Annotated Partial Draft of Brief Section III-C
Working File
January 1, 1985

Cite this item
-
Case Files, Thornburg v. Gingles Working Files - Guinier. Annotated Partial Draft of Brief Section III-C, 1985. fbd1cc7d-db92-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/305fdb82-b2b5-4780-b2ea-38634564df54/annotated-partial-draft-of-brief-section-iii-c. Accessed July 07, 2025.
Copied!
g+fi,eT 61) *#y,t s, ftl,a^.,t h rylL:s\ " >-+. 105 overall pattern of polay'Lza- Eion... Racial bloc votiflg, in ,^ff 3 3 s' Co o. C,* ng'?) , t/,t41q 6)Lt ^, pe h l6^t' t^Hta v+rf o Sil 5..J* 3r/1, 366, 3)l . the context of an elctoral s\ucture wherein the ryimber of for ,/ election the number ,/of black 'diminishesvoterb, substantialllr' diminishes the opdortunitv for,6lack voters choice. t'to elecb. the candidate of theircll i// The Court below made the correct inquiry: whethe/ raeial polarization in voting was Lo7'an extent that it minimized //the voting ptrength of black citizens and, thereforqi diminished their opportunity t.o elec L ,/'representatives of thelr choice. Eb€+ti#E+;LcL /\ k\' ," -2-votre dlf'ut'ton"-eIa-1Tl requ iscriti+* t-gElr motive orr Ehe pAft of ''t obers A. Br^. 9t'e\ t appellants I viewrnproof that white voters rarely or never vote for minority candi- ) 58D F. ho"l- et*u!\ tl.,l 106 dates does not establish the presence of pol ar i zed plaintiff n voti ng.*';{ther, they urse, a must adduce probative eviden""F fiLove )''' n""l/ (** of the motives of the individual white 69 6.eg.ti.". :oChar wutT*"1'*-l\ 70 Appellants argue in particular that proof of motives of the electorate must take the form of a multivariate analysis. (App.Br. 43-44). No such multivariate analysis was presented in White v. Regester or any of the other dilffih Congress referred in adopting section 2. Although appellants now urge that evidence of a multivariate analysis is essential as a matter of law, no such contention was ever made to or considered by the district court. Solicitor suggests that etretr r{ou est.ablish a "prima f acie ca polari could "which voting, but that such e "rebuttedn by a defe e study ther factors in account. " (U.S.Br. II, n.57 ) Appe ants in the instant case d adduce a such analysis. (Tr) r does not indicate t-"other factors should be considered/i such a studyr oE explain what they'ltima factual issue would have to be,fesolved i ight of such a rebuttal. is argument represent an ef forE/y the Department Just ice which u,,in6uccessfully sought tci CongregC to place an intent require 2, lo persuade this Court to d 107 voters at issue, and must establish that they cast their ballots with a conscious intention to discriminate against minority candidates because of the race of those 70' candidates .'- fApryr.Br. 42-44tr This proposed definition of polarized voting would incorporate into a dilution claim precisely the sort of intent requirement which Congress overwhelmingly voted to remove Congress was clarifying the from section 2. Although prirnarily concerned to statutory standard after Mobile v. Bolden, Con- gress' reasons for objecting to the intent requirement in Bolden are equally applic- able to the intent requirement now proposed by appellants. 108 Congress opposed any intent require- ment, first, because it believed that the very litigation i nev i tably ties: lTlhe Committee has heard persuasive testimony that the intent test is unnecessarily divisive because it, involves charges of racism on the partl of individuals or communities. . . entire Litigators representing excluded minorities will have to explore the notivations of individual council members, mayors, and other citizens. Such inquiries can only be divisive, threaten- ing to destroy any existing racial progress. It is the intent test, not the results test that would make it neces- sary to brand individuals as racist in order to obtain judicial relief . fis.Rep . 36lD 71 .6 See also Additional Views of Sen. Dole, 193 (the intent test "also causes divi- siveness because it inevitably involves charges that the decisions of officials were racially motivated. ") of such issues would stir up racial animosi- 71 109 Congress contemplated that under the section 2 results test the courts would not be requiredr €rs appellants suggest, to "brand individuals as racist." €iLcltrttr&- .ho- the divisive effect of + 7o@ would be infinitely greater if a plaintiff were required to prove and a federal court rrere to hold that the entire white citizenry # - b.qoY't had acted with racial ms'ti-rrcs. Second, Congress rejected the intent test because it created 'an inordinately difficult burden for plaintiffs in most cases.' (S.Rep. 36) The Senate Committee noted the general difficulty of proving the existence of a discriminatory intent, and expressed particular doubts about whether it might be legally impossible to inquire into the motives of individual voters: 7 1 110 [T] he courts may rule that plaintiffs face barriers of "legislative immunityr" both as to the motives involved in the legislative process, and as to the motives of the majority electorate when an election law has been adopted or maintained as a result of a referendum. ( Id. ) ( footnotes omitted ) 72 The Senate Committee expressly referred to a the n recent Fif t.h Circuit decision holding that the First Anendment forbade any judicial inquiry into why a specific voter had voted in a particular *ay.73 Congress thought it unreasonable to require plaintiffs to establish the motives of local officials i a#reqttent-I y -kept--records. -of .. th-e i r a ct.i-ons"---9- 2=a+d-aurposes; establishing the motives of 72 See also Additional Views of Sen. DoIe, p. 193 (intent test "places an inordinate burden of proof on plaintiffs. . . o ) 73 rd. n.'135, citing Kirksey v. City of G-ckson, 699 F.2d ffi cTE?iffi-nq Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 663 F':ZaC9= of whom keep any records of le,,*-ez/why they voted, and all of whom are constitu- tionally immune from any inquiry into their actions or motivations in casting t,heir ballotsr74 infinitely more difficult task.75 111 thousands of white voters, none would clearly be an 74 See also Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, T0-(196mi11s, 664 F.zd 600, 608-9 (5tmth Alameda Spanish Speaking org. v.CTEy oEffiT' c ffiiEed States v. nxffitive Committee of Denpcratic Paarty of Greene County, AIa.7 ). The courts have consistently entered findings of racially polarized voting without imposing the additional burdens ncw urged by appellants. See I'tississippi Republ i can Ex e c u t ive comm iE e-Tln-f5o-Fil fE-ummary aEffrmance of district court using correlation test). See also Rogers v. Lodge, supra, 458 U.S.€t--6Z3TEcIiTF @F.2d at 1043 n.12; MEienE-o ffinffisupra, 731 r.2d at 1567-i:,34; 75 ffi. GeAfrlEn county schoor Board , 69l rT-T96'2l iTilIins v. Helena, 67 5 F . 2tr2TT]nT [r?-ff d mem. 4 59 U. S. 80 1 ( 1982 ) ; city of-T6?E TFthur v. United States, ID:m 1981), aff 'd as9 u.s. 1s9 (1982); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 337 ffi; City of Rome v. United States , 472 F. S 191-9]1 3rrf 'd 446 U.S. 156 (1980); city qf eeterski@f . united states | 354 F;S[pp. Z)r aff'd 410 u.s. 962 (1973). 76@ Appellants'expert .t ,.testifi?-il EEaf no^1d1 l<tt^,oub wL.,l-ht Co*5,d,trs r^prl*@, SUCh aS a Candidaters skiIls or positi'ons on the issuesT *R4- a,rrc nol 6o*^lr'l,nhl<. 112 Counsel for appellants contend that the plai ntiffs in a section 2 action should be required to establish the motives of white voters by means of statistics, but at trial appellants' statistician conceded it would be impos- sible to do "o.75 thaE a quanEi Eat{ ve stati st i cal apprea"en-r- fuegression ana'lysis, was . *pt>e1:larrts €rt* refl=es,s-i@i-ng McCleskey v. zant, 580 F.Supp. 338 (N.D;6il-13Tlff , | // t 4 , tnt ,nr|t ' - n ;l6i-' 1,.-!> f 2),4 ' I'-" i aTFTa, F.2d ( 5th Cir. 1 985 ) , EpeTtffig, No.TF @ ---((<ot(55rt'>', 7' are incapable'of demonstrating racial ( intent wherer ds here, "qualitative" I -^ :r:-L1^ ri cc- -- i -- -^1--- ti rprquantifiable dif ferences are involved. j 580 F. Supp. at 372. I h T ile A"A r.,o)' sr.r11r:| h+J 6uA *n nffil4r,, a"JJ L pt4l,t ,^J/ [! .nnu4-el V 4-,d ^o\**L) ]'r. 6rrrF.r**ra^-.'tr. Wbct^,-l o'* - llgg t lqTo , l'tt(, t'lCO . 113 Third, Congress regarded the presence or absence of a discrininatory motive as largely irrelevant to the problem with which section 2 was concerned: [T]he intent test ... asks the rdrong question.... tIl f an electoral system operates today to exclude blacks or hispanics from a fair chance to partici- pate, then the matter of what motives were in an officialrs mind is of the most limited relevance. (S.Rep. 36) The motives of white voters are equally beside the point. The central issue in a dilution case is whether, not why, minority voters lack an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. If an at-large system in fact creates Uuift/n headwinds that put I rninorities at a disadvantage, section 2 is violated regardless of the precise mechanisn which creates that disadvantage. 114 I On appellant's view, polarized voting.7 occurs only when whites vote against black candidates because of their race, but not when whites consistently vote against black candidates because of their posi- tions on issues about which the black and white communities happen to disagree. s f{-ecfion z guarantees to minority voters an equal opportunity to elect officials "of their choicer" not 'of their race. " BIacks may welI choose particular candidates because of their positions favoring affirmative action or economic sanctions against South Africa; prilh ,"dr 7)f n# gcr$--Ta {e --oo. P1toL@ *-,A-14- drt'*d4*t? -{> e*t+ illtoe-,t -t Le \3,-Ur1** 4-fuL a fuv.-I;t-rnfar& a,r,tl+t.,S r.n-Ll ff'or.f. ]\.-- <ttrt;l*| b"ltu-' 'iA;A i -=, a