis
tration o f Justice Tar* Force Report: The Police. Washington,
O C .: Government Printing Office, 1967 (hereafter cited as The
Police).
3 .Ibid., p. 193.
4,lbid.. pp. 193 -94 .
5 .Ibid., p. 198.
6.For detailed analysis and commentary on effectiveness o f ex-
temal review, see. The Police, chap. 2, "External Controls," pp,
3 0 -3 5 and chap. 5, “ Ensuring Fairness.” pp. 1 9 3 -205 .
7.Agreement between city o f Memphis and Memphis Police As
sociation. effective July 1, 1974 (hereafter cited as 1974 Union
Contract). See chap. 3 for discussion o f the Memphis Police
Association.
8 .Inspector Robert Wilkinson. lAB commander, stated that
charges o f police misconduct initiated internally without citizen
complaint represent less than 5 percent o f the total lAB in
vestigations. Telephone interview, Aug, 3, 1977. (hereafter
cited as Wilkinson Interview.) In referencing the data in exhibit
4 (which, among other things, lists the total number o f com
plaints investigated by the lA B ) the complaints arc. therefore
termed "citizen com plaints" for the sake o f general reference. ’
9 . Robert Wilkinson, interview in Memphis, May 4, 1977
(hereafter cited as Wilkinson Interview).
10. M PD Disciplinary Action Report, nos. 77123 and 77125.
M ^Memphis Police Department: Policies and Regulations, May
k
K-
r
12. Wilkinson Interview.
13. Wilkinson Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 198 -204 ; W il
kinson Interview. ’
14.1974 union contract, art. XII. sec. 5.
No member shall be ordered to submit lo a polygraph (lie-detec
tor) test for any reason. Such lest may be offered by Police Ad
ministration or independently requested by the officer.
15.Ibid., art. XII, sec. 4 ,,subsec. H.
If a member is under arrest or is likely to be, that is, if he is a
susfKct or the target o f a criminal investigation, the investigation
^ turned over to the appropriate investigative bureau and
the olTicer shall he given his rights pursuant lo the Miranda deci
sion or applicable law If a member chooses to invoke his protec
tion under the Miranda decision at that time, that member will
not be subject to charges o f insubordination or failure to
cooperate for that reason alone.
16 .Ibid., art. XII, sec, 7.
Before Internal Affairs interrogates an officer as a direct result o f
\ ® whose identity is known, that citizen
should be required to sign a sworn affidavit, clearly slating the al-
egation. a copy o f which shall be provided to the officer at the
iim6 o f ih€ interrogation.
17.Wendell L. Robinson, captain, MPD lAB , telephone inter
view, Aug. I I , 1977 (hereafter cited as Robinson Interview).
IS.Agreement between city o f Memphis and Memphis Police
Association, effective July I, 1977 (hereafter cited as 1977
Unioh CofUraci).
19.Ibid., drt. X V , sec. 4, subsec. H.
If a member is under arrest or is likely to be. that if he is a
suspect or the target o f a criminal investigation, the investigation
shall ^ conducted by the Internal Affairs Bureau with the adviso-
ry and technical assistance o f any appropriate investigative bureau
deeined necessary, and the officer shall be given his rights pur-
suani to the Miranda decision or applicable law. Such advisory
and technical assistance personnel from ih proper investigative
bureau shall not be physically involved in the interrogation
process. If a member chooses to invoke his protection under the
Miranda decision at that lime, that member will not be subject lo
auTre'* '"subordination or failure lo cixiperale for that reason
2 0 .Robert Wilkinson, telephone interview, Aug. 2, 1977.
21 .Steven Brown, telephone interview, Aug. 2, 1977.
22 .1977 Union Contract, art. X V , sec. 5.
10B7 77
2 3 .Memphis Police Department, General Order 1 2 -76 ,
“ Internal Discipline" (M ar. 18, 1976) (hereafter cited as GO
1 2 -76 ).
24 .Ibid., sec. 3, subsec. A .
25. Chapman Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 3 1 3 -1 4 .
26. John Holt, former acting chief, currently deputy chief, in
vestigative services division, telephone interview, Aug. 3, 1977.
27. G O 1 2 -7 6 , sec. 3, subsec. D.
28 .Ibid., sec. 3, subsec. J.
2 9 . Chapman Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 314.
30 . Memphis, Tennessee, Code, Civil Service, chap. 12, § § I 2 -
18(c).
31.1977 Union Contract.
32.“ O f the forty-five major U.S. cities, thirty-three (7 3 .33 per
cent) have more police per thousand than Memphis. Addi
tionally, M emphis has 1.13 less police per square mile (i.e.,
4 .32] than the national average....” U.S. Department o f Justice,
Community Relations Service, "M em phis, Tennessee Police
Project" ( 1 9 7 4 ) , p. 1.
'M.CommercutI Appeal, “ For the Next A ct” (editorial), Aug. 6 ,
1977, p. 6.
34.See discussion in chap. 2.
3S.Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 , 277 (1 9 6 8 ) .
36.Sm 1977 Union Contract, art. X V , sec. 1.
37 .392 U.S. at 2 7 7 -7 8 .
38. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U .S, 49 3 , 500 (1 9 6 7 ) .
39. Chapman Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 3 0 6 -0 7 .
40.1bid., p. 307.
4 1 . L E A A Grant No. 72A 47R 05 5 4 ; Grantee; Memphis Police
Department; Title: “ Development o f an Internal Polygraph
Capability” ; Award Date: Oct. 26 , 1973.
42. “ Memphis Police Department: A Police O fficer,”
(recruitment brochure), undated. Submitted in response to U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights subpena.
43 .392 U.S. at 278 .
4 4 . M.
45 . GaiTity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 ( 1 9 6 7 ) ; Spevack v.
Klein, 385 U .S . 511 (1 9 6 7 ) ; and Gardner v. Broderick, 392
U.S. 273 (1 9 6 8 ) .
46 .392 U .S. at 279 .
47 .385 U.S. at 500 .
48 .392 U.S. at 2 7 7 -7 8 .
49 .392 U.S. at 278 .
50 . Article X V , sec. 4 , subsec. J.
5 1. Kent Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. I & l .
52 . Wilkinson Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 181.
53 . Chapman Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 308.
5 4 .Ibid., p. 309.
5 5 . The Police, p. 194.
5 6 . Based on lAB data, supplied pursuant to Commission sub
pena, o f the 1,126 complaints investigated by the lAB from
Jan. 1, 1974, through Apr. 29, 1977, 382 o f the complaints
have alleged physical abuse, or 34 percent o f the total. See ex
hibit 6 for complaints o f police misconduct by lAB category
that have been investigated by the lAB.
5 7 .See, generally, the summary o f testimony o f representatives
o f private and public service organizations, chap. 5.
5 8 .Wilkinson Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 185.
5 9 .See summary o f A .C . Wharton, executive director, Memphis
and Shelby Legal Services Association, testimony, chap. 5.
6 0 .Kent Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 184—85.
6 1 .Ibid., p. 183.
62.Chapm an Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 3 0 0 -2 7 .
6 3 .Ibid.
6 4 .The Police, p. 174.
65.1bid.
66.1bid., p. 175.
6 7 . Wilkinson Interview.
6 8 . The Police, p. 195.
69.lbid.
70.Chapman Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 317.
7 1 .Ibid., p. 318.
7 2 . A t the Commission hearing. Inspector Wilkinson testified
that he did not have the exact statistics available, but he be
lieved that o f the complaints investigated by the lAB for which
he had made a written finding to the director that the investiga
tion had revealed that complaints were founded, approximately
50 percent did not result in any form of disciplinary action
(Hearing Transcript, p. 205 ). Director Chapman, during his
testimony before the Commission, questioned Inspector Wilkin
son’s opinion, stating that, “ I would say it’s probably more
like...20 to 25 percent....” (Hearing Transcript, p. 306). Inspec
tor Wilkinson was subsequently contacted to clarify his state
ment. He said that a review o f his records disclosed that the
procedure o f informing the director whether a complaint was
“ founded” or “ unfounded” was initiated in October 1976, and
through May 8, 1977, 53 percent of the founded complaints
had not resulted in any disciplinary action. Telephone inter
view, Aug. 2, 1977.
73 . Chapman Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 306.
74.1bid.
7 5 .Commercial Appeal, Aug. 23 , 1977, p. 11.
76.See discussion chap. 2.
7 7 .See discussion chap. 4.
78.See statements and testimony o f city council members,
chap. 5.
79.Halloran Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 289.
80.lbid ., p. 290.
78
8 1 .Memphis, Tennessee, Code, Civil Service, chap. 1 2 , § 1 2 -2 .
82 .See, e.g., testimony o f Herman Ewing, discussed in chap. 5
and Commercial Appeal, Aug. 9 , 1977, "W h o Runs Police”
(editorial).
8 3 .Walter Evins, former C R C Chairman, interview in Memphis
Apr. 21, 1977. ’
Press Scimilar, Oct. 12, 1976.
85 .Memphis, Tennessee, Code, Civil Service, chap. 12.
86.1bid., § 1 2 -1 8 .
8 7 . Fargarson Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 222..
8 8 . Hardy Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 229 .
8 9 . Fargarson Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 230 ; And see
Memphis Code, § 12 - 6 ( 2).
Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp.
91. Ibid.
9 2 . Hardy Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 232 .
93 . Commercial Appeal, Aug. 7 , 1977, p. B -2 .
9 4 . Fargarson and Hardy Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 228.
9 5 . Hardy Testimony. Hearing Transcript, p. 227 . Note: figure
IS as o f date o f Commission Hearing, May 9 , 1977.
96.See discussion, chap. 6.
91 .Commercial Appeal, Aug. 10, 1977, p. 29.
9 8 .Wade Hardy, interview in Memphis, Apr. 2 8 , 1977.
99.1bid.
l(X).Robert Fargarson, interview in Memphis, May 5, 1977.
101 . T/te Police, p. 198.
102. Hugh Stanton, interview in Memphis, May 3, 1977.
103.Stanton Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 130.
10 4 .Ibid., p. 133.
105.Ibid., p. 139.
106. Ibid.
10 7 .Ibid., p. 128.
108.Ibid., pp. 12 8 -2 9 .
109.lbid„ p. 129.
1 10. Ibid.
111.Ibid., p. 132.
112.Robinson Interview.
1 13.See, The Police, p. 198.
I14.lbid.
1 l5,C ody Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. I 18 -19 .
116.“ W hoever under color o f any law., statute, ordinance, regu
lation, or custom , willfully subjects any inhabitant o f any State,
Territory, or District to the deprivation o f any rights, privileges.
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws
o f the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or
penalties, on account o f such inhabitant being an alien, or by
reason o f his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punish
ment o f citizens, shall be fined not more than $1 ,000 or im
prisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death results
shall be subjected to imprisonment for any term o f years or for
life.”
117.The statistics cited originate from national statistics
prepared for inclusion in the Annual Report o f the Attorney
General. ^
1 18 .Statistics are not kept for the number o f complaints
received that allege only police misconduct. According to W il
liam H. Stapleton, U.S. Department o f Justice, Civil Rights
Division, the greater majority o f the complaints involve allega
tions o f criminal police misconduct. Telephone interview, Aug.
2, 1977; and Drew S. Days, III, Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Rights Division, letter to Mark G . Schneider, Aug. 17 ̂
1977. (hereafter cited as Days Letter).
1 19.Nancy Gunter, legal technician. Office o f U.S. Attorney,
Western District o f Tennessee, telephone interview Aug 5 1977. . g. J,
120.325 U.S. 91 , 107.
121. Cody Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 120, 149 -50 .
122. Comm eraa/ Appeal, Aug. 18, 1977, p. 27. On Oct. 13,
1977, a second indictment alleging beating o f a victim by a
Memphis police officer was returned in the case o f United
States V. Edwin Currie.
123. Commercray Appeal, Aug. 18, 1977, p. 27.
124.1bid.
125. The Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act o f 1 9 7 6 " (42
U.S.C. § 1 9 8 8 ) now authorizes a federal court, in its discretion
to award the winning party to certain suits (e .g., 42 U.S.C.
§1 9 8 3 ; this statute, which mirrors the federal criminal statute
(18 U .S.C . §2 4 2 ) is the most frequently used law for civil
redress o f police misconduct) reasonable attorney’s fees as part
o f the costs o f bringing the suit. This law should increase the
use o f federal courts for vindication o f rights. However, other
obstacles to successful suit on police misconduct charges still
prevail as stated.
126. The Police, p. 199.
\2~J.The Police, p. 32.
12 8 .Kramer Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp. 163 -64 .
129 .See also, Arnold Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, pp.
1 8 7 -2 2 2 ; Wharton Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, pp!
3 5 ^4 5 ^^ ’ Testimony, Hearing Transcript, pp.
130 .Kramer Testimony, Hearing Transcript, p. 159 -60 .
lOGfl 79
Chapter 7
USE OF DEADLY FORCE
Tennessee law establishes the right of police o f
ficers to use whatever force necessary, presumably
even deadly force, to make an arrest. The law
reads;
If, after notice of the intention to arrest the
defendant, he either fiee or forceably resist,
the officer may use all the necessary means to
effect the arrest.'
The written policies of the Memphis Police De
partment address an officer’s right to use force
given certain restrictions. Those policies arc cited
here in their entirety;
Use of Force; Officers arc confronted daily
with situations where control must be exer
cised to effect arrests and to protect the
public safety. Control may be achieved
through advice, warnings, and persuasion, or
by the use of physical force. While the use of
reasonable physical force may be necessary in
situations which cannot be otherwise con
trolled, force may not be resorted to unless
other reasonable alternatives have been ex
hausted or would clearly be ineffective under
the particular circumstances. Officers are per
mitted to use whatever force that is reasona
ble and necessary to protect others or them
selves from bodily harm.-*
Self Defense and Defense of Others; The law
of justifiable homicide authorizes an officer to
use deadly force when it is necessary to pro
tect himself or others from what reasonably
appears as an immediate threat o f great bodily
harm or from imminent peril o f death. The
policy o f the Department does not limit that
law. Under certain specified conditions, deadly
force may be exercised against a fleeing
felon.’’ [emphasis added)
Nowhere in the department’s I’olicies and Regu
lations arc those “ certain specified conditions"
written. It might assume that conditions cited in
the first paragraph, “ Use of Force” apply. But that
is not stated. The results of such broad State law
and departmental policies appear to have been the
frequent use of deadly force by Memphis police
officers; use primarily employed against black
Memppians. The department’s own statistics '
show that in the two persons killed by Mem
phis police were black men. In 1970, 1 I men were
killed and 8 were black; in 1971 no one was
killed; in 1972, 2 persons were killed during the
first 14 days of the year and both were black
(statistics for the remainiler of 1972 were not
available). In 197.7, 5 persons were killed. MPD
statistics for 197.7 did not list the victims’ race. Of
the 7 persons killed m 1974, 5 were black; in
1975, 8 men killed, 7 were black; in 1976, 4 men
were killed, 2 were black. In 1977 in the course
of 5 weeks, July I 7 to August I 7, 5 persons were
killed by Memphis police and all were black.'’ Ex
hibit 7 displays the race and sex of persons killed
in MPD shootings from 1969 through 1976 and
also the “ overt act or reason" given for the
shootings in the MPD reports.
The MPD statistics for 1974, 1975, and 1976 re
ported shootings of suspects that involved both in
juries and deaths. A simple display of the number
of persons injured in police shootings shows that
blacks are the victims in numbers disproportionate
to the size of the black population in Memphis and
the numbers of blacks arrested. The race and sex
of persons injured in police shootings in 1974,
1975, and 1976 is shown in table 4.
Phillip Arnold, member of the board of directors
of the American Civil Liberties Union of Tennes
see and an attorney, cited statistics which he said
clearly showed that the frequent use of firearms by
Memphis police affect blacks more than whites
and is, in all probability, racially motivated;
...we looked at its [use of deadly force] appli
cation and we found that 58 percent of the
persons arrested in the city of Memphis are
black; but of those persons, against whom
deadly force was employed — that is, who the
police shot at—87 percent were black.
We got a statistition...and his analysis was that
there was only one chance in ten thousand
mathematical probability that race was not the
factor in these disparate statistics.”
19
191
19
19
19
19
1!
80
107fi
EXHIBIT 7
Report of Persons Killed In Shootings By Memphis Police 1969-1976
Year Type Call
1969
Overt Acf/Reason
Suspect’s
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1,
2.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Still watch
Still watch
Unknown
Assault on citizen, attempted on officer
Fleeing burglar
Fleeing burglar
Fleeing armed robber, shot at officers
Resisting arrest
Resisting arrest, pointed gun at officers
Fleeing burglar
Fleeing armed robber, pointed gun at officers
Fleeing scene of shooting
Shot at officers
Armed robber
Armed robber
Fleeing burglar
No one killed in shootings by police officers in 1971
(Statistics reported only for January 1-14 1972)
1. Unknown
2. Unknown
1. Shooting
2. Shooting
3. Armed person
4. High Speed Auto
5. Armed person
1. Burglary
2. Prowler
3. Hold-up
4. Assault
5. Prowler
6. Shooting
7. Unknown
1. Personal crime
2. Personal crime
3. Property crime
4. Property crime
5. Personal crime
6. Personal crime
7. Property crime
8. Personal crime
1. Property crime
2. Property crime
3. Personal crime
4. .. Personal crime
Fleeing burglar
Fleeing—car theft
Pointed rifle at officer
Fired at officers
Pointed rifle
Unknown
Shot officer
Burglary
Burglary
AR
Pointed gun at officers
Burglary
Fired at officer
AR
Self defense
Self defense
Fleeing felon
Fleeing felon
Self defense
Self defense
Fleeing felon
Self defense
Fleeing felon
Fleeing felon
Self defense
Self defense
TOTAL: 39 persons killed, 39 males, 26 black, 8 white, 5 race unknown
Sex Race
M B
M B
M B
M W
M B
M W
M B
M B
M B
M W
M B
M B
M B
M B
M B
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
M B
M B
M W
M B
M B
M B
M W
M B
M B
M W
M B
M B
M B
M B
M B
M B
M B
M W
M W
'. Chapman, Septem-
October 3 1Q77 f h o c l ' ’ 'nspecior, memo to Police Director E. W. Chapman
f S i S '°n ^ iT 3T Js n̂ t“ „ « e d ‘’in the’ S re p o ts " ” " ''" '’ '" ’
1071
'I
i it
̂ '
!
( i
J ! ii
,n:i
• i li
•r :
ii
Female Total
Black White Black White
1974 ■ 10 1 1 0 12
1975 11 3 2 0 16
1976 8 0 1 0 9
Total 29 4 4 0 37
An article by Gerald Robin in the Journal o f
Criminal Law, Criminolof>y and I’olicc Science on a
study of police use of firearms concluded that the
frequent use of firearms is largely due to
overemphasis on the danger in police work. The
study cited statistics that showed the rate of police
fatalities as 33 per 1 ()(),()()() officers compared to
a death rate of 94 per 100,000 in mining, 76 per
100,000 in construction, and 55 per 100,000 in
agriculture.’
The report of the President’s Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
states, "It is essential that all departments formu
late written firearms policies which clearly limit
their use to situations o f strong and compelling
need."" The guidelines recommended for firearms
control, which were developeil by the Presiilential
Commission after review of the policies of several
police departments and discussions with numerous
police administrators, are reprinted here in there
entirety;
1. Deadly force should be restricted to the ap
prehension of perpetrators who, in the course
of their crime threateneil the use of detidly
force, or if the officer believes there is a sub
stantial risk that the person whose arrest is
sought will cause death or serious bodily htirm
if his apprehension is delayed. The use of
firearms should be flatly prohibited in the ap
prehension of misdemeanants, since the value
of human life far outweighs the gravity ttf a
misdemeanor.
2. Deadly force should never be used on mere
suspicion that a crime, no matter how serious,
was committed or that the person being pur
sued committed the crime. An officer should
either have witnessed the crime or should
have sufficient information to know, as a vir
tual certainty, that the suspect committed an
offense for which the use of deadly force is
permissible.
3. Officers should not be permitted to fire at
felony suspects when lesser force could he
used; when the officer believes that the
suspect can be apprehended reasonably soon
thereafter without the use of deadly force; or
when there is any substantial danger to in
nocent bystanders. Although the requirement
of using lesser force, when possible, is a legal
rule, the other limitations are based on sound
public policy. To risk the life of innocent per
sons for the purpose of apprehending a felon
cannot be justified.
4. Officers should never use warning shots for
any purpose. Warning shots endanger the lives
of bystanders, anti in addition, may prompt a
suspect to return the fire. Further, officers
should never fire from a moving vehicle.
5. Officers should be allowed to use any
necessary force, including deadly force, to
protect themselves or other persons from
death or serious injury. In such cases, it is im
material whether the attacker has committed
a serious felony, a misdemeanor, or any criitie
at all.
6. In ortler to enforce firearms use policies,
department regulations should require a
detailed written report on all discharges of
firearms. All cases should he thoroughly in-
vestigateil to determine whether the use of
firearms was justified under the circum
stances."
Police officers themselves would benefit from
very specific firearms policies. They would be
aware ot the kinds of circumstances where their
use of firearms or of deadly force would be sup-
K2
1072.
4
ported by their police department. Without a very
specific policy, as outlined above, the officer is
vulnerable to the subjective interpretation of his or
her police administrators whose interpretations
may be inconsistent.
In 1972 Congressman Harold Ford of Memphis,
then a State representative, introduced legislation
(HB 1639) to replace the current Tennessee law
that governs a police officer’s right to use all
means necessary to effect the arrest.'® Mr. Ford’s
bill included two of the major points made in the
Presidential Commission guidelines (1 and 5).
The Memphis Police Department is not
restricted by Tennessee law from promulgating
detailed guidelines regarding the use of firearms
and of deadly force. The law reads “ the officer
may use all the necessary means....’ ’ It certainly
does not compel an officer to use firearms or
deadly force.
Notes to Chapter 7
1. Tenn. Code. Ann., ch. 40 , §808 .
2. City o f Memphis, Memphis Police Department, Policies and
Regulations, May 1975, p. 5.
3. Ibid., p. 9.
4 . Steve Cohen, police legal advisory, memorandum to Police
Director E .W . Chapman, Sept. 8. 1977, and Lt. E. Brown,
M PD staff inspector, memorandum to Police Director E W .
Chapman, Oct. 3. 1977.
5. Commercial Appeal, Aug. 18, 1977, p. 1, and Aug. 19, 1977
p. 25
6. Arnold Statement, Open Meeting Transcript, p. 192.
7. U.S. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and A d
ministration o f Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (1 9 6 7 ) ,
p. 189.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., pp. 18 9 -9 0 .
10. Mike Honey, southern director. National Committee
Against Repressive Legislation, to Concerned Individuals and
Organizations in Tennes.sec, Feb. 29 , 1972.
83
PART 9: Excerpt from A
Community Concern; Po lice
Use o f Deadly Force
1074
T» W'tf
THE CONCERNS OF THE POLICE FOUNDATION
Patrick V. Murphy
President
The Police Foundation has had a continuing interest in the study of
police use of deadly force. The authority to use ‘ Je nios
distinctive characteristic of policing; how a police department uses
force affects its relationship with the community arid its mission to
provide humane, productive law enforcement. Lack of restraint i
ihc use of force, particularly deadly force, is a telling ^>8"
management and supervision of a police department By the same
token, a police department which controls the use of force thi-oug
clearly stated policies, training, and exacting supervision is almost
certainly an effective agency. . . , • r
To date, the foundation’s major effort in dealing with the
deadly force has been support for the two years of research which l"d
to publication of the foundation’s report. Po/uj Use o f Dead^i
Force, discussed in the following pages. Police Foundation board
and staff believe this report is among the foundation s most
significant efforts, not because the report is definitive, which it is not
but because it has contributed to an important, growing debate on the
issue of deadly force and to a rapidly developing body of research on
To further debate and research, the foundation is pleased to be able
to contribute to this document the following literature review on
police use of deadly force. This review marks the first comprehensive
examination of empirical research available on the subject.
m -.
67
1075
SUM M ARY OF RESEARCH ON THE POLICE USE OF
DEADLY FORCE
Cynthia G. Sulton and Phillip Cooper
Program Dircdor and Researcher, The Police Foundation
In 1977, the Police Foundation published a report entitled Police
Use o f Deadly Force, which presented the results of research by
Police Foundation staff and police officers from Washington, D.C.,
and Birmingham, Alabama.' The Police Foundation continues to
view police use of deadly force as an important research topic worthy
of further analysis. In continuance of this interest. Police Foundation
staff have analyzed the empirical studies conducted on the topic,
some of which were prepared subsequent to the Foundation’s report.
An annotated bibliography on police use o f deadly force is presented
as an appendix to this review.
This review summarizes several leading studies of police use of
deadly force. Three types of data sets are analyzed in this review;
national trend data; single-city data, which demonstrates the
circumstances and ramifications of police use of deadly force in
specific cities; multiple-city and state data, which permit comparisons
among several cities and regions within a state. A few studies contain
two or three of the data set types analyzed and therefore these studies
appear in more than one section of the review. Finally, the common
elements in the studies, are noted, particularly the significance of
several generally recognized variables thought to characterize or
explain police use of deadly force.
m
{■i.
National Trend Data
The National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), Division of
Violent Statistics (U.S. Public Health Service) indicates that 3,082
citizensdied between 1968 and 1976 asa result of'Megal intervention.”
Included in the NCHS statistics are all reported civilian fatalities at
the hands of law enforcement officers. The vast majority of these
deaths were caused by firearms discharged by police officers. An
average of 342 citizens were reported killed each year, with the
percentage of deaths among nonwhites remaining almost constant at
51 percent per year. These statistics can be contrasted with data for
the periods 1960 to 1967 and 1950 to 1959. In the former period an
average of 268 citizens were killed per yearfKobler, 1957a) and an
average of 240 in the latter period (Robin, 1963). These data suggest
that civilian fatalities at the hands of the police increased significantly
during the 18 years reviewed (See Tables 1 and 2).
A second recognizable trend is that nonwhite Americans comprise
between 47 and 50 percent of the fatally injured (NCHS, 1978;
Harringet al., 1977; Kobler, 1975a; Kobler, 1975b; and Robin, 1963).
1076
69
TABLE 1
C ivilian D eaths by L egal Intervention 1952-i969
United S i ates Public Health Service
V l EAL S'EA EISI ICS
Year
Total
Civilian
Deaths
White Male
Deaths
Number %
Nonwhite Male
Deaths
Number %
1952 256 128 50 125 49
1953 255 124 48 130 51
1954 244 130 53 112 46
1955 227 111 49 114 50
1956 226 123 54 103 46
1957 228 119 52 109 48
1958 229 111 49 117 51
1959 227 109 48 117 52
I960 245 124 51 118 48
1961 237 132 56 103 43
1962 184 88 48 94 51
1963 242 111 46 129 53
1964 in 131 47 143 51
1965 271 154 57 117 43
1966 298 150 50 144 48
1967 387 200 52 182 47
1968 350 163 46 I8I 52
1969 354 160 45 190 54
Source: Arthur L. Koblcr, “ Police Homicide in a Dcmocracy"r
Female
Deaths
Number %
TABLE 2
C ivilian D eaths by L egal Intervention i968-I976
National C enter for H ealth Statistics
Total Civilian
Deaths
White Civilian Nonwhite Civilian
Year
Deaths
Number %
Deaths
Number %
1968 343 159 46 184 54
1969 347 158 46 189 54
1970 329 154 47 176 53
1971 409 214 52 198 48
1972 296 132 45 164 55
1973 372 185 50 187 50
1974 370 183 49 187 51
1975 330 177 54 153 46
1976 286 146 51 140 49
Source: Unpublished NCHS statistics
i c n i IS)
“ Justifiable Homicides by Police” by Gerald D.
Robin^
As part of a study in which he collected extensive data relating to
pohce^killings of criminals in Philadelphia, Gerald Robin conducted
some analyses of national statistics on police. Using National Centcr
of Health Statistics data, the author notes that natiotia y during tl
neriod 1950 to 1959 the average number of citizens killed by po ice
officers was S o . Four4 years-1950, 1955, 1956, 1957-4he author
obtained national data on the race and sex of fatal police victims.
Forty-nine percent of the victims were black, and blacks were victims
seve^ times as often as whites. All but 0.4 percent ot the victims were
" ’ considering concern for the occupational risks of police officers
Robin analyzed fatality rates from Monthly Labor Review -and
Uniform Crime Reports and concluded that the occupational risks o
law enforcement have been exaggerated. The rate of occupationa
fatalities per 100,000 workers in mining, agriculture, construction
and transportation exceeded the rate for law enforcement. (SeeTable
3)
TABLE 3
O c c u p a t i o n a l F a t a l i t i e s p e r loo.ooo E m p l o y e e s
1955
Occupation
Mining
Agriculture
Contract Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation
Public Utilities
Trade
Finance, Service, Govt., Misc.
Law Enforcement
■AIL 1" « r . “ 7r
o fih e Untied Slates. Colonial Times lo 1957 (Washington. B.C.. ), p.
‘ Calculated from Uniform Crime Reports.
“ A Garrison State in a ‘ Democratic’ Society” by
Paul TakagF
In response to 1971 mass media reporting o f increasing
“ assassinations” of law enforcement officers, Paul Takagi conducted
a comparison study of police officers killed in the line of duty and
civilians killed by the police. This article presents the findings and
Fatality
Rate per
No. o f No. of 100,000
Employees Fatalities Employees'
748,000 \ 700 93.58
6,730,000 3700 54.97
2,506.000 1900 75.81
16,552,000 2000 12.08
2,722,000 1200 44.08
1,335,000 200 14.98
10,728,000 1100 10.25
14,808,000 2100 14.18
167,862 55 32.76f
71
1078
1- .. ’*4 f r '.-rJ L . ' f . . f t
I
conclusions o f that 1971 study.
Takagi reports that the FBI reported an increase in the number of
police officers killed, from 55 in 1963 to 125 in 1971. During the same
time period there was an increase of more than 50 percent in the totiil
number of police officers. Consequently, there was no increase in the
actual rate of death. The rate fluctuated from year to year, peaking in
1967 with 29.9 deaths per 100,000 law enforcement officers, but with
no apparent trend. Takagi notes further that the number of agencies
reporting data to the FBI has increased since 1963, suggesting that the
increased number of reporting agencies has contributed to the
increase in the number of reported police deaths.
Analyzing the number of deaths among male civilians 10 years old
or older as a result of “ legal intervention of police,“ Takagi reports a
gradual increase in the age-adjusted rate for the period 1962 to 1968.
His comparison of civilian with police death rates shows
. . . police to be victims of homicides at an annual rate of
about 25 per hundred thousand/ while citizens are victims
of killingsatthehandsof police at a rate ofO.5 per 100,000
males ages ten and over, on the national level, and a rate
of about 0.8 in California... (p. 29)
Examining the racial disparity of civilian deaths by “ legal
intervention o f the police,” Takagi concludes.
Between I960 and 1968, police killed 1,188 Black males
and 1,253 white males in a population in which about ten
percent are Black. The rates of homicides due to police
intervention increased over the years for both whites and
Blacks, but remained consistently at least nine times
higher for Blacks for the past 18 years, (p. 29)
Takagi maintains that arrest rates among blacks do not explain the
disparate proportion of deaths in that group. He says that in 1964 and
1968 blacks constituted about 28 percent of total arrests and 51
percent of the civilian deaths. Further, blacks accounted for 36
percent of arrests for the major crimes— homicide, rape, robbery,
aggravated assault, burglary, theft, and auto theft—in 1968 and less
than 30 percent in 1964, a year when blacks constituted 5 1 percent of
civilian deaths.
Looking at racial differences in specific ages groups, which he says
are unlikely to contain “ desperate” criminals, Takagi concludes, “ In
proportion to population, black youngsters and old men have been
killed by police at a rate 15 to 30 times greater than that for whites of
the same age.” (p. 30)
Takagi concludes that police killings are “ manifestations of
racism" and the increase in law enforcement personnel demonstrates
America’s movement toward a “garrison state.”
“The Management o f Police Killings” by Sid Harring,
Tony Platt, Richard Speiglman, and Paul Takagi^
In this article, Harring et al. present additional data updating the
earlier Takagi data. The authors report that deaths by legal i-;
72 l)7n
intervention of police among white male civilians continued in the
period 1969 to 1972ata ratcofO.2 per 100,000 white males 9 years old
and older, while the black civilian death rate continued the upward
trend started around 1962. 1 he highest black civilian death rate ol 2.4
occurred in 1969. Kates lor both whites and blacks showed a notable
decrease in 1972,0.18 and 1.81 respectively. Total civilian deaths lor
1972 were 300, in contrast to412 in 1971. Racial breakdowns for 1973
and 1974 were not available at the time this report was written, but
the total civilian deaths for those years were376 and 375, respectively.
For the period 1972-1975 the authors find continued yearly
fluctuation in the rate to be around 25 deaths per 100,000 police killed
in the line of duty, with no discernible trend. The rate dropped in 1968
from the reported high of 29.9 per 100,000 law enforcement officers in
1967, “ but increased in 1970 and reached an all-time high of 31 deaths
per 100,000 police officers in 1971.”
The article continues with a critical analysis of other studies of
police killings o f civilians and an e.xamination o f“ the ideological and
strategic premises underlying state efforts to manage police killings of
civilians.” (p. 34)
“ Police Homicide in a Democrary” by Arthur L.
Kobler*
In this article, Kobler reports on the results of a 1970 research
program which focused on records of about 1,500 civilians killed by
police and 400 killings of police. Data sources included (1) the U.S.
Public Health Service’s annual. Vital Statistics, for data on violent
civilian deaths where police involvement was specified for the years
1952 through 1969; (2) the FBl’sannual, Uniform Crime Reports, for
the years 1960 through 1973; and (3) newspaper reports for the period
1964 through 1969.
Using Vital Statistics data, Kobler reports a marked increase in
civilians killed by police in recent years, an average of 237 for the 13-
year period 1952 to 1964 and 332 for the 5-year period 1965 to 1969.
Dividing Vital Statistics data into more comparable time intervals,
the increase in civilian deaths remained apparent; an average of 242
civilian deaths for the 3-year period 1952 to 1954; and for the 5-year
periods 1955 to 1959, I960 to 1964, and 1965 to 1969, the average
civilian deaths were 147, 297, and 332 respectively. According to FBI
data, the number o f police killed has increased from an average of45
for the 5-year period I960 to 1964 to an average of 67 for the 5-year
period 1965 to 1969 and to an average of 116 for the 4-year period
1970 to 1973.
Further analysis of the data which Kobler himself collected showed
Using the threat of death or severe injury to a person as
criteria for Justifiability of homicide, information on
about 1,500 incidents form' 1960 through 1970 suggests
that two-fifths o f the killings were justifiable, one-fifth
questionable, and two-fifths unjustifiable, (p. 165)
The remainder of the article deals with laws and administrative
rules regarding police use of force, the absence of penalties for officer
73
1080
■
'A' /S;'
killings of civilians—coroner’s inquest, criminal prosecution and
trial, and civil suits.
“ Figures (and Perhaps some Facts) on Police
Killings of Civilians in the United States,
1965-1969” by Arthur L. Kobler’
This article contains the findings regarding fatal incidents
involving police officers from a study on noncriminal homicides. The
principal data source for these findings was newspaper reports
provided by clipping services throughout the nation. By writing to
officers, attorneys, etc., Kobler obtained data which augmented the
newspaper data. He examined records on civilians killed by police in
the 5-year period 1965 through 1969, excluding riot-related killings.
Comparing his totals to Vital Statistics data, Kobler estimated that
the 911 incidents analyzed represent 70 percent of the total
occurrences. This comparison also suggested that Kobler’s data is
overrepresentative of Pacific area occurrences.
Acknowledging that the data are poor and uncertain for statistical
tests, Kobler presented the following findings;
The fatal incidents took place most often between9 p.m. and 3 a.m.
(42 percent), on weekends (35 percent), in the last 6 months of the
year (two-thirds).
Data on time, day, and month o f police officer deaths were
strikingly similar to that on civilian deaths.
Three-quarters of the police killings of civilians occurred in urban
areas, compared with 60 percent for police killed.
In urban areas, minority group members were 57 percent of the
citizen victims and 57 percent of the killers of police.
In populations areas o f50,000 and smaller, white persons were the
predominant victims (54 percent) and killers (56 percent).
For all areas, the racial distribution of victims was white, 43
percent; Spanish-American, 13 percent; black, 42 percent; other
(Asian and American Indian), 2 percent.
Almost half o f the persons killed were between the ages of 17 and
27, with a mean of 29 and a median o f 25.5.
The group of civilians killed were younger than the group of
civilians who killed police; the latter group had a mean age of 31 and
median age o f 27.
The average age o f both black and Spanish-American victims was
27, as compared to an average age o f 31 for white victims.
Prior to the fatal encounter, 30 percent of the victims were involved
in no criminal activity or a misdemeanor; 27 percent were involved in
property crimes; approximately 20 percent were involved in a
dangerous felony, most commonly armed robbery; 10 percent were
threatening others; 7 percent had assaulted others.
More than 30 percent of the incidents where police officers were
killed began with a misdemeanor or less.
1081 74
After encountering the police, approximately one-half reportedly
attacked the police and more than one-fourth were reportedly fleeing
from the police.
One quarter of the victims had no weapons; half had a firearm; 15
percent had a knife or sharp instrument.
Of the 530 armed victims, 24 percentf 125) either killed or injured a
police officer and almost 60 percent (315) used their weapons in other
menacing ways.
The racial distribution o f the police who killed civilians is white, 89
percent; black 7 percent; Spanish-American, 4 percent.
The racial distribution of police killed is white, 86 percent; black,
11 percent; Spanish-American, 3 percent.
Most ol police who killed and were killed by civilians had between
I and 5 years of police experience and were onduty city patrol
officers.
Seventy percent of the officers reportedly approached the subject
because they saw or suspected a felony; while one-quarter saw or
suspected a misdemeanor.
The predominant reasons for police killing the civilian was defense
o f self from real of imminent danger (more than one-halO and
prevention of escape of known or suspected felon (more than one-
quarter).
One quarter of the victims were shot in the back and one-third in
the head.
Although there were witnesses to 95 percent o f the fatal incidents,
in only 20 percent were the witnesses independent bystanders as
opposed to police officers and companions to the victims.
Single-City Data
“Justifiable Homicides by Police Officers” by
Gerald D. Robin**
Robin analyzed 32 cases of police killings of civilians in
Philadelphia between 1950 and 1960 (inclusive) to determine their
justafiability.
The author reviewed all police killings of criminals in Philadelphia
from 1950 to 1960 using data obtained from the books of the
homicide unit of the Philadelphia Police Department. According to
Robin, “ Extensive records were maintained for each case, detailing
the circumstances under which the killings occurred, various
characteristics o f the victim-offender, his previous criminal record if
any, and interviews with witnesses to the homicide as well as friends
and relatives o f the decedent.” (p. 226) Additionally, the author
examined the testimony given at th6 medical examiner’s inquest,
along with police interviews and reports, to create an accurate picture
of the events surrounding each killing.
108 ,
m
75
'*■■';' n ‘̂Z- m ‘tJ’r'S'ji
’j'-5v̂ ;wr>:V
*-4-v-̂ ' :>•
Robin collected data on the number of officers who, in the
performance of their duty, shot and killed a criminal, as well as on the
number of criminals who were shot and killed; race, age, marital
status, occupation, instant offense, resistance to arrest, and criminal
record of victims and offenders; and the time, place, and
circumstances of the shooting, as well as whether the criminal had
been warned.
The author found that 42 officers in performance of their duty had
shot and killed 32 criminals; in 23 cases only 1 officer was responsible
for the killing; 28 victims were black. Although during the time
period studied, Philadelphia’s black population was 22 percent of the
total population, blacks comprised 30.6 percent of the total arrests,
37.5 percent of the arrests for Part 1 serious offenses, and 87.5 percent
of the deaths by police officers. The rate of black victims killed
relative to the total black population was found to be22 times greater
than the comparable fatality rate among whites. The mean age for
victims was 27.6 and half of the victims were less than 24 years old.
The marital status of 27 victims was known to the researcher. Of
these, 15 were single, 5 were married, 5 were separated, 1 was
divorced, and 1 was a widower. Of the 30 victims about whom
information could be obtained, 25 had jobs that required “ no special
skills or training.” Of 32 victims 28 were shot either during the course
of a crime, immediately after a crime, or in pursuit. Various degrees
to resist arrest were used by 25 of the 32 victims. Seven fled from the
scene of the crime. M ore than 75 percent of the victims had previous
records; the average number of charges against each individual was
4.9 for general offenses and 2 .1 for Part 1 offenses. Almost 72 percent
of the incidents occurred between the hours of 9 p.m. and 9 a.m.
Finally, in 28 of the 32 cases the victims were warned either verbally,
by gunshot, or by both before they were killed.
The author relies on his findings to conclude that all the killings in
Philadelphia were Justifiable.
The context within which the killings occurred, the
serious crimes for which the V-O’s (victim-offenders)
were being arrested, their realization of the possible
consequences of resistance and flight, and the officer’s
reliance upon fatal force as a last resort— all these things
make it clear that criminals killed by police officers
generally are responsible for their own death, (p. 230)
The Police and Their Use o f Fatal Force in Chicago
by Ralph Knoohuizen, Richard P. Fahey, and
Deborah J. Palmer^
Knoohuizen et al. (1972) sought to determine patterns in the
'conduct of Chicago police toward civilians by exaniining79 incidents
in which civilians were killed by police in 1969 and 1970. The study
sought to analyze the characteristics common to fatal force incidents
in Chicago, to determine the extent of use and misuse of police
firearms, and to determine the degree of accountability for police
misconduct in Chicago.
1083
76
Data summarizing the incidents were obtained from newspaper
clippings. The International Association of Chiefs o f Police provided
data on Chicago police officer fatalities. Transcripts and
supplemental information were obtained from the Cook County
Coroner’s Office.
Knoohui/.en et al., noted several characteristics of the victims of
Chicago police killings. Although black male citizens comprised 33
percent of theChicago population, they accounted for70.9 percent of
the fatalities of the incidents studied. Black females accounted for 3.9
percent of the fatalities, white males 24.0 percent. (Spanish-
Americans were tabulated as white American citizens in this
investigation.) The death rate among blacks, 5.35 per 100,000 was
found to be approximately 6.3 times greater than the white rate of
0.86 per 100,000. Although the proportion of black citizens arrested
was found to be greater (55.4 percent of the arrest population as
compared to 35.7 percent for white citizens), the death rates adjusted
for arrest frequencies still indicate that the death rate for black
citizens in Chicago is about twice that for white citizens. This
conclusion is consistent with Robin’s evidence for Philadelphia
(1963).
The analysis also indicated that 62 percent o f those killed were
under 25 years of age, and that those under 25 were twice as likely to
die from police action than those over 25; 80 percent of the officers
involved were on duty and 20 percent were off duty; 65 of the 76 cases
were determined by the coroner to be justifiable homicides; 9 cases
were determined accidental; 1 was determined involuntary
manslaughter; and 1 was determined murder.
On the basis of a subjective review of the newspaper accounts and
coroner’s inquest records for each of the incidents, the researchers
concluded that in 28 o f the 76 incidents investigated (37 percent),
substantial evidence of misconduct existed. Further, they concluded
that, in 10 of those 28 cases, there was a substantial liklihood of
criminal misconduct on the part of the police officers.
The researchers concluded further that the interdependence of the
four separate bodies authorized to review incidents in which police
kill a civilian (police department. State’s attorney, coroner, and
internal affairs division) comprises effective scrutiny of police use of
fatal force. The researchers say
w
. . . the system for reviewing police use o f fatal force
suffers from two defects which combine to compromise
the integrity of the review process. The agencies in the
system have a close working relationship, an arrangement
which precludes independent examination within the
system; the review proceedings are conducted almost
entirely out of view of the public, an arrangement which
precludes independent examination from without.(p. 72)
1084
77
“ Killings by Chicago Police, 1969-70: An Empirical
Study” by Richard Harding and Richard P.
Fahey'*'
Richard Harding and Richard Fahey examined killings by
Chicago police olTiccrs during 1969 ami 1970, the same period
studied by Knoohui/en et al. Harding and Fahey also critically
analyzed the Illinois criminal justice system's failure to eontrol
questionable police conduct and suggested more effective control
measures.
The authors were able to investigate 85 killings for which the
Chicago Police Department acknowledged responsibility. Sources of
information included inquest transcripts and other public data, as
well as police descriptions of the incident, witne.ss testimony, and
coroner reports.
The analysis revealed that the death rate for Spanish-Americans
was highest, at 4.5 per 100,000 population; black citizens followed,
with 2.67 per 100,000 population; and white citizens had a
significantly lower rate of 0.34 per 100.000 population. Clearly, the
disparity in death rates between whites and nonwhites is significant.
The study categorizes the incidence of felony arrest{ murder, robbery,
aggravated assault, and weapons offenses) by race. Black citizens
were found to account for 73.3 percent of the arrest population for
the felony offenses and 74.7 percent of the fatality victims. White
citizens accounted for 19.5 percent of the felony arrests and 19
percent of the police fatal force victims. Spanish-American citizens
accounted for 7.2 percent of the arrests and 6.3 percent of the
fatalities. Finally, the authors reported that 68.0 percent of those
arrested for violent crimes were under 24 years of age and that age
group constituted 64.6 percent of the citizens killed by the police.
These statistics are similar to other statistics comparing arrest and
fatality (Milton, 1977; Kobler, 1975).
The authors criticize the criminal justice system’s ability to hold
police accountable for killing citizens for the following reasons; ( 1 )
The State’s attorney is a politician under pressure from his
constituent to convict criminals and to let police officers do their job
unencumbered; (2) the States attorney is a police officer of sorts
insofar as he shares police standards; and (3 ) the function of the
State’s attorney requires cooperation with the police, thus diluting his
incentive to prosecute police officers vigorously.
An Analysis o f 248 Persons Killed by New York
City Policemen by Betty Jenkins and Adrienne
Faison
The purpose of this study was to determine the number of youths
21-years-old and under who were killed by New York City police
officers for the years 1970 to 1973 and to determine in each case the
victim’s age and ethnic origin, the location of the incident, and the
ethnic origin of the police officer(s) involved.
w
l o s s
78
I
Jenkins and Faison investigated 248 cases using both the New
York Times newspaper and the New York Police Department
firearms/discharge assault reports for supplemental information.
Characteristics recorded from the newspaper source included age and
ethnic origin of the victim, ethnic origin of the police officer, and
geographic location o( the incident.
Of the 248 individuals killed by police while involved in alleged
criminal activity, 73 percent were minority group members: 52
percent were black and 21 percent were Hispanic, Only 10 percent
were white. White police officers killed 96 black and 4 Hispanic
civilians. Black and H ispanic police officers combined killed only two
white citizens. Between 1970 and 1973 black officers constituted 6
percent of the NYPD and killed 9 percent of all black victims of
police, 18 percent of all Hispanic police victims, and only 4 percent of
all white police victims. Similarly, Hispanic police officers were 1
percent o f NYPD and accounted for 2 percent of the black civilian
deaths, 6 percent of the Hispanic civilian deaths, and 4 percent o f the
white civilian deaths.
The majority of the slain civilians were black or Hispanicand were
under 30 years of age. Nearly half the incidents analyzed involved
white police officers and a large proportion occurred in ghetto areas.
During the period studied, the number of deaths among blacks
declined, as did the number of deaths attributed to white patrol
officers, but this phenomenon was accompanied by an increase in the
number of unknown ethnicity” of slain civilians and involved
officers.
A Study o f the Use o f Firearms hy Philadelphia
Policemen from 1970 through 1974 prepared by the
Public Interest Law Center o f Philadelphia
(PlLCOP)i2
In 1975, the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia(PILCOP)
investigated 236 incidents of police use of firearms for the 5-year
. period 1970 to 1974, According to the' authors, the study was
intended to provide an overview of the use of deadly force by
Philadelphia police officers.
Researchers scanned newspaper articles from the four major
Philadelphia papers: the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Bulletin, the
Daily News, and the Tribune for fatal incidents involving the police.
Information recorded included the names of citizens and police
officers, race, juvenile status if applicable, previous record if
applicable, and duty status of officer. Other factors included location
o f circumstances, fatality or injury, type of crime, victim armed or
unarmed, resistance toarrestf victim fleeing or confrontation), victim
shot during or after confrontation, accidental or intentional
shooting, type and number ol verbal warnings.
Researchers collected data on each vari'able for each year studied
and aggregated the data for all 5 years. The researchers found that, of
the 236 incidents di.scovered, 126 victims were armed, and 52 of these
armed victims were killed. O f those shot, most (41) were in the act of
79
1080
committing or had committed armed robbery. One hundred five of
the 126 armed victims allegedly confronted the police. Regarding the
105 who confronted the police, 88 victims were shot during the
confrontation and 17 were shot after the confrontation. Among the
126 armed victims, 45 allegedly fled, 15 of whom were killed. There
were 10 juvenile armed victims. Off-duty police ollicers were involved
in 2 1 of the 126 incidents involving armed suspects.
Simlarly, from 1970 to 1974, 110 of 236 incidents involved
unarmed victims: 29 were killed, 39 “allegedly confronted the police,”
and 64 allegedly fled. Of the 64 unarmed fleeing victims, 15 victims
were killed. Off-duty police officers were involved in 25 unarmed
incidents. The greatest number of unarmed victims were accused ol
burglary. There were 22 unarmed juvenile victims. The discussion
and analysis include both the aggregate data and the year-by-year
statistics.
The study made several conclusions. First, use of fatal force
appeared to be worsening in the time period studied. 1 hirty-six
incidents occurred in 1970,30 in 1971,45 in 1972,55 in 1973, and 70 in
1974. From 1973 to 1974 shootings by police officers increased 27.3
percent. Of the civilians shot, 65.7 percent were wounded and 34.3
percent were killed. Off-duty police involvement appears to be
significant. Off-duty officers accounted for 19.5 percent of the
shootings during the5-year period. Of the victims, 53.4 percent were
armed. A significant proportion (14.3 percent) of the victims
commited no crime. Finally, the review process appears to be
inadequate. O f 170 incidents from 1970 to 1974, only 6 (3.5 percent)
of the cases were formally brought before the attention of the review
board and in all circumstances the officers’ actions were vindicated.
The researchers cite 73 police officers identified in the PILCOP
police cross-reference records of incidents of alleged misconduct.
They condemn the police department for its failure to discipline
officers who the researchers allege have misued a firearm. 1 hey call
for a discussion between the police department and the community of
the problems which were outlined in the report in order to resolve
these problems.
'̂ • 1
“ Shots Fired: An Examination of New York City
Police Firearms Discharges” by James Joseph
Fyfe.'J
In his study of firearms discharges by New York City police, Fyfe
pursues three research objectives: (1) To describe the phenomenon;
(2 ) to analyze the effect of direct organizational interventions upon
shooting discretion; and (3) to analyze the effects of indirectly related
organizational variables on police shootings. Fyfe’s data sources
included New York City Police Department (NYPD) records of all
reported incidents between January 1, 1971, and December3l, 1975,
involving discharges of police firearms and/ or assaults on police by
persons who were armed with deadly weapons or dangerous
instruments and who inflicted serious physical injury on police
officers; and NYPD personnel records including characteristics of
1087.
80
involved officers. The data analyzed are not a sample, but rather the
total population of shooting incidents and “ officer shooters” in the
NYPD over a 5-year period.
Fyfe employed a modified form of the department’s Firearms
Discharge/Assault Report (FD A R ) to conduct incident-specific
analyses. To conduct officer-specific analyses, he used a second form
for each officer who had reported discharging a firearm and/ or being
the subject of a serious assault.
Although Fyfe also examined animal shootings and suicides, this
summary concerns his analysis of shootings involving “ opponents,”
the main concern of his study. In analyzing shooting incidents
involving opponents, Fyfe found that the primary police officer was
on duty in uniform in 52.1 percent; the primary police officer was on
duty in civilian clothes in 26.4 percent; and the primary police officer
was off duty in 21.5 percent.
Fyfe confirmed a hypothesis that the geographic distribution of
firearms discharge/assault incidents over New York City’s police
precincts correlate closely with general “ police hazard rates” for
precincts (NYPD equation consisting of measures gauging the need
for uniform personnel-reported indoor and outdoor crimes of
violence and all complaints). He concluded that New York City, like
Los Angeles, is composed .o f a few “ free fire zones” and several
“sleepy hollows” (Farrell, 1977, p. 72).
After examining the variables of age and race o f opponents in
police shooting incidents, Fyfe concluded
. . . while police shooting opponents are generally young
and a greater proportion of the Black population is
young. Black males in all age groups are considerably
more liable to become police shooting opponents than are
their White/Hispanic contemporaries.
Ofthe2,149 opponents whose race and age were reported, 51 percent
were 23 or younger. Of 1,878 shooting opponents o f all ages, 19 2
percent were white, 57.8 percent were black, and 22.9 percent were
Hispanic.
Also in the section o f the research related to race and age of
opponents, Fyfe concluded that the disproportionate number of
blacks among police shooting opponents is explained by the larger
number o f black opponents reportedly armed with guns and involved
in robberies. Of the black opponents, 61 percent were armed with
handguns, machine guns, rifles, or shotguns, as compared with 5 3 7
percent o f the Hispanic and 35.4 percent o f the white opponents.
Further, 45.8 percent o f the black opponents were reportedly
involved in robberies as a precipitating event, compared with 26.3
percent of the Hispanic and 23.4 percent of the white opponents.
Another interesting finding concerns the race o f opponents in
shooting incidents where the police officers were injured or killed.
Police officers were injured in 16.6 percent of the encounters with
black opponents.
. . . proportionally more officers are injured in
encounters with Whites (2 2 . 8 percent) or Hispanics(l8 .0
108H
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percent). Proportionally more officers are killed in the
line of duty by Blacks (1.2 percent) than Whites (.8
percent) or by Hispanics (.7 percent), (p. 137)
After examining the relationship between the sex of police
shooting opponents and the type of incident, Fyfe concluded
1. Firearms Discharge/Assault Incidents involving
female opponents are significantly more often precipi
tated by non-crime related events than are those involving
male opponents.
2. The most severe consequences o f Firearms Discharge/
Assault Incidents involving lone female opponents are
generated by confrontation between off-duty officers and
females with whom these officers have been previously
acquainted, (p. 158)
Fyfe found that most of the female opponents were involved in
incidents along with male opponents and that no shooting incident
precipitated by a robbery or burglary involved'a lone female
opponent.
In analyzing officer race and police shootings, Fyfe tested and
affirmed the hypothesis that black and Hispanic officers have a
higher rate o f involvement in police shooting than white officers. The
shooting rates of black, Hispanic, and white officers were 207 per
1,000, 177.5 per 1,000, and 114 per 1,000 respectively.
In an effort to explain these rates, Fyfe concluded
. . . that the major reason for the disproportionate
shooting rate of on-duty black and Hispanic police
officers and detectives is their disproportionate assign
ment to department units andi those areas of the city in
which the likelihood of police shooting is greatest, (p. 190) ’
Further, Fyfe found that minority officers seem to become involved
in a disproportionate number o f off-duty shootings because they
reside m high hazard precincts in greater proportions than do white
officers.
More than four in ten Black and Hispanic off-duty
shooters (49.7 and 40.0 percent, respectively) reside in A
Precincts, while only one in twenty (5.7 percent) o f our
White shooters do. (p. 211)
Fyfe attempted to measure the impact o f direct organizational
interventions on police shooting incidents. Examining the Firearms
D^charge Review Board (FDRB), Fyfe found that 70.8 percent of
FDRBs 2,155 dispositions and findings were “ within law and
department guidelines.”
Fyfe hypothesized that negative FDRB dispositions and findings
would be greatest among incidents which officers initiated and off-
duty incidents, especially those occurring outside of the city or in bars
and grill.s. Fyfe’s findings affirmed the hypothesis with the exception
of the impact of incidents occurring in bars and grills. Incidents
involving proactive uniformed officers resulted in administrative
1080
f n S ” ' '̂ ■‘ h greater frequency than did incidents
n S e FDRm'T " '”''■ ‘-•“y ->■"-< .n
S 4 n errlT o .5 '̂'‘ ''"'■"i n.adans within the city and
off dS?v S i! >ncidents within the city. Incidents involving
- " ‘I did not result inmore frequent FDRB negative dispositions and findings
histoTy on liirF D R R ^^ootingrr disposition and findings. O f the incidents
Z l 7 I T " " " " ” P=r«n. were t o J J S t b
Within guidelines as compared to 70.5 percent of the incidents
nvolving officers with no prior shooting history
N YPn c S .■ ® department order which established
f^ L d a 29 9 H administrative review procedures. He
tound a 29.9 percent decrease m the weekly mean of officers reported
discharging their firearms after the issuance o f T.O.P. 237 He found
important changes in officers’ reported reasons for discharging
of “ defense o f life” shootings increasedtnd
both the weekly mean and percentage of “ prevent/ttminate S r ”
wounded and killed also decreased after the issuance of T O P 0 3 7
“ 8 ^ ! S S r narcotics enforcement policy from
Fvfon 1 ‘ o lengthy investigations o r L h I r Z T '
level d ie n te le " • > . M ) ” " ' ™ " '
“ ■>’ I’ ' " ' " ■Peidents involving
■ rob L iL - L r e X '" ? d ' ' , " ‘ I'P'
Shootings ” fn 5n7 t4 precipitant of New York City police
involved in’ n o l iS 'c S S a t t e m p t s to generalize about the officers
states police shooting incidents. Looking at officer rank, Fyfe
r r k' ' “̂ P^'^'sors fire their guns far less often th a n S
their subordinates; when they do fire their guns, however they are
^hnoS^ K very similar to those which characterize
shooting by non-supervisory officers.” (p. 422-24) He finds that
officprc A P ° ‘ ^® Î’ t̂Jting incidents than are whiteofficers. Analyzing police officer shooter characteristics bv rate of
opponent fatality, Fyfe concludes that black plainsc othes off ce?s
are involved twice as often as black u n ifo rm e d S te ^nd
uniformed and plainclothes officers. The FDRB disposition^and
dings show that shooting incidents involving white black and
H, pa„,b o f t o r , arg found .o be justifiable i„ expected p ro p o L u s
In discussing opponents involved in police shootings, Fyfe offers
oU ^F a lone black male between 21 and 29 years
old. Fyfe finds also that white, black, and Hispanic opponents are
thafth^'^h inhabited by their own race and
hat the shootings are overwhelmingly intraracial. He finds further
83 1090
that
Minority opponents—especially Blacks—are far more
often armed with guns when they confront the police than
are Whites. Concomitantly, wc find blacks are far more
often in the company of others in these situations; that
lone H ispanics, who are generally older than most of our
types, frequently employ knives against police; and that
Whites are frequently involved in situations in which they
employ vehicles to assualt and/or flee from police, (p.
483)
The wide range of data and findings in the Fyfe study are
attributable to the unique research opportunity of the open access to
NYPD data.
The Use o f Deadly Force By Boston Police
Personnel prepared by Planning and Research
Division, Boston Police Department''*
In this report, the Planning and Research Division of the Boston
Police Department endeavored objectively to review the policies,
rules, and regulations governing application of deadly force by its
members. As a part of this effort, 210 Boston police firearms
discharges during the period 1970 to 1973 were studied.
Although not all firearm discharges reports were available,
researchers examined 37 from 1970,62 from 1971,70 from 1972, and
41 from 1973. For analysis purposes, researchers categorized the 210
discharges as follows; 102 at a fleeing felon, 74 at an assailant, and 34
miscellaneous. The offenses which most frequently precipitated
shooting at fleeing felons were breaking and entering, 31.4 percent;
robbery, 18 percent; and auto theft, 15.7 percent. In the fleeing felon
category, 57 of the 102 discharges were actually directed at the
suspect, 40 of these discharges were “ for assistance,” and 5 were
warning shots. In the fleeing felon group, 2 1 . 6 percent apparently
were armed with deadly weapons.
O f the 74 shooting incidents resulting from assault and battery on a
police officer, the most frequent initial violations were larceny
(usually of an auto), 25.7 percent; traffic violations, 20.3 percent; and
robberies, 13.5 percent. Analysis revealed that o f the74 incidents, the
type of weapons used by assailants were automobile, 44.6 percent;
firearm, 27.0 percent; knife, 21.6 percent; and physical force, 5.4
percent.
O f the 34 miscellaneous shooting incidents, 32.4 percent involved
assault, without battery, against a police officer, and 26.5 percent
were “ accidental discharges.”
Another interesting finding is that “Those shooting incidents that
involved suspects resulted in 78 being captured uninjured, another43
being wounded, and 5 fatalities. A total of 58 suspects escaped.” (p. 9)
The report also reviewed firearm discharge policies and review
procedures in Boston and other large cities departments, as well as
provided a legal prospective on the issue o f police use of deadly force.
1091 84
Multiple City Data
^ 0 7 7 , 0 ^ ftomicUtcs in California.
Q. . '’ y orCriminal.lustice
> lati.stics. Division ol l.aw l•;^^orccment, Calilornia
Uepartment of Justice'^
This study was conducted at the request o f a California lecislative
slndrt d n ! a " i " “ “ The
years of age; all were shot to death, 1 2 by handguns.
1 he report analyzes 169 homicides by police in 1971 and 1972
Sixty S.X percent of the police homicidL and 62.5 percent o f the
felony crimes occurred m southern California, as compared with 14 8
and 23.0 percent of the San Francisco Bay Area.
d i f f k u l S ' h e ' * ^ - d i s c u s s i o n of the ailticultics the re.searchers encountered in the data Only 5 5 cases
were correctly reported in both police summaries and vital sSistics
summaries. There were 68 reported in both sources btt not a s c S
t h a r - 'r statistics. The researchers conclude
hat dependence on a single source would result in a sizable
Bureau dfCH 2) As a result of this finding, the
reliable ?uturrcoum s"‘ ‘" —
tha^tTnereem 'f s r ' ' --e^earchers report
pereenlasr of ‘ ^e largest
f n v e s t S L s Pal misdemeanorinvestigations. Patrol activities account for 75 percent o f the“ Dolice
homicides” and detective operations 15 percent. ^
hmdings regarding the circumstances surrounding suspect death-i
e r c l', S c c 'J 'L r hours^or d a X : Wpercent occur between 9 p.m. and 3 a.m.). More than one-third took
jidsutfciT?,*"” ' " " ™v»r, sand suffered between one and three wounds.
sh o 7 s1 h a tT 8 2 ?n °^ consequences of the “ police homicides”
snows that in 82.2 percent o f the incidents there was no legal -irtinn
were filed I n 'lT l f were civil sufts, whichwere tiled in 13 percent of the cases.” (p. 2)
Police and Their Use o f Fata! Force in Chicago
n K u ,̂ Richard P. Fahey, andDeborah J. Palmer*^
_ Group’s report included a comparison of
d f ^ l l p h S f with killings in four ofher major
C W a?n ? i'"r ""d Detroit. ■'
Chicago ranked first in the rate o f citizen fatalities per hundred
1092
85
thousand population; 42 percent greater than the next city,
Philadelphia. Chicago also ranked first in the rate ol civilian tenths
per 1 , 0 0 0 olTiccrs, second in the rale ol civilian deaths pci - 0 ,<H»l
arrests, and second in the rate of olTieer deaths per 1 ,000 ollieers.(See
rablc4)
TABLE 4
R atio of C ivilian D eaths from Police
Actions to Population, Arrests, and Officers in
F ive L arge U.S. C ities—July i970-M arch i97i
City
New York
Chicago
Los Angeles
Philadelphia
Detroit
Number of Death Rate Death Rate Civilian Death
Civilians per 100,000 per 20,000 Rate per 1,000
Killed Population Arrests Officers
21 o n 0.79 0.66
32 0.95 1.21 2.53
8 0.28 0.32 1.18
13 0.67 1.28 1,67
4 0,26 0.25 0.77
Police Use o f Deadly Force by Catherine H.
Milton, Jeanne Wahl Halleck, James Lardner, and
Gary L. Albrecht.”
Milton et al, investigated police use of deadly force in seven cuies:
Birmingham, Ala., Detroit, Mich., Indianapolis, Ind., Katyas Oty,
M o., Oakland, Calif., Portland, Ore., and Washington, D.C. The
study was conducted to raise issues and identify factors police
administrators should consider in developing or reformul^ating
department policies about the use of deadly force, specifically
^'"^In^ch of the seven cities, the researchers examined the record of
shootings by police officers over a period of time, ranging frorn 1 .
years in Detroit to 3 years in Kansas City. Data sources included (1)
review of shooting incident reports, (2 ) department regulations, ( )
procedures for the use of firearms, and (4) patrol car nde-along
observations. , ■ .u
Using an aggregate sample of 320 shootings from the 7 cities, the
researchers present several interesting findings.
96 (30 percent) were fatal shootings.
308 (98 percent) of the subjects shot by the police were known to be
male.
168 (58 percent) o f the shooting victims were between the ages of 19
and 29.
7 9 percent of all shooting victims were black.
57 percent of civilians shot were armed, 45 percent with guns.
1Q93.
86
102 (32 percent) of the precipitating incidents were disturbance
calls; 6 6 ( 2 1 percent) were robberies.
55 (17 percent) of the shooting incidents involved off-duty officers
and 58 (18 percent) involved onduty plainclothes officers.
Almost 92 percent o f shooting incidents in all cities except Detroit
were found to be justified.
There is no consistent relationship between shooting rates and
changes in index and violent crime rates.
A comparison of the circumstances surrounding the shootings of
civilians and police fatalities shows that, although robberies
constitute a high-risk situation for both groups, disturbance calls
constitute a greater risk.
Shooting rates varied from a high in Birmingham to a low in
Portland. (See Table 5)
TABLE 5
R a t e s o f P o l i c e S h o o t i n g s o f C i v i l i a n s , 1974
City and
Population
Number of
Shootings
Rate of
Shootings
Per 100,000
People
Number of*
Officers
Rate of
Shootings
Per 1,000
Officers
Portland
(378,134) 6 1.6 714 4.2
Washington, D C.
(733,801) 40 5.5 4,937 6.0
Indianapolis
(509,000{) 28 5.5 1,110 7.2
Oakland
(345,880) 10 2.9 722 9.6
Kansas City
(487,799) 10 2.1 1,310 12.2
Detroit
(1,386,817) 77 5.6 5,575 21.8
Birmingham
(295,686) 25 8.5 637 25.0
JThe figure refers to police district population.
•Figures are derived from 1973 UCR report and 1973 police data from seven sample cities.
The study presents the statutory and common law history of police
use of deadly force, as well as new codes such as the Model Penal
Code. The authors discuss the diversity of internal policies and in
strictness o f policy guidelines, and use brief case studies to define
circumstances which may Justify the use of force. Among other
recommendations, the authors recommend monitoring and altering
personnel policies to identify violence-prone officers, developing a
firearm policy which stresses use only im.se^-^fense, defense of
87
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* ' <v • ••.T.>'<5. .i ■ r ■<•.■ ; . '• *r / »• ; •-
.■>.•'■" ** /■' •'. • ' . *̂11
'.■■•' .i
others, apprehension of potentially dangerous felons if no other
lesser means are available and if there is no significant risk to
innocent bystanders (Basic Model Penal Code Approach);
prohibiting firing at moving vehicles; prohibiting display or drawing
of firearms unless dangerous circumstances warrant; developing
specific policies for the use of shotguns and long guns; developing
specific guidelines for off-duty police officers; providing extended
firearms training for all officers; requiring immediate reporting to the
radio dispatcher for any use of weapon; establishing rotating firearm
review boards, separate from the department’s internal affairs
division and empowered to call civilian witnesses to establish the
propriety of police conduct; and administering punishment based on
the particulars of the case.
“ Varieties of Police Policy: A Study of Police Policy
Regarding the Use of Deadly Force in Los Angeles
County” by Gerald F. Uelman"*
Uelman’s purpose is to extend the debate about the most effective
means of controlling police behavior from preoccupation with
external methods of control; i.e., evidentiary exclusionary rules and
civil tort liability. Toward this end, Uelman proposes a study of the
formulation, promulgation, and enforcement of police policy
regarding the use of deadly force in the 50 independent police
departments in the Los Angeles metropolitan area.
The methodology used in this study had four stages; (1) extensive
interviews with chiefs of police or other designated administrative
police officials regarding use of deadly force policy formulation and
its interpretation and enforcement in five hypothetical situations (all
within justifiable homicide provisions of California F’ enal Code); (2)
review of written policies; (3) statistics regarding the characteristics
and dispositions of all firearm di.scharges for the 2 year period, 1970
to 1971; and (4) interviews with three police officers in selected
departments, using the same five hypothetical situations presented to
chiefs and administrative officials to test the officers’ familiarity with
policy and reactions to typical stress situations.
Uelman discusses at length the relationship of police policy to state
laws regulating the use of deadly force and the resulting disparity
among police departmental guidelines in Los Angeles County. In
order to analyze department policy in greater depth, Uelman
categorized the chiefs’ o f police and administrative officials’
responses to the five hypothetical situations into five levels of
restrictiveness. This categorization shows no patterns when levels of
restrictiveness are compared with department size and character of
the community. A slight tendency for more restrictive policies
appears in categories o f cities with higher collective arrest rates, but
the relationship is suspect because of wide disparity among the
individual cities’ arrest rates. Uelman therefore concludes that the
diversity in the chiefs’ o f police personal philosophies is the major
factor which accounts for the wide disparity in policy. That police
chiefs heavily influence the policy formulation process was evidenced
by two of Uelman’s findings: (I) the departments with the fewest
m
fiV.
1095 88
Vs ••.'li'--■»• ■'.
yvi'i *r .̂
m -
changes in policy were administered by chiefs with relative longevity;
and conversely, (2 ) the most frequent explanation for a change in
policy was the appointment of a new chief.
Uelman goes to great lengths to describe the processes of
formulation, promulgation, interpretation, and enforcement of
department policy regarding police use of deadly force. For the latter
process of enforcement of deadly force policy, Uelman examined
statistical information on police shooting incidents found to be
outside of policy. Twelve percent of the shootings that occurred
countrywide during 1970 and 1971 were declared outside policy.
There did not seem to be much correlation between category of
restrictiveness of department policy and the rate o f shootings outside
of policy. Analysis of disciplinary actions revealed infrequent
disposition o f severe sanctions for officers involved in shootings
outside of policy. In the 2 -year period, only one officer was referred
for criminal prosecution, two officers were discharged, two were
suspended, nine were reprimanded; and four received no discipline.
The reasons for the infrequent imposition o f severe sanctions include
the following; severe discipline is reserved for incidents with most
serious consequences, such as wounding or killing o f a suspect by a
police officer. Also cited were such bureaucratic difficulties as the
evidentiary requirements of the possible civil service board appeal.
The final reason given was “ the specter of civil liability.”
In an effort to assess the effectiveness o f department policy in
controlling police behavior, Uelman conducted a series of
comparisons of statistics on firearm discharges and officer reactions
to hypothetical stress situations. The results were inconsistent.
The statistical data reflected a direct relationship between
the restrictiveness of policy and the number of actual
shooting incidents; the hypothetical testing, however,
while disclosing a strong relationship between the
officer’s perception of policy and his reaction to
hypothetical situations, did not reflect a relationship
between the actual policy and the officer’s reaction, (p. 4 4 )
In an effort to explain this inconsistency, Uelmen analyzed 1970 and
1971 statistical information on the breakdown o f firearm discharges
related to self-defense or fleeing felons as either within or outside
department policy. He found a strong correlation between
restrictiveness of policy and the rate of firearm discharges per
thousand felony arrests. The departments in the least restrictive
categories had twice the rate of the departments in the most restrictive
category.
Uelmen also found great disparity in perception o f department
policy regarding use of deadly force among officers in the same
department, as well as disparity between officers’ and chiefs’
perceptions. However, most of the officers’ reactions to the
hypothetical situations coincided with their perceptions of
department policy. Given the vast distortion of perceptions of policy,
the departments with the most restrictive policies had more officers
responding that they would shoot in the hypothetical situations than
109G
'-tr
iPf'-
departments with less restrictive policies.
Analysis of officer characteristics had interesting results; Older,
more experienced and less educated officers responded that they
would shoot in the hypothetical situations less often than their
younger, less experienced, and more educated colleagues.
In conclusion, Uelmen describes the diversity in police policy
regarding the use of deadly force, a difference he believes can be
measured in human lives. Also of concern to Uelmen is the disparity
in interpretation of policy within individual departments. In response
to these problems, Uelmen recommends a Policy Appraisal Review
Board “ empowered to establish statewide policy governing the use of
force by police officers, and to enforce that policy through
investigations, hearings, and a wide range of administrative
sanctions.” (p. 63) The envisioned result of the establishment of such
a board would be policy uniformity and control of individual
discretion.
“ Justifiable Homicides by Police” by Gerald D.
Robin''*
Robin also conducted multiple city analyses. He requested
comparative data on homicides from 17 selected cities and was able to
analyze data from 9 cities that responded, along with data from
Philadelphia.
Using the information obtained from the 9 responding cities, the
author found that the median age of the victim was 28, and 61.7
percent were black.
Robin presents data on the citizen death rate by city (table 6 ), the
distribution o f justifiable police homicides by city (Table 7),
justifiable police homicides per 1 0 , 0 0 0 officers (Table 8 ), and average
annual rate of officers responsible for deaths of criminals per 1 0 , 0 0 0
officers by city (Table 9).
m -
TABLE 6
R a t e s o f B l a c k a n d W h i t e D e c e d e n t s , b y C i t y
City
Akron
Chicago
Kansas City, Mo.
Miami
Buffalo
Philadelphia
Boston
Milwaukee
Black White B;W Ratio
Rates per
1,000,000 Pop.
16.1 2.7 5.8 to I
16.1 2.1 7.4 to 1
17.0 2.2 7.5 to 1
24.4 2.7 8.8 to 1
7.1 .5 12.2 to 1
5.4 .2 21.9 to I
3.2 .1 25.2 to 1
13.5 ,4 29.5 to 1
1097
90
-
W
‘.'I-*'
The author concludes that there are the following major certain
trends: The death rate for blacks killed by police officers is 6 to 20
times greater than the rate for whites in the 10 majorcities studied; the
victims were overwhelmingly male and relatively young. Cities varied
greatly with respect to death rates.
TABLE 7
D istribution of J ustifiable Hom icides by C ities
AND Average R ate per i .ooo.ooo
City 1955 Pop.
J.P.H,
1950-60
X Annual
Rate per
1,000,000
Pop.
Boston 749,320 3 .40
Buffalo 556,445 7 1.07
Milwaukee 689,358 10 1.32
Philadelphia 2,037,058 32 1.42
Washington, D C. 783,067 26 3.06
Cincinnati 503,274 23 4.17
Kansas City, Mo. 466,080 23 4.50
Akron 282,478 14 4.60
Chicago 3,585,683 191 4.85
Miami 270,482 21 7.06
TABLE 8
J ustifiable Police Hom icide per
10,000 O f f ic e r s
Annual
Police Rate per
Force* 10,000
City (1955) Officers
Boston 2835 1.05
Buffalo 1260 4.76
Milwaukee 1635 5.50
Philadelphia 4763 6.08
Washington, D.C. 2253 10.65
Chicago 7720 22.53
Cincinnati 846 24.82
Kansas City, Mo. 593 35.41
Miami 498 38.15
Akron 268 48.50
•Source; Uniform Crime Reports,
91 1098
TABLE 9
AVERAGE Annual R ate of Officers R esponsible
FOR Deaths of C riminals per 10,000 Offic er s ,
BY C ity
City
Boston
Buffalo
Milwaukee
Philadelphia
Washington, D.C,
Chicago
Cincinnati
Kansas City, Mo,
Miami
Akron
Conclusion
The studies reviewed in this article provide consensus on at least a
few conclusions. They concur that the number of civilian deaths by
legal intervention of the police is increasing and that the death rates
for blacks and Hispanics remain disproportionate to the numbers ot
blacks and Hispanics in the general population. They generally
acknowledge that most police shootings of civilians occur at night in
urban ghetto areas and involve white, onduty patrol officers and
minority male civilians between the ages of 19 and 29. However, the
studies provide several opposing explanations of the rising nurnber o
fatal shooting and the disproportionate number of black and
Hispanic victims.
Fyfe and Uelman seem to believe that the dangerousness of the
police job explains the increased number of civilian deaths, pointing
to increased numbers of felony crimes. Fyfe cites the large proportion
of shooting opponents in his New York City study who were armed
with guns or knives at the time of the incident. On the other hand,
Takagi and Robin seriously question the assumption of danger m the
police job. Robin noted that the fatality rate for law enforcement is
lower than the rates for such occupations as mining, transportation,
agriculture, and construction. Takagi found no upward trend in
police deqth rates to accompany the upward trend in civilian rates.
Fyfe suggests that the disproportionate number of blacks shot in
New York City is caused by the fact that a larger number and
proportion of blacks than whites and Hispanics involved in the
shooting incidents were armed and/ or participating in robberies and,
therefore, presented the greatest danger to police. Milton et al„
explain that although the percentage of black shooting victirns is
disproportionately high in comparison with percentages of blacks in
921093 .
p.:̂
vV;trtr̂ 4-:;»r;
the total population, that percentage corresponds to black arrest
rates for Index crimes. Barring et al., took issue with the Milton
explanation, citing the continuously climbing black civilian death
rate in comparison with a steady rate for whites. The lindings ol
Takagi (1974), Robin (1963), and Knoohuizen et al (1972) also
contradict the Milton explanation. Takagi found that blacks made
up 38 percent of the arrests for major crimes but 51 percent of the
civilian deaths. Even more stark a difference was reported by Robin,
who found that blacks accounted for 30.6 percent of the total arrests
and 37.5 percent of the arrests for Index crimes, but 87.5 percent of
the civilian deaths. Similarly, Knoohuizen et al. reported that the
death rate for blacks, adjusted for arrest frequencies, indicates that it
is twice the adjusted'rate for whites. The Harding et al., analysis of the
same data analyzed by Knoohuizen disputes the Knoohuizen finding.
Harding reported that the percentages of black, Hispanic, and white
felony arrests mirror the respective percentages of black, Hispanic,
and white civilian deaths.
An interesting and perhaps important finding in the PILCOP,
Knoohuizen et al., Milton et al., and Fyfe studies in the significant
involvement of off-duty police officers in shooting incidents. These
studies reported that between 17 and 20 percent of the officers
involved were off duty at the time of the incident. Fyfe and M ilton et
al. also reported significant involvement in shooting incidents by
onduty plainclothes officers.
Another interesting finding reported in both the Jenkins and
Faison and the Fyfe studies was the higher rate of involvement in
shooting incidents by black and Hispanic police officers as corn pa red
with white officers although blacks were involved in a significantly
lower number. Fyfe offered as explanation for the disproportionate
involvement of black and Hispanic police officers in shootings their
corresponding disproportionate assignment to and residence in high
hazard geographical areas.
Generally, the studies reviewed found that there was usually no
legal action in relation to police shootings. (Fyfe, 1978; Milton et al.,
1977; California Department of Justice, 1974; Uleman, 1973; and
PILCOP, 1974). Further, Fyfe and Uelman attempted to measure the
impact of restrictive police department policy regarding the use of
deadly force and concluded that restrictive policies accompanied by
strong enforcement did reduce the incidence of police shootings.
The studies reviewed in this article provide analyses of the
characteristics of police shooting incidents, as well as police
department and general criminal justice system responses to the
incidents. The analyses give some insight in the national scope of the
problem and understanding the specific situations in selected cities.
The quality of the various research efforts vary because of limitations
in methodology and data sources, but the sum of the findings are, at
the very least, suggestive of some trends.
m
93
I l O Q .
REFERENCES
1 Catherine II, Milton, Jeanne Wahl Halleck, James I.ardner and Gary
L. Albrecht, Police Use of Pcacllv lorcc. Washington, D C.: 1 olicc
Foundation, 1977 (NCJ 41735).* _
2 Arthur L Robler, "Police Homicide in a Democracy, Journal oj
. V . 31 n. I , Winter 1975a, pp. 163-184 (NCJ 31845).
3. Gerald D. Robin, “Justifiable Homicides by Pohee Officer^
of Criminal Law. Criminology, and Police Science, 1963 (NCJ 15 ).
Reprinted in Samuel G. Chapman, Police Pairo R e f mgs 2d
Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1972, pp. 511-523 (NCJ 01974).
4. PaulTakagi,“A Garrison State in a'Democratic’ Society, Crtmeand
5ociWyu.vt/Ve, Spring-Summer 1974, pp. 27-33.
5. Sid Marring, Tony Platt, Richard Speiglman, and Paul Takagi The
Management of Police Killings," Crime and Social Jusitcc. n.8,1 all-Wintcr
1977, pp. 34-43 (NCJ 44416).
6. Kobler, “ Police Homicide.”
7 ____ “ Figures (and Perhaps some Facts) on Police Killings of Civilians
in the U nited States, 1965-1969," Journal o f Social Issues, v. 31, n. 1, W inter
1975b, pp. 185-191 (NCJ 31846).
8. Robin, “Justifiable Homicides.”
9. Ralph Knoohuizen, Richard P. Fahey, and Deborah J. Paln^r, The
Police and Their Use of Fatal Force in Chicago, Evanston, Illinois: Chicago
Law Enforcement Study Group, 1972 (NCJ 12792).
10. Richard Harding and Richard P. Fahey, “ Killings by Chicago Police,
1969-70: An Empirical Study,” California Law Review, v. 46, n.2,
March 1973, pp. 284-315 (NCJ 14395).
11 Betty Jen kins and Adrienne Faison, An Analysis of248 Persons R'Red
bv New York City Policemen, New York: New York Metropolitan Applied
Research Center, Inc., 1974. __
12 Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia(PILCOP), A Study o f the
Use o f Firearms h v Philadelphia Policemen from 1970 throughout 1974.
April 1, 1975.13 James Joseph Fyfe, “Shots Fired: An Examination of New York City
Police Firearms Discharges,” unpublished dissertation. State U niversity ot
New York, Albany, 1978. r̂ . . . -n.
14. Boston Police Department, Planning and Research Division,
of Deadly Force by Boston Police Personnel, May 3, 1974 (NCJ 26010).
- 15 California Department of Justice, Division of Law Enforcement,
Bureau of Criminal Justice Statistics, Peace Officer Involoved Homicides in
California. 1971-1972. 1974 (NCJ 18786).
16. Knoohui/.en et al.. Police Use of Fatal Force.
17. MWxon ei a\„ Police Use of Deadly Force.
18. Gerald F. Uelmen, “Varieties of Police Policy; A Study of Police
Policy Regarding the Use of Deadly Force in Los Angeles County,’ Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review, v. 6, 1973, pp. 1-61.
19. Robin, “Justifiable Homicides.”
W -
94 1101
■ "v;: J'f-
BIBLIOGRAPHY
m
Bassiouni, M.C. “ Use of Force in Riots.” In his The Law o f Dissent
and Riots. (NCJ 01764) Springfield. III.; Charles C. Thomas, 1971
2 pp. (NCJ 02033)
This is a presentation of The Chicago Bar Association’s report on
the use of force by law enforcement agencies according to Illinois
Statute.
Bauer, J. L. Chicago Police Department— Office o f Professional
Standards— A One Year Analysis. Evanston, III.: Chicago Law
Enforcement Study Group, 1976. 78 pp. (NCJ 32534)
The Office of Professional Standards, the Chicago Police Depart
ment’s agency for investigating complaints of excessive use offeree
by police, has been un.satisfactory in its performance, according to
the author.
Bittner, E. “ Capacity to Use Force as the Core of the Police Role.”
In Skolnick, J. H., and Gray, T. C., eds. Police in America, 1975.
(NCJ 19813) Boston, Mass.: Little Brown, 1975.8 pp.(NCJ I98I8)
A new definition of the police role is offered in which the policeare
viewed as the mechanism for the distribution of situationally justi
fied force in society instead of as agents of law enforcement.
BJelajac, J. M. Madison (Wisconsin)— Recommended Policy Guide
lines fo r the U.se o f Deadly Force. Madison, Wis.; University of
Wisconsin Law School, 1972. 55 pp. (NCJ 13677)
Guidelines are presented focusing on situations in which the need
for deadly force arises as the police perform essentially routine,
daily tasks—primarily in one-to-one situations.
Boston Police Department. Use o f Deadly Force hv Boston Police
Personnel. Boston, Mass. 1974. 56 pp. (NCJ 26010)
The firearms policy and review procedures of the Boston Police
Department are compared with those of other major police depart
ments; Boston Police firearm discharges from 1970-1973 are
categorized.
California Department of Justice Bureau of Criminal Statistics.
Peace Officer Involved Homicides in California, 1971-1972.
Sacramento, Calif., 1974. 7 pp. (NCJ 18786)
Tabular data on both homicides of peace officers and homicides by
police officers are presented, together with a brief summary of
statistical findings.
95 i i o ;
Canadian Civil Liberties Association. Canadian Civil Liherties
Association— Submissions to the Task Force on Policinf' in
Ontario. Toronto, Canada, 1973. 28 pp. (NCJ 28110)
Recommendations and suggestions are presented for the improved
delivery of police services in Ontario, concentrating on police
use of force and due process rights.
Chapman, S. G. Police Firearms Use Policy. Washington, D.C.; U .S.
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, 1967. 50 pp. (NCJ 07861)
Guidelines for the writing of rules and regulations governing the
use of deadly force by policemen are presented.
Creeden, C. T. Development o f Police Regulations and Training fo r
the Use ofSidearms. Washington, D. C.; U.S. Department of the
Army, 1974. 8 pp. (NCJ 29844)
This discussion of the historical development of the use of sidearms
by police is divided into two periods— the early period, 1900-1934,
and the current period, 1935 to present.
Cunningham, Lorinne. “ A Little Closer to Perfection.” e/saforum-
46. 1978. pp. 25-28. (NCJ 52132
Efforts of an Ad Hoc Group, formed in August 1977, to improve
police-community relations in Memphis,Tennessee, are described.
High point was a conference and workshops dealing with such
matters as police use of force, domestic crisis intervention, police
internal affairs, and communication between police and commun
ity.
Day, S. C. Shooting the Fleeing Felon— State o f the Law. B ost^
Mass.: Warran, Gorham and Lamont, Inc., 1978. 26 pp. (iNCJ
49455)
The author examines the question of when a police officer or
private citizen is privileged to use deadly force to stop a suspected
criminal who might otherwise escape.
Farris, L. “ Substantive Due Process and the Use of Deadly Force
Against the Fleeing Felon— Wiley v. Memphis Police Department
and Mattis v. Schnarr. "Capital University Law Review, v. 7, n. 3,
1978. 10 pp. (NCJ 47472)
Two contradictory opinions, reached by the Sixth and Eighth Cir
cuit Courts of Appeals, on the use of deadly force by law enforce
ment officers to prevent a felonious escape are discussed.
Flemming, Arthur S. “ Investigating Police Practices.” ejsa forum-
46, 1978. pp. 15-17. (NCJ 52130)
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is conducting an investiga
tion of police misconduct, ranging from verbal abuse to use of
deadly force. Commission’s goals include reform of police depart
ment policies, external review mechanisms, and legislative and
m '
1103
96
*r>'
F̂ -1
policy changes on the national level.
Fyfe, James J. Police Deadly Force in New York City: Some Implica
tions fo r Police and Community Action. U npublished paper, n. d
15 pp. (NCJ 53594)
The author states that police agencies can reduce deadly force use
by developing clear policies and review procedures, monitoring
police performance, providing better training programs, and,
with society’s approval, equipping officers with weapons capable
of temporarily immobilizing without killing.
Geller, William A. Deadly Force Research by Public Interest
Groups: The Sources and Availability o f Information. Evanston,
111.; Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group, 1978. 12 pp
(NCJ 53593)
Efforts o f the Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group to obtain
material on police use of deadly force are outlined. Sources cited
include police department officials, literature reviews, news-
clippings, coroner’s records, citizen groups, and State’s Attorney’s
records.
Goldkamp, J.S. Minorities as Victims o f Police Shootings— Inter
pretations o f Racial Disproportionality and Police Use o f Deadly
Force. Denver, Colo.: Institute for Court Management, 1976
15 pp. (NCJ 40099)
Two perspectives are examined which are frequently involved
when racial disproportionality is being interpreted— either in the
realm o f police killings or in the realm o f arrest rates for
crimes o f violence.
Marring, S.; Platt, T.; Speiglman, R.; and Takagi, P. “ Management
of Police Killings.” Crime and Social Justice, n. 8, Fall-Winter
1977. pp. 34-43. (NCJ 44416)
A critical analysis is presented o f research on police killings of
civilians in the United States, and conclusions are drawn regarding
the management of police violence.
Harvie, R. A. Police Officer’s Use o f Force— Law and Liability.
Chicago, 111.: University o f Illinois, n. d. 24 pp. MICROFICHE
(NCJ 19412)
Illinois criminal statutes and case law relating to the use of
deadly force by a peace officer are presented and discussed.
Hubs, M. Seattle (WasI\ington)— Police Use o f Deadly Force.
Seattle, Wash.: Seattle City Council, 1978. 15 pp. (NCJ 48659)
Various aspects of the effort initiated by the city government of
Seattle to define and limit police use of deadly force— when and
under what circumstances police officers may shoot— are detailed.
Kania, R.R., and Mackey, W.C. “ Police Violence as a Function of
irw"'
i
97 1104
Community Characteristics.” Criminology, v. 15, n. 1, May 1977.
pp. 27-48. (NCJ 42109)
The authors find that existing models concerning police violence
are not designed to explain variations among the states in the rates
of police use of deadly force.
Katz, B.S., aifd Edgner, D.O. Los Angeles County District At
torney’s Less-ljttha! Weapons Task Force. Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Md.; U.S. Department of the Army, 1976.31 pp. (NCJ
38670)
This report presents the findings of the Los Angeles County
District Attorney’s Office Task Force on less-lethal weapons,
covering research and evaluation, wound ballistics, legislation, and
public information.
McCreedy, K. R., and Hague, J. L. Administrative and Legal As
pects o f a Policy to Limit the Use o f Firearms by Police Officers.
Gaithersburg, Md.: International Association of Chiefs of Police,
1975. 5 pp. (NCJ 26136)
An examination is made of laws relating to the use of deadly force
and influences that groups such as the police, courts, and city
government may have on firearms policy decisions; a restrictive
policy is recommended.
___________ Aspects o f a Policy to Limit the Use o f Firearms. Austin,
Tex.: Texas Police Association, 1975. 7 pp. (NCJ 18681)
The legal framework within which policy decisions concerning the
use of deadly force must be made is discussed in relation to avail
able alternative policies.
Nelligan, K. E. Constitutional Law— Police Officer Who Shoots
Fleeing Felon Protected from 42 U.S.C., 1983 Action by State
Privilege Rule—Jones v. Marshall, 528 F ID 132 (2d Cir. 1975).
Boston, Mass.: Suffolk University, 1976. 18 pp. (NCJ 37240)
An analysis is presented o f a Federal Court of Appeals decision in
Jones V. Marshall (2d cir. 1975) determining the privilege of a
police officer to use deadly force in effecting the arrest of a
suspected felon.
Pompa, Gilbert G. “ A Major and Most Pressing Concern.” ejsa
forum-46, 1978. pp. 10-14. (NCJ 52129)
A general discussion of issues pertinent to police use of deadly
force is presented, with emphasis on the nature of the problem, its
effect on police-minority community relations, and efforts to
achieve a solution.
Ranck, Lee. “ We Hire Our Officers from the Human Race.” ej sa
forum-46, 1978. pp. 29-34. (NCJ 52133)
A revised firearms policy that has tightened controls on police use
o f deadly force in Prince George’s County, Maryland, is examined.
98
1 1
Written generally from the police point of view, the article includes
a caution from the Chief of Police that the revised policy is flexible
rather than absolute since police officers are human beings subject
to the usual human frailties.
Rhine, B. Kill or Be Killed— Use of Deadly Force in the RiotSitua-
tion. 'In Bassiouni, M.C.,ed. The Law o f Dissent and Riots (NCJ
01764) Springfield, 111.; Charles C. Thomas, 1971. 52 pp (NCJ
An investigation into the use of deadly force in the Detroit riot
and recommendations regulating such usage are presented.
Sands, J.M. Civil Liability o f Government fo r Inadequate Police
Firearms Training. Unpublished paper, October 15, 1972 19 on
(NCJ 16215)
A review is presented of appellate court decisions holding State
and local governments liable for misuse of firearms by their police
officers due to inadequate training, with suggestions for preventing
such liability.
Stone, D. “ On the Question of Repression— An Analysis o f Repres-
J Community.” Journal on
Fic itfN cTm f)' '■
An analysis IS presented of police repression of the black commun-
ny in America as a reaction of monopoly capitalists to a national
and international economic crisis resulting from a loss of markets
and resources in underdeveloped nations.
Tange, D. E. Model Firearms Training Program fo r All Police
A g^ cies Can One Be Devised? Master’s thesis. City University
of New York, 1974. 219 pp. (NCJ 25234) ̂ ^
Findings of a study conducted to examine the present firearms
the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to determine whether a model police fire
arms program can be devised are reviewed.
Police. Prisons, and Violence. Lexington
Mass.: D.C. Health, 1977. 148 pp. (NCJ 44297) ^‘"gton,
L°al w'ith^rn? violence in prisons, and efforts to
deal with and reduce future conflict are examined.
Wallen, LM . Professional and Bureaucratic Process o f Organiza-
tional Central-Internal Discipline in the Los Angeles Police
Department. Doctoral dissertation. University of California at
Los Angeles, 1976. 353 pp. (NCJ 42040)
At the descriptive level, a major purpose of this study is to delineate
external) the processes by
which police malpractice in Los Angeles is handled
99
I I O B
Fr-
Wilson, J. V. Deadly Force. A Report to the 79th lACP Annual
Conference, Salt Lake City. Gaithersburg, Md.: International
Association of Chiefs of Police, 1972. 3 pp. (NCJ 07517)
This article reviews guidelines and recommendations relating to
police practices and policies on the use of firearms.
Wright, E. J. Police Handguns and Deadly Force— A Special Report
to the Governor o f the State o f New York, Hon. Hugh L. Carey,
February 1976. Albany, N.Y.: New York State Division of Crim
inal Justice Services, 1978. 180 pp. MICROFICHE (NCJ 46256)
The necessity of the use of the .357 magnum handgun and of
deadly force by New York State troopers is examined, and the
study’s findings and recommendations are reported.
f t
1107
^ U^. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 197D 0 - 201-380 ( 1821) ^ J QQ
PART 10: Compilation o f
regulations governing use
o f deadly force in fo r ty -
f iv e metropolitan Po lice
Departments
1108
C I T Y OF A L B U Q U E R Q U E CMif y or '̂oi ict
808 V STOVLR
P O L I C E D e p a r t m e n t
401 MARQUETTE NW
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO !!7in?
August 30, 1977
Mr. W il l iam A. G e l le r
Research D i rec to r
Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group
109 North Dearborn S t ree t , Suite 303
Chicago, I l l i n o i s 60602
Dear Mr. Ge l le r :
In rep ly to your l e t t e r o f August 24, 1977, the fo l low ing information
covers the period from August 1, 1974, to th i s date.
During th i s period, there were e ight s i tua t ion s which required o f f i c e r s
o f th is department to u t i l i z e a f i rearm in the course o f performing
t h e i r du t ie s . As a r e su l t of these s i t u a t io n s , three persons received
fa ta l gunshot wounds, and f i v e received non-fatal wounds. During th is
same period, three o f f i c e r s o f t h i s department received gunshot wounds
whi le on duty, a l l non- fa ta l .
The use o f deadly force by o f f i c e r s o f th i s department i s governed by
Standard Operating Procedures, Sect ion 320.06. A copy of th i s sect ion
i s enclosed.
I f I can be o f fu r the r ass is tance, please do not hes i ta te to contact me,
BVS/pb
r-jSO.C'ij In U'lO p e r f o r m a n c e of hir; cKiUos and aftem a l l iritiic r i \ , r n , ’
rrie-.m-j o f app ro hcn s . io n h iv e b een w e iy h e d , .111 o l f i r " i - r
ucc- d e a d ly fot'e.cn
.al>!
A . / \ n ^ . f l ic e r m a y di'avv and i.'SO f i is f i f 'o a r m vd'.criever Iv.' :!■ 1
it n a c e s e a r y f o r h ie own r;d\rcty e.r ffie cab (;! . .n ' l i i i e .
I'.. I'o e'ff. -ct an n t ' r r s t wile n fie I i -̂e 1 c a s o n a b lc 1 . I 'l .a In b li
I f .at a ''.Luipoct hnr. comrriiLl-tf l or- a t le m c ilo d to i n i m r i i t r
feloi'.y in v o lv i r r j the u se o r tfiia a l t ne-d u se n <:■ .-.dly !f 1 ■
C . I f an o f f i c e r , in the p e r fo rm ia n c e of h is d u ‘ !, !•, tf. vi«.
of a m u r d e r o u s ass ;. i' lt, hit i?, not r r 'q u i r c d to i r t r e a t bt;l
n ia y s ta n d f i i ' j qtajurid and dt-fend h i m s e l f f ' .a n tri lie pow ;
of u-.inq d e a d ly fo r c e n p a in s t l iis a t .r .a i la i ' i t . I lie m l ' 1 ■!'
r .e l f -d c .fcn se is a p p l i c a b le , t ' t f j t i rd lr r i r , cif th r ai| - t . r ;.t>: el
the a s s a i l a n t .
IJ . Wh-'-n an a n i m a l is m o r t a l l y in ju ro t l o r p r r st n ts c l e a r
a r r l p r e s nt clancjcr to I tu m an s a fe t y . T h e t.-r j. t a r e a ! a ■■
bi tl ir h ea d unless, p o s s ib i l i t v ol r a u i c s c x ir t' .
i t . T a r c ic t p trac t ico a t an a p p ro v e d ranpio.
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D is t r ic t 1
D is t r ic t 2
D is t r ic t 4
D is t r ic t 6
D is t r i c t 7
M i l t o n Farr is
C nar l ie B ro w n
T o m L o w e
H. D. D odson
R. H. Jo h n s to n
July 6 , 1977
Mr. William A. Geller
Research Director
QilCAGO LAW ENTORCEMENT STUDY GROUP
109 North Dearborn Street
Suite 303
Chicago, I llin o is 60602
Dear Mr. Geller:
In reference to your le tter dated July 5, 1977, inquiring about
the nurrber of shootings by Police Officers of this Departnent,
this Department is only two years old.
We have had to shoot only one pierson - a shoulder wound vhich
was non-fatal, since the beginning o f this Police Department.
We also have had only one O fficer shot during the sane period of
time.
You also inquired as to the administrative rules or policies to
the u^e o f deadly force by Officers o f this Departnent. The policy
of this Department is - the only time an O fficer is pcrrrritted to use
deadly force is in defense o f his ovn l i f e , in chtense of a third
person's l i f e , or to prevent a forcible felony from being cormdtted.
I f this Department can provide further information, or be of
assistance in any way, please feel free to contact us.
Sincerely,
Chester
Chief o f Police
l J X : b d h
i n i
Atlanta, Georgia .
(Officer Lou Lombardi, Atlanta Police Department,
Planning and Research; additional materials provided by
Ronald A. Carter, Research Analyst, Metropolitan
Atlanta Crime Commission)
Atlanta has experienced liigh levels of violence recently, in its crime rate,
its number of police officers Idlled and injured, and its increase in shootings by
police officers. Of die nine cities surveyed, Atlanta had tlie highest ci'iminal
liomicide rate and rate of assaults on police, die fifdi highest aggravated assault
rate, and a high number of both police and civilian deaths.
The Atlanta Police Department firearms policy is in accord vidi the Georgia
law; a police officer can fire his weapon only in defense of his ovm or another
person's life or to stop the pex'petration of a forceful felony. In addition, no warning
shots are allowed. A complicating and not yet resolved prohibition of die policy is
tiiat it is no longer legal to shoot a fleeing felon; the courts have not yet decided when
the perpetration of a felonj’ has ended and die felon is fleeing, however. The police
officers are at this time confused by the law.
Every time a police officer fires his weapon, a report goes to die department's
internal investigation division. After its investigation of the incident and a determina
tion of justified or unjustified, internal investigation dien sends the unjustified cases
to die Cliief. The Chief administers die disciplinary action (loss of days, suspension,
e tc .). If criminal proceedings develop, the case is turned over to the District
Attorney's office.
1113
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C H A P T E R I
GENERAL ORDER M -78).
FIREARMS DISCHARGE POLICE
A. F IR E A R M S D IS C H A R G E POLIC Y
An officer is equipped wi^h a f.rearrr, to defend ►'•mself or others
against deadly pnysicai force. Ihe threat of irr.rr.,nent use c‘ deadly
physical force or to prevent serious pnysiral injury Hci.N‘'ver v.hpna
firearm is used by an officer, it must be the real ^3 t cn that the
death of another human being mav occ^f Such use o ' ' rearn.s must
be strictly guided by adherence to a c!^*ar and knc.v '' po"Cv The
following policy shall govern such usebv members cf t^e 3 'r-^mgnam
Police Department
1 A police officer should not discharge a firearm m the l ne
ol duty unless ail other reasonable alternatives of
apprehension have been exhausted and the safety of
innocent bystanders is not threatened.
2. The use of deadly force by a police officer may be
considered warranted when necessary
a To make an arrest or to prevent the escape from
custody of a person whom the off'cer has reasonable
cause to believe
( 1 ) has committed or attempted tocom m .t a felony
involving the use of deadly phyS'cal fc 'ce. or
(2 ) IS a ttem p ting to escape apprehens ion or
custody by the use of deadly phyS'cai force, or
(3 ) has indicated mat he is IikeU to enda'^ger
human life or to n 'lx i serious p'^^s caf miury
unless apprehenceo w ithout delay
b To defend h.mself or a tn-rd person 'rom wh.it t^e
oM.cer has reasonable cause to bo'ie^e is t-'*- .mrr.»
nent use of deadly physical force
c To make an arrest of a person whom tr'e c*f cer has
reasonable cause to believe has committed the
burglary of a res-dence place of business. C" jrch , or
public bu 1 tmg An ofr cer may not use dea'j y force
m m '
rrn :S lu"' ^*0 !'J t'i*- ' jw!S
d-.’C-dv'i to S' o .? ' jc :s
J ! il‘:i r
in t^e qppre^-ns'on o' a person sus:j***.te<J :?
LurqlaM/ioy a school ur'V^s tne . js{.e«,l h;i> u .eO cr
threatens .mm<neri us^' of deaJ!> f-ifce
3 Just’f'cat.on for Ihe use of a
k n o w n hv !^io o : f iC ‘ -r r»-*cr-
unKoovvr to tbe officer canno* Pe co!". C
deJermiring jus; fication t*'e sopcting
■i VV*̂ c love r d poi.cc officer a.scha''gos a w-^ai^n. po<.w»:
ccr^T iun it-T ’C-ns and tno off wOr s nT,n -(}.are sup-;rvscf
must be notified as soon as poss bie
CLARIFICATION OF TERMS
5 Deaoiv Phys.cai Force r^eans pCivsica" force whicn
under the crcunb iances i"' wncr-. r* is used is read •,
capao'e Cf causing deatn or Se'ious iriiury Usif'Q a deaaiy
Weapon or a danyemus irstfum»-r^t to ih re iie n .n
tim idate or pnysicaiiy harm another const tu ies use of
Deadly Physical Force
6 ■ Reasonaple cause to oeleve ' is defined as a set of fac’ s
whicr' would lead a trained po lxe officer of orOiP.ir-,
caution and prudence artmg im partirilly and w-tnout
prejudice under the samt: s.milar c ir'u rrs tances to
conscientiously reach a concius-on
B. G U ID E L IN E S TO S PE C IF IC S IT U A T IO N S
BURGLARY
VVner*. dsmg deadly force to make an a 'rest of someone w*^on f '
o ffice ' has reasor'.abie cause to bei:eve has committed tn
burgia'v of a home or business, an c ff cer must use restraint an
sojCid .udgment An officer may pr^.s._,me that anyone burglar r
m e a n''rT !e o r I'usiness S a rm e d and p o s e s d threat to h jm a ' '
but an off cer ma* use deadly force only as a last i*surt
Bury a'leS o* schools a'e usuaiiv dcr'e by unar med 'uven.les an<
the'isfore. an officer w ill not usr- dead-v force to maKP an arre* t c
a pe'Spn suspected o fb u rg ljr i^ nya su'’'0 ol unless the officer ■~a
reasonable cause to believe tr'at tne suspect
fa) nas cerrm itted or attempted to com.mit a felony involvmy tn
use of aeaciy physical force or
(b) ts a tte m p tin g to e scap e a p p re h e n s io n o r c u s to d y by th e use
o f d e a d ly p h y s ic a l fo rce , or
(c) th re a te n s im m in e n t use o t deadU phvS 'ca t fo rc e a g a m s t t ^ e
o ff ic e r Of a th 'd p e rs o n
LARCENY
An office ' w ill not use deadly pt ySicai force wn.en tne felony
comm, ii-id is a o'Ceny of any Kind ^n'oss me office ' “ as
reasonable cause to believe tf'at the suspect
(a) has cu'omitted or a’ tempied to commit a larceny invO'V.ny
the use of dead v physical force or
fb) *s atte'^pting to escape apprehension cr custody bv the - 'e
of deadly physical force, or
<C) IS l ik - ly to e n d a n g e r h u m a n life or to m fi:c t s e n o u s phvS :a i
in ju r , u n le s s a p p re h e n d e d w it h o u t d e la y , or
(d) th re a te n s im m in e n t use o f d e a d ly p n v s c a i fo rc e a ga m st tn e
o ff ic e r or 3 th ird p e rso n .
When the force used by the suspect is not deadly physical force,
then the off cer w ill use only the force necessary to apprehend me
suspect short of deadly physical force
MOVING VEHICLES
An oflicer w ill not discharge his weaoon at a moving veh :;e
regardless of whemer the officer is on foot or -r. a movng venicie
unless t 'e ofheer "as reasonable c.tuse to believe f a t t"e
suspect
'ai has committed or attempted to commnit a ‘elony invo'vmg me
use of oeaci'v pn^s-cal force, or
lb) s attu-m: tmg tu esc.:ce appren. 'is icn cr cusmd, bv me
cT d -jd lv pnyS'Ca. force cr
'Ci t' ''.•. ■‘-ns ."''••m.er'.t ibe of Tepidly c ' .s eal force- aga rs t t*'e
o'f.Cer ur .1 tn*'d person
Before "•? olf'Cer d'SenargeS 'I'S wespcn ne m-jbf be Sure t'^at
innocent rvstand»"s and inncce'it occupants ot car a'e '̂ 'A
threaten-id Shoot.ng from a mcv.rg .•er' cle s particu ar:y
dang.;rous to bvst.mders and rare'v e fe c t \
firearm is d-sccufa'j“ d
Such use -f a
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ui>e o< '̂ ‘r̂ d:, i>̂ivi>'C3i fof:c
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JUVErgiLES
An officer »v II Tiake s;:eci3 l efforrs to aoprphend juveniles
.•. tn o jt use 0 < ciojdlv ;<-vS‘s,3 i force and v..iJ not shoot at a
.uv«n'io h n up ifss off cer h.is reasor.jp -r cause to bt;ii»?vv
l‘'.j! t"’-̂ ,̂ »* n' .■
t̂ 'Cl O' a "e '’ 'ptcfJ tc ccrrm .t j ‘e: -.ny mvolv-ny th.y
or
ehension cr custody by the usefb' 'S at!«*'T':;:in<i tu escape a:
cf do.■•d̂ • p'^ys'cal force or
c) IS i-ne . to endanger hyrran i<̂ e or lo tnfl.ct serious physical.
in ;u ry u ~ ie s s oppre^^endeC w t h o u t de lav or
Cl tn 'e a te n s im m in e n t u se o ‘ d ea d ly p h y s ic a l fo rc e ag^ens t the
o ff-C '* ' “ r 3 th i rd p e rs o n
5 h o s t a g e s
Crim inals .vno use nostages to effect tne i' escape are desperate
lod'yid-ials '/.ho, if aMovv-d to escape w ill pose a continuing
threat to tn-sir hostage and to the public at large Assurance by thp
C'lmT'dl that a hostage w ill be released unharmed is a
-nean-nql-^ss promise Tre department does not have the ability to
protect the safety of a hostage / . no is allowed to be removed from
the presence of officers The safety of hostages can be best
assured py Ke .̂-ping them in tre presence of officers and by
preventing irie if removal by the suspect 0 ‘ f'cers should use
every ver ea and tactical tool at the :' d soosal to secure the arrest
of the suspect w ithout harming the postage Hov./ever. officers
snouid realize that e«ceptiona! sdootions could arise where
cons.aered ’ udgment m.ght d-ctate allow-ng rem.oval of a
■~ostage. sum as w -.-re tntfre is im minent and probable danger to
a large g'Oup of persons
• The Tact Unit should be notif.ed and dispatched to the scene
immediateiy- ar>d upon arrival they w ill to'<e command of the
S'tuaron
S U M M A R Y
In s u r rm a ry . p r io r to th e u se o f a fire a rm , a n o ff c e r s h o u ld e.nerc-se
eve ry p o s s ib le c a u tio n , e x h a u s t a ll re a s o n a d e a lte rn a tiv e s , and
p ro te c t th e safe:-,' o f a ll b v s ’ a n r te rs W h e n an o ff ic e r m u s t use a
w e a p o n , n e w II be s u p p o r te d by tn e d ^^p a rtm e n t a n d h e w rit n o t be
c r it ic .z e d fo r th 'S d e c is io n w h e n th e s ta n d a rd s m th is p o lic y have been
fo l lc / .e d In c 'o s m g . it s h o U d a qa n be n o te d th a t
AN OFFICER IS NOT PERMITTED TO USE DEADLY
SIMPLY TO APPREHEND A FLEEING FELON EXCEPT
SITUATIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE.
FORCE
IN THE
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m
C H AP TER II
FIREARMS DISCHARGE REVIEW COMMITTEE
F IR E A R M S D IS C H A R G E R E V IE W C O M M IT T E E
In orde^ t^d l polire o ff’Cer may be pfOp‘'rlv trametJ and g lided m t‘'e
use ot Ceadly pnvsica' force every f.res'm cJiscnarge wdl be reviewed
by a Df-paarnental Firearms Discharge Review Committee
This corT'mif’ ee w ill be composed of other police officers w ith field
e'DcrienC'', wno can fairly etam ine another officer s act:or>s Police
personnel of tne following rank w ill be on the comm.ttee
1 One Captain who may vote only ir> the event of a tie
2 Ore Lieutenant
3 Two Sergeants
4 Three Officers
This committee w ill be convened w ithin 72 hours to review any
firearri! d scharge by Birmingham Police officers including non^^^
effective discharges and discharg--’ s by Birmingham officers ass igne^^^
to other law enforcement agencies Only discharges made d u rm ^ y ^
auihoriied training and practice w ill not be reviewed • ^
At the commit'ee meetings. Internal A ffairs w ill present the f in d in g s ^ ’
of Its mdenendent •nvesiigation of the incident At the discretion ^
the committee other information may be reauested and persons may
be caded before tne committee On the basis of information
presentee tne committee w ill determine that the discharge was one
of the following
In Ppi-cmg
Out cf Pci'Cy
Accidental
The ppi c»: off c*'r vvnose discharge of a weapon is bemg reviewed w ill
have tnt- r c ''t 'O he present dunng the part o' the comm.ttee rreetmg
in w h x ^ .''terr- al A ffairs ma<es 'ts report and w.ll have the rigm to
’espon.j t; repc'T
In maMng I's deC'S-on com.mittoe vvtM ca 'e '^ liv e^amme the
officers a - '- ^ s to determinp if they were cons.stent w ith the
Depaan^e-.l 3 f .irarr- D sc^.arge Pol.cv 5 GuiCsIi.'es Tre fellow.ng
quest.ons w. : he'p t^em make such a Oeterm.nation
1 -A o j d a trained do .ce o'f.cer of o 'dinary caution and
Dr^,>.'-.ce, act n.g m'Dariiady and witr^out orejud ce under
I
C H APTER
g e n e r a l o r d e r '9-731. REVISED OCTOBER 76
SERIOUS INJURY OR DEATH
INVOLVING POLICE OFFICERS
SU BJ: G E N E R A L O R D E R 9 -7 3
(R E V ISE D O C TO BE R 18. 1 9 76 ) .
S E R IO U S IN J U R Y OR D E AT H
IN V O L V IN G POLICE OFFICERS
Purpose The purpo<ie Orcer is to estabitsh a procedjre fcr
incidents concern ng ser cus injury or death involving police ofl ce'’S
This'Oraer sna'i consist of t ’'e fo 'lc ’.vmg numbered sub sections
I Injury or Death In'licted b> ®olice Officer
Injury or Dea*n Inflicted on Pc.ice Officer
HI Nev.s Media lr fo "n a tio n Procedure
INJURY OR DEATH INFLICTED BY POLICE OFFICER
A Serious Injury to Citizen by Police CM
Vtfhen any c tizen is wounded or seriously injured b y ^ ^ ^
police officer, on or off duty, where such injury results m
death, or possible death, the following personnel w ill t f f * f
notified
a The Pank.ng Uniform Division Officer The ranking
Uniform Division officer w ill proceed to the scene
and take charge of the Uniform personnel m the
protection of the crime scene, crowd control, preser
vation o’ evidence, notifying the evidence techni
cian, arrest of suspects, and any other necessary
duties
Tne D iviS 'onjI Deputy Chief or Bureau Comn'ander
of the officer involved
The Commander of the Internal A f’ airs Section
The Internal Affairs Investigator The Internal A f
fairs Invest-gato 'w il proceed to the scene and make
an independent investigation of tne inciCent He
shall Submit a repen of his findings througn the
Commander of tne Internal A ffairs Bureau, in
cluding a copy of the offense report to the Chief of
Pol.ee
The Staff Duly Officer The Staff Duty Officer will
procf»H3 to ;^c scene and e»ert s;3 " supers 's<on ove'
the invesi'^at'on He w ill command, control, ariclco-
Ofdinate all phases of the investigation and make a
'epoM of tr»e inc dent to the Cn ef of Po'ice w itnm
t w e n : , fo u r "o u 'S
Chief of Police The Chief of Poi.ce w ill be notified
immed ^telv -f at all possible
Note The S ta ff Duty O fficer s d'-fmed as the
des'gnated on-ca'I officer of theChicf s
Staff during hours wnen the Chief is off
duty
be c a lle d me
2 Homicide Detect'ves
Homicide Deti^'Ci-ve on ca
folicw ing cond-t''.ns e<ist
3 Death has occuTed as a result of poi'ce action
b A serious iniu'v has occurred that could possibly
result IP death as a result of police action
C A request mat Hormcde be called by tne Internal
AHairs Invest gator assigned to mvest-gate the inci
dent
Tr.e Homicide Investigator w ill be responsible for
1 Assuming c ~troi of the investigation
2 Not’fvn g tn*; Coroner, if necessary
3 Co'^piet-ng nec*»ssarv depart.mental report
♦Cf ms
3 The r a r u rg off 'Cer on duty m the C o'^m uncations
O jcm w 'l je respcnsbi^ for notify.ng ail personnel
abov' wi.r-n net.fir'd to do so b\ the f i r s : s u p e r 'o r o f f ic e r
cn the scene
a Persenne: n-,'.h»?d vĵ o are required to comn- to the
scene n':3v er-ct to ren a n awav ^ov»ever. suc^
persu'-r’ i:! A ^eep tht-mseives rfo r'- 'ed cn the
P’ u j ' - s i ut me ip v s: g.Jti'<n
0 T’ e s-per or u h „ ..r n ^narge o* f 'e S«,».me w il
Control t''e ’'sir hi r and duties of cn Out . personnel
WHO are pre “ nt
il INJURY OR DEATH INFLICTED ON POLICE OFFICERS
A The sam.e procedur*® v.ili be followed wh-en officers are
victims With V'e fo'icw-inq exceptions
; 0
t Hom'Ci'Jc Detectives w iii be ca'ted m all mcidents
resulting in deatri or ser<cus injur> .nft cTed on poi ce
officers
^ 2 Tne Common cations Ro >m will notJv the Poi ce
Chaplain, wfio v^.ll m jke *>, —5;^;* available to me of
ficer s family
3 The Communications Rocr^ a -II nct fv the r j r k ir g o f
fice' on duty m the d*strict wne*-. me officer s fam.iy
lives
a The ranking officer v.ill not fy the officer's fam.iy m
person,
b The rank ng officer w ill provide all necessary
assistance to the family
c In me even; the officer lives outside me Cdy, me
nearest ranking BirmmgnarTi police off'cer w il oe
sent
4 Under no circumstances w ill the officer's family be
notified except by a personal visit
111. NEWS M EDIA INFORM ATION PROCEDURE
A The Staff Duty Officer w ill be respohsible for d ssem nating
available information 10 news media at the scene, c o n s is te n t(^ ^
w ith good investigative practice
B The Public Information Officer w ill be responsible for d is
seminating available information to the news media m ie’ er
stages of the investigation ^
C H A P T E R IV
RULES AND REGULATIONS 3.1 1.9 and 3 43,1 -
3 43 15 Arrests and Au lhortred Use of Firearms
A, RULES A N D R E G U L A T IO N S - A R R E S T S
3 .1 1 . ARRE S TS :
3.11 1. RISK INVOLVED:
Members shall distinguish between foolhardnsess a rc courage m
making arrests, and investigating susoicious persons ie a certain
degree of risk is involved m all pchce service off-cers should not
unnecessarily jeopardize their 'ives. or the eves of otners Since tneir
purpose is to apprehend criminals, they shall suf^tmon assistance
when unaided arrest seems unlike'y, or dangerous
3 1 1 3 Unnecessary Force;
Members shall not use unnecessary force or vicler'.ce m making an
arrest or dealing w ith a prisoner or any person Mem.bers shall not
strike or use any other form of physical force on a prisoner or other
person except when necessary to prevent the escape from custooy of
a person w rom the officer has reasonable cause to believe
(a) has comm.tted or attempted to com m t a felony
involving the use of deadly physical force, or
(b) IS attempting to escape apprehension or custody by
the use of deadly physical force, or
(c) has incicated that he is likely to encanger numan life
or to inflict serious physical injorv unless ap
prehended w ithout delay, or in seif defense, or to
overcome actual physical resistance, or to prevent
Violence to another person Ho'wever, he must be
firm, resolute, and energetic m exercising the
necessary means to properly perform his duty
3 1 1 5 DEGREE OF FORCE TO BE USED IN MAKING AN
ARREST:
In rr:« ing an anest. an ofhee' must be care'ul not to submit h.s
pf Sur'er to any greater sever t» or indignity than is recess3'’y ic efteci
f 'e a'rest and bnng the prisoner safely to n e poi.ee Ouiidmg for
bocki'-g
The statutes require the officer to do h-s duty at a-1 hazards but m the
performance of h.s duty tney require him to be as considerate as
1 J
?3trJ
W m
lawful derrands all musi suarr,:i Tt-o ott.cer .s . a
and armed w in n e power 10 corroe sue" su s
3 1 1 7 r e p o r t t o EE M ADE ON ANY FORCE USED.
Wheraever „ IS necessary to use am unusual
means, said member shall repori same « P°” ^
n e ar.esl repon on the case Snould ne have -o use phy Sica, furce o
in terfer ing wi th an officer and or assau.i , as 1 . - c - Y
3 1 1 9 PERSONS TO BE SEARCHED:
or damage fo property V.nert ma- ng ^ ^ s 'e « .n :< 3 "
prisoner carefully and ^ ; ' ; ' ; ^ " ' \ ' : , ’ ^ '% ': : : r e r c a n n c t be
iH '; e : ^ n ^ o « - : ^ h :T y ! , n r u ^ l ll ; - ^ ^
prisoner.
3 .4 3 . f i r e a r m s A N D W E A P O N S :
3 4 3 1 a u t h o r iz e d USE;
A member shall not draw or disp'ay his ^ ' X ' - s
or official inspection A member s"ould neyer d aw
f,rearm unless he plans to and is ready to use u
A member may rfisenarge h.s - a r m m c o ^ e c t . ^ d h the p e H .^
T o ^w m " r^ s o n s " r c " tm .::,;:c :s ,'a s author red by law and Huies
" ^ " T to defend himself from death or serious in,ury or
felonious assauU
,b, At the pistol range for target practice or when
autfronzed for training purposes
To luM a senouslv wounded or dangerous amr^.ai
when oiher disoos'tion ts impractical fonly) on
authorization from a Superior Officer, if t.me perm ts
To defend another person, unlawfully attacked, from
death or serious ‘njury, when other means have
failed
To give an alarm or to call for assistance for an
impor'ant purpose wnen no other means can be
used
3 43 3 UNAUTHORIZED USE;
Firing into the air or ground in an attempt to halt a
fleeing crim inal is dangerous to innocent persons
and is a great personal and official risk to the officer
A member shall not fire upon, or as a warning to. a
person wno has been ordered to hall because of a
mere suspicion, and who. w ithout making any ^
resistance, simply runs away to avoid arrest I
A member shall not d.scharge his revolyer to o f fe e t j^ ^ |
an arrest or to stop the flight of a person who has
committed a misdemeanor ^
If the person suspected of a misdemeanor becomes a ^ ^
dangerous assailant, or if an attempt is made to
rescue by violence any prisoner, even though charg
ed w ith only a misdemeanor the situation changes
instantly The officer must meet force w ith force, and
to us*' his revolver only as a last means of protecting
himself or his prisoner from death or serious injury i$
acting w ith in the law
3 43 5 REPORT OF USE:
A member who discharges his service revolyer accidentally or inten-
tionaily (encept at firearms rangel shall maYe a verbal report to his
Superior Olficer and notify Police Communications es srjon as Cir
cumstances w ill permit, and shall file a w ritten reorrrt w th h s
Commanding OHicei as soon as practical therealter. describ ryg the
circumstances in detail under which the l.reaim was d.sch.rged
3 43 7 LOADING. UNLOADING
Members shall not clean, display, load or unload meir firearms at amr
place m a police bu*kJ 'g •*cepi
10
Idf
le)
(3)
lb)
(0
(d)
m m .
T v . " " V -r '^ t y - s -
W 4
m
f #
k ^ '
(a) When ordered by a Superior Officer for inspection
purposes
(b) In the p stol range and tnen only v.hen shooting
under supervision of a Superior Officer or training
officer
3 43 .9 . CARE OF FIREARMS.
AM members must keep the revolver issued to them or earned by them
cleaned and oiled and free from rust or corrosion, and in perfect firing
condition at all times Any officer who is careless or negligent in the
care or use of the service revolver wMl be subject to disciplinary action
3 43 n USE OF NIGHTSTICKS:
Unnecessary, excessive, or brutal use of the nightstick in subduing a
prisoner is forbidden It w ill be used w ith discretion and common
sense, and then only as a "come along" when necessary or as a
defensive weapon when attacked.
3 .43 .13 . RECEIVING LOADED FIREARM S — EVIDENCE:
Upon receiving a loaded firearm for any reason, a member of the
Department shall immediately unload same. If the firearm Is to be
used as evidence, great care should be taken to preserve fingerprints,
and the unloading done so as not to damage or contaminate the
breech or the cartridge being unloaded. The firearm, if it is to be
handled, shall be handled by the grips — never put anything into the
barrel or wrap loosely m paper or cloth.
3 .4 3 .1 5 . SHOTGUN IN CURISER:
Whenever the shotgun is earned in a cruiser and its immediate use is
not anticipated, it shall be placed in the gun holder (provided m
uniform cars) w ith the safety ON and bolt FORWARD, and the
chamber empty
n
BIRMINGHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM
DATE; March 1 4 , 19 75
TO: A l l Sworn P e rso n n el
FROM; James C, P a r s o n s , C h i e f o f P o l i c e
SUBJ: C h i e f ' s D i r e c t i v e 3 - 7 5 , Firearm Use P o l i c y
S''?hr,ise’’of“ irea™s J guidance to officers
I . POLICY
However, when a f i r e a r m i s used by an o f f i c e r i'r
r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t t h e d e a t h n f c j n m o m u s t b e w i t h t h e
for the use of L offil^^ lirea?™*̂ ?, ?" '?y • Justification
JO sSoo?!-^-ts°LCo™ -IoK
pS£i€Sl£SH«be aware that, even in the rare iases wLrl the Ase
xea.sori3.ble a p p ea rs n e c e s s a r v -r-icV /-̂ -p j f i r e a r m s
sh ou ld be m iS m iz I d ? ^ ' '^ ^ " ^ ' '^ ’ p e rso n
I I . GUIDELINES FOR USE OF FIREARMS
''^ - '^ i P t :a s o n "a “ jrap p ea% “ s‘ '‘ ° " e : s a ^ ^ ^
e x e r c i l l d W h e n I l l ^ ? I a s L a b l e ^ a l t e r S t ^
■ L^o- ? o -L ro ^? L -“a v t^
1126
C h i e f ' s D i r e c t i v e 3 - 7 5
P^iga T^vo
I t i s not p r a c t i c a l to enumerate s p e c i f i c f e l o n i e s and s t a t e
w ith c e r t a i n t y t h a t the escap e o f the p e r p e t r a t o r must be
p r e v e n te d at a l l c o s t s , or t h a t th e r e are o t h e r f e l o n i o u s
cr im es where the p e r p e t r a t o r must be a l lo w e d to escap e
r a t h e r than to sh o o t him. Such d e c i s i o n s are based upon
sound judgem ent, not a r b i t r a r y c h e c k l i s t s .
B. J u v e n i l e Felony S u s p e c t s . An o f f i c e r g e n e r a l l y sh ou ld n o t
s h o o t at a f l e e i n g f e l o n whom he has r e a s o n a b le grounds to
b e l i e v e i s a j u v e n i l e . However, when the escap e o f such a
s u s p e c t can r e a s o n a b ly be e x p e c t e d to pose a s e r i o u s t h r e a t
to the l i f e o f another p e r s o n , t h e n , under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,
an o f f i c e r may s h o o t to p r e v e n t the escape o f such p e r s o n .
T h is s e c t i o n does not l i m i t an o f f i c e r ' s r i g h t o f s e l f - d e f e n s e
o r h i s d e f e n s e o f o t h e r s whose l i v e s he r e a s o n a b ly b e l i e v e s
are i n imminent p e r i l .
C. H o s t a g e s . C r im in a ls who use h o s t a g e s to e f f e c t t h e i r e sc a p e
a re d e s p e r a t e i n d i v i d u a l s who, i f a l lo w e d to e s c a p e , w i l l
p o se a c o n t i n u i n g t h r e a t to t h e i r h o sta g e and to th e p u b l i c
a t l a r g e . A ssu ran ce t h a t a h o s t a g e w i l l be r e l e a s e d unharmed
i s a m e a n in g le s s p r o m is e . The department does not have the
a b i l i t y to p r o t e c t the s a f e t y o f a h o s ta g e who i s a l lo w e d to
be removed from the p r e s e n c e o f o f f i c e r s . The s a f e t y o f
h o s t a g e s can be b e s t a s s u r e d by keeping them in the p r e s e n c e
o f o f f i c e r s and by p r e v e n t i n g t h e i r removal by the s u s p e c t .
O f f i c e r s should use e v e ry v e r b a l and t a c t i c a l t o o l a t t h e i r
d i s p o s a l to s e c u r e the a r r e s t o f the s u s p e c t w ith o u t harming
th e h o s t a g e . However, o f f i c e r s should r e a l i z e t h a t e x c e p
t i o n a l s i u t a t i o n s c o u ld a r i s e where c o n s i d e r e d judgement
m ight d i c t a t e a l lo w i n g rem oval o f a h o s t a g e , such as where
th e re * i s imminent and p r o b a b le danger to a l a r g e group o f
p e r s o n s .
D. In summary, ev ery p o s s i b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n sh ou ld be taken
p r i o r to the u se o f a f i r e a r m , and i f an o f f i c e r b e l i e v e s
t h a t , under e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s , he should n o t use a f i r e a r m
t o apprehend a f e l o n , he w i l l n o t be c r i t i c i z e d or d i s c i p l i n e d
f o r t h i s d e c i s i o n , and h i ^ _ ^ e c i s i o n to empl9y) e v e r y o t h e r
means to e f f e c t an a r r e s '
\ A n
dr i o
:h i'e f o f P o l i
JCP/adm
EFFECTIVE DATE: March 2 4 ,
RECISIONS: None
1127
I\ < V I\. J,-)
322 F i re a rm s- - Use o f - - B v Offi .
1.
' c r s . h / j (
The term " d i s p l a y " s h a l l be used , to d e s c r i l )e the un-
h o l s t e r i n g o r _ h r a n d i s h i n g o f a l e t h a l f i r e a r m during
" l e t h a l f i r e a r m " s h a l l be used to d e s c r i b e
t h a t i s lo a d e d w i t h ammunition d e s ig n e d to
3 .
4 .
5
6
7 .
the conduct o f p o l i c e b u s i n e s s .
The term " '
a f i r e a r m
k i l l .
L e t h a l weapons s h a l l be d i s p l a y e d o n l y in a d e f e n s i v e
manner,
A l e t h a l f i r e a r m may be d i s p l a y e d o n ly i f the o f f i c e r
f e e l s i s , o r may become, n e c e s s a r y in the
d e f e n s e oT kzis. h r a n o t h e r ' s l i f e , or under the n r o -
v i s i o n s o f I'R 3 2 3 . ^
L e t h a l f i r e a r m s s h a l l n ot be d i s c h a r g e d as a w a rn in e .
L e t h a l f i r e a r m s s h a l l not be p o i n t e d a t a person in
an a t te m p t a t a p p r e h e n s io n u n l e s s the o f f i c e r has
r e a s o n a b l e c a u se to b e l i e v e the person f a l l s w i t h i n
th e purview o f PR 3 2 3 .
O f f i c e r s s h a l l n ot u n n e c e s s a r i l y d i s p l a y any f i r e a r m
n-i any p u b l i c p l a c e o r c a r e l e s s l y handle a f i r e a r m
at any t im e .
e x p e c t e d to
t ke p o l i c e a c t i o n as under PR 270 when
i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l as d e f i n e d in S e c t i o n
2 3 1 26 o f the C a l i f o r n i a V e h i c l e Code, a n d /o r o t h e r
drugs
"D ry S n a p p in g " o f weapons in the H a l l o f J u s t i c e
be c o n f i n e d to the r a n g e . _________________
( 'Revised 5Llxciv---l ' - - t 9 7 5 )
s h a l l
l R̂ 323 r e a r m s- - D i s c harge o f - -W h c n P e r m i t t e d . O f f i c e r s s h a l l
n o t d i s c h a r g e f i r e a r m s in c o n n e c t i o n w ith p o l i c e duty
e x c e p t under the f o l l o w i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
1 .
2 .
Or
3.
4 .
5 .
At an approved ran ge .
s e r i o u s l y wounded or d a n g e ro u s , when
o t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n i s i m p r a c t i c a l .
when a l l o t h e r r e a s o n a b le means have f a i l e d .
In the n e c e s s a r y d e f e n s e o f the o f f i c e i ' * s l i f e .
In the n e c e s s a r y d e f e n s e o f the l i f e o f a n o t h e r person
To apprehend a iCiOWN f e l o n x.hen th e o f f i c e r has r e a
s o n a b le ca u se tB b e l i e ^ a ^ b £ ‘ ii^5y be armed and may -b.5 an
immediate t h r e a t to l i f e . pece:
( 'Revised Fc4MrT :aiy—1,—
^ ^^^eairns—* —O isc l ia ro p P i^ i.
a ffroarm a e c ld~nta l lv or f n i l f Any o f f i c e r who discharges
function s h a i r m a v fa n ° L " h l l e performing any po l ic e
cumstances w i l l permit, and sha l l O f f i c e r as soon as c i r -
o f f i d e r as soon as p ra c t ic a l T f a ̂ ̂ w r i t ten reportwith ones superior
resu lt o f an o f f i c e ? cH ‘ person is injured or k i l l e d as a
iu te ly r e - a L L n e S L =haU be immed-
C o ^ a L o r ass is tan t to the o f f i o e f s Division
working d^ys, c ? L L ? r o ? " d ° ? c r r
' T i 2 H ~ L -3^ °"
'[B © O te C D [P © 0 0 (E(B
RULE'S AND REGULATIONS
See. 1
July 14, 1975
RULE NO. 303
Section 1
DEADLY FORCE
This ™ ie is issued to provide guidelines and regulations goveminp the
use o f deadly force by members of the Department and to establish
procedures for the orderly investigation of firearm discharges under
street conditions. Its provisions are effective immediately, '^upersedinc
a l l previously issued rules, regulations, orders, bu lletin s, and directives
regarding the use of firearms or other deadly force by Boston Police o fficers.
regulations in the Department, i t is understood
tnat they u i l l not lik ely cover every conceivable situation that may
arise. Mien the provisions of this iiile are found to be inconnlete or
a particular set o f circiniLstonces, o fficers are expected
to act with intelligence and sound judgment, attending to the sp ir it
above the le tte r o f the rule.
DEFINITIONS; For the purpose o f this rule, the following definitions
w ill apply:
I ^ ^ ^ f o ^ is ^ a t degree o f force lik ely to result in death or great
r a n y i n j i y . The discharge of a firearm toward a person constitutes
the use of deadly force, even i f there is no e.xpress intent to k i l l or
cause great bodily injury.
Great bodily injury means bodily injury which creates a substantial
or^lnsq lik e ly to cause serious, permanent disfigureincnt
or lo ss , 01 extended inpairmcnt of the function o f any bodily nenrber
or orgcin*
°*' includes circiunstunces
i^der which (1) such a danger exists in re a litv , or 121 such a danrer
a c t S 'e S s t e ^ e d iL ffir ir ; its
Predcnce to^ ts using cautious, discreet or shrewd action and havin'-
ue regard tor the rights o f citizens while maintaining an awareness of
the respon sib ilities o f acting as a police o ffic e r .
^asonableness is moderate and/or fa ir action, within reason, suitable
to the confrontation.
The fin a l decisions as to the reasonableness and prudence o f a police
action L^all be determined on a case-by-case basis by those members of
the Department called upon to judge the propriety o f a fellow o ff ic e r 's
actions. Such judpients may not con flict with the ex-pressed provisions
o f this or any other rule o f order
1 2 H
• 303
.tions 2
c . 2
’!?C 2 2 2 2 2 5 3
Street Condi_tiorts arc a l l those in wMch an o ffice r is rendering police services
as opposed to attending a training course, m intaining equipment, or encaeine
in purely administrative fimctions wluch do not bring him into public contact.
GlLNldhVL CONSIDERATIONS: The primary purpose for which each sworn member of
the Department is issued a firearm and trained in its use is the protection of
l i c and limb, his own and that o f every other person needing such protection.
Mthough the firearm is a necessary tool for present day policing, the
estructive potential i t carries mandates that i t be used discriminately and
within clearly defined lim its . Tliis m le establishes those lim its.
In the interests o f personal safety, police officers must seek to gain and
maintain advantage over persons kno\m or suspected to be armed. Such an
edge nuay take the fomi of numerical siqieriority of manpower and firepower
or that o f an o fficer staying "one junp ahead" o f a subject lik e ly to produce
a weapon; but the o ffic e r seeking to m intain the advantage over'a subject
suspected o f being anred is in a d iff ic u lt position. He must prepare to use
his iirearn shoidd i t be necessary, yet show the restraint required to ensure
the propriety oi his actions. The situation demands the utmost a b ility to
think clea rly , quickly, and decisively , and to use a firearm in a safe and
eiiectiv e manner.
Tlie lioston Police Department recognizes i t s legal duty to protect the rights of
a ll individirils to due process of law and a fa ir t r ia l , and its memliers are
thereby boimd to refrain fiom any use o f force that unnecessarily tends to
administer pimishiurnt at the hands of a police o ffice r . The responsibility for
puiiishmcntof criminal acts rests solely with duly constituted courts of law
and penal institutions and is by no means extended to the police.
roiMl ING FIREARMS: O fficers shall avoid pointing firearms at persons in
ciicimiistances i^dor which discharge would not be clearly ju stifia b le . However
involving a strong p o ssib ility of great danger ( e .g . , searching
a building pursuant to a burglar alarm or approaching a business establisliment
on report o f a robbery in progress, e tc .j the o ffice r should carry his weapon
in a position that l^all fa c ilita te its speedy and safe use. V.liile an o ffice r
siiould not point h p weapon unless ho is prepared to use i t , the fact that
he has done so obviously should not be interpreted as an obligation to fir e .
Disai/\RGE OF FIPd'.MyvlS: The law permits police officers to use physical force
in tlie performance o f their duties, but only to the degree required to over
come unlawful resistance. This doctrine o f "minimum use o f force" applies
to the use o f fireanns as well as to that o f non-lethal force. Also, because
o . their destructive p oten tial, tlie use o f firearms must be further restricted
to tlie pui-pose for which they are issued, that o f protecting l i fe and lim.b.
^ e discharge of a firearm under street conditions by a member o f the
Department is permissible only when there are no less drastic means available.
A. To defend himself or another from an unlav/ful attack which
he has reasonable cause to believe could result in death or
great bodily injury, or
1130
/
See. 7
Sec. 8
Sec. 9
Sec. 10
-T< ■»7rvyi;t̂ iin; .̂. -
RlJI.n KD. 303
Sections 5 - 1 0
Sec. 5
Sec. 6
B.
C.
lo apprehend a fleeing felon when the o ffic e r knows
as a_virtual certainty, (1) that the subject has
comutted a felony during the conmission o f wiiich he
in flic ted or threatened to in f lic t deadly force
’upon the victim , and (2) that there is substantial
risk that the felon in question w ill cause death or
groat bodily injury i f his apprehension is delayed, or
To k i l l a dangerous animal or one so badlv injured
that humanit)- requires its removal from further
suffering.
c^im l^ ''^ comiutted or that a particular person has coinmitted a
^ N T L E S : i^dcr the laws of the ComaxDnwealth, persons uvier the are
̂ nonmally proceeded against as delinciuent
children, and their records are lik e ly to be expunged uî on their
reaching adulthood. .\n o fficer of this nepartment'shall therefore
a ̂ except when no less drastic means are avail'.h l-
.-mJ p ro p e k i in ?hc” rca
bystaSdoJs that t l ir e ia no danger to
W/\R.\ING SllOTS A\T) SIGNALS: Fireanas shall not be used as a sicnalino
S v r s i g ™ i f : r H o " :r m ° k = n “ - " ° ‘ s ^ ^ a s a L ■ ;a ^ c c ^ o ^ '‘ ;S
thlt S ^ f f L e ^ mnv ^ .flee in g subject to stop. This does not mean
k i l l or dit-ahlp if^ i t discharge his revolver without the intent to
c o n v in c in i " f iL n > judgnvent he has no alternate method of
h iJ ^ ilf n r ̂ ^^lo to defendhim self, 01 others, i f the potential threat is not discontinued.
t e h i S e ^ e S ^ t h e ^ n r r ' ' '^ shall not be discharged at or from a moving
an oenmanJ nf H IS being threatened with deadly force by ^
shonldTo n ' ̂ vehicle. Under such circumstances, o fficers
^lould be oiware o f the usual in a b ility o f revolver fire to penctra^rihn
rrctal 01 glass surfaces of an automobile. Revolver fire cannot be
depended upon to stop a noving vehicle. he
PnitMISSIELi: U-E\P0NS ANT) AM-IUNITION: O fficers shall carry on duty only
ueapons and amimanition authorized by the Denartmont. S p L ia l Capons
e .g . , shotguns, r i f le s , automatic weapons, e t c . , are not nonmally^ ’
1131
A
.sc
ion
fc .
303
11 - 12
^ j'' i w f »< p ^ y M uxr T T -^ V •••'».','i r w
imJi yiftiif'
11
c. 12
issued. However, such weapons as are authorized by the Department for special
operations nviy be selectively issued by the Duty Supervisor i f , in his opinion,
they are necessaiy to ensure the safety and effectiveness of police operatibns.
O fficers armed with special weapons in such circumstances shall use those
weapons in accordance with the provisions o f this rule as well as any additional
guidelines issued at the time.
D'̂ TORTING FIERAK'l DISCIi-\RGES: An o ffic e r discharging a firearm under street
conditions sh all, as soon as possible, take the necessaiy steps to report
the discharge. An on-duty o fficer w ill notify his immediate superior as well
as tiie o ffic e r in charge of the d istr ic t in which the event occurred, and w ill
submit tlie necessary reports without undue delay. An off-duty o fficer
discharging a firearm inside the c ity w ill notify his om commanding o fficer
and the o fficer in charge of the d istr ic t in which the event took place and
w ill submit the necessaiy reports, without undue delay, to the supeindsor
im^cstigating the discharge. An off-duty o ffice r discharging a Department
fircann outside the city udll notify his oun commanding o ffic e r and w ill
submit the necessary reports without imiduc delay. A ll discharges require
the submission of iin Incident Report containing, in addition to the regular
infonnation, the o ff ic e r 's duty status (on duty or o ff duty) at the time of
the incident, the model and serial nuriier o f the weapon, t!ie numl̂ er of
shots fired , and the reason for tlie discliarge. Cases in v.'hich an o fficer
fires at a person require also that tlie o fficer report the numlier of shots
( i f any) fired by the subject, the distance between the subject and himself
wlien the f ir s t shot was fired , and wlio fired the f ir s t shot. A ll these jioints
of infonnation w ill lie included in the narrative portion o f the Incident Report.
INVESTIGMION OF FIRLVRM DISCH-XRGES: The manner in whidi police officers use
tlieir fireanns is an extremely c r itic a l issue to the Department, one in wliich
the community and the courts allow l i t t le margin for error. To ensure that
proper control in this area is maintained, a ll discharges under street conditions
w ill be thoroughly investigated for the puiqiose of detemrining the extent to
wliich they comply with Department policy, hlien a firearm is discharged by
an on-duty o ffic e r , his conumuiding o ffice r w ill be responsible for in itiatin g
an investigation. I f the o ffice r involved was o ff duty at the time of a
discharge within the c ity , the o fficer in charge of the d istric t in which the
event occurred w ill in itia te the investigation. For off-duty discharges of
Department firearms occurring outside the c ity , the investigation w ill be
in itiated by the conunanding o fficer of the o ffice r involved.
Ul̂ on receiving n otification of a firearm discharge by an o ffic e r , the commanding
officer responsible for in itiatin g an investigation w ill assign a supervisor
to investigate. hTen possible, tlic involved o ff ic e r 's immediate su{oervisor
w ill be assigned; however, i f the o fficer involved is o ff duty at the time of
the discharge, or i f his suiiervisor is otherwise not available, another
su}icrvisor w ill be assigned.
The investigating super\dsor shall respond to the scene o f the discharge as
expeditiously as possible and shall there conduct an investigation to determine
the facts o f the incident and the extent to whicli the discharge complied with
Department policy, nie supervisor w ill submit Ins finding to tlie coiiuwinding
o fficer who in itiated the investigation who, within 24 hours of the incident,
i . 1 o
\
J
n
wr"»»T»
Sec. 13
Sec. 14
rule no. 305
Sections 13 - 14
r r is
r t f f i " ' ’=stigativo report, along noth his o m i recoirrondations
Comiussioner. ,\ny infonnation obtained later ivil] be
subnutted in a suriplementary report. Die Chainnan of the Fircarmf
RoyioK Board (see Section 14) also w ill receive a copy o f a n r ^ r t s
pertaining to firearms discharges.
PERSONS INJIJRED OR KILLED: IVhen a person is wounded or k illed as a
I h T l \ 1 "" application of deadly force by a member o f the ^ p a r L n t
in\estigation by a street supervisor w ill be augmented by an
on scene investigation by the Internal A ffairs Division. ^
FIREAÎ HSDISaL-X.RGERE\qBV BOARD: As an additional investigative resource
theie w ill be a seven-member Firearms Discharge Review Board comnosed ’
o f the Superintendent-in-Cliief or his designee, who w ill sJn’ e a?^
Chaimin; the deputy superintendent in charge o f the area to which the
not under ihe Jo,m'an^^
Field^sJj^-^"'^^ deputies, a deputy sqierintendent from the Bureau of
sc^locbd f S f e f c i t f f : t “ do
related to the officer by affinity, consanguinity ofIS op U o m
^le Firearms Discharge Review Board w ill review not only disch-rees of
rcanns, but also the subsequent actions o f siqierior officers'vbo
r ? S L is s io n e ,me iX3ard w ill seek to determine the extent to which both artivitinc-
coirqilied or failed to comply with Department p o l i c i e s ^ d J Jns
provided to the Board, as needed, by the Internal
resourcefas ln v J s ? i S ? i r s t a f f ^ f o t
° L p P ° " s pertaining to a fircanas discharge, the Chain,nn
nectssaiyy Tlie Firearms Discharge Review Board w ill investigate
t^ r fe r ^ r e o i 't in S iH o 'n s !'^ ™ ^
I'he Board w-ill receive a ll reports submitted in relation to a firearms
schaige and may c a ll and interview any person who can give infoimntion
1133
c. 15
16
17
pertinent to the inquiry. Members o f the Department must appear and give
infonnation i f called; however, before being questioned by the lioard, members
shall be advised of their right to witlihold infonnation lik e ly to result in
the f i lin g of criminal charges against them or that may be used as evidence
against them in a court o f law. Tlus docs not abridge the Department's right
to require members to answer a ll questions relevant to their o f f ic ia l actions;
however, inaccordance with Silverio vs. Justices o f the Municipal Court, City
o f lioston, information obtained througli such administrative questioning can not
be used to criminally prosecute the member providing the infoimation.
Copies of a l l reports relating to a discharge incident w ill be routed to the
Office of the Commissioner, Internal A ffa irs , Personnel, the B allistician and
the Chairman of the Pirearr.is Discharge Review Board. A copy of the Board's
report to the Commissioner w ill be made available to the o fficer whose actions
arc reviewed. A ll related reports, including those generated by the proceedings
or inquiries of the Firearms Discharge Review Board, w ill be maintained in
separate f i le s by the Intenial A ffa irs Division.
DISPOSiriON: U{)on receiving the F.D.R.B. report pertaining to a firearms discharge
and investigation, tlie Commissioner may accept and act uĵ on its recommendations
in tota l or in j'lart, or lie may return the report to the Board with a request
for further infonnation or c la rific a tio n . In either case, the authority and
responsibility for fin al Departmental disposition of a fiream s discharge
case rests solely with the Commissioner.
TRAINING AND QUALIFIQMION: In the use o f a fircami, ineptitude can be as
disastrous as indiscretion. Police o fficers in this Department, therefore,
w ill be held accountable for proficiency as well as compliance with policy
in tlie use of fireanns. A ll sworn members o f tlie Department are responsible
for maintaining a minimum level o f expertise in the use and handling o f a l l
firearms approved for their carrying. S p ecifica lly , sworn members w ill
qualify at least once a year with a score of 60°o or higher, using the firearm
normally carried on duty. An o ffice r who fa i ls to qualify w ill be allowed
30 days to bring liis score up to a qualifying level and, fa ilin g to do so, vd.ll
be temporarily reassigned to intensive training at the police range until
qualification is achieved. An o ffice r who after 60 days of such intensive
training has s t i l l fa iled to qualify w ill be subject to reevaluation.
SECURITi AND MMNTEN.'VN'CE OF FIRE/XR̂ IS: Members shall take reasonable precautions
to ensure tliat weapons issued them by the Department are protected against
misuse, f̂cmbers are also responsible for keeping their issued fireaims clean
and in good working order.
PART 4: Preliminary Report
o f Mr. C. H. Cole, Chief
Inspector, Invest igat ive
Services Bureau, Memphis
Po l ice Department
7 9 S
HOMICIDE SECTION
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS UNIT
INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES BUREAU
MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE
January 18, 1972
Mr. C. H. Cole, Chief Inspector
Investigative Services Bureau
Memphis Police Department
Dear Sir:
PRELIMINARY REPORT
At approximately 10:30 p.m, on Wednesday, January 12, 1972, Eddie Hugh
Madison, male Negro, 14, of 35 East Davant, Walter Lee Williams, male
Negro, age 17, of 127 West Frank, Jerry Lee Wilkins, male Negro, 15, of
120 West Dempster, and Lynell Wilkins, male Negro, 14, of 162 West
Frank, stole a 1952 white over blue four door Pontiac Catalina, bearing
Tennessee 1971 license 1-E7340, VIII 362-D5351. These male Negroes stole
this car from 62 East Norwood. The car belonged to Elije Renfroe, male
Negro, 36 of same address. After the four male Negroes rode around for
a short while in this car, Lynell Wilkins and Jerry Lee Wilkins got out
of the car near Gage and Florida leaving Walter Lee Williams and Eddie
Hugh Madison in the car alone. Eddie Lee Madison was driving the car
at approximately 11:00 p.m.going west on Gage at Shelby, where he continu
ed West at which point police officers E. R, Fedrlck and L. P. Davidson
in Baker-12 recognized the car as being stolen from a previous, broad
cast placed on the air by the dispatcher which included Che license num
ber. Officers Fedrick and Davidson followed this stolen car west to
Florida where the stolen car stopped behind another car at the stop sign.
When the police officers attempted to apprehend Che two male Negroes,
Eddie Hugh Madison jumped from the car and fled sout.i across Gage and
down Florida Street. Several shots were fired at Madiscn by Officer
Fedrick using a shotgun loaded with buckshot. Madison was struck by two
of these shotgun pellets and after running down the sidewalk south on
Florida for approximately seventy-five feet, he collapsed oh the sidewalk
and was transported to the John Gaston Hospital a few alnirtes later
where he was pronounced dead at 11:49 p.m., January 12, 1972.
At approximately 10:30 p.m. on Wednesday, January 12, 1972, Patrolman
E. R. Fedrick and Patrolman L. P. Davidson, while working the 4:00 p.m. '
to 2:00 a.m. shift, in Squad Car Baker-12, were sent on a complaiiit call'
by the police dispatcher to 1686 Kansas, apartment 2. While these offi
cers were on this call, Charlie-12, another squad car, operated by Patrol
men J. C. Boswell and R. K. Cates, which also over-laps this same dis
trict at this particular time of night, were sent on another call in
this same district. The time of this call was 10:45 p.m. The dispatch
er, J. D. Williams, told the officers the nature of the call was a car
theft, which had just occurred at 62 East Norwood. He told them that
the stolen car was a 1952 white over blue Pontiac, Tennessee 1971 license
lE-7340. These officers proceeded to 62 East Norwood and took a theft
report of this 1962 white over blue Pontiac, belonging to ELIje Renfros
of the Norwood address. The VIN number of this car was verified as being
362D5351. These officers then phoned this report in to the Recording
Center before leaving 62 East Norwood.
In the meantime Baker-12 with officers Fedrick and Davidson completed
their call at 1686 Kansas. These officers got back into service at 10;^^
p.m. Before getting into service they had heard part of the broadcast
on the stolen 1962 Pontiac taken from 62 East Norwood. However, they
were not sure of the color on the car, therefore, they asked the dispatch=
er to verify the color on the stolen car. Another dispatcher, Mike
Christopher, repeated the color on the stolen Pontiac, telling the offi
cers that it was a white over blue 1962 Pontiac, Tennessee license 1-E7340.
The tine was now 10:,^ p.m. Officers Fedrick and Davidson now started
cruising, looking for the stolen Pontiac.
A few minutes later, which was approximately 11:00 p.m., these officers
were cruising south on .Shelby approaching Gage with Patrolman Davidson
under the wheel. As they approached Cage Avenue, they saw a 1962 Pontiac
white over blue approaching the same Intersection, going west on GAge.
These officers allowed the Pontiac to go through the Intersection, then
they f, j.l In behind It, also going west on Cage, toward Florida Street,
with Florida Street being only one long block west of Shelby Street.
After observing that this Pontiac was bearing TENnessee license 1-E7340,
and was the stolen car, which had been broadcast a few minutes earlier,
they then notified the dispatcher that they were west on Gage behind
the stolen auto. The time was 11:00 p.ra. These officers proceeded be
hind this car to Florida Street where the stolen car came to a stop be
hind another car which had stopped for a stop sign before entering
Florida Street. Patrolman Davidson stopped the squad car directly behind the stolen Pontiac.
j,Fntrolman Fedrick had gotten the ,12 guage pump shotgun which was loaded.
’with four rounds of 00 buckshot, ;hich is a police issued. Fedrick jumped
from the squad car and ran to the passenger side of the stolen car. He'
pointed the shotgun at the two occupants who were two male Negroes tell
ing them that they were under arrest and to get out of the car with their hands up.
The male Negro who was driving the stolen car Immediately jumped from
the driver’s side Into the street and started running south across Gage
to the Florida Street sidewalk being the east side of Florida. Patrol
man Fedrick yelled "Halt" three times to this fleeing male Negro; when
the male Negro made no effort to halt. Patrolman Fedrick fired a warning
shot from the shotgun which was several feet above the head of the flee
ing male Negro, who still refused to stop. Patrolman Fedrick then fired
a second shot at the male Negro who still did not stop and continued to
run. Fedrick then fired a third shot at the male Negro as he rounded
the corner going south on Florida. Fedrick lost sight of the male Negro and thought that he had made good his escape.
While Patrolman Fedrick was firing the shotgun, at the fleeing male Negro,
his partner. Patrolman Davidson had also pulled his .38 calibre revolver
and yelled for the male Negro to halt, then fired one shot at this sub
ject as he was fleeing,.but apparently did not hit him.
In the meantime, the other male Negro who was still in the stolen cat
had moved over into the driver’s position and had taken the wheel,
apparently for the purpose of driving the car away. When Patrolman
Fedrick turned from firing at the first male Negro, he saw the stolen
car moving across Florida Street, headed west. He turned and fired his remaining round from the shotgun into the rear glass of the stolen
Pontiac causing the rear window to shatter. Fedrick then pulled his
38 calibre service revolver and while running toward the car on the passen
ger side, he fired one shot from the revolver into the rear door glass,
also causing this window to shatter. The male Negro inside the car laid
down in the floorboard and the stolen auto ran up on the street curb and
across the sidewalk on the northwest corner of Florida and Gage, where
it came to a rest with the right rear wheel still on the street gutter.
The male Negro inside the car surrendered and was placed under arrest
for the Auto Theft Bureau. He was later learned to be Halter Lee Williams
age 17 of 127 West Frank. Although two shots were fired into the car Williams was not hit or injured in any way.
While Patrolman Fedrick was getting the second male Ne’gro from the stolen
auto. Patrolman Davidson ran south on Florida Street in the direction
which the fleeing male Negro had gone. Davidson found that the male Nevro
had been shot and had collapsed on the sidewalk apprcrinately twenty-five
yards south of Gage Street. Seeing that the male Negro was seriously
Injured, these officers immediately called for an ambulance. They later
identified this male Negro as Eddie Hugh MADISON, age 14, of 35 East Davant.
Page 2 - Prellciinary Report on Eddie Hugh Madison, male Negro, 14.
This shooting and apprehension occurred within a three minute time lapse,
which was between 11:00 p.m. and 11:03 p.m. This can be proven because
of the fact that the replay of the dispatchers’ tape shov/s that Baker-12
reported following the stolen automobile west on Gage toward Florida
Street from Shelby at 11:00 p.m. They called for an ambulance at 11:03
p.m. The next time the dispatcher gave the time it was 11:07 p.m. and
Baker-12 had checked the third time with the dispatcher to see if an
8 0 0
Page 3 - Preliminary Report on Eddie Hugh Madison, male Negro, 14.
ambulance was on the way. '
Immediately after this shooting, several other cquad cars who had been
sent to assist, arrived on the scene. These cars were Baker-50, operat
ed by Lieutenant H. S. Schultz, Charlie-50, operatea by Lieutenant T. H.
Smith, Charlle-51, operated by Lieutenant H. T. York, Charlie-115,
operated by Captain C. E. Watts, Baker-11, operated by Patrolmen M. E.
White and Patrolman J. W. Jeter, also Baker-18, operated by Patrolman
C. P. Action and Patrolman L. S. Reeves. IT was Patrolman Action and
Patrolman Reeves who transported Walter Lee Williams to Juvenile Court
shortly after his arrest.
Shortly after other police cars arrived on the scene, a city fire depart
ment ambulance arrived and rushed the victim, Eddie Hugh Madison, to the
John Gaston Hospital. The officers on the scene then called for Homicide
Officers, Crime Scene Of fleers , and the Internal Affairs investigating
officers. They protected the scene and awaited the arrival of the in
vestigating officers.
On Wednesday, January 12, 1972, at approximately 11:12 p.m.. Homicide
Detectives J. A. Dungan and H. E. Randle, were in the Homicide Office
along with Lieutenant B. G. Hinson and Detective C. A. Gregory, when
they received a phone call from police dispatcher Thompson, who advised
them that police officers had recovered a stolen car at Florida and
Gage, which had been occupied by two male Negroes; also that during the
apprehension, one of the male Negroes had gotten shot by the arresting
officers. Dispatcher Thompson also advised that Homicide Officers were
needed at the scene. Detectives Dungan and Randle informed Lieutenant
Hinson of the incident, then proceeded to Florida and Gage, arriving
there at 11:27 p.m.
When Detectives Dungan alid Randle arrived on the scene, they observed
several police cars and police officers about the intersection of Florida
and Gage. They also noticed a 1962 white over blue four door Pontiac,
Catalina, bearing Tennessee 1971 plates, 1-E7340, which was on the north
west corner of the intersection. This car had run over the curb and was
sitting across the sidewalk with both front wheels and the left rear
wheel on or across the sidewalk. The right rear wheel was in the street
gutter, but was on top of the grating that covers the street sewer just
a few feet north of the street Intersection. The'lights of the car were
on bright and the motor was still running. The right front door was
standing open and the right rear door glass and the car's rear window
had been shot out. This car's front end was pointed in a slight north
western direction toward a house on the corner which numbers 8 West Gage.
Lieutenant Sc hultz. Lieutenant Smith, Lieutenant York and Captain Watts
were still on the scene. Patrolman E. R. Fedrlck and Patrolman L. P.
Davidson were standing by the stolen automobile and Patrolman H. E. WHITE
and Patrolman J. W. Jeter of Baker-11 were standing by on the sldew'alk
on the east side of Florida which was several yards south of Gage. This
was the spot where the victim, Eddie Hugh Madison had fallen, after being
sho t.
Homicide Detectives Dungan and Randle talked with Patrolman Davidson and'
Patrolman Fedrick and were told that a few minutes before 11:00 p.m.,
the dispatcher had sent Charlie-12 to 62 East Norwood in regards to a
white over blue 1962 Pontiac, which had just been stolen from that loca
tion, and which was later broadcast to them as bearing license number
1-E7340. They revealed that they were cruising for this car when they
spotted it going west on Gage at Shelby. They had gotten behind the
car which was occupied by two male Negroes and had advised the dispatcher
that they were behind the car, and when they reached the intersection
of Florida and Gage, the stolen car had stopped behind a car which had
stopped for this stop sign, before going into Florida Street. They stat
ed the car in front then turned south on Florida. Officer Fedrick had
gotten out of the squad car and approached the occupants of the stolen
car on the right hand side. He had also brought from the squad car the
.12 guage pump shotgun loaded with four rounds of 00 buckshot. They
told the Homicide officers that Che driver of the stolen vehicle leaped
out on the driver's side after being Cold he was under arrest and ran
across Gage to the sidewalk heading south on Florida.
801
Patrolman Fedrick had yelled for the fleeing subject to halt several
times, and when he did not do so, he had fired one shot high over the
head of the fleeing subject. The male Negro still did not stop and
Fedrick had fired a second shot which struck the corner of the building.
He was not sure if the subject was struck with the second shot but he
continued to run around the corner south on Florida and Patrolman
Fedrick had fired a third shot from the shotgun, as the male Negro went
out of sight from him around the corner. Also, Patrolman Davidson re
vealed that he had fired one shot from his service revolver during the
time Fedrick was firing the shotgun. While the shots were being fired
at the fleeing male Negro, the other male Negro had remained in the car,
but had slid over under the steering wheel, and the Pontiac was continu
ing west across Florida.
Patrolman Fedrick then related that he ran a few steps toward Che stolen
car and fired the remaining fourth round of 00 buckshot into the rear
glass of the stolen car. He then ran after the car, drawing his revolver
and fired one round into the rear door glass, causing it to break. The
car continued on across Florida, jumped the curb on the northwest corner
and Patrolman Fedrick had gotten to the car and heard the male Negro
occupant who t/as laying on the floorboard indicate that he was surrender
ing. He then opened the right frontdoor and arrested the male Negro
who identified himself as Walter Lee Williams, age 17.
Patrolman Davidson had run around the corner of the building south on
Florida to check for the fleeing male Negro and found that he had been
critically Injured and had collapsed on the sidewalk. Patrolman Davidson
related that he then ran to the squad car and called for an ambulance
and stood by at the scene until the ambulance arrived. They noted that
at the time of the shooting they had seen no one in the street in any
direction, but shortly after the shooting, it appeared to then that
approximately two hundred people had gathered around the area.
The Homicide Detectives then talked with Lieutenant K. T. York, lieutenant
i n -ommand, and the immediate superior of Patrolmen Fedrick and Davidson.
He :old them that Patrolman J. C. Boswell and Patrolman R. K. Cates
assigned to Charlie-12, had answered a call to 62 East Norwood whera. they
had taken an auto theft report from Ellje Renfroe, male Negro, 36, of
that address, phone 774-3597, which was in regards to his 1962 white
over blue, four door Pontiac, Catalina, having been stolen in front of
his house at approximately 10:30 p.m. on that day. The theft had been
discovered by Renfroe's 17 year old step-son, David Chattraan, who had
actually observed the car being stolen and driven away,by what he
thought to be five male Negroes. The owner, Renfroe, had produced owner
ship papers according to Lieutenant York and Patrolman Boswell had taken
the theft report and phoned it in to the Recording Center at 11:07 p.m.
which is filed under R. & I. number 532-008.
After these officers had been interviewed. Lieutenant York and the two
officers Fedrick and Davidson, showed the Homicide Officers where the
shooting had occurred, which was on Gage Avenue just east of Florida.
There was noted to be a stop sign at the intersection which stops the
west bound traffic on Gage. On the northwest corner of this intersection
was a two-story building and across the street on the southeast corner
Is a building which is occupied by Kaplan Furniture Company, which has
the number 2194 Florida. The Homicide Investigating officers' in^?esti-
gatlon reveals that Patrolman Fedrick fired the first three shots from
the shotgun,that the male Negro was fleeing across the street and was
almost at the corner of the Kaplan Furniture Company. Patrolman Fedrick
was standing at a point four to five feet east of the east curb of
Florida and fired at an angle. The first shot went high and it was
observed that this load of buckshot had struck the north wall.of the
Kaplan Furniture Company approximately ten feet above the ground. These
pellets struck a window which was covered with wood^ the windov; was
approximately six feet east of the sidewalk, and ten feet above the
ground. All nine of the pellets had gone through the wood window and
passed into the Kaplan Furniture Store. The HOMlclde investigation re
vealed that the second shot from Fedrick's shotgun was fired as the
male Negro was near the corner of the building. The Homicide officers
were able to count eight (8) freshly Indented marks on the brick wall
Page A - Preliminary Report on Eddie Hugh Madison, male Negro, 14.
Q >
that appeared to have been struck by buckshot. Theresas a small chip
of brick which had been knocked loose from one of Che brick on the
corner of Che building; this part of the brick was lying nn the sidewalk.
These officers noted that approximately twenty-five yards south of the
south curbline of Gage, on the sidewalk at the south property line of
the Kaplan Furniture Company, and just at the edge of the next business,
which is the South Memphis Cleaners at 2196 Florida, was a blood spot,
approximately one foot by two foot. There were chalk markings made
around this blood spot which Indicated that the victim's head had come
to a rest at the base of the wall which Indicated that his feet extend
ed out across the sidewalk in a northwestward angle. These chalk marks
had been made by Officers onthe scene prior to Che removal of the victim while an ambulance was en route.
Approximately six feet north of this large blood spot was a small blood
spot which also had been circled with chalk; approximately three feet
north of this blood spot was another spot which had also been circled wlthchalk.
The Homicide investigation further revealed that Patrolman Fedrlck's
third shot had been fired from the same point as the first two. The
examination of the scene revealed that the three spent shotgun shells
had been ejected from the pump shotgun and had fallen into the storm
sewer next to where Fedrick was standing when he fired the shots, which
was on the northeast cornerc£ Gage and Florida. The investigation also
revealed that before Fedrick fired the fourth shot, at the moving stolen
car, that he had moved out to the edge of Florida Street, and after the
fourth shot,,the shell had also been ejected but could not be found and
was possibly removed from the scene by someone in the crowd that, had gathered around Che scene.
Homicide officers could not determine where Patrolman Davidspn's .38
calibre slug had landed but they were of the opinion that the pistol
shot fired by him might have struck the victim. The victim's injuries
which were determined through Detective, C. J. Harrell and Detective
R. I.. Hannah's part of the investigation, will be written into this report later.
Further examination of the 1962 Pontiac by Detectives Dungan and Randle,
revealed that in addition to the rear glass and right rear door glass
being shot out, that the back of the front seat had numerous holes, which
could have been caused by a shotgun pellet or flying glass. It is un
known where Patrolman Fedrlck's pistol shot came Co rest in th'e car. It
was observed that there were' two holes in the front seat just to the'
right of where the driver was sitting. These holes appeared to be fresh. -
The motor of the car was still running and the lights were on bright.
These officers noted that the ignition switch which is the type chat is
turned on and off with a key only, was on but there was no key in the
Ignition. It was later learned that the ignition was faulty and could
be turned on and off with a pointed object or any other key, which was later done in removing the car.
It should also be noted that the South Memphis Cleaners which is 2196
Florida and is part of a continuous building, is where the victim had
fallen to the sidewalk, which is next door to the Mallory Heights Laund-
rette, which carries Che number of 2198 Florida. Homicide officers did
not observe any damage to either of these three buildings along the
front, which Includes Kaplan Furniture, South Memphis Cleaners and Mallory Heights Laundrette.
Homicide Detectives noted that on the west side of Florida, south of Cage,
the first business place was Kaplan Discount Store, which has the num
ber 2191 Florida. Adjoining this on the south is Moore's Barber and
Beauty, having the number 2193 Florida. Next to this is a record shop,
being 2195 Florida. Next is Engleberg's Grocery, 2197 Florida, joined
by Oser's Department Store, which is 2201 Florida. Next is an alley
which runs west off Florida, south of this alley is the Toast-of-Town
Lounge, and Sundry; then the Southslde Cafe. The investigation revealed
Chat at the time of this shooting, all of the businesses were closed with
the exception of the Toast-of-the Town Sundry and the Southslde Cafe.
Page 5 - Preliminary Report on Eddie Hugh Madison, male Negro, 14.
8 o : i
The front of the buildings at this locatiin were examined but no evidence
could be found that any of these buildings had been struck by bullets or
shotgun pellets. However, Homicide Detectives did locate a 1963 two door
Cadillac, white in color bearing Tennessee license 1-S7098 v;hich was
parked heading south on Florida in front of Oser's which was just north
of the alley to Che west curb of Florida. The left front tire of this
auto was flat. The owner, Lorece Thompson, male Negro, age 38, of 2248
Devoy, phone 523 1539, was located inside Che Toast of Tovm Sundry. He
Cold the officers that he was an Auxiliary Probation Officer with the
Juvenile Court, and that he works part time at the Toast of Town. He
also revealed that he parked his car at the spot where it was noticed by
the officers at approximately 6 p.m. then when he learned about the
shooting he went outside and noticed his tire was flat.
The officers noticed that the tire had what appeared Co be a small puncture
in thelower part of the tire which was located in the rear part which would
be in line of fire from where Officer Fedric and Officer Davidson were shoot
ing from. Thompson told theofficers that he would take the tire and have it
repaired and if there was a bullet or pellet in the tire that he would hold
the slug and notify the Homicide office.
The inrestigating officers had been unable to obtain names of any witnesses
to this shooting. The only witnesses on -the scene at the time of the shoot
ing which the officers knew about were the occupants of the car which was
stopped for the stop sign at Gage and Florida just before the shooting oc
curred. However, the names and whereabouts of the occupants of this car
are unknown.
Lt. B. G. Hinson had been contacted by phone from the scene by Detective
Dungan. Lt. Hinson had informed Dungan that he had Checked with the
hospital and that the victim, Eddie Hugh Madison, had expired. Lt. Hinson,
Acting Bureau Commander, in charge of Che Homicide Office, on this partlcula
night, also arrived on the scene a short time later to assist with the in
vestigation. Also Lt. G. E. Jordan and Detective J. F. McQuarry arrived on
the scene to help with the investigation.
Crime Scene Officers Detective C. J. Harrell and Detective R. L. Hannah
who had arrived on the scene, began their processing of the scene shortly
after their arrival which was 11:39 p.m. These officers observed the shot
pattern in the brick wall on the north side of the Kaplan Furniture Company
which was made by the second shot from Fedrlck's shotgun. They counted eight
marks where the pellets had struck at this location. They measured the
distance from the ground up and found it to be three and one half feet, fror
the ground to the shot pattern. They also noticed a piece of brick broken
from the corner of the building a few inches higher and a few inches west
of the main shot pattern. The spot where the piece of brick was broken off
had been struck by a pellet and the measurement here was four feet from Che
ground to this broken brick. They also measured the distance from where
officer Fedrick was standing when the shots were fired to the approximate
location of where the victim was when shot. They found this distance to be
thirty-five feet. These officers measured the distance from the corner of
the building to the large blood spot where the victim had fallen and found
this distance to be forty-eight feet. They also measured the distance from
where the squad car was stopped at the time of the shooting to where the
blood spot was on the sidewalk on Florida and found this distance to be -
seventy-five feet. The distance from the Florida Street curb to where the
squad car was sitting on Gage at the time of the shooting was twenty-five
feet. Gage Street at this intersection, measures twenty-seven feet and
Florida Street, fifty-four feet wide.
The Crime Scene Officers also processed the stolen Fontiac which had not
been moved from where it had come to rest. They also took measurements
from different points from where the car was sitting. The measurements
showed that the car was sitting twelve feet north of the north curb of
Gage on the west side of Florida Street. They noted that Che car was part
ly in the yard on Che east side of the residence near the intersection
which has bhe nurabtr 8 West Gage. The auto was found to be seventy-nine
feet from the northeast corner of the intersection of Florida and Gage.
While at the scene the crome scene officers made photographs of the entire
area showing the stolen car where it came to rest after the shooting.
Page 6 r- Preliminary Report on Eddie Hugh Madison, male Negro, 14.
804
These photographs shows the brick wall of Kaplan Furniture Store where
one load of buckshot had struck. One photograph shows the blood spots on
the sidewalk where the victim fell. Another photograph shows the boarded
up window which is ten feet above the pound, where the first load of buck
shot had. struck. A photographs shows the 63 Cacillac belonging to Lorece
Thouias which was found to have a flat tire. The photographs also show
the street drainage sev;er where three of the spent shotgun shells landed
after being ejected from Fedrick's shotgun. The photographs show the
side walk on the east side of Florida which is the flight route taken by
the victim, Eddie Madison. These officers also dusted for prints and
photographed the glass windows at 2196 Florida where the victim fell after
being shot. There will be more written later in this report in regards to
the processing of this glass.
It should be noted that the shotgun shells were found in the sewer on the
north side of Gage just east of Florida Street. These spent shells were
photographed prior to their removal after the heavy iron grating had been
removed. These shotgun shells were reaoved after being photographed by
the crime scene officers then later tagged as evidence under property
receipt number A40348. Crime scene officers also drew a diagraiof the entire
scene in this diagram they Included measurements and pinpointed all evidence in this diagram.
After the crime scene officers finished processing the stolen auto was then
towed to the city lot by a city wrecker. At approximately 2 a.m. on Thurs
day, January 13, 1972, while at the city lot it was processed for finger
prints by the sane crime scene officers. These officers v;ere successful in
lifting several prints. However, these orints have not been checked against
any of the male negroes Involved in this car theft, due to the fact that the
were under eighteen years of age.
At 3:16 a.m. on Thursday, January 13, 1972, these same two crime scene of
ficers arrived at the morgue. They photographed the body of Eddie Madison
showing the wounds on the body and the fact for 1 den11ficat ion purposes.
A check of the body revealed that the victim had two small holes in the
upper part of the back on the right side, which measured forty-nine inches
from the right heel. There were also two small holes in the upper portion
of the back on the left side, which measured forty-eight inches from the
left heel. These officers measured the victim in length and found that he
measured sixty-four Inches, however, it should be noted that Dr. James Bell,
Assistant Shelby County Medical Examiner, later measured the victim and
found that he was sisty-six inches long. The crime scene officers also
collected the clothing worn by the victim which consisted of a pair of black
and white striped pants, a black jacket, a pair of blue socks, a pair of
white shorts, a pair of brown shoes, a brown leather belt, and a brown
sweater. These officers also received the personal property of the victim
which was turned over tothem by Patrolman M. E. Bibbs, who was on duty at th
John Gaston Hospital. This property consisted of a one dollar and fifty-twc
cent laundry ticket which had the name of South Memphis Cleaners and Laundry
2196 Florida. This ticket was dated January 12, 1972. The victim also had a
black comb, a cob pipe, a partial pack of Kool Cigarettes, a Vicks Inhaler,
and three small match books. The clothing was tagged in the property room
by these crime scene officers as evidence under receipt number A40345.
These officers later rendered a full report of their on the scene processing
their processing of the stolen auto and their processing at the morgue. Thi
report including photographs and diagrams will be a part of this preliminary
report.
While at the scene Homicide Detectives Dungan and Randle learned that the
male Negro, Walter Lee Williams, had already been turned over to Patrolmen
Reeves and Acton in squad car 13 for transportation to Juvenile Court. They
also learned that no force was used to affect the arrest on Williams and he had received no injuries of any type.
Although, it was not written into the supplement rendered by Detectives
Dungan and Randle in regards to the check of their pistols and ammunition
while at the scene, however, the writer talked to rtt , Dungan about this
and Det. Dungan told the writer that he personally checked the pistols of
both Fedric and Davidson and also noted tint they had their necessary extra
rounds of anmunttlon, while at the seme. He said that a check of their
plstold revealed five live rounds in each pistol and one spent hull in
each pistol.
Page 7 - Prelirainary Report on Eddie Hugh Madison, male Hegro, 14
80 :
Inspector Duke Vincent of the Internal Affairs Bureau, was also at the
scene of this shooting during the investigation and he requested from the
Homicide Office that he be furnished a copy of all the paper work that was involved in this investigation.
Prior to the Homicide Officers leaving the scene after they finished their
investigation, they called for a fire pumper. When the pumper arrived on
the scene the blood on the sidewalk v;here the victim fell was washed from the sidewalk.
Page 8 - Preliminary Report on Eddie Hugh Madison, male Negro, 14.
Patrolman Fedrick and Patrolman Davidson reported to the Homicide Section
immediately after the investigation at the scene had been completed. These
officers were advised of their rights by the homicide detectives prior to
giving written statements. Written statements were then taken from eacli
of them regarding recovery of the auto and the apprehension and shooting of
Eddie Madison. Their written statements are a part of this file and are
self-explanatory. The spent round was removed from each of the officers'
service revolver while in the Homicide Section, then placed in to separate
envelopes and after being narked, they were tagged as evidence under receipt
number A40346. The serial number was taken from each of the officer's re
volvers and written into their statements. Along with the serial number and description of the shotguns used in this shooting.
After Homicide Officers had been in the Homicide Offic a short while after
completing their on the scene investigation. Inspector Duke Vincent came to
the office and advised that he had been informed by Captain Weaver Chat City
Councilman J. N. Ford had gone to the scene of the shooting and talked to
some witnesses who had said that the victim had put his hands up against the
front window of the laundry where he fell and that the police had shot him
down after he surrendered. Inspector Vincent stated that he had contacted
Councilman Ford by telephone and that Ford had told him that he did go to
the scene since he was home in bed and had received a call from some citizen
about the shooting and that when he was at the scene someone had told him
that the victim had Cried to surrender and the police had shot him anyway.
Detective Dungan, along with Inspector Vincent, then returned to the scene
where they were met by the Crime Scene Officers Hannah and Harrell. It had
been mentioned by Councilman Ford that one of the windows had been shot
out where the victim was standing. However, it was known by investigating
officers while they were at the scene that none of the windows in Che area
near where the victim was shot had been broken. While at the scene, Det.
Dungan and Inspector Vincent, along with the Crime Scene Officers, made a
further check but could still find no broken windows. However, it was re
quested of the Crime Scene Officers to dust the window of the cleaners at
2196 Florida where the victim had fallen after being shot, for possible
prints. These windows were dusted and no fingerprints could be raised.
The only possible sign of any break in these windows that could be found
were very small holes which were old and which could have possibly been
made by B. Bis. The only glass that was known Co have been broken was a
small glass window in the north wall of the Kaplan Furniture Company which
was boarded up on the outside. It was known earlier when the officers were
at the scene that this small window which was ten feet from the ground .was broken by the first pattern of buckshot that struck these boards. However,
this glass window is only visible from lookingChrough the door of the Kaplan
Furniture Company, and Che glass Itself could not be touched unless you went
in the store and climbed up on Che wall by using a ladder. However, the
owner of this store was not called down to the scene and the store itself was not open.
While the Homicide Detectives were investigating at the scene they -made ob
servations as to the lighting conditions at the scene. They drew a rough
sketch of the scene for their own use. They included the tv70 street lights
at the intersection, one of which is located just to the rear of the Kaplan
Furniture Company. One street light is located on a utility pole on the
northeast corner of the intersection of Florida and Gage. The other one, the
one being nearer the Kaplan Furniture Company, is also on a utility pole on
Gage, but east of Florida at the rear of the northeast corner of the Kaplan Furniture Company.
There were noted to be other street lights north and south on Florida.
There are also interior lights burning inside the Kaolan Furnityre Company.
At 2194 Florida the South Memphis Cleaners, at 2196 Florida and the Kaplan
Discount Store at 2191 Florida, these lights inside these stores cast light
into the street making Florida Avenue brighter than the area on Gage, just
east of Florida where the car was first stopped. On Gage east of Florida
at the stop sign there is a two-story building on the northeast corner. The
Kaplan Furniture Company on the southeast corner is also a two-story bulldin-
The windows In these buildings are closed up on the Gage side and the in
terior lights from Inside the buildings do not shine onto Cage Avenue, which
causes Gage Street not to be as well lighted as Florida, especially the lo
cation between the two two-story buildings where the shooting occurred. The
officers noted at the time they conducted this investigation that the weathe
was cool and the sky was dark but it was not raining at the time.
When Homicide Detectives, Lt. G. E. Jordan and Detective J. F. McQuarry
arrived on the scene the processing was already taking place. Therefore,
Lt. Jordan and Detective McQuarry attempted to Interview the witnesses
that were standing around the street,however, they were unable to find any
one who would admit to seeing the shooting Incident. These officers talked
to the occupants of the apartments over the stores on the northeast corner
of Gage and Florida. Hot.rever, they did find people that had only heard shot
They talked to Alberta Perkins, female negro, age 60, of 2180 Florida, Apt.
S i who told them she'-had been in bed asleen and she thought that it was
around 11:30 or Midnight when she was awakened by three shots being fired.
She said she looked out the window and saw a car chat was sitting on the
curb. Sheobserved the car jump up on the curb and the officer run over and
get a male negro out of the car from the passenger side of the car.. She
observed him put handcuffs oh the male negro and saw him place hi.m in Che
squad car. She said she did not see any of the shooting and was awakened by
the shots but did not look out in time Co see the shooting but she did look
in time to see the car jump up On the curb at Florida and Gage, which was
the stolen car.
These officers also Calked to Mary Tolan, female negro, age 28, of 2180
Florida, Apt. S 2 , no phone, who told the officers that^she had been up
watching television and she thought it was around 11:30 or Midnight when
she heard either five or six shots being fired in the street. She said she
did not see anything that had occurred.
These officers then went to a duplex on the northwest corner of. Gage and
Florida where the car jumped the curb and where the second occupant of the
car was apprehended. This address was noted to be 8 Nest Gage and was oc
cupied by Anner Carpenter, female negro, age 67, no phone. She told the
officers that she was in bed with her husband sleeping and she was awakened
by shots being fired. She estimated Che time as being around 11:05 p.m..
She told the officers she heard a total of five shots and shortly after the
shots she heard a car jump up on the curb, then heard someone say, "Get out
of the car". However, she did not see any of what occurred.
After canvassing the area and finding no one else that heard anything, the
officers then went to 62 E. Norwood the home of Ellge Renfroe, nale negro,
age 36, hone phone 774-3597, this being the home of Che male negro Chat
owned the stolen 1962 Pontiac. At this location the officers were told by
Ellge Renfroe who is employed with the Don Rust Company on Colorado, that
he was gone to bed and his son was sleeping on the couch in the living room.
He said his son woke him up and Cold him that five male negroes had driven
off with his car. Renfroe further stated that he had driven the car to
work on that date and when he arrived horaein the car around 3 p.m. January
12, 1972, he parked the car on the street in front of Che house and that
the car had not been moved since Chen by any member of his family until it
was stolen around 10:30 p.m. He said as soon as his son awakened him he
called the police and when they arrived a’ report was taken. He said they
did have difficulty finding the license number on their ownership papers.
Detective McQuarry and Lt. Jordan also talked to the owner's son, David
Chattman, male negro age 17,10th grade student at Central High .School. HE
told them that he had gone to bed somewhere around 10:30 p.m., had fallen
asleep and was awakened by the sound of the car motor starting. He said he
raised up and looked out the window from the living room and saw what ap
peared to him as two male negroes wearing black coats in the back seat and
what lookd three male negroes in the front seat as his father's car drove
away. He was not positive but he thought he saw five male negroes in the ca
But it was dark and he could not tell anything about Che descrlntions of the
male negroes.
Page 9 - Prelininary Report on Eddie Hugh Madison, nale Negro, 1^.
8 0
After finishing these interviev;s Lt. Jordan and Detective McQuarry proceeded
to the John Gaston Emergency Room where the mother of the victim and the ste
father were v/aitlng to be interviewed. These officers talked to the mother
and the father of the victim in the officers' room of the hospital, found
them to be Tommy Jones, Male Megro, age 37, and Katherine Jones (Madison),
female Negro, age 37, both of 35 East Davant, no phone. They both told the
officers that Eddie Madison had left home alone around 9:30 p.ra. January 12,
1972 and that they knew nothing about what occurred until three young boys
came by the house a little after 11 p.m., telling then that the police had
shot Eddie at Florida and Cage. The step-father said tha t he went to the
scene and learned that Eddie had already been taken to the hospital by an
ambulance. The mother was questioned as to whether her son had ever been in
any trouble before and she said that he had not been in any trouble before.
However, Lt. Jordan and Detective McOuarry later checked Central Records and
found that Eddie Madison does have a previous record. They also chec'iced wit
Juvenile Court and it was confirmed that he has a record which is several
arrests for Burglary, Larceny, Assault and Battery, and some minor charges.
The QOther told the officers that her son was only 14 years old and that his
date of birth was February 13, 1955. She was then told by the officer§ that
ifthls birthdate was correct he would be almost 17 years old. She then state
she was not sure of the birthdate but chat he was only 14 years old. The
Juvenile Court records also revealed that his date of birth is February 16,
1957, which would make him 14 years old.
At 1:15 a.m. January 13, 1972 Che step-father. Tommy Jones, viewed the body
of the deceased in the morgue and made a positive identification. The record
reveal that the body of the victim arrived at John Gaston Hospital By a fire department ambulance and was pronounced dead at 11:49 p.m. January 12,
1972 by Dr. Adcoc's, and then was placed in Che morgue, pending the County
Medical Examiner's examination.
After leaving John Gaston Hospital, Lt. Jordan and Detective McQuarry went
to Juvenile Court where they requested and were granted permission to inter
view Walter Lee Williams, the other occupant of the stolen car. They learne
his age to be 17 years old and address to be 127 W. Frank. Walter Lee
Williams was brought to thelnterview room at 1:30 a.m. January 13, 1972,
where he was advised of his rights as per the rights card. HE made an oral
statement which was reduced to writing and is a part of this file. This
statement was made to Lt. Jordan and Dec. McQuarry.
After obtaining the oral statement from Walter Lee Williams, Male Negro age
17, Alias "Bay-Bee" whose date of birth is May 6, 1954, he was then checked
out of Juvenile Court and transported Co Headquarters where at 3:30 a.m.
January 13, 1972, while in the Homicide Office, he gave a written statement
after he was advised of his rights. This statement was given to Det. J. A.
Dungan and Lt. G. E. Jordan. This statement is hereto attached and self-
explanatory .
The scissors, or box cutters, which were used to start the stolen car by
sticking them in the ignition, were obtained from the personal property of
Walter Lee Williams while at Juvenile Court and were tagged in the property
room as evidence under receipt number A40347.
We were unable to find a record on Walter Lee Williams in Che Police Central
REcord files, but it was learned through Juvenile Court that he does have a
record.
Councilman J. N. Ford had mentioned to Inspector Duke Vincent while Cal’icing
with him that there were several witnesses to this shooting incident and tha
some of then had stated that the victim had not even been in the stolen car
and was just running dov?n the street when the police came up on him and that
he had his hands un against the window of the cleaners when he was shot. He
mentioned that there were several t/ltnesses and chat they would be coning to
his office on Thursday, January 13, 1972 to relate everything they had seen.
Inspector Vincent had asked Councilman Ford for the names of the witnesses
so that they could be interviewed regarding this incident. However, Council
man Ford could not furnish any names but had mentioned to Insnector Vincent
that he would be hearing from the witnesses later.
On Thursday, January 13, 1972 at apnroxlmately 9:15 a.m., the writer tal'iced
with Dr. Janes Bell, Assistant County Medical Ex.amlner, who was requesting
Page 10 - Preliminary Report on Eddie Hugh Madison, male !!egro,14
S O S '
information on the victim, Eddie Hugh Madison, for his medical record.
While talking to Dr. Bell he stated that he had measured the victim and
that he measured sixty-six inches in length. He further stated that they
had not yet v/eighed the victim but that this would be done just prior to
them doing, an autopsy. However, he mentioned that the victim looked pretty
heavy and was a pretty big boy. He stated that he would estimate him to
weight from 155 to 165 pounds. When Dr. Bell was told that the victim was
only 14 years old he expressed disbelief, stating that helooked older.
While talking furtherwlth Dr. Bell, he mentioned that earlier when he cane
to the morgue that he and his chief assistant in the morgue work. Chief
Grebbe, were both in the morgue when one of the Ford brothers from the
Ford Funeral Home came to the morgue with a release slip for the body of
the victim. He stated he overheard the Ford Brother talking to Chief Grebbe
but that he was not sure which one of the Ford Brothers it was. He said he
heard him tell Chief Grebbe that he had a petition with thirteen names on it
that were witnesses to the police officers shooting the victim, Eddie Hugh
Madison while his hands were up after he surrendered.
The writer later contacted Chief Grebbe at the morgue and talked with him
in regards to this conversation vfith the Ford Brother. Chief Grebbe then
stated that it was Harold Ford, the State Representative, from Ford Funeral
Home whoni; he had talked with. He said that Harold Ford showed him a piece
of paper with thirteen names and told him that the police were killing male
negroes too fast. He said he told him the victim was shot without a cause
and that he had his hands up on the window and had already given uo when he
was shot. Chief Grebbe further stated that Harold Ford said the victim
didn't even steal a car, that he was just walking down the street when the
police got after him and took no part in stealing a car. While talking to
Chief Grebbe he also estimated that the victim would weigh from 155’ to 165
pounds. He stated he had examined the wounds of the victim and it anpeared
to him that the two small holes on the right portion of the back were an
entrance and exit wound, stating that it appeared the bullet entered at an
angle then went underneath the skin and made an exit. However, he stated th
two holes in the left portion of the back were close together and had nene-
trated Inwad. He said these holes on both sides of the back were measured
from the heel of the victim and were from 4652 to 48 inches from the heel.
Later in the day on Monday, January 13, 1972, Representative Harold Ford
furnished the Internal Affairs Bureau with the following names whom he
claimed were at the scene of the shootin.g of ’Eddie Hugh Madison, and ac
cording to Ford, these people would cone to the Internal Affairs Bureau to
give statements. Their names are:
Melvin Louis, Jr., 3465 Rochester Road, telephone 398-4734
James 0. Lee, 3539 Rochester Road, teleohone 398-0769
Clifton Ellis, 373 Jacklyn, telephone 774-1625
Sylvester Brewer, 79 West Dempster, telephone 774-4142
Leon Lee, 3539 Rochester Road, teleohone 398-0769
Robert Smith, 135 East Fernwood, telephone 946-3844
James Baker, 25 East Gage, no teleohone
Tommy Janes, 2133 Kansas, no telephone
Charles Wood, 644 East Dlson, no telephone
Sylvester Weakley, 223 Vance, no telephone
Claude L. Clemons, 106 West Davant, no telephone
It should be noted that at the writing of this report only oneof the above
mentioned names has come forward to give a statement regarding this shooting
Although several efforts have been made to have these people come to Homlcid
Office or the Internal Affairs Bureau. The only one of these people who did
come forward was Clifton Ellis. The interview with Ellis regarding what he
saw will be written into this report later.
During Che morning of Thursday, January 13, 1972 the x/rlter went to the
Dispatcher's office and made copies of the call cards which are made out bv the Pdlice Dispatcher listing the date and time of each call, the nature of
the call, the location of the call, the number of the squad car, which also
Includes the time the car v a s shox;n out of service on a call or special as
signment, and the time the car got hack into service. Upon checking these
cards it was learned that Baker-12 with Patrolmen E. R. Fedrick and L. P.
Davidson was sent ona complaint call to 1686 Kansas, Ant. .?2, at 10:30 p.m.
Page 11 - Preliminary Report on Eddie Hugh Madison, male Negro, 14.
80 !)
Page 12 - Preliminary Report on Eddie Hugh Madison, male Megro,14
January 12, 1972. They returned to service at 10:56 p.m.
Another card reveals that Disoatcher J. D. 'Jilliams gave Patrolman R. K.
dates and Patrolman J. C. Boswell a theft call to 52 East Morv.'ood in
regards to a stolen car listing the license number as lE-7340. The time
of this call was 10:46 p.m. January 12, 1972. The card further shows
that these officers got on the scene at 10:52 p.m., then at 11:15 o.n.
they changed their location and were put on a special assignment to Florida
and Gage. They returned to service at 11:50 p.m.
Another card reveals that Baker-12 was put on a special assignment at 11:03
p.m. at Florida and Gage in regards to the stolen Pontiac, license number
1-E7340 by Dispatcher Mike Christopher. Other cars that were put on this
location were Charlie-51, Charlie-115, Baker-51, Baker-10, Charlie-10,
Baker-11, and Baker-16. Baker-12 returned to service at 4:57 a.m. which
was pparently the time they returned to service after leaving the Homicide
S e c r 0 n .
Another card reveals that Crime Scene Car 253 with Detective C. J. Harrell
and Detective R. L. Hannah, arrived at Florida and Gage at 11:17 p.m. and
returned to service at 2:11 a.m.
The writer also made a copy of the theft report of the 1952 Pontiac, Tenness
1971 license 1-E7340, belonging to Elige Renfroe of 62 East Norwood. This rc
port shows that the car was aio recovered before the broadcast from the thef
report was put on the air.
Detective D. 0. Lewis went to the Dispatcher's office on Monday, January 13,
1972 and made a tape recording of the Dispatcher's radio log of all calls
put out on the air from 10:47 p,m.' to 11:43 p.m. on the date of January 12,
1972. This transcript was later typed and copies are a part of this file and
are self-explanatory. This transcript is also further proof that Baker-12
got in service from 1686 Kansas at 10:56 p.m. It further proves that in-
nediately after getting into service officers Fedrlck and Davidson in Baker-
12, asked the Dispatcher to repeat the color of the stolen Pontiac. This
transcript also shows that the dispatcher repeated that the stolen car was a
62 white over blue Pontiac, Tennessee 1971 license 1-E7340. The time was at
10:57 p.m. This transcript also shows that Baker-12 got behind the stolen
Pontiac occupied by two male negroes, west on Gage toward Florida, at 11p.m.
The transcript further proves that the Dispatcher told Baker-12 that Charlie
12 was at 62 East Norv;ood taking a theft report on the stolen car. The
transcript also shows that Baker-12 called for an ambulance to Florida and
Gage at 11:03 p.m. January 12, 1972, then chec'xed with the Dispatcher twice
more in regards to whether or not there was an ambulance on the way prior
to the Dispatcher givin g the next time v/hich was 11:07 p.m.
On Thursday, January 13, 1972 Detective J. C. Peel went to Juvenile Court
and checked out Walter Lee Williams, male Negro, age 17, and brought him to
the Homicide Office so he could be talked to further by the writer. At
12:30 p.m. January 13, 1972 Walter Lee Williams, after having been advised
ofhis rights by the writer, gave another written statement to the writer.
Detective R. R. Davis and D. 0. Lewis. This statement is a part of this fil
and is self-explanatory.
After taking the written statement from Walter Lee Williams, the writer,
along with Detective R. A. Lowry, went to the area of where this shooting
Incident occurred. While there we checked the Southside Cafe and the
Toast of Town Sundry on Florida Street since these two business places were
supposedly open at the time this shooting incident occurred. We learned that
Richard Sanders, male Negro, was the operator of the Southside Cafe, however
he was not at this business place but the writer left a card for him to con
tact the writer since his name had been mentioned as being in or ourslde the
cafe at the time this shooting took place. However, at the writing of this
report, Richard Sanders has not contacted the writer, even though another ef
fort was made to locate him and word was left again at the cafe for him to
call the writer.
'Jhile at this cafe we learned the address of Jerry Lee Wilkins, male Negro,
age 15, whose address was 120 West Dempster. He drove to this location,
finding Jerry Lee Wilkins at home with his family. We informed Jerry Lee
Wilkins that he was being arrested for the Auto Theft Section. He then
810
explained to his father that he was being arrested due to the fact that he
was Involved in the stealing of the 1962 white over blue Pontiac which re
sulted in the shooting death of one of his companions, Eddie Lee Madison.
The time of this arrest was 4:30 p.n. Thursday, January 13, 1972. Jerry
Lee Wilkins was advised of his rights then brought to the Homicide Section
and charged with Larceny of an .\uto and Protective Custody. While at the
Homicide Section prior to taking him to Juvenile Court, Jerry Lee V/ilklns
gave a written statement to Detective R. R. Davis and Detective R. A. Lowry
which was at 4:50 p.m. Thursday, January 13, 1972. This written statement
is a part of this file and is self-explanatory.
Shortly before 5 p.n. the writer contacted Patrolman J. W. Jeeter and Patrol
man M. E. White in Baker-11 and Instructed then to go to 162 West Frank and
arrest Lynell V.'ilkins, male Negro, age 14, for Larceny of .\uto and for Pro
tective Custody, and to transport him to the Homicide Section. These in
structions were carried out and Lynell Wilkins was placed under arrest at
6:15 p.m. on Thursday, January 13, 1972 at his hone at 162 West Frank. He
was advised of his rights by the arresting officers then transported to the
Homicide Section, where at 5:50 p.m., Thursday, January 13, 1972, he was
advised of his rights by the writer. He then gave a vjritten statement in
regards to what he knew about the stolen 1962 Pontiac belonging to Elige
Renfroe. His written s&teraent is hereto attached and is self-explanatory.
After the written statements were taken from Jerry Lee Wilkins and Lynell
Wilkins, they were then held in Juvenile Court pending an investigation by
the Auto Theft Section in regards to their part in the stealing of Elige
Renfroc's 1962 Pontiac from 52 East Norwood.
On Thursday, January 13, 1972 the writer contacted the family of Elige
Renfroe at 62 East Norwood and learned from talking with Lucille Chattman,
female Negro, age 19, step-daughter of Elige Renfroe, that she was the one
who reported her step-father-’-s car being stolen, to the police Dispatcher
Immediately after Itoccurred. • ' .
Later in the day on Thursday, January 13, 1972, Lucille came to the Homicide
Section and gave a written statement in regards to this auto theft, wherein
she stated that she was in her room watching TV at approximately 10:30 p.m.
the previous night. She said it was about this time that her brother called
to his father that somebody had stolen the car. She said her father didn't
believe it at first. She said she then looked out the windot.; and saw the
car was gone and she told her father that it was a fact. She said hermother
told her to call the police. She said they got the papers and she called the
police but she gave the police dispatcher the wrong number of the license
plate from the paper which v;as the 1970 license plate number RW 7000. She said the Dispatcher told her that she had given the wrong number from the
paper but that he could look it up from last year’s registration and de
termine the correct 1971 license plate number. She said the dispatcher asked
her if they had ownership papers and that he would send a police car to thei
home for a report. She said about ten minutes later the police arrived and
talked to her father and took a report of the stolen car. She said the polic
officer used Che family telephone to call in their report before leaving.
Lucille further stated the officers left and about 1:30 a.m. police officers
came back and said they had recovered the car and that one of the male negro In the stolen car had been killed. She said she had talked to her brother
David Lee Chattman, age 17, about the stealing of the car and he had Coldher
that he thought there were five male negroes and he thought some of then v;er
wearing leather coats. She said he did not mention knowing any of the boys
and she felt that if he had known them he would have told the family.
Lucille was asked if she knew a male negro, Eddie Hugh Madison, or '..'alter
Lee Williams, and she stated she did not. The writer instructed Lucille
Chattman to have her brother, David Lee Chattman, cone to the Homicide Sec
tion and also give a written statement since he did observe the car being
stolen. However, at the writing of this report, David Lee Chattman has not
come forv/ard to give a written statement.
It should be noted that in Lucille Chattman's written statement she stated
when she talked to the Dispatrher that she told him the model of Che car and
the color of Che car. She further stated chat her father had owned this car
since 1965. While this statement was being taken from Lucille Chattman, her
mother was present in the Homicide Office and she confirmed what Lucille sai
was a fact. Lucille's written statement is apart of this file and is self-
explanatory.
Page 13 - Prellnlnary Report on Eddie Hugh Madison, nale N'egro, 14
811
Efforts had been made by Lt. G. E. Jordan and Detective J. F. McOuarry
while at the John Gaston Hospital during the night of Wednesday, January
12, 1972 to have the mother of the victim whose name is Katherine Madison,
to sign consent papers for an autopsy to be performed unon the body of her
son, Eddie Hugh Madison. Hov;ever, at the time Katherine Madison refused to sign consent papers for an autopsy.
At approximately 7 p.m. on Thursday, January 13, 1972, Lt. T. Marshall and
Detective G. S. Willis contacted the Ford Funeral Home and were able to lo
cate Katherine Madison at 10 West Norwood, ?7lth the assistance of Harold For
After talking with Katherine Madison again she agreed to sign consent papers
for an autopsy to be performed upon tlie body of her son. These papers v;ere
signed by the mother at 7:25 p.m. Thursday, January 13, 1972 which was witnessed by Levon Williams and Detective G. S. Willis.
Dr. Janes Bell was notified at 8 a.m. on Friday, January 14, 1972 that con
sent papers had been signed and he then proceeded with the autopsy. Later
In the day which was 3:30 p.m. on Friday, January 14, 1972, Dr. Bell called
the Homicide Section and talked to Detective J.H. Hester, informing him
that the autopsy uas complete on the body of Eddie Hugh M.adlson and that he
was listing the cause of death as Shotgun Hounds to, the Lungs and Aorta.
Later in the day on Friday, January 14, 1972, the writer went to Dr. Janes
Bell's office and picked up two 00-buc’tC lead slugs v;hich were taken from
the body of Eddie Hugh Madison during the autopsy. While talking to Dr.
Bell he stated that these txjo slugs were the two that had entered the back
on the left side at a slight angle and penetrated into the lung. He stated
the two holes in the ri^t portion of the back x̂ ere made by one pellet or
bullet. He said the slu,g that caused these holes had entered also at a slip
angle and went under the skin then made an exit and he found no other slugs
in the body of the victim. He stated that they had weighed and measured the
victim prior to the autopsy and he was very surprised that the victim did
not weigh as much as he thought. HE said they had weighed the victim tx̂ ice
to make sure of his correct weight. He said he x-xelghed only 129 pounds and
was 66 inches long. He further stated that -the victim x;as the muscular type
and looked much larger to him than he really x âs. His Chief Assistant, Mr.
Grebbe, also had estimated the victim to weigh at least 155 pounds. The
two lead slugs taken from the body during the autopsy were tagged in the
property and evidence section as evidence under receipt number A403S7.
Late in the evening on Thursday January 13, 197-2, the xjrlter along with
Detective Lox/ry, x̂ htle in the area x-/here the shooting occurred, checked
the buildings for any sign of gunshot pellets that might have struck the
buildings on Florida Street near x̂ here the victim fell and also across the
street near the Southside Cafe and other buildings on Florida. We also
checked the ground at the base of the north end of the Kaplan Furniture
Company in an effort to locate any pellets xjhich might have fallen to the
ground after striking the building. Hox-xever, we were unable to find any pellets .
The following day xjhich x-xas Friday, January 14, 1972, the writer along with
Detective J. N. Willis returned to the scene and rechecked both the outside
and inside of the Kaplan Furniture and Hardxxare Store. We noted that there
were nine holes in the boarded up xxindoxv approximately ten feet from the
ground where the load of buckshot fired from Officer Fedrick's shotgun st̂ ruc
We went inside the store and xxith the permission of the ox/ner, xxe obtained a
ladder and checked the boards on the Inside, noting that there xxere nine
holes in these boards. These pellets had also broken the inside xv'indox; x>;hic
the boards covered. A further check of the store revealed that the shot had
continued upward and the pellets had struck the ceiling and wall about mid
way of the store traveling in a slight southxxestern direction. We were able
to find one 00 lead slug lying on the floor anproxinately one third of the xx
north to south across this store. We also noted a utility tyne sprayer
which xxas sitting on a shelf in front of the wlndoxx which this load of buck shot came through. The -nozzle on this sprayer had been struck by one of
these pellets causing xxhat the store ox-;ner estimated to be $2.50 damage.
This x-xas probably the pellet that xxas found lying on the floor. The xxriter
and Detective Willis later tagged this slug as evidence in the property room- under receipt number A40456.
Page 14 - Preliminary Report on Eddie Hugh Madison, male Negro, 14.
8'V
i )
While at the store the writer and Detective Willis, talked with the owner
Hr. D. L. human, phone 363-7269. Mr. Luraan was not distrubed at all about
the slight damage done to his store in regards to the shooting. He ex
pressed delight that the police department was taking action to stop some
of the crime that had been occurring in the area. He stated that he knew
the victim, Eddie Madison, personally and that he was known as the type of
trouble maker that was continually getting into trouble in the area. He
mentioned to us that we night talk to an Ernest Harper that usually cleaned
up at the Mallory Heights Laundryette, two doors from him and stated that he might have been at the laundry when the shooting occurred.
We went next door to 2196 Florida, phone 946-4657, which is the South
Memphis Cleaners. We talked to the owner, Rubin Applebaun, home address
290 North Yates, home phone 683-0422. Mr. Applebaum stated that the male
negro, Ernest Harper, works for him and thathe usually cleans up at the
laundryette next door and most of the time is gone home before 10p.m. He
gave us the address of Ernest Harper as 8 East Dempster. Mr. Applebaun,
further stated that he had not heard of any witnesses who had seen the
shooting incident of Eddie Madison. However, he stated that Ernest Harper
had told him the next morning that the police officers had killed a man
in front of the cleaners and that he saw the pool of blood there.
We proceeded to 8 East Dempster and talked to Ernest Harper, male negro,
age 61, who gave his place of employment as the Mallory Heights Laundryette,
2196 Florida. He said that on the night of the shooting which was January
12, 1972 that he cleaned up the laundryette and left before 9p.m. He said
there was no one around anywhere, to his knowledge when he left. He said
he did not knov7 anything about the shooting and only heard about it the next
day when he came back up on the corner. He said he did not know of any
one that had witnessed the shooting.
On Friday, January 14, 1972 Chief Inspector G. P. Tines furnished the
Homicide Office with some information that he had received from a male
negro, Curtis Shields, employed with the Shields Patrol. According to the
information Shields had received was that the male negro Lynell Wilkins
was supposed to have been in the stolen car, along with the victim, Eddie
Hugh Madison and Walter Lee Williams, and it was throught, that Wilkins had
escaped from the car at the time of the shooting, however, the writer knows
this is not true because both Lynell Wilkins and Jerry Lee Wilkins, were
arrested the previous day before this information was recleved, and it
was already known by the writer that both Jerry Lee VJilkins and Lynell
Wilkins had gotten out of the car prior to the shooting near Gage and
Kansas. However, it was a fact that these two male negores did assist in
helping to steal this car and Lynell Wilkins even drove it away from the lo
cation it was stolen from. Chief Tines furnished this office with type
written literature regarding this information which will be a part of this file and is self-explanatory.
On Saturday, January 15, 1972 at approximately 11:10a.m., while the writer
was on his days off, Clifton Ellis, Jr. male negro, age 22, Alias "Jabo",
of 373 Jacklyn, phone 774-1625, employed at the Federal Compress on Lauder
dale at Bodly, came to the Homicide Office stating that he had talked to
Attorney Walter Bailey, Jr.on the night that this shooting incident had
occurred at Florida and Gage and that he had also been contacted by Inspector Tines, to come to the police station and give a statement.
Lt, B. G. Hinson, who was in charge of the Homicide Section on this partlcur
day, contacted Inspector Tines and he and Detective R. L. Roby also from the
Internal Affairs Bureau, came to the Homicide Section and interviewed Cliftor
Ellis. He told the officers that he had gotten off of the //31 Crosstown Bus
at Florida and Mallory at 10:59p.n., on the night that the shooting occurred
He told then that he had walked over to the Esso Service Station at Florida
and Mallory where he used the restroom then walked back over to the front of
the Southside Cafe on Florida. While he was standing at this location in fror
of the front door, he heard some shots. He then turned and noticed a man run
ning south on the east side of Florida at Gage. He stated that he saw a
policeman chasing the man and saw the police officer shoot the man four times
in the back at a distance of about five feet with his pistol. He said that
the same officer fired a fifth shot from his pistol which missed the man and
struck a sign in front of the Southside Cafe, which knocked some of the
paint off the paint chlppings struck him under the right eye on the cheek.
Page 15 - Preliminary Report on'Eddiu Hugh Madison, male negro, 14.
He told them he saw the man fall in front of the cleaners at or neat
Kaplan;s Furniture Store. He said that he then went inside the cafe.
He told them that after the shooting Halter Bailey, Jr, came down to
the cafe and talked to him. He said there was no one in the street at
the time of the shooting other than three male negroes who were at the
Esso Service Station at Florida and Mallory and there no cars driving
on Florida.
He further revealed that earlier in the night he had been to visit his glrlc.-
frlend, Hattie Bradford, age 16, who lives in some apartments behind the
Harlem House on Firestone, number unknown, but who stays with her mother and
father, Mary and Early Bradford. He said that he left Hattie's house and
caught a J31 Crosstown Bus at 9:59p.m., at Marble and Thomas. He then rode
the bus to Flordia and Mallory arriving At 10:59p.m. and vzhen he got off
the bus he was by himself.
Clifton Ellis describes the male Negro that the police officer was chasing
and shot as being about 5'3, heavy and wearing a dark coat, blue jeans and
white tennis shoes and stated he appeared to be a grown man. He then stated
that he observed the male negro get out of the car and start running from
the officer. He said that he saw him turn and look back then saw the officer
start shooting at him. He said he didn't see anyone else in the car, which
was the stolen car, but he did see the car go across Florida street and onto
the sidewalk where it stopped. He said he did not see any officers go over tc
this car. He does not know if there was any damage done to the car. He
stated he could not see the rear glass in the automobile or the rear windows
to know if they had damage or not.
It should be noted that there are several discrepancies in Clifton's
statement that do not correspond with what actually took place during this
shooting. For Instance, Ellis mentioned that the first he knew of anything
taking place was when he heard shots being, fired, then he mentioned later
that he observed the male negro get out of the car and start running and
saw the officer chasing him and shooting at him about five feet behind him
with a pistol. He also mentioned that he could not see the rear glass of
the stolen car after it came to rest on the sidewalk, even though he admitted
walking down to the vicinity where the shooting occurred, and if he had seen
the car at all he would have noticed the rear glass first because the rear
part of the car is what he could have seen best. He also mentioned that the
man whom the officer was chasing was wearing blue jeans and white tennis
shoes. It should be noted that the victim was wearing black striped pants
and brown shoes. Also, there was only two pistol shots fired and not five,
as Ellis mentioned and the officer doing the shooting was not running behind
the victim.
It should be mentioned that the writer did check with the Memphis Transit
Company and learned that on this particular night Memphis Transit Bus f31
did leave Marble and Thomas at 9:59p.m., and arrived at Florida and Mallory
at 10:55p.m., or at least was scheduled to arrive at that time.
It should also be pointed out that the autopsy on the body of Eddie Hugh
Madison, had been completed and Dr. Bell, County Medical Examiner, removed
two shotgun pellets from his body and no lead slugs which were fired from a
pistol.
Clifton Ellis was questioned by Lt. Hinson and Detective Roby regarding
previous arrests with this department and he stated he did have a record
with the department or with the Sheriff's Department which was under the
name of Clifton Owens, Jr. Lt. Hinson chec'xed and found that he was arrested
by the Sheriff's Department in 1968 and charged with two counts of Auto
Theft.
After this written statement was obtained from Clifton Ellis, Jr, these of
ficers then went to the area where this shooting occurred and examined the
only sign on the sidewalk near the front of the Southside Cafe, and could
not find no real evidence that this sign which was a restricted parking
sign, for one hour parking 8a.m., to 6 p.m., had been hit by any bullet or
shotgun pellet. Clifton Ellis, had gone to the scene with these officers
and pointed out this particular sign as being the one that was struck.
Although these officers did notice a very small spot on the sign which
did not appear to have been made by a bullet. The sign was twisted and was nc
facing in the direction of which the bullet would have come from, therefore,
it would have only have struck the post.
Page 16- Preliminary Report on Ed'die Hugh Madison, male negro, 14.
SM
The sign itself va.s facing in the opposite direction fron vhera Clifton
Ellis was standing, therefore, if a. bullet or pellet had strucl. this
sign and. knoched paint chippings, they r.iost likely .̂-ould have bacn k.noched
in the opposite direction from 'where Ellis v;as standing.
VJhile at the scene, Lt. Kinson and Detective Roby called for a Crime Scene
Car and Car 253, with 'Jarrant Officers I. E. Lunday and V?. H. 'Jhite, cane
to the scene and photographed the parking sign and also the Southsidc Cafe.
They also nade several photographs of the overall area. They photographed
froti the Southside Cafe showing the direction fron which any bullet or
pellet would have cone from, fron the point '.j'nera Patrolman Fedrick and
Davidson were standing when the shots '.;ere fired. They also nade photo-
gr phs fron the point where these two officers './ere standing back to 'where
the Southside Cafe and the parking sign are located. They also nade measure
nents fron the door of the Southside Cafe to the corner of the building whic
is the Kaplan Furniture Company at Florida and Gage. The Crime Scene Of
ficers also drew a diagram and made a report iti regards to their photo
graphing and measuring of the scene and their report and diagram has become
a part of this file. Also the written statement of Clifton Ellis is a part
of this file and self-explanatory.
On Monday, January 17, 1972, the writer along with Detective J. M. Barrow
fron the photo lab, wen t to Florida and Gage for the purpose of making
photographs of the inside of Kaplan Furniture Company showing the damage
where the load of shotgun pellets had entered the store. While there
we photographed in color, the windox? shov;ing the damage showing the damage
on the Inside of the store. Oneof these photographs also shows the damage
to the nozzle of the utility sprayer 'which was sitting on the shelf when
the shot was fired. Another photograph shox7S the holes v;hich the buchshot
made when they penetrated the celling and the wall in the store, after
coning through the xvindow. The x/riter had also placed back at the approxi
mate location on the floor,' the shotgun pellet found earlier by the x/riter
and Detective J. I-T. Willis. This pellet was also photographed to shox7 its
location where it had been found.
The writer and Detective Earrox-r came outside and re-axanined the brlcls on
the north end of the building xwhere the second load of buckshot struck
these bricks. A closer examination revealed that in addition to the eight
buckshot imprints that ware already kno'wn to be on the brick xjall, xje found
that one buckshot had embedded itself betx^een the last brick at the corner
and the brick next to it which is just tx;o bricks doxwn from the chipped
brick on this corner. We recovered this flattened pellet x.'hich xwas later
tagged as evidence under receipt nunber A40457. V.'hile at the scene ue also
circled the embedded marks on the bricks that had been caused by shotgun
pellets. These marks xjera circled X7ith blue chalk then photographed in cole
by Detective Barroxj.
While at this location x7e also x/alked dox7n to the Southside Cafe and ex
amined the area again and could find no other evidence of any pellets or
bullets striking these buildings or any other stationary object. While
standing in front of the Southside Cafe Detective R.arrox? made a colored
photograph shooting from behind the signpost that was mentioned by Clifton
Ellis to'ward the corner of Florida and Gage. The x/riter then stepped the
distance from the front of the Sout'iside Cafe to the northeast corner of
Cage and Florida 'which is the approximate location xfhere Patrolman Fedrick
was standing 'when he fired the shots at the fleeing victi;.'.. It X7as found
that it X7as ninety-nire steps making the distance approximately 297 feet,
from X7here Patrolman Fedrick fired the shotgun to the front of the Southsidc
Cafe. Eefore leaving the area X7e also recovered the damaged nozzle from thr
utility sprayer at Kaplan Furniture Compan-y, x.'hich x.'as tagged as evidence
under receipt number A40458.
The X7riter had tried for several days to have borece Thompson, male Kegro,
of 2248 Devoy to have his flat tiro repaired x.'hich X7as found to be flat
on his 1953 Cadillac, X7hich Xv-as parked on the street that has beex cxplainc-
earlier in this report. Through talking further X7i th Thompson it X7as found
that he is not nox7 emplo’/ed x7ith Juvenile Court ns an Auxiliary Probation
Officer. Iio'.7ever, it x.'aslearned that he is the onerator of a pool hall at
1111 Springdale and 'work.s part time at the Toast of Tot7n Cafe or Suniary
on Florida. Thompson finall’/ repaired this tire on Tuesday, Janu.ary 20, 19'.
Page 17 - Prelininary Report on Eddie Hugh Madison, nale Megro, 14.
c
<)
then called the ■••riter stating that a nalc llegro, Cleo Xing, at the I.ion
Oil Service Station at 1093 Springdale had broken the tire down to re
pair it and found a piece of lead slug in the tire. The writer and Ilet.
J. N. V.'illis then net Lorece Thonpson on Florida at the Toast of Tov;n
Cafe and he turned over to the writer a partially flattened piece of lead
which appeared to be a 00-shocgun pellet. Thompson stated that the nan
who removed the slug from his tire had told him that the tire could not be
repaired because the hole in the tire v;as in the side of the tire. '-.'e then
proceeded to the Lion Service Station at 1093 Springdale and talked to Cleo
King, male Negro, age 50, of 1412 Taylor, phone 946-2096, operator of the
Lion Service Station. He confirmed the fact that he did take the slug r/hic’--
we showed to him from the tire belonging to Lorece Thompson. He also shoijed
us the tire and the hole and explained that , due to the fact that this v;as a
tubeless tire and the hole being on the side, he v/ould be unable to repair
it. We noted that the tire was an 355 x 15 in size which had a narrow white
wall. The tire was very old and did not appear to have many more miles of
use left in the tire. This tire bore the brand name General Jet Air f2.
The pellet taken from this tire was tagged asevidence by the writer under
receipt number A40539. The recovery of this slug leaves little doubt but
what this pellet was one of the pellets fired from the shotgun of Patrolman
E. R. Fedrick as he was shooting at the fleeing Negro, Eddie Hugh Iladison.
It should be noted that after Dr. Bell had expressed belief that the male
Negro was older than 14 years old, also considering the fact that his mother
had first given a birthdate that would have made him at least 16 years old,
there was doubt in the writer's mind as to his correct age. Therefore, on
Monday, January 17, 1972, the writer sent a letter to the Bureau of Vital
Statistics in Jackson, Mississippi to try to determine the correct birthdate
of the victim, Eddie Hugh Iladison. The writer had learned from the Vital
Statistics Bureau in this City that there was no record of his birth and that
apparently he was born in Mississippi, due to the fact that his father and
mother were from that State.
A few days later the writer received an answer to the letter sent to Jacksor
Mississippi wherein a Mr.' Paul B. Hawkins, with the Department of State
Registrar, informed the writer that there is no record with the state of
Misslssippin in regards to the birthdate of the victim, Eddie Hugh Madison.
It should be noted that the photographs made of the victim while at the
morgue on the night of this shooting incident did not take, therefore, we
have no photograph showing t’le victim for Identification purposes. However,
the writer has talked to Dr. Janes Bell, Assistant Shelby County Medical
Examiner and he has informed the writer that his photographs made by him of
the victim at the morgue maybe borrowed by the vzriter and copies made so thr
x-je might furnish the office of the .Attorney General photographs or the vict:
These photographs will be included in this file.
It should be noted that all the other photographs x̂ hich x-;ere taken x/hich have
been mentioned in this report did turn out as good photographs in addition
to aerial viex; photographs made from the helicopter of the scene by the
phogograph lab. These photographs x-.’ill also be included in this file.
The scene xxhsre this shooting occurred can be described as the. intersection
of Florida and Gage x?i th the irtnediate scene x/here the shooting of Eddie
Hugh Madison occurred being the northeast corner of Florida and Gage x-xhere
officer F.. P. Fedrick x.'as standing xxhile shooting at the victim. Koxxever,
the scene xxhere the victim x/as actually shot xjas across Gage Street on the
southeast corner of Florida and Gage and at the approximate corner of the
Kaplan Furniture Company building x-xhich is a txxo-story brick building. Loo’.x-
ing south doxxn Florida from the corner of this intersection there are severr
business places xxhich are inside the buildings at this location xxhich ad
join each other, mailing thi.s part of the block a continuous string of build
ings. The location xxhere the victim fell after having been shot xxas in
front of the South Memohis Cleaners x.-hich is next door to Xaplan Furniture
Company. There is a sidexxal'.: where the victim fell at this location xxhich
is on tixe east side of Florida and approximately 75 feet south of Gage.
Across the street on Florida xxhere the victim fell after being shot is also
old buildings, some of xxhich are txxo-story, x-xith these buildings being used
also as business places.
Page IS - Prelininary Report on Eddie iiugh Itadison, nale Eegro, 14.
81 C
Gage Street crosses Florida just north of most of these business places
however, there is a large two-story apartment building located on the
northeast corner of Gage and Florida which would be near \7here Che police
officers stopped their squad car and where Officer Fedrickwas standing v7hen •
he fired the shots at the fleeing victim. The nort'iwest corner of this
intersection where the stolen car cane to arest after Officer Fedrick fired
shots into it, only has a fire plug near the corner but a few feet northwest
is a dwelling which is a single story building. The general area at this
location is not too well lighted, however, there are street lights on Florit
but there is only one street light or. Gage near the shooting scene and this
light is in the rear of the ICaplan Furniture Company. The Crime Scene Of
ficers who were at the scene on the night of this shooting have also descri’
the scene of this shooting in their report V7hich is apart of this file and i hereto attached and self-explanatory.
Photographs V7ere made of the scene of this incident Crime Scene Officers
Detectives C. J. Harrell and R. L. Hannah. Photogtaphs were made of the
victim at the morgue showing the location of the wounds and the face for
identification purposes by Dr. Janes Bell, County Medical Examiner. Other
photographs were made of this scene later by Uarrant Officers I. E. Lunday
and U. H. White of the Crime Scene Squad and Detective J. M. Barrow of the
photo lab. These photographs will be forwarded to the Office of the .A.ttorne
General in the event they are needed in this case later.
There have been no interrogations of the responsible parties of this shootir
due to the fact that they were police officers acting in the line of duty.
However, they did give written statements regarding this shooting and were ^advised of tlieir rights prior to giving the statements.
No written or oral statement was taken from the victim of this report due
to the fact that he was unconscious when the officers reached him after he was shot.
Written statements were taken from Lynell Wilkins, MN, 14, of 162 West
Frank, Jerry Lee Wilkins, MU, 15, of 120 West Dempster, Walter Lee Williams,
MH, 17, of 127 West Frank, Lucille Chattnan, FN, 19, of 62 E. Norwood, and
Clifton Ellis, Jr. MN, 22, of 373 Jacklyn and their statements are hereto attached and self-explanatory.
The pistols and shotgun used in this shooting incident are in the possession
of the police officers and police denartnent. Officer E. R. Fedricks' .38 caliber service revolver bearing serial number D144851 is in his pbssession.
Patrolman L. P. Davidson's .33 caliber Smith and Wesson Revolver bearing
serial number C741837 is in his possession. The shotgun used in this shootir
which is a 12 gauge Remington Pump, Model 870, bearing serial number 1062177
belonging to the Mephis Police Department, is still in Squad Car 12, but wi] be available if needed in this case later.
The clothing worn by the victim at the time of this shooting, has been turne
to the property and evidence section under receipt number A40345 to be for
warded to the office of the Criminal Court Clerk in case they are needed lat in this case.
Pase 19 - Prelininary Report on Eddie Hush Madison, nale Kegro, 14.
th
q J
th
Also the below described.evidence has also been tagged to be forwarded to"
Criminal Court Clerk's office in the event it is needed later. Two spent
.38 caliber hulls taken from Officer Fedrick's and Officer Davidsion's
pistols receipt number A40346, one 00-lead pellet removed from the brick w
of Kaplan Furniture Company, receipt number A40457. One lead 00-pellet re
moved from the tire of a Cadillac belonging to Lorece Thompson, receipt
number .\40539. The nozzel of a utility sprayer damaged by a pellet at Kay
Furniture Company, receipt number A40453. Two 00-lead pellets taken from
body of Eddie Hugh Madison during autopsy receipt number A40387. One OO-lea
pellet found inside Kanlan Hardware Store, receipt number A40455. Three span
12 gauge 00-buck shotgun shells recovered at the scene of the shooting, re
ceipt num'ner A40343 , and one pair of blunt scissors taken from nronarty of
Walter Lee 'Williams at Juvenile Court after his arrest, receipt number A4034
On Friday, January 14, 1972 Katherine Madison, mother of the deceased, did
sign a family consent for an autopsy to be performed on the body of tliis sub
jeet and at such time as the autopsy is complete, a copy of thenrotocol will be furnished the office of the Attorney General.
1 '-i-LLj
At approxlr.iately 3:30 p. n. on Friday, January 14, 1972 Dr. Janes Bell,
Assistant County ;iedical Examiner, called the Homicide Office and stat-’d
that the autopsy was complete on the body of Eddie Madison and that the cause of death was shotgun wound to the lungs and aorta.
Copies of all written and oral statements, offense reports, all sunplements
photographs, arrest tickets, tine cards from the dispatcher's office, the
drime scene officers' report, transcript of the dlsoatcher's tape, tran -
scripts by various people who had conversation with the Internal Affairs
Bureau, and a copy of this preliminary renort will be furnished to the of
fice of the Attorney General to be used if needed later in this case.
Page 20 - Prellntnary Report on Eddie ITugh Madison, nale negro, 14.
Respectfully submitted.
R. R. I)avis, Detective, IB;!i-2033 HOMICIDE SECTIOM
VICTIM: Eddie Ugh Madison,
R & I Number 532-027
Homicide Number 4/3728
,14, 35 E. Davan t 'to phone
WIT1IESSE3: Lynell Uilkins, MN, 14, 162 W . Frank 948-9672
Jerry Lee E'il'<ins, ttN, 15 120 H. Dempster 943-2252
Walter Lee Williams, MN,17, 127 V . Frank 947-2520
Lucille Chattman, F’', 19, 52 E. Norwood 774-3597
Clifton Ellis, Jr. MN, 22, 373 Jacklyn 774-1625
OFFICERS I
INVESTIGATING
OFFICERS:
Ptlm, E. R. Fedricks 2655 Det . c . J. HarrellPtln. L. P. Davidson 2123 De t . R. L. HannahPtlm. M. E. White 9145 Det. I. E. LundayPtlm. J. W. Jeeter 4224 Det. W. H. WhitePtln. J. C. Boswell 0307 De t. J. M. Earrot'Ptln. R. K, Cates 1339 De t . L. RobyPtlm. L. S. Reeves 7195 Insp . L. R. Ho HowellPtlm. C. P. Acton 0037 Insn . D. C. VincentLt. H'. S. Schultz 7743 CH/I . G. P. TinesLt. T. H. Smith 7772 Disp . J. D. WilliamsLt. M;. T. York 9901 Di so . Mike Chris topherCap t. C. E. Watts 9077 De t . C. E. Huddles ton
Det. J. A. Dungan 2109 Det . J. P.. Hes terDe t. H. E . Rand1e 7079 Det . G. S . WillisDet. J.‘ F. McOuarry 5156 Det . R . D DavisDe t. C. A. Gregory 2960 Lt. G. E. JordanDet . J. N. Willis" 9109 Lt . T. MarshallDet. R. A. Lowry 4767 Lt. B. G . HinsonDet. D. 0. Lewis 4747
3300
3247
4769
9035
0433
7126
3278
9029
8695
9171
1282
3343
3263
9108
2083
4195
5167
3270
A P P R O V E D :
Cap tain
RRD/bbk
m .