Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

    I n' the

® ottr t  o f  %  IntteJ i
October Term, 1983

No...............

E lizabeth Brandoh, et al.,

V.

John D. H olt, etc., et al.

Petitioners,

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

E lizabeth A. M cEIanha 
686 W . Clover Drive 
Mempliis, Tennessee 38119

G. P hilip A rnold
300 E. Main Street 
P.O. Box 760 
Ashland, Oregon 97520

W illiam E. Caldwell 
731 Center Drive 
Memphis, Tennessee 38112

Jack Greenberg
E ric Schnapper*

16th Floor 
99 Hudson Street 
New York, New York 10013 
(212) 219-1900

Counsel for Petitioners

* Counsel of Record



i '-'..T. >; C - j  ;•

t i ;  't T,' O  C' “t'U J n  i- 'J

- ki ''.I mJ  i ,  .J- J
f  “V f. f  ' V /  ;i.. J. i -

J. s 3 £•'■■■ :?':■* ?  > 3 . . 3 r > ? n 5  ■ ,■ :  L/iy

^ .  J  ' *>•

i



QUESTION PRESENTED

Did t h e  C o u r t  o f  A p p e a l s  e r r  in  

ho la ing  that  a monetary judgment under Rule 

2 5 ( d ) ,  F .R .C .P . ,  against  a p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l  

" in  h is  o f f i c i a l  capaciti^" imposes personal 

l i a b i l i t y  on the o f f i c i a l  which he must pay 

out o f  h is  own pocket?

- 1 -



The p l a i n t i f f s  in t h i s  a c t i o n  are 

E l i z a b e t h  A. Brandon and James D, Muse. 

The o r i g i n a l  d e f e n d a n t s  were E. V7inslow 

Chapman, in  h i s  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y  as 

D i r e c t o r  o f  P o l i c e  f o r  the C ity  o f  Memphis, 

and R o b e r t  J .  A l l e n ,  W h i l e  t h e  c a s e  

was pending in the court  o f  appeals ,  John 

D, Holt replaced  E. Winslow Chapman as the 

D i r e c t o r  o f  P o l i c e ,  and was thus s u b s t i ­

tuted f o r  him as a defendant by opera t ion  

o f  Rule 4 3 ( c ) ( 1 ) ,  Federal Rules o f  Appel­

l a t e  Procedure.

The p r a c t i c a l  i s s u e  p o s e d  by t h e  

Question Presented i s  whetlier any judgm.ent 

a g a i n s t  H o l t  o r  Chapman in h i s  o f f i c i a l  

c a p a c i ty  operates  as a judgment against  the 

C ity  o f  Memphis.

PARTIES

-  11 -



TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Question Presented .......................................  i

P a r t ie s  ................................................................  i i

Table o f  Contents .........................................  i i i

Table o f  A u th o r i t i e s  ..................................  iv

Opinions Below ................................................  2

J u r i s d i c t i o n  ..................................................... 2

Rules Involved ....................... * ......................  3

Statement o f  the Case ................................  5

Reason f o r  Granting the Writ ..............  12

C e r t i o r a r i  Should Be Granted To 
Resolve A C o n f l i c t  Among the C ir ­
c u i t s  Regarding the E f f e c t  o f  a 
Judgment Against A Publ ic  Employee 
"In His O f f i c i a l  Capacity"  . . .  12

Conclusion .........................................................  29

APPENDIX

D i s t r i c t  Court Findings o f  
Fact ,  Conclusions o f  Law, 
and Order, July  8, 1981 . . .  la

Opinion o f  the Court o f  
Appeals ,  October 11,
1983 ....................................    29a

Order o f  the Court o f  Appeals 
Denying P e t i t i o n  f o r  Rehear­
ing En Banc, December 2,
1983 ................................................  45a

- iii -



C ases ;

B erto t  V. School  D is t .  No. 1, Albany 
County, 613 F.2d 245 (10th C ir .
1979) .............................................    25

Campbell v .  Bowlin, 724 F.2d 484
(5th C ir .  1984) ...................................  23

Family Unidas v.  B r i s c o e ,  619 F.2d
391 (5th C ir .  1980) ..............................  23,26

Gay Student S erv ices  v. Texas A. & M.
U n iv e rs i ty ,  612 F.2d 160 (5th C ir .
1980) .......................................................... 23

Hughes v.  Blankenship, 672 F.2d 403
(4th C ir .  1982) ................................... 22

Irwin V. Wright,  258 U.S. 219
(1922) .......................................................

Key V. Rutherford ,  645 F.2d 880
(10th C ir .  1981) ................................  25,27

Kincaid v .  Rusk, 670 F.2d 737
(7th C ir .  1982) ................................... 24

McGhee v. Draper,  639 F.2d 639
(10th C ir .  1981) ................................. 25,27

Monell V. New York C ity  Dept, o f  
S o c ia l  S e r v i c e s ,  436 U.S.
658 (1978)   p a ss im

Nekolny v. P a in ter ,  653 F.2d 1164
(7th C ir .  1981) ................................... 24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

-  IV -



Owen V. C ity  o f  Independence, 445 U.S.
622 (1980) ..................   passim

Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848
(4th C ir .  1980) ............................22

Scheuer v.  Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1^ ‘74) .......................................................  20,25-26

Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15
( 1950) .......................................................  12

United States  ex r e l .  Bernardin v.
Butterworth, 169 U.S. 600
(1897) .......................................................  13

Universal Amusement Co. v.  Hofheinz,
646 F.2d 996 (5th C ir .  1981) . . .  23,26

Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488
(5th C ir .  1980) ................................... 23,24

W o l f - L i l l i e  V. Sonquist ,  699 F.2d
864 (7th C ir .  1983) ............................. 24

S t a t u t e s ;

28 U.S.C. § 1254( 1 ) ....................................  2

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ............................................ 7

30 S ta t .  822 .............................................   1 3

43 S ta t .  936 ..................................................... 1 3

Page

-  V -



Page

Other A u t h o r i t i e s

3B Moore 's  Federal P r a c t i c e  If 25.01 
[13J ....................................................... 14

-  VI -



No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1983

ELIZABETH BRANDON, ^  a l . ,

P e t i t i o n e r s ,

V.

JOHN D. HOLT, e t c . ,  e t  a l .

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

P e t i t i o n e r s  E l i z a b e t h  A. Brandon  

and James D. Muse r e s p e c t f u l l y  p r a y  

that  a Writ o f  C e r t i o r a r i  issue  to  review 

the  judgment and o p i n i o n  o f  the United 

S t a t e s  C o u r t  o f  A p p e a l s  f o r  t h e  S i x t h  

C i r c u i t  e n t e r e d  in  t h i s  p r o c e e d i n g  on 

October 11, 1983.



2 -

OPINIONS BELOW

The d e c i s i o n  o f  the Court o f  appeals 

i s  r e p o r t e d  at  710 F.2d 151, and i s  s e t  

out  at pp. 28a-43a o f  the Appendix. The 

o r d e r  d e n y i n g  r e h e a r i n g ,  w h ic h  i s  n o t  

r e p o r te d ,  is  se t  out at p. 44a. The d i s ­

t r i c t  court  Findings o f  Fact ,  Conclusions 

o f  law and Order are  r e p o r t e d  at  516 F. 

Supp. 1355, and are se t  out at pp. 1a-27a 

o f  the Appendix.

JURISDICTION

The judgment o f  the court  o f  appeals 

was entered on October 11, 1983. A t imely  

p e t i t i o n  f o r  rehearing was f i l e d ,  which was 

denied on December 2, 1983. On February

22, 1984, J u s t i c e  O'Connor granted an order  

extending the date on which the p e t i t i o n  

f o r  writ  o f  c e r t i o r a r i  is  due u n t i l  March 

31, 1984. J u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  t h i s  Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1 ) .



-  3 -

RULES INVOLVED

Rule 2 5 ( d ) ,  Federal Rules o f  C iv i l  

Procedure,  p rov ides :

( d ) Publ ic  O f f i c e r s ;  Death or
Separation from O f f i c e

(1) When a p u b l i c  o f f i c e r  i s  a 
party  to  an ac t ion  in h is  o f f i c i a l  
c a p a c i t y  and d u r ing  i t s  pendency  
d i e s ,  r e s ig n s ,  or  otherwise  ceases  
to  hold o f f i c e ,  the a c t io n  does not 
abate and h is  successor  i s  automatic­
a l l y  subst i tu ted  as a party .  Pro­
ceedings  f o l l o w in g  the s u b s t i t u t i o n  
s h a l l  be in the name o f  the s u b s t i ­
t u t e d  p a r t y ,  but any misnomer not  
a f f e c t i n g  the  s u b s t a n t i a l  r i g h t s  
o f  the p a r t i e s  s h a l l  be d isregarded .  
An o r d e r  o f  s u b s t i t u t i o n  may be 
e n t e r e d  a t  any t i m e ,  b u t  t h e  
o m i s s i o n  t o  e n t e r  s u ch  an o r d e r  
s h a l l  not a f f e c t  the s u b s t i t u t i o n .

(2) When a p u b l i c  o f f i c e r  sues 
or  i s  sued in h is  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i ty ,  
he may be d e s c r i b e d  as a p a r t y  by 
h i s  o f f i c i a l  t i t l e  r a t h e r  than by 
name; but the court  may requ ire  his  
name to  be added.

R u le  4 3 ( c ) ( 1 ) ,  F e d e r a l  R u l e s  o f  

Appe l la te  Procedure, p rov ides :



- 4

( c )  P u b l ic  O f f i c e r s ;  Death or  Sep- 
ara t ion  from O f f i c e

(1) When a p u b l i c  o f f i c e r  i s  a 
party t o  an appeal or  o ther  proceed­
ing in the court  o f  appeals  in h is  
o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y  and d u r in g  i t s  
pendency d i e s ,  r e s ig n s  or otherwise  
c e a s e s  t o  h o ld  o f f i c e ,  the  a c t i o n  
does not abate and h is  su ccessor  i s  
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  s u b s t i t u t e d  as a 
p a r t y .  P r o c e e d i n g s  f o l l o w i n g  the  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  s h a l l  not  be in the  
name o f  the su b s t i tu te d  party ,  but 
any m is n o m e r  n o t  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  
s u b s t a n t i a l  r i g h t s  o f  the  p a r t i e s  
s h a l l  be d is regarded .  An order  o f  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  may be entered at any 
t ime, but the omission t o  enter  such 
an o r d e r  s h a l l  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  
s u b s t i t u t i o n .

Supreme Court  Rule 4 0 .3  p r o v i d e s :

When a p u b l i c  o f f i c e r  i s  a 
p a r t y  t o  a p r o c e e d i n g  h ere  in  h i s  
o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y  and d u r in g  i t s  
pendency d i e s ,  r e s i g n s ,  or  otherwise  
c e a s e s  t o  h o ld  o f f i c e ,  the  a c t i o n  
does not abate and h is  su ccessor  i s  
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  s u b s t i t u t e d  as a 
p a r t y .  P r o c e e d i n g s  f o l l o w i n g  the  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  s h a l l  be in  the  name 
o f  the s u b s t i t u t e d  p a r t y ,  but any 
misnomer not a f f e c t i n g  the substan­
t i a l  r i g h t s  o f  the p a r t i e s  s h a l l  be 
d isregarded .  An order  o f  s u b s t i t u ­
t i o n  may be e n t e r e d  at  any t im e ,  
but the omission to  enter  such an



5 -

order  s h a l l  not a f f e c t  the s u b s t i t u ­
t i o n .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

T h is  c a s e  a ro s e  from the  d e l i b e r a t e  

p o l i c y  o f  Memphis p o l i c e  a u t h o r i t i e s  o f  

re fus ing  to  d i s c i p l i n e  or d ismiss  p o l i c e  

o f f i c e r s  whom they knew to  be dangerously 

v i o l e n t .  The p a r t i c u la r  o f f i c e r  in th is  

case,  Robert A l le n ,  had in the words o f  the 

D i s t r i c t  Court a

reputat ion  f o r  d isp la y in g  maladap­
t i v e  b e h a v i o r  w e l l  known among 
P o l i c e  o f f i c e r s  in h i s  p r e c i n c t .  
. . .  A l l e n ' s  reputat ion  as a "mental 
c a s e "  was w i d e s p r e a d  among t h e  
o f f i c e r s .  ( 8 a ) 1/

A l len  ceremoniously  put on what he r e fe r re d  

to  as h is  " k i l l i n g  g lov es "  when c a l l e d  to  

t h e  s c e n e  o f  a c r i m e ,  and e x p r e s s e d  a 

morbid fa s c in a t i o n  with the wounds o f  a man

See a lso  26a-27a ( A l l e n ' s  "dangerous 
p r o p e n s i t i e s  were  w i d e l y  known among 
o f f i c e r s  o f  the Department").



6 -

he had k i l l e d  ( I d . ) .  By 1977 A l l e n ' s  

personnel  record s  contained some 20 com­

p l a i n t s  o f  abuse o f  a u th or i ty  and unneces­

sary  f o r c e  (1 1 a ) .  A l l e n ' s  behavior  was so 

b i z a r r e  that none o f  h is  f e l l o w  o f f i c e r s  

were w i l l in g  t o  r id e  in a squad car with 

him (9 a ) .  the City  o f  Memphis, however, 

armed A l len  with a gun and a badge and s e t  

him l o o s e  on the  c i t i z e n s  o f  the  c i t y .

T h is  i n e x p l i c a b l e  p r a c t i c e  l e d  t o  a 

p r e d i c t a b ly  t r a g i c  r e s u l t  on the night o f  

March 5, 1977. At 11:30 p.m. that  evening 

two high schoo l  s tudents ,  E l izabeth  Brandon 

and Jam.es Muse, were on a date and parked, 

as youn g  c o u p l e s  a r e  wont  t o  d o ,  in  a 

sec luded area. A l l e n ,  a f t e r  i d e n t i f y i n g  

h i m s e l f  as a Memphis p o l i c e  o f f i c e r ,  

ordered Muse t o  step  out o f  the c a r . A f te r  

b r i e f l y  q u e s t i o n i n g  him. O f f i c e r  A l l e n  

m a l i c i o u s l y ,  and w i t h o u t  p r o v o c a t i o n ,  

a s s a u l t e d  Muse w i t h  a k n i f e ,  s t a b b i n g



“  7 -

him in  the neck and e a r .  When O f f i c e r  

A l len  t r i e d  t o  break in to  the car where Ms. 

B ra n d on  was s e a t e d .  Muse jumped i n t o  

the d r i v e r ' s  s ide  and q u i ck ly  drove away. 

O f f i c e r  A l l e n  then drew h i s  s e r v i c e  r e ­

v o l v e r  and s h o t  at the f l e e i n g  c o u p l e .  

The b u l l e t  shattered a window in the car 

and s t r u c k  Brandon  in  t h e  f a c e .  Muse 

required  surgery f o r  h is  wounds, and was 

permanently d i s f i g u r e d .  ( 5 a -8 a ) .  Neither 

Brandon nor Muse were ever charged with or 

suspected o f  any o f f e n s e ;  O f f i c e r  A l len  was 

u l t i m a t e l y  i n d i c t e d  and c o n v i c t e d  o f  

a ssau lt  with in tent  to  murder in connect ion  

with t h i s  in c id e n t .

P e t i t i o n e r s  Brandon and Muse commenced 

t h i s  a c t ion  in the United States  D i s t r i c t  

Court f o r  the Western D i s t r i c t  o f  Tennes­

s e e ,  a l l e g in g  a v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  r i g h ts  

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth 

Amendment. P e t i t i o n e r s  named as defendants



- 8 -

O f f i c e r  A l l e n  and t h e  D i r e c t o r  o f  t h e  

Memphis P o l i c e  Department, then E. Winslow 

Chapman. A l l e n ,  who by then had f i n a l l y  

l e f t  t h e  Memphis P o l i c e  D e p a r t m e n t ,  

never appeared or answered the complaint .  

A d e f a u l t  judgment was subsequently  entered 

against  A l l e n ,  but he was in j a i l  when t h i s  

case came to  t r i a l ,  and apparently  lacks  

s i g n i f i c a n t  personal  a s s e t s .  The l i t i g a ­

t i o n  th e r e f o r e  proceeded to  t r i a l  aga inst  

D i r e c t o r  Chapman " i n  h i s  o f f i c i a l  c a ­

p a c i t y  . "

The d i s t r i c t  ju d g e  found t h a t  the 

re s p o n s ib le  Memphis a u t h o r i t i e s  engaged in 

se v e ra l  o f f i c i a l  p r a c t i c e s  which p r e d i c t ­

ab ly  led to  A l l e n ' s  assau lt  on p e t i t i o n e r s .  

F i r s t ,  i t  was t h e  e x p r e s s  p r a c t i c e  o f  

D i r e c t o r  Chapman not to  take d i s c i p l i n a r y  

a c t io n  against  o f f i c e r s  known to  engage in 

u n la w fu l  v i o l e n t  c o n d u c t .  ( 1 4 a ,  2 3 a ) .

Second, there  was a "code o f  s i l e n c e  among



- 9 -

the o f f i c e r s "  pursuant to  which no members 

o f  the f o r c e  would t e s t i f y  regarding known 

m is c o n d u c t  by t h e i r  c o l l e a g u e s .  ( 1 4 a ,  

2 2 a ) . T h i r d ,  th e  i n t e r n a l  p r o c e d u r e s  

e s ta b l i s h e d  by D ire c to r  Chapman imposed on 

superv isory  o f f i c e r s  no duty to  in v e s t i g a t e  

or  r epor t  on dangerous p r o p e n s i t i e s  on the 

p a r t  o f  t h e i r  s u b o r d i n a t e s .  ( 1 2 a - 1 3 a ) .  

Fourth, i t  was D ire c to r  Chapman's p o l i c y  

not to  read c i t i z e n  complaints o f  p o l i c e  

misconduct sent to  h is  o f f i c e .  In A l l e n ' s  

c a s e ,  f o r  e x a m p l e .  Chapman had s i g n e d  

l e t t e r s  to  two complainants s ta t in g  that 

A l l e n ' s  b e h a v io r  was be in g  i n v e s t i g a t e d  

(22a~23a);  Chapman t e s t i f i e d  under oath, 

however, that he had never heard o f  O f f i c e r  

A l len  p r i o r  to  the assau lt  on p e t i t i o n e r s ,  

and th a t  he was unaware o f  the ch a rg es  

against  Al len  about which he had wr it ten  to 

the two e a r l i e r  complainants.  (13a, 20a).  

Based on th e s e  s u b s i d i a r y  f i n d i n g s  the



-  10 -

d i s t r i c t  judge held that  D i r e c t o r  Chapman 

should have known about and taken s teps  to  

QQj^tail  A l l e n ' s  v i o l e n t  c o n d u c t ^  and 

awarded damages a g a i n s t  Chapman " i n  h i s  

o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y ” . ( 2 2 a - 2 7 a ) .  The 

d i s t r i c t  court  understood that  that award 

was in f a c t  a judgment aga inst  the c i t y  o f  

Memphis, not ing  that  an " o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i ty  

s u i t  i s  "an a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  an e n t i t y  o f  

w h ic h  an o f f i c e r  i s  an a g e n t "  ( 1 6 a ) .

While the case was on appeal Chapman 

l e f t  o f f i c e ,  and was r e p l a c e d  as P o l i c e  

D i r e c t o r  by J ohn  D. H o l t .  S i n c e  t h e  

lower court  d e c i s i o n  was against  Chapman 

" i n  h i s  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y " .  H o l t  was

a u t o m a t i c a l l y  s u b s t i t u t e d  as the  named

defendant by opera t ion  o f  Rule 4 3 ( c ) ( 1 ) ,  

Federal Rules o f  A ppe l la te  Procedure.  On 

October 11, 1983, the cour t  o f  appeals  held 

that  a judgment against  a p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l  

" in  h is  o f f i c i a l  ca p a c i ty "  was as a matter



- 1 1 -

o f  law a judgment against  the o f f i c i a l  as 

an " in d iv id u a l "  (38a ) ,  to  be paid out o f  

h i s  own p o c k e t .  The S ix th  C i r c u i t  thus 

reasoned th a t ,  although the c i t y  o f  Memphis 

could claim no good f a i t h  immunity in l i g h t  

o f  Owen V. City  o f  Independence, 445 U.S. 

622 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  D i r e c t o r  Chapman " i n  h i s  

o f f i c i a l  ca p a c i ty "  was e n t i t l e d  to  invoke 

t h a t  d e f e n s e .  A lthough  the t r i a l  c o u r t  

had never  c o n s i d e r e d  o r  d e c i d e d  whether 

Chapman had acted in good f a i t h ,  the Sixth 

C i r c u i t  proceeded to cons ider  th is  fa c tu a l  

issue  n i s i  p r i u s , and held that Chapman had 

dem onstra ted  the  r e q u i s i t e  good f a i t h .  

(3 8a ) .  A ccord in g ly ,  the court  o f  appeals 

d i r e c t e d  that the claim against  him " in  his  

o f f i c i a l  capac i ty "  be d ismissed .  (33a) .



-  12 -

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

C e r t i o r a r i  S h o u l d  Be G r a n t e d  To 
Re s o l v e  A C o n f l i c t  Among the  C i r ­
c u i t s  R e g a r d i n g  t h e  E f f e c t  o f  a 
Judgment A g a in s t  a P u b l i c  Employee 
"In His O f f i c i a l  Capacity"

The S ix t h  C i r c u i t  d e c i s i o n  in t h i s  

case c re a te s  in a s in g l e  blow the proce ­

dural  and substant ive  problems regarding 

" o f f i c i a l  ca p a c i ty "  a c t i o n s  which J u s t i c e  

Frankfurter  a generat ion  ago ch a ra c te r i ze d  

as a " l e g a l  snarl  . . .  compounded o f  con fu -  

Sion and a r t i f i c i a l i t i e s . " - ^  For at l e a s t  

a c e n t u r y  p r i o r  t o  1961 u n c e r t a i n t y  

about when s u i t s  against  p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l s  

were t o  be t r e a t e d  as s u i t s  a g a i n s t  the

e n t i t i e s  f o r  which they  worked d i v i d e d
3 /

t h i s  C o u r t ,  c o n f u s e d  the  l ow er  c o u r t s  

and ensnared unwary l i t i g a n t s .  Repeatedly

_2/ Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15, 22 (1950) 
(d i s s e n t in g  o p i n i o n ) .

3/ See, e.g. id.



p o in t in g  to  the procedural  problems posed 

by s u i t s  against  p u b l i c  employees in t h e i r  

o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t i e s ,  t h i s  Court on severa l  

o c c a s i o n s  s u c c e s s f u l l y  c a l l e d  upon Congress

- 13 -

to  adopt c l a r i f y i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n . 4 / These

p r o b l e m s ,  the  Court em phas ized ,  imposed 

u n r e a s o n a b le  burdens on the c o u r t s  and 

l i t i g a n t s  a l i k e .

Under the present s ta te  o f  the law, 
an i m p o r t a n t  l i t i g a t i o n  may be 
b e g u n  and c a r r i e d  t h r o u g h  t o  
t h i s  c o u r t  a f t e r  much e f f o r t  
and expense, only to  end in d ism is ­
sa l  . . . .  5 /

D e s p i t e  the enactment o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  in 
6 /  7 /1899— and 1925, and the p r o v i s i o n s  o f  

the Rule 25 o f  the 1937 Federal Rules o f  

C i v i l  Procedure,  these problems continued

£ /  I rw in  V. W r i g h t , 258 U.S. 219,  223,
224 (1922) ;  United States  ex r e l .  Bernardin 
V. Butterworth , 169 U.S. 600, 605 (1897) .

_5 /  I rw i  n v . W r ig h t  258 U .S .  a t  2 2 4 .

30 S ta t .  822, ch. 121.

7/ 43 Stat. 936, 941, ch. 229.



u n t i l  1961. In 1961 the Advisory  Committee 

noted that Rule 25 as i t  then e x i s t e d  was 

" g e n e r a l l y  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be u n s a t i s f a c ­

tory^"  operat ing  at times as "a trap f o r  

unsuspecting l i t i g a n t s  which seems unworthy 

o f  a great  government.

Rule 25(d) was amended in 1961 in the 

hope o f  ending once and f o r  a l l  the snarl  

o f  w h i c h  J u s t i c e  F r a n k f u r t e r  had com­

p la in e d .  As amended Rule 25(d) e x p r e ss ly  

recogn ized  and regu lated  a c t i o n s  which were 

"brought in form aga inst  a named o f f i c e r ,

b u t  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  a g a i n s t  t h e  g o v e r n -  
9 /m e n t . " —' The C o m m it t e e  N o te  e x p l a i n e d  

t h a t  in  a Rule  2 5 (d )  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  an 

o f f i c e r  " i n  h i s  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y "  any 

judgment was to  prov ide  " r e l i e f  . . .  by the

- 14 -

Quoted in 3B Moore*s Federal P r a c t i c e , 
If 25.01 [13J .

9/ Id.



one having o f f i c i a l  s ta tu s ,  rather  than one 

who has l o s t  that s tatus  and power through 

c e a s i n g  t o  h o ld  o f f i c e . " ”  ̂ Rule  2 5 (d )  

" o f f i c i a l  ca p a c i ty "  a c t io n s  were by d e f i n i ­

t i o n  l im ited  to l i t i g a t i o n  seeking r e l i e f  

against  whichever o f f i c i a l  might hold the 

o f f i c e .  A p l a i n t i f f  s e e k in g  a monetary 

award t o  be p a i d  by t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  i s  

d i r e c t e d  by Rule 25(d) t o  sue the re levant  

o f f i c i a l  " in  his  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y " ;  that 

Rule i s  in a p p l i ca b le  to  a s u i t  seeking to 

compel a d e fe n d a n t  o f f i c i a l  " t o  . . .  pay 

damages out  o f  [ h i s ]  own p o c k e t [ ] .

Since an " o f f i c i a l  ca p a c i ty "  defendant is  

merely a re p resen ta t iv e  o f  the e n t i t y  fo r  

which he works. Rule 25(d) prov ides  that i f  

a new o f f i c i a l  i s  appointed to  the p o s i t i o n  

o f  the named defendant,  that new o f f i c i a l

-  15 -

19./ I I -

10a/ Id .



- 16 -

w i l l  a u tom at ica l ly  be su b s t i tu te d  as the 

nominal defendant .

T h is  Court  has t w i c e  h e ld  t h a t  in  a 

Rule 25(d)  a c t io n  against  an o f f i c i a l  " in  

h i s  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y "  any m o n e t a r y  

award runs against  the p u b l i c  e n t i t y  f o r  

which the o f f i c i a l  works, not  against  the 

o f f i c i a l  p e r s o n a l ly .  In Monel1 v .  New York 

C i t y  Department o f  S o c i a l  S e r v i c e s , 436

U. S .  6 5 8 ,  690 n.  55 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,  t h e  C o u r t

exp la ined ;

S i n c e  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y  s u i t s  
g e n e r a l l y  r e p r e s e n t  o n l y  a n o th e r  
way o f  p leading an a c t i o n  against  an 
e n t i t y  o f  which an o f f i c e r  i s  an 
agent  . . .  our  h o l d i n g  to d a y  th a t  
l o c a l  governments can be sued under 
§ 1983 n e c e s s a r i l y  d e c i d e s  th a t
l o c a l  government o f f i c i a l s  sued in 
t h e i r  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t i e s  a r e  
" p e r s o n s "  u n d e r  § 1983 i n  t h o s e  
c a s e s  in  w h ich ,  as h e r e ,  a l o c a l  
government would be s u a b le  in i t s  
own name.

B e c a u s e  i t  r e g a r d e d  a s u i t  a g a i n s t  an 

o f f i c i a l  i n  h i s  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y  as a



-  17 -

judgment against  the governmental e n t i t y  

f o r  which he worked, the Court in Monell 

held such " o f f i c i a l  ca p a c i ty "  s u i t s  proper 

when, but o n l y  when, the e n t i t y  i t s e l f  

could be sued.

A s i m i l a r  c o n c l u s i o n  wi t h rega rd  to

good f a i t h  immunity was reached in Owen v .

C ity  o f  Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) .

The p l a i n t i f f  in t h a t  ca se  had sued the

c i t y  o f  I n d e p e n d e n c e  and c e r t a i n  c i t y

o f f i c i a l s  " in  t h e i r  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t i e s . "

445 U. S.  630. In u p h o ld in g  an award o f

backpay t h i s  Court emphasized;

The governmental immunity at issue 
in  the  p r e s e n t  ca s e  d i f f e r s  s i g ­
n i f i c a n t l y  f r o m t h e  o f f i c i a l  
immunities involved in our previous  
d e c i s i o n s .  In those ca ses ,  var ious  
government o f f i c e r s  had been sued 
in t h e i r  ind iv idu a l  c a p a c i t i e s  . . . .  
Here ,  in c o n t r a s t ,  o n l y  the l i a ­
b i l i t y  o f  the m u n i c i p a l i t y  i t s e l f  
J. ^ _  a jt _  ^ ^  e _  n o jt _ jt h o
o f f i c e r s  . . . .  445 U.S. 638 n. 18
(Emphasis added).



Thus bo th  f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  j u r i s d i c t i o n  

under M one l l , and in assess ing  a claim o f  

im m unity  u n der  Owen, t h i s  C o u r t  has 

adhered t o  the in tent  o f  the d r a f t e r s  o f  

Rule 25(d) and treated  an a c t io n  against  an 

o f f i c i a l  " i n  h i s  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y "  

as an a c t io n  against  the e n t i t y  f o r  which 

he works.

The ins tant  case was l i t i g a t e d ,  t r i e d ,

and ad judicated  as an a c t io n  against  the

Memphis D i r e c t o r  o f  P o l i c e  " in  h is  o f f i c i a l

c a p a c i t y . "  The D i s t r i c t  Judge emphasized

at three  separate  p o in ts  in h is  Findings o f

F a c t  and C o n c l u s i o n s  o f  Law t h a t  t h e

D i r e c t o r  was sued " i n  h i s  o f f i c i a l  c a ­
l l /p a c i t y . " —  The M a g i s t r a t e  t o  whom the  

judge r e fe r re d  the c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  damages 

noted  th a t  the  c o u r t  had found D i r e c t o r

- 18 -

11/ la, 16a, 25a.



Chapman l i a b l e  " i n  h i s  o f f i c i a l  capa~  
1 2 /c i t y . " —  The d i s t r i c t  j u d g e c l e a r l y

contemplated that the damages which he had 

awarded would be paid by the c i t y  o f  Mem­

p h is ,  not by D ire c to r  Chapman p e rs o n a l ly .  

Q uot ing  t h i s  C o u r t ' s  o p i n i o n  in M o n e l l , 

Judge Horton d e c l a r e d  th a t  an " o f f i c i a l  

c a p a c i t y  s u i t [ ]  . . .  r e p r e s e n t [ s ]  o n l y  

another way o f  pleading an ac t ion  against  

an e n t i t y  o f  wh i c h  an o f f i c e r  i s  an
13 /agent . "

The Sixth C i r c u i t ,  d isregard ing  both 

the c o n t r o l l i n g  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  Court and 

t h e  m a n i f e s t  i n t e n t  o f  t he  d i s t r i c t  

c o u r t ' s  o r d e r ,  he ld  th a t  the l i t i g a t i o n  

against  D ire c to r  Chapman " in  h is  o f f i c i a l  

ca p a c i ty  . . .  i s  a s u i t  against  the in d i -

- 19 -

12/  J o in t  Appendix, Nos. 
5346, p. 70.

83-5321 and 83-

13/ 16a.



v i d u a l ,  n o t  the  c i t y . "  The c o u r t  o f

a p p e a l s  a p p l i e d  t o  s u c h  an " o f f i c i a l

ca p a c i ty "  lawsuit  the e x ecu t iv e  immunity

standards o f  Scheuer v .  Rhodes, 416 U.S.
1 5 /232 ( 1 9 7 4 ) , —  and i t s  p r o g e n y ,  d e s p i t e

the f a c t  that f o o t n o t e  18 in Owen c l e a r l y  

in d ica ted  that  Scheuer was in a p p l i c a b le  to  

such " o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i ty "  a c t i o n s .  In deny­

ing rehear ing ,  the a p p e l la te  panel r e i t ­

erated  that  an award o f  damages "a g a in s t  a 

p o l i c e  o f f i c i a l  in h is  o f f i c i a l  ca p a c i ty "  

was n o t  " a  ju d g m e n t  a g a i n s t  t h e  c i t y  

i t s e l f , "  but against  the o f f i c i a l  person­

ala l l y . —

The p a t e n t  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  o f  t h i s  

co n c lu s io n  with Rule 25(d)  o f  the Federal 

R u les  o f  C i v i l  P r o c e d u r e ,  and w ith  the

-  20 -

14/

lA / 31a, 38a. 

] ^ /  45a.

16/ 45a.



21 -

s i m i l a r  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  Rule 4 3 ( c )  o f  the 

Federal Appe l la te  Procedure, i s  h igh l igh ted  

by the p a r t i c u la r  c ircumstances o f  th is  

appeal .  The n o t i c e  o f  appeal was f i l e d  on 

May 2 0 ,  1 9 8 2 .  On D ecem b er  2 9 ,  1 9 8 2 ,  

Chapman was r e p l a c e d  as D i r e c t o r  o f  the 

Mem.phis City  P o l i c e  by John D. h o l t .  Thus 

in December 1982, by o p e r a t i o n  o f  Rule 

4 3 ( c ) ,  Holt was autom at ica l ly  subs t i tu ted  

f o r  Chapman as the a p p e l l a n t .  When the 

Sixth  C i r c u i t  subsequently  he ld ,  in October 

1983, that t h i s  a c t i o n ,  and the d i s t r i c t  

cour t  judgment appealed from, were against  

Chapman as an " i n d i v i d u a l " .  Chapman was no 

longer  even a party t o  the l i t i g a t i o n ,  and 

had not been f o r  over 9 months.

The S i x t h  C i r c u i t  d e c i s i o n  in t h i s  

c a s e  i s  s q u a r e l y  i n c o n f l i c t  w i t h  t he  

d e c i s i o n s  o f  four  other  c i r c u i t s  regarding 

Rule 25(d)  " o f f i c i a l  capac i ty "  law su its .  

The Fourth  C i r c u i t  has he ld  th a t  in an



a c t i o n  against  schoo l  board o f f i c i a l s  in

t h e i r  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t i e s  any award would

be pa id  " f rom  the  s c h o o l  b o a r d ' s  t r e a -  
. .17/sury. That c i r c u i t  t r e a t s  " o f f i c i a l

ca p a c i ty "  s u i t s  j u s t  as i t  does a c t i o n s  in

which the government e n t i t y  i s  the named

d e f e n d a n t ,  a p p l y i n g  t h e  i mmuni t y  r u l e
18/a p p l i c a b l e  to  l o c a l  government un its—  and

r e q u i r i n g  p r o o f  o f  the  same " p o l i c y  o r
..19/custom mandated by Monell in a c t io n s

against  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s .  The F i f t h  C i r c u i t  

has  h e l d  i n  5 s e p a r a t e  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  

" a c t i o n s  f o r  damages  a g a i n s t  a p a r t y  

in h is  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i ty  a re ,  in e ssen ce ,  

a c t i o n s  aga inst  the governmental e n t i t y  o f

-  22 -

1 7 /  Paxman v.  Campbell,  612 F.2d 848, 856 
(4th C ir .  1980) .

18/  I d . at 856-60.

19/  Hughes v.  Blankenship, 672 F.2d 403, 
406 (4th C ir .  1982) .



which the  o f f i c e r  i s  an a g e n t . " —  For

that reason the F i f th  C i r c u i t  a p p l ie s  to

" o f f i c i a l  ca p a c i ty "  a c t ion s  the Owen ru le

that c i t i e s  enjoy no good f a i t h  immunity

and the Monell " p o l i c y  or  custom" r e q u i r e -
1 1 /ment a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  a 

m.unicipal i t y . The F i f th  C i r c u i t  has a lso  

e x p r e ss ly  held that the due process  r ig h ts  

o f  a county are not v i o la t e d  by compell ing 

i t  t o  pay the  judgment in an " o f f i c i a l  

c a p a c i t y "  a c t i o n  in  which i t  was never

- 23 -

2 0 /

20/  Campbell v.  Bowlin, 724 F.2d 484, 489 
n. 4 (5th C ir .  1984) ;  see a l s o  Universal 
Amusement Co. v.  Hofneinz , 646 F.2d 996, 
997 (5th C ir .  1981) ;  Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 
628 F.2d 488, 496 (5th C ir .  1980) ;  Family 
Unidas v. B r i s c o e , 619 F.2d 391, 403 (5th 
C ir .  1980);  Gay Student S erv ices  v. Texas 
A & M U n iv e r s i t y , 612 F.2d 160, 164 (5th 
C ir .  1980) .

21/  Universal Amusement Co. v.  Hofheinz , 
646 F.2d at 997; Family Unidas v.  B r i s c o e , 
619 F.2d at 403; Campbell v. Bowlin, 724 
F.2d at 489.



- 24 -

fo rm a l ly  named as a p arty .  The Seventh 

S e v e n t h  C i r c u i t  r e c o g n i z e s  t h a t  " an 

o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y  s u i t  . . .  i s  m e r e l y  

another form o f  claim against  the govern­

2 2 /

ment e n t i t y . ..1 1 / For that  reason

the rea l  defendant in an o f f i c i a l -  
c a p a c i t y  s u i t  i s  n o t  t h e  named 
p u b l i c  o f f i c e r  b u t  r a t h e r  t h e  
g o v ern m en ta l  e n t i t y .  The g o v e r n ­
ment, and not the p u b l i c  o f f i c e r ,  i s  
s o l e l y  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  s a t i s f y i n g  a 
judgment rendered against  an o f f i ­
cer  sued in h is  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y .  24/

Thus the Seventh C i r c u i t  t o o  a p p l ie s  the 
2 5 /  26/

Owen and M onel l  r u l e s  t o  an " o f f i -

2 2 /  Van Qoteghem v .  G r a y , 6 28 F. 2d at
495-96.

23/  K in c a id  v .  Rusk , 670 F .2d  at  745.

24/  Kincaid v .  Rusk, 670 F.2d 737, 742 n. 
7 ( 7 t h  C i r .  1 9 8 2 ) ;  s e e  a l s o  Nekolny  v . 
P a i n t e r , 653 F.2d 1164,  1170 ( 7th C i r .
1981) (under  Monel l  " r e c o v e r y  from the  
p u b l i c  t r e a s u r y  i s  p o s s i b l e  in  c a s e s  o f  
government o f f i c i a l s  being sued in t h e i r  
o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y . " )

25/  K in c a id  v .  Rusk , 670 F. 2d at  745.

26 /  W o l f - L i l l i e  v .  S o n q u is t , 699 F.2d at
870.



c i a l  ca p a c i ty "  a c t io n .  The Tenth C i r c u i t  

r e co g n iz e s  th a t ,  in l i g h t  o f  f o o t n o t e  55 in 

M on e l l ,

a judgment against  the board members 
runs a g a in s t  the S c h o o l  D i s t r i c t  
t r e a s u r y ,  i t  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a 
j u d g m e n t  a g a i n s t  t h e  D i s t r i c t  
i t s e l f . 2 7 /

As a consequence, the Tenth C i r c u i t  as wel l
28 /a p p l i e s  Owen to  such a c t i o n s . —

In the instant  case the Sixth C i r c u i t ,  

r e ly in g  on i t s  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  " o f f i ­

c i a l  ca p a c i ty "  s u i t s  as personal  a c t ion s  

aga inst  the named defendants ,  held that the 

d e f e n d a n t  in such a s u i t  may in v ok e  the 

"good f a i t h "  defense  provided by Scheuer v .

“  25 -

2 7 /  Bertot  v. School Dist^ No. 1, Albany 
County, 613 F.2d 245, 247 n. 1 (10th C ir .  
1979);  see a lso  Key v.  R uther ford , 645 F.2a 
880, 883 n. 5 (10th C ir .  1981) (" judgments 
against  l o c a l  government o f f i c i a l s  in t h e i r  
o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t i e s  are e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a 
judgment a g a in s t  the government e n t i t y  
i t s e l f . " )

28/  Key v.  Ruther ford , 645 F.2d at 883; 
McGhee v.  Draper, 639 F.2d 639, 644 ( 10th 
C ir .  1981) .



-  2 6  “

R h o d e s , 416 U.S.  232 ( 1 9 7 4 ) .  The S ix t h

C i r c u i t  thus dismissed a l l  c laims against

Chapman " in  h is  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y , "  i n s i s t -
«

ing that there was i n s u f f i c i e n t  evidence

" t h a t  he a c te d  w ith  any th in g  o t h e r  than
2 9 /g o o d  f a i t h . " —  T h r e e  o t h e r  c i r c u i t s ,  

however, have e x p re ss ly  re fused  to  apply 

the Scheuer v.  Rhodes good f a i t h  de fense  to  

" o f f i c i a l  ca p a c i ty "  a c t i o n s .  In the F i f t h  

C i r c u i t  "Government o f f i c i a l s  sued in t h e i r  

o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i ty  may not . . .  a s se r t  good

f a i t h  immunity. . .30/ The Seventh  C i r c u i t

has a lso  r e j e c t e d  any good f a i t h  de fense  in 

such a c t i o n s :

29 /  37a.

30/  Universal Amusement Co. v .  H ofhe inz , 
646 F.2d at 997; see a lso  Famil ias Unidas
V. B r i s c o e , 619 F.2d at 403 ( " q u a l i f i e d ,  
good f a i t h  immunity in su la te s  defendants 
o n l y  from l i a b i l i t y  in  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  
c a p a c i t i e s . . . .  I t  has no e f f e c t  on t h e i r  
l i a b i l i t y  in t h e i r  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t i e s . . . . )



-  27 -

Because  an o f f i c i a l - c a p a c i t y  s u i t  
. .  . merely represents  another form 
o f  c la im  a g a i n s t  the government 
e n t i t y  i t s e l f  . . .  the Owen holding 
d e n y i n g  t h e  g o o d  f a i t h  im m unity  
d e f e n s e  h a s  b e e n  e x t e n d e d  t o  
o f f i c i a l  ca p a c i ty  s u i t s . 3 1 /

S im i la r l y ,  the Tenth C i r c u i t  construes  Owen

as hold ing " l o c a l  government o f f i c i a l s  in

t h e i r  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t i e s  l i a b l e  f o r

com pen sa tory  damages r e g a r d l e s s  o f  good 
32 /f a i t h . " —

The d e c i s i o n  o f  the Sixth C i r c u i t  in 

t h i s  c a s e  t h u s  p r e s e n t s  a c o n f l i c t  on 

i s s u e s  o f  r e c u r r i n g  i m p o r t a n c e  w i t h  

the d e c i s i o n s  o f  the Fourth, F i f t h ,  Seventh 

and Tenth C i r c u i t s ,  and with the d e c i s i o n s  

o f  t h i s  C o u r t  in  Mo n e 1 1 and Ow e n . The 

Sixth C i r c u i t  court  o f  appeals has e f f e c ­

t i v e l y  a b o l i s h e d  " o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y "

31/  K in ca id  v .  Rusk, 670 F.2d at 745.

32/  McGhee v.  Draper, 639 F.2d at 644; see 
a l s o  Key v. R uther ford , 645 F. 2d at 883.



a c t io n s  in the f e d e r a l  c o u r ts  in Michigan, 

Ohio, Tennessee and Kentucky; h en ce for th  

such a c t i o n s  are t o  be t r e a t e d  in  t h a t  

c i r c u i t  as i f  the defendants  were sued in 

t h e i r  in d iv id u a l  c a p a c i t i e s .  The d e c i s i o n  

in t h i s  case a lso  abrogates  f o r  a l l  p r a c t i ­

c a l  p u rp o s e s  Rule  2 5 (d )  o f  the F e d e r a l  

Rules o f  C i v i l  Procedure and Rule 43 (c )  o f  

the Federal Rules o f  A ppe l la te  Procedure.  

Equally  s e r i o u s l y ,  the d e c i s i o n  below c a l l s  

in to  quest ion  the manner in which c o u n t le s s  

" o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y "  a c t i o n s  now pend ing  

across  the country have been pleaded and 

t r i e d ;  i t  s ta n d s  as an open i n v i t a t i o n  

to  in tra n s ig e n t  l i t i g a n t s  to  r e c r e a t e  the 

" l e g a l  snar l "  which t h i s  Court thought i t  

had untangled by amending Rule 25(d) two 

decades ago. C e r t i o r a r i  should be granted 

to  r e s o l v e  the c o n f l i c t  noted above,  and to  

preterm it  the con fus ion  and m is c h ie f  which 

t h e  S i x t h  C i r c u i t  o p i n i o n  p o r t e n d s .

- 28 -



- 29 -

CONCLUSION

For  t h e  a b o v e  r e a s o n s  a w r i t  o f  

c e r t i o r a r i  s h o u l d  i s s u e  t o  r e v i e w  t h e  

judgment and op in ion  o f  the Sixth C i r c u i t .

R e s p e c t fu l l y  submitted.

ELIZABETH A. McKANNA
686 W. Clover Drive 
Memphis, Tennessee 38119

G. PHILIP ARNOLD
300 E. Main S tree t  
P.O. Box 760 
Ashland, Oregon 97520

WILLIAM E. CALDWELL
731 Center Drive 
Memphis, Tennessee 38112

JACK GREENBERG
ERIC SCHNAPPER*

16th Floor  
99 Hudson S tree t  
New York, New York 10013 
(212) 219-1900

Counsel f o r  P e t i t i o n e r s

*Counsel o f  Record



rev,.

'■ 'if r:

% j ■' ■' "'■' :-j • ■'■' *■ .;'■ 1

a-' ■

vn
V ->■  ̂- '-: VH

' ji
■*.

:̂ '1 re* l §i--
^ \  X O S! -, < ■ i

-rru:, JXX IriXA

',>■/:'3'

. j|£. :.,r f ̂
f ;, '

'lx-'-:

,;: ■ , ■ . iimx i - -X )

;„... ■' ,■ ; s 3 ’&mvl:Jx^e‘ x ■'soi

D3C.Ĵ ;45|; a€? / :m
"'''■'-\  ̂ V -■.'*<'■■- ;* • "■‘'5 V''' ■ ■-

*■•-■ - ji't

. • '■ Jr- ■ '. Vi "

4Xsr XV. Ct.y> C>-VV-.s.:lV

V--,:



APPENDIX



fj :.C O

^  ̂ ' a<r ..  ̂ -

r.;i p.

>•;< . ' j. K'- K

; •> ■•- 5

•}' ~ -y'■

■, A

>jf * "* .•' ' ̂  is ' ' t  f -  ̂ '

- j V'. ■ ■

cv r; X fXp/> iu>..< :f..;

a „r

3 i' l -1

- f ii.

U 1

<4 'f t

f| 0 i. i. 3 .1: ' =3 d  <X;! V '3 i 't O X /. J. - i:

<'3ma>h Dds noon.&ii:^ *A nJa-"’& x..'■ * ;-j ... .:■ 0

O, I fv*̂ '4 ' v'v ’; /  % r'# r'yr^v-
C *  . . .  ^  * .  -» , ' • V  / .  ■ , i .  . y  u.  *.



Elizabeth  A. BRANDON and James S. Muse, 

P l a i n t i f f s ,

V.

Robert J.  ALLEN and E. Winslow Chapman, 

Defendants.

No. C-78-2076.

United States  D i s t r i c t  Court,
W. D. Tennessee,  W. D.

July 8, 1981.

G. P h i l l i p  Arnold,  Memphis, Tenn.,  
f o r  p l a i n t i f f .

Henry Kle in ,  Memphis, Tenn. f o r  
defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT, AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER

HORTON, D i s t r i c t  Judge.

T h i s  i s  a c i v i l  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  the  

H o n o r a b l e  E. V7inslow Chapman, in  h i s  

o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y  as D i r e c t o r  o f  the  

Memphis P o l i c e  D e p a r tm e n t  and f o r m e r  

Memphis P o l i c e  O f f i c e r  Robert  J .  A l l e n .  

P l a i n t i f f s ,  E lizabeth A. Brandon and James 

S. Muse, seek actual  and pun it ive  damages



- 2a -

from the  d e f e n d a n t s  f o r  an a s s a u l t  and 

b a t te ry  committed upon them by e x - o f f i c e r  

A l l e n  and f o r  d e c l a r a t o r y  r e l i e f  a l l  

pursuant to  42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, and

the Fourteenth Amendment o f  the C on s t i tu t io n  

o f  the United S t a te s .  Due to  h is  f a i l u r e  

t o  appear  or  answer the c h a r g e s  in the 

com pla int ,  a d e fa u l t  judgment was entered 

a g a i n s t  the d e fe n d a n t  R ober t  J .  A l l e n .  

The case was heard by the Court on Septem­

ber 29 and 30, 1980.

P l a i n t f f s  a l l e g e  the f o l l o w i n g :

1) An o f f - d u t y  p o l i c e  o f f i c e r  acts  

under c o l o r  o f  s t a t e  law;

2) As D ire c to r  o f  P o l i c e  and as an 

agent o f  the C ity  o f  Memphis, Mr. 

Chapman should have known o f  Mr. 

A l l e n ' s  dangerous p r o p e n s i t i e s ;

3) Mr. Chapman should have taken 

steps  to  dismiss  Mr. A l len  from 

the P o l i c e  Force p r i o r  to  the



- 3a -

occurrence  o f  the in c ident  in v o lv ­

ing p l a i n t i f f s .

4) P o l i c i e s  e x is te d  which precluded 

the P o l i c e  Department from taking 

ac t ion  to  d i s co v e r  dangerous pro­

p e n s i t i e s  among ce r t a in  o f f i c e r s ,  

and those p o l i c i e s  encouraged 

"cover -up"  o f  p o l i c e  misconduct ;

5) Mr. Chapman's in act ion  was the 

cause o f  p l a i n t i f f s '  pa in ,  s er ious  

ph ys ica l  and emotional i n j u r i e s ,  

and property  damange, and defend­

a n t ' s  in a c t ion  denied p l a i n t i f f s  

equal p r o t e c t i o n  o f  the law;

6) Mr. Chapman's w i l l f u l ,  wanton and 

re ck le s s  conduct c o n s t i t u t e s  a 

bas is  f o r  an award o f  pun it ive  

damages.

D e f e n d a n t  E. W in s low  Chapman, as 

an agent o f  the Memphis P o l i c e  Department, 

presented the f o l l o w in g  de fense :



- 4a

1) He had no actual  knowledge o f  

the dangerous p r o p e n s i t i e s  o f  

O f f i c e r  Robert J.  A l le n ;

3) Upon h is  a r r i v a l  as P o l i c e  

D i r e c t o r ,  he in s t i t u t e d  a new 

p o l i c y ,  which provided f o r  h is  

personal  involvement in cases  o f  

p o l i c e  misconduct;

4) S i l e n ce  among p o l i c e  o f f i c r e s ,  

review by the C i v i l  S erv ice  

Commission, and p r o v i s i o n s  o f  a 

union c o n tra c t  l im ited  the P o l i c e  

D i r e c t o r ' s  a b i l i t y  to  d i s c i p l i n e  

o f f i c e r s ;

5) O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  d i s c i p l i n a r y  

record at the time o f  the in c id en t  

invo lv ing  p l a i n t i f f s  d id  not 

warrant d ism issa l  from the P o l i c e  

F orce ;

6) Under the c ircumstances o f  t h i s  

case ,  i t  cannot be said  that Mr.



Chapman should have known o f  Mr. 

A l l e n ' s  dangerous p r o p e n s i t i e s .

The C o u r t ,  p u r s u a n t  t o  R u le  5 2 ,  

F e d r e a l  R uels  o f  C i v i l  P r o c e d u r e ,  makes 

the f o l l o w in g  f in d in gs  o f  f a c t  and con c lu ­

s ion s  o f  law:

-  5 a  ~

FINDINGS OF FACT

1) On March 5, 1977, at approximately

11:30 p.m. p l a i n t i f f s ,  who were seventeen 

years o f  age,  drove to  the Memphis Hunt and 

Polo  Club while  on a date and parked in a 

d a rk  and s e c l u d e d  d r i v e w a y  a r e a .  The 

d r iv e r  o f  the v e h i c l e  was p l a i n t i f f  James 

S .  Muse. A f t e r  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  t h i r t y  

m inutes  had e l a p s e d ,  a C h e v r o l e t  p i ck u p  

truck entered the driveway where p l a i n t i f f s  

were parked. The truck proceeded down the 

driveway and returned a few minutes l a t e r ,  

stopping near Mr. Muse's car .  The d r iv e r  

o f  the truck id e n t i f e d  himsel f  to  p la in ­

t i f f s  as a p o l i c e  o f f i c e r  and showed them



an o f f i c i a l  p o l i c e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  card  

bearing the name and photograph o f  Robert 

J.  A l l e n .  Mr. A l len  was in f a c t  employed as 

an o f f i c e r  with the Memphis P o l i c e  Depart­

m e n t ,b u t  he was o f f  du ty  at  th a t  t im e .  

Mr. A l len  ordered Mr. Muse to  s tep  out o f  

the  c a r .  A f t e r  b r i e f l y  q u e s t i o n i n g  him. 

O f f i c e r  A l l e n  m a l i c i o u s l y ,  and w i th o u t  

p r o v o c a t i o n ,  struck Mr. Muse in the neck 

and head with h is  f i s t  and then stabbed and 

cut  Muse on the neck and ear with a k n i f e .  

As O f f i c e r  A l len  t r i e d  to  break in to  the 

car where p l a i n t i f f  E l izabeth  A. Brandon 

was s e a t e d ,  Mr. Muse jumped i n t o  th e  

d r i v e e r ' s  s ide  o f  the car and q u i c k ly  drove 

away. O f f i c e r  A l len  f i r e d  a shot at the 

escaping v e h i c l e  with h is  p o l i c e  r e v o l v e r .  

The b u l l e t  shattered the f r o n t  window on

- 6a -

the d r i v e r ' s  s ide  o f  the car .  O f f i c e r  A l l en

fo l low ed  p l a i n t i f f s  in a high speed chase 

which ended at St .  J osep h 's  Hospita l  East,



where p l a i n t i f f s  sought medical  care and 

a s s i s t a n c e  and r e p o r t e d  the  unprovoked 

attack  upon them by O f f i c e r  A l len .

2) M iss  Brandon  was t r e a t e d  in  th e  

e m e r g e n c y  room f o r  f a c i a l  c u t s  c a u s e d  

by the  s h a t t e r e d  g l a s s .  L a t e r ,  a b u l l e t  

fragment was removed from her fa c e .  Mr. 

Muse u n d e r w e n t  t h r e e  h o u r s  o f  p l a s t i c  

surgery and was h o s p i t a l i z e d  f o r  two days.  

He was required to  return to  h is  phys ic ian  

p e r i o d i c a l l y  f o r  a d d i t io n a l  treatment.  Mr. 

Muse s t i l l  has scars  on h is  fa c e .

3)  B o t h  p l a i n t i f f s  h a v e  s u f f e r e d  

great  phys ica l  pain and anguish as a r e s u l t  

o f  the in c id e n t .  Miss Brandon t e s t i f i e d  

t h a t  she  has e x p e r i e n c e d  n i g h t m a r e s ,  

h e a d a c h e s ,  i r r i t a b i l i t y ,  i m p a t i e n c e ,  

withdrawal,  f e a r ,  and emotional d i s t r e s s .  

Mr. Muse t e s t i f i e d  that he has had d i f f i ­

c u l t y  s leep ing  s ince  the in c id e n t .  He has 

s u f f e r e d  f e a r  and e m o t i o n a l  d i s t r e s s .

-  7a -



-  8 a  -

He s u s t a i n e d  damage t o  h i s  c a r .  Both  

p l a i n t i f f s  t e s t i f i e d  they have l o s t  re sp e c t  

f o r  t h e  p o l i c e .  T h e i r  s e n i o r  y e a r  in  

high schoo l  was d isrupted  by the in c id e n t .  

T h e r e  i s  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  p l a i n t i f f s  a r e  

l i k e l y  to  bear some emotional scars  from 

t h i s  e x p e r i e n c e  f o r  th e  r e m a i n d e r  o f  

t h e i r  l i v e s .

4) Although O f f i c e r  A l len  was t e ch n i c ­

a l l y  o f f  duty at the time o f  the in c id e n t ,  

an o f f  duty Memphis policeman i s  authorized 

to  be armed. He i s  required to  act  i f  he 

o b s e r v e s  the commiss ion  o f  a c r i m e .  The 

Court t h e re fo re  f in d s  that O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  

use o f  h is  Memphis P o l i c e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  

c a r d  and p o l i c e  s e r v i c e  r e v o l v e r  were  

a c ts  done under c o l o r  o f  s t a t e  law.

5) O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  r e p u t a t i o n  f o r  

d i s p la y in g  maladaptive behavior  was wel l  

known among P o l i c e  o f f i c e r s  in  h i s  

p r e c i n c t .  When informed o f  the inc ident



i n v o l v i n g  p l a i n t i f f s ,  th e  f o l l o w i n g  

s t a t e m e n t s  were made by O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  

c o l l e a g u e s :

They f i n a l l y  caught  up with  him; h e ' s  
a quack; A l len  has done something th is  
time that he c a n ' t  get  out o f .

A l l e n ' s  r e p u t a t i o n  as a " m e n t a l  c a s e "

was widespread among the o f f i c e r s .  Because

none o f  the o f f i c e r s  wished to  r id e  in the

same squad car with O f f i c e r  A l l e n ,h e  was

fre q u e n t ly  re legated  to  r ide  by h im se l f .

He was known to  have bragged about k i l l i n g

a man in the course o f  duty.  O f f i c e r  A l len

has o f t e n  stated  to  other  o f f i c e r e  that he

wished he knew the exact  b u l l e t  spread in

the  c h e s t  o f  the man he k i l l e d .  O f i c e r

A l len  re fe r re d  to  a pa ir  o f  g lo v e s  in his

p o s s e s s i o n  as " k i l l i n g  g l o v e s , "  and he

would ceremoniously  put those g lov es  on h is

hands when he wsa c a l l e d  to the scene o f  a

crime.

- 9a -



6) At l e a s t  on one  p r i o r  o c c a s i o n ,  

an o f f i c e r  reported  O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  

morbid  c o n d u c t  t o  a s u p e r v i s o r .  O f f i ­

cer  Joe Davis made that report  to  Captain 

D. A. M oore  and r e q u e s t e d  t h a t  he be 

assigned t o  r id e  with someone other  than 

O f f i c e r  A l l e n .  As long as Captain Moore was 

at Mr. Davis '  p r e c i n c t ,  t h i s  request  was 

honored f o r  the most p a r t .

7)  At l e a s t  two f o r m a l  c o m p l a i n t s  

were f i l e d  with the Memphis P o l i c e  Depart­

ment by c i t i z e n s  a g a i n s t  O f f i c e r  A l l e n  

p r i o r  to  the in c id en t  in vo lv ing  p l a i n t i f f s .  

K a t h l e e n  M y r i c k  had f i l e d  a coni p l a i n t  

a l l e g in g  "conduct  unbecoming o f  an o f f i ­

c e r . "  J e a n n e  D e B lo c k  t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  

O f f i c e r  A l l e n  had s t o p p e d  h e r  on t h e  

i n t e r s t a t e  highway, ordered her in to  h is  

squad ca r  and ta u n ted  her  f o r  about  an 

h o u r  and a h a l f .  D u r in g  t h a t  t im e  he 

o r d e r e d  her  t o  r e p e a t  her s t o r y  t o  him

- 10a -



1 la

at l e a s t  f o u r  t im e s .  When he r e l e a s e d  

her ,  she c a l l e d  him a name, and he threw 

her back in to  h is  squad ca r ,  taunted her 

f o r  at l e a s t  another hour,  took her to  j a i l  

f o r  the night and impounded her ca r .  Al­

though she had presented a v a l id  d r i v e r ' s  

l i c e n c s e  when asked. O f f i c e r  A l len  charged 

her  with  d r i v i n g  w i th o u t  a l i c e n s e  and 

speeding.  O f f i c e r  Al len  was given an o ra l  

repr imand based upon Ms. M y r i c k ' s  com­

p l a i n t .  No ac t ion  was taken against  him fo r  

Ms. DeBlock 's  complaint .  Upon his  depar­

t u r e  from  t h e  Memphis P o l i c e  D e p a r t ­

ment in March o f  1977, twenty complaints 

a g a i n s t  O f f i c e r  A l l e n  were p a r t  o f  h i s  

p o l i c e  f i l e  r e c o r d s .  T h o s e  i n c l u d e d  

c o m p l a i n t s  f o r  s e r i o u s  abuse o f  p o l i c e  

a u t h o r i t y  and use o f  u n n e ce s s a ry  f o r c e .  

O f f i c e r  Al len  had re ce ived  commendations 

w h i l e  a p o l i c e  o f f i c e r .  He was s u b s e ­

quent ly  conv icted  and imprisoned fo r  his



r o l e  in the in c ident  in vo lv ing  p l a i n t i f f s .

8) D e fendant  Chapman has been P o l i c e  

D i r e c t o r  s in ce  h is  appointment in Septem­

b e r ,  1976. P r io r  to  h is  A dm inistrat ion ,  

t h e r e  was no d i r e c t  in v o lv e m e n t  o f  the 

P o l i c e  D i r e c t o r  with  m a t t e r s  o f  o f f i c e r  

misconduct .  Mr. Chapman devised  procedures 

which provided f o r  h is  personal  involvement 

with matters o f  misconduct .  Those proce ­

dures were not implemented u n t i l  e a r ly  in 

the year o f  1977. The o ld  procedure was 

f o l l o w e d  u n t i l  D i r e c t o r  Chapm.an's new 

procedures  were adopted and implemented. 

The new procedures operated p r o s p e c t i v e l y .  

Thus,  Mr. Chapman was not  a p p r i s e d  o f  

O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  d i s c i p l i n a r y  r e c o r d ,  s ince  

he had f a i l e d  t o  r e v i e w  t h e  e x i s t i n g  

r e c o r a s  o f  p o l i c e  o f f i c e r s  r e l a t i n g  t o  

m isconduct .

9) Even under the  new p r o c e d u r e s  im- 

pe lmented  by Mr. Chapman, O f f i c e r  A l l e n

- 12a -



would not  have been d i s m i s s e d  from the  

Memphis P o l i c e  D e p a r t m e n t  b a s e d  upon 

h i s  p o l i c e  d i s c i p l i n a r y  r e c o r d  a t  t h e  

time o f  the inc ident  invo lv ing  p l a i n t i f f s .  

The new p r o c e d u r e s  f a i l e d  t o  e n c o u r a g e  

o r  impose any du ty  on o f f i c e r s  t o  f i l e  

f o r m a l  c o m p l a i n t s  on t h e i r  own i n i t i a ­

t i v e  a g a i n s t  o t h e r  o f f i c e r s  when w a r ­

r a n t e d .  Mr. Chapman's p lan  a l s o  f a i l e d  

t o  impose a duty  on s u p e r v i s o r s  t o  take  

a c t i o n  to  seek out and d i s c o v e r  o f f i c e r s  

who might  have dangerous  p r o p e n s i t i e s .  

Even under the new procedures ,  immediate 

s u pe rv i so rs  o f  the o f f i c e r s  were insulated 

from knowledge o f  o f f i c e r  misconduct .  In 

the absence o f  the f i l i n g  o f  formal com­

p l a i n t s  by e i t h e r  c i t i z e n s  or o f f i c e r s ,  Mr. 

Chapman was a lmost  always uni f ormed o f  

p o l i c e  o f f i c e r  m i s c o n d u c t .  No d i r e c t  

a c t i o n  was taken by the P o l i c e  D i re c t o r  to  

seek out inc idents  o f  o f f i c e r  misconduct

-  13a  -



-  14a  -

from immediate su p e rv is o rs .

10) Mr. Chapman had no personal  knowledge 

o f  O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  dangerous p r o p e n s i t i e s  

n o r  d i d  many o f  t h e  o t h e r  s u p e r v i s o r s  

within  the h ierarchy  o f  the p o l i c e  depart ­

ment .

11) S e r i o u s  l i m i t a t i o n s  h in d e re d  the  

p o l i c e  departm ent  and i t  D i r e c t o r  from 

d i s c i p l i n i n g  errant  o f f i c e r s .  Those f a c t o r s  

i n c l u d e d  a c o d e  o f  s i l e n c e  among t h e  

o f f i c e r s ,  r e s t r i c t i v e  p r o v i s i o n s  within  the 

u n i o n  c o n t r a c t ,  and r e v i e w  o f  p o l i c e  

d i s c i p l i n a r y  a c t i o n s  by a C i v i l  S e r v i c e  

R e v ie w  B o a r d .  In a p r e v i o u s  c a s e ,  Mr. 

Chapman t e s t i f i e d  that  he f i r e d  an o f f i c e r  

charged with p i s to l -w h ip p in g  a c i t i z e n  and 

d i s m i s s e d  a n o th e r  o f f i c e r  charged  with  

breaking the limbs o f  a p r i s o n e r .  In both 

c a s e s  t h e  C i v i l  S e r v i c e  R e v ie w  Board  

r e in s ta te d  the o f f i c e r s .  Because o f  those 

c o n s t r a i n t s ,  Mr. Chapm.an b e l ie v e d  that i t



was Detter to  take no d i s c i p l i n a r y  ac t ion  

aga inst  an o f f i c e r  than to  take ac t ion  and 

be r e v e r s e d  by the C i v i l  S e r v i c e  Review 

Board.

12) Standard form l e t t e r s  were r o u t in e ly  

s e n t  t o  c i t i z e n s  in  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e i r  

f o rm a l  c o m p l a i n t s .  Those l e t t e r s  were 

signed by Mr. Chapman and assured complain­

ants that the matter in quest ion  had been

p ro p e r ly  acted upon by the P o l i c e  Depart­

m e n t .  Such l e t t e r s  w ere  s e n t  t o  Ms. 

Myrick and Ms. DeBlock in response to  p r i o r  

c o m p l a i n t s  made a g a in s t  O f f i c e r  A l l e n .

CONCLUSIONS OF LAV?

P l a i n t i f f s  have f i l e d  an a c t i o n  f o r  

damages f o r  assault  and b a ttery  and d e c l a ­

r a t o r y  r e l i e f  a r is ing  under 42 U.S.C. §§ 

1983, 1988 ,and the Fourteenth Amendment to

the C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  the United S t a t e s .  

P l a i n t i f f s  seek to  redress  the d ep r iv a t ion

-  15a  -



- 16a-

o f  r i g h t s ,  under c o l o r  o f  Tennessee law, 

s e c u r e d  t o  them by s a i d  s t a t u t o r y  and 

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s .  The j u r i s d i c ­

t i o n  o f  the Court i s  invoked pursuant t o  28 

U . S . C .  §§ 1 3 3 1 ,  1 3 4 3 ,  2 2 0 1 ,  and 2 2 0 2 .

D e fen da n ts  in t h i s  c a s e  are R ober t  

J.  A l l e n ,  a former p o l i c e  o f f i c e r  who was 

o f f  duty  at  the  t ime o f  the i n c i d e n t  in 

q u e s t i o n ,  and t h e  H o n o r a b l e  E W in s lo w  

Chapman, D i r e c t o r  o f  the Memphis P o l i c e  

Department. Because Mr. A l len  f a i l e d  to  

answer the complaint ,  a d e fa u l t  judgment 

was entered against  him..

Mr. Chapman was sued in h is  o f f i c i a l  

ca p a c i ty  as an agent o f  the Mem.phis P o l i c e  

Deparment. According t o  Monell v.  Depart­

ment o f  S o c i a l  S e rv i ce s  o f  the C ity  o f  New 

Y ork ,  436 U.S. 658 , 690 n. 55 , 98 S . C t .

2018,  2036,  56 L .E d .2d  611 ,  635 ( 1 9 7 8 ) :

" o f f i c i a l - c a p a c i t y  s u i t s  g e n e r a l ly  repre ­

sent on ly  another way o f  p leading an a c t io n



-  17a  -

against  an e n t i t y  o f  which an o f f i c e r  is  

an a g e n t . . . .  [ 0 ] ur h o l d in g  . . .  d e c i d e s  

t h a t  l o c a l  government o f f i c i a l s  sued in 

t h e i r  o f f i c i c a l  capacat ies  are 'p e r s o n s '  

under § 1983 . . . .  "

T i t l e  42, s e c t i o n  1983, United States

Code prov ides  in part  as f o l l o w s :

§ 1983. C i v i l  a c t ion  f o r  d e p r iv a t io n  
o f  r i g h t s .

Every person  who, under c o l o r  o f  
any s t a t u t e ,  o r d i n a c e ,  r e g u l a t i o n ,  
c u s t o m ,  o r  u s a g e  o f  any S t a t e  . . .  
s u b je c t s  or causes to  be s u b je c t e d ,  any 
c i t i z e n  o f  the United States  . . .  t o  the 
d e p r iv a t io n  o f  any r i g h t s ,  p r i v i l e g e s ,  
or  immunities secured by the C onst i tu ­
t i o n  and laws, sh a l l  be l i a b l e  to  the 
party  in jured in an ac t ion  at law, s u i t  
in e q u i ty ,  or other  proper proceeding 
f o r  r edress .

In Taylor v.  G r i n d s t a f f , 467 F.Supp. 4, 5

(E .D.  Tenn. 1 9 7 8 ) ,  the Court s t a t e d  the 

f o l l o w i n g :

Two elements are r e q u i s i t e  f o r  r e co v ­
ery  under the F edera l  C i v i l  R ig h ts  
A c t ,  i . e . , c o n d u ct  under c o l o r  o f  
s t a t e  law by th e  p e r s o n ( s )  whose  
co n d u c t  i s  com plained  o f ,  and the



-  1 8 a  -

s u b j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  p l a i n t i f f  by  
such co n d u c t  t o  the  d e p r i v a t i o n  o f  
r i g h t s ,  p r i v i l e g e s  and immun i t i e s  
secured to  him by the f e d e r a l  C onst i ­
tu t i o n  and laws. Bas is ta  v .  W eir , 340 
F.2d 74, 79 (3rd C ir .  1965) .

For one to  be l i a b l e  under t h i s  p r o v i ­

s i o n ,  he must act  under " c o l o r  o f  law ,"  and 

in doing so he msut play an " a f f i r m a t i v e  

part "  in the d e p r iv a t io n  o f  the c o n s t i t u ­

t i o n a l  r i g h t s  o f  another.  See R izzso  v . 

G o o de , 423 U .S .  3 6 2 ,  96 S . C t .  5 9 8 ,  46

L.Ed.2d 561 (1976 ) .  According to  Henig v . 

O d o r i. o^  o , 385 F .2 d  4 9 1 ,  494 ( 3 r d  C i r .

1967) :

[M ] i s u s e  o f  power,  p o s s e s s s e d  by 
v i r t u e  o f  s ta te  laws and made p o s s ib l e  
on ly  because the wrongdoer i s  c lo th ed  
with  the a u t h o r i t y  o f  s t a t e  law [ i s  
a c t io n  taken under c o l o r  o f  l a w ] . See 
U.S. V. C l a s s i c , 313 U.S.  299 at  316 
[61 S . C t .  1031 ,  1043 ,  85 L .Ed.  1368] 
(1940) .

F u r th erm ore ,  the  United  S t a t e s  Supreme 

Court in Monroe v.  Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81

S . C t .  4 7 3 ,  4 7 6 ,  5 L . E d . 2d 492 ( 1 9 6 1 ) ,

s ta ted  the f o l l o w i n g :



-  19a  -

T h e r e  can be no d o u b t  . . .  t h a t  
C o n g r e s s  has th e  pow er  t o  e n f o r c e  
p r o v i s i o n s  o f  the Fourteenth Amendment 
a g a i n s t  th o s e  who c a r r y  a badge o f  
a u t h o r i t y  o f  a S t a te  and r e p r e s e n t  
i t  in  some c a p a c i t y ,  w h e t h e r  t h e y  
act  in accordance with t h e i r  au thor i ty  
or  misuse i t .

Mr. Chapman could not be held l i a b l e  

under any theory f o r  the a c t ion s  o f  the o f f  

du ty  o f f i c e r  A l l e n ,  as lon g  as O f f i c e r  

A l l e n  had f a i l e d  t o  a c t  under " c o l o r  o f  

l a w . "  However, when O f f i c e r  A l l e n  d i s ­

played his  o f f i c i a l  p o l i c e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  

and used h i s  p o l i c e  r e v o l v e r ,  he a c te d  

under " c o l o r  o f  law."

I t  has been held  th a t  a P o l i c e  C h ie f  

played an " a f f i r m a t iv e  part"  in the d e p r i ­

va t ion  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h ts  " i f  [he] 

deployed or hired an o f f i c e r  under cond i ­

t i o n s  which he should  have known would 

c r e a t e  a t h r e a t  t o  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  

r i g h t s  o f  the c i t i z e n r y  . . . . "  Kostka v. 

Hogg , 560 F.2d 37, 40 ( 1 s t  C i r .  1 9 7 7 ) .



- 20a -

However, such a f e d e ra l  o f f i c a l  i s  under 

no duty  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  u n f o r s e e a b l e  c o n ­

s t i t u t i o n a l  d e v e l o p m e n t s .  M i t c h e l l  v .

King, 537 F.2d 385, 389 (10th C ir .  1976) .  

Moreover, in the case o f  R izzo  v .  Goode, 

^_u£ra , a c l a s s  a c t i o n  s u i t  w here  o n l y  

e q u i ta b le  r e l i e f  was sought,  the Supreme 

Court held that the Federal D i s t r i c t  Court 

e x ce e d e d  i t s  a u t h o r i t y  when i t  r e q u i r e d  

d e f e n d a n t  t o  adopt  a r e v i s e d  program t o  

g o v e r n  t h e  manner by w h ic h  c o m p l a i n t s  

against  o f f i c e r s  would be handled.

B o t h  p a r t i e s  t o  t h i s  c a s e  h a v e  

a g r e e d  t h a t  Mr. Chapman had no a c t u a l  

knowledge  o f  O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  dangerous  

p r o p e n s i t i e s .  Thus,  the  s o l e  i s s u e  i s  

whether D ire c to r  Chapman should have knov/n 

that O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  dangerous propens i ­

t i e s  c r e a t e d  a t h r e a t  t o  the  r i g h t s  and 

s a f e t y  o f  o t h e r  c i t i z e n s .  Because  Mr. 

Chapman, as P o i c e  D i r e c t o r ,  shou ld  have



- 21a -

known o f  O f f i c e r  A l len*s  dangerous propen­

s i t i e s  the Court  f i n d s  th a t  he must be 

held l i a b l e ,  in h is  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i ty ,  to 

the p l a i n t i f f s .

P o l i c e  o f f i c e r s  are v e s t e d  by law 

with great  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  As a r e s u l t ,  

they  must be h e ld  t o  high s ta n d a rd s  o f  

o f f i c i a l  conduct .  In the absence o f  high 

standards o f  o f f i c i a l  conduct ,  the l i k e l i ­

h o o d  o f  a b u s e  o f  p o l i c e  a u t h o r i t y  and 

d e p r iv a t io n  o f  c i t i z e n s '  c i v i l  r i g h t s  is  

v e r y  g r e a t .  O f f i c i a l s  o t  th e  P o l i c e  

Department must become in form ea  o f  the 

presence  in the Department o f  o f f i c e r s  who 

pose a threat  o f  danger to  the s a f e t y  o f  

the community. Likewise,  when knowledge 

o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  o f f i c e r ' s  dangerous propen­

s i t i e s  i s  w idespread  among the  ranks o f  

p o l i c e  o f f i c e r s ,  the P o l i c e  Department's 

o f f i c i a l s  must understand that a threat  to 

the s a f e t y  o f  the community e x i s t s .



- 22a -

In t h i s  c a s e ,  Mr. Chapman f a i l e d  t o  

take proper a c t ion  to  become informed o f  

O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  dangerous  p r o p e n s i t i e s .  

For  e x a m p l e ,  upon h i s  a p p o i n t m e n t  as 

P o l i c e  D i r e c t o r ,  Mr. Chapman f a i l e d  t o  

review the d i s c i p l i n a r y  records  o f  o f f i ­

c e rs  p r i o r  to  the in c ident  in vo lv ing  the 

p l a i n t i f f s .  Even i f  he had done s o ,  i t  

i s  d o u b t f u l  t h a t  Mr. Chapman would have 

been apprised o f  O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  dangerous 

p r o p e n s i t i e s  under departmental procedures  

then in s t i t u t e d  by Mr. Chapm.an. This is  

b e ca u s e  o n l y  i f  a fo rm a l  c o m p l a i n t  were 

f i l e d  by e i t h e r  a policeman or a c i t i z e n  

would the P o l i c e  D ire c to r  ever be informed 

o f  an o f f i c e r ' s  dangerous p r o p e n s i t i e s  or 

o f  p o l i c e  misconduct.

Due t o  a code  o f  s i l e n c e  induced  by 

p e e r  p r e s s u r e  among t h e  r a n k - a n d - f i l e  

o f f i c e r s  and among some p o l i c e  s u p e r v i s o r s ,  

few - -  i f  any - -  f o rm a l  c o m p l a i n t s  were



ever f i l e d  by p o l i c e  personnel .  Further­

m o r e ,  when c o m p l a i n t s  were  f i l e d  by 

c i t i z e n s ,  l i t t l e  d i s c i p l i n a r y  ac t ion  was 

a p p a r e n t l y  taken a g a i s n t  the o f f e n d i n g  

o f f i c e r .  Instead,  a standard form l e t t e r ,  

b e a r i n g  Mr. Chapman 's  s i g n a t u r e ,  was 

mailed to  each complainant,  assuring the 

p e r s o n  t h a t  a p p r o p r i a t e  a c t i o n  had been 

taken by the  P o l i c e  Department ,  even i f  

such a c t i o n  had not  in f a c t  been taken .  

T h i s  t e n d e d  t o  d i s c o u r a g e  f o l l o w - u p  

m e a s u r e s  by t h e  c o m p l a i n i n g  c i t i z e n .  

Perhaps, Mr. Chapman's b e l i e f  that i t  was 

b e t t e r  to  take no d i s c i p l i n a r y  a c t io n  than 

to  act  and la t e r  be reversed by a review 

board was respon s ib le  f o r  th is  ob v iou s ly  

i n a d e q u a t e  s o l u t i o n .  The end r e s u l t  

was tw o fo ld :  1) Mr. Chapman's procedures

were h i g h l y  c o n d u c iv e  t o  " c o v e r i n g  up" 

o f f i c e r  misconduct;  2) the P o l i c e  D ire c to r  

and many o f  his  superv isors  were t o t a l l y

- 23a -



i n s u l a t e d  from knowledge  o f  w rongdo ing  

by o f f i c e r s  as a r e s u l t  o f  p o l i c i e s  in 

e f f e c t  during that per iod  o f  Mr. Chapman's 

r e l a t i v e l y  new adm in is t ra t ion .  In other  

w o r d s ,  due t o  the i n h e r e n t l y  d e f i c i e n t  

nature o f  p o l i c e  a dm in is tra t ive  procedures 

in vo lv ing  the d i s c o v e r y  o f  o f f i c e r  miscon­

d u c t ,  Mr. Chapman seldom knew o f  misconduct 
/

matters which he should have known, such 

as O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  dangerous p r o p e n s i t i e s .

O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  reputat ion  f o r  mala­

d a p t i v e  b e h a v io r  was w id e sp re a d  at  the 

o f f i c e r s  o f  the p r e c i n c t .  F u r th e rm o re ,  

the l e a s t  one o f  the o f f i c e r s  p e rs o n a l ly  

informed one o f  the c h i e f  p r e c in c t  super­

v i s o r s  o f  Mr. A l l e n ' s  morbid t en d en c ies .  

N ev erthe less ,  in v e s t i g a t i o n  and a c t io n  by 

t h i s  superv isor  were not undertaken as a 

r e s u l t  o f  those procedures then in e f f e c t  

during th is  per iod  o f  Mr. Chapman's d i r e c ­

t o r s h i p .  Under t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  i t

- 24a -



would requ ire  f e a t s  o f  mental gymnastics to  

b e l i e v e  that Mr. A l l e n ' s  immediate super­

v i s o r s  were not  aware o f  the dangerous  

s i t u a t i o n  c r e a t e d  by O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  

p r e s e n c e  on t h e  Memphis p o l i c e  f o r c e .  

S t i l l ,  there  was apparently no communica­

t i o n  between Mr. Chapman and those superv i ­

sors  regarding O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  dangerous 

p r o p e n s i t i e s .

Mr. Chapman has ,  in e f f e c t ,  asked 

the Court to  f ind  as acceptab le  u n j u s t i f i e d  

in a c t i o n .  This the Court cannot do.  The 

evidence  does not permit the Court to do 

s o .  The p l a i n t i f f s  in  t h i s  c a s e  were  

s e r i o u s l y  f r i g h t e n e d  and i n j u r e d  by 

O f f i c e r  A l l e n .  The attack upon them was 

w i l f u l ,  wanton, unprovoked and b r u t a l .  

Because  he shou ld  have known o f  O f f i c e r  

A l l e n ' s  dangerous p r o p e n s i t i e s  cons ider ing  

the t o t a l i t y  o f  a l l  o f  the circumstances 

o f  t h i s  c a s e  and beca u se  he shou ld  have

- 25a -



- 26a

taken s teps  to  d ismiss  O f f i c e r  A l len  from 

t h e  p o l i c e  f o r c e .  D i r e c t o r  C hapm an 's  

u n j u s t i f i e d  i n a c t i o n  was t h e  c a u s e  o f  

p l a i n t i f f s '  damage and i n j u r i e s .  Accord­

i n g l y ,  Mr. Chapman in  h i s  c a p a c i t y  as 

D ire c to r  o f  the Memphis P o l i c e  Department 

must oe held l i a b l e  to  p l a i n t i f f s  in t h i s  

case .

The d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  t h i s  c a s e ,  upon 

a l l  o f  t h e  e v i d e n c e  p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  

hear ing ,  does not b l ind  the Court to  the 

f in e  record  o f  Mr. Chapman. Neither  i s  the 

C o u r t  unaware t h a t  t h e  Memphis P o l i c e  

Department i s  s t a f f e d  by v e r y  f i n e  men 

and women. T h i s  C o u r t  can  n o t e  w i t h  

s a t i s f a c t i o n  the p r o g r e s s  made by th a t  

Department under the p r o g re s s iv e  D i r e c t o r ­

s h i p  o f  Mr.Chapman. In t h i s  c a s e ,  the  

Court is  dea l ing  with evidence  p er ta in ing  

t o  o n l y  one o b v i o u s l y  dan gerou s  p o l i c e  

o f f i c e r ,  former O f f i c e r  A l le n .  The over ­



27a -

whelming ev idence ,  and not j u s t  a prepond- 

e r a n c e  o f  t h e  e v i d e n c e ,  shows t h a t  i t  

was a rea l  and present danger to  the City  

o f  Memphis and i t s  c i t i z e n s  f o r  O f f i c e r  

A l len  to  have been on the Memphis P o l i c e  

D e p a r tm e n t  a t  th e  t im e  t h i s  t e r r i b l e  

in c id e n t  occurred .  His dangerous p rop ens i ­

t i e s  were widely  known among o f f i c e r s  o f  

the Department. O f f i c e r  A l len  i n f l i c t e d  

s e v e r e  and p a i n f u l  i n j u r i e s  upon two 

i n n o c e n t  young p e o p l e .  C o n s id e r in g  a l l  

the f a c t s ,  Mr. Chapman, though r e l a t i v e l y  

new in h i s  j o b  at the t im e ,  sh ou ld  have 

known o f  A l l e n ' s  dangerous p r o p e n s i t i e s .

I t  i s  th e re fo re  by the Court

ORDERED t h a t  the d e f e n d a n t s  be he ld  

l i a b l e  in damages to  the p l a i n t i f f s .  The 

Court w i l l ,  a f t e r  a period o f  30 days from 

the date o f  th is  order ,  r e f e r  the case to 

a United  S ta es  M a g i s t r a t e  f o r  a prompt 

hearing on the issue o f  damages and f o r  a



- 28a -

recommendation to  the Court on the amount 

o f  damages that should be awarded p l a i n ­

t i f f s .  I f  t h i s  matter o f  damages can be

r e s o v l e d  by the  p a r t i e s  t o  t h i s  a c t i o n  

w i t h i n  30 d a y s  t h e n  no h e a r i n g  by a

Magistrate  w i l l  be necessary .  The p a r t i e s  

can simply present an appropr ia te  order  to

the Court.



- 29a

Nos. 82-5321 
82-5346

UNTIED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ELIZABETH A. BRANDON AND 
JAMES D. MUSE,

P l a i n t i f f s - A p p e l l e e s , 
C ro s s -A p p e l la n ts .

V.

ROBERT J. ALLEN,

Defendant-Cross-  
Appel lee  ,

E. WINSLOW CHAPMAN,

Defendant-Appel lant , 
C ro s s -A p p e l l e e .

On Appeal from 
the United 
States  D i s t r i c t  
Court f o r  the 
Western D i s t r i c t  
o f  Tennessee.

Decided and F i led  October 11, 1983

B e f o r e ;  L IVELY,  C h i e f  C i r c u i t  

J u d g e ;  MERRITT, C i r c u i t  J u d g e ;  PECK, 

Senior  C i r c u i t  Judge.



30a -

MERRIT, C i r c u i t  Ju dg e .  P l a i n t i f f s ,  

E l i z a b e t h  A. Brandon and James S. Muse, 

commenced t h i s  a c t i o n  in  the  D i s t r i c t  

Court f o r  he Western D i s t r i c t  o f  Tennessee 

t o  recover  damages and d e c la r a t o r y  r e l i e f  

under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Their  complaint a r i s e s  from an 

assau lt  and b a t te ry  committed aga inst  them 

by e x - p o l i c e  o f f i c e r  d e f e n d a n t  R o b e r t  

J .  A l le n .  P l a i n t i f f s  a l s o  sue E. Winslow 

Chapman, D i r e c t o r  o f  the Memphis P o l i c e  

Department, in his  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i ty  fo r  

h is  f a i l u r e  to  prevent the a s s a u l t .  The 

c a s e  p r e s e n t s  q u e s t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  the  

s t a n d a r d  o f  l i a b i l i t y  o f  s u p e r v i s o r y  

p o l i c e  o f f i c i a l s  and the measure o f  damages 

against  p o l i c e  o f f i c r e s  who d e l i b e r a t e l y  

and without provocat ion  assau lt  c i t i z e n s  

under c o l o r  o f  law.



- 31a -

I .  Facts

The p l a i n t i f f s ,  who were high school  

s e n i o r s  a t  th e  t i m e ,  were  p a r k e d  in  a 

s e c l u d e d  s p o t  at 11 :3 0  p.m. on March 5,  

1977. O f f i c e r  A l len  was then employed by 

the Memphis P o l i c e  Department but was o f f  

duty.  The o f f i c e r  approached the parked 

c a r ,  showed h i s  p o l i c e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  

card ,  and ordered the young man t o  get  out 

o f  the car .  When Muse obeyed the o rd er .  

O f f i c e r  A l l e n  m a l i c i o u s l y  and w i t h o u t  

p r o v o c a t i o n  s t r u c k  Mr. Muse in the  head 

and n e c k  and t h e n  s t a b b e d  him w i t h  a 

k n i f e .  Muse managed to  get  back in to  the 

car  and d r iv e  o f f  d e s p i te  O f f i c e r  A l l e n ' s  

e f f o r t s  t o  g e t  i n t o  t h e  c a r .  As Muse 

pu l led  away. O f f i c e r  A l len  f i r e d  his  gun 

at the car shatter ing  the windshield  and 

c a u s in g  f a c i a l  i n j u r i e s  t o  Ms. Brandon.  

The young couple  went immediately to  the 

h o s p i t a l  with  O f f i c e r  A l l e n  in  p u r s u i t .



- 32a -

A l l e n  was s u s e q u e n t l y  t r i e d  in  c r i m i n a l  

court  and conv ic ted  o f  a ssau lt  with in tent  

t o  murder.

The p l a i n t i f f s  r e c e i v e d  a d e f a u l t  

judgment in the D i s t r i c t  Court  a g a i n s t  

defendant A l len .  The D i s t r i c t  Court a lso  

f o u n d  D i r e c t o r  Chapman l i a b l e  in  h i s  

o f f i c i a l  ca p a c i ty  f o r  the i n j u r i e s  s u f fe re d  

by the p l a i n t i f f s .  The cause was r e fe r r e d  

t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  M a g i s t r a t e  f o r  a 

recommendation on the amount o f  damages to  

be awarded. The Magistrate  recommended and 

the  D i s t r i c t  Court  agreed  t h a t  Mr. Muse 

should r e c e iv e  $21,210.75 in compensatory 

damages and o u t - o f - p o c k e t  expenses,  that 

Ms. B randon  was e n t i t l e d  t o  $ 5 , 0 0 0  in  

compensatory damages, and that each should 

g e t  $ 2 5 , 0 0 0  in  p u n i t i v e  d a m a g e s .  The 

c o m p e n s a t o r y  and o u t - o f - p o c k t y  damage 

aw ards  were  made a g a i n s t  d e f e n d a n t s  

Chapman and A l l e n  j o i n t l y  and s e v e r a l l y



while  the pu n it iv e  damages were assessed 

on ly  against  A l len .

The p l a i n t i f f s  c h a l l e n g e  the  award 

o f  dam ages  b e c a u s e  t h e  c o m p e n s a t o r y  

damages were not  measured to  take  i n t o  

account the de p r iv a t io n  o f  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u ­

t i o n a l  r i g h t s  by t h e  p o l i c e  o f f i c e r .  

D e f e n d a n t  Chapman, c r o s s - a p p e a l i n g ,  

c h a l l e n g e s  th e  f i n d i n g s  o f  l i a b i l i t y  

a g a i n s t  him p r i m a r i l y  by a t t a c k i n g  the  

standard u t i l i z e d  by the D i s t r i c t  Court.  

Defendant Allen  has ne i ther  appealed nor 

p a r t i c ip a t e d  in th is  appeal.

Vie h o l d  t h a t  th e  D i s t r i c t  C o u r t  

erred by f ind ing  D ire c to r  Chapman l i a b l e  

f o r  t h e  a t t a c k  p e r p e t r a t e d  by O f f i c e r  

A l l e n .  There fore ,  we need not reach the 

damage quest ion  as i t  per ta in s  to  D ire c to r  

Chapman. C o m p e n s a to r y  damages  were  

awarded a g a in s t  both d e f e n d a n t s  j o i n t l y  

and s e v e r a l l y ,  however, so the p l a i n t i f f s '

- 33a -



-Xiharilenge t o  the compensatory award must 

be a d d re ss e d  with  r e g a rd  t o  the  absent  

d e f e n d a n t ,  R obert  J .  A l l e n .  Because  we 

b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e  M a g i s t r a t e  and t h e  

D i s t r i c t  Court erred in re fu s in g  to  a l low 

the f u l l  measure o f  compensatory damages 

u n d e r  a p p l i c a b l e  l a w ,  we r e v e r s e  and 

remand t h a t  p o r t i o n  o f  th e  D i s t r i c t  

C ou rt ' s  judgment which e s t a b l i s h e s  p la in ­

t i f f s '  damages.

I I .  L i a b i l i t y  o f  P o l i c e  D i r e c t o r  Chapman 

In P a r r a t t  v .  T a y l o r , 451 U.S.  527 

(1981) the Supreme Court r e c e n t l y  c l a r i f i e d  

the  s tan dard  o f  l i a b i l i t y  under § 1983

against  superv isory  o f f i c i a l s  in the law 

e n fo r ce m e n t  and c o r r e c t i o n s  f i e l d .  The 

Court l i s t e d  the f o l l o w in g  two e s s e n t ia l  

elements which must be present  as a th re s ­

h o ld  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  s u p p o r t  a § 1983

a c t i o n :  (1 )  the p e r p e t r a t o r  must have

acted under c o l o r  o f  s t a t e  law and (2) the

 ̂ - 34a -



- 35a -

conduct must have deprived the complainant 

o f  r i g h t s ,  p r i v i l e g e s ,  o r  i m m u n i t i e s  

secured by the C o n s t i tu t ion  or  laws o f  the 

United Staes .  451 U.S. at 535. The Court 

s p e c i f i c a l l y  dec l in ed  to  adopt a standard 

re q u ir in g  more than simple n e g l ig e n ce .  I t  

concluded that "nothing in . . .  § 1983 .

. . l i m i t s  the s t a t u t e  s o l e l y  t o  i n t e n ­

t i o n a l  d e p r iv a t io n s "  or  denies  l i a b i l i t y  

to  a "wrong . . . n e g l i g e n t ly  as opposed

t o  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  c o m m i t t e d . "  ^  d . a t

534.

Although the Parratt  Court s e t  a com­

p a r a t i v e l y  lo w  t h r e s h o l d  s t a n d a r d  f o r  

s h o w i n g  a § 1983 d e p r i v a t i o n  in  c a s e s  

aga inst  supervisory  o f f i c i a l s ,  the Court 

d id  not d is tu rb  i t s  hold ings  in previous  

cases  which extend to  governmental o f f i ­

c i a l s  a q u a l i f i e d  immunity defense  based 

on good f a i t h .  The Court  r e f e r r e d  with 

approval t o  i t s  d e c i s i o n  in Procunier  v.



N avaret te , 434 U.S. 555 (19 78 ) ,  which held 

that s ta te  pr ison  o f f i c a l s  were e n t i t l e d  

t o  q u a l i f i e d  immunity in  s u i t s  under § 

1 9 8 3 .  In o t h e r  w o r d s ,  g o v e r n m e n t a l  

o f f i c i a l s  are immune from l i a b i l i t y  under 

§ 1983 u n le s s  they  "knew o r  r e a s o n a b l y

s h o u l d  h ave  known" t h a t  t h e i r  a c t i o n s  

would cause a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  or s t a t u t o r y  

d e p r iv a t io n .  _I^. at 562.

The p a r t i e s  in  t h i s  c a s e  e x p e n d  

co n s id e ra b le  energy e i t h e r  r e ly in g  on or 

d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  our o p i n i o n  in  Hays v .  

J e f f e r s o n  County, 668 F.2d 869 (6th C ir .

1 9 8 2 ) ,  w h ich  was d e c i d e d  w i t h o u t  t h e  

b e n e f i t  o f  P a r r a t t , supra . In Hays, the 

p l a i n t i f f s  sued various  high l e v e l  p o l i c e  

o f f i c i a l s  under § 1983 to  redress  i n j u r i e s  

s u f f e r e d  a t  t h e  hands  o f  s t r e e t  l e v e l  

o f f i c e r s  during an a nt i -bus ing  demonstra­

t i o n .  We held that simple neg l igen ce  was 

i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  s u p p o r t  a § 1983 c l a i m .

- 36a -



37a -

The governmental author i ty  must be shown 

some o t h e r  way d i r e c t l y  p a r t i c i p a t e d  in 

t h e  m i s c o n d u c t .  Hays , s u p r a , at  8 7 4 .

D e f e n d a n t  Chapman a r g u e s  in  h i s  

b r i e f  th a t  he shou ld  not  be h e ld  l i a b l e  

because o f  th is  higher standard s e t  out in

H a y s The Supreme C o u r t  in  P a r r a t t

c l e a r l y  r e j e c t e d  t h i s  h i g h e r  t h r e s h o l d  

standard. L i a b i l i t y  based on neg l igence  

i s  s u f f i c i e n t ,  and t h e  P c a s e

undermines our d e c i s i o n  in Hays. We need 

not d e c id e ,  however, whether the D i s t r i c t  

C o u r t  c o r r e c t l y  f o u n d  t h a t  D i r e c t o r  

Chapman was g u i l t y  o f  simple neg l igence  by 

f a i l i n g  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  a s s a u l t  on t h e  

p l a i n t i f f s .  We need n o t  r e a c h  t h i s  

q u e s t i o n  b e c a u s e  D i r e c t o r  Chapman i s  

p r o t e c t e d  by t h e  q u a l i f i e d  i mm. u n i t y .

In P r o c u n i e r , Supreme

Court rea f f irm ed that governmental o f f i c e r s  

have immunity i f  they acted in good f a i t h :



- 38a -

I t  i s  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  r e a s o n a b l e  
g r o u n d s  f o r  t h e  b e l i e f  f o r m e d  a t  
t h e  t im e  and in  l i g h t  o f  a l l  t h e  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  c o u p le d  with  g o o d -  
f a i t h  b e l i e f ,  t h a t  a f f o r d s  a b a s i s  
f o r  q u a l i f i e d  immunity o f  e x e c u t i v e  
o f f i c e r s  f o r  a c t s  per fo rm ed  in the 
course  o f  o f f i c i a l  conduct .

I d . at 562 (quoting Scheuer v.  Rhodes, 416

U.S. 232 (1 9 7 4 ) ) .

D i r e c t o r  Chapman a c t e d  i n  g o o d  

f a i t h  and i s  a c c o r d i n g l y  e n t i t l e d  t o  

immunity.  The r e c o r d  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  he 

knew n o t h i n g  w h a t s o e v e r  a b o u t  O f f i c e r  

A l l e n  - -  i n c l u d i n g  A l l e n ' s  i n s t a b i l i t y .  

D i r e c t o r  Chapman assumed h i s  o f f i c e  s i x  

m onths  p r i o r  t o  t h e  i n c i d e n t  w i t h  t h e

p l a i n t i f f s . He was in the  p r o c e s s  o f

i n s t i t u t i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t  changes  t o  s t o p  

p o l i c e  b r u t a l i t y  in Memphis. He played no 

personal  r o l e  in the actual  in c id e n t ;  he 

executed his  superv isory  fu n c t i o n s  in good 

f a t i h  and w i t h  d i l i g e n c e  in  o r d e r  t o  

prevent ju s t  th is  type o f  c i t i z e n  abuse.



We can f i n d  no i n d i c a t i o n  in  the r e c o r d  

t h a t  he a c te d  with  anyth ing  o t h e r  than 

g o o d  f a i t h  d u r i n g  h i s  s h o r t  t e n u r e  in  

o f f i c e  p r i o r  to  the in c id e n t .

The p l a n t i f f s '  a rgum ent  t h a t  th e  

q u a l i f i e d  immunity is  in a p p l i ca b le  simply 

because they sued Chapmanin his  o f f i c i a l  

c a p c i t y  i s  unavai l ing .  Under Owen v .  C ity  

o f  I n d e p e n d e n c e , 445 U.S. 622 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  a

m u n ic ip a l i ty  i s  not e n t i t l e d  to  claim the 

q u a l i f i e d  immunity that the c i t y ' s  agents 

can a s s e r t .  But th is  i s  a s u i t  against  an 

i n d i v i d u a l ,  not  the c i t y .  In r e a l i t y ,  

p l a i n t i f f s  are attempting to  amend t h e i r  

c o m p l a i n t  s o  as t o  t r e a t  th e  P o l i c e  

D i r e c t o r  as though he were the  C i t y  in 

o r d e r  t o  a v o i d  t h e  q u a l i f i e d  im m unity  

which sh ie ld s  D ire c to r  Chapman. Such an 

argument is  without support in precedent 

or reason.

“ 39a -



- 40a

I I I .  The Damages Issue 

In h i s  R eport  and Recommendations 

on d a m a g e s ,  t h e  M a g i s t r a t e  r e f u s e d  t o  

a l l o w  p l a i n t i f f s '  damage award a g a i n s t  

A l len  to  r e f l e c t  the f a c t  that the in ju ry  

t o  t h e i r  d i g n i t y ,  t h e  i n s u l t  t o  t h e i r  

person was g rea ter  because the assau lt  was 

c a r r i e d  out  by a p o l i c e  o f f i c e r  a c t i n g  

under c o l o r  o f  law. The Magistrate  based 

t h i s  d e c i s i o n  on Carey v .  P iphus , 435 U.S. 

247 (1978) ,  which holds that a s u c c e s s f u l

p l a i n t i f f  in a p r o c e d u r a l  due p r o c e s s  § 

1983 a c t i o n  i s  e n t i t l e d  t o  r e c o v e r  o n l y  

nominal damages in the absence o f  p ro o f  o f  

a c t u a l  i n j u r y .  The Court  o b s e r v e d  t h t  

although the law re co g n ize s  the importance 

to  organized s o c i e t y  that  c e r t a in  "a b so lu te  

r i g h t s "  be p r o t e c t e d ,  " s u b s ta n t ia l  damages 

s h o u l d  be awarded  o n l y  t o  c o m p e n s a t e  

actual  in ju ry  o r ,  in the case o f  exemplary 

or  p u n i t i v e  damages, t o  d e t e r  or  punish



-  4 1 a  -

m a lic ious  d e p r iv a t io n  o f  r i g h t s . "  at

266. C it ing  the Piphus C o u r t ' s  emphasis 

on a c t u a l  i n j u r y  and t h e  c o m p e n s a t i o n  

p r i n c i p l e ,  the Magistrate and the D i s t r i c t  

C o u r t  a p p e a r  t o  have  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  

damages may on ly  include actual  or  s p e c i a l  

damages f o r  the phys ica l  in jury  involved 

and may not  r e f l e c t  in jury  to  the d i g n i t y  

o f  the person which a r ise s  when a p o l i c e  

o f f i c e r  u n d e r  c o l o r  o f  law  a s s a u l t s  a 

c i t i z e n .

We b e l i e v e  that the Magistrate  erred 

in re fu s in g  to  cons ider  f u l l y  the nature 

o f  the wrong in measuring damages. In addi­

t i o n  to  prov id ing compensation f o r  p l a in ­

t i f f s  who i n c u r  t a n g i b l e  p h y s i c a l  o r  

e c o n o m i c  i n j u r y ,  t h e  common law f o r  

c e n t u r i e s  has p e r m i t t e d  r e c o v e r y  f o r  

i n v a s i o n s  o f  a wide a r ra y  o f  i n t a n g i b l e  

" d i g n i t a r y  i n t e r e s t s ; "  in  such  c a s e s ,  

in ju ry  i s  presumed. See D. Dobbs, Law o f



- 42a -

Remedies § 7 .3 ,  at 528 (1973) .  The Piphus 

case has not d is turbed  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  as 

i t  p er ta in s  t o  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  t o r t  a c t io n s  

in ge n e ra l .  On the c o n tra ry ,  the Supreme 

C o u r t  s t r e s s e d  t h a t  common law  r u l e s  

" d e f i n i n g  th e l e m e n t s  o f  dam ages  and 

p r e r e q u i s i t e s  f o r  t h e i r  recovery  provide  

the  a p p r o p r i a t e  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  f o r  the  

inqu iry  under § 1983 as w e l l . "  Carey v . 

ZiiPli f s u p r a  , 435  U . S .  a t  2 5 7 - 5 8 .

M oreov er ,  the  Court  e x p l i c i t l y  l i m i t e d  

i t s  d e c i s i o n  in  P h p p  by n o t i n g  t h a t  

"the  elements and p r e r e q u i s i t e s  f o r  

recovery  o f  damages appropr ia te  t o  compen­

sate  i n j u r i e s  caused by the d e p r iv a t io n  o f  

one c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t  are not necessar ­

i l y  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  compensate  i n j u r i e s  

caused  by the  d e p r i v a t i o n  o f  a n o t h e r . "  

Id .  at 264-65.

U n l ike  P i p h u s , the  i n s t a n t  a s s a u l t  

and b a t t e r y  c a s e  e n t a i l s  a c t i o n s  by a



Memphis p o l i c e  o f f i c e r  w h ich  c l e a r l y  

v i o l a t e d  p l a i n t i f f s '  substant ive  r i g h t s  to  

en joy  the s e c u r i t y  o f  l i f e  and limb. At 

common law, general  as d is t in g u is h e d  from 

s p e c i a l  damages were a l lowed.  See D.Dobbs, 

supra , at 528. In such ca se s ,  two other 

c i r c u i t  c o u r t s  have  h e l d  t h a t  § 1983

p l a i n t i f f s  may recover  su b s ta n t ia l  general  

money damages  as c o m p e n s a t i o n  f o r  t h e  

wrong. See C o r r i z  v .  N a r a n j o , 667 F.2d 

892, 897-98 (10th C ir .  1981) ,  c e r t ,  d i s ­

m issed  , 103 S .C t .  2 ( 1 9 8 2 ) ;  H errera  v .

V a l e n t i n e , 653 F.2d 1220 , 1227-31  ( 8th

C ir .  1981) .  We agree with the Tenth and 

Eighth C ir c u i t s  that there i s  a q u a l i t a ­

t i v e  and q u a n t i ta t iv e  d i f f e r e n c e  between 

in ju r y  su f fe re d  as a r e s u l t  o f  a wrong f o r  

which the common law did not a l low general  

damages and an i n j u r y  r e s u l t i n g  from, an 

in t e n t i o n a l  battery  by a p o l i c e  o f f i c e r .  

This common law d i s t i n c t i o n  must continue

- 43a -



- 44a -

t o  p lay a r o l e  in the awarding o f  compen­

sa tory  damages in S 1983 a c t i o n s .  See D. 

Dobbs, supra , at 531 (1973) .

We, t h e r e f o r e ,  r e v e r s e  the  D i s t r i c t  

C o u r t ' s  judgment r e g a r d in g  com pensatory  

damages and remand the c a s e  so  t h a t  the 

nature o f  the wrong may be cons idered  in 

computing p l a i n t i f f s '  compensatory damage 

award. Because o f  our ho ld ing  in Part I 

o f  t h i s  op in ion  that defendant Chapman is  

immune to  th is  s u i t ,  the remand regarding 

damages per ta in s  only  to  defendant A l l e n .

A c c o r d i n g l y ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  th e  

D i s t r i c t  Court  i s  r e v e r s e d  and the  ca s e  

remanded f o r  further  proceed ings  c o n s i s t e n t  

with t h i s  o p in ion .



45a -

Nos. 82-5321 
82-5346

UNTIED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ELIZABETH A. BRANDON AND 
JAMES D. MUSE,

P l a i n t i f f s - A p p e l l e e s , 
C ro s s -A p p e l la n ts .

ROBERT J. ALLEN,

Defendant

V.

E. WINSLOW CHAPMAN, 
in h is  o f f i c i a l  ca p a c i ty  
as D i r e c t o r  o f  P o l i c e  
f o r  the City  o f  Memphis,

Defendant-Appel lant , 
Cross -Appel lee

ORDER DENYING 
PETITON FOR 
REHEARING 
EN BANC

B efore :  LIVELY, Chief  Judge; MERRITT,

C i r c u i t  J u d g e ;  PECK, S e n i o r  C i r c u i t

Judge.



- 46a -

In a long  l̂rld e l o a u e n t  p e t i t i o n  t o r  

en banc r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  the  p l a i n t i f f s  

t a k e  t h e  C c u r t  t o  t a s k  f o r  g r a n t i n g  a 

q u a l i f i e d  g o o d  f a i t h  p r i v i l e g e  t o  t h e  

Memphis D i r e c t o r  o f  P o l i c e  su ed  f o r  

damages in h is  o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y .  No judge 

o f  the Court having requested an en banc 

v o t e ,  the  p e t i t i o n  has been r e f e r r e d  t o  

the  o r i g i n a l  pane l  f o r  d i s p o s o t i o n .  On 

t h i s  i s s u e ,  t h e  p a n e l  a d h e r e s  t o  i t s  

o r i g i n a l  v iew .  We do not  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a 

ju d g m e n t  f o r  damages a g a i n s t  a p o l i c e  

o f f i c i a l  in h is  o f f i c i a l  ca p a c i ty  is  the 

same as a judgment against  the c i t y  i t s e l f  

o r  t h a t  the  l e g a l  p r i n c i p l e s  r e s p e c t i n g  

o f f i c i a l  p r i v i l e g e s  and immunities are the 

same. Although some cases  may t r e a t  the 

p e r s o n  and the govern m en ta l  e n t i t y  in a 

s im i la r  fash ion  f o r  some purposes ,  we f ind  

no case which holds or suggests  that the



two shou ld  be t r e a t e d  the  same f o r  t h i s  

purpose .

A cco rd in g ly ,  the p e t i t i o n  f o r  recon­

s id e r a t i o n  i s  denied.

- 47a -

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/ s /  John P. Helman
Clerk

* t h i s  order  was prepared by Judge M err i t t





'-.■ii -'■'

-V '.
- '

•<<"v :

, ■/ ■ . ■ •.'
, / -  ■;

> -
'C*-V.

;
t ' ,  * *  1

' i '  - ■ -• - ' r '  -- • - : ■■■" - * - - 

' '

5 i ; ' r ^ . - - ; . . ~  ■
....... ; ...........................

- . h  ̂ ' =T5

“ - .'

. . " ,  ....  1 :



Hamilton Graphics, Inc.— 200 Hudson Street, New York N.Y.— {212) 966-4177