Order to Desegregate

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adequacy of any plans the defendant prooiems 

and to effectuate a transition te 

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system, Subsequently in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U, 8, 1, 1,7, the 

school 

Court ordered that "... [A] District Court, after analysis of the 

relevant factors (which of course excludes hostility to racial desegre~ 

gation) might conclude that justification existed for not requiring present 

nonsegregated admission of all qualified negro/children, In such circum- 

stances, however, the courts should scrutinize the program of the school 

authorities to make sure that they had developed arrangements pointed 

towards the earliest practicable completion of desegregation, and had taken 

appropriate steps to put their program into effective operation, And 

finally, ''State authorities were thus duty bound to devote every effort 

toward initiating desegregation and binging about the elimination of 

racial discrimination in the public schools,”'4 There can be little doubt 

that the original conception of the Supreme Court was that desegregation 

would be implemented by the school boards through plans devised &
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boards and supervised by the District Courts.?® The history & 

tion in New Orleans proves that this was not te be the case here, or
 

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id 5 The implementing decision in Brown was handed down on May 31, 

19565, On February 15, 1956, the Orleans Parish School Board was ordered 

to desegregate with all deliberate speed,” When no independent action 

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 Board, this Court, on July 15, 1959, ordered the Board to 

file a plan of desegregation by May 16, 1960, When the Board failed to do 

that, this Court ordered the desegregation under its own plan on May 16, 

1960. On August 27, 1960, a three-judge court ordered that the May 16, 

1960, order be implemented, 37 

See procedure suggested in Gibson v. Board of Public Instruction, 

Dade County, Fla, (5 Cir.) 272 F.2d 763, and adopted in Dove Vv. 

181 ¥, Supp. 504, 183 F., Supp. 389, modified 8 Cir, Parham, E.D. Ark 
ne? 

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(E.D., La,) 138 F. Supp. 337, aff'd. » 16 gush v. Orleans Parish School Board 
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3 5 ¥ iy) Yr ® 242 F. 2d 16 Je 

17 3 © v -s - ry a y 3 r oe 4 

Ibid, 187 F. Supp. 42, aff'd, 365 U, 8S. 569 



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Schools, To believe that desegregation can be eifected here with all 

deliberate speed through application of the Pupil Placement Law is indeed 

no more than "a speculs tive possibility wrapped in disuasive qualifica- 

tions, "98 However, ii dual school systems are elimated and the Pupil 

Placement Law is administered even-handedly without overtones of race, 

the constitutional inhibition is alleviated, Once a child is given the 

opportunity to choose a school on a non-racial basis, he may be segrega= 

ted according to academic ability. The mechanics of the plan to be 

constitutionally applied by the Board would also necessitate a dissolution 

of the dual schools system, 

It remains to consider the expanded plan of April 9, 1962, As 

noted before, the discretion to formulate plans for desegregation has been 

vested in local officials even if such officials come to be the United 

: 38 : : 
States District Court, All such officials are answerable to the Consti- 

tution, the public needs, and physical possibility. A new Court in a 

case such as this must respond to these demands as it deems wise and 

proper, whatever may have gone before, It is in the exercise of that 

considered judgment that this Court views the present state of the record. 

This Court is impressed with the magnitude of the administrative 

problem of suddenly turning tens of thousands of children free to choose 

y their own schools, leaving the School Board to shepard them into some 

workable order, However, the Board now finds itself able to accommodate 

the administration of thie schools with the order of May 16, 1960, With 

this resolution the Orleans Parish School Bard starts active compliance 

with the order of May 16, 1960, While it does not divest this Court of 

the duty to formulate plans of desegregation, it is a drasticedeparture 

from programs of the past, By this the Board supplements good faith with 

affirmative performance. The Board's formal decision to comply with the 

prders of this Court coupled with the order handed down this day repre- 

sents, to the Court's satisfaction, an active plan of desegregation under 

Brown that will adequately protect plaintiffs’ rights as well as the aspir- 

ations for order sought by all reasonable men, 

a  ., tl A OU. , ll... —._. ss  ii..—.—. 

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““Doveé v., Parham, 8 Cir, 282 F, 2d, 256, 261 

39 ; 
See footnote 21 supra 



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